A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics

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A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics

Edited by

Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo



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CONTENTS

Introduction 1
Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo

Latin Medieval Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 19
Marta Borgo

The Commentator: Averroes's Reading of the *Metaphysics* 59
Matteo di Giovanni

Avicenna's and Averroes's Interpretations and Their Influence in Albertus Magnus 95
Amos Bertolacci

English Commentaries before Scotus. A Case Study: The Discussion on the Unity of Being 137
Silvia Donati

Aquinas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* 209
Gabriele Galluzzo

Giles of Rome's Questions on the *Metaphysics* 255
Alessandro D. Conti

Five Parisian Sets of Questions on the *Metaphysics* from the 1270s to the 1290s 277
Sten Ebbesen

Alexander of Alessandria's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* 315
Fabrizio Amerini

The Questions on the *Metaphysics* by John Duns Scotus: A Vindication of Pure Intellect 359
Giorgio Pini

Jandun's Question-Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 385
Roberto Lambertini

Three Franciscan Metaphysicians after Scotus: Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet 413
William O. Duba

John Buridan's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* 495
Femke J. Kok

Paul of Venice's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* 551
Alessandro D. Conti

Fifteenth-Century Parisian Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 575
Paul J.J.M. Bakker

Bibliography 631
List of Manuscripts 665
Index of Names 667

INTRODUCTION

Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo

Few philosophical books have been so influential in the development of Western thought as Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. For centuries, Aristotle's most celebrated writing has been regarded as a source of inspiration as well as the starting point for every investigation into the structure of reality. Not surprisingly, the topics discussed in the book—the scientific status of ontology and metaphysics, the foundation of logical truths, the notions of essence and existence, the nature of material objects and their properties, the status of mathematical entities, just to mention some—are still at the center of the current philosophical debate and are likely to excite philosophical minds for many years to come. Friends and foes of Aristotle's philosophical project cannot help measuring themselves against the strength and intricacies of his metaphysical arguments and finally recognize the importance of the *Metaphysics* for the constitution of our philosophical interests.

This volume reconstructs a particular phase in the long fortune of the *Metaphysics* by focusing on the medieval reception of Aristotle's masterpiece. Moreover, the narrative contained in the volume is told from a particular point of observation, that of the *commentaries* on the *Metaphysics*. This choice is deliberate and stems from the assumption that the history of the reception of Aristotle's thought is first of all the history of the interpretations of Aristotle's texts. Although the influence of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines shows up in many aspects of medieval theology and philosophy as well as in many different kinds of writings, it is first of all to the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* that we should look for an answer to the question as to how medieval philosophers understood Aristotle's metaphysical enterprise.

We said "medieval reception" of the *Metaphysics*, where "late medieval" would have been a more appropriate expression. As is known, the *Metaphysics* has been a comparatively late acquisition of Latin medieval thought. As Marta Borgo clearly shows in her chapter, it is only at the beginning of the 13th century, when Michael Scot translated into Latin the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* contained in Averroes's *Long Commentary*, that the text of the *Metaphysics* became fully available

to Western philosophers and theologians. This does not mean that the contents of Aristotle's book were altogether inaccessible to early medieval thinkers. The fact remains, however, that early medieval thoughts about ontology and metaphysics have been mainly guided and shaped by the reading of another fortunate work of Aristotle's, i.e., the *Categories*. The *Metaphysics* entered the scene only later on when the tradition of the *Categories* commentaries was already well established.

This volume is a history in fourteen chapters of the late medieval reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Our aim in assembling the volume is not only to provide the readership with up-to-date information about medieval commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and the scholarly research they have given rise to but also to offer a rough guide to and a map of the different philosophical issues that were raised and discussed when commenting on Aristotle's celebrated writing. The authors and works with which the contributors to the volume deal differ in many respects. One major difference is in literary genre. Roughly speaking, medieval commentaries on Aristotle basically split into two different categories: literal expositions of Aristotle's text, which take up and comment on the text lemma by lemma; and commentaries *per modum quaestionis*, i.e., works consisting of a series of discussions about the philosophical topics that are taken up by Aristotle. Some commentaries (like the one by the Franciscan Master Alexander of Alessandria) present both literal expositions and questions and so properly belong to the literary genre of the commentaries *cum quaestionibus*, while some others (like Albert the Great's *Metaphysica*) are difficult to accommodate within the bipartite schema. But in general, commentators choose one or the other of the two main literary genres. Even though it is difficult to draw precise lines here, it is a fact that literal expositions were more popular in the 13th century and were progressively superseded by commentaries *per modum quaestionis*. Upon reflection, this is understandable enough. Literal expositions prevail when commentators need to become acquainted with the details of Aristotle's text. Once the text has been explained and understood, it is natural to expect philosophers to move to a further level of analysis and to start raising problems *about* the philosophical contents of the work on which they are commenting. Without going as far as to say that Aristotle's text progressively became just a pretext to raise general philosophical questions, philosophers and theologians certainly looked at the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* as the occasion on which crucial issues in ontology and metaphysics could and should be discussed.

The period from ca. 1250 to ca. 1350 is the "golden age" of the commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. Literal expositions and questions-commentaries are frequent in this period, and interest in the *Metaphysics* is keen and vibrant. From the mid-14th century onward, however, the interest tends to decline. From an institutional point of view, for instance, numerous university statutes prescribe that philosophers should confine themselves to commenting on a portion of the text (i.e., on the first six books), with the result that commentaries progressively decrease first in size and then in number. At a philosophical level, moreover, "realist" thinkers seem to consider sufficient for their purposes the "old" commentaries of Thomas Aquinas or John Duns Scotus and so tend not to put out new ones. "Nominalist" philosophers such as John Buridan, by contrast, tend to change the way of looking at metaphysics and so to reject the traditional, ontological reading of the *Metaphysics* in favor of a more "logical" or "linguistic" approach. With Buridan, one reaches the apex of this commentary tradition. After Buridan, except for some rare exceptions, commentaries are no longer composed. The reasons of the "crisis" of this literary genre in the second half of the 14th century still need to be completely clarified, but one thing is clear: as some recent studies have shown, we have to wait till the 15th century to witness a full revival of the interest in Aristotle's work.

If late medieval commentaries first of all differ as to the literary genre, they also differ insofar as their provenance and cultural background are concerned. Some, for instance, are the product of the Faculty of Arts, while others have been drafted by members of some religious order or other. This does not mean, strictly speaking, that we should look, as it were, for a Franciscan or a Dominican Aristotle or that commentaries which took their origin from the Faculty of Arts are necessarily alike in character. But it would be a mistake to completely disregard the cultural provenance of a commentary. After all, commentaries originating in the same cultural milieu are more likely to use the same sources of inspiration and so to display some common traits. Sometimes, the geographical provenance of a commentary is also particularly relevant. Suffice it to think, for instance, of 13th-century Oxford and Paris. In this case as well, commentaries coming from the same geographical context are likely to exhibit common traits. This is particularly true for important university centers. More often than not, Oxford or Paris commentaries can be grouped together around a core of fundamental doctrines and tend to present themselves as the products of a distinctive philosophical school.

The present volume takes account of all these differences within the genre of commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. Many chapters deal with single philosophers and commentators who have been particularly influential in the Latin reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or are just important on account of their philosophical quality: Albert the Great (Amos Bertolacci), Thomas Aquinas (Gabriele Galluzzo), Giles of Rome (Alessandro D. Conti), John Duns Scotus (Giorgio Pini), Alexander of Alessandria (Fabrizio Amerini), John of Jandun (Roberto Lambertini), John Buridan (Femke J. Kok), and Paul of Venice (Alessandro D. Conti). Other chapters, by contrast, deal with groups of works, some edited and others unedited, that exhibit common traits on account of either their cultural or geographical background or both: Silvia Donati, for example, deals with Oxford commentators up to Scotus; Sten Ebbesen presents some Faculty-of-Arts Parisian commentators on the *Metaphysics* at the end of the 13th century (among whom Peter of Auvergne, Siger of Brabant, and Radulphus Brito); William O. Duba focuses on three Parisian commentators after Scotus (i.e., Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet); while Paul J.J.M. Bakker provides detailed information about the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* from the end of Middle Ages (15th century). The general goal of the volume is to convey the sense of the variety of perspectives from which Aristotle's text has been approached and investigated across the mature Middle Ages.

There is another distinguishing feature of this volume that is worth mentioning in this context. The Latin medieval understanding of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* would be incomprehensible without taking into account two preliminary steps in the reception of Aristotle's work. One step is the history of the translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that became available to Latin commentators. This history is complex, but has to be told if one wishes to have a clear picture of the fortune of the *Metaphysics*. For different translations may provide readers with different texts, and this may considerably affect the way in which Aristotle's doctrine is received and understood. This is true in general, but particularly so when the text that is translated into Latin is not the original Greek of Aristotle but the Arabic translation thereof. Thus, one preliminary chapter in the volume (by Marta Borgo) is specifically devoted to the Latin translation of the *Metaphysics*. The chapter takes stock of the scholarly research on the Latin text of the *Metaphysics* and provides detailed information about the date and origin of the different translations that have progressively come to be used in the Western world. Another factor that made a decisive contribution to the Latin philosophers' understanding of the *Metaphysics* was

certainly the Arabic mediation. The main characters here are Avicenna and Averroes.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Averroes for the Latin reception of Aristotle's metaphysical thought. For one thing, the most popular translation of the *Metaphysics* in the first half of the 13th century, i.e., the Arabic-Latin translation drafted by Michael Scot, was transmitted together with the Latin version of Averroes's *Long Commentary*. The result is that Latin commentators became simultaneously acquainted with both Aristotle's text and Averroes's line-by-line interpretation. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Averroes's interpretation of the *Metaphysics* established itself as the point of reference for 13th-century authors and as the official reading with which everybody had to come to terms. Moreover, Averroes's *Long Commentary* remained influential also at a later stage, when other authoritative expositions of the *Metaphysics* had already become popular in the Western world. This is due to the somehow classical character of Averroes's commentaries as well as to the insightfulness of his explanations. Recent studies have shown that Averroes's exposition of the *Metaphysics*, far from being a flat paraphrasis of Aristotle's text, contains a number of original philosophical views, which medieval philosophers did not fail to bring to the fore and evaluate.

Also, Avicenna's metaphysical thought had a huge impact on the Latin reception of the *Metaphysics*. Admittedly, Avicenna's *Philosophia Prima* is not, strictly speaking, a commentary but is, rather, an original reshaping of the issues which Aristotle tackles in the *Metaphysics*. However, partly because of its originality and partly because of its undeniable connections with Aristotle's thought, Avicenna's metaphysical system remained a source of inspiration up to the end of the 13th century and beyond. It is not just that Avicenna's opinions crop up in the discussion of single metaphysical issues. Rather, it is Avicenna's way of conceiving of metaphysics that raised both enthusiasm and hostility among Latin readers. In consideration of the crucial role played by the Arabic tradition in the Latin reception of the *Metaphysics*, the volume includes an entire chapter on Averroes's *Long Commentary* (by Matteo di Giovanni), while Avicenna's reshaping of Aristotle's thought is examined at length in Amos Bertolacci's chapter about one of Avicenna's most acute interpreters, Albert the Great.

Contemporary interpreters of Aristotle have been guided by historical and philological research from the beginning of the 20th century to regard the *Metaphysics* not as a unified piece of work but as a collection of fourteen treatises, whose editorial unity is due not to Aristotle himself

but to ancient editors. This does not mean that the *Metaphysics* is a collection of unrelated treatises. On the contrary, a certain number of treatises can be clearly grouped together to form a comparatively unitary stretch of text. This is the case, for instance, with the so-called "central books" (Z–Θ), which focus on the issue of substance and on related ontological themes. The same thing can be said of Books M–N, which represent Aristotle's sustained attack on Plato's theory of Forms and on his philosophy of mathematics. And there are also good reasons to think that most of the material in Books A–E belongs to the same phase of Aristotle's reflection upon the nature of metaphysics. What is more, the text of the *Metaphysics* contains clear indications that Aristotle wanted to embark on the project of systematically discussing the topics characteristic of what he calls "first philosophy" or "wisdom," i.e., metaphysics. Reconstructing such a project must have been the ancient editors' intention when they strung together the fourteen treatises that go under the name of *Metaphysics*. Thus, what we call into question nowadays is not that Aristotle had a metaphysical project but, rather, that the *Metaphysics* as it has come down to us was designed to be the realization of such a project.

It is important to stress that the medieval approach to the structure and contents of the *Metaphysics* is significantly different from ours. Medieval philosophers and commentators did regard the *Metaphysics* as a complete exposition of first philosophy and as an application, to the specific case of metaphysics, of the theory of science outlined by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*: in their eyes, it had been Aristotle himself who had arranged the different treatises of the *Metaphysics* in the order in which they have been handed down to us. The result is that the medieval reading of the *Metaphysics* is highly systematic. Not only does the *Metaphysics* as a whole accomplish a well-defined metaphysical and scientific project but also each treatise has its own place and plays a certain role in the structure of Aristotle's writing. This does not mean that medieval interpreters are unable to spot tensions and inconsistencies in Aristotle's text. It is just that they were more prepared than we are to make such tensions and inconsistencies context-relative and to play down their importance for the general tenability of Aristotle's thought.

Another important consequence of the systematic approach endorsed by medieval commentators is that commentaries on the *Metaphysics* often become *loci classici* for discussing a series of issues that were regarded as vital to any metaphysical investigation. These issues partly follow the flow of Aristotle's text and partly reflect the commentators'

particular interests. Among the various things that the *Metaphysics* may be said to be about, there are three areas or groups of problems that were the focus of medieval interpreters' attention, besides being of particular importance for contemporary interpreters as well: (1) the problem of the scope, nature, and limits of metaphysics as a scientific discipline; (2) problems concerning the nature of material objects and their properties; and (3) the issue of immaterial substances. Much of the scholarly debate surrounding medieval commentaries on the *Metaphysics* has centered on the first issue and, more particularly, on the question of the so-called subject-matter of metaphysics, i.e., the primary object of a metaphysical investigation. Discussion has been mainly about whether metaphysics should be conceived of as some sort of general ontology or as an instance of rational theology. Although this line of study is well represented in the present volume, our view is that the debate about the subject-matter of metaphysics is only part of what medieval commentators have to say about the agenda of metaphysics and so of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, for instance, were often the place where a wide range of issues concerning the nature of the material world were carefully put under scrutiny: the question of substantiality, the analysis of material objects in terms of matter and form, the distinction between essence and existence, and the problem of universals and individuation are just a few of the many topics that receive extensive treatment in medieval commentaries.

But it is not only the material world that was of interest to medieval philosophers. Prevalent in medieval commentaries on the *Metaphysics* is also the issue of the relationship between material beings and their immaterial causes. How do you know about immaterial substances? How do they relate to the material objects of which they are the causes? The main philosophical concern in this area is to give a principled account of the hierarchical structure of reality and provide an accurate description of the relationship among the different levels around which such a structure is built.

All the contributions to this volume deal, in different ways and to different extents, with the three groups of problems that we have just singled out. The result is a much richer picture than we are used to of the medieval commentators' philosophical interests as well as of the depth and originality of their metaphysical thought. In the rest of this introduction, we wish to offer a sketch of the different topics which readers should expect to be dealt with in the single chapters.

1. The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics

In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle presents us with at least three different views as to the nature and scope of a metaphysical investigation. (1) According to one view, metaphysics is first of all a general science, which deals with the totality of reality and so with everything that exists. So conceived, metaphysics is often contrasted with the so-called "special sciences." While the special sciences cut out for themselves only a particular sub-class of the things that exist, metaphysics studies them all. Physics, for instance, is not concerned with the totality of reality, only with those things which change or can change. Metaphysics, by contrast, studies both things that are subject to change and things that are not. Metaphysics differs from the other sciences not only extensionally but also intensionally. Just as physics is not interested in all the properties of changeable things but considers only those that follow upon the fact that such things are subject to change, so metaphysics is interested not in all the properties of existing objects but only in those that follow upon the fact that they exist. In this conception, metaphysics is portrayed as some sort of general ontology and its subject-matter is identified with "being *qua* being," i.e., with the totality of existing things considered with exclusive reference to the fact that they exist. This is the conception of the nature of metaphysics that Aristotle outlines in Book Γ 1–2 and partly in Book E 1 of his *Metaphysics*.

(2) Aristotle does not think, however, that all existing things are on par with one another. He famously remarks, for instance, that the term "being" is spoken of in many ways and with different degrees of appropriateness. "Being" signifies different things when applied to substances, quantities, qualities, relations, and so on and so forth for the different categories of things that there are. Moreover, "being" is said primarily of substance and only secondarily of all the other categories, i.e., the categories that comprise the different accidental properties that substances may have. It is not only language and linguistic usage that Aristotle has in mind. In his view, the reason why "being" is said primarily of substance is that substances exist primarily. As a consequence, "being" is said only secondarily of the accidental categories because the entities belonging to these categories exist only secondarily. Accidents exist secondarily because they depend on substances in a way in which substances do not depend on them. If one pushes this line of thought a step further, one will easily form the view that the subject-matter of metaphysics should be not being in general or being *qua* being but, rather, the primary kind of being. In this perspective, metaphysics is mostly concerned with substances. For

it is only when we understand the nature of the primary kind of being that we will be in a position to draw conclusions about what being in general means. Thus conceived, metaphysics is still some form of ontology, but its scope is narrower than it is when metaphysics is conceived as a general ontology. It is *substance* in which we are mainly interested, even though the study of substance has consequences for our general understanding of reality. As said, the focus on substance especially emerges in the so-called central books of the *Metaphysics* (Z–Θ).

(3) Aristotle also says that metaphysics should study the causes and principles. Although there are different levels of causality for Aristotle, he certainly has in mind the causes and principles of the physical world when he describes metaphysics as involved with causes and principles. Moreover, in the philosophical tradition to which Aristotle somehow belongs, i.e., Platonism, there is the strong presupposition that the causes of the physical world must be non-physical, i.e., not subject to change and so immaterial. Although denying that the causes of the physical world should be characterized as Plato did, Aristotle contends that the physical world indeed has non-physical and immaterial causes. These causes are identified by Aristotle with the intelligent and immaterial unmoved movers, which account for the motion of the celestial spheres and so of the whole universe. This line of thought leads to identify the subject-matter of metaphysics with immaterial substances: metaphysics is primarily concerned not with being, or even with substances in general, but with the most dignified and eminent substances. Although Aristotle regards all the unmoved movers are somehow divine in character, he seems also willing to distinguish between the first unmoved mover and the others. To medieval philosophers it took just one step to move from this distinction to the idea that the first unmoved mover is God, while the others are the angelic substances. Thus, metaphysics is ultimately about God and, hence, can be presented as an instance of rational theology. Hints at this conception of the nature of metaphysics are present in *Metaphysics* A 1–2, E 1, and Λ.

Now, medieval commentators are perfectly aware that there is a sense in which metaphysics (and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) is about all the things mentioned, being *qua* being, substances in general and divine things in particular. However, the issue of the subject-matter of a science is not just the issue of what a science is generally speaking *about*. According to Aristotle's model of scientific investigation, as it is presented in the *Posterior Analytics*, each science has a distinct subject-matter, which sets it apart from all the other sciences. The task of a science is precisely to discover the necessary properties of the things that fall within its subject-matter and to

give a causal explanation of why such properties belong to them. If metaphysics is a science, therefore, it must have one subject-matter and not many. This put some pressure on medieval interpreters to choose among Aristotle's different accounts of the subject-matter of metaphysics. The traditional story has it that accounts (1) and (3) were the most popular. Averroes, for instance, is often described as a champion of the view that metaphysics deals with separate substances and God in particular, while Avicenna is often associated with an ontological rather than theological understanding of metaphysics. The activities of Latin commentators are currently presented in the literature as an attempt to defend one view or the other. Although the traditional story is not entirely false, this volume shows that matters are more complicated than they might seem at first glance. For one thing, Averroes's and Avicenna's views are not so clear-cut as they are often described. For another, the Latin commentators' effort was not so much to adjudicate between the two rival interpretations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as to come up with a general account that might accommodate the different intuitions contained in Aristotle's seemingly conflicting statements on the nature of metaphysics. Are we completely sure, for instance, that a science of immaterial substances is not also, *ipso facto*, a science of everything that exists? Are we completely sure that a science of substances in general is not, *ipso facto*, a science of everything that exists?

Medieval interpreters were concerned with the scientific status of metaphysics also from a slightly different perspective. The unity of a certain science is guaranteed by the unity of its subject-matter. An intellectual activity counts as *one* science if the things it studies are sufficiently unified. Normally, the things studied by one single science fall under the same genus or kind. Now, suppose, for the sake of argument, that we agree that the subject-matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being. Aristotle argues in *Metaphysics* B that being is not a genus. There is no single genus encompassing, for instance, both substances and accidental properties. So, how can metaphysics be one single science if the things it deals with differ so much from one another and do not belong to the same genus? There are different possible answers to this question. One is to say that of the different kinds of things that we call "beings" only one, i.e., substance, exists on its own, while the others, accidental properties, exist only insofar as they can be somehow reduced to substances, i.e., to substances being such-and-such (quantified, qualified, related, etc.). This reductionist approach tends to deny ontological significance to the accidental categories and to regain the unity of metaphysics by somehow eliminating one of the items

to be unified. More popular in the Middle Ages was the idea that metaphysics is one single science because the things that it studies are different but not unconnected. In particular, they are connected because accidental properties depend for their existence on substances, and so substances are the primary beings to which all secondary beings are related in some way or other. Thus, metaphysics studies substances and considers all the other things insofar as they are related to and dependent on substances. Thus, there is a focus to the metaphysical investigation, and it is in relation to this focus that all the other subjects of metaphysical study should be understood. In this way, the priority of substance over accidental properties can be preserved without denying that accidents are real things. This solution, which is known as "the analogy of being," raises as many problems as it solves and was at the center of a heated debate in the Middle Ages. This is not surprising, given that the doctrine of the analogy of being touches upon the ontological status of accidental properties. Are we sure, for instance, that the ontological dependence of accidents on substances is a matter of metaphysical necessity? Or should we rather say—as John Duns Scotus emphasizes—that such a dependence only reflects the structure of our physical world, while accidents, metaphysically speaking, are independent kinds of beings perfectly on a par with substances? After all, medieval philosophers and theologians were expected to give a philosophical account of the sacrament of the Eucharist. And in the Eucharist, accidents do exist without inhering in any substance—which invites the thought that, if they can exist without inhering in substances, accidents are, metaphysically speaking, independent of them.

Another difficulty with the analogy of being concerns the level at which the doctrine should be understood. One may well be prepared, for instance, to grant that the analogy of being holds at the ontological level but still deny that it carries over to the conceptual and semantic levels. One could insist, as Duns Scotus did, for instance, that we do have a single concept of being by which we represent all existing things, or that "being" has only one meaning when applied to the different categories, even if in reality the things represented by the single concept or signified by the univocal term are related as the analogy of being describes them. At the other end of the spectrum, one could insist instead that, even if there is some connection in reality among the different things that exist, we have no single concept representing them or no univocal term that might pick them all out. Moreover, the different concepts by which we represent the different things that exist, as well as the different meanings of the term "being," display no significant connection and are not "analogically" related. Thus, the

analogy of being may be taken to be a good picture of how things are in the extramental world without implying that it is also a good description of how we think about things in the world or how we refer to them in our language. This volume does justice to the medieval debate on the analogy of being and on the relationship between substance and accidents by reconstructing the various positions and showing how they stem from different and irreducible understandings of Aristotle's text.

2. Material Objects

Over the last four decades or so, Aristotelian scholars have put emphasis on the importance of Books Z–Θ of the *Metaphysics* and on the notion of substance which is at center of these books. The rediscovery of the theme of substantiality has in some way run parallel to the growing importance that the debate over the nature of material objects has acquired in contemporary metaphysics. The issue of substantiality has both a textual and a theoretical aspect. The textual aspect mainly revolves around the relationship between the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*, while the theoretical aspect concerns the question as to what substantiality is. In the *Categories*, Aristotle argues for the view that ordinary material objects are the fundamental entities in the world and so deserve to be called "primary substances." The reason why material objects are fundamental is that all the rest, i.e., all the other things that exist, depend for their existence on the existence of material objects. Properties, for instance, exist only because they are in, or inhere in, material objects. Likewise, universals exist only because they are predicated of ordinary material objects. If material objects did not exist, Aristotle concludes, nothing else would. Thus, according to Aristotle's ontology in the *Categories*, there is nothing more fundamental than material objects and nothing that lays a better claim to being called "primary substance."

In the central books of the *Metaphysics*, however, Aristotle presents ordinary material objects as composites of matter and form. The form of a material object is its characteristic principle of structuring and organization, while the matter is the substratum in which such a principle operates. The soul and the body of living beings, for instance, are paradigmatic examples of form and matter. Now, the analysis of material objects as composites of matter and form may be thought to have consequences for the issue of substantiality. For if to be a substance is to be a fundamental entity, it might seem that matter and form lay better claims to

being called "substances" than the material objects of which they are the constituents. For material objects seem to depend on matter and form for many of their basic properties and characters. A special case can be made for form. It is form that Aristotle often calls "primary substance" in the central books of the *Metaphysics*. And it is form that mostly accounts for many of the characteristic properties and for the typical behavior of material objects. Thus, forms may be thought to replace ordinary objects in the role of primary substances that the *Categories* attributes to them.

As in the case of contemporary interpreters, medieval commentators also were at variance concerning the issue of substantiality. Given the historical role that the *Categories* played in the shaping of medieval thought, it should come as no surprise that few medieval interpreters accepted without qualification the claim that form is primary substance. More popular became some sort of compromise solution, according to which there are different senses of "substance," and so form is primary according to one of these senses while the composite is primary according to another. The compromise solution was prompted not only by Aristotle's remarks in the central books but also by the desire to give a consistent account of the way in which the hierarchy of beings is structured. Since immaterial substances are pure forms and are prior to material objects, there must be a sense in which form is prior to the composite of matter and form. If the composite were unconditionally primary, immaterial substances could hardly be described as more substances than material objects. The compromise, however, did not convince everyone. Averroes, for instance, may have endorsed the view that, since the forms of material objects *explain* why such objects are what they are, they must be substances in the same sense of "substance" as material objects and, what is more, more truly substances than them. But supporters of the *Categories* ontology also are likely to find the compromise solution fundamentally misguided. Composites of matter and form are primary in the material world, while forms are primary in the immaterial one. But composites of matter and form are primary in the material world for the same reason that pure forms are primary in the immaterial world, i.e., both composites and pure forms are autonomous and independent objects. There is no need, therefore, to look for different senses of "substance." Since immaterial substances are more perfect than material ones, there is no wonder that substantiality comes without composition in the immaterial world and together with composition in the material one.

The debate over the notion of substance also extends to the issue of the essence and definition of material objects. Should we think that

the essence and definition of material objects include their form alone? Or should matter also be comprised? Since Aristotle's decision on this particular issue is not entirely clear, the medieval debate is considerably complex and varied. What is at stake is not only the correct interpretation of Aristotle's text but also a wide range of anthropological issues: is a human being essentially just a soul? Or is she essentially a soul and a body? According to the story that Aquinas tells us in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Averroes was a champion of the view that the essence and definition of material objects only include their form, while Avicenna defended the view that material objects are essentially composed of matter and form. Although Aquinas's reconstruction may not be fundamentally incorrect, positions are often more nuanced than one may expect. The view that material objects are not essentially material was not taken to imply that they could exist without matter, the thought being that matter is necessary to material objects but not essential to them. Conversely, the view that the essence and definition of material objects include matter was not supposed to have the consequence that matter and form are on par when it comes to explaining the fundamental properties of material objects. For form remains, even on the more materialistic conception, the fundamental principle that accounts for the essential properties and typical behavior of material things.

There is another area of medieval philosophy where the debate over the nature of material objects is relevant. Material objects are particular, while their natures or essences could be taken to be somehow universal, i.e., shared by the many individuals in the same species or of the same kind. So, commentaries on the *Metaphysics* are often the occasion for discussing the problem of universals. The problem is so widely known that it would be pointless to provide here even a rough description of the solutions advanced by medieval philosophers. Suffice it to recall that the problem intersects with the evaluation of the impact of the hylomorphic model on our understanding of material objects. Suppose, for instance, that the nature of material objects is not of itself particular. The question arises as to what makes it particular—and, therefore, with what the principle of individuation of material objects should be identified. The hylomorphic analysis provides medieval philosophers with some interesting material for this investigation. Is it form or matter (or both or neither) that accounts for the individuation of material objects? It is not rare to see commentators on the *Metaphysics* engage in the discussion of the issue of individuation. Particular prominence has been given to the critical evaluation of the Aristotelian view that matter accounts for individuation. The

view is attractive, especially for those who maintain that there is a sense in which essences are common. For one thing, however, it is difficult to make sense of the claim that matter individuates, since matter is often conceived of as an undifferentiated and undivided material substratum, while individuation implies numerical differentiation and division. For another, the view that matter individuates leaves completely unexplained how individuation takes place in the case of immaterial things. Critics of individuation by matter insisted that the view should be altogether abandoned, while supporters struggled to amend and correct it so as to meet even the most powerful criticisms.

3. Immaterial Substances

Aristotle's immaterial substances were standardly identified by medieval philosophers and commentators with God and the angelic intelligences. This explains why the topic was so important and at the same time so difficult to discuss. One difficulty is connected with God in particular and with the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Should the existence of God be proved in metaphysics or somewhere else? To say that it is metaphysics that proves the existence of God becomes particularly difficult for those who maintain, like Averroes and his followers, for instance, that God is the primary object of study in metaphysics. For it seems to be one of the fundamental tenets of Aristotle's theory of science that no science can prove the existence of its subject-matter. Rather, a science assumes the existence of its subject-matter and then proceeds to investigate its properties. So, the existence of God cannot be proved in metaphysics, if God is its main object of study. The solution was normally to think that metaphysics borrows the proof of God's existence from physics. It is physics which proves the existence of God, while metaphysics investigates the relationship between God and the rest of reality. Supporters of an ontological conception of metaphysics (like Avicenna and his followers) are arguably better off on this score. Since the primary object of metaphysics is being *qua* being, and not God, there is nothing wrong with saying that it is metaphysics which proves God's existence. Of course, in this conception metaphysics cannot prove the existence of being. But to say that some other science proves the existence of being, or that experience makes us acquainted with it, seems to be less problematic than the claim that the noblest of human sciences cannot prove the existence of the first cause and principle of reality.

There is also a more general problem with how we come to acquire knowledge of God and separate substances. A traditional view, which was widespread in the Middle Ages, is that God and separate substances cannot be known directly, only indirectly. This is due to the fact that human knowledge always starts with sense experience, and senses give us no access to God and angelic substances. One consequence of this state of affairs is that the existence of God can be proved not directly but only on the basis of the effects of God's causal power on the created world. Another consequence is that our knowledge of the essence of both God and angelic substances is obscure and limited. Because our knowledge is involved at all levels with sense impressions and representations, we entirely lack the resources to grasp the essence of things that are entirely free from matter. Although quite popular, this view too could be called into question. Why not say that knowledge of the essence of God and angelic substances is possible, at least to some extent? Why not have a more optimistic stance on the capacities of our intellectual knowledge? Optimism, however, posed problems of demarcation. If metaphysics has access to the essence of God, what distinguishes it from theology proper? Metaphysics may certainly be described as a form of rational theology, but it is theology proper, i.e., revealed theology, which provides human beings with information about the nature of God. And the contents of revealed theology are believed, not rationally proved.

One final topic may be worth outlining in this short introduction to the contents of our volume. Medieval philosophers believe that reality is hierarchically structured. In particular, there are at least three different levels of reality that should be taken into account whilst doing metaphysics: God, immaterial created substances (angels), and material created substances, with the human soul somehow occupying an intermediate position between immaterial and material substances. The problem is then to furnish a principled account of the difference between one ontological level and another. There is a fairly clear approach to this problem, which is mainly due to Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, the different layers of reality have to be distinguished in terms of composition. God is absolutely simple. All creatures, i.e., both immaterial and material substances, display at least one form of composition, i.e., the composition of essence and existence. Material substances, in addition to being composed of essence and existence, display a further level composition, i.e., matter-form composition. Thus, all creatures are distinct from God because, unlike Him, they are composed of essence and existence; material substances are distinct from immaterial ones because, unlike them, they are also composed of matter and form.

Aquinas's account was certainly neat and elegant, but there was a price to pay for it, i.e., to believe that essence and existence are two principles or constituents of created beings which are not dependent on an act of our mind. And few medieval philosophers were disposed to pay such a price. Thus, many medieval commentators discuss at some length the relationship between essence and existence. For many of them, the problem is to do justice to the intuition that to know that something exists is different from knowing what it is without attributing too much weight to the essence-existence distinction. Solutions here include the idea that essence and existence are only "conceptually" distinct (i.e., are just two different ways of considering one and the same thing) as well as the more intermediate views that they are "intentionally" or "formally" (i.e., definitionally) or even "modally" distinct (i.e., existence is a way or mode in which essence presents itself). What is clear is that philosophers who reject Aquinas's metaphysical picture must come up with an alternative account of the hierarchy of beings and, more particularly, of what distinguishes God and creatures. But alternative options were, in fact, available. Some philosophers and theologians, for instance, distinguish God and the other things in relational terms, God being the creator and the other things the creatures, and they insist that causation is more important than simplicity and composition. Be that as it may, the issue of the hierarchy of beings or *scala naturae* is well in front of medieval commentator's mind when they comment on the *Metaphysics*.

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Our aim in assembling the contributions to the present volume has been to provide the readership with as rich a picture as possible of the current debate on the medieval reception of the *Metaphysics* and to present different approaches to the history of Aristotelianism. The volume, therefore, comprises contributions by scholars with different geographical and cultural backgrounds, who put emphasis on different features of medieval commentaries on the *Metaphysics*. All the authors, however, share our presupposition that the textual and philosophical aspects are equally important when it comes to understanding the nature of medieval philosophy.

Over the years, many people have helped us to shape our views on the nature of medieval philosophy in general as well as on the significance of Aristotelian commentaries in particular. Even though it would be impossible to mention all of them here, we nonetheless wish to express our sincere gratitude to them for their precious suggestions concerning

both general problems and points of detail. A special mention is due to Francesco Del Punta for the decisive role he played over the last three decades or so in establishing the view that medieval commentaries on Aristotle cannot be left out when it comes to reconstructing the historical and philosophical development of Latin Western culture. Without his support and inspiration, this volume would have been simply unthinkable. We are also very grateful to him for having organized at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa a number of seminars and meetings on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which allowed us to benefit from the thoughts of many important Aristotelian and medieval scholars. We are grateful in particular to Enrico Berti, Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede, Annick Jaulin, Lindsay Judson, Michael Loux, Pierre-Marie Maurel, Mauro Mariani, and Theodore Scaltsas for having been so kind as to present to us their views on several aspects of Aristotle's metaphysical thought. We are also grateful to Jan A. Aertsen, Richard Cross, Dimitri Gutas, Simo Knuuttila, John Marenbon, Marilyn McCord-Adams, Claude Panaccio, Andreas Speer, Cecilia Trifogli, and John F. Wippel for having discussed with us, in various ways and on various occasions, some aspects of the metaphysical thought of medieval authors. This volume should also be regarded as the fruit of such a stimulating research environment.

LATIN MEDIEVAL TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

Marta Borgo

When used with regards to Aristotle, the term "metaphysics"—which is not an Aristotelian word—carries different levels of meaning.[1] First, it can stand for a general (non-original) title: it signifies then one particular writing by Aristotle—the *Metaphysics*—consisting of 14 books, all of them written in Greek and traditionally designated by means of the first 13 capital letters of the Greek alphabet plus the first small one.[2] Second, "metaphysics" can designate one particular science: broadly speaking, the universal science whose domains of investigation are being *qua* being, its properties and its primary causes.[3] Thus, as a book, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is a treatise on metaphysics. Indeed, it ultimately lays down one body of doctrine, i.e., Aristotelian metaphysics, which is certain results issued from the metaphysical inquiry: specific metaphysical questions are there raised and solved in a way that is peculiar to Aristotle (and which will be shared by later Aristotelian thinkers).[4]

Although we are all familiar with this distinction among the *Metaphysics* as a 14-book work by Aristotle, metaphysics as a science, and Aristotelian metaphysics as the resulting knowledge in the field of metaphysics, it must not be taken for granted when dealing with medieval philosophy. Nor should we take for granted what any single expression refers to, especially if, as will be the case in the following pages, at issue is the so-called rediscovery of Aristotle's *Met.* in the West, between the 12th and 13th centuries.[5] In fact, at that time Aristotle's *Met.* gradually undergoes a

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[1] For an overview, see Jonathan Barnes, "Metaphysics," in: Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 66–108; esp. 66–69.

[2] Alpha Meizon (A=I), Alpha Elatton (α=II), Beta (B=III), Gamma (Γ=IV), Delta (Δ=V), Epsilon (E=VI), Zeta (Z=VII), Eta (H=VIII), Theta (Θ=IX), Iota (I=X), Kappa (K=XI), Lambda (Λ=XII), Mu (M=XIII), and Nu (N=XIV).

[3] Aristotle never calls such a science metaphysics but, rather, "wisdom," "first philosophy," or "theology." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* [hereafter cited as *Met.*], A 2; Γ 1 and E 1.

[4] Note that, taken in this third sense, metaphysics is not exhausted by the *Met.* In fact, Aristotle also goes into metaphysical themes elsewhere. See Barnes, "Metaphysics," p. 66.

[5] For an overview on the rediscovery of Aristotle in the Latin West and the medieval translations of Aristotle, see Jozef Brams, *La riscoperta di Aristotele in Occidente* (Milan,

"lengthening" process (passing from an 11-book work to a 13-book, then to a 14-book work). In addition, medieval thinkers in their usage of the term "metaphysics" often drift between the meanings. Indeed, in the Middle Ages the umbrella term "metaphysics" had a wider scope than what it has today, so that under it fell not only what is nowadays so designated but also something else, which might seem odd at first glance.

In order to get a sense of the polysemy of such a word, suffice it to think of what the author of the Ripoll *Student's Guide* writes, concerning metaphysics, in the 1240s.[6]

> Accedamus autem ad diuisionem naturalis philosophie. [...] Possunt [...] res nature tripliciter considerari: uno modo prout sunt omnino separate a motu et a materia secundum esse et diffinitionem, et de talibus rebus est methaphisica. Et dicitur a *metha*, quod est "trans," et *phisis*, quod est "natura," quasi "transcendens phisim." [...] Et hec scientia habet tres libros. [1] Unus appellatur *Vetus methaphisica*, et hic continet unum librum secundum quosdam, secundum uero alios duos. Et durat usque ibi:[7] *Consideratio* etc. Et in hoc libro determinatur de rebus in ratione qua sunt entes et habent reduci ad primum ens. [2] Alius liber est qui dicitur *Methaphisica noua*; et incipit ibi:[8] *Consideratio* etc. Et continet .X. libros partiales. Et sic in tota *Methaphisica* sunt .XI. libri. In *Noua* uero *methaphisica* agitur de rebus diuinis et de primis principiis rerum secundum quodlibet sui esse. [3] Tertius liber est *De causis*. [...] Et nota quod methaphysica, cum tractet de principiis generalibus rerum, est superior ad omnes alias scientias.

2003); concerning the translations of *Met.*, see esp. pp. 49–51, 64–66, 76, 109–13 and 117–18. See also: Jozef Brams, "Der Einfluß der Aristoteles-Übersetzungen auf den Rezeptionsprozeß," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer, & Marc-Aeilko Aris, eds., *Albertus Magnus und die Anfäge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis* (Münster i. W., 2005), pp. 27–43 (on *Met.*: esp. pp. 34–37).

[6] See Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier, *Le "Guide de l'étudiant" d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des Arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle. Édition critique provisoire du ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Ripoll 109, fol. 134ra–158va* (Québec, Canada, 1992), p. 33, §§9–11 (the underscoring is mine). On this passage, cf. Alain de Libera, "Structure du *corpus* scolaire de la métaphysique dans la première moitié du XIIIe siècle," in: Claude Lafleur & Joanne Carrier, eds., *L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du* Guide de l'étudiant *du ms. Ripoll 109* (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 61–88, esp. 68–75; Olivier Boulnois, "Le Besoin de métaphysique. Théologie et structures des métaphysiques médievales," in: Jean-Luc Solère & Zenon Kaluza, eds., *La servante et la consolatrice. La philosophie dans ses rapports avec la théologie au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2002) pp. 45–94, esp. 53–56. See also Alain de Libera, "Genèse et structure des métaphysiques medievals," in: Jean-Marc Narbonne & Luc Langlois, eds., *La métaphysique. Son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux* (Paris, 1999), pp. 59–81, esp. 66–69.

[7] Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, α 1, 993a30.

[8] *Ibid.*

Different aspects emerge from these lines.

i First of all, for the author of the *Guide*, metaphysics as a science bears a closer relationship to Aristotle's *Met.* than it does for us. After some introductory remarks about the subject of metaphysics and the etymology of the word "metaphysics," the author moves on to say that such a *science* divides into three *books*, then to describe, book by book, its contents. Briefly, he seems partly to equate the concept of metaphysics as a science with the concept of the *Met.* as a work including a certain number of books.[9]

ii This implicit switch of perspective, however, needs some qualification. For, in the *Guide*'s perspective, even if Aristotle's *Met*. is included in metaphysical science, the latter does not strictly coincide with the former. In fact, in the *Guide*, the term "metaphysics" refers, more widely, to an Aristotelian metaphysical corpus, in which the *Liber De Causis*—which at that time was still supposed to be a work by Aristotle—is included as well and, as a consequence, is intended to be read in addition to, and as the complement of, Aristotle's *Met*.

iii Concerning this latter, the way in which the author of the *Guide* describes its structure and hints at its contents is worth noticing. In fact, by using three distinct adjectives to qualify the title "Methaphysica" (i.e., "vetus," "noua," and "tota"), he end up signifying three different things: first, one particular Latin version of Aristotle's *Met*.; second, another Latin version of Aristotle's *Met*.; and third, what we commonly refer to by means of the title "Met.," i.e., the whole of Aristotle's writing.[10]

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[9] For another example of this tendency, see Adam of Buckfield, *Sententia super secundum Metaphysicae*, ed. Armand Maurer, in: J. Reginald O'Donnell, ed., *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto, 1955), pp. 99–144, at 101: "Supposito [...] quod subjectum hujus philosophiae sit ens in quantum ens, ad divisionem hujus scientiae attendamus; quae primo dividitur in duas partes, scilicet in prooemium et tractatum." On the overlap between the notions of metaphysics as a science and *Met.* as a book, see Louis-Jacques Bataillon, "Les conditions de travail des maîtres de l'Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 67 (1983), 417–33, esp. 421 (with note 16). Bataillon hints at the fact that the superimposition between one discipline and its base text is a common phenomenon among medieval masters. This occurs first of all with the *sacra doctrina*, i.e., theology as a science, and the *sacra pagina*, i.e., the Bible. According to him, this is quite natural, given that lecturing on theology, as well as lecturing on philosophy, concretely involves the reading of base texts and their literal explication.

[10] Note that, for the author of the *Guide*, Aristotle's *Met.* is a collection of 11 books only.

Therefore, in addition to what we usually admit as falling under the umbrella term "metaphysics," the author of the *Guide* attests to two further notions, namely, "metaphysics" in the sense of the philosophical corpus including Aristotle's *Met.* and culminating with the *De Causis*, and "metaphysics" in the sense of one Latin translation of Aristotle's *Met.* rather than another. In the latter case, the term "metaphysics" is indirectly used to single out a certain number of books of Aristotle's *Met.* and to exclude the rest.

In what follows, I shall deal with medieval translations of Aristotle's *Met.* into Latin. Thus, the focus will be mainly on two of the meanings of "metaphysics" illustrated above: the collection of books called *Met.* and different Latin translations of it. No reference will be made to what argumentative structure the *Met.* has, what philosophical topics it tackles, and what doctrines it conveys. In order to put the subject in context, a few remarks will be required about the concept of metaphysics as a corpus. As far as metaphysics as a science and Aristotle's metaphysical thought are concerned, I pass the baton to the other contributors to this volume.

My chapter divides into seven parts and is intended to approach the main subject from a bottom-up perspective, going from details to an overview. Indeed, it is conceived as a backward journey from the latter-day Latin Aristotle to the medieval one. I shall start by making a virtual visit to the consultation room of a research library (§§ I–II), where, through an analysis of the titles given to the reference texts of Aristotle's Latin *Met.*, I will identify the number and nature of the medieval translations of the *Met.*, compare them to one another, and note their structural differences. In the following sections (§§ III–V), each individual Latin translation will be examined: first the Greek-Latin translations (§§ III–IV), then the Arabic-Latin one (§§ V). In these central sections, I shall take the opportunity to emphasize that, for several reasons, there is some distance between the Latin texts we can consult today, in our libraries, and the texts really circulating in medieval manuscripts and to explain those differences. I aim to show, as precisely as possible, how, by means of critical editions, contemporary readers can get closer and closer to original texts and, as it were, picture the medieval translators at work. As far as the Greek-Latin translations are concerned, they will be analyzed two by two, starting from the so-called *Vetustissima* and *Vetus* (§ III), then moving on to the so-called *Media* and *Met. Novae Translationis* (§ IV). The conclusive sections are two. I shall first of all provide a chronological and geographical overview of the rediscovery of Aristotle's *Met.* in the West, piecing together the points made in the previous sections (§§ VI); I shall then make some conclusive remarks (§§ VII).

Concerning the contents of the single sections, readers must be warned that I do not set myself the goal of being original. Indeed, in the following pages I shall intentionally confine myself to taking stock of the existing literature on the Latin translations of Aristotle's *Met*. and to sorting the main pieces of information it contains, in order to provide a framework for the reading of the Latin *Met*. in its different versions and the study of the Latin commentary tradition on it.

I

At least five Latin versions of the *Met*. become available to readers between about 1125 and 1270. In this span of time, Aristotle's text is translated into Latin at least four times from the Greek and at least once from the Arabic. Four out of these five Latin versions are today accessible in critical edition (sorted here by publication date):

1. *Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Tanslatio Iacobi sive "Vetustissima"* [= TJ];[11]
2. *Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Composita sive "Vetus"* [= TC];[12]
3. *Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media"* [= TA];[13]
4. *Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka* [= RTM].[14]

As far as the fifth is concerned, for a complete version of the text we can rely only on ancient editions of Averroes's *Long Commentary* on Aristotle's *Met.*; one in particular, which is available in photomechanical reproduction:[15]

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[11] In *Aristoteles Latinus* [hereafter cited as AL] XXV I–I^a, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Brussels, 1970), pp. 1–73.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–155.

[13] In AL XXV 2, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, 1976), pp. 1–275.

[14] In AL XXV 3.2, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, 1995), pp. 1–320. RTM is sometimes designated as *Metaphysica Novae Translationis.*

[15] There exist four modern scientific, still non-critical, editions of some segments of it: (a) Gion Darms, *Averroes (Ibn Rushd). In Aristotelis librum II (α) Metaphysicorum Commentarius. Die lateinische Übersetzung des Mittelalters auf handschriftlicher Grundlage mit Einleitung und problemgeschichtlicher Studie* (Fribourg, 1966), esp. pp. 51–81; (b) Bernard Bürke, *Das neunte Buch (Θ) des lateinischen grossen Metaphysik-Kommentars von Averroes. Text-Edition und Vergleich mit Albert dem Großen und Thomas von Aquin* (Bern, 1969), esp. pp. 25–75; (c) Ruggero Ponzalli, *Averrois in librum V (Δ) Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Commentarius. Edizione condotta su manoscritti scelti con introduzione, note ed uno studio storico-filosofico* (Bern, 1971), esp. pp. 61–235; and (d) Rudolf Hoffmann, "Übersetzungsbedingte Verständnisprobleme im Grossen Metaphysik-Kommentar des Averroes (zu Met. Δ 15, 1020b26–1021a14 und 1021a26–b3)," in: Albert Zimmermann and Gudrun Vuillemin Diem, eds., *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter. Übersetzungen, Kommentare, Interpretationen* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 18) (Berlin, 1986), pp. 141–60 (esp. pp. 151–54).

5. *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, vol. 8, Venice, 1562 (repr. Frankfurt/Main, 1962) [=TnS].

The reason for the series of "at least" in my opening paragraph, is threefold.

i First, it is likely that Aristotle's *Met.* was translated from Arabic into Latin more than once. In fact, in one manuscript belonging to the Vatican Library—Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. Lat. 2048, fol. 112ra–vb—there survives a fragment of a Latin version of *Met.* A1, which can be traced back to none of the extant translations of the *Met*. From a stylistic exam of this fragment, it emerges that it is ascribable to someone working on an Arabic model rather than on a Greek one.[16]

ii Second, like any other research in medieval philosophy, the research on the history of medieval Latin translations of the *Met.* must ultimately be based on manuscripts, and so the material loss of something relevant cannot be excluded. For instance, while Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem claims that Boethius never translated Aristotle's *Met.* into Latin,[17] she is open to admit that the author of TC could have had in hand a Latin translation which is no longer extant.[18] In other words, she does not dismiss the possibility that the Latin translations of the *Met.* known in the 13th century could have numbered more than those actually preserved.

iii Third, there were more than five versions of the *Met*. actually circulating in the 12th and 13th centuries.[19] Of course, such an abundance is primarily due to the specific way in which medieval writings were diffused,

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For an overview of both ancient and modern editions of Averroes's Long Commentary on Aristotle's *Met.*, see Roland Hissette, "En marge des éditions de la *Métaphysique* d'Averroès. Sur les traces de Nicoleto Vernia," *Medioevo* 13 (1987), 195–221. See also F. Edward Cranz, "Editions of the Latin Aristotle accompanied by the Commentaries of Averroes," in: Edward P. Mahoney, ed., *Philosophy and Humanism* (E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 116–128.

16 See Cecilia Martini, "The Arabic Version of the Book *Alpha Meizon* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the Testimony of the ms. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. lat. 2048," in: Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., *Les traducteurs au travail. Leurs manuscrits et leurs méthodes* (Textes et Études du Moyen Age) 18 (Turnhout, 2001), pp. 173–206. On the basis of the sole fragment, nothing can be inferred about the extension of this Arabic-Latin translation. It cannot be excluded that it used to encompass only Book A or even a few books of Aristotle's *Met*.

17 Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio. Wilhelm von Moerbekes Übersetzung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik," in: AL XXV 3.1 (Leiden, 1995), pp. 2–3. On the *Translatio Boethii*, see below, pp. 31–32.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 4. See also below, p. 37.

19 Note that what is meant here is something ultimately different from "the plurality of medieval metaphysics" which Alain de Libera discusses (see above, note 6).

i.e., by means of handwritten, one-shot, imperfect copies.[20] But this is not the whole story. The huge number of versions circulating is also due to two other phenomena, which a hasty modern reader of the Latin Aristotle might overlook.

iii-a First, each individual translator has the possibility to "publish"—let me put it in anachronistic terms—more than one "edition" of his work: a translator might put forth a translation, then decide to go back over it and rework it. Once his revision is finished, he would put forth the revised version of his previous translation, without withdrawing the "first edition" from the "book market."[21] Accordingly, readers will have at their disposal two translations, both ascribable to the same author, but different from one another. Now, while this is not the case with James of Venice, it is so with William of Moerbeke, whose version of Aristotle's *Met*. circulated in two different forms.[22]

iii-b Second, especially before the diffusion of Moerbeke's 14-book *Metaphysica*, medieval readers often encountered a variety of "cut-and-paste Metaphysics,"[23] that is, miscellaneous texts in which segments taken from different incomplete translations are combined in several ways.

There are textual pieces of evidence proving the existence and diffusion of such miscellaneous Metaphysics and attesting to how they are structured. In the aforementioned passage from the Ripoll *Student's Guide*, for instance, Aristotle's *Met.* is described as including (also) two distinct translations of the *Met.*: the old one and the new one. If the author of the *Guide* is to be believed,[24] these two translations are supposed to be read in succession and, consequently, not to be taken as alternative to one

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[20] Cf. Alain de Libera, *L'art des généralités. Théories de l'abstraction* (Paris, 1999), pp. 9–10.

[21] Cf. Luca Bianchi & Eugenio Randi, *Le verità dissonanti. Aristotele alla fine del Medioevo* (Bari, 1990), p. 11.

[22] See below, pp. 47; 54. For an introduction to this topic, see Jozef Brams, "L'édition critique de l'*Aristote latin*: le problème des revisions," in: Steve G. Lofts & Philipp W. Rosemann, eds., *Éditer, traduire, interpréter: essais de méthodologie philosophique* (Leuven, 1997), pp. 39–53.

[23] We are not concerned here with manuscripts of Aristotle's *Met*. in which one version is contaminated with another, since contamination is actually a widely diffused phenomenon, affecting the traditions of all the different translations. See below, e.g., p. 31.

[24] The case of the *Guide* is not isolated. See, for example, Adam of Buckfield, *Sententia*, p. 101 (emphasis mine): "Secundum tamen alios, dicitur *vetus metaphysica* primus liber, et quod in principio *novae metaphysicae* incipit secundus." Also Roger Bacon's commentaries *per quaestiones* on Aristotle's *Met.* presuppose a combined use of these two versions of

another but, rather, as complementary texts, merging into and being part of one single *Met.*[25] In fact, he seems to suggest that the "Methaphisica nova" picks up exactly where the "vetus" leaves off.[26] Thus, some sections are supposed to be read according to one version (i.e., *Met.* A), and others according to the other (i.e., *Met.* α, B-I, Λ). The aim of this fusion is to produce a complete text, which neither the "vetus" nor the "nova" taken separately can make available. Furthermore, there is a certain number of manuscripts handing down these "cut-and-paste Metaphysics."[27] From them there emerges the same concern for completeness observed in the *Student's Guide*, which induces medieval readers to put side by side different partial translations of Aristotle's text and to form a variety of metaphysical corpora.[28]

The remarks made at points (iii-a) and (iii-b) lead us to reflect upon the way in which we must approach books (1)–(5) listed above. Prudence and accuracy are required in order to avoid confusing the texts we read today with the texts medieval people read.[29] There is a distance between them, and it must not be neglected. In order to do that, critical texts should

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Aristotle's text: see de Libera, "La structure," pp. 70–72; Boulnois, "Le besoin," pp. 54–55, n. 37.

[25] The reason for this emerges clearly once it is established that there is a strict relationship not only between what is called "vetus" by the author of the *Guide* and what is so called by us (i.e., TC), but also between what the author of the *Guide* calls "nova" and what we call so (i.e., TnS). As we will see better below, in fact, on the one hand, the beginning of TC provides a segment of Aristotle's text that is missing in TnS; on the other, TnS provides a text far longer than TC. As far as the sections common to TC and TnS are concerned, the author of the *Guide* avoids the overlapping of the two translations by shortening TC. See de Libera, "La structure," p. 70.

[26] Cf. *Met.* α 1, 992a30.

[27] This emerges clearly from the manuscript tradition of TA. In fact, since such a translation encompasses some parts of Aristotle's text that are missing both in TJ/TC and in TnS, it is not rare to come across manuscripts in which TJ/TC and TnS complete each other and, moreover, are enlarged by the addition of some parts of TA. The resulting Metaphysics are longer than the one described in the *Student's Guide*. Still, they are incomplete with respect to the one circulated by William of Moerbeke. For more details see Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in AL XXV 2, p. xxxvii (Table 1) and Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles Latinus," in: Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, & Jan Pinborg, eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), pp. 45–79, esp. 51.

[28] Note that these miscellaneous Metaphysics are sometimes parts of more extended corpora. Two collections of philosophical works are particularly important: the "corpus vetustius" and the "corpus recentius." See Dod, "Aristoteles," pp. 50–51; Brams, *La riscoperta*, pp. 69–79; 123.

[29] For some general remarks on this topic, see Brams, "L'édition"; see also Adriano Oliva, *Les Débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la* sacra doctrina. *Avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des "Sentences"* (Paris, 2006), p. 23, esp. note 25.

never be read without the apparatus that accompany them and the introductions that precede them.

II

1. *The Latin Aristotle on Our Shelves*

None of the titles (1)–(5) listed above is, in the form given here, original. Among them, title (5) is certainly the least descriptive with respect to the translation of the *Met*. which it is supposed to introduce. Only one aspect emerges from it, and that indirectly: the fact that the Arabic-Latin translation of the *Met.* is a constitutive part of the translation into Latin of Averroes's *Long Commentary* on Aristotle's *Met*. On the contrary, titles (1)–(4) are very informative. Each of them consists of a string of clues. While some of these clues figure unvaried in more than one titles (or even in all), some others turn out to be peculiar to only one of them. Within the first group there falls not only the general title, i.e., "Metaphysica,"[30] but also the indication of the literary genre "translatio," which describes all these *Met*. as (a) renderings of Aristotle's text from one language into another. As far as the non-identical parts of the strings are concerned, by and large they introduce three kinds of information:[31] (b) the extension of the translation is pointed out; (c) the translation is attributed to some translator;[32] and (d) the translation is designated by means of the title which it is traditionally given.[33]

Along the lines of these strings and on the basis of the results to which modern scholars have come,[34] title (5) could be made even more informative: *Metaphysica, lib. I.5-X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova."*

Some points emerge from this comparison. (i) Traditional denominations presented in line (d) of the table are intended to characterize the translations according to relative age: new is what comes later, old what

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[30] On this general title, see Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. xi; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, p. x.

[31] Broadly speaking, what appears in the part of the strings peculiar to each translation are three subtitles: (b) the first one identifies the work according to quantitative criteria; (c) the second does it on the ground of the authorship.; and (d) the third subtitle consists of a denomination by means of which one translation is put in some chronological relation to others.

[32] This is not the case with TC.

[33] This is not the case with RTM. However, as hinted at before, RTM can be found circulating under the designation "Metaphysica Novae Translationis."

[34] See below, p. 49.

Table 1. *An Examination of the Titles*

	Greek → Latin				Arabic → Latin
	TJ	**TC**	**TA**	**RTM**	**TnS**
a	translation	translation	translation	translation + revision	translation
b	4 books	4 books	13 books	14 books	11 books
c	James (of Venice)	—	anonymous translator	William of Moerbeke	Michael Scot
d	*Vetustissima*	*Vetus*	*Media*	—	*Nova*

comes earlier, medium is what is in-between. Some of these denominations trace back to the Middle Ages, others do not.[35] In any case, all of them are deceptive, should someone put the five translations in chronological order. Let us take, for instance, the case of TA. Initially called "Media" insofar as it was supposed to be composed some time in-between TC and RTM (i.e., before the latter and after the former),[36] it is nowadays considered older than both; moreover, its posteriority with respect to TJ is no longer taken for granted. Accordingly, even the denomination "Vetustissima," which is supposed to single out TJ as the oldest translation of all, is possibly no more appropriate.[37] (ii) As far as the next-to-last line of the table is concerned, the case of TC is striking. In fact, in the title the authorship issue is in all appearances left out: TC is neither ascribed to some translator nor described as an anonymous translation. Rather, the editor chooses a title that emphasizes the "miscellaneous" nature of this translation. In reality, such a title is not so evasive. For the reference to the composite character of the text implicitly calls our attention to something relevant to its nature: there is somehow more than one author involved in TC, and not all of them have no name.[38] (iii) Moving on to the first line of the table, the case of RTM is noteworthy. From the title, in fact, the editor draws our attention to the twofold nature of this text, which is not

[35] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I[a], pp. xi–xii. Vuillemin-Diem is inclined not to use subtitles of kind (d) as reference designations of the translations because, in the light of the results obtained by scholars, they no longer have descriptive value but merely possess a conventional one.

[36] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," AL XXV 2, p. xv.

[37] See below, pp. 38, 53.

[38] For more details, see below, p. 35.

a translation *tout court* but, rather, partly a (new) translation from the Greek, partly a revision of a previous translation from the Greek. What does not emerge from the table is the identity of the translation Moerbeke revises. Moreover, it does not emerge that Moerbeke's case is probably not an isolated one. In fact, to some extent, the label "revision" also suits TC with respect to TJ.[39]

2. *An Inside Look at the Latin Aristotle*

If, on the one hand, this overview of the titles allows us to fix some reference points, on the other it invites us to prudence. There are still many questions to answer, chiefly concerning the relationships the five translations (and their respective authors) bear to one another. A more definite, though certainly not conclusive, picture can be outlined by taking a closer look at the contents of the translations as announced in the titles.

To start with, let us go back over Table 1, where subtitles of kind (b) are only partially taken into account. From there, some generic information emerges about the (in)completeness of each translation with respect to Aristotle's *Met.* and the number of books included in each of them. But that is not all that can be inferred from those subtitles. Actually, they inform readers also concerning which books are translated in the different cases. And a look through each translation is sufficient to be even more precise about which segments of the different books are actually encompassed in the single translations.

Some new elements emerge from this comparison. Among others, (i) Book K is included only in RTM. However, on the basis of this sole table, we cannot grasp whether Book K is missing for the same reason in the four remaining translations.[40] (ii) Moreover, TJ and TC include the same parts of Aristotle's *Met*. It remains unclear, however, whether and how this coincidence can be accounted for. (iii) Furthermore, there seems to be a rather wide range of books and chapters covered by all (or almost all) texts, so that a structural and stylistic comparison should be easy to make systematically. Actually, when reading the texts, things prove to be

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[39] See below, pp. 36–37.

[40] On the tradition of Book K see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, pp. xvi–xix; Brams, "Der Einfluß," p. 36. For some details about the possible diffusion of Book K in the Arabic world, see Amos Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 241–75, esp. 250–51, n. 22.

Table 2. *Internal Structure of the Translations*

Books of Aristotle's *Met.*		TJ	TC	TA	RTM	TnS
I (=A)	A1–5 (until 987a6)	○	○	○	○	
	A5–10 (987a6ff.)	○	○	○	○	○
II (=α)		○	○	○	○	○
III (=B)		○	○	○	○	○
IV (=Γ)	Γ1–4 (until 1007a32)	○	○	○	○	○
	Γ4–6 (1007a32ff.)			○	○	○
V (=Δ)				○	○	○
VI (=E)				○	○	○
VII (=Z)				○	○	○
VIII (=H)				○	○	○
IX (=Θ)				○	○	○
X (=I)				○	○	○
XI (=K)					○	
XII (=Λ)	Λ1–10 (until 1075b11)			○	○	○
	Λ10 (1075b11ff.)			○	○	
XIII (=M)				○	○	
XIV (=N)				○	○	

trickier than that. It is only going beyond the title pages of the five translations that these, and others, aspects can be brought into light.

III

1. *James of Venice's Translation*

The Latin *Met.* critically edited in AL XXV I is intended to restore the pure, i.e., original, version of a partial 12th-century translation of Aristotle's *Met.* by James of Venice.[41] Actually, such a translation has a rather limited diffusion in its pure version. In fact, as far as the section from the beginning of Book I to line 998b23 of Book III is concerned, James's text

[41] TJ was previously edited—although with the title "Metaphysica Vetus" —by Steele in 1932, in appendix to his edition of Roger Bacon's *Questions on Met.* I–IV. See Roger Bacon, *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, ed. Robert Steele (Oxford, 1932), vol. 11, pp. xxi–xxvi, 255–312, 329–32. This edition, however, is unreliable. Cf. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines de la *Métaphysique* au Moyen-âge: le problème de la *Metaphysica Vetus*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 49 (1967), 7–71, esp. 8, n. 5.

circulates mainly in contaminated forms, blended with another translation of Aristotle's *Met.*: TC.[42] The pure version of James's text has been established by the editor mainly on the basis of two 12th-century manuscripts:[43] Ay (= Avranches, Municipal Library 232) and Os (= Oxford, Bodleian Library, Selden sup. 24).

In its original form, James's translation was almost certainly longer than the one handed down in manuscripts and critically edited.[44] This thesis is grounded on a consideration of the translator's intention and on the witness of Thomas Aquinas. First of all, it is unlikely that James decided to stop translating Aristotle's text right in the middle of an argument (as is the case at 1007a32 of the Greek text). Moreover, what appear to be traces of the now-lost section have been found in Aquinas's literal quotations from Aristotle's *Met*. For two passages, one from Book Δ (1024a11) and one from Λ (1076a24–26) of Aristotle's *Met.*, Aquinas records and discusses two readings that match none of the variants attested by the extant Latin translations.[45] Aquinas introduces both as "Boethian" readings and, in doing so, gives rise to a doubt: did Aquinas have in his hands a now-lost translation of Aristotle's *Met*. ascribable to Boethius?[46] Other "Boethian" readings that Aquinas cites in his Commentary on Aristotle's *Met*.[47] give evidence for answering this question in the negative. In fact, these further quotations from the supposed Boethian version are taken from the part of Aristotle's *Met*. preserved, among others, in James's translation. This makes it possible to compare these "Boethian" readings with those attested in TJ. What emerges from such a comparison is that Aquinas is actually citing James under the name of Boethius. This allows us to think, by extension,

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[42] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xvii–xx; xvi–xxvii. With regard to the rest of James's text, from 998b23 onwards, it is attested, in his pure form, by both manuscripts handing down TJ and manuscripts handing down TC.

[43] More details in Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xxxiii–xlii.

[44] See Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "La *Metaphysica Vetustissima* comprendeva tutta la Metafisica?" *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 42 (1950), 222–26 (repr. in Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* [Amsterdam, 1972], pp. 98–102); Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 9–10.

[45] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, V, lec. 21, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 1109; *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*, c. 1, ed. Hyacinthe F. Dondaine, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. 43 (Rome, 1976), p. 298.585–87; see also Hyacinthe F. Dondaine's preface, p. 281.

[46] See Minio-Paluello, "La Metaphysica"; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xii–xvi.

[47] All these passages are examined in Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xiv–xv.

that the aforementioned passages of *Met.* Δ and Λ, despite their explicit attribution to Boethius, are also in reality from James's version. Some stylistic elements corroborate this identification: the "Boethian" readings witnessed by Aquinas are characterized by a number of formal features peculiar to James's manner of translating.[48]

All these elements invite the conclusion that James's translation originally contained more than four books of Aristotle's *Met.*[49] The pieces of evidence are too few to specify how much more. Still, nothing prevents us from thinking that James's translation could have encompassed even the whole of *Met.*, with potentially no exceptions. The loss of a certain number of the books of the *Met.* is likely due to accidental reasons.[50]

If Aquinas's witness is useful for claiming that James's translation was originally (almost) complete, it does not show that such a version was still circulating in Aquinas's times. Quite the opposite, the references by Aquinas to the non-extant sections of James's translation are so rare that it is likely that this part of James's text was not accessible to him in its full form, but only in a fragmentary one,[51] probably in the form of marginal notes, in a partially annotated manuscript that transmitted another complete Latin version of Aristotle's *Met.* However matters stand, since there is philological evidence that the whole extant tradition of James's translation cannot be traced back directly to the original but entirely depends on an archetype,[52] it is plausible that this very archetype was already incomplete.[53]

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[48] See Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Iacobus Veneticus Grecus: Canonist and Translator of Aristotle," *Traditio* 8 (1952), 265–304 (repr. in Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 189–228).

[49] All these elements do not allow us to establish, however, whether what is indicated by means of either the expression "Littera Boethii" or "Translatio Boethii" is TJ *tout court*, that is, in its pure form. It cannot be excluded that such a designation refers to TC or to a contaminated version, mingling readings of both TJ and TC. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 55; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xiv–xv; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, p. 3. The reason why all these identifications are possible and, anyway, do not compromise the strict nexus between James of Venice and the supposed Boethius will become clearer later on (see pp. 34–35). Basically, not only is TJ the basis for TC but also, from a certain point onwards, TC coincides exactly with TJ.

[50] See Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Giacomo Veneto e l'Aristotelismo Latino," in: Agostino Pertusi, ed., *Venezia tra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Florence, 1966), pp. 53–74 (repr. in Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 565–86, esp. 578).

[51] See René-Antoine Gauthier, *Thomas d'Aquin, Somme contre les Gentils. Introduction* (Paris, 1993), p. 62.

[52] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. xxxiv.

[53] See Minio-Paluello, "La Metaphysica," p. 98.

2. *James's Style*[54]

Both James's style of translation and his (Greek-)Latin vocabulary have been accurately and exhaustively studied by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Gudrum Vuillemin-Diem, mainly with the aim of establishing the authorship of the so-called "Vetustissima." In fact, in the manuscripts, this translation is never openly ascribed either to James of Venice or to anybody else.[55]

Literalness characterizes TJ. James is definitely not concerned about the literariness of his Latin phrasing. Rather, respect for the original text and restitution of its veritable meaning are high on his list. James establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the words in the original text and his Latin version. This is particularly evident when the sequence of words is taken into account. In fact, wherever possible, James reproduces faithfully in Latin also the Greek word-order. Indeed, he does not seem to be concerned that this choice sometimes detracts from legibility. It is worth noting, however, that this tendency to symmetry in quantity and order does not entail a strict one-to-one lexical correspondence. For, while there are some Greek terms that James always renders with the same Latin term, there are also a certain number of Greek words that he translates with different words. Nevertheless, this is not the case with key terms, which James translates in a fixed way, sometimes drawing on Boethius's philosophical Latin vocabulary.

Finally, it is important to call attention to the presence, in TJ, of simply transliterated terms and of untranslated ones. While the choice of introducing transliterations can be accounted as a stylistic one, this is not the case with terms which are kept untranslated. Actually, these terms are signs of James's very honest approach to the text: not being sure about the appropriate rendering, he prefers not to translate the Greek into Latin.

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[54] It is impossible to single out the Greek manuscript on the basis of which James of Venice translates Aristotle's *Met*. into Latin. Indeed, there is no evidence for definitely excluding that James was working with more than one Greek model at once. Most certainly, the Greek text read by him coincides with none of the Greek manuscripts used in Ross's and Jaeger's critical editions of Aristotle's text. It is very likely a manuscript that also hands down marginal Greek scholia, which James translates into Latin in addition to Aristotle's text. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xlii–xlvii; 74–83. Cf. also Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Manoscritti aristotelici latini del XII secolo con note contemporanee; scolii greci alla *Metafisica* tradotti da Giacomo Veneto," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scoalstica* 47 (1952), 489–95 (repr. in Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 178–88).

[55] See Minio-Paluello, "La Metaphysica," p. 98; Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," 26–27, 36–43; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xiv–xv.

That this is actually the case is confirmed by Latin paraphrases following some of these untranslated words.

3. *James's Translation and the* Composita

A comparison between TJ's and TC's stylistic features makes James's approach in translating clearer.[56] Suffice, for the time being, to keep in mind that the so-called "Vetus" is, for the most part, a reworking of James's translation and, as such, depends on James's text. The unknown translator reworks James's text with a general linguistic revision in view. In fact, his main goal seems to be to rewrite James's text in order to make it sound more Latin, so to say. In the eyes of the TC's author, for instance, James's strict adherence to the Greek phrasing ends up seeming as odd, even unnatural, by Latin readers. Accordingly, while James's vocabulary is often left unchanged, the sequence of words is frequently rearranged in a different order; philosophically key terms are also involved. On the one hand, the TC's author tends to avoid both transliterations and untranslated words. On the other, he tries to simplify the philosophical jargon and to make it as unambiguous as possible: while one Greek concept is signified by more than one Latin word, any single Latin word is employed to signify only one concept.

4. *The* Translatio Composita[57]

Despite what the comprehensive title of AL XXV I–I^a might lead us to think, this stylistic comparison cannot be made along the whole length of James's text. In fact, as can be inferred from the graphic devices used by the editor, from line 134.5 onwards, the printed text is nothing but James's translation itself. As a consequence, the end of part I^a of AL XXV also corresponds to the beginning of line 1007a32. We need to account for the "patchwork structure" of this text. The question to be answered is ultimately the following: which *Met.* does AL XXV I^a intend to restore?

In order to answer this question, we must first understand what TC was originally supposed to be and what material aspect it was supposed to

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[56] The comparison is made simpler because of the graphic devices used by Vuillemin-Diem in her edition of TC. For an explanation of them, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. 88. More details about the comparison between TJ and TC can be found in Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 36–43, and Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xxix–xxxii.

[57] On the rediscovery of TC, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 16–18.

have.[58] In all likelihood, the TC's author did not compose his new translation of Aristotle's *Met.* as an independent and continuous text. Rather, he worked directly on a manuscript copy of TJ, making his amendments directly on it. Materially speaking, thus, his translation was a sort of drafted fusion between James's text and a series of marginal/interlinear annotations to such a text: the achievement of this fusion was up to readers.

Now, for some reason,[59] the anonymous's corrective annotations do not go beyond the translation of line 998b23. Accordingly, the reviser ultimately entrusts his readers with the task of finding in his annotated copy of TJ a new partial version of Aristotle's *Met.*: a version briefer than James's.[60] Given the material status of the original manuscript, however, what he provides his readers with is actually something more: a partially new version of Aristotle's *Met.*, consisting of, first, a revised segment of TJ and, second, of a non-revised segment of it.[61] On the whole, then, TC ends up being a version of Aristotle's *Met.* as long as James's and partially identical with it.

Therefore, the text printed in AL XXV I^a reproduces this enlarged version of the revision, so that this critical edition restores more than just the revised section of the text. In fact, while the translation of lines 998b23 onwards does not make part of the reviser's work taken by itself—being part, on the contrary, of the translation by James—in AL XXV I^a the two segments are juxtaposed, as parts of one continuous text. As a consequence, it is not to the anonymous revision in his original form that we are sent back, but to the extended form in which, from the very beginning, it actually circulates; to be precise, to its pure form, which the editor establishes on the basis of one manuscript in particular: Rx (= Reims, Municipal Library 865, fols. 15r–30v). The rest of the tradition is sensibly damaged by phenomena of contamination, possibly due to its dependence on an

[58] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 51–52.

[59] There are no decisive elements, so it could be either because of an accidental loss of the following part of the revision or because of the choice of the author to interrupt his revision. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 52.

[60] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 54.

[61] This is one possibility. But it cannot be excluded that this juxtaposition is the result of a different process: the revision being originally longer than the extant one, some part of it could have been lost, so that a copyist, coming across an autograph already damaged, could have decided to integrate the lost part, drawing on James's translation. However matters stand, the pure text of James (from 998b23 onwards) is copied by a faulty model. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 52.

original too difficult to interpret, because of the huge number of notes and corrections on it.[62]

5. *The Nature of TC*

Up to now, I have taken for granted that the first part of TC (until 998b23) is a *revision* of James's text and its author an unknown *reviser*. As I mentioned earlier, however, none of these aspects filters out from the title of AL XXV I[a]. This discrepancy needs a word of clarification.

Caution is required, since there is no evidence that the unknown author confines himself to simply revising James's text. The point seems not to be whether the anonymous deserves the label of translator *tout court*, that is, whether his dependence on James's work is ultimately not so strict. Rather, at issue are two aspects strictly related to one another: (a) on the one hand, the uniformity and the quality of the transformations to which he subjects James's text; and (b) on the other, his working method.

a It might be suggested that the author of TC is doing something even less demanding than a true revision. He could be, for instance, a copyist who is arbitrary conflating TJ with another, now lost, translation of Aristotle's *Met*. Nevertheless, the majority of the transformations TJ undergoes at the hands of the TC's author answers to one coherent project: rewriting TJ in a more scholastic and plainer Latin, as touched on above. This being the case, there is no need to think of the unknown author as of a copyist contaminating two texts with one another.[63] There are no impediments, then, to considering the opening section of TC as a proper revision of the corresponding part of James's translation rather than the result of a unsystematic contamination.

As a reviser, the unknown author is supposed to improve James's translation, but this is not always the case, since wrong renderings as a replacement for James's good solutions are not rare.[64] Hence, if TC can still be

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[62] While from the translation of 998b23 onwards copyists are faced with a non-ambiguous continuous text (overlapping with TJ), this is not the case with the opening section. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 51.

[63] On the reasons for rejecting this possibility, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 44–45.

[64] What these bad corrections betray is the fact that the anonymous reviser is not such a proficient Greek user: although being able to go back over James's Latin version on the basis of Aristotle's Greek text, he is unlikely to have translated it into Latin from the ground up, facing the Greek text by himself. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," p. 49.

considered a revision—since the lexical and grammatical choices of his author, although sometimes worse than TJ's, are instrumental to the main task of Latinizing it—it is a revision of poor quality. Is that all that can be said about TC? Maybe not. One question in particular is worth asking about the unknown author's working instruments: is there anything else on his table, in addition to a manuscript copy of TJ and a manuscript copy of Aristotle's Greek text?[65]

b This question could tentatively be answered positively. In fact, it cannot be excluded that the reviser could have been in possession of some Latin translation, now lost, and could have—more or less systematically—consulted it, either to check his own renderings or to reinforce his own (modest) linguistic skills. If this is the case, TC would turn out to be something more than a (bad) revision of TJ: it would be, to some extent, a new translation with respect to TJ, in virtue of the renderings that it would take from the supposed previous translator and introduce as alternatives to TJ's. But, once again, decisive evidence is lacking, so that we are compelled to conclude that TC is a revision potentially inspired by a lost translation.[66]

IV

1. *The* Translatio Anonyma

The (first part of) TC is not the only translation of Aristotle's *Met.* that depends on a previous Latin translation. In fact, William of Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Met.* is extensively, even if not wholly,[67] based on TA. Namely, Moerbeke neither generically draws his inspiration from TA nor occasionally falls back on it; rather, he reworks the translation systematically, re-examining it word by word in light of Aristotle's Greek

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[65] The Greek model used by the reviser coincides with none of the extant Greek manuscripts of Aristotle's *Met.* However, it is certainly different from the one used by James of Venice. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 68–71; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. lvii–lviii.

[66] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 44–49; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, pp. xxxi–xxxii. For further details, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 4–5; Brams, *La riscoperta*, pp. 49–50.

[67] See below, p. 42.

text.[68] In order to better characterize this dependency, let me say a few things about TA.

In terms of chronology, TA is a translation (i) possibly coeval to James's translation and (ii) certainly earlier than both TnS and TC; still, (iii) it has no immediate diffusion, so that it starts to circulate not only much later than TJ but also after both TnS and TC enter circulation.

As before, we need to answer the question of which *Met.* AL XXV 2 intends to restore.[69] Roughly speaking, the critical text we can currently read does not reproduce TA in its pure form; rather, it reproduces a "composite" text.[70] In fact, the text of TA actually starts at 9.27 (in correspondence to line 982a23 of Bekker's text), while what precedes—from the beginning until 9.27—is a reproduction of the opening segment of TC. Even apart from chronological remarks—TC being successive with respect to TA—there are stylistic reasons for considering this opening section as extraneous with respect to what follows and, therefore, non-original.[71] It is worth noting that this juxtaposition TC-TA dates back to the origin of TA's circulation. In fact, since the whole manuscript tradition attests to this "composite" version of the text, it is likely that the archetype of the whole tradition had it.[72] Accordingly, though the incipit we read in AL XXV 2 is the very same as the one 13th-century copyists and readers were provided with and considered as the incipit of TA, it must not be mistaken for the authentic incipit of TA.[73]

For the modern reader, the text of TA from 9.27 onwards is an ideal one, so to say, taking us back not simply to the archetype but beyond it, towards the lost autograph by the anonymous translator. In fact, while a philological examination of the witnesses allows the reconstruction of

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[68] On the notion of dependence, see Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Jakob von Venedig und der Übersetzer der *Physica Vaticana* und *Metaphysica Media* (zu Datierungs- und Abhängigkeitsfragen)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Âge* 41 (1974), 7–25, esp. 12.

[69] A previous, scientific edition of TA was prepared by Bernard Geyer: see Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, 2 vols. (Münster i. W., 1960–64). Geyer bases his reconstruction on only three manuscripts (see *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. x).

[70] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 52–55.

[71] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. xx.

[72] Since his model lacked the beginning, the copyist producing the archetype could have drawn on TC to supply the missing part.

[73] Actually, of this authentic incipit nothing is known; to some extent, not even whether it used to exist. However, since it is hardly likely that the author of TA began his translation in the middle of an argument (indeed, of a sentence), TA must have had originally a proper incipit and then successively undergone an accidental mutilation, so as to remain acephalous.

the archetype—on the basis of the mistakes occurring in the whole tradition—the editor is able—mostly through conjectures—to correct and improve it.[74] These amendments occur at many levels. Let us mention just one of them. The manuscript tradition is unanimous in attesting to some interpolated passages, borrowed from TnS, which is posterior to TA. It is likely that such passages were noted down in the margins of one (direct or indirect) archetype's model, so that a scribe could have conflated them with or substituted them for the original version. This is why the editor tends to expunge them.[75]

To sum up: even if the text provided in AL XXV 2 strives for the original and pure form of the *Anonyma*, far older than the archetype from which the whole tradition descends, as far as its beginning is concerned, it reproduces the actually circulating version of it, which goes back to the archetype and not beyond it.[76] All in all, how was the original form supposed to look? First of all, it was not interpolated, neither with the *Composita* nor with Scot's translation. Second (and accordingly), it must have been more complete[77] than the one that came down to us: it was almost certainly provided with a proper incipit.

2. *Authorship Issues*

Up to now, the issue of authorship has not been approached. It is now time to say a few words about it, in order to establish whether and to what extent the label "anonymous" really suits this translation. In fact, over the years, scholars have collected elements relevant not only to characterizing more precisely the style of the anonymous author but also to identifying him, although tentatively, with one definite translator.

In 1950, when starting work on TA—at that time commonly called *Media*—Minio-Paluello begins to examine the text from a stylistic and a lexical perspective. Through a comparative approach he comes to two conclusions:[78] (1) the *Media* is attributable to none of the known translators from Greek into Latin, namely, neither to James of Venice nor to

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[74] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, pp. lv–lx.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] For the rest, the discrepancy between the circulated text and the original one can be observed by comparing systematically the critical text with the apparatus.

[77] About the possible absence/presence of Book K, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, pp. xvi–xix, esp. xix.

[78] See Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Caratteristiche del traduttore della *Physica Vaticana* e della *Metaphysica Media* (Gerardo di Cremona?)," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 42 (1950), 226–31 (repr. in Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 102–07).

Boethius; (2) there is a very close relationship between the *Media* and the so-called *Physica Vaticana*—another anonymous translation from Greek into Latin, transmitted in a manuscript dating back to the second half of the 12th century[79]—so close that the two translations could be ascribed to the same unknown author. In fact, there are very few divergences between the two texts in vocabulary (philosophical as well as non-technical) and in manner of translating; indeed, all these divergences can be easily accounted for as different solutions elaborated by the same author, but at different times.[80] But who was the translator? Minio-Paluello looks for an answer to this question in the manuscript tradition of the *Media*:[81] in one of them the translation is ascribed to one "Canoniensis." Taking "Canoniensis" as a corruption for "Cremonensis," Minio-Paluello hypothesizes (3) an ascription of the *Media* to Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). However, he admits openly the limitations of such an ascription. First, (3a) Minio-Paluello doubts whether Gerard may have had time to take on himself such an enterprise among his many other translation projects. Moreover, (3b) Minio-Paluello calls attention to something odd about this attribution: the *Media* would represent the first and the only attempt by Gerard to translate a text from Greek into Latin, since he is usually known as a translator from Arabic into Latin.

When preparing her edition of TA, Vuillemin-Diem goes back to Minio-Paluello's thesis. She shares all his convictions as well as all his doubts. In particular, she gives new evidence in favor of points (1) and (2). She rejects point (3), as the title she gives to the translation shows: "anonyma." Moreover, drawing to some extent on objection (3b), Vuillemin-Diem comes to a more precise characterization of the anonymous's translating style[82] and to the conclusion that the anonymous must be someone who

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[79] Cf. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat. 1855, fols. 88r–94v, described in: AL, *Codices. Pars Posterior*, ed. George Lacombe et al. (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), p. 1200, n. 1800. On this manuscript, its dating, and the dating of the text it hands down, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Jakob von Venedig," pp. 8–9; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, pp. xxiii–xiv; and Fernand Bossier & Jozef Brams, "Préface," in: AL VII 2 (Leiden, 1990), pp. xiii–xv.

[80] See Minio-Paluello, "Caratteristiche," p. 106.

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 103–04.

[82] Vuillemin-Diem describes it as suitable for a non-native speaker of Greek. For instance, he often makes recourse to transliterations in Latin, betraying some uncertainties about Greek vocabulary. The translator turns out to be not so current on Greek grammar as well: he renders plural terms in the singular and vice versa, and confuses abstract terms with concretes ones; he often mistakes one case for another, or one construct for another, missing the general sense of the original sentence. With regard to syntax, the

practices Greek as a foreign language; indeed, a person well acquainted not only with Latin but also with Arabic. Certain features of his translating style, in fact, seem to be accountable for only with reference to an Arabic background.[83]

A new, very stimulating hypothesis on the subject has been proposed by Charles Burnett, which ultimately substantiates Vuillemin-Diem's vague intuition. Looking at TC from a sensibly different perspective,[84] Burnett comes to the conclusion that there is likely to be a link between TA and some texts composed in 12th-century Antioch, within a scientific circle which makes reference to a particular philosopher, named Stephen. At that time, Antioch was a multilingual cultural center, where Greek, Arabic, Latin, and Syrian intellectuals met and exchanged books and experiences. In such a context, the circle around Stephen devoted itself to translating texts; Stephen, in particular, translated texts from Arabic into Latin. His translations bear traces of the multicultural background from which they come. In fact, Stephen's way of translating from Arabic into Latin cannot be explained without assuming that he is working in contact with Greek speakers as well as that Stephen himself is well acquainted with Greek.

Now, Burnett suggests that TA, in virtue of the multilingual background of its author—(4) a non-Greek translating from Greek into Latin and with Arabic elements—resembles Stephen's translations. Although this affinity does not permit the conclusion that the author of TA is Stephen himself—indeed, Burnett tends to exclude this possibility[85]—it certainly allows us to locate the author of TA in a more precise context than beforehand, perhaps within the very circle of Stephen, or at least in some contact with Antioch and the intellectual life of the city.[86]

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translator seems not so well acquainted with conjunctions, which he ends up misinterpreting. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Jakob von Venedig."

[83] Actually, Vuillemin-Diem does not push her intuition too far, and she confines herself to hinting at the possibility of placing the anonymous's enterprise in some not-further-specified Arabic context. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 6–7.

[84] See Charles Burnett, "A Note on the Origins of the *Physica Vaticana* and *Metaphysica Media*," in: Rita Beyers, Jozef Brams, Dirk Sacré, & Koenraad Verrycken, eds., *Tradition et Traduction. Les textes philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au Moyen Âge latin* (Leuven, 1999), pp. 59–68. His study concerns not only TA but also the so-called *Physica Vaticana*. Burnett focuses on the use, in both these texts, of a Latin system of alphanumerical notation.

[85] See Burnett, "A Note," p. 67.

[86] See Brams, *La riscoperta*, pp. 65–66, and "Der Einfluß," pp. 36–37.

While these elements turn out to be relevant for situating the TA's author in place and time, they unfortunately do not further our knowledge of his working method. For instance, nothing new can be said concerning the Greek manuscript(s) that he took as his model(s). Likewise, nothing new emerges about the instruments he used in his translating activity. All that can be said is that on his desk there must have been one Greek manuscript, probably not completely accentuated,[87] and perhaps TJ, from which it cannot be excluded the anonymous translator sporadically draw.[88]

3. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka

William of Moerbeke's workroom is much less hard to reconstruct. In fact, Vuillemin-Diem's accuracy in philological research[89] has led not only to discovering which books were on William's desk and how many of them there were, but also to formulating plausible hypotheses about when and how he used them in order to accomplish his translation of Aristotle's *Met*.

The critical text printed in AL XXV 3.2 restores the second and definitive version of William's twofold work:[90] in part, William limits himself to correcting and reworking TA—and this is the case with Books I to X, the whole of Book XII, and the beginning of Book XIII (until 271.42)—; and in part, he provides his readers with a new translation from Greek into Latin of Aristotle's text—and this is the case with the whole of Books XI and XIV, as well as with a considerable segment of Book XIII (from 271.42 onwards). The reconstruction of this definitive version of William's text is essentially based on four witnesses: three manuscripts belonging to the

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87 On the Greek manuscript possibly used by the anonymous as a model, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 2, pp. lxii–lxvii.

88 See Vuillemin-Diem, "Jakob von Venedig," pp. 24–25.

89 See Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Untersuchungen zu Wilhelm von Moerbekes Metaphysikübersetzung," in: Albert Zimmermann & Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, eds., *Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 15) (Berlin, 1982), pp. 102–208; Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, "Recensio Palatina und Recensio Vulgata—Wilhelm von Moerbekes doppelte Redaktion der Metaphysikübersetzung," in: *Aristotelisches Erbe*, pp. 289–366; Gudrun Vuillem-Diem, "La traduction de la Métaphysique d'Aristote par Guillaume de Moerbeke et son examplaire grec: Vind. phil. gr. 100 (J)," in: Jürgen Wiesner, ed., *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1987), vol. 2 (*Kommentierung, Überlieferung, Nachleben*), pp. 434–86; and Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1.

90 See Brams, "L'édition," p. 45.

so-called independent tradition (Da, Zl, Si),[91] plus the exemplar on which depends the whole university tradition (P).[92]

The autograph by Moerbeke—to which P, Da, Zl, and Si are, for the most part, all independent witnesses[93]—is conjectured to have had a layout that differed according to its parts. As we have already seen in the case of TC, in fact, William also carries out his revision by working directly on his own manuscript copy of TA. While he puts into the copyists' and the readers' hands a (legible) continuous and complete text—which he writes down word by word, from beginning to end—of the books he properly translates, for the books he simply revises, like his counterpart in the case of TC, he introduces his own corrections in an existing continuous version of TA, with the result that he circulates a manuscript overflowing with marginal and interlinear autograph notes.[94] It is up to the copyists and the readers to interpret William's intentions and write down his revision in the form of a continuous text, by inserting all corrections, each of them in the right place.

In light of these observations, the contents of AL XXV 3.2 can be described more precisely as follows. The critical edition restores on the one hand the translation by Williams in its original and definitive form and, on the other, an ideal (i.e., never actually handwritten by him) continuous version of his revision of TA, in its definitive form, such as William is likely to have conceived it.

Let us linger on the part of Aristotle's text which William translates directly from the Greek. While the case of Book XI is comparatively simple—since this book is missing in TA, William must simply translate it into Latin—the case of Books XIII and XIV requires some clarification. In fact, Books XIII and XIV are already included in TA. Why does William decide to translate them, rather than to revise them, as he does for all the other books already included in TA? According to Vuillemin-Diem, there is a purely material explanation for this choice: William is working on an

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[91] Respectively: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1060 (fols. 1r–176v); Venice, Biblioteca nazionale Marciana 1639 (fols. 1r–104v); El Escorial, Biblioteca del Real Monasterio, f. II. 1 (fols. 2r–127v).

[92] The exemplar P is actually lost, but it still can be reconstructed on the basis of the consensus among the codices belonging to such a family of the tradition. On the university tradition of RTM, the exemplar and its diffusion by means of the pecia system, see Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," p. 435; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 55–101.

[93] See Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," p. 436; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 123–40 and 157–64.

[94] See Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," pp. 437–38.

incomplete manuscript copy of TA, so that *his* TA stops in mid-sentence at 1076b9 and includes neither the rest of Book XIII nor the whole of Book XIV. This is the reason why he decides to integrate his revision of TA with a translation of the missing part,[95] indeed, to switch quite abruptly from revision to translation.[96]

4. *William's Translating Style*[97]

When translating Aristotle's text, William pursues one main aim: providing a clear Latin version of Aristotle's *Met*., as close as possible to the Greek text. William tends to render Aristotle's work word by word, to reproduce its grammatical structures as precisely as possible, yet without losing sight of the overall meaning of any sentence and the thought it conveys. Moreover, he tries to establish some lexical correspondence between Aristotle's vocabulary and his own: to any given Greek word he tends to make correspond one single Latin term, which he uses when the corresponding Greek word occurs.

His revision of TA is inspired by these same principles of rendering. William is not inclined to change TA drastically and on the basis of preconceived ideas. He amends TA wherever it sounds to him unfaithful to the original text, too loose or grammatically incorrect; moreover, he introduces corrections whenever TA presents expressions either ambiguous or inadequate to restore the sense of Aristotle's text. Two kinds of modifications are worth noting in particular: on the one hand, William modifies TA, when he realizes that the translator has misread his Greek model; on the other, William replaces one Latin expression with another when he thinks that the Greek text followed by the anonymous author is not the best one. From these corrections there emerges clearly not only William's linguistic finesse but also the great attention he constantly pays to paleographical and philological aspects, his commitment to the search for good Greek variants, in addition to satisfactory translations.

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[95] From this point up to the end of Book XIV, William's text turns out to be independent from the text of the *Anonyma*, and actually distinct from it. It is worth noting that, while up to 1076b9 William's intervention certainly improves the text of the *Anonyma*, from 1076b9 onwards William's translation appears sometimes to be less correct and refined than the anonymous one, which William was not able to consult: see Vuillemin-Diem, "Untersuchungen," p. 115.

[96] On the sudden switch from revision to translation at 1076b9, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Untersuchungen," pp. 103–16.

[97] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Untersuchungen," pp. 109–16.

In summary, William had at his disposal an incomplete manuscript copy of TA, which he annotated and integrated with new pieces of translation. But how did he concretely go about his work? While his revision involves a comparative effort—TA must be compared, word for word, with Aristotle's text—his new translation involves an immediate approach to the Greek text. Therefore, two manuscripts are thought to have been on William's desk: one copy of TA plus a manuscript of Aristotle's *Met*. in Greek. Actually, this is not exactly the case; or, at least, this is the case at the very beginning, when William starts working on the *Met*. Then, at some point, a third manuscript appears on his desk; there is evidence that he begins to consult a further Greek manuscript. And this is not surprising, given his aforementioned philological concerns.

Which manuscripts are we talking about? While not so much is known about the third manuscript,[98] far more can be said about the other two. The manuscript copy of TA on which William works is lost, but it was doubtless closely related to an extant manuscript: Sc (= Pisa, Biblioteca Cateriniana del Seminario Arcivescovile 11).[99] One of his two Greek models, in contrast, is an extant manuscript: J (Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Phil. Gr. 100).[100]

J includes a version of Aristotle's *Met*. missing the beginning: the text begins from line 994a6 of Chapter α2; the whole of Book A, Chapter α1, and the beginning of Chapter α2 are missing. Accordingly—just as William's switch from revision to translation at M2, 1076b9, can be explained on purely material grounds—there is likely to be a material explanation of his use of a second Greek manuscript. Still, this is not enough. In fact, William has recourse to the second Greek manuscript not only in order to fill J's material gaps but also in order to check the accuracy of some other passages which are attested also in J.

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98 See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 185–88.

99 See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 22–24.

100 J is not one manuscript copy of Aristotle's *Met*. among the others: it is a very ancient manuscript, written in Constantinople, dating back to the 9th century and belonging to the so-called "Philosophical Collection." It is likely that William took possession of this manuscript in Greece during a stay there and then carried it away to Italy. There are several pieces of evidence proving that Moerbeke not only looked through J but also possessed it as a personal copy of Aristotle's *Met*.: among others, the presence of Latin annotations, ascribable to William himself and dating back to the time in which he was elaborating his translation. See Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," pp. 442–86; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 165–84.

5. *A Two-Step Work*

The text in AL XXV 3.2 shows the final result that William achieves by using all these instruments. But what about the path to this result? Many details can be inferred by the critical edition and, in particular, through an examination of the inconsistent way in which the manuscript Da relates to P, Si, and Zl. In fact, while there are many cases where its testimony agrees with theirs, there are many others in which it does not.

As Vuillemin-Diem points out,[101] Da's individual readings are not trivial scribal errors but, rather, alternative readings ascribable to William himself.[102] Indeed, such individual readings are not mere confirmations of the fact that, when in doubt about which Greek variant to choose or which rendering to propose, he suggests a double reading. They also prove that Moerbeke does not make a one-shot translation of Aristotle's *Met.* But, rather, works it up in two distinct phases: first he goes through it from beginning to end and then, sometime after, reworks it throughout. To be precise, Da represents the first translation drafted by Moerbeke (called *Recensio Palatina*),[103] while the definitive version (called *Recensio Vulgata*) is handed down by P, Si, and Zl.[104]

6. *William's Work Step-by-Step*[105]

At the very beginning of his work, William's translating plan is subordinated to material contingencies. J lacking the beginning, (i) William starts revising TA from 994a6 onwards, i.e., from where the *Met.* contained in J begins. In this first phase, no annotations are introduced in the opening part of his copy of TA. (ii) William's revision must have been interrupted at the end of Book X. At this point, in fact, in TA there is something missing with respect to J: Book K, which Moerbeke decides to translate from Greek and introduce in his *Metaphysica.* (iii) William then resumes his revision of TA and keeps on revising until obliged, once again because of

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101 See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 206–47.

102 See Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," pp. 439–41.

103 Technically speaking, Da is a manuscript witnessing the first recension of Moerbeke's translation. Pay attention to the fact that the Latin term "recensio" used in this context means something slightly different from what it signifies in the title of AL XXV 3.

104 Obviously, the existence of Da proves that, however little, also the first version of the translation has some circulation. See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, pp. 275–85.

105 See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, p. 207 (see *Schema*). For chronological details, see below, p. 54.

material circumstances, to a second halt: his own copy of TA being incomplete, (iv) he starts again to translate from the Greek in order to provide the missing portion of text.

At some point of this first phase of work,[106] William probably takes possession of the other aforementioned Greek manuscript. It is in virtue of it that (v) he can partially revise the opening part of TA, coming to cover also chapters A1–A3 (until 984b8) of Aristotle's *Met*. In any case, for some reason William interrupts his work before completing his revision, so that there is a segment of TA that he still leaves unrevised (984b8–994a6).

Sometime later, (vi) he resumes the previous version of his translation and decides to modify it. At his disposal are now the same copy of TA as he had beforehand, J, and the other Greek manuscript, which became available during the first phase of his work. In making this revision, his focus is threefold. First of all, William is now able to complete his revision of TA and to cover the segment previously left unrevised. Second, he goes back to the parts of TA already revised and double-checks them on the basis of J. Third, he reworks the parts he previously translated from the Greek, double-checking them on the basis of J. There are segments of text in which he limits himself to making a few changes, others in which his reworking is rather intense. (vii) It is only after this second phase that he finishes, making public the definitive version of his work.

To conclude, let me describe briefly this two-phase elaboration from a qualitative point of view, explaining what undergoes change from the one version—the *Recensio Palatina* (= G_1)—to the other—the *Recensio Vulgata* (= G_2)—and how both relate to TA. Broadly speaking, in his first approach to Aristotle's *Met*. and to TA, William seems to focus mainly on philological issues; in his second approach, by contrast, he is engaged in improving his translation, as far as the vocabulary and the overall interpretation of Aristotle's text are concerned.[107] Moerbeke shows himself flexible and works on his text in various ways:[108] sometimes the passage from G_1 to G_2 entails some change, sometimes it does not; and the same happens with respect to TA: sometimes in G_2 William reintroduces the reading of TA, which he had changed in G_1; sometimes in G_2 he modifies the reading of

[106] See Vuillemin-Diem, "La traduction," pp. 458; 460–61.

[107] See Brams, *La riscoperta*, pp. 117–18.

[108] Concetta Luna has very clearly schematized this variety, collecting all the cases examined by Vuillemin-Diem: (1) $G_2 = G_1 = TA$; (2) $(G_2 = G_1) \neq TA$; (3) $G_2 \neq (G_1 = TA)$; (4) $G_2 \neq G_1 \neq TA$; and (5) $(G_2 = TA) \neq G_1$. See Concetta Luna, "Review of AL XXV 3.1–2," *Gnomon* 70 (1998), 120–24, esp. 122.

TA, which he had on the contrary kept unchanged in G_1; sometimes the reading of TA is modified a first time in G_1, then again in G_2.

V

In his Long Commentary on Aristotle's *Met.* [= *LComM*], Averroes includes not only his comments on Aristotle but also the text of the *Met.* upon which he is commenting:[109] Averroes divides it into 340 segments (*textus*), which he alternates with as many sections of comment (*commenta*). When translated from Arabic into Latin, Averroes's *LComM* is reproduced faithfully: the Latin version reproduces the same two-level structure. In fact, it includes the translation into Latin of both Aristotle's texts and Averroes's comments. Thus, we should look at the Latin tradition of *LComM* in order to deal with the Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Met*.

An overview provides the following results. While this two-level structure is restored by Gion Darms, Ruggero Ponzalli, and Bernard Bürke in their editions, this is not the case with the 1562 Juncta edition. The Juncta edition contains a third text: Bessarion's Latin translation of Aristotle's *Met.*, which has nothing to do with the 13th-century Arabic-Latin translation of *LComM*. When the manuscript tradition is taken into account, something still different can be observed. In fact, while we certainly come across manuscripts handing down the aforementioned two-level translation, this is not always the case. For there are also extant manuscripts in which only the whole of Aristotle's texts are copied, without the respective comments by Averroes: they are copied consecutively, from the first to the last, with no traces of the segmentation peculiar to Averroes's text.

In light of these few remarks, it is necessary to stop briefly to think about the denominations by means of which the Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Met.* is usually designated, namely, either as a translation by Michael Scot or as "Metaphysica Nova."[110] While the latter denomination can be properly used only to indicate Aristotle's text when taken out of Averroes's Commentary, the former can be used for it as well as for the segmented version of Aristotle's text. Nevertheless, some caution is advised.

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[109] On the Arabic text of Aristotle's *Met.*, see Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations," p. 251.

[110] See, for instance, Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, p. 7.

1. *The Identity of the Translator*

Among the other problems which the absence of a critical edition of *LComM* has left unsolved, there is also the question of its authorship: who translates from Arabic into Latin Averroes's *LComM* including Aristotle's texts? Despite the common attribution of these "twins translations" to Michael Scot, this is actually a legitimate question, since in none of the extant manuscripts are they explicitly attributed to him.[111] However, new encouraging results in support of the generally accepted belief come from some recent studies by Dag N. Hasse, concerning the translating style of Michael Scot (and of other translators) from Arabic into Latin. From an examination of Scot's Latin translation of Averroes's Commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo* in parallel with the Arabic text, Hasse singles out a series of Latin renderings peculiar to Scot, and so isolates some key terms of Scot's vocabulary. Then, proceeding by comparison, he shows that the vocabulary used by the translator of Averroes's *LComM* is consistent with Scot's standard vocabulary, while inconsistent with that of any other translator known. Therefore, Michael Scot is very likely the author of this translation of *LComM* and, consequently, of the "Metaphysica Nova" too. Once a complete edition of the text is achieved, it will be possible to resolve the issue in a definitive way.

Be that as it may, the "Metaphysica Nova" can no doubt be characterized as a very literal translation from the Arabic,[112] and its author as someone who masters Aristotle's text not only from a linguistic point of view but also from a doctrinal one. As opposed to how he treats Averroes's comments, the translator never abridges Aristotle's texts.[113] Instead, he tries to reproduce them as faithfully as possible, although he is sometimes compelled to take some liberties of expression because of the structural differences between Arabic and Latin. It cannot be excluded that the translator

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[111] See Dag N. Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century* (Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, 2010), pp. 7–8.

[112] See Charles Burnett, "Translating from Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: Theory, Practice, and Criticism," in: Lofts & Rosemann, eds., *Éditer*, pp. 55–79, esp. 67. This characterization might sound odd, since the Arabic-Latin text, when compared with the Greek text of *Met.*, seems to be a paraphrase of it more than a translation. Actually, this comparison is misleading, because the Arabic-Latin *Met.* does not descend directly from the Greek text but, rather, bears to it an indirect relationship. In fact, it is the Arabic *Met.*, of which the "Metaphysica Nova" is a literal translation, that is, a paraphrastic rendering of the Greek *Met.* is the Arabic *Met.*

[113] See Hasse, *Latin Averroes*, p. 33.

could have made use of double readings or even that he could have come back to rework his translation more than once.[114]

2. *Number, Numbering and Sequence of the Books*

Like the surviving Arabic text, also the Latin version of Averroes's *LComM* does not cover the whole of Aristotle's *Met*. Books K (=XI), M (=XIII), and N (=XIV) are not commented on.[115] Moreover, there are no extant comments on the first half of Book A (until 987a6). Unsurprisingly, the same parts are lacking also in the Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Met*. As a result, despite what might seem to be the case from a perfunctory overview of the Juncta edition, the Arabic-Latin *Metaphysics* consists of 11 books: half of A, the whole of α, B, Γ, Δ, E, Z, H, Θ, I, and an incomplete version of Λ. This incompleteness with respect to the original Greek *Met.* brings about a shift in the book numbering. Because of the absence of Book K—which would naturally be numbered as the eleventh—the Latin version of Book Λ no longer figures as the twelfth book of the *Met.*: it becomes the eleventh book, the translation of the extant part of A being counted as the opening book, that of α as the second, the translation of B as the third and so on. Note that this numbering does not coincide with the one in the Juncta edition, where Λ figures as Book XII.[116]

Things are even more complicated than this, since the numeration issue goes side by side with another intricate question: that of the sequence of the books. Actually, the opening book of the Arabic *Metaphysics*.[117] is not A, but α. As a consequence, Averroes's *LComM* opens with comments on α. As far as the comments on the extant part of A5 and on A6–10 are concerned, they follow the commentary on α and figure immediately before the commentary on B. This reversal gets transmitted also to the Latin tradition, so that it is not rare to find manuscripts, both of Averroes's *LComM* and of Aristotle's *Met*., attesting to the following sequence: α, A (from 987a6 onwards), B-I, Λ. Therefore, while in the aforementioned

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[114] See Hissette, "En marge," p. 217.

[115] There are some doubts about the final part of the commentary on Book Λ, whether it used to exist or not: see Maurice Bouyges, "Notice," in: Averroès, *Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat*, 4 vols., ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beyrouth, 1967–73), vol. I.1, pp. cxii–cxiii.

[116] The Juncta edition includes also a Latin version of Book K of Aristotle's *Met*.

[117] See Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations," pp. 246–51; Cecilia Martini, "La tradizione araba della *Metafisica* di Aristotele. Libri α-A," in: Cristina d'Ancona-Costa & Giuseppe Serra, eds., *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba. Atti del colloquio "La ricezione araba ed ebraica della filosofia e delle scienze greche," Padova, 14–15 maggio 1999* (Padova, 2002), pp. 75–112.

11-book *Metaphysics* the translation of Book A figures as the first book, in this new sequence it is counted as the second book. In any case, this reversal does not eliminate the distinction between α and the extant part of A, and it involves no further shift: B continues to be the third book, and Λ continues to figure as Book XI.

However, this is not always the case. In fact, in some of the manuscripts witnessing the A-α reversal, we encounter phenomena of merging and splitting, which may entail not only a rethinking of the A-α distinction but also some renumbering of the books from B onwards. The cases attested are basically three:[118] (i) the contents of Averroes's commentary on Book α and the extant part of A5 and A6–10 are included, in this very order, in one single book, which is regarded as the opening book of the whole *LComM*; (ii) Averroes's commentaries on Book α and A are merged, as in (i), while the commentary on Γ is split into two segments; and (iii) Averroes's commentary on Book α and the comments 1–6 on A are included in one single book, the opening one, which is followed by another book, including the rest of the comments on A.[119] Now, while the main consequence of arrangement (iii) is a redistribution of contents between Books I and II, which actually does not affect the numbering of books from III onwards, something different occurs in case (ii)—which entails a partial renumbering—and (i), which involves a general change of sequence,[120] since the total amount of books is reduced by one.[121]

Now, which structure must be restored in a critical edition? It is not easy to say. At issue is the huge gap between the text as originally conceived by the translator and the text as it actually circulates. Which one must be edited? It is a question that scholars have already had the occasion to discuss and probably will continue to discuss for a while.[122]

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[118] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," AL XXV 3.1, p. 8; Auguste Mansion, "Les prémices de l'*Aristoteles Latinus*," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 44 (1946), 104–29, esp. 117–19, n. 14.

[119] The opening book covers the segment 993a30–995a20, plus the segment 987a6–989b6; Book II encompasses the rest of Book A, i.e., from 989b6 onwards. See Maurice Bouyges, "Annotations à l'*Aristoteles latinus* relativement au *Grand Commentaire* d'Averroès sur la *Métaphysique*," *Revue du Moyen Âge Latin* 5 (1949), 211–32, esp. 222.

[120] This seems to be the structure of the "Methapisica noua" which the author of the Ripoll's *Student's Guide* describes (see above, p. 20).

[121] The reason for such a variety of arrangements is still to be ascertained. However, it is natural to think that, at least for some of the aforementioned solutions, the comparison with other Greek-Latin translations of Aristotle's *Met.* and the tendency to combine the Arabic-Latin with parts of them could have played some role.

[122] Darms and Bürke, for instance, establish the text of Averroes's commentaries respectively on α and Θ working on a group of Parisian manuscripts only and argue in favor of an

VI

Up to this point, I have not been too much concerned with chronological issues, and still less with geographical ones. It is now time to piece the information collected together by fixing some dates and some spatial coordinates.

1. *A Chronological Overview*

To start with, let me recapitulate some of the main points made in the previous sections.

i TC is in part a reworking of TJ. Accordingly, TC is no doubt posterior to TJ.
ii Being in part a reworking of TA, RTM is posterior to TA.
iii In both cases, one of the two authors involved is known: James of Venice in the first case, William of Moerbeke in the second. This allows us to be more precise about the relative chronology of TJ, TC, TA, and RTM.
iv In the case of TnS, no relative chronology can be suggested. However, the almost certain attribution to Michael Scot enables us to put forward some reliable hypotheses concerning the date of the translation, given that we know Michael Scot's biography in some detail.[123]
v There is evidence that TA's archetype, on which the whole of its extant manuscript tradition depends, was copied after the publication of both TC and TnS. However, while this chronological datum is very useful for reconstructing the history of the diffusion and reception of TA, it is of little help in accounting for its origin and composition.
vi Nevertheless, there is some evidence that links TA to the *Physica Vaticana* and that ascribes both to one single author, on stylistic grounds. Moreover, some clues relate TA to the figure of Stephen and his multicultural circle in Antioch.

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edition restoring the text as actually known by men of the Middle Ages. Ponzalli does not agree with them. On this debate, see Hissette, "En marge," pp. 210–17.

[123] See, in particular, Charles Burnett, "Michael Scot and the Transmission of Scientific Culture from Toledo to Bologna via the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen," *Micrologus* 2 (1994), 101–26; see also Richard C. Taylor, "Introduction," in: Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, *Long Commentary on the "De Anima" of Aristotle*, ed. Richard C. Taylor (with Thérèse-Anne Druart) (New Haven, 2009), pp. cvii–cviii.

vii TA does not depend on TJ; however, it may have drawn occasionally on it. As a consequence,

viii both TJ and TA date back to the 12th century and are possibly contemporary to one another.

ix The composition of TnS dates to the first half of the 13th century.

x The composition of Moerbeke's work instead dates to the second half.

xi TC should be placed between James's translation and the archetype of TA, somewhere in-between the 12th and the 13th centuries.

xi* Not so many chronological facts can be established about TC. Vuillemin-Diem observes that the first attested quotations from this translation dates back to the 1230s, but she does not venture to deduce anything about the date of its composition.[124] There are no pieces of evidence either that it was composed immediately before, or that it was composed a long time before—and started circulating only far later, as in the case of TA—anyway at least a little after TJ. However, Vuillemin-Diem tentatively establishes a connection between TC and the 1231 papal bull by Gregory IX, which confirms the previous prohibitions against the use of Aristotle's *libri naturales*, but envisages also their suspension, as soon as the *libri* have been examined, purged, and corrected. Vuillemin-Diem hints at the vague possibility that the anonymous translator is engaged in this campaign of revision, about which very little is actually known. This would explain his commitment to making James's Latin more plain, to the detriment of the faithfulness and correctness with respect to the Greek original. Still, for the time being this remains nothing more than conjecture.[125]

Much more can be said about the other translations.

viii* James of Venice translates Aristotle's *Met.* in the second quarter of the 12th century, and TA supposedly belongs to the same period, since Stephen and his circle were active in the 1120s.[126] Nothing is really certain about the relative order of succession between these two translations. We have to be content with the cautious suggestion[127] that TJ precedes TA.

ix* Concerning the Arabic-Latin version of Aristotle's *Met.*, it is commonly acknowledged that it was composed in the 1220s. Indeed, on the

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[124] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, p. 4. TC was composed for sure before 1237: see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. xxxii.

[125] See Vuillemin-Diem, "Les traductions gréco-latines," pp. 50–51; Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV I–I^a, p. xxxii.

[126] For a slightly later dating, see Vuillemin-Diem, "Praefatio," in: AL XXV 3.1, p. 6.

[127] See Brams, *La riscoperta*, p. 65.

basis of a study on the reception of Averroes's *LComM* at the University of Paris, Gauthier is inclined to date it even more precisely. He claims that the knowledge of "Metaphysica Nova" is attested from 1225 onwards, so that it is plausible to date TnS back to the period 1220–24.[128]

x* As far as William of Moerbeke's translation is concerned, finally, several elements can be used to establish its date. First of all, a stylistic comparison (between the translation of the *Met.* and other translations by Moerbeke whose dating is already known) can give us indications of its approximate date. Moreover, there are several indirect proofs of the use of Moerbeke's translation by contemporary authors, and Aquinas in particular, who knows and uses both the *Recensio Palatina* and the *Recensio Vulgata*, as soon as they come out.[129] All things considered, Vuillemin-Diem comes to formulate the following hypothesis: the first version of William's translation dates back to about 1260–61; after an interruption of few years, William resumed his work between about 1266–68; certainly before 1270, he finished his translation and put the definitive form of it into circulation.

2. *A Geographical Overview*

The history of medieval translations of Aristotle's *Met.* unfolds across a wide geographical area. Apart perhaps from TC, which may come from a Parisian context, in all the other cases the story of the text is one of travels and intercultural exchanges, and its main characters are individual translators,[130] with their curiosity, their linguistic skills, and their interest in ancient books.

i First of all, there is James of Venice,[131] "Iacobus Veneticus Grecus," as he calls himself. James introduces himself as a Greek; indeed, as someone

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[128] See René-Antoine Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier 'averroïsme,'" *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), 321–74, esp. 334. Hasse seems to be disposed to consider TnS even earlier (see Hasse, *Latin Averroes*, pp. 30–31).

[129] See above, note 104.

[130] See Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Aristotele dal mondo arabo a quello latino," in: *L'Occidente et l'Islam nell'Alto Medioevo*, 2 vols. (Atti delle settimane di studio 12) (Spoleto, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 603–37 (repr. in Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 501–35, esp. 506–07); Dod, "Aristoteles," p. 53; Luca Bianchi, "La ricezione di Aristotele e gli 'Aristotelismi' del XIII secolo," in: AA.VV., *Ciencia y Cultura en la Edad Media. Actas VIII y X* (Canary Islands, 2003), pp. 293–310, esp. 296–99; and Louis-Jacques Bataillon, "Sur Aristote et le Mont-Saint-Michel. Notes de lecture," in: Max Lejbowicz, ed., *L'Islam médiéval en terres chrétiennes. Science et idéologie* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2008), pp. 105–13, esp. 111–13.

[131] On James of Venice see Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Iacobus"; Minio-Paluello, "Giacomo Veneto e l'Aristotelismo latino," in: Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula*, pp. 565–86; Bossier &

who feels more comfortable speaking Greek than Latin. He was probably not born in Venice, as his name may make us suppose, but more probably in Constantinople, in the Venetian quarter: "a Venetian by extraction born and educated among Greeks," as Minio-Paluello suggests. At some point, in the 1140s, James appears in Italy. It could be somewhere in Italy that he translated into Latin Aristotle's *Met.*, working on a Greek manuscript that he could have carried with him from Constantinople. But nothing militates against the hypothesis that his translation, or at least part of it, might date back to his time in Constantinople. Therefore, James's translation might have started there and journeyed west.

ii Second, there is the author of TA: Stephen or, in any case, someone related to the context in which Stephen himself operates. The translator may have worked precisely in Antioch, and if this was the case, it easily accounts for the slow and late spreading of his work in Europe. However, there are no reasons to prefer this hypothesis over the following one: the translator could have been in touch with the Syrian cultural world, even if his base of operation was quite far from it. This could be the case for someone working somewhere in Italy,[132] since we know of numerous exchanges between Antioch and Italy at that time.[133]

iii As far as the "Metaphysica Nova" and Michael Scot are concerned, they must in all probability be traced back to an Italian context; to be precise, Scot works for Fredrick II and his court in southern Italy.

iv Finally, William of Moerbeke begins translating Aristotle's *Met*. during a stay in Greece. When leaving for Italy, William brings with him his Greek model, so that he may continue to work on it. It is probably in Viterbo that he resumes and completes, step by step, his work.

The Latin world's rediscovery of Aristotle's *Met*. is thanks to these men, to their capability to learn new things and to broaden their own horizon, to their willingness to be confronted with others. It is not useful to argue who among these translators is most entitled to be described as the "true discoverer" of Aristotle's *Met.*, to whom the Latin World is more indebted, even less if the question is raised from a contemporary perspective. There are no winners, there is no race, but rather an unconscious collective effort to make available one book, so fascinating that it never stops arousing

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Brams, "Préface," in: AL VII 2, pp. xv–xx; and Sten Ebbesen, "Jacques de Venise," in: *L'Islam médiéval*, pp. 115–32.

132 Maybe in Pisa: cf. Burnett, "A Note," p. 67.

133 *Ibid.*, pp. 67–68.

interest, exciting discussions, and rallying people from different countries and cultures, at different times and in different languages.

VII

In the previous pages I have surveyed the medieval translations and translators of Aristotle's *Met.* into Latin and provided an account, however indirect, of current research on these topics. Allow me to conclude with two methodological remarks.

First of all, I would like to say a few words about the reason for taking an interest, as philosophers, in these historical and philological issues. For anyone interested in a certain medieval Latin commentary on Aristotle's *Met.*, the issue of the Latin text which is commented on is crucial. In fact, it is illogical to make interpretative points if we do not know what Latin version of Aristotle's *Met.* one author is reading and expounding. In other words, the reading of commentaries as exegetical instruments cannot disregard this philological dimension.

As a matter of fact, determining the base text of a given commentary is as important to the analysis of the commentary as it is hard to achieve. It is so difficult for two reasons. First, it is not rare for an author to work with more than one Latin version at the same time. Second, we need to come to terms with the fact that medieval authors do not have at their disposal five hardback standard editions, one for each Latin translation, as we have in our libraries. They read Aristotle in manuscript copies, each of which is unique in terms of the individual readings it contains. Accordingly, the fact that two authors comment on the same Latin version of the *Met.* does not imply that they are commenting on exactly identical—word-by-word—texts.[134]

A further caveat is in order. From my chapter, Aristotle's *Met.* presents itself as an isolated, independent work which can be read in several different versions. What does not emerge, by contrast, is the fact that this is not how things were perceived by medieval readers. For they never faced

[134] Whence the advisability of providing readers with two-level editions of medieval commentaries on Aristotle, linking any commentary with the Latin text upon which it is plausibly commenting. Cf. René-Antoine Gauthier, "Praefatio," in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. 47.1 (Rome, 1969), pp. 203*–34*. Note that such a reconstruction is necessarily imperfect, insofar as exclusively based on quotations, for the greatest part implicit, and paraphrastic sections of the commentaries.

Aristotle's *Met.* by themselves; it was always accompanied by some—by then inescapable—exegetical tools. Indeed, two in particular stand out: from the end of the 12th century, Aristotle's text is read in the light of the metaphysical section of Avicenna's *Book of the Cure*—a treatise on metaphysics, rather than a true commentary on Aristotle—and from the 1220s also it is read in the light of Averroes's *LComM.*[135] This historical element is very important to the analysis of medieval commentaries on the *Met.*[136] Suffice it to point out here the importance of taking them into account whenever examining commentaries on the Latin *Met*. and, then, whenever dealing with the reception of Aristotle in the West.[137]

[135] For further details on this aspect, see Amos Bertolacci, "The Reception of Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Latin Medieval Philosophy until Albertus Magnus," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Hannes Möhle, & Susana Bullido del Barrio, eds., *Via Alberti. Texte—Quellen—Interpretationen* (Münster, 2009), pp. 457–80, and "From Athens to Buhārā, to Cordoba, to Cologne: On the Transmission of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the Arab and Latin Worlds during the Middle Ages," in: Graziella Federici Vescovini & Ahmad Hasnawi, eds., *Circolazione dei saperi nel Mediterraneo: filosofia e scienze (secoli IX–XVII). Atti del VII Colloquio della SIHSPAI* (Florence, 2013), pp. 217–33.

[136] For more on the nature and contents of these complements to Aristotle's *Met.*, see the chapters by Amos Bertolacci and Matteo Di Giovanni in this volume.

[137] For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter I would like to warmly thank Fabrizio Amerini, William O. Duba, Gabriele Galluzzo, Adriano Oliva, and especially Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem.

THE COMMENTATOR: AVERROES'S READING OF THE *METAPHYSICS*[1]

Matteo di Giovanni

1. The Texts and the Context

Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rušd (d. A.D. 1198), known to the Latins under the name of Averroes, is a preeminent interpreter of the intellectual flowering of 10th- to 12th-century Islam in the lands of al-Andalus. His story and career as an intellectual of strict Aristotelian observance are intimately tied to the vicissitudes of Muslim Spain after the proclamation of the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh (d. 961). When al-Ḥakam II (d. 976) succeeded his father in 961, he inherited the project of turning a western province of the Islamic Empire into a leading intellectual center capable of competing with the refined civilization of the East. Initially, and mainly as part of an anti-Abbasid strategy, the Umayyads of al-Andalus supported Mālikism and regarded with favor its high appreciation of the values connected with the tradition (*naql*) and transmission (*riwāya*) of prophetic *ḥadīṯ* as the ultimate foundations of religion and society. Subsequently, in the time of al-Ḥakam II, the widening gap between East and West prompted a change in cultural policy. Driven again by a steadfast anti-Abbasid bias, the Umayyads toned down their sympathies for Mālikī traditionalism and increasingly promoted the cultivation of natural sciences, logic, and philosophy.

A turning point was marked by the foundation of the great library of Cordoba under al-Ḥakam II. A few decades after the death of al-Fārābī in 950, the Saragossian philosopher Abū Bakr b. Bāğğa (d. 1139), the Latin Avempace, had access to his major philosophical works. While Averroes was still active between Cordoba, Seville, and Marrakesh, another library, in Toledo, had handed over its holdings to the Spanish invaders. Occupied militarily in 1085, Toledo conquered its conquerors with the fascination of

[1] I wish to thank warmly Prof. Peter Adamson and Prof. Dimitri Gutas for their helpful comments on a first draft of this chapter. I am solely responsible for any mistakes that remain.

a highly refined scientific and philosophical civilization. Under the Archbishop Raymond of Sauvetat (d. 1152) and his successor John of Toledo (d. 1166), much of the Arabic intellectual legacy was appropriated by and made available to the Westerners: al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-ʿulūm* (*De Scientiis*), al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* (*Intentiones Philosophorum*), as well as a large part of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'* (*Liber Sufficientiae*) were translated into Latin by the end of the 12th century. At roughly the same time, the Arabic-Latin corpus of works further gained in substance through the inclusion of such authors as al-Kindī (Alkindius), Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (Johannitius), Quṣtā b. Lūqā (Constabulus), and Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron).

Averroes was a young man when a new Berber domination was established in the Maghreb. The failure of the Umayyad caliphs to halt the Christian advance paved the way for new leaders from North Africa. When Averroes was 21, in 1147, the Almohads (*al-Muwaḥḥidūn*) took over al-Andalus with far-reaching consequences for the intellectual life of the Islamic West. The self-proclaimed Mahdī Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130), founder and spiritual guide of the Almohad movement, portrayed himself as the herald of a highly intellectualized form of religion which he inculcated among the executive cadres of Andalusian society. State officers were selected among scholars (*ṭullāb*), the guardians (*ḥuffāẓ*) of the Almohad dogma, and Averroes was naturally, on account of his lineage, a full member of the ruling class. Both his father and grandfather were chief judges (*qāḍī l-quḍāt*) of Cordoba, an office that Averroes would eventually assume in his turn.[2] The new rulers were genuinely interested in the rational sciences; it is thus under the patronage of the Almohad caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf (d. 1184) that Averroes began his extraordinary intellectual career. One day, as the story goes, Averroes was introduced to the Almohad court by his mentor Abū Bakr b. Ṭufayl (Abubacer, d. 1185). The prince asked him the opinion of the philosophers about the eternity of the world and was highly impressed by the talent the young philosopher demonstrated in his response. When, later on, the caliph expressed his wish to have the books of Aristotle explained, Averroes undertook his celebrated exposition (*talḫīṣ*). There is no universal agreement among scholars as to the exact date when this episode took place, if it may be considered historical at all. According to the Moroccan historian ʿAbd

[2] See Dominique Urvoy, *Averroès. Les ambitions d'un intellectuel musulman* (Paris, 1998), pp. 24, 29–30.

al-Wāḥid al-Marrākušī (b. 1185), at least, this encounter with the caliph set the tone for all or most of Averroes's exegetical work.[3]

An extremely prolific author, Averroes is credited with more than 100 titles. His exegesis of Aristotle consists of three series of "commentaries" which cover almost the entire *Corpus Aristotelicum*. These are usually referred to as *Short Commentaries* or *Epitomes* (*Epitomae*, *Compendia*), *Middle Commentaries* (*Paraphrases*, *Mediae Expositiones*, or simply *Expositiones*), and *Long Commentaries* (*Magnae Expositiones*, *Magna Commentaria*, or *Commentarii*), even though these labels do not quite capture the meaning of the original titles. As pointed out by Dimitri Gutas,[4] Averroes's *Epitomes* (*ǧawāmiʿ*) are in fact "abstracts of demonstrable truths" of philosophy with no visible link to the text commented on; likewise, the so-called *Middle Commentaries* (*talāḫīṣ*, sing. *talḫīṣ*) can be described as "precise expositions of subjects (*al-maʿānī*) in Aristotle," while the *Long Commentaries* (*tafāsīr*, sing *tafsīr*; also *šurūḥ*, sing *šarḥ*) take the form of commentaries *ad litteram* (*ʿalā l-lafẓ*) providing a detailed exegesis of the text organized around a number of lemmata (*textus*) and corresponding sections of commentary (*commenta*).[5] The different works supply the reader of Aristotle with a wide range of approaches to the text and its doctrine, and those familiar with Latin Scholasticism will easily recognize in the *Short* and *Long Commentaries* the rough equivalents respectively of the doctrinal summaries known as *Sententiae* and of the more analytical, text-based *Expositiones*. The *Long Commentaries*, in particular, were soon canonized in the Latin West as the prototypes of literal exegesis, and Thomas Aquinas would model upon them his own expositions of Aristotle.

Considered in its immediate historical context, the undertaking of Averroes was key in the implementation of the Almohad ideal of a revival of the intellectual sciences within the Muslim community. By his time, an illustrious tradition had portrayed Aristotle as a champion of the sciences and a safe guide towards a clear and objective understanding of reality. Against this background, the well known devotion to Aristotle of "the Commentator," far from denoting the slavish attitude of a dogmatic mind,

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[3] On the encounter with the caliph and the scholarly debate concerning its date, see Nemesio Morata, "La presentación de Averroes en la corte almohade," *La Ciudad de Diós* 153 (1941), 101–22; Urvoy, *Averroès*, p. 219, n. 6.

[4] See Dimitri Gutas, "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works," in: Charles Burnett, ed., *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts. The Syriac, Arabic, and Medieval Traditions* (London, 1993), pp. 29–76.

[5] The numeration of *commenta* is a peculiarity of the Latin translation.

stands out as a tribute to the potential and the value of philosophical reason. The recourse to literal exegesis reflects the need to rediscover the *prisca veritas* of Aristotle's teaching, and, in this regard, Averroes embodies a conception of philosophy that has, since Late Antiquity, expressed itself in the practice of commentary. At the same time, this tradition is reshaped, in Averroes's intentions, through the rejection of any harmonizing attitude towards Platonism of the kind exemplified by earlier Peripatetics. Averroes's dispute with Avicenna signals a broader reaction against a whole strand of Aristotelianism where, as Gerhard Endress has described it, the actual text of Aristotle becomes gradually detached from the virtual doctrine of Aristotelianism.[6] Explicitly in the *Long Commentaries* and more tentatively in the *Middle Commentaries*, the Commentator challenges the philosophical koine of his time in the name of a strict adherence to the letter of the First Teacher (*al-mu'allim al-awwal*). What he creates in the end is indeed a new, coherent, and influential version of Aristotelianism; but the process is not smooth, and it develops, with discontinuities and reversals, through all the different stages of Averroes's career.

Three major phases can be distinguished in this regard. It is assumed that the *Epitomes* were generally composed before the *Middle Commentaries* and the *Middle Commentaries* prior to the *Long Commentaries*.[7] As far as the *Metaphysics* is concerned, the *Middle Commentary* is the only dated work (1174). Towards its end, Averroes expresses his intention to compose a literal exposition, thus announcing the project represented by the *Long Commentary*. This is, in all likelihood, the last work before his death in 1198, and it is thought to have been composed in two stages between 1192 (Books α–I) and 1194 (Book Λ). The *Epitome*, in four books, is usually dated a few decades earlier to around 1159, even though an explicit reference to the *Long Commentary* (*šarḥ*) in Book II, Chapter 39, attests the existence of at least one later revision and suggests, along with other insertions in one branch of the manuscript tradition, the hypothesis of a somewhat desultory process of composition.[8]

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[6] See Gerhard Endress, "L'Aristote arabe: réception, autorité et transformation du Premier Maître," *Medioevo* 23 (1997), 1–42.

[7] Problems with this periodization as they emerge in connection with the *De anima* and the *Physics* commentaries are briefly outlined by Marc Geoffroy, "Averroè," in: Cristina D'Ancona, ed., *Storia della filosofia nell'Islam medievale*, 2 vols. (Turin, 2005), vol. 2, pp. 760–64.

[8] The doubts about the authenticity of the *Epitome* raised in the past by Bruno Nardi and, more recently, by Charles Genequand are no longer tenable. The chronology of the

The *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* (Arabic: *Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa*; Latin: *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis Metaphysicam*) consists of about 340 textual units (*textus*) in which the text of Aristotle is segmented in a way analogous to the arrangement into chapters of modern editions. Each *textus* is accompanied by a section of commentary (Arabic: *tafsīr*; Latin: *commentum*) internally divided into lemmata (short quotations from the pertinent *textus*) and corresponding explanations. The Arabic text is preserved in a composite manuscript in the University Library of Leiden constituted by two major blocks (*cod. or*. 2074 and 2075) and several quires by different hands. The text was masterfully edited by Maurice Bouyges, S.J., in 1938–48 for the series *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum* within the ambit of a general project to publish the Arabic philosophical works of greatest relevance to the Latin reception. Since Bouyges's edition, only a few translations of parts of the *Long Commentary* have appeared, such as a French translation of Book B by Laurence Bauloye, of Book Z by Ahmed Elsakhawi, as well as a French and an English translation of Book Λ respectively by Aubert Martin and Charles Genequand.[9]

The Arabic-Latin translation of the *Long Commentary*, most likely executed by Michael Scot (d. ca. 1235) between 1220 and 1224, is available in a photomechanical reproduction of the 1562–74 Junta edition, in its

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Middle Commentary is discussed in Mauro Zonta, *Il* Commento medio *di Averroè alla* Metafisica *di Aristotele nella tradizione ebraica. Edizione delle versioni ebraiche medievali di Zeraḥyah Ḥen e di Qalonymos ben Qalonymos, con introduzione storica e filologica*, 2 vols. (Pavia, 2011), vol. 1, pp. 6–7. On the dates of the *Long Commentary*, see Jan A. Aertsen, Carlos Steel, & Rüdiger Arnzen, "Averrois Cordubensis Commentaria Magna in Aristotelis *Physica*, *De Caelo* et *Metaphysica*," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 69 (2002). Supplement: *Averroes Latinus. A New Edition* (Bibliotheca, 4), pp. i–v.

[9] An Arabic-English translation and philosophical commentary of Averroes's *Long Commentary* on *Met*. Z is under preparation by me. The available translations can be found in Averroès, *Grand Commentaire (Tafsīr) de la Métaphysique, Livre Bêta*. Presentation et traduction de Laurence Bauloye (Paris, 2002); Ahmed Elsakhawi, *Étude du livre Zây (Dzêta) de la Métaphysique d'Aristote dans sa version arabe et son commentaire par Averroès* (Lille, 1994); Averroès, *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa), Livre Lām-Lambda*. Traduit de l'arabe et annoté par Aubert Martin (Paris, 1984); and Charles Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Lām* (Leiden, 1986). On the latter, see Dimitri Gutas, "Review of C. Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*," *Der Islam* 64 (1987), 122–26. All the English translations of Averroes's *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* in the present contribution are based on the Arabic text in Averroès, *Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa*. Texte arabe inédit établi par Maurice Bouyges, S.J., 3 vols. (Beirut, 1938–52).

turn a revised reprint of an earlier Venice edition of 1550–52.[10] Hitherto, only parts of the commentary have been edited in a scholarly fashion, on the basis of a limited selection of the 65 manuscripts that preserve the *Long Commentary* according to Rudolf Hoffmann's reckoning.[11] Under the aegis of the Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften and of the Union Académique Internationale, Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Stefan Georges are currently working on a critical edition with English translation of the integral text of the Latin version of the *Long Commentary* based on five Latin manuscripts and two printed editions (Junta 1562–74 and the *editio princeps* by Lorenzo Canozi, Padua 1473). Remarkably different are the situations of the *Epitome* and of the *Middle Commentary*. While the *Epitome* is still extant in Arabic, the *Middle Commentary* is preserved only by two Hebrew translations; moreover, the *Epitome* was translated into Latin during the 16th century, whereas the alleged "translation" of the *Middle Commentary* in the Comin da Trino (Cominus de Tridino) edition of 1560 is, in all likelihood, an original composition by Elijah b. Mošeh del Medigo (Helias Cretensis, d. 1493). Finally, while the *Middle Commentary* has only recently received a critical edition of one of its Hebrew versions with a partial Italian translation, the *Epitome* has been edited as many as five times between 1905 and 1994 and has already received one Spanish, two German, and most recently one English translation.[12]

The special importance of the *Long Commentary* compared to both the *Middle Commentary* and the *Epitome* is due to the fact that it preserves, embedded in the *textus*, the only direct and comprehensive evidence of

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[10] See *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, 11 vols. (Venetiis, 1562–74; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1962).

[11] See Rudolf Hoffmann, "Übersetzungsbedingte Verständnisprobleme im Großen Metaphysik-Kommentar des Averroes (zu Met. Δ 15, 1020b26–1021a14 und 1021a26–b3)," in: Albert Zimmermann & Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, eds., *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 18 (Berlin, 1986), pp. 141–60, esp. 147.

[12] On the editions of the *Epitome* and of the Latin translation of the *Long Commentary*, see Gerhard Endress & Jan A. Aertsen, eds., *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198)*. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum, Cologne 1996 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science) 31 (Leiden, 1999), pp. 363–65. The Spanish edition and translation of the *Epitome* has recently been reprinted with an introduction by Josep Puig Montada in Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, ed. Carlos Quirós Rodríguez (Cordoba, 1998). Most recently, an English translation based on a complete collation of eight Arabic manuscripts has been published by Rüdiger Arnzen, *Averroes on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." An Annotated Translation of the So-Called "Epitome"* (Berlin-New York, 2010). The *Middle Commentary* (critical edition of the Hebrew version by Zeraḥyah Ḥen with a provisional edition of the other Hebrew version by Qalonymos ben Qalonymos and a partial Italian translation) is now available in Zonta, *Il Commento medio*.

the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Guided by his philological sensitivity, Averroes consults the different translations that are available to him so as to ensure that the transmitted text is free from scribal mistakes. Moreover, a large part of the Arabic *Metaphysics* is the work of Usṭāṯ, a member of al-Kindī's circle whose translation is based on an exemplar that is at least as early as the earliest extant Greek manuscript. Unfortunately, the *Metaphysics* incorporated into Averroes's commentary is not complete; it leaves out Books K, M, and N as well as the first half of Book A (A 1–5, 987a5).[13] Averroes's silence does not of course mean that he lacked access to some or all of these books. In fact, the Arabic bio-bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 995) mentions in his index (*Kitāb al-Fihrist*) Arabic translations also for the books that do not appear in Averroes's *Long Commentary*, and Averroes himself shows some acquaintance with *Met*. Books K, M, and N both in the *Middle Commentary*, where he gives a paraphrase of them, and in the overview of the contents of the *Metaphysics* placed before his *Long Commentary* on Book Λ.[14] The reason why these books were not included remains obscure, and several hypotheses have been put forward. Averroes might have chosen to pass over those parts of the *Metaphysics* which he deemed to be redundant, like *Met.* K, or merely dialectical, like *Met.* M–N, either because of the notorious hardships that he experienced at the end of his life or, more deliberately, for the purpose of conveying to his audience an idea of Aristotle's metaphysics as a terse and concise apodictic discourse. What seems better established is that, at least in the case of *Met*. A 1–5, Aristotle's text was lost to Averroes (perhaps already in its Greek exemplar), although some traces of an Arabic circulation have recently been detected.[15]

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[13] In the Arabic version, Books A and α appear in reversed order. Also noteworthy, the section of Book Λ and of Averroes's commentary thereon that is certainly authentic ends at *Met*. Λ 10, 1075b11 (see Averroès, *Tafsīr, Notice*, pp. cxii–xxiii).

[14] There is no conclusive evidence that Averroes's prologue to his *Long Commentary* on *Met*. Λ was translated into Latin during the Middle Ages; see Maurice Bouyges, "La *Métaphysique* d'Aristote chez les Latins du XIIIe siècle: connurent-ils le *Proœmium* d'Averroès (m. 1198) à son commentaire du livre LAM = Lambda?" *Revue du Moyen Âge Latin* 4/3 (1948), 279–81; Averroès, *Tafsīr, Notice*, p. lxxvii.

[15] These, however, point to an Arabic translation other than the one used by Averroes. See Amos Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 241–75, esp. 257–69. Cf. also Cecilia Martini, "La tradizione araba della *Metafisica* di Aristotele. Libri α e A," in: Cristina d'Ancona & Giuseppe Serra, eds., *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba. Atti del colloquio "La ricezione araba ed ebraica della filosofia e delle scienze greche," Padova, 14–15 maggio 1999* (Padova, 2002), pp. 75–112.

The attention paid by the Commentator to even the small details of Aristotle's arguments is evident from the number of translations that he gathers and consults. We are left to speculate as regards the *Epitome* and the *Middle Commentary*, where the text commented on is not extensively reproduced, but in his *Long Commentary* Averroes employs no fewer than five different translations, at times supplementing them with the available exegetical material. Thus, for example, when he encounters a lacuna in the Arabic version of *Met*. Z 7, he has recourse to the *Epitome* of Aristotle's philosophy composed by Nicolaus of Damascus (b. 64 B.C.) and now preserved only in Syriac fragments.[16] The exposition of *Met*. Λ is likewise interspersed with citations from a lost section of the *Metaphysics* commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias, while Themistius's paraphrase represents a major reference on crucial philosophical issues such as the problem of God's providence and of spontaneous generation. Due to its comparative independence from the text of Aristotle, the *Epitome* maintains a still more intense dialogue with the major representatives of the Greek and Arabic philosophical tradition. Ptolemy, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius, al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī are regarded as key figures for the articulation of the metaphysical discourse. Despite Averroes's unparalleled admiration for Aristotle and his model of research, or precisely because of it, all the noble spirits that share in the same intellectual endeavor are valued and embraced. In Averroes's eyes, just as in Aristotle's, each provides a unique contribution to that communitarian and trans-cultural enterprise which is the human pursuit of philosophical truth.

2. The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics

Contemporary scholarship generally concurs that what Aristotle sets forth in the *Metaphysics* is the ideal of a philosophical science rather than the science itself in its concrete determination. Together with the available evidence concerning the stratified nature of the text, this perspective explains why, on the theoretical level, many aspects of the "science sought" (ἡ ἐπιζητουμένη ἐπισήμη) to which Aristotle refers in *Met*. A[17] remain underdetermined and highly controversial. Outstanding among them is

[16] See Hendrik Joan Drossaart Lulofs, *Nicolaus Damascenus on the Philosophy of Aristotle* (Philosophia Antiqua) 13 (Leiden, 1965).

[17] Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* A 2, 983a21; cf. B 1, 995a24; B 2, 996b3.

the question of what the metaphysical science is all about. In some texts (e.g., *Met.* Γ 1), metaphysics is presented as the study of being *qua* being, i.e., as a general consideration of all beings insofar as they *are* and irrespective of their distinguishing features. In other texts (e.g., *Met.* E 1), by contrast, the subject-matter of metaphysics is identified with a particular kind of existents, that is, the separate substances and the sphere of the divine. Aristotle's wavering has triggered an ongoing debate among his ancient and medieval interpreters. In the late 13th century, when Duns Scotus restates the issue in the opening question of his *Metaphysics* commentary, he refers to Avicenna and Averroes respectively as the major advocates of the two opposite camps.[18]

The Arabic tradition has paid special attention to the epistemology of metaphysics and, particularly, the question of its subject-matter. Already in the formative period of *falsafa*, al-Kindī (d. after 870) portrays metaphysics as an overarching science that is identified with natural theology and conducive to the exploration of the first principles and the realm of the transcendental. Several decades later al-Fārābī (d. 950), the initiator of a different strand of Arabic philosophy, proposes an interpretation in which metaphysics is represented, instead, as a universal discipline that deals with the most general subject-matter, that is, unqualified being. It is with Avicenna (d. 1037), however, a self-identified admirer of al-Fārābī,[19] that the whole debate takes on its most intellectually refined and philosophically mature character. Avicenna links the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics with his conception of the sound proof for God's existence. He starts by affirming that a valid theological argument must be based on the notion of being. "Being" is analyzed in terms of "possible" and "necessary": existing beings are possible insofar as they are capable of existence and necessary, in Avicenna's sense, insofar as they actually exist. Arguably, the totality of the beings of which we have experience cannot be assumed to be actual, and hence necessary, by virtue of itself. Therefore it must be so by virtue of some other entity. This entity cannot, in turn, be only possible (because it is a principle of actualization and hence actual in its own right) or necessary by virtue of something else (since it

[18] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, I, q. 1: "Utrum proprium subiectum metaphysicae sit ens in quantum ens (sicut posuit Avicenna) vel Deus et Intelligentiae (sicut posuit Commentator Averroës)."

[19] On Avicenna's credit to al-Fārābī for his understanding Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, see Amos Bertolacci, "From al-Kindī to al-Fārābī: Avicenna's Progressive Knowledge of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* According to His Autobiography," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 11 (2001), 257–95.

is assumed to be different from the collection of beings of which we have experience). Therefore, it remains that it be necessary by virtue of itself, and this is what we call God.[20]

Averroes rejects this line of argument. To his mind, the proof of God's existence revolves around not being but movement. This is, he maintains, the view of Aristotle, who makes the theological argument a part of his science of movement as developed in *Physics* Θ. The difficulties associated with the position that Averroes criticizes in Avicenna emerge from the assumption that some beings are simultaneously possible (by virtue of themselves) and necessary (by virtue of something else). In this way, according to Averroes, Avicenna ascribes to the same entities opposite and mutually exclusive properties, since whatever is necessary is also eternal, whereas any given possibility involves a possibility of the contrary which must eventually be realized.[21] Now, one basic tenet of Aristotle's epistemology is that no science can prove the existence of its own subject-matter (*Post. An*. A 10). Avicenna, who construes his theological argument

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[20] See Herbert A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (New York, 1987), pp. 287–304. Averroes seems to understand the argument along similar lines. For a recent reassessment of Avicenna's argument as centered primarily on the notion of causality and the finiteness of causal chains rather than on the notion of being, see Amos Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence and the Subject-Matter of *Metaphysics*," *Medioevo* 32 (2007), 61–97, esp. 78–84.

[21] Cf. e.g., Averroes, *De Substantia Orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary* by Arthur Hyman (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 104–05: "It would necessarily follow that something eternal has within itself the possibility of being destroyed, without ever actually being destroyed [. . .] and upon this assumption Avicenna built his proof of the existence of a first principle, a proof different from the one based on the existence of eternal motion. But Avicenna's proof is based on faulty premises as you can see." The treatment of the modal concepts of "necessity" and "possibility" in terms of what is eternal and what must be eventually realized (the latter notion being typically referred to in scholarly literature as the "principle of plenitude") surfaces for example in Aristotle's *De gen. et corr.*, B 11, 337b35–338a5 ("What is of necessity coincides with what is always, since that which must be cannot not be. Hence a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal, it is of necessity. And if, therefore, the coming-to-be of a thing is necessary, its coming-to-be is eternal; and if eternal, necessary") and *Met*., Θ 4, 1047b3–6 ("If what we have described is the possible or a consequence of the possible, evidently it cannot be true to say 'this is capable of being but will not be,'—a view which leads to the conclusion that there is nothing incapable of being"). It is remarkable that Aristotle's proof based on motion is taken by Avicenna as a mere anticipation of the proof that pertains to metaphysics (see Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," 76–77). Conversely, the proof for the existence of a first efficient cause in the *Metaphysics* (Book α, Ch. 2) is interpreted by Averroes as a reminder of Aristotle's conclusions in the *Physics* (see Peter Adamson, "Yaḥyá ibn 'Adī and Averroes on *Metaphysics* Alpha Elatton," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 21 (2010), 343–73, esp. 363–65. I thank Peter Adamson for calling my attention to this aspect of Averroes's interpretation of Book Alpha Elatton.

as distinctly metaphysical, appeals to this principle and argues that the subject-matter of metaphysics cannot be God or the separate substances. Averroes refutes this conclusion on the basis of a different interpretation of Aristotle's epistemology. He agrees that no science can demonstrate the existence of its subject-matter, but at the same time he rejects Avicenna's claim that the existence of God is established in metaphysics. By doing so, the Commentator is in a position to bypass the objection against God as a subject-matter, and he concludes in the *Long Commentary* on the *Posterior Analytics* that metaphysics does inquire into the highest and immaterial principles.[22] The same view is stated in the *Physics* commentary, where the immaterial principles that make up the subject-matter of metaphysics are described as separate forms: "Consyderatio de dispositionibus formarum abstractarum, secundum quod sunt abstractae, et de quiditatibus earum est proprie primae philosophiae."[23]

Averroes is aware of a possible objection that Avicenna also must face. In the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* (A 9), Aristotle argues that the principles of a science are not subject to demonstration. Now, God is clearly a universal cause of being and of movement and, as such, constitutes a principle for both physics and metaphysics. How, therefore, can the existence of God be demonstrated in either discipline? Avicenna's solution turns on the idea that God is not in fact a *principle* but, rather, a *kind* of being. God is the kind of being that is necessary by virtue of itself as opposed to the kind of being that is necessary by virtue of something else and possible by virtue of itself. In this way, according to Avicenna,

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[22] Cf. Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, cited in Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," p. 93 (*In Posteriorum Resolutoriorum Commentarium*, I, t.c. 100 [Venice, 1562], vol. I, fol. 230v): "Thus, many [issues] that the divine science assesses are solved by means of what is clarified in the natural science. This kind of cooperation, however, is not the one that Aristotle points at. For, in our case, the posterior [discipline] is the one that provides to the anterior [discipline] the subject-matter which this latter investigates." Unless otherwise noted, all Latin quotations of Averroes's commentaries are taken from the Venice edition 1562–74.

[23] Cf. Averroes, *In De Physico auditu Commentarium*, II, t.c. 26, vol. IV, fol. 59rA, where Averroes also subscribes to the general principle that no science is able to demonstrate the existence of its own subject matter ("Impossibile enim est aliquam scientiam universalem et particularem declarare subiectum esse"). Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 935 (*In Metaphysicorum Commentarium*, VII, t.c. 39, fol. 192rA, where the passage is not fully translated): "[Aristotle] says that natural philosophy is secondary to first philosophy and to its remit precisely because the separate entities (*al-umūr al-mufāriqa*) that are the subject matter proper to first philosophy (*al-mawḍūʿ al-ḫāṣṣ bi-l-falsafa l-ūlā*), are the principle of the subject matter of the natural science." In all quotations from the Arabic of Averroes's commentaries the two numbers separated by a colon refer to the volume and to the page of Bouyges's edition.

God can be posited as the *quaesitum* (*maṭlab*), i.e., the thing sought, in metaphysics, whereas being without qualification, or absolute being, will be its *subiectum* (*mawḍūʿ*).[24] Here again Averroes's strategy is quite different. For him the argument of Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* applies only to those kinds of demonstrations where effects are deduced from causes. There are, however, other kinds of demonstrations where causes are inferred from effects, and Averroes calls them "signs" or "demonstrations of sign" (*barāhīn al-dalīl*). Aristotle employs these kinds of proofs in the *Physics* when he extrapolates from the existence of movement, as an effect, to God as its first cause: "Primus motor impossibile est ut declaretur esse nisi per signum naturale."[25] In the *Physics*, God is posited as the First Mover (*primum movens*) of a first moved substance (*primum mobile*), that is, the outermost heavenly body and the sphere of the fixed stars. The complex argument through which, according to Averroes, Aristotle establishes the existence of the First Mover is analyzed in detail by David B. Twetten.[26] The eternity of movement presupposes the existence of a substance that is capable of receiving eternal motion. This must be a self-moved body which moves itself through a sort of unmoved organ, lest an infinite regress follow. The First Mover that is proved in the *Physics* is, therefore, the unmoved organ of a first self-moving body. At this point, Averroes assumes from Aristotle's *Physics* (Θ 10) and *De Caelo* (B 12) the fundamental principle according to which no body can have an infinite power. This means for him that the First Mover must be unmixed with the body that it moves, for otherwise it could not impart to it an everlasting motion through an infinite motive power. It will, hence, be an immaterial

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[24] Cf. Avicenna, *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, ed. Ǧūrǧ Š. Qanawātī, Saʿīd Zāyid, al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya (Cairo, 1960), and *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt (2)*, ed. Muḥammad Yusuf Mūsā, Sulaymān Dunyā, & Saʿīd Zāyid, al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya (Cairo, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 3–16 (Eng. trans. in Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*. A Parallel English-Arabic Text Translated, Introduced, and Annotated by M.E. Marmura [Provo, Ut., 2005], esp. p. 3).

[25] Cf. Averroes, *In Phys.*, II, t.c. 22, vol. IV, fol. 57rA. Cf. Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, cited in Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," p. 94 (*In Post. Res.*, I, t.c. 70, vol. I, fol. 154v): "The Master of the particular discipline can demonstrate the causes of his own subject-matter by means of proofs (*dalāʾil*) as Aristotle does in the clarification of first matter in the *Physics* and of the First Mover. There is no way to clarify the existence of the First Mover except by means of a proof (*dalīl*) in this science, namely natural science, contrary to what Avicenna thought." Cf. also *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 73–74 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 5, fol. 293rA).

[26] See David Twetten, "Averroes on the Prime Mover Proved in the *Physics*," *Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 26 (1995), 107–34.

principle and a separate substance that *sets in motion*, and in this sense also *constitutes*, the outermost heavenly body.

The proof for the existence of a First Mover marks at once the crowning achievement of physics and the transition to the further inquiries of metaphysics. As Averroes observes in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, "The physicist provides to the master of the divine science [the proof of] the fact that there are existents separated from matter."[27] The same idea is expressed in the earlier *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics* in a way that is also reminiscent of the doctrine in the *Posterior Analytics*: "What has become plain in physics with respect to the existence of separate principles is not superfluous in this science [of metaphysics], as Ibn Sīnā maintains, but rather necessary, because it is employed in this science as a supposition."[28] "Supposition" (*al-aṣl al-mawḍūʿ*) is used here as a technical term of logic (ὑπόθεσις) to indicate the position of a subject-matter that is liable to scientific investigation. According to the *Epitome*, then, the expert of metaphysics assumes the existence of separate substances from physics and takes them as the proper subject-matter of his own investigations. In the later *Long Commentary* on the *Physics*, the relationship between physics and metaphysics is characterized in a similar way: it is only after physics has established the existence (*esse*) of separate substances that metaphysics begins to explore in what way such substances exist and what their "quiddities" and "dispositions" (*quiditates et dispositiones*) are.[29]

It has been noted that Averroes's physics contains no proof for the existence of God *stricto sensu* and that it arrives, at most, at a First Mover of the universe. It has also been argued that Averroes sets out his decisive theological argument not in the *Physics* commentary but in his original treatise on the substance of the celestial spheres, the *De Substantia Orbis*.[30] Whatever the merits of this interpretation, it is in the *Metaphysics* more than anywhere else that the Commentator finds the theological climax of the investigation in the *Physics*. If, on the one hand, Averroes maintains

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[27] See Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," pp. 92–93.

[28] See Arnzen, *Averroes on Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"* p. 24.

[29] Cf. Averroes, *In Phys*., II, t.c. 26, vol. IV, fol. 59rA: "Consyderatio de dispositionibus formarum abstractarum secundum quod sunt abstractae et de quiditatibus earum est proprie primae philosophiae, non scientiae naturalis. Et notandum quod consyderatio in esse istarum formarum est in scientia naturali, non in prima philosophia sicut existimat Avicenna, quoniam in hac scientia apparet istud genus formarum esse, deinde prima philosophia consyderat de quiditatibus et dispositionibus earum."

[30] See David Twetten, "Averroes' Prime Mover Argument," in: Jean-Baptiste Brenet, ed., *Averroès et les Averroïsmes juif et latin*. Actes du Colloque International, Paris, 16–18 juin 2005 (Turnhout, 2007), pp. 9–75.

that only physics can afford a conclusive proof for the existence of God, he is also clear, on the other, that it does so in an indirect way and to the extent that God is really identical with the First Mover. In order to establish this identity, some further and distinctly *metaphysical* assumptions are needed, because the identity or nature of the First Principle is what metaphysics investigates (*prima philosophia consyderat*). In his *Long Commentary* on *Met*. Λ 1 Averroes mentions those properties of the First Mover on which metaphysics sheds light. The account that he gives here is among his most explicit statements on the subject: "[Aristotle] shows in this book that the principle of the first separate substance [i.e., the First Mover] is also substance (*ǧawhar*), form (*ṣūra*), and end (*ġāya*), and that it imparts motion in the two ways together."[31] Averroes explains that the First Mover proved in the *Physics* is subsequently treated as the subject of certain metaphysical properties and becomes, in this sense, the subject-matter of metaphysics. Thus the First Mover turns out to be a primary substance that acts upon the natural world as a First Form and a First End, and so Aristotle's metaphysics supplies a full understanding of God in terms of both his essence and his relationship to the world. It is this same twofold characterization that Averroes alludes to in another passage from the prologue to his commentary on *Met.* Λ, where he observes that in the theological book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle "makes clear the principles of the first substance: he makes clear that it is a substance (*hāḏā huwa ǧawhar*) and in how many ways it is a principle (*wa-ʿalā kam naḥw huwa mabdaʾ*)."[32]

It may appear surprising that Averroes takes the substantiality of the First Mover as a claim that needs demonstration rather than as a self-evident truth. His intuition seems to be that God is a particular kind of substance, i.e., the primary substance, and that only in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle makes clear what it means to be a substance at all. In the so-called central books, from Z to Θ, a long argument is set out to show that

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[31] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1425 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 5, vol. VIII, fol. 293rB–vA; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 75). The English translation of Averroes's *Long Commentary* on *Met*. Λ is taken with some adaptations from Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*.

[32] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1404 (*In Met.*, I, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 290r; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 64, slightly modified). Cf. also Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1394 (*In Met.*, I, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 286r; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 59): "In this book [Aristotle] talks about the principles of being *qua* being, that is the principles of the first substance which is absolutely real. He does it by showing that there is a substance which is in this state (*annahū yūǧadu ǧawhar mā hāḏihī ḥāluhū*) and what this substance is (*mā huwa hāḏā l-ǧawhar*)" (translation slightly modified: I read *wa-hiya* instead of *wa-fī*: see app. crit., n. 24).

being a substance means, ultimately, having the nature of a formal principle. This provides the metaphysician with an important doctrine that must, in Averroes's view, be combined with the *Physics* teaching that the First Mover is utterly immaterial. As a most perfect form, the First Mover is proven to be also a most perfect substance, which corresponds to our concept of God:

> As soon as it becomes clear to [Aristotle] that the principles of sensible substances, i.e., forms, are substances, given that it has already become clear in natural science that there is a sensible body which is the cause of all sensible substances and is prior to them, it [also] becomes clear that the form of this body is the principle of the outermost substance which is prior to all substances, and that it is what gives all substances their being generated and corruptible substances.[33]

The consideration of God as a First Form and a First End in metaphysics runs parallel to the inquiry into First Matter and the First Mover in physics. Though overshadowed by certain shifts and hesitancies,[34] this complementariness of physics and metaphysics is repeatedly asserted by Averroes and the medieval authors in his wake.[35] The line of argument seems fairly clear: while the analysis in the *Physics* arrives at a First Matter

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[33] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pp. 780–81 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 9, vol. VIII, fol. 160rA).

[34] Physics is said to be mainly focused upon efficient and material, as opposed to formal and final, causation in the *Long Commentary* on *Met.* B 1; see Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 1, pp. 190–91 (*In Met.*, III, t.c. 3, vol. VIII, fol. 41vA–B [French trans. in Averroès, *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, Livre Bêta*, pp. 209–10]); cf. also *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1433 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 6, vol. VIII, fol. 294vB; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 79). This claim has a parallel in the *Epitome* of the *Physics*, where efficient and material causes are viewed as the main factors involved in the explanation of movement (*aḥad hāḏayn huwa al-sabab al-aqṣā fī l-taḥrīk wa-l-āḫar fī l-taḥarruk wa-l-infiʿāl*); see *Epitome in Physicorum Libros*, ed. Josep Puig Montada (Madrid, 1983), p. 26; Spanish trans. in Averroes, *Epitome de Física (Filosofía de la naturaleza)*, trans. Josep Puig Montada (Madrid, 1987). In the *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics*, by contrast, Averroes draws a distinction between "efficient" (*muḥarrik*) and "active" (*fāʿil*) causes, and the consideration of the latter is said to fall within the scope of metaphysics along with that of formal and final causes (Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 6–7). The picture appears further complicated in the *Long Commentary* on the *Physics* (*In Phys.*, I, t.c. 1, vol. IV, fol. 6rA), where metaphysics is still, as in the *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics*, a science *de causa efficiente, formali, et fine*, whereas physics is presented as the knowledge of all types of causes (*de quatuor causis*).

[35] This is, with some qualifications, the case of Albert the Great as illustrated in James C. Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics. A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics* (The Hague, 1972), pp. 130–32. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Expositio*, I, lec. 1, ed. Mariano Maggiòlo (Turin-Rome, 1954), n. 5, which echoes Averroes's commentary on the *Physics*: "Non omnis scientia per omnes causas demonstrat. Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam formalem; metaphysica demonstrat per causam formalem et finalem praecipue, et etiam agentem; naturalis autem per omnes causas."

and a First Mover as the necessary conditions for movement, a thorough understanding of God in terms of First Form and First End can only be achieved within the ambit of metaphysics. It is along these lines that Averroes comments on the first aporia of *Met.* B 1 as to whether different kinds of causes are studied by different sciences. His answer involves a sophisticated view of the mutual relationships among metaphysics, physics, and cosmology which can only be adumbrated here. God is the substantial form of the outermost heavenly sphere. In this sense, He is a First Form, because He is the form of the first heaven.[36] At the same time, precisely as such, God is in some way the all-embracing form of every existent. Gad Freudenthal has reconstructed the strategy by means of which Averroes explains the conformity or, as he says, the "synonymy" (Arabic: *al-muwāṭa'a*; Latin: *convenientia*) between God and the natural world.[37] Nothing of what exists in the world comes about independently of God. God is involved in all natural processes of both local and substantial movement, both in sublunary and in supralunary substances. He is, as such, the source of all being and the principle of generation. Now every generated thing is "synonymous" with, i.e., of the same kind as, the principle which generates it, as is proven in *Met.* Z 7–8. Hence, insofar as He is the generator of all entities, God is synonymous with all of them. His synonymy is of a general kind (Arabic: *ʿāmm*; Latin: *universalis*),[38] for God is not specifically identical with any of the things that exist in the world. He is clearly not *this* or *that* particular entity; but He *is*, and thus He resembles all things precisely in that aspect under which they *are*. As Averroes clarifies in his commentary on *Met.* Λ 9:

> The truth is that because [God] knows only Himself, He knows the existents through the existence which is the cause of their existences. For instance, one does not say, with regard to him who knows the heat of fire only, that he has no knowledge of the nature of the heat existing in hot things, but he is the one who knows the nature of heat *qua* heat. Likewise, the First (praise

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[36] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pp. 780–81 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 9, vol. VIII, fol. 160rA).

[37] See Gad Freudenthal, "The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle's Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Being," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 12 (2002), 111–37 (repr. in Gad Freudenthal, *Science in the Medieval Hebrew and Arabic Traditions* [Aldershot, 2005], n. XV). See also Laurence Bauloye, "Le genre des substances dans la Métaphysique d'Averroès," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), 143–53. On the doctrine of God's synonymy with the existents, see Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1529–30 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 24, vol. VIII, fol. 309vA; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 122–23).

[38] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1529–30 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 24, vol. VIII, fol. 309vA.; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 122–23).

> be to Him!) is He who knows the nature of being *qua* being in an absolute way, which is Himself (*ṭabīʿat al-mawǧūd bi-mā huwa mawǧūd bi-iṭlāq*).[39]

God is not only the First Form but also the First End of the universe. The everlasting perfection and perpetual activity of the First Mover are imitated by the heavenly spheres as objects of love and desire:

> This First Mover imparts motion, without being moved, to the first object moved by it, just as the beloved (*al-maḥbūb*) moves his lover (*al-muḥibb*) without being moved itself, and it imparts motion to what is below its first moved by means of the first moved. By its first moved [Aristotle] means the celestial body, and by all the other moved, that which is below the first body, namely, all the other spheres and that which is subject to generation and corruption. The reason is because the first heaven is moved by this mover by means of its desire for it (*bi-l-šawq ilayhi*), I mean because it imitates it according to its ability as the lover is moved to imitate the beloved, while all the other celestial bodies are moved by their desire for the motion of first body.[40]

In these lines Averroes outlines a three-tiered cosmological system in which (i) God originates the kinetic activity of the first heaven; (ii) this activity is imitated by the celestial spheres through contemplation and circular motion; and, finally, (iii) the heavenly movement of the stars triggers and directs the physical processes of the sublunar world. It has been noticed that the cosmology of Averroes, unlike that of Aristotle, construes the First Mover not only as a final but also as an efficient cause.[41] The role of efficient causation is most evident in the sphere of the sublunar world, where all major physical processes are mechanically generated by the movements of the stars. Similarly, in the upper regions of the cosmos, the heavenly bodies imitate the activity of the final cause by means of circular motions that originate in the celestial souls precisely as their efficient causes. In this sense it could be said that final and efficient causations coexist in the Averroean cosmology and cooperate in the government of the movements of both celestial and sublunar bodies. This is not, however,

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[39] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1707–08 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 51, vol. VIII, fol. 337rA, divergent from the Arabic; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 197, slightly modified). A Neoplatonic shade has been detected in Averroes's claim that substantial forms are present in different ways in the different levels of reality, both sublunar and divine; see Jean Jolivet, "Divergences entre les métaphysiques d'Ibn Rushd et d'Aristote," *Arabica* 29 (1982), 225–45.

[40] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1606 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 37, vol. VIII, fol. 320vA; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 154, slightly modified). Cf. also *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1592–98 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 36, vol. VIII, fol. 318r–v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 148–50).

[41] See Charles Genequand, "The Prime Mover," in: *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 33–48.

how Averroes would typically express himself. For him, final and efficient causes do not remain in the heavens as distinct motive forces. Contrary to the case of sublunar bodies, heavenly bodies are not potentialities that become actualized by substantial forms, that is, their celestial souls and efficient causes. This means, in metaphysical terms, that celestial souls are utterly immaterial and, as such, utterly undistinguishable from the First Mover, which is the final cause. Efficient and final causes are therefore identical in reality: if different causal actions are indeed exerted on the heavenly spheres, not as many entities are to be posited as really distinct agents.[42]

3. The Unity of Metaphysics

While he subscribes to the idea of metaphysics as a *scientia divina*, Averroes is well aware of a number of texts where metaphysics is instead portrayed as a universal science of common being. This is the view that he finds not only in the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* but also in a paraphrastic version of the *Posterior Analytics*, where the idea of a "common discipline" (*al-ṣināʿa al-ʿāmma*) that is universal in scope and embraces all of the particular sciences is emphasized beyond the letter of Aristotle.[43] In the face of such evidence, the challenge for the Commentator lies not so much in deciding whether to side with a theological or an ontological characterization of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* but in supplying an interpretation where *both* the theological *and* the ontological strands can be brought together and successfully reconciled. The illustrious commentatorial tradition before and after Averroes has long struggled with this same problem. A *locus classicus* for this debate is the epistemology that Aristotle outlines in the *Posterior Analytics* (A 10), where the subject-matter of a science (περὶ ὃ δείκνυσι) is connected with a *quaesitum* that is sought therein (ἃ δείκνυσι) and a set of principles from which the science develops (ἐξ ὧν δείκνυσι). Within this framework, one strategy to account for the unity of metaphysics consists in positing being *qua* being as the subject-matter of metaphysics, while placing God on the side of

[42] For a general background to this analysis of the relationship between celestial bodies and souls in Averroes, see Matteo Di Giovanni, "Averroes on the Species of Celestial Bodies," in: Andreas Speer & Lydia Wagener, eds., *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 33 (Berlin-New York, 2006), pp. 438–64.

[43] See Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," pp. 65–73.

its principles (Thomas Aquinas); or, alternatively, God is conceived of a *quaesitum* rather than a principle of the science of being (Avicenna). In both cases, being is understood, in contradistinction to God, as the universal concept of all things that exist (*ens commune*).

Even among this variety of approaches, Averroes's strategy is unique in many ways. The Commentator begins by acknowledging the ontological component of metaphysics, and in this connection he affirms that "absolute being" (*al-wuǧūd al-muṭlaq*) is, just like God, a "subject-matter" (*al-mawḍūʿ*) for metaphysics.[44] According to the *Long Commentary* on the *Posterior Analytics* "being" (*al-mawǧūd*) is what metaphysics is concerned with, and similarly, in the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*, absolute being is presented as a subject-matter that metaphysics has in common with logic. In the *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics*, moreover, in the context of a general presentation of the system of the sciences, metaphysics is grouped together with logic among "the universal disciplines" (*al-ṣanāʾiʿ al-kulliyya*) that deal with "being in an absolute way" (*al-mawǧūd bi-iṭlāq*).[45] The coexistence of two diverse lines in Averroes, one theological and one ontological, might easily be interpreted as a lack of a coherent and definite view on the subject. Alternatively, Averroes's twofold approach may be taken as implying just the same kind of inner consistency that is presupposed in other theories by the commentators. In fact, Averroes seems occasionally to entertain a view similar to Avicenna's, where absolute being is the subject-matter of metaphysics and God is its *quaesitum*. In the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*, for example, he proposes that by

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[44] Cf. Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 4.

[45] Cf. Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, cited in Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes," p. 94 (*In Post Res.*, I, t.c. 70, fol. 154r–v): "The nature that is common to the subject-matters of the particular sciences is 'being,' which is the subject-matter of metaphysics." For the sake of consistency with the other translations I render here *al-mawǧūd* as "being" instead of "existent." On Averroes's use of *mawǧūd*, lit. "existent," to indicate in an abstract way the notion of "being," see Aubert Martin, "Un type particulier de la *muzāwaǧa* dans la langue d'Averroès," in: Georges Dossin et al., eds., *Mélanges à la mémoire de Philippe Marçois* (Paris, 1985), pp. 103–11, esp. 107; and Laurence Bauloye, "Averroès. *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique* d'Aristote, Z1 et Z2. Traduction et notes," *Bulletin d'études orientales* 49 (1997), 53–73, esp. 55, n. 7. Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 167 (*In Met.*, III, t.c. 1, fol. 36vB; *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, Livre Bêta*, p. 188), and p. 329 (*In Met.*, IV, t.c. 5, fol. 70vA); *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 749 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 2, fol. 153vB) on the subject matter of metaphysics as "absolute being" (*al-mawǧūd al-muṭlaq*); *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 2: "being in an absolute way" (*al-mawǧūd bi-iṭlāq*); *In Phys.*, II, t.c. 22, fol. 5 rA: "ens simpliciter"; *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1395 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., fol. 286v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 60); *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 5: "being *qua* being" (*mawǧūd bi-mā huwa mawǧūd*); and *In Phys.*, I, t.c. 83, fol. 47vB: "ens secundum quod est ens."

relying on the prior knowledge of sensible substances the metaphysician arrives at the knowledge of the "substance sought (*al-ǧawhar al-maṭlūb*), that is, the eternal separate substance."[46]

The key to a sound and complete assessment of Averroes's theory is, however, to be found in his interpretation of the focal meaning of being in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[47] In various texts and by various strategies, Aristotle argues that being is a multivocal term with a number of related meanings (*Met*. Γ 2, 1003a33–b12). In the opening lines of *Met*. Z, where he distinguishes between such predicates as substance, quality, quantity, and the other categories, Aristotle establishes that "that which is primarily and *is* simply (not is something) must be substance" (1028a30–31). In what follows he makes clear that substance (οὐσία) is, in its turn, said in many ways, the primary way being that of "substance" in the sense of "form." Substantial form is the essence of individual entities and a principle of intelligibility for matter itself; it is to matter what actuality is to potentiality (*Met*. Θ 8), and actuality is prior to potentiality in notion (λόγῳ), substance (οὐσίᾳ), and time (χρόνῳ). While all existents are equally *real*, because they are all equally *existent*, the whole world of nature ultimately depends upon substantial form for its ontological constitution, inner dynamism, and perpetual actualization.[48]

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[46] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 1008 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 59, fol. 207rA).

[47] For a lucid example of this line of interpretation, see Timothy B. Noone, "Albert the Great's Conception of Metaphysical Knowledge," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer, & Marc-Aeilko Aris, eds., *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richard Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis* (Münster, 2005), pp. 685–704. Cf. also John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 13–15; Jan A. Aertsen, "Metaphysics: Theology or Universal Science?" *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 69 (2002). Supplement: *Averroes Latinus. A New Edition* (Bibliotheca, 4), pp. vii–ix; and Thérèse-Anne Druart, "Metaphysics," in: Peter Adamson & Richard C. Taylor, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 327–48, esp. 346. For a specific analysis of the homonymy of being and its significance in Averroes, see Matteo Di Giovanni, "Averroes and the Logical Status of Metaphysics," in: Margaret Cameron & John Marenbon, eds., *Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500–1500* (Leiden, 2011), pp. 53–74.

[48] On the centrality of substantial form in Aristotle's metaphysics, see the introductory remarks in Michael Frede & Güntger Patzig, *Aristoteles. "Metaphysik Z." Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 36–47. The emphasis on the undiminished reality of beings other than substantial form distinguishes Averroes's theory from eliminative ontologies such as are developed, for example, in the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. On a typical eliminativist strategy applied to the mind-body problem, see Tim Crane, *Elements of Mind* (Oxford, 2001), p. 53. Insofar as it is key to the explanation of the being of all that exists, substantial form is, for Averroes, a preeminent but not the only real, or really existing, entity that populates the world.

Averroes appropriates and elegantly expresses this view in his commentary on *Met.* Γ 2. He describes the various entities populating the world as being interconnected by various relations of causal dependence: just as the being of accidental properties depends on that of substances, so inferior substances are related to form as a first item in their category, i.e., a primary substance.[49] Against this background, "absolute" or "unqualified" being ceases to be merely a general notion that embraces all existents insofar as they are divested of any differentiating properties; it takes on a new, ontologically loaded connotation in which it means the same as "primary" being (substantial form) insofar as primary being is not constrained, i.e., not "qualified," by any such secondary determinations as are material or accidental properties. Averroes goes so far as to suggest an equivalence between being "unqualified" (*lā bi-ḥāl mā*) and "immaterial" (*lā fī l-hayūlā*),[50] and in this vein he interprets those passages where Aristotle assumes a fundamental unity between the science of being and the science of the divine.[51] It is not altogether clear, in fact, to what extent the Commentator relies on those passages where Aristotle himself alludes to some kind of intrinsic connection between unqualified and divine being.[52] There is no doubt, however, that he interprets this connection in a very strict sense, since he conjoins the terms "God" and "being" in what recurs almost as a fixed hendiadys of his philosophical language. In the *Long Commentary* on the *Physics*, metaphysics is represented as a science of separate substances and, precisely as such, it is identified with the science of absolute being: "consyderatio de formis est duarum scientiarum quarum una, scilicet naturalis, consyderat de formis materialibus, secunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia et est illa scientia quae consyderat de ente simpliciter."[53] The same position is adumbrated in the

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[49] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 1, pp. 302–03 (*In Met.*, IV, t.c. 2, vol. VIII, fol. 65rB).

[50] Cf. Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 4.

[51] See, e.g., *Met.*, E 1, 1026a29–32: "If there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *qua* being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it *qua* being." This and the following translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are taken from Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), vol. 2.

[52] Cf. *Nic. Eth.*, H 13, 1153b32: "All things have by nature something divine in them."; *Met.*, K 7, 1064a28–31: "Since there is a science of being *qua* being and capable of existing apart, we must consider whether this is to be regarded as the same as natural science or rather as different," where "being *qua* being" is, as it were, in an hendiadys with "capable of existing apart."

[53] Cf. Averroes, *In Phys.*, I, t.c. 83, vol. IV, fol. 47rB.

earlier *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics*, where the properties of unqualified being (unity and multiplicity, actuality and potentiality) are said to be the same properties of separate substances.[54] For this reason, metaphysics is at once a theory of being and a theory of God: for every being is what it is on account of its ontological relation to God and, indeed, "all things have by nature something divine in them."

In a deservedly famous passage from the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*, the Commentator sets forth his most mature view of the relationship between being and God. God is portrayed as an archetype of the perfect metaphysician, the one who has full knowledge of what being *qua* being is in an absolute way (*al-mawǧūd bi-mā huwa mawǧūd bi-iṭlāq*). As Averroes maintains, such knowledge pertains to God on account of His reflexive act of self-contemplation, by which God looks into Himself as He truly is, that is, being *qua* being without qualification. Aristotle's account of God as *noēsis noēseōs* is in this way interpreted in the light of the assumption that God is essentially unqualified being and that He has full knowledge of being because He has full knowledge of Himself: "The truth is that because [God] knows only Himself, He knows the existents through the existence which is the cause of their existences." As is clarified in the *De Anima* commentary, moreover, God is utterly being because He is utterly form: "Nulla est forma liberata a potentia simpliciter, nisi prima forma, que nichil intelligit extra se, sed essentia eius est quiditas eius; alie autem forme diversantur in quiditate et essentia quoquo modo."[55] Since God is totally free from matter, He exists in the highest degree of simplicity. And so, if we say that "[God] is living (*ḥayy*) and that He possesses life (*lahū ḥayā*)," we thereby mean that He is

> one and the same with regard to the subject (*bi-l-mawḍūʿ*), but two with regard to the point of view (*bi-l-ǧiha*). [...] As for those things which are not a form in matter, the attribute and the thing to which it belongs refer in their case to the same entity in reality (*maʿnā wāḥid bi-l-wuǧūd*) but double in consideration (*bi-l-iʿtibār*).[56]

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[54] Cf. Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 4.

[55] See Frederick Stuart Crawford, ed., *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 410 (Eng. trans. in Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, *Long Commentary on the 'De Anima' of Aristotle*. Translated with Introduction and Notes by Richard C. Taylor with Thérèse-Anne Druart (New Haven-London, 2009), pp. 326–27.

[56] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1620–21 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 39, vol. VIII, fol. 322vB; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 160, trans. slightly modified).

Unlike the other immaterial substances (the separate intellects), God is not even affected by the potentiality that is involved in discursive reasoning, namely, the potentiality of entertaining different objects of thought. According to Averroes, this potentiality stems from the ontological distinction that is found in the inferior intellects between the subject and the object of intellection. In God, by contrast, what intelligizes and what is intelligized are wholly identical, with the result that the object of God's intellection, which is nothing other than God, is always entirely, immediately, and simultaneously present to Himself: "For the multiplicity of intelligibles in the same intellect, as happens with our intellect, is the consequence of the differentiation which exists in it, that is, between the intellect and the intelligible."[57]

The implications of this philosophical theology are of paramount importance for Averroes's conception of metaphysics. God is perfectly being because He is perfectly actualized; He is being *qua* being insofar as He is being *qua* form. In this way there vanishes any opposition between the *transcendent* and the *transcendental*, as well as any distinction between a *metaphysica specialis* and a *metaphysica generalis*.[58] Averroes's analysis presupposes the sophisticated doctrine that Aristotle sets forth in the central books of the *Metaphysics*. Being "simply" (ἁπλῶς) means not just being in some unspecified way but being in the specific way of that which is "simple," i.e., not joined to the limitations of either matter, potentiality, or any accidental properties. The Arabic philosophical lexicon provides Averroes with a pregnant word to express this multifaceted notion of absoluteness: the term *muṭlaq*, Lat. *simplex*, is used to indicate both the "separate" and the "unqualified." Insofar as being is separate from any secondary modes of existence, it is unqualified; as unqualified, it is primary.[59] Primary being is form and the First Form is God.

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[57] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1706 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 51, vol. VIII, fol. 336vB; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 197). Cf. Richard Taylor, "Averroes' Philosophical Conception of Separate Intellect and God," in: Ahmad Asnawi, ed., *La lumière de l'intellect. La pensée scientifique et philosophique d'Averroès dans son temps* (Leuven, 2011), pp. 391–404.

[58] A similar interpretation of the unity of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* has been put forward in recent times by Michael Frede, "The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics," in: Michael Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1987), pp. 81–95. The dissociative interpretation of being as conceptually distinct from God is, according to Joseph Owens, an original contribution by Avicenna, subsequently taken on by most Latin thinkers, and quite diverse from the view that is common among Late Antique commentators (Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Syrianus, Asclepius), who intended to unify the two notions. See Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics. A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 1–68.

[59] Cf. Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 4. Cf. *Tafsīr*, vol. 1, pp. 299–300 (*In Met.*, IV, t.c. 1, vol. VIII, fol. 64rB).

4. The Structure and Method of Metaphysics

The *Metaphysics* was not composed as a single work. From a doctrinal standpoint some books, such as Z, H, and Θ, set out the mature views of Aristotle on a number of issues, whereas others, such as Books A and α, Λ, and N, seem to belong to earlier phases of his philosophical career or even to his Academic period as a student of Plato. Much indebted to the studies of Werner Jaeger in the 20th century, this reconstruction diverges from the typical perspective of a medieval interpreter.[60] In the footsteps of a philosophical tradition that underlines the strong unity of Aristotle's inquiry in the *Metaphysics*, Averroes takes in his commentaries a systematizing line of interpretation. He assumes that the material is arranged in accordance with the best possible order (*al-afḍal fī l-tartīb*) and criticizes Nicolaus of Damascus for objecting to the structure given by Aristotle. In his reply to Nicolaus, Averroes maintains that all the parts of the work "follow the best possible order and nothing in them is out of place" especially for the purpose of clear and coherent instruction (*al-afḍal fī l-taʿlīm*).[61]

The supposed masterly ordering of the *Metaphysics* stands out particularly in the case of the philosophical lexicon in Book Δ, whose role and place depend on the epistemic status of metaphysics and its specific demands. On the one hand, as a rigorous demonstrative investigation (*al-faḥṣ al-burhānī*),[62] metaphysics has to employ definite and unequivocal terms; on the other, metaphysical terms are in themselves polysemous, because they are coextensive with being, and being is said in many ways. Thus, Book Δ is intended to provide a preliminary disambiguation of the vocabulary of the metaphysician in order to clear the way towards his positive inquiry. A similar argument holds for the discussion of the

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[60] Contemporary readings of the *Metaphysics* have, in fact, greatly varied both in the extent to which they have accepted the developmental hypothesis by Werner Jaeger and in the chronological details of their reconstructions. Most recently, Myles Burnyeat suggested as "a story that might just be true" that Book Λ was hurriedly written by Aristotle towards the end of his life. See Myles Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta* (Pittsburgh, 2001), pp. 140–49.

[61] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1397 (*In Met.*, I, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 287r; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 60, slightly modified): "Having investigated these different classes [of beings], Aristotle chooses to teach them in the best didactic order (*al-afḍal fī l-taʿlīm*)," and p. 1405 (*In Met.*, I, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 290r; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 65, slightly modified): "This exposition has made clear what each one of the books of this science attributed to Aristotle [i.e., metaphysics] contains, and that they follow the best possible order (*al-afḍal fī l-tartīb*), and that nothing in them is out of place or order, as we find that Nicolaus of Damascus claims in his book."

[62] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 777 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 8, vol. VIII, fol. 159vA).

aporiae in *Met.* B. Averroes compares it with those in other treatises by Aristotle where the aporiae are not gathered in a single book but, rather, discussed locally as the investigation develops. This different approach is made necessary, according to Averroes, by the very nature of the subjects under investigation. As a demonstrative discipline, metaphysics is distinct from dialectic; and yet the two disciplines share in the generality of their subject-matter (which is being without qualification), with the result that they could easily be confused. It is for this reason that Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* gathers all the aporiae and sets the positive doctrine clearly apart from its dialectical counterpart, so as visibly to isolate merely persuasive from truly demonstrative reasoning.[63]

The gist of Averroes's reconstruction is fairly consistent across the different contexts of his exegetical works, beginning with the *Epitome* up to the introductory sections in his *Long Commentary* on *Met.* B, Γ, Δ, Z, and Λ. Probably unknown to the Latins,[64] the prologue to Λ contains remarks of special importance concerning the structure of the *Metaphysics.* Averroes summarizes the content of each book following the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias, although his use of Alexander does not diminish in any way the originality of Averroes's exposition. In fact, Averroes is quite independent from his source,[65] and even where he draws on it he clearly "intersperses Alexander's text with remarks of his own."[66] In the *Long Commentary* on *Met.* Z, moreover, Averroes spells out what he takes to be the fundamental division of the *Metaphysics* into (1) an introductory section concerning preliminary issues (*al-tawṭi'a wa-l-muqaddimāt*) and (2) a major section incorporating the kernel of the metaphysical "science" (*al-ʿilm*).[67] The latter begins with *Met.* Z and extends presumably to *Met.* Λ, while the former covers the preceding books, from *Met.* α to E.

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[63] On the position of Book B, see Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1398 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 287v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 61): "Thus he thought that the best didactic procedure (*al-afḍal fī l-taʿlīm*) was to devote a special inquiry to the problems of this science and their investigation together with the dialectical arguments which raise doubts concerning each one of its aims in a separate book," and vol. 2, pp. 166–68 (*In Met.*, III, t.c. 1, vol. VIII, fols. 36vB–37rA; *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, Livre Bêta*, pp. 187–89). On Book Δ, see *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1400 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 288v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 62, slightly modified): "The best didactic procedure (*al-afḍal fī l-taʿlīm*) appeared to him to make separate mention of them [i.e., of the notions used in metaphysics] in one book," and vol. 3, pp. 475–76 (*In Met.*, V, t.c. 1, vol. VIII, fol. 100vA–B).

[64] See above, note 14.

[65] See Gutas, "Review of C. Genequand," pp. 122–26.

[66] See *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 8.

[67] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 745 (*In Met.*, VII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 152vB): "As for that which comes before this book [i.e., Book Zeta], [Aristotle] there examines things that

The "science" expounded in the central books conforms to the epistemic principles that Aristotle lays down in the *Posterior Analytics* (A 2, 10): all sciences presuppose (a) a subject-matter (ὑποκείμενον), (b) a set of properties (καθ'αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) belonging to the subject-matter and whose connection with the latter is elucidated within the science, and (c) a causal, or explanatory, understanding of the things that are subject to scientific investigation. In the case of metaphysics: (a) the subject-matter is absolute being, in the sense specified; (b) the properties of being are predicates such as one, many, and those properties mentioned in *Met.* Γ 2 to which Averroes adds actuality and potentiality; and (c) the ultimate cause is God (as formally indistinguishable from absolute being).[68] Similarly, in Chapters 10–13 of Book I of the *Epitome*, metaphysics is said to consist of two "necessary" (*ḍarūrī*) parts which concern (2. a–b) its subject-matter and properties and (2. c) its causes. To these (3) a third part can be added which contains an inquiry into the principles of particular sciences and a refutation (*munāqaḍa*) of the errors of the Ancients.[69] According to the *Long Commentary* on Book Z, furthermore, part (2. a–b) falls into three major subdivisions (*aǧzāʾ ʿuẓmā*). The first (2. a–b. i) corresponds to *Met.* Z–H and deals with absolute being in relation both to sensible substances and their immanent principles, i.e., matter and form. The other two cover (2. a–b. ii) *Met.* Θ and (2. a–b. iii) *Met.* I, where the

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are like an introduction and [a set of] premises (*al-tawṭiʾa wa-l-muqaddimāt*) to what he intends to say in this [book]. So it is as if he divided this science (*hāḍā l-ʿilm*) primarily into two parts, one being that in which he mentions the premises and the matters through which one arrives at examining the other, whose examination is the aim of this science."

[68] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pp. 744–45 (*In Met.*, VII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 152vB); vol. 4, pp. 1403–04 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., fol. 289r–v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 63–64). God is the cause of being insofar as He is its primary instance, in compliance with the principle that the property produced by a certain cause is found preeminently in the cause itself (cf. *Met.*, α 1, 993b24–31).

[69] This third part corresponds in all likelihood to Books M and N, which Averroes in the *Epitome* (I, 13) describes as an addition "for the better" (*ʿalā ǧihat al-afḍal*) to the kernel of the metaphysical science and does not include in his *Long Commentary*. Also remarkable is the fact that in *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 14 Averroes provides a general outline of the four books by which his own *Epitome* is constituted and refers to the matters discussed in each of them. Thus, Book I, II, and III deal respectively with parts (1), (2. a), and (2. b), i.e., the introductory material; being *qua* being; and its general properties (actuality and potentiality; one and many). Book IV is instead devoted to part (2. c), on separate substances as the principles of being. In the same passage from the *Epitome*, Averroes refers to a "fifth" book that was supposed to cover part (3), on the refutation of the Ancients; this fifth book does not appear in the *Epitome* as it has come down to us. For a recent study on the structure of Averroes's metaphysics, see Rüdiger Arnzen, "Ibn Rushd on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010), 375–410. Cf. also Rüdiger Arnzen, "On the Nature and Fate of Chapter V of Ibn Rushd's Epitome of Aristotle's Metaphysics," in: A. Akasoy & W. Raven, eds., *Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science* (Leiden, 2008), pp. 43–58.

investigation shifts from absolute being considered in itself to its general properties (*al-lawāḥiq al-ʿāmma*), that is, actuality and potentiality on one side, and unity and multiplicity on the other.[70]

More interesting and perhaps more original is the treatment of what Averroes considers to be a long introductory section in the *Metaphysics* (1). Consistent with the reversed order of the two books in the Arabic translation, Averroes assumes that the inquiry begins with *Met.* α, where Aristotle lays down a general principle according to which the number of causes is necessarily finite. *Met.* A would then build on this principle by clarifying that the causes of being can be reduced to four kinds, i.e., formal, final, efficient, and material, whereas Book B raises the difficulties that metaphysics addresses and thus sets the agenda for the following investigation.[71] Here is located, according to Averroes, a major branching within the introductory section: while Book B examines in a dialectical way the different aporiae, Book Γ inaugurates the apodictic section where Aristotle sets out his substantive and positive teaching. From Book Γ onwards, the dialecticisms (*al-aqāwil al-ǧadaliyya al-mušakkika*) mentioned in B will be scrutinized in a demonstrative way (*min qibal al-burhān*), and the contrast between a dialectical and an apodictic approach to the questions of metaphysics is what distinguishes (1. b) the exposition in *Met.* B, which presupposes (1. a) the inquiry into causes in *Met.* α–A, from the section (1. c) *Met.* Γ–Δ–E, followed by *Met.* Z and the remaining books.[72]

The questions of metaphysics are of two kinds: some concern the subject-matter, while others bear on the formal structure of the discipline. While the former are discussed beginning with Book Z, the latter

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[70] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 744 (*In Met.*, VII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 153vB): "This science divides primarily into three main parts; the first concerns the division of being into substance and accident, the second its division into potentiality and actuality, the third the division into one and many."

[71] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, pp. 1397–98 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 287r–v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 61).

[72] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1398 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem, vol. VIII, fol. 287v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 61, slightly modified): "Thus [Aristotle] thought that the best didactic procedure was to devote a special inquiry to the problems of this science and their investigation together with the dialectical arguments which raise doubts (*al-aqāwil al-ǧadaliyya al-mušakkika*) concerning each one of its quaesita in a separate book. Then, in the remaining books of this treatise, he sets out to solve the problems arising in this science"; vol. 2, pp. 166–67 (not in the Latin; *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, Livre Bêta*, p. 187): "The perfect way in which the science of a thing occurs, I mean the demonstrative science, requires that one determine in the first place the opposed arguments concerning that thing and then their solution by means of the demonstration (*min qibal al-burhān*) that is [given] about that thing."

are preliminary issues examined as early as *Met*. Γ–E. Averroes refers to *Met*. Γ–E as the "specific logic" (*al-manṭiq al-ḫāṣṣ*) of metaphysics where Aristotle undertakes to clarify the special epistemology that is proper to metaphysics in much the same way as in his "logic," i.e., his logical writings, he defines the general epistemology valid for all sciences. Just as in the *Organon* he works with the three notions of (i) subject-matter, (ii) demonstrable properties, and (iii) causes or explanations, so in *Met*. Γ–E Aristotle determines (i) what the subject-matter of metaphysics is, (ii) its specific properties, and (iii) its principles. To these three the Commentator adds two further lines of investigation that he takes as revolving around (iv) the kind of definitions (*naḥw al-ḥadd*) and (v) the method of inquiry (*naḥw al-naẓar*) that are employed in metaphysics. The subject-matter (*al-mawḍūʿ*), the properties (*al-lawāḥiq*), and the principles (*al-asbāb*) of metaphysics are all examined in (1. c. i–iii) the first section (*ǧumla*) of Book Γ (corresponding to Chapters 1–3)[73] and in Book E, where Aristotle restricts the domain of metaphysics to extramental being ("real being"; Arabic: *al-huwiyya al-ḥaqīqiyya*) as opposed to mental and accidental being ("defective being"; Arabic: *al-huwiyya al-nāqiṣa*). The use of definitions will be the subject of (1. c. iv) Δ's philosophical lexicon,[74] whereas a distinct problem is posed by the last of the questions indicated by Averroes as constitutive of the specific logic of metaphysics, that is, the question of Aristotle's method of inquiry (1. c. v).

In contrast to the case with the other "logical matters" (Arabic: *al-umūr al-manṭiqiyya*; Latin: *res logicae*), in fact, Averroes does not locate the treatment of this subject in any specific book of the *Metaphysics*. At the same time, he has clear and distinct ideas about the method of analysis and the argumentative strategies that metaphysics must adopt. He distinguishes between instances of what he calls an "absolute demonstration" (Arabic: *al-burhān al-muṭlaq*; Latin: *demonstratio absoluta*) and a "demonstration of sign" (Arabic: *burhān al-dalīl*; Latin: *demonstratio signi*):

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[73] The second part (*ǧumla*), beginning with Chapter 4 of Book Γ, is devoted to the refutation of the Sophists and the defense of the first logico-ontological principles. See Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 1, pp. 297–98 (*In Met*., IV, t.c. 1, vol. VIII, fol. 64rA–B).

[74] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1396 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 286v; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 60); vol. 2, p. 297 (*In Met.*, IV, t.c. 1, not in the Latin). The same passage from the prologue to the commentary on Book Λ contains the characterization of mental and accidental being in terms of "defective being," see *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1402 (*In Met.*, XII, Prooem., vol. VIII, fol. 289r; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 63). Averroes's notion of "specific logic" is discussed in Rudolf Hoffmann, "La puissance argumentative de la logique spéciale dans la métaphysique d'Ibn Rushd," in: Mohammed Allal Sinaceur, ed., *Penser avec Aristote* (Toulouse-Paris, 1991), pp. 667–76.

while the former is typical of mathematics and similar sciences, in natural philosophy (both physics and metaphysics) Aristotle makes use of demonstrations of sign, that is, *a posteriori* arguments from effects to causes. A case in point is the argument by which Aristotle, in *Physics* Θ, deduces the existence of a First Mover from the existence of motion:

> It is not for the specialist in the lower discipline [i.e., physics] to investigate the principles of its genus according to the method of absolute demonstration (*al-burhān al-muṭlaq*), but according to the method leading from the things that are posterior to the things that are prior, called signs (*al-dalā'il*).[75]

The value of demonstrations of sign is repeatedly asserted by Averroes. In the *Epitome* of the *Metaphysics* he is more explicit about most metaphysical demonstrations being demonstrations of signs (*hiya akṯara ḏālika dalā'il*), while in the *Long Commentary* the same view is left implicit behind the literal exegesis. Thus, for example, the proof that accidents have an essence is construed in the *Long Commentary* on *Met*. Z 4 as a demonstration of sign. By the same token, when Averroes comments on Aristotle's argument in *Met*. Z 1 (1028a13–20) to the effect that essences are substances because they have definitions, he takes this as a demonstration of sign proving something about essences from something posterior to them (definitions), and remarks: "You must know that this sign (*al-dalīl*) is a logical sign (*dalīl manṭiqī*) and that most demonstrations in this science are logical demonstrations."[76]

By acknowledging that metaphysics proceeds non-deductively and by means of signs, or indications, Averroes does not intend in any way to play down its epistemic status as a truly demonstrative science. To his mind the demonstrative status of metaphysics lies primarily in the logical necessity with which conclusions are derived from premises, what is "prior by nature" from what is "prior to us." In the footsteps of a commentary tradition that has increasingly emphasized the similarity, rather than the difference, between inductive and deductive reasoning, Averroes posits as a fundamental requirement for demonstrative reasoning that all

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[75] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1423 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 5, vol. VIII, fol. 293rA; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, pp. 73–74, slightly modified). Cf. *In Phys*., II, t.c. 22, vol. IV, fol. 57rA. For all his disagreement on the issue of the proof for God's existence, Averroes concurs with Avicenna that the theological argument has to rely on a demonstration of sign (*dalīl*). See Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, pp. 298–99.

[76] The arguments of Aristotle are reconstructed in the light of Averroes's interpretation. See Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, I, 17; *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, pp. 800–01 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 14, vol. VIII, fol. 164vA) and pp. 747–49 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 2, vol. VIII, fol. 153r–v).

conclusions be validly deduced from their premises, irrespective of whether the latter express also an objective cause (the "prior by nature") or merely a logical ground for the former. In this way, he broadens the definition of "science" (ἐπιστήμη; Arabic: *ʿilm*) in terms of knowledge through causes so as to cover all appropriate instances of logical explanations. In his account, inductive arguments from effects to causes qualify as instances of apodictic reasoning on the condition that causes are validly inferred from effects.[77] While Averroes is well aware that no metaphysical principles, whether in the inner structure of reality or in the supernal realm of the divine, are directly accessible to men, he maintains that the proper usage of discursive reason, regulated by logic and grounded on the phenomena of which we have experience, is able to afford a kind of knowledge that actualizes the human intellect and brings it closer to the divine mind. Nature has expressed the paradigm of intellectual perfection in Aristotle, until whose days "nobody has said anything on which demonstration can be based."[78] By opening the way to a reliable use of reason and a rigorous practice of philosophy, Aristotle has anticipated and made possible Averroes's grandiose project as described by Gerhard Endress: "fonder la communauté—religieuse, scientifique, intellectuelle—sur la seule et irréfutable vérité atteinte par ἀπόδειξις, la méthode demonstrative."[79]

5. Averroes's Metaphysics in the Latin West

"Averroís che 'l gran comento feo": in these celebrated words from Dante's Comedy and in their companion line about the translator Michael Scot "che veramente de le magiche frode seppe 'l gioco" is encapsulated the story of Averroes's fortune and of his enormous impact on the Latin West. Even now that Western scholarship is becoming more aware of the connection between Averroes's project and the indigenous context of Muslim Spain, it remains clear that the continuation of his project found in Latin Europe its ideal and most durable conditions. Soon after his death

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[77] See Matteo Di Giovanni, "Demonstration and First Philosophy. Averroes on *Met.* Zeta as a Demonstrative Examination (*al-faḥṣ al-burhānī*)," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 20 (2009), 95–126. On the demonstrations of sign in Averroes, see also Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal, "La demonstration du signe (*burhān al-dalīl*) selon Ibn Rushd (Averroès)," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 113–31; and Henri Hugonnard-Roche, "Averroès et la tradition des Seconds Analytiques," in: *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, pp. 172–87.

[78] Cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 758 (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 5, vol. VIII, fols. 155vB–156rA).

[79] See Endress, "L'Aristote arabe," p. 41.

TABLE 1. *The Plan of Aristotle's* Metaphysics *as Reconstructed from Averroes's Commentaries (see above for number and letter references)*

1.	Premises to the discipline and introductory material [*Met.* α–E]
1.a	Inquiry into causes, their finiteness and kinds [*Met.* α–A]
1.b	Dialectical treatment [*Met.* B]
1.c	Demonstrative treatment [*Met.* Γ–E]
1.c.i–iii	"Logical" inquiry into the subject-matter, the properties, and the causes examined in metaphysics [*Met.* Γ 1–3, E]
1.c.iv	"Logical" inquiry into the terms used in metaphysics [*Met.* Δ]
2.	Kernel of metaphysics as a scientific discipline [*Met.* Z–Λ]
2.a–b	On being *qua* being and its general properties [*Met.* Z–I]
2.a–b.i	On being *qua* being as such [*Met.* Z–H]
2.a–b.ii	On such properties of being as potentiality and actuality [*Met.* Θ]
2.a–b.iii	On such properties of being as one and many [*Met.* I]
2.c	On God and the separate substances [*Met.* Λ]
3.	Inquiry into particular sciences and refutation of the Ancients [*Met.* M–N]

in 1198, Averroes became known in the West as "the Commentator" *par excellence* of Aristotle. His immense reputation, fueled at the same time by high intellectual esteem and fierce ideological opposition, offset his virtual oblivion in medieval Islam. To be sure, this oblivion is not entire. Already in the 14th century the great polymath Ibn Ḫaldūn (d. 1406) interspersed his introduction (*Muqaddima*) to the *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* ("Book of Lessons") with quotations from Averroes's logic and natural philosophy. The *Epitomes* and the *Middle Commentaries* continued to play a role of some importance in the Islamic educational system and especially in Safavid Iran. Most remarkably, the *Bidāyat al-muǧtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid* ("Starting-Point of the Studious and End-Point of the Contentable"), an authoritative work of comparative *fiqh*, spread Averroes's renown as a *faqīh* throughout the Ottoman Empire and secured the preservation of his intellectual legacy up to the present day. At the same time, however, Averroes's fortune in Arabic and Islamic contexts is due to his juridical work to a much greater extent than it is to his Aristotelian commentaries. Emblematic in this regard is the severe judgment that one of Averroes's contemporaries in 13th-century al-Andalus, Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 1269–71), expresses in his *Budd al-ʿārif* ("The Escape of the Gnostic"): "If [Averroes] had heard the Philosopher saying that whoever is standing is at the same time sitting, he would have professed and believed this."[80]

[80] Cf. Ibn Sabʿīn, *Budd al-ʿārif*, ed. Djürdj Kattura (Beirut, 1978), p. 143.

The situation in Latin Europe turned out rather different. Particularly momentous was the creation of institutional centers of learning such as the universities, while the galvanizing contact with Arabic science after the Reconquista paved the way for the enthusiastic, though not unhindered, reception of Averroes. Some 30 years after his death, between 1225 and 1231, passages from the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* are quoted by Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253) in his *De potentia et actu* and *De motu supercelestium*. This early circulation of Averroes at the University of Oxford may indicate that the translator, Michael Scot, kept open preferential channels with his birthplace in Britain. There is no proof that this was indeed the case, as there seems to be no absolute certainty that Michael Scot was in fact the translator of the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*. The thesis of Michael Scot's authorship has been defended very convincingly,[81] however, and it is generally assumed that his translation was completed sometime between 1220 and 1224. At the latest in 1227, Michael Scot joined the court of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen, where, according to the testimony of Giles of Rome, the emperor enjoyed the company of Averroes's sons.[82]

Frederick II played a strategic role in the intellectual history of 13th-century Europe. It is at the Naples *Studium* established by Frederick II that the promising student Thomas Aquinas received his early education. His teacher was Peter of Ireland (d. after 1260), among the first to use the new translations of Averroes. Aquinas was soon exposed to the influence of the Commentator, from whom he borrowed the technique of literal exegesis that he employed in his Aristotelian commentaries. Clemens Vansteenkiste has counted in Aquinas's works no fewer than 100 quotations from

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[81] See Dag N. Hasse, "Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century," in: *Universality of Reason, Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages*. Proceedings of the XII International Congress of the Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M), Palermo, Italy, 16–22 September, 3 vols., ed. Alessandro Musco, with Carla Compagno, Salvatore D'Agostino, & Giuliana Musotto (Palermo, 2012), vol. 1, pp. 149–78.

[82] See Ermenegildo Bertola, "Le traduzioni delle opere filosofiche arabo-giudaiche nei secoli XII e XIII," in: Francesco Vito, ed., *Studi di filosofia e di storia della filosofia in onore di Francesco Olgiati* (Milan, 1962), pp. 235–70, esp. 263–64; Charles Burnett, "Michael Scot and the Transmission of Scientific Culture From Toledo to Bologna via the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen," *Micrologus* 2 (1994), 101–26; Charles Burnett, "The Introduction of Arabic Learning into British Schools," in: Charles E. Butterworth & Blake A. Kessel, eds., *The Introduction of Arabic Philosophy into Europe* (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1994), pp. 40–57; and Charles Burnett, "The Sons of Averroes with the Emperor Frederick and the Transmission of the Philosophical Works by Ibn Rushd," in: *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, pp. 259–99.

Averroes, and it is clear that, although he takes an independent line on many metaphysical issues, the Dominican Master depends on Averroes for various aspects of his doctrine and interpretation of Aristotle.[83] When he outlines the structure of the *Metaphysics*, for example, Aquinas, like Averroes, contrasts the dialectical character of *Met.* B with the apodictic method in the following books, distinguishing between a "disputative" (*disputative*) and a "demonstrative" (*demonstrative*) line of reasoning. Likewise echoing the Commentator, he resorts to the doctrine of the focal meaning in order to account for the specific function of Book Δ within the *Metaphysics* and argues that the insertion of Δ's lexicon is made necessary by the polysemy of metaphysical terms. Also remarkable in this connection, Averroes's conception of metaphysics as the study of final, formal, and efficient causes is reflected in Aquinas's doctrine that the conclusions of metaphysics are proved "*per causam formalem et finalem praecipue et etiam agentem*."[84]

Further connections between Averroes's and Aquinas's philosophical theologies are established by Alfonso García Marqués. God possesses all the perfections that pertain to the different kinds or genera of beings, and this is precisely the view of the Commentator ("Hoc est etiam quod Philosophus et Commentator dicit in V Metaph., text. 21, quod Deus dicitur perfectus, quia omnes perfectiones quae sunt in omnibus generibus rerum in ipso sunt").[85] Aquinas is here endorsing Averroes's interpretation of *Met.* Δ 16, where the perfect "in a general way" (ὅλως) mentioned in 1021b32–33 is referred to God and explained as the property of enjoying the perfections of every genus to the utmost degree (*šaraf mimmā yūğadu fī kull wāḥid min al-aǧnās*). Inspired by another text in the *Long Commentary* on *Met.* Λ 7, Aquinas observes that all the perfections existing in God must be included in his essence; furthermore, since God's essence is utterly simple, His perfections must be identical with one another, with the result that any distinction between divine attributes will be the mere work of reason: "Et ideo dicit Commentator XI Metaphysicorum, quod multiplicitas in Deo est solum secundum differentiam in intellectu, et non in esse, quod nos dicimus unum secundum rem, et multa secundum

[83] See Clemens M.J. Vansteenkiste, "San Tommaso d'Aquino ed Averroè," *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 32 (1957), 585–623.

[84] See Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas's Interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book Beta," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 413–27.

[85] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super libros Sententiarum*, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1929), vol. 1, p. 64.

rationem." Another intuition is here appropriated that surfaces in the *Metaphysics* commentary, where Averroes discusses the ontological import of predication. In non-material substances, he argues, no source of multiplication is found, because all multiplicity derives from matter; therefore, the properties that belong to such substances are only logically distinct: "The intellect distinguishes one of these from the other for it is in its nature to analyze things which are ontologically united (Arabic: *al-muttaḥida fī l-wuǧūd*; Latin: *adunata in esse*) into their components even if they are not ontologically distinct from one another."[86]

The reception of the *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* as an authoritative text is in stark contrast with the rapid disappearance of both the *Middle Commentary* and the *Epitome*. Although some indications of an early circulation of the latter have been detected in the *Pugio Fidei* by the Dominican Arabist Ramon Martín (d. after 1284), the Latin translation of the *Epitome* was published only in the 16th century and was realized from a Hebrew version of Moses Ibn Tibbon (d. after 1283) by the Jewish physician Jacob Mantino (d. 1549). In the same years an alleged translation of the *Middle Commentary* by Elijah del Medigo, ending abruptly at *Met*. Z 12, appeared in the Comin da Trino edition of 1560. This "translation," however, is quite unrelated to the text of the *Middle Commentary* as preserved in Hebrew and is probably a composition by Elijah del Medigo himself. In an intriguing study in 1934, Jacob Teicher pointed out a number of doctrinal and textual connections between Averroes's *Middle Commentary* and the paraphrase of the *Metaphysics* by Albert the Great. These connections were interpreted as an indication of Averroes's commentary being known in Latin at an early date, despite the lack of any evidence in the manuscript tradition. Recently, within the context of a comprehensive study of the Hebrew text of the *Middle Commentary*, Mauro Zonta has reexamined these correspondences and has found them too vague and weak to prove Teicher's thesis conclusively.[87]

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[86] See Alfonso García Marqués, "Averroes, una fuente tomista de la noción metafísica de Dios," *Sapientia* 37 (1982), 87–106. Cf. J.G. Flynn, "St. Thomas' of the Arab Philosophers on the Nature of God," in: *Tommaso d'Aquino nella storia del pensiero*. Atti del congresso internazionale (Rome-Naples, 17/24 aprile 1974), 2 vols. (Naples, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 325–33. The Δ passage can be found in Averroes, *Tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 627 (*In Met.*, V, t.c. 21, vol. VIII, fol. 131rA). For the quotation from the Λ commentary, see *Tafsīr*, vol. 3, p. 1621 (*In Met.*, XII, t.c. 39, vol. VIII, fol. 322vB; *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, p. 160). References to the text of Thomas Aquinas are given in the cited literature.

[87] On the Averroean sources of the *Pugio fidei*, see Madeleine Fletcher, "Almohadism: An Islamic Context for the Work of Saint Thomas Aquinas," in: Patrice Cressier, Maribel

The vicissitudes of Averroism in the late medieval and Renaissance periods cannot be exhaustively recounted here. While some of Averroes's metaphysical views were clearly embedded in and circulated with such celebrated doctrines as the unity of the intellect or the eternity of the world, a specific survey of the subsequent impact of Averroes's metaphysics is still a *desideratum* in the Averroean scholarship. During the Italian Renaissance, the traditional opposition of the Church was soon joined by the hostility of all humanists and advocates of the *Graeca veritas*. Yet Averroism continued to increase in popularity to the point of constituting a mainstream view in the institutional centers of learning and among churchmen themselves. One of the finest fruits of Renaissance Averroism was the intense editorial activity from which many readers benefited and continue to benefit even today. Most of Averroes's commentaries are still accessible only through a reproduction of the magnificent Venice edition published in 1562 by the brothers Giovan Maria and Tommaso Giunta. This represents the crowning achievement of a long story of commitment and dedication to producing a reliable and complete text of the works of the Commentator. A place of honor in this history is occupied by Averroes's *Metaphysics*. The *Long Commentary* appears in the *editio princeps* printed in 1473 by Lorenzo Canozi (Laurentius Canotius) in Padua and again in the more comprehensive edition published by Nicoletto Vernia in 1483. In both editions Averroes's commentary is accompanied by the Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle attributed to Michael Scot (*Nova Translatio*) and by the Greek-Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (*Novissima Translatio*). A few years later, in 1489, Bernardino da Trino (Bernardinus de Tridino) published Averroes's commentary and complemented the text of the *Nova* with Books M and N of the *Metaphysics* in Moerbeke's translation. This latter would finally be replaced by the translation of Cardinal Bessarion in the Junta edition of 1562–74, which preserves unchanged the essential structure of the preceding editions while representing the immediate antecedent of the text that we read today. Latin versions of the *Epitome* and the pseudo-*Middle Commentary* by Elijah del Medigo were prepared in the meantime. The *Epitome*, translated from the Hebrew by Jacob Mantino, was published

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Fierro, & Luis Molina, eds., *Los almohades: problemas y perspectivas*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 2005), vol. 2, pp. 1163–1226; Jacob Teicher, "Alberto Magno e il Commento Medio di Averroè sulla *Metafisica*," *Studi italiani di filologia classica* 11 (1934), 201–16. Zonta's criticism is in Zonta, *Il* Commento medio, vol. 1, p. 18.

in 1524.[88] The alleged translation of Averroes's *Middle Commentary* appeared somewhat later, in 1560, in the *Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera* edited in Venice by Comin da Trino.[89]

Among their many merits, Renaissance editions of Averroes convey a vivid image of the immense authority enjoyed by "the Commentator" up to the threshold of the 17th century. They express in this way a distinctive mark of medieval and pre-modern philosophical culture. While Aristotle embodies the ideal of philosophical knowledge, his authority devolves upon those who perpetuate his teaching. Averroes made it the project of his life to explain the sense and the letter of the First Teacher. For him, as for so many of his readers, Aristotle is the Philosopher *par excellence*. In his discipleship, Averroes becomes "the Commentator," to the point that no one else, whether Greek, Arab, or Latin, will come to be honored with this same title; Averroes alone is the Commentator, he alone the transposed Aristotle: "Nemo enim vel Graecus vel Arabs vel Latinus inventus est unquam interpres quem quis tanto ut honestaretur nomine dignum censuerit quanto omnes Averroim honestarunt, cum eum solum Commentatorem, solum Aristotelem transpositum appellarunt."[90]

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[88] See F. Edward Cranz, "Editions of the Latin Aristotle Accompanied by the Commentaries of Averroes," in: Edward P. Mahoney, ed., *Philosophy and Humanism. Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 117–28, esp. 124.

[89] The information in Zonta, *Il* Commento medio, vol. 1, p. 15 ("[…] pubblicata per la prima volta dagli editori Giunta di Venezia") should be corrected. For an introduction to the problems of the Latin tradition of Averroes's *Metaphysics*, see Maurice Bouyges, "Annotations a l'Aristoteles Latinus relativement au *Grand Commentaire* d'Averroès sur la *Métaphysique*," *Revue du Moyen Âge Latin* 5 (1949), 211–32; Cranz, *Editions of the Latin Aristotle*; and Roland Hissette, "En marge des éditions de la Métaphysique d'Averroès. Sur les traces de Nicoleto Vernia," *Medioevo* 13 (1987), 195–221. Cf. also Bouyges, "La *Métaphysique* d'Aristote."

[90] Cf. *Aristotelis Stagiritae omnia quae extant opera*, 11 vols. (Venice, 1550–52), vol. 1, fol. 6v, quoted in Charles B. Schmitt, "Renaissance Averroism Studied Through the Venetian Editions of Aristotle-Averroes (with particular reference to the Giunta edition of 1550–2)," in: *L'Averroismo in Italia*. Convegno Internazionale: Rome, 18–20 aprile 1977 (Atti dei Convegni Lincei) 40 (Rome, 1979), pp. 121–42, esp. 140.

AVICENNA'S AND AVERROES'S INTERPRETATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN ALBERTUS MAGNUS

Amos Bertolacci

The commentary on the *Metaphysics* was part of Albertus Magnus's (d. 1280) overall project of divulging philosophy to Latin readers by explaining each of Aristotle's works, a project whose realization took about 20 years (ca. 1250–70).[1] This commentary is exceptional in many respects: it is one of the first commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, if not the very first, written outside a university or a *studium* of a religious order;[2] it relies on a seldom-used Graeco-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (the *Metaphysica Media*);[3] and it is formally a sort of hybrid between a *sententia* and a *commentum per quaestiones*.[4] As a further aspect of originality, this commentary also displays an unprecedented use of Arabic sources. Albertus wrote it as a retired bishop in the Dominican Kloster of Würzburg between 1264 and 1267, after having preached a crusade in the German-speaking countries (1263–64), following the order of Pope Urban IV.[5] The idea of a war against the Muslims, preached by the *episcopus*

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[1] See James A. Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," in: James A. Weisheipl, ed., *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980* (Toronto, 1980), pp. 13–51, esp. 27; and "Albert's Works on Natural Science (*libri naturales*) in Probable Chronological Order," in: *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, pp. 565–77; Irven M. Resnick, "Albert the Great: Biographical Introduction", in Irven M. Resnick, ed., *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden-Boston, 2013), pp. 1–11. The philosophical commentaries by Albertus are often called "Aristotelian," even though they include also commentaries on pseudo-Aristotelian (*De causis et proprietatibus elementorum, De plantis, Liber de causis*) and non-Aristotelian works (Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Boethius's *De divisione, Liber sex principiorum*), as well as original works by Albertus (such as *De natura loci, De nutrimento et nutribili, De intellectu et intelligibili*, and *De natura et origine animae*).

[2] See Weisheipl, "The Life and Works," p. 40.

[3] See *Metaphysica lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media,"* ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, AL XXV 2 (Leiden, 1976), pp. xxxi–xxxii.

[4] The most accurate analysis of the style of Albertus's Aristotelian commentaries is provided by Olga Weijers, "The Literary Forms of the Reception of Aristotle. Between Paraphrase and Philosophical Treatise," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer, & Marc-Aeilko Aris, eds., *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richard Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis* (Münster i. W., 2005), pp. 555–84.

[5] See Weisheipl, "Albert's Works on Natural Science," p. 576; Weisheipl, "The Life and Works," pp. 39–40; and Kennet F. Kitchell Jr. & Irven M. Resnick, transl., *Albertus Magnus On Animals. A Medieval "Summa Zoologica"* (Baltimore-London, 1999), pp. 1–17.

calceatus Albertus for sheer obedience to the pope's command and immediately abandoned after the pope's death, is totally alien, on the cultural side, to Albertus as a theologian and a philosopher: the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*—like all other Aristotelian commentaries of Albertus, as well as his previous and later theological works—contains frequent references to a wide array of Arab philosophers and astronomers, foremost among whom are Avicenna and Averroes, the authors of the two major treatments of metaphysics in Arabic.[6] The fact that Albertus relies on Muslim authors is in no way exceptional, since a similar dependence is common, in different amounts and degrees, to many other medieval Latin philosophers and theologians. What is peculiar to Albertus is the modality of his reception of Arabic sources, in terms of breadth and depth: some Arab authors whom he quotes in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, for

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On Albertus's stay in Würzburg, see Thomas Beckmann & Adolar Zumkeller, *Geschichte des Würzburger Augustinerklosters von der Gründung im Jahre 1262 bis zu Gegenwart* (Würzburg, 2001), pp. 4–5, and the bibliography reported there.

[6] An overview of the Greek, Latin, Arab, and Jewish authors nominally quoted in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, with special attention to Avicenna and Averroes, is provided in: Amos Bertolacci, "A New Phase of the Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West: Albertus Magnus and His Use of Arabic Sources in the Commentaries on Aristotle," in Ludger Honnefelder, ed., *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee. Die Begegnung der Wissenschaftkulturen im 13. Jahrhundert und die Entdeckung des Konzept der Bildung durch Wissenschaft* (Berlin, 2011), pp. 259–76, 491–500. Albertus's receptivity towards Arabic authors is even more remarkable, if we consider that he shares some anti-Islamic prejudices current in Medieval Latin culture, regarding both the theological positions and the moral customs of this foreign religion: see, for example, the virulent attack against the *lex Machumeti*, inspired by Eustratius of Nicaea's ("Commentator") considerations, in: Albertus's *Super Ethicam Commentum et Quaestiones*, VI, 2, ed. Wilhelm Kübel, 2 vols., in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 14.1 (Münster i. W., 1968–72), vol. 2, p. 405.69–74, and against Mohammed himself as master of falsity and baseness in the Commentary on the *Politics*, VI, 6, ed. Auguste Borgnet, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 8 (Paris, 1891), p. 608a. According to Gianfranco Fioravanti ("*Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum*. Alberto Magno e la *Politica* aristotelica," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere, Storia e Filosofia* 9 [1979], 195–246, esp. 245, n. 17), Albertus adds to the traditional anti-Islamic *querelle* original accusations, resumed by later authors. In Albertus's Commentary on the *Politics*, the aversion against Islam connects with a very low consideration of the ethical and political habits of Oriental communities (see the aforementioned passage, as well as VIII, 6, p. 803, both discussed in Fioravanti, "*Politiae Orientalium*," pp. 195, 244). Albertus is, of course, perfectly aware of the Arabic origin of both Avicenna and Averroes (see, for example *De XV problematibus* I, ed. Bernhard Geyer, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 17.1 (Münster i. W., 1975), p. 32.69–71: "Et quem Graeci sapientes [intellectum] possessum, eundem Arabum philosophi Avicenna, Averroes, Abubacher et quidam alii adeptum esse dicebant"). Thomas Aquinas's general attitude towards Islam has been outlined by Jean Pierre Torrell, "Saint Thomas et les non-chrétiens," *Revue Thomiste* 106 (2006), 17–49, esp. 34–42; a similar comprehensive investigation of Albertus's approach is still a desideratum.

example, are otherwise unknown;[7] more specifically, the "what," "where," and "how" of Albertus's use of Avicenna and Averroes seems to represent an unique case in Latin metaphysics.[8]

Although they are portrayed as stemming from Albertus's intention of "remaking Aristotle to the benefit of Latin scholars" or "making Aristotle intelligible to Latins,"[9] the Aristotelian commentaries of Albertus are programmatically meant, by the author's own frequent admissions, to report in an objective way the positions of the Aristotelian school (the Peripatetics) rather than of Aristotle himself.[10] Now, in addition to

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[7] I deal with the mysterious "Avenzoreth" whom Albertus quotes in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, an author never mentioned before or after Albertus, arguing with its possible identity with Abū ʿAlī ʿIsā Ibn Zurʿa (d. 1008) in Amos Bertolacci, "Albertus Magnus and 'Avenzoreth' (Ibn Zurʿa, d. 1008): Legend or Reality?" *Micrologus* XXI (2013): *The Medieval Legends of Philosophers and Scholars*. Proceedings of the International Colloquium *Les légendes des savants et philosophes* (*Moyen Âge et Renaissance*), Tours, 16–18 septembre 2010, ed. Agostino Paravicini Bagliani & Jean-Patrice Boudet (Florence, 2013), pp. 369–96.

[8] A complete inventory of the different kinds of quotations of Avicenna is available in Amos Bertolacci, "*Subtilius speculando*. Le citazioni della *Philosophia Prima* di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 9 (1998), 261–339, and "Le citazioni implicite testuali della *Philosophia prima* di Avicenna nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001), 179–274. Some particularly relevant quotations of Averroes are discussed in Amos Bertolacci, "The Reception of Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Latin Medieval Philosophy until Albertus Magnus," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Hannes Möhle, & Susana Bullido del Barrio, eds., *Via Alberti. Texte—Quellen—Interpretationen* (Münster, 2009), pp. 457–80. The Arabic background of Albertus's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, with special focus on Avicenna and Averroes, is the topic of two other papers of mine: "From Athens to Buḫārā, to Cordoba, to Cologne," in: Vescovini & Hasnaoui, eds., *Proceedings of the Colloque International SIHSPAI (Florence, February 2006)*, pp. 217–34, and "Albert's Use of Avicenna and Islamic Philosophy," in: Irven M. Resnick, ed., *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden-Boston, 2013), pp. 601–11.

[9] Albertus's original formula in *In Physicam*, I, 1, 1 ("Cum autem tres sint partes essentiales philosophiae realis, quae, inquam, philosophia non causatur in nobis ab opere nostro, sicut causatur scientia moralis, sed potius ipsa causatur ab opere naturae in nobis, quae partes sunt naturalis sive physica et metaphysica et mathematica, nostra intentio est omnes dictas partes facere Latinis intelligibiles," ed. Paul Hossfeld, 2 vols., in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 4 [Münster i. W., 1987], vol. 1, p. 1.43–49) underwent a scholarly distortion reconstructed in Amos Bertolacci, "La divisione della filosofia nel primo capitolo del Commento di Alberto Magno alla *Fisica*: le fonti avicenniane," in: Giulio d'Onofrio, ed., *La Divisione della Filosofia e le sue Ragioni. Lettura di testi medievali (VI–XIII secolo)* (Cava de' Tirreni, Salerno, 2001), pp. 137–55, esp. 137–38.

[10] Just to limit the inventory of such statements to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, see *In Metaphysicam*, III, 3, 11, ed. Bernhard Geyer, 2 vols., in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 16 (Münster i. W., 1960), vol. 1, p. 151.48–49: "nos hic suscepimus vias Peripateticorum declarare"; *ibid.*, VII, 5, 3, p. 378.41–42: "nunc enim non suscipimus explanare nisi dicta et opiniones Peripateticorum"; *ibid.*, XI, 1, 9, p. 473.92–93: "Haec autem omnia dicta sunt

regarding them as outstanding philosophers in their own right,[11] Albertus gives Avicenna and Averroes a place of privilege among the *Peripatetici*, more precisely among the most recent members of the school (*Peripatetici novi* or *posteriores*).[12] It is therefore unsurprising that the metaphysical works of Avicenna and Averroes are extensively used in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Among occasional quotations also of other works of Avicenna and Averroes, this commentary mainly depends on the *Ilāhiyyāt* ([*Science of*] *Divine Things*) of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ* (*Book of the Cure*)—a very radical and influential reworking of the *Metaphysics*—and on Averroes's *Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa* (*Long Commentary on the*

secundum opinionem Peripateticorum, quia nec in his nec in aliis in hac via philosophiae dicimus aliquid ex proprio, quia propriam intentionem, quam in philosophia habemus, non hic suscepimus explanare"; *ibid.*, XI, 2, 1, p. 482.23–29: "In his autem quae deinceps dicemus, nemo arbitretur, quod aliquid dicamus de nostra intentione, sicut nec diximus in aliquo librorum naturalium, sed tantum declarabimus opiniones Peripateticorum de istis substantiis, relinquentes aliis iudicium, quid verum vel falsum sit de his quae dicunt"; *ibid.*, XI, 2, 3, p. 486.68–70: "hoc non est praesentis negotii, in quo non suscepimus nisi Peripateticorum positiones exponere"; *ibid.*, XI, 3, 7, p. 542.20–23: "non suscepimus in hoc negotio explanare nisi viam Peripateticorum"; *ibid.*, XIII, 2, 4, p. 599.61–66: "Hic igitur sit finis disputationis istius in qua non dixi aliquid secundum opinionem meam propriam, sed omnia dicta sunt secundum positiones Peripateticorum. Et qui hoc voluerit probare, diligenter legat libros eorum, et non me, sed illos laudet vel reprehendat." The so-called "disclaimers" by Albertus, namely his contentions of being simply an expositor of alien views on sensible doctrinal points, are preliminary investigated by James A. Weisheipl, "Albert's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Paraphrases," *Proceedings of the Patristic, Mediaeval and Renaissance Conference* 5 (1980), 1–27.

[11] *De causis proprietatum elementorum*, II, 1, 1, ed. Paul Hossfeld, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 5.2 (Münster i. W., 1980), p. 90.55–57: "Et in hoc concordant excellentes in philosophia viri, Aristoteles et Ptolemaeus et Avicenna et Messealach et plures aliorum"; *In Phys.*, V, 1, 8, vol. 2, p. 417.7–8: "Hoc autem non placet Averroi et aliis praecipuis de secta Peripateticorum"; *ibid.*, IV, 3, 4, p. 266.83–85: "Propter quod respondent viri illustres in philosophia, Avicenna, Alexander, Themistius et Averroes, Theophrastus et Porphyrius […]."

[12] Cf. *In De anima*, III, 2, 12, ed. Clemens Stroick, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 7.1 (Münster i. W., 1968), p. 194.10–12: "In hac autem sententia nobiscum conveniunt et Averroes et Avicenna et plures alii Peripateticorum"; *De natura et origine animae* I, 1, ed. Bernhard Geyer, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 12 (Münster, 1955), p. 1.12–13: "Huc usque de animalium membris et generatione et natura et accidentibus determinata sunt, quaecumque a Peripateticis invenimus scripta, Aristoteles videlicet, quem praecipue sectuti sumus, et Theophrasto et Avicenna"; *In Met.*, III, 3, 4, pp. 143.98–144.3: "Sicut enim de talibus dixerunt Peripatetici formis, Porphyrius et Alexander et Avicenna, essentialiter sunt qualitates virtutem substantiae habentes"; *In De Causis*, I, 3, 2, ed. Winfried Fauser, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 17.2 (Münster i. W., 1993), p. 36.62–64: "Multi autem Peripateticorum in primo negabant esse voluntatem, Aristoteles scilicet, Theophrastus, Porphyrius, Avicenna et Averroes"; *In Phys.*, II, 2, 12, vol. 1, p. 118.26–28: "Ego autem magis consentio novis Peripateticis et concordo cum Alexandro et Themistio et Averroi et Porphyrio et multis aliis […]"; *ibid.*, VIII, 2, 9, vol. 2, p. 607.15–17: "Quidam autem ex posterioribus Peripateticis ex quadam difficultate seducti sicut Avicenna et Algazel et Moyses Aegyptius et quidam alii dixerunt. […]" (see also *ibid.*, V, 1, 8, vol. 2, p. 417.7–8; above, note 11)

Metaphysics)—the most thorough and detailed exegesis of this work that has survived.[13] Albertus knew these works by means of their Latin translations (*Liber de Philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, ca. 1150–75; *Commentum in Metaphysicam*, ca. 1220–24),[14] with which he got acquainted during his teaching in Paris (1243ca.–48)[15] and to which he kept on referring massively in his subsequent philosophical and theological works. Avicenna and Averroes, i.e., the authors of *Ilāhiyyāt* and *Tafsīr*, are not only the Arab philosophers most frequently quoted by Albertus in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*: if compared to the many Greek, Latin, and Hebrew authors occasionally mentioned, they are also, after Aristotle and Plato, the authorities to whom he refers most frequently. They are cited in three different ways: by name; in an explicit indeterminate way (under the rubrics "aliqui," "nonnulli" etc.); and silently, this last mode of quotation being the most indicative of Albertus's reliance on Avicenna and Averroes. In all these three different respects, Avicenna and Averroes are the post-Aristotelian authors to whom Albertus most often and extensively refers. In other words, they represent the two real "sources," together with the *Metaphysics*, of the commentary.

Some general lessons can be immediately derived. First, by instantiating the case of a man of the Church who, as a Christian bishop, obeys the pope's order of supporting a war waged against the Muslim infidels, and also, as a scholar, uses abundantly in his works Arabic

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[13] Avicenna, *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* (*1*), ed. Ǧūrǧ Š. Qanawatī, Saʿīd Zāyid, al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya (Cairo, 1960); *Al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* (*2*), ed. Muḥammad Yusuf Mūsā, Sulaymān Dunyā, & Saʿīd Zāyid, al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya (Cairo, 1960); Averroes, *Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa*. Texte arabe inédit établi par Maurice Bouyges s.j., 4 vols. (Beirut, 1938–48).

[14] Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina I–X*, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven, Louvain-la-Neuve-Leiden, 1977–83); Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis* [=Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*], in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. VIII, fols. 1–355. On the Latin translations of Avicenna, see Amos Bertolacci, "A Community of Translators: The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna's Book *of the Cure*," in: Constant J. Mews & John N. Crossley, eds., *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe 1100–1500* (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 37–55; on those of Averroes, see Dag N. Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century* (Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, 2010). In what follows, the *Tafsīr* will be quoted indicating: the book of the *Metaphysics* and the section of Averroes's exegesis (for instance: Λ, 5 = Book Λ, commentum 5); the number of pages and lines of the Arabic edition (for instance: pp. 1420.6–1421.16); between square brackets, the indication of the folia of the Juncta edition of the Latin translation and their sections (for example: [fol. 292K–M]).

[15] See Weisheipl, "The Life and Works," pp. 21–28. The references to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in Albertus's earliest known treatise (*De Natura boni*), written before his teaching in Paris (*ibid*., p. 20), do not evidence any particular knowledge of Avicenna's and Averroes's works on metaphysics.

writings of Muslim authors, Albertus well exemplifies the two-faced attitude of the western medieval world towards Islam (clash of religions, on the one hand, positive dialogue in the field of culture and in the perspective of the common Greek heritage, on the other).[16] Second, by commenting on the *Metaphysics* according a Graeco-Latin translation of Aristotle's text, the *Translatio Media*, while at the same time depending massively on Averroes and Avicenna, known for the interpretation of Aristotle's work by means of Arabic-Latin translations, Albertus provides a glaring example of how unhistorical is any attempt to dissect the living reality of medieval Peripatetism: he creates a fictive divide and opposition between the process of transmission of Aristotle's works from Greek into Latin and the concomitant tendency to interpret the Aristotelian *littera* with the help of the exegesis developed in the Arabo-Islamic philosophical context.[17] Equally instructive, on more specific grounds, is Albertus's *modus operandi* in the reception of his two main Arab sources, once it is systematically investigated.

The Commentary on the *Metaphysics* offers a particularly profitable vantage point for studying Albertus's attitude towards Arabic metaphysics.[18] On the one hand, for this commentary he could dispose of both Avicenna's and Averroes's major accounts of metaphysics in Latin translation. Only in the case of the Commentary on the *Physics* and the *De Anima* he found

[16] The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to Albertus's attitude towards Judaism: on the one hand, he was involved in the Parisian condemnation of the *Talmud* of 15 May 1248 (on which see Weisheipl, "The Life and Works," pp. 26–27); on the other hand, in the shortly posterior Aristotelian commentaries, he positively quotes many Jewish philosophers.

[17] Sylvain Gouguenheim (*Aristote au Mont-Saint-Michel. Les racines grecques de l'Europe chrétienne* [Paris, 2008]) notoriously holds the opposite view.

[18] The amount and degree of Albertus's reliance on Arab authors and works in his commentaries on Aristotle's *corpus* is unequal and differs from case to case, depending on the source at his disposal. Before a general view of his reliance on Arabic philosophy in the Aristotelian commentaries can be assessed, detailed accounts of the sources inspiring each of these commentaries are needed. Martin J. Tracey ("Albert's Readings of Aristotle's Moral-Philosophical Treatises on Pleasure vis-à-vis Three Recent Perspectives on his Thought," in: Walter Senner et al., eds., *Albertus Magnus 1200–2000. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven* [Berlin, 2001], pp. 311–25), for example, remarks that Albertus used theological authorities and relied on the very text of Aristotle in his ethical commentaries, against those (most notably Alain de Libera) according to whom Albertus kept the fields of philosophy and theology distinct from one another and mainly drew from post-Aristotelian Peripatetic authorities. In this regard, Albertus's two commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for which he had at his disposal only Averroes's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's work, are scarcely comparable, for instance, to his commentary on the *De anima*, for which he could use both Avicenna's reworking and Averroes's Long Commentary thereupon.

himself in such a favorable situation.[19] On the other hand, Avicenna and Averroes upheld two alternative formulations of metaphysics, in terms of style (paraphrase vs. literal commentary), attitude towards Aristotle (free adaptation vs. faithful endorsement), and doctrine (inclusion of non-Aristotelian views vs. strict adherence to the Peripatetic tradition); moreover, Averroes frequently and harshly criticizes Avicenna in the *Tafsīr*, the commentary of his in which his constant polemic against Avicenna reaches its climax.[20] Faced with this manifest disagreement between his main sources, Albertus adopted a very original strategy—both historically significant and theoretically demanding—namely, the effort of *synthesis*. This harmonization was an arduous path to follow, since it required a profound understanding of Avicenna's and Averroes's standpoints and an intelligent disclosure of a "third way" in the interpretation of the *Metaphysics*, in terms of approach, style, and doctrine.

In Part I below I will sketch the nature and content of *Ilāhiyyāt* and *Tafsīr*, showing their pivotal role in determining the historical, stylistic, and doctrinal specificity of Albertus's commentary; in this first part, I will devote greater attention to Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*, since a full-fledged analysis of Averroes's *Tafsīr* is offered by the contribution of Matteo di Giovanni in the present volume. Next, in Part II, I will provide an account of the criticisms of Avicenna contained in Averroes's *Tafsīr*, briefly describing their main trends. Finally in Part III below I describe the harmonizing strategy that, faced with these criticisms, Albertus adopts in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

I

I.1. *Avicenna's* Ilāhiyyāt

In the *Ilāhiyyāt*, Avicenna mounts a thorough recasting of the epistemology and content of the *Metaphysics*, with the aim of replacing Aristotle's work with a full-fledged original elaboration in which metaphysics may finally receive a complete, coherent, and rigorous treatment, thus

[19] In the commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, Albertus had at his disposal Averroes's Long Commentary on the *De Caelo*, but he mainly used the pseudo-Avicennian *Liber Caeli et Mundi*, rather than Avicenna's original part of the *Šifā'* corresponding to Aristotle's *De Caelo* (see Ps.-Avicenna Latinus, *Liber Celi et Mundi*, ed. Oliver Gutman [Leiden, 2003], p. xvii). This part of the *Šifā'* was known to him only through the quotations by Averroes.

[20] In Averroes's Long Commentary on *De anima*, in contrast, the points of opposition towards Avicenna are scanty.

becoming properly a science. This reworking invests all the main aspects of the epistemological profile of metaphysics (theme, structure, method, relationship with other sciences) and is performed by arranging in a different framework a selection of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines, to which the views of the Peripatetic commentators, Neoplatonic theories regarded as Aristotelian, and Avicenna's own ideas are added. Avicenna also pays considerable attention to the philosophical underpinnings of Islamic religion and to the opinions of Muslim theology having philosophical relevance. Insofar as it is a comprehensive treatise of metaphysics in which the "row" material of the *Metaphysics* is refined, expanded, and reconstructed according to a precise epistemology (that of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*), the *Ilāhiyyāt* can be regarded as a second "edition" or second "beginning" of Aristotelian metaphysics in Western philosophy.[21]

Avicenna's reworking of the *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhiyyāt* is outlined in Table 1. Two radical aspects of innovation are noteworthy. First, Avicenna changes the "form," i.e., the scientific profile, of the *Metaphysics* (point A). Accordingly, he modifies also its "content," namely, the disposition and doctrinal purport of the single books (point B). The changes regarding the "form" affect four main areas: the theme of metaphysics, its structure, its method, and its relationship with the other sciences. The content of the *Metaphysics*, for its part, is reworked by means of a different arrangement of its books and by its integration with the subsequent metaphysical speculation, both Greek and Arabic.

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[21] On Avicenna's recasting of the epistemological profile and the material content of the *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, see Amos Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's "Metaphysics" in Avicenna's* Kitāb al- Šifā': *A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought* (Leiden, 2006). Scholars increasingly acknowledge Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* as the real "second beginning" of Aristotelian metaphysics (see, for example, Andreas Speer, "Das 'Erwachen der Metaphysik.' Anmerkungen zu einem Paradigma für das Verständnis des 12. Jahrhunderts," in: Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Alexander Fidora, & Andreas Niederberger, eds., *Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. On the Relationship among Philosophy, Science and Theology* (Turnhout, 2004), pp. 17–40, esp. 19: "Die arabische Philosophie, allen voran Avicenna müsste man wohl nennen, wenn man beispielweise von einem zweiten Anfang der Metaphysik im eingangs genannten Sinne redden wollte, der sich am Modell des aristotelischen Metaphysikentwurfs orientiert"). It cannot be coincidental that the authors and works about which this formula has been used in recent scholarship (Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, "zweite Anfang/Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik," in Ludger Honnefelder, "Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert," in: Jan P. Beckmann & Ludger Honnefelder, eds., *Philosophie im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen* (Hamburg, 1987), pp. 165–86; and Gundissalinus, "zweite Anfang der aristotelischen Philosophie," in Alexander Fidora, *Die Wissenschaftstheorie des Dominicus Gundissalinus. Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen des zweitens Anfangs der aristotelischen Philosophie in 12. Jahrundert* [Berlin, 2003]) depend significantly, in different respects, on Avicenna.

TABLE 1. *Outline of Avicenna's* Ilāhiyyāt

Avicenna, *Ilāhiyyāt*		Sources
(A) Form:		
(1) Theme: existent is the subject-matter; God and the ultimate causes are the goal; existent and God are immaterial realities		
(2) Structure:		
Ontology species of existent (OntologyS)	Henology species of one-many (HenologyS)	(1)–(4) Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics; Met.* Γ, 1–2; E, 1 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on *Met.* Λ al-Fārābī, *On the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics* (<– Ammonius Son of Hermeias?)
properties of existent (OntologyP)	properties of one-many (HenologyP)	
causes of existent (OntologyC/Theology)		
(3) Method: apodictic, analytical, non-dialectical		
(4) Relationship with other sciences: metaphysics grounds the proper principles of logic, natural philosophy, mathematics (and practical philosophy)		
(B) Content:		
(i) Prolegomena (I, 1–4): subject-matter, goal, utility, rank, name, and division of metaphysics. Introduction (I, 5–8): existent and the other primary concepts; Necessary Existent in Itself/possible existent in itself; the axioms		(i) *Met.* Γ and E, 1 Greek Prolegomena al-Fārābī, *Survey of the Sciences*
(ii) OntologyS (II–III): categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation) OntologyP (IV–VI): prior and posterior, potency and act, perfect and imperfect, whole and part; universal and particular; cause and effect		(ii) *Met.* Z-H, Θ

Table 1 (*cont.*)

Avicenna, *Ilāhiyyāt*	Sources	
(iii) HenologyS (III, 2–6; III, 9): one by accident and one by essence (by genus, by species = by differentia, by relation, by subject, by number); quantity; absolute and relative multiplicity; opposition one-many; qualities which are in quantities HenologyP (VII, 1): sameness by accident (similarity, equality, comparability), sameness by essence (in genus, species and properties); otherness, alterity, difference, privation, and contrariety	(iii) *Met.* I	(i)–(iv) *Met.* B, Δ
Appendix to Henology (VII, 2–3): exposition and criticism of the doctrine of numbers of Plato and the Pythagoreans	*Met.* A, M–N	
(iv) OntologyC/Theology (VIII–X, 3): the First Principle's existence (VIII, 1–3); His nature (VIII, 4–7); Cosmology (IX, 1–5); Theodicy (IX, 6); Eschatology (IX, 7); Prophetology (X, 1–3)	(iv) *Met.* α 2 + Λ 6–10 (<– al-Kindī) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On the Principles of the Universe* Themistius, Commentary on *Met.* Λ *Theologia Aristotelis* (<– Plotinus), *Liber de Causis* (<– Proclus) al-Fārābī, *Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City* Islamic religion and theology	
Appendix to OntologyC/Theology (X, 4–5): practical philosophy	Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* Bryson, *Oeconomica* Plato, *Respublica, Leges*	

Avicenna shows that the theme of metaphysics corresponds coherently to all the different ways according to which Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* portrays this discipline. Thus, metaphysics is a study of the First Causes and God, since the First Causes and God are its "goal." But it is also a study of "existent," since "existent *qua* existent" is its subject-matter. Finally, it is a study of immaterial and motionless things, since both the First Causes and God, on the one hand, and "existent *qua* existent," on the other, are realities of this kind.

As to the new structure that metaphysics receives in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, it is the result of two vertical axes, which intersect with three horizontal layers. The vertical axes are the study of "existent *qua* existent" and the study

of "one *qua* one," called in the table, respectively, Ontology and Henology. The horizontal layers are given by the species, properties, and causes of "existent" and "one." Ontology is the first and main axis, since it concerns the subject-matter of metaphysics: it displays a three-fold distinction in species, properties, and causes of "existent" according to which metaphysics rests primarily on a sequence of three parts (OntologyS, OntologyP, and OntologyC). OntologyC is also a Theology, since the first cause of "existent" is God. Henology is a complementary and shorter axis: it encompasses a treatment of the species of "one" and "many" (HenologyS) and an analysis of their properties (HenologyP). The culmination of metaphysics is OntologyC/Theology, which Avicenna portrays as the "seal" of this discipline.

In comparison with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the method of the *Ilāhiyyāt* is both more apodictic (i.e., more dependent on rigorous proofs such as demonstrations) and, conversely, less dialectical. On the one hand, Avicenna clarifies the status and limits of metaphysics as a demonstrative science, reworks the arguments of Aristotle's writing in syllogistic form, and pays considerable attention to the truth and certainty of the premises of arguments. In the same vein, he complements the recourse to demonstrations with procedures that we can call "analytical," like proofs by division, terminological distinctions, and classifications. On the other hand, he endeavors to reduce the importance and visibility of the dialectical procedures adopted by Aristotle. Thus, he places the doxographies of Books A, M, and N in an appendix to Henology, rather than at the beginning and at the end of the work as in the *Metaphysics*, and quotes only a few aporias of Book B in different places of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, always connecting them with their solution.

More coherently and systematically than in Aristotle, metaphysics, according to Avicenna, is the apex of the system of sciences. In Avicenna's classification of the sciences, and in its concrete realization in the *Šifāʾ*, metaphysics functions as a *regina scientiarum* that ascertains the principles of all the other sciences, which therefore become not simply interconnected but also hierarchically ordered. The scientific principles assessed by metaphysics are, on the one hand, the logical laws common to all the sciences (the axioms) and the universal concepts that every science uses without discussing them (the primary concepts such as "existent," "thing," "necessary," and "one"). On the other hand, metaphysics clarifies the principles that are proper to each of the sciences and regard their specific subject-matters, i.e., the epistemological hypotheses of the distinct sciences. Thus, metaphysics proves the very existence and mode of existence of the subject-matters of the other sciences (like the existence

and way of existence of universals and categories with regard to logic, of matter and form with regard to natural philosophy, of discrete and continuous quantity with regard to mathematics). Metaphysics provides this foundation primarily and directly to the three branches of theoretical philosophy (logic, natural philosophy, and mathematics), indirectly to the disciplines subordinated to these latter (the foundation of practical philosophy lies in the discussion of prophecy at the end of OntologyC).

Considered collectively, the quotations of the *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhiyyāt* (taken from various Arabic translations of Aristotle's work and corresponding to different techniques) show both an extensive use of this work and a radical recasting of its content. Avicenna quotes, in different ways, all the books of the *Metaphysics* (apart, perhaps, from K), but according to an order that is strikingly different from their original disposition in Aristotle's work. Thus, Book A is quoted by Avicenna not at the beginning of the *Ilāhiyyāt* but at the end of Henology. Chapters 1–2 of Book a are transferred even "further," namely, to OntologyC/Theology, in conjunction with Chapters 6–10 of Book Λ. The fate of Book Γ is opposite: it is not "postponed" but, rather, placed in the forefront of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (Prolegomena and Introduction). Chapter 1 of Book E inspires, together with Book Γ in its entirety, some themes of the Prolegomena. Chapters E 2–4, in contrast, lay in the background of some minor points of the Introduction and OntologyS. The doctrine of Book Z (and, to a lesser extent, of Book H) is used in the treatment of substance in OntologyS, in the treatment of the universals in OntologyP, and in the treatment of material and formal causes, still in OntologyP. A comprehensive summary of Book Θ occurs in the analysis of potentiality and actuality within OntologyP. Book I is the main source of HenologyP. Chapters 6–10 of Book L are quoted, as the continuation of α, 1–2, within OntologyC/Theology. Books M and N, finally, are quoted together with Book A at the end of Henology. Other books of the *Metaphysics*, rather than ordered differently, are "scattered." Thus, Avicenna refers to some aporias of Book B in distinct places of the Introduction, OntologyP, and OntologyC/Theology. Likewise, several terminological distinctions deriving from Book Δ serve (sometimes with critical remarks) as linguistic preliminaries to the treatment of various issues in all the parts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* preceding OntologyC/Theology (Prolegomena, Introduction, OntologyS-HenologyS, OntologyP, and HenologyP). In general, we can say that Avicenna's reworking of the content of the *Metaphysics* consists in enucleating three main "poles" around which the books of this work can be grouped: the epistemological pole (Prolegomena and Introduction), given by Books Γ and E, 1; the

ontological-henological pole (OntologyS-P and HenologyS-P), constituted primarily by Z–H, Θ, and I, in which B plays a "trouble-shooting" role, Δ provides the semantic preliminaries to the discussion, and A–M–N serve as a doxographical complement; and the theological pole (OntologyC/Theology) constituted by α 2 and Λ 6–10.

Avicenna's reshaping of the epistemological profile of the *Metaphysics* derives from three main sources: first, the Aristotelian *corpus* (the model of science presented in *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics* Γ and E 1, above all); second, the Greek commentators of Aristotle (especially Alexander of Aphrodisias); and third, the Arab interpreters of Aristotle (*in primis* al-Fārābī, who might depend in this not only on Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, whom he quotes, but also on a lost essay by Ammonius Son of Hermeias on the goals of Aristotle's works, lost in Greek but mentioned by Arabic sources). OntologyC/Theology is the section of the work in which the integration of non-Aristotelian material in the content of the metaphysics is more clearly visible. Thus, the connection of chapter α 2 with chapters Λ 6–10 within this section derives ultimately from al-Kindī's way of understanding the content of the *Metaphysics*. Moreover, OntologyC/Theology is expanded by means of Alexander of Aphrodisias's and Themistius's works on metaphysics, pseudo-Aristotelian, in fact Neoplatonic, metaphysical works (*Theologia Aristotelis* and *Liber de Causis*), and the theological sections of some original works by al-Fārābī. Finally, in the examples, terminology, themes, and opinions of OntologyC/Theology there can be detected an attempt to show the affinity of metaphysics with Islamic religion.

I.2. *Averroes's* Tafsīr

The *Tafsīr* is, both stylistically and doctrinally, the counterpart of the *Ilāhiyyāt*.[22] Of Averroes's three commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, it is by far the most comprehensive and detailed, being much more faithful to Aristotle's text than the *Epitome* and much more extensive and articulated than the *Middle Commentary*. Its historical importance is evident: since all the previous commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, both Greek and Arabic,

[22] Bibliographical references to the partial translations and studies regarding Averroes's *Tafsīr* can be found in Philip H. Rosemann, "Averroes: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 Onwards," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 30 (1988), 153–221; and, for the following years, in the bibliographical database of the Thomas-Institut of the University of Cologne.

are incompletely preserved, the *Tafsīr* represents the first extant overall (although not complete) exegesis of Aristotle's work in the Peripatetic tradition.[23] On the methodological side, its aim is to resume the exegetical technique of the Greek ancient tradition, namely, the literal commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias and, to a lesser extent, the paraphrase of Themistius, two author whose exegesis of *Met*. Λ Averroes abundantly quotes in his commentary thereupon. On their footsteps, Averroes provides a punctual and continuous explanation of the text of the *Metaphysics*, with frequent references to the other Aristotelian works, according to a model of "holistic" interpretation of the *Metaphysics* and of its role within the *corpus*. On the doctrinal side, its goal is to preserve the original pattern and content of the *Metaphysics* against the modifications and—in Averroes's eyes—"corruptions" introduced by modern philosophers, *in primis* Avicenna. From this point of view, the *Tafsīr* can be regarded as the culmination of an anti-Avicennian *crescendo* in Averroes's commentaries: starting with the early Epitome (ca. 1260), whose style and doctrine are still dependent on Avicennian models, despite the occasional criticisms of Avicenna that it displays; passing through the substantially "neutral" middle commentary, in which Averroes adopts an objective attitude towards Aristotle's text, without discussing extensively the subsequent metaphysical tradition; this ascending polemical line culminates in the *Tafsīr*, whose second main purpose, complementary to the explanation of Aristotle's text, is just the dismissal of Avicenna's metaphysics.

I.3. *The Specificity of Albertus's Commentary in the Light of Its Arabic Background*

Albertus's attitude towards these two paradigmatic and antithetic interpretations of the *Metaphysics* is interesting in many respects. First, historically, it exemplifies the crucial phase of transmission of Arabic metaphysics into Latin, insofar as it documents the process of joint reception of these two fundamental accounts of the *Metaphysics* in one of the earliest, most extensive, and most influential Latin accounts of Aristotle's work. Albertus's commentary is unique in this respect, since it is the first known example of interpretation of the *Metaphysics* in Latin that relies

[23] For an overview of the Greek commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, see Concetta Luna, "Les commentaires grecs à la Métaphysique," in: Richard Goulet, ed., *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Supplement* (Paris, 2003), pp. 249–58; Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"* pp. 136–42.

massively on *both* Avicenna's *and* Averroes's works on the subject. Before Albertus, the lines of transmission of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* had followed separate paths: the Latin reception of Avicenna's metaphysics is witnessed either by theological works or by treatises on specific metaphysical or epistemological topics, whereas the exegesis of the *Metaphysics* is based almost exclusively on Averroes's model, with a much narrower recourse to Avicenna's contribution.[24] With Albertus, for the first time, these two lines of transmission merge and interact. Albertus accords to both authors an equally important, although distinct, function: Averroes provides the exegetical tools to explain the text; Avicenna contributes to its doctrinal enrichment. Consequently, the amount of space and degree of attention that Albertus devotes to Avicenna and Averroes in the commentary is similar to the one accorded to Aristotle: he reports the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* comprehensively, signaling the cases in which the content of these two works is, for some reason, noteworthy. Due to the similarity of the exegetical technique that Albertus applies to Aristotle's, Avicenna's, and Averroes's texts, it is not far-fetched to view his commentary on the *Metaphysics* also as a kind of "super-commentary," albeit *in nuce*, of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr*.

The joint dependence on the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* is mirrored—and this is the second element of interest—in the format of Albertus's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, adopted also in his other Aristotelian commentaries. Among the different kinds of exegesis applied to Aristotle's works in history (Alexander of Aphrodisias's literal commentaries, Themistius's paraphrases, Nicholas of Damascus's abridgements etc.), Albertus's commentaries represent a case on their own. They can be defined "paraphrases with digressions": they consist of chapters that clarify, by way of paraphrase, the meaning of Aristotle's text, intermingled with autonomous chapters in which the doctrine of the text previously paraphrased is either accounted for anew differently and more thoroughly, or is confronted with possible objections, or is compared with

[24] I have outlined the main trends of the Latin reception of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* until Albertus Magnus in Amos Bertolacci, "On the Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus: An Attempt at Periodization," in: Dag N. Hasse & Amos Bertolacci, eds., *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*. Proceedings of the Conference held at Villa Vigoni (Menaggio, Como), 2–6 July 2008 (Berlin, 2012), pp. 197–223.

different opinions on the same topic.[25] This stylistic peculiarity makes Albertus's commentaries a sort of conflation of the two most widespread models of Aristotelian exegesis in the Middle Ages, namely, the *sententia* and the *commentum per quaestiones*. It is the task of future research to ascertain whether this twofold nature of Albertus's commentaries may be related genetically to Avicenna and Averroes[26] and, if so, to determine the amount of Albertus's originality in the adoption of Arabic exegetical formats.[27] What is certain is that in the Commentary on

[25] Scholars tend to define the style of Albertus's Aristotelian commentaries simply as "paraphrase," disregarding the essential role played by digressions: see, for example, Bernardo C. Bazán, "13th Century Commentaries On *De anima*: From Peter of Spain To Thomas Aquinas," in: Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi, & Stefano Perfetti, eds., *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino* (*secc. XIII–XV*). *The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West (13–15th centuries)*. Atti del colloquio Firenze-Pisa, 19–22 Ottobre 2000 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale) 10 (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 119–84, esp. 168–74 ("Albertus Magnus: Eclectic Commentaries by Way of 'paraphrase' "); likewise, Weijers, "The Literary Forms of the Reception of Aristotle," p. 577, selects Albertus's commentary on the *De anima* as representative of the genre "Paraphrase." This one-sided view has some impact on the consideration of Albertus's originality: Alain de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique: Albert le Grand* (Paris, 2005), p. 53, for example, contends that "la forme littéraire de son activité philosophique—la paraphrase—se prête moins que d'autres à l'esposé de vues originales."

[26] In an Avicennian vein, Albertus replaces the text commented upon by his own rephrasing of it; in the footsteps of Averroes, he uses frequent doctrinal parentheses in the continuous, systematic, and detailed interpretation of Aristotle's text. In scholarly literature, the paraphrastic component of the style of Albertus Magnus's Aristotelian commentaries is frequently related to Avicenna's *Šifāʾ*: see, for instance, Sten Ebbesen, "Late-Ancient Ancestors of Medieval Philosophical Commentaries," in: *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino*, pp. 1–15, esp. 9: "[Albert] may have been somewhat influenced by Themistius's paraphrase of the *Posterior Analytics*, but the main inspiration surely came from elsewhere (Avicenna)"; Cristina d'Ancona, "Commenting on Aristotle: From Late Antiquity to the Arab Aristotelianism," in: Wilhelm Geerlings & Christian Schulze, eds., *Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter. Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung* (Leiden-Boston-Cologne, 2002), pp. 201–51, esp. 204, 246: "one is led to wondering if the paraphrastic approach of Albert has something to do with Avicenna's own favorite (albeit not exclusive) way of dealing with authoritative texts … the favorite approach of Albert the Great to Aristotle's work is paraphrase, no doubt thanks to the influence of the Latin Avicenna on him"; de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 17: "la paraphrase de style avicennien." The possible impact of the style of Averroes's long commentaries on Albertus's digressions has not been taken into account.

[27] Albeit possibly inspired, in different respects, by Avicenna and Averroes, Albertus's style remains, however, original. His paraphrases are not a free reworking of Aristotle's text as in Avicenna's *Šifāʾ*, since they follow rigorously the order of Aristotle's *littera* (the term "paraphrase" can be applied to Avicenna's and Albertus's styles only in different senses). Nor are the digressions randomly scattered in the exegesis, as they are in Averroes's long commentaries, but instead they constitute a stable second structural element of Albertus's commentaries. In this respect, one might envisage in Albertus's commentaries a sort of mutual interaction of the formats of his Arabic sources: in his commentaries, the paraphrases modeled on Avicenna assume the running character of Averroes's

the *Metaphysics*, as well as in other commentaries, this double register of paraphrases and digressions allows the incorporation of Avicenna's and Averroes's contributions: Albertus mainly quotes Averroes's literal exegesis of the *Metaphysics* in the explicative paraphrases, whereas he prefers to cite Avicenna's doctrinal developments in the digressions. In this way, the contributions of Avicenna and Averroes remain separate within two different structural levels of the commentary, but they can also interact and balance each other in the overall architecture of the work. Of Albertus's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the *Tafsīr* represents—so to say—the "basis," whereas the *Ilāhiyyāt* constitutes the "height" and the trait-d'union connecting the exegesis of Aristotle's work with the Neoplatonic speculation of the *Liber de causis* (a work upon which Albertus comments after the *Metaphysics* and which he regards as an Aristotelian oeuvre, albeit not *stricto sensu* a work by Aristotle). In other words, the articulated format of Albertus's commentary—itself a kind of synthesis of the exegetical styles adopted by Avicenna and Averroes—allows a use of sources in which the borrowings from Avicenna and Averroes are, at the same time, structurally distinct from, and functionally complementary to, one another.

Third, from the point of view of doctrine, Albertus tries to solve and overcome the conflict between the views of these two authors on many issues regarding metaphysics. This tendency is most visible in the case of the doctrine of the primary and most universal concepts ("existent," "thing," "one," "necessary," etc.), the so-called "transcendentals," of which recent studies have remarked the centrality in Latin medieval philosophy in general and Albertus Magnus in particular, as well as the seminal role of the discussions of this topic in Arabic philosophy.[28] In the case of

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exegesis, whereas the digressions inspired by Averroes become structurally independent from the explanation of the text, thus mirroring Avicenna's way of replacing Aristotle's text with doctrinal developments that are related to, but independent from, the Aristotelian *littera*.

[28] For a general account of the impact of this doctrine in various authors and periods of Latin philosophy, see Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 107 (Leiden-Boston, 2012); Ludger Honnefelder, *La Métaphysique comme science transcendentale* (Paris, 2002); Luisa Valente, "*Ens, unum, bonum*: elementi per una storia dei trascendentali in Boezio e nella tradizione boeziana del XII secolo," in: Stefano Caroti, Ruedi Imbach, Zenon Kaluza, Giorgio Stabile, & Loris Sturlese, eds., *"Ad Ingenii Acuitionem." Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù* (Louvain-La-Neuve, 2006), pp. 483–545; Sabine Folger-Fonfara, *Das "Super"-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 96 (Leiden-Boston, 2008). Although the relevance of this doctrine should not be overemphasized (see the cautious remarks in Jorge J.E. Gracia, "Critical Study. Medieval

Albertus's commentary on the *Metaphysics* and its Arabic sources, the theory of transcendentals is crucial in several respects. To start with, this theory has a paramount importance in Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*. In this work, the scattered statements on transcendentals that can be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are transformed into a comprehensive framework that allows an overall rebuilding of metaphysics as a science. Thus, in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, "existent" is shown to be the subject-matter of metaphysics, the relationship between "thing" and "existent" conveys the fundamental distinction of essence and existence, the treatments of "existent" and "one" are the two main axes along which metaphysics is structured, and around the concept of "necessary" is centered the discussion of God' nature and His distinction from all other beings.[29] Moreover, the transcendentals are the issue of metaphysics about which Averroes in the *Tafsīr* disagrees most decidedly with Avicenna: the recurrent and harsh criticisms that he addresses in his commentary to this aspect of Avicenna's metaphysics, especially if compared with less frequent and severe critiques regarding other topics, make clear that he aims to demolish Avicenna's metaphysical system by resolutely attacking its theoretical cornerstone. Finally, whereas in other cases when, faced with a tension between Avicenna and Averroes, Albertus decidedly takes one side or the other or rejects

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Philosophy and the Transcendentals: Aertsen's Characterization of Medieval Thought and Thomistic Metaphysics," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 64/2 [1997], 455–63), scholars generally agree in regarding it as one of the pivotal theories of medieval thought. On the importance of the Arabic discussion of primary concepts for the genesis of the Latin doctrine of transcendentals, see Alain de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la théorie scolastique de l'un transcendental," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 4 (1994), 141–79, esp. 142 and note 2; Jan A. Aertsen, "Avicenna's Doctrine of the Primary Notions and its Impact on Medieval Philosophy," in: Anna Akasoy & Wim Raven, eds., *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber* (Leiden, 2008), pp. 21–42. On the key role played by this doctrine in Albertus Magnus, see Jan A. Aertsen, "Die Frage nach dem Ersten und Grundlegenden. Albert der Große und die Lehre von den Transzendentalien," in: *Albertus Magnus 1200–2000*, pp. 91–112; "Die Umformung der Metaphysik. Die mittelalterliche Projekt der Transzendentalien," in: Johannes Brachtendorf, ed., *Prudentia und Contemplatio. Ethik und Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Festschrift für G. Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag* (Paderborn-Munich-Wien-Zürich, 2002), pp. 89–106, esp. 94–96; Carlo Gabbani, "Le proprietà trascendentali dell'essere nel *Super Sententiarum* di Alberto Magno," *Medioevo* 28 (2003), 97–138; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, p. 303, n. 35, and p. 307.

[29] See Amos Bertolacci, "'Necessary' as Primary Concept in Avicenna's Metaphysics," in: Gianfranco Fioravanti & Stefano Perfetti, eds., *Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale* (Pisa, 2008), pp. 31–50; and "The Distinction of Essence and Existence in Avicenna's Metaphysics: The Text and Its Context," in: Felizitas Opwis & David C. Reisman, eds., *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas* (Leiden, 2012), pp. 257–88.

the views of both, in the case of the doctrine of transcendentals he seeks a more encompassing perspective through which both positions can be reconciled. Albertus's "solution" of the antinomy opposing Avicenna to Averroes on transcendentals can be taken as a glaring example of his mastering of the Arabic philosophical heritage.

II

Against the background of a wider polemic ranging over the entire *corpus* of Aristotelian commentaries written by Averroes—in which most of the nominal quotations of Avicenna are critical; criticisms can be found indifferently in commentaries on logic, natural philosophy, or metaphysics, regardless of the time of composition of the different exegetical works, since the early epitomes until the late long commentaries; and attacks are more frequent in Averroes's long commentaries than in the middle commentaries or the epitomes, due to the wider frame of this exegetical format—the dissent towards Avicenna concerns natural philosophy and metaphysics more than logic. Within the commentaries on the *philosophia realis*, then, the debate focuses not so much on psychology but, rather, in an ascending order, on cosmology (*De caelo*), on the foundation of natural philosophy (*Physics*), and, above all, on metaphysics.[30] The higher frequency of critical quotations of Avicenna in the Epitome and Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* with respect to the Epitome and Long Commentary on the *Physics* reveals that metaphysics is the crucial field in the clash between Averroes and Avicenna. The *Tafsīr* represents the peak of this tendency.

The following table reports the criticisms of Avicenna's metaphysics that can be found in the *Tafsīr* and the way in which Albertus reproduces them, or the cases in which he omits them, in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

[30] An overview of criticisms of Avicenna in Averroes's commentaries is provided in Amos Bertolacci, "The 'Andalusian Revolt Against Avicennian Metaphysics': Averroes' Criticism of Avicenna in the commentaries on Aristotle," in: David Wirmer, ed., *Proceedings of the Conference From Cordoba to Cologne: Transformation and Translation, Transmission and Edition of Averroes's Works, Cologne, 25–28 October 2011* (Berlin-New York, forthcoming).

TABLE 2. *Averroes's Criticisms of Avicenna in the* Tafsīr *and Their Reception in Albertus*

Averroes	**Doctrine criticized**	**Remarks by Averroes**	**Avicenna**	**Albertus, *Met.***
(1) α, 15, pp. 46.18–47.4 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 35D; [1966], p.77.25–8)	[i] A man can be generated from earth, [ii] as a mouse is (an instance of the denial of a necessary link between specific forms and their matters)	In this and many other mistakes, Avicenna was influenced by the Aš'ariyya, "if he [indeed] held it [i.e., this doctrine] and did not disparage it"	[i] *Ma'ādin wa-Āṭār 'ulwiyya* [= *De diluviis*], II, 6, pp. 76.15–79.6; [ii] *Cp. Ḥayawān* [= *De animalibus*] XVII, 1, p. 419.9–10	om.
(2) α, 15, p. 47.10–12 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 35E; [1966], p. 78.37–38)	Many followers of Avicenna ascribes to him the denial of the absence of plenum, void and time outside the world, and the denial of the existence of beings that are incorporeal, non-spatial and atemporal.	This ascription is false		om.
(3) Γ, 3, pp. 313.6–314.11 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 67B–E)	"One" and "existent" signify attributes superadded to the thing's essence.	Avicenna made this error despite his familiarity with the Aš'arite theologians, who held a different position.	*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 5, pp. 31.10–11; 32.3; III, 2, pp. 95.15–17; 97.4–5; 103.9; III, 3, pp. 106.12–13, 15; 109.10; 110.2–3, 4–5; V, 1 *passim*; VII, 1, p. 303.9–10	IV, 1, 5, pp. 166.74, 167.15, 39, 66 ("Obicit enim contra hoc **Avicenna** dicens, quod [...]"; "Haec et similia inducit **Avicenna** pro se"; "Et hoc forte attendit **Avicenna** [...]"; "Et facile est [...] excusare dicta **Avicennae** [...]")

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

Averroes	**Doctrine criticized**	**Remarks by Averroes**	**Avicenna**	**Albertus, *Met.***
(4) Γ, 3, p. 315.3–9 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 67G)	A thing is one in virtue of an entity superadded to its essence		*Ibid.*	IV, 1, 4, p. 166.42–51 (Albertus anonymously resumes the argument that Averroes directs against Avicenna)
(5) Δ, 5, p. 508.9–11 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 107I; [1971], p. 92.43–46)	The metaphysician demonstrates the existence of nature, whereas the natural philosopher takes it for granted from the metaphysician		*Samāʿ* [= *Liber primus naturalium*] I, 5, pp. 30.6–7; 31.5–6	om.
(6) Δ, 14, p. 557.16–19 (om.)	"Existent" is a derivative name and signifies an accident		*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 5, pp. 31.10–11; 32.3; III, 2, p. 103.9	om.
(7) Δ, 14, pp. 558.17–559.14 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 117C–D; [1971], pp. 130.83–131.94)	Derivative names, like "white" signify primarily the subject (i.e., the thing that is white) and secondarily the accident (i.e., whiteness)		*Ilāhiyyāt* III, 2, pp. 109.17–110.3	V, 1, 11, p. 234.37–42 (Albertus anonymously resumes the thesis that Averroes opposes to Avicenna); V, 2, 6, p. 243.36–42 (Albertus resumes the argument that Averroes directs against Avicenna; "sicut dicit **Averroes**")

Table 2 (*cont.*)

Averroes	**Doctrine criticized**	**Remarks by Averroes**	**Avicenna**	**Albertus, *Met.***
(8) Z, 31, p. 882.17–19 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 181B)	All forms of the sublunary world come from the Agent Intellect (Giver of Forms)	Themistius appears to share the same opinion, whereas Alexander [of Aphrodisias] agrees with Aristotle.	*Ilāhiyyāt* IX, 5, p. 413.8–11; IX, 5, p. 411.9; *Kawn wa-fasād* [= *De gen. et corr.*] 13, p. 187.3, 14, p. 190.14, 16; *Afʿāl wa-infiʿālāt* [= *De actionibus et passionibus qualitatum primarum*] II, 1, p. 256.10	om.
(9) Z, 31, pp. 885.18–886.3 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 181I)	The majority [of philosophers] (*al-qawm*) went against them [i.e., against Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias] on this [i.e., the issue of spontaneous generation], since they did not understand Aristotle's demonstration in this place, nor did they grasp its truth. This is surprising not only in the case of Avicenna, but also in the case of Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī], since in his book on the two philosophies [of Plato and Aristotle], he seems to be hesitant in this matter.	The majority inclined towards the doctrine of Plato, since it is an opinion similar to what the theologians of our religion believe in this matter.	*Ibid.*	om.

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

Averroes	**Doctrine criticized**	**Remarks by Averroes**	**Avicenna**	**Albertus, *Met.***
(10) I, 5, pp. 1267.15–1268.3 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 255B)	The numerical "one" is a genus of all categories, since it signifies an accident common to them		*Ilāhiyyāt* III, 1, p. 95.15–17	X, 1, 5, p. 437.17–27, 31–35 ("**quidam** fuerunt qui dixerunt [. . .] et hoc non est verum")
(11) I, 8, pp. 1279.12–1280.11 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 257E–G)	"Existent" and "one" signify an item superadded to the essence		*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 5, pp. 31.10–11; 32.3; I, 8, p. 48.5; III, 2, p. 95.15–17; 97.4–5; 103.9; III, 3, pp. 106.12–13, 15; 109.10; 110.2–3, 4–5; V, 1 *passim*; VII, 1, p. 303.9–10	om.
(12) I, 8, p. 1282.8–12 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 257K)	If "existent" and "one" were synonyms of "thing," the statement "the thing is one" would be false		om.	om.
(13) Λ, 5, pp. 1423.18–1424.4 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 293D)	Since Avicenna takes the statement "no science demonstrates its own principles" in an absolute sense, he believes that the metaphysician clarifies the existence of the principles of sensible substance, and that the natural philosopher takes for granted from the metaphysician the existence of nature		*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 2, p. 14.2–3; II, 3, p. 78.14; III, 7, p. 139.12–13; VI, 5, p. 294.4–5; *Samāʿ* I, 5, pp. 30.6–7; 31.5–6	XI, 1, 3, p. 462.73–77, 81–83 ("Nec est dicendum, sicut **quidam** dixerunt [. . .] Nec etiam est dicendum, sicut **quidam alii** dixerunt")

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

Averroes	**Doctrine criticized**	**Remarks by Averroes**	**Avicenna**	**Albertus, *Met.***
(14) Λ, 5, p. 1426.11–12 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 293K)	The obscurity of Alexander [of Aphrodisias]'s statement (p. 1420, 8–10), according to which the metaphysician demonstrates the principles of the existents, whereas the physicist admits their existence, misled Avicenna		*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 1–2 *passim*	om.
(15) Λ, 6, p. 1436.5–6 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 295D)	Averroes recalls quotation (14)		See above (14)	om.
(16) Λ, 8, p. 1442.14–16 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 296D)	The proof of the existence of first matter does not pertain to natural philosophy		*Samāʿ* I, 2, p. 16.17–18; pp. 17.20–18.2	om.
(17) Λ, 10, p. 1447.15–16 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 297A)	Matter in potency is present in all bodies		*Ilāhiyyāt* II, 2, p. 67.12–13	om.
(18) Λ, 18, pp. 1498, 12–15 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 304 G)	Avicenna is among those who think that the agent that creates the forms and places them in matter is immaterial and is called Giver of Forms	The belief in the creation of forms is common to the advocates of the Giver of Forms and to Jewish, Christian and Muslim theologians	*Ilāhiyyāt* IX, 5, p. 413.8–11	XI, 1, 8, p. 470.9–41 ("**alii** sunt qui dicunt [...] secundum eam [sc. hanc opinionem], ut dicit **Averroes** [...] multa impossibilia sequi videntur ad hanc opinionem")

TABLE 2 (*cont.*)

Averroes	Doctrine criticized	Remarks by Averroes	Avicenna	Albertus, *Met.*
(19) Λ, 41, p. 1632.1–3 (Averroes Latinus [1562], fol. 324I–K)	"Necessary" can be divided into "necessary by itself" and "necessary in virtue of something else"	According to Averroes, the situation in which a thing is possible by itself, and necessary in virtue of something else, is limited to the heavenly movement	*Ilāhiyyāt* I, 7, p. 47.10–19; VI, 3, p. 277.4–6.	om.

Some of these criticisms have been discussed in previous studies.[31] Others still wait a systematic investigation. Most of them, albeit not all, have a (more or less precise) correspondence in Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*. Averroes emerges, first of all, as a competent and careful reader of Avicenna: he questions Avicenna's authorship of doctrine 1, for example, and discards doctrine 2 as not authentic. If we exclude quotation 2, which does not contain any criticism, all the other 18 quotations are critical. Even a cursory glance at the gathered data evidences that Averroes's attack against Avicenna's metaphysics is radical, involving all the main aspects of Avicenna's account of this discipline. The polemic invests not only—directly—Avicenna's view of the internal organization and function of metaphysics in the system of knowledge, as well as some of its key metaphysical doctrines, but also—incidentally—its method (not sufficiently

[31] On criticism 1, see Amos Bertolacci, "Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation: The Starting-Point of an Enduring Debate," in: Anna Akasoy & Guido Giglioni, eds., *Renaissance Averroism and its Aftermath. Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe* (Dordrecht, 2013), pp. 37–54. On criticisms 8, 9, and 18, see Gad Freudenthal, "The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle's Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings," *Arabic Science and Philosophy* 12 (2002), 111–37 (repr. in Gad Freudenthal, *Science in the Medieval Hebrew and Arabic Traditions* [Aldershot, 2005], n. XV); Dag N. Hasse, "Plato arabico-latinus: Philosophy—Wisdom Literature—Occult Sciences," in: Sthephen Gersch, Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, & Pieter T. van Wingerden, eds., *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic Approach* (Berlin-New York, 2002), pp. 31–64, esp. 42–45; Dag N. Hasse, "Spontaneous Generation and the Ontology of Forms in Greek, Arabic and Medieval Latin Sources," in: Peter Adamson, ed., *Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception* (London-Turin, 2007), pp. 150–75, esp. 159.

apodictic and unable to account properly for Aristotle's doctrines) and sources (Alexander of Aphodisias, Themistius, and Fārābī among Peripatetic authors, but also Neoplatonic emanationism and Islamic theology). The doctrines mainly criticized by Averroes belong to the three main areas of Avicenna's metaphysics: the epistemological account of this discipline provided in the Prolegomena of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (the theory according to which metaphysics provides the epistemological foundation of natural philosophy, by proving the assumptions of this latter, like the existence of nature, of prime matter, of the hylomorphic composition in bodies, and so forth); the analysis of the primary concepts in ontology, unfolded in treatises I, 5–8 and II–VII of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (the distinction of essence and existence, and the idea that existence—and consequently oneness—is a non-essential feature of things, as well as the related distinction of what is necessary by essence, and what is contingent by essence and necessary on account of something else); and the cosmology and philosophical theology in which the *Ilāhiyyāt* culminates (the doctrine of emanation of forms from the heavenly intelligences in the sublunary world). In all evidence, Averroes aims to demolish Avicenna's metaphysics, in order to preserve and restore Aristotle's metaphysical system.

The doctrine of transcendentals is the metaphysical doctrine of Avicenna that Averroes most frequently and harshly criticizes in his *Tafsīr*. Criticisms of this doctrine are recurrent, extensive, and disdainful: the dissent with Avicenna is repeated, almost in the same terms, in different places of the work (criticisms 3–4, 6–7, 10–12), it is long and articulated (especially in criticism 3), and it is mixed with expressions of amazement and scorn.

III

Albertus is not only receptive with regard to Avicenna and Averroes but also original. His originality surfaces apparently when he rejects particular theories of either Avicenna or Averroes, as happens quite often. Less visibly, but more interestingly, the joint reliance on Averroes and Avicenna underscores a further aspect of originality, since it shows the presence in Albertus's commentary of a theoretical apparatus, ideated by Albertus himself, by means of which he solves the conflict between the metaphysics of these two authors. For Averroes frequently and harshly criticizes Avicenna in the *Tafsīr*, the commentary of his in which the polemic against Avicenna is most recurrent and intensive. Now, on the issues about which Avicenna's and Averroes's standpoints are at odds, Albertus adopts a

harmonizing strategy, striving to focus on similarities and to dispense with differences. This strategy consists in "hiding," as much as possible, the dissent, and it has material, stylistic, and doctrinal aspects.

Due to this articulated strategy, the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* represents a noteworthy case: it is the only Aristotelian commentary in which Albertus, despite using the corresponding Long Commentary of Averroes, does not reproduce explicitly (i.e., naming both Avicenna and Averroes) any of the criticisms of Avicenna that he finds in his source. Conversely, it is also the only Aristotelian commentary of this kind in which Avicenna and Averroes are never said to be in agreement on a certain position.[32] In other words, despite his reticence, Albertus is deeply aware of the dissent that he tries to conceal. This concealment of dissent concentrates on a precise theoretical area, namely, the doctrine of the primary and most universal concepts (the so-called "transcendentals") in ontology, which Albertus rightly individuates as a crucial aspect of the confrontation between Avicenna and Averroes.

III.1. *The Material Strategy: "Omitting Part of the Dissent"*

On the one hand, Albertus does not deal with all the criticisms of Avicenna contained in the *Tafsīr* but omits many of them.[33] More precisely,

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[32] See, in contrast, *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, II, 6, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 1.1A (Münster i. W., 2004), p. 33.60–61: "Adhuc autem Averroes et Avicenna dicunt, quod [...]"; V, 6, p. 99.49–50: "Et haec est sententia tam Avicennae quam Alfarabii, et est sententia Averrois"; VIII, 8, p. 134.32: "Cuius causam dicunt Avicenna et Averroes"; *In Phys.*, I, 3, 3, vol. 1, pp. 41.17–18; 43.73–74: "Si forte aliquis velit sequi Avicennam et Averroes in solutione quaestionis [...] De solutione autem Avicennae et Averrois patet, qualiter intelligatur, si quis eam velit sustinere"; *ibid.*, II, 1, 4, vol. 1, p. 81.9–10: "Ad secundum autem respondet Avicenna et videtur consentire Averroes [...]"; *ibid.*, IV, 3, 4, vol. 1, p. 266.83–85: "Propter quod respondent viri illustres in philosophia, Avicenna, Alexander, Themistius et Averroes, Theophrastus et Porphyrius [...]"; *ibid.*, V, 1, 3, vol. 1, p. 407.26–27: "Averroes et Avicenna assignant tertiam [rationem]"; *ibid.*, p. 407.51–53: "duorum philosophorum, Avicennae et Averrois, ratio adiungetur"; *ibid.*, p. 408.5: "sicut dicunt Avicenna et Averroes"; *In De Caelo*, I, 1, 11, ed. Paul Hossfeld, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 5.1 (Münster i. W., 1971), p. 30.47–50: "Et haec est sententia duorum philosophorum, scilicet Avicennae in *Sufficientia caeli et mundi* et Averrois in libro de essentia orbis"; *ibid.*, II, 1, 2, p. 107.57–60: "Haec autem [...] hic dicta sunt secundum sententiam Avicennae et Averrois et aliorum philosophorum"; *De natura loci*, 1, 4, ed. Paul Hossfeld, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 5.2 (Münster i. W., 1980), p. 7.6–9: "[...] patet veram esse sententiam, quam tres philosophi communiter tradunt, Avicenna videlicet et Averroes et Moyses Aegyptius [...]"; *In De anima*, III, 2, 12, p. 194.10–12: "In hac autem sententia nobiscum conveniunt et Averroes et Avicenna et plures alii Peripateticorum"; *In De Causis*, I, 3, 2, p. 36.62–64: "Multi autem Peripateticorum in primo negabant esse voluntatem, Aristoteles scilicet, Theophrastus, Porphyrius, Avicenna et Averroes."

[33] Completely omitted are criticisms 1, 5, 8–9, 11–12, 14–17, and 19. Criticism 6 is absent in the Latin translation of the *Tafsīr*. Reference 2 is not, strictly speaking, a criticism.

he reports only six of the 17 critical references to Avicenna that he can read in the Latin translation of the *Tafsīr* (i.e., nearly one-third).

From the point of view of content, the six criticisms reported by Albertus, although few in quantity, are nonetheless representative of the main areas of Avicenna's metaphysics and of Averroes's dissent towards it: they concern the epistemology of metaphysics (criticism 13), the theory of the primary concepts in ontology (criticisms 3–4, 7, 10), and the doctrine of emanation of forms from the Agent Intellect in philosophical theology (criticism 18). Quantitatively, Albertus accords a decided preference to the second area of dissent, since Averroes's critique of Avicenna's doctrine of transcendental "being" and "one" is resumed by Albertus in four of the overall six criticisms he takes into account.

This kind of material strategy is somehow at work also in Albertus's previous Aristotelian commentaries: not all the criticisms of Avicenna that one finds in Averroes's Long Commentary on the *Physics* or the *De Caelo*, for example, are resumed in Albertus's own commentary thereupon. But the proportion of the criticisms reported by Albertus with regard to those available to him appears to be decidedly lower in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* with respect to previous commentaries: in the Commentary on the *Physics*, for example, the first of the entire series, Albertus reports nine of Averroes's 18 criticisms of Avicenna; in the Commentary on *De Caelo*, likewise, written immediately after that on the *Physics*, he reports four of Averroes's seven criticisms. In both cases, the criticisms reported are no less than half of the entire set, whereas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* they are approximately one-third, as we have seen. Moreover, one notices in previous commentaries a certain tendency by Albertus to *increase* the number of criticisms: thus, he adds by his own initiative further polemical references to Avicenna, extending to this latter criticisms originally targeted by Averroes against other authors (such as Ibn Bağğa);[34] or he repeats twice, in one and the same commentary, a criticism of Avicenna made only once by Averroes;[35] or he reports in previous commentaries criticisms of Avicenna that Averroes posits in the

[34] *In Phys.*, IV, 2, 7, vol. 1, p. 247.59–61: "Propter haec et his similia dicit Averroes deceptum esse Avempace, et Avicennam per consequens relinquitur condeceptum"; in the corresponding place of Averroes's Long Commentary on the *Physics*, only Avempace is mentioned. In *In De anima* II, 3, 33, the *altercatio* among Alexander, Themistius, and Avicenna, on the hand, and Averroes, on the other, does not correspond to any criticism of Averroes against Avicenna.

[35] Cf. *In Phys.*, IV, 1, 13, vol. 1, p. 226.30–51, with *ibid.*, V, 1, 8, vol. 2, pp. 416.65–417.61; cf. *In De Caelo*, III, 2, 1, p. 221.3–6, with *ibid.*, III, 2, 8, p. 241.14–15, 22–26, 44–45.

Tafsīr.[36] In all these respects, Albertus's inclination to report, and therefore underscore, the dissent between Avicenna and Averroes appears to have decreased over time.

III.2. *The Stylistic Strategy: "Disguising the Dissent"*

On the other hand, in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* Albertus reports the criticisms that he selects without stating explicitly that, on the issue under discussion, Averroes is criticizing Avicenna. As a matter of fact, Albertus never mentions Avicenna and Averroes together in connection with Averroes's criticisms: the names of Avicenna and Averroes occur explicitly only in three of the six aforementioned criticisms, and never together (four times the name "Avicenna," all in the context of criticism 3; twice the name "Averroes," once in the second occurrence of criticism 7, and once in criticism 18). In this way, no reader of Albertus's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* lacking a direct knowledge of Avicenna's and Averroes's original works would be able to guess a disagreement between the two Arab authors simply on the basis of Albertus's report.

This concealment of dissent is performed in three main ways. In some cases, Albertus reports the criticism as such (namely, as an argument directed by someone against someone else), without mentioning Avicenna and Averroes, however, as, respectively, the target and the source of the criticism but referring to *either* of them or to *none* of them: more specifically, either he presents the criticism as coming from Averroes, but as regarding in general a group of unidentified authors (*alii*) rather than Avicenna in particular (criticism 18);[37] or he disguises the identity of both the target and the source of the criticism by means of expressions like *quidam* and *quidam alii* (criticism 13).[38] In a second series of cases, Albertus

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[36] The contrast of opinions between Avicenna and the *plures sapientium* (p. 102.29) and *plurimi Peripateticorum* (p. 103, 5) in *In Phys.*, II, 2, 3 seems to reflect criticisms 13 and 18 of Averroes's *Tafsīr*.

[37] The omission of Avicenna's name in the report of this criticism is intentional, since elsewhere Albertus ascribes the doctrine in question expressly to Avicenna (see *De unitate intellectus*, 2, ed. Alfons Hufnagel, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 17.1 [Münster, 1975], p. 2.61–64), and at the beginning of the digression in which it occurs (*In Met.*, XI, 1, 8, p. 468.51–55) he describes the phenomenon of spontaneous generation with examples taken from Avicenna ("mures ex terra [...] serpentes parvi de capillis mulierum," *Maʿādin wa-Āṭār ʿulwiyya*, II, 6, p. 77.3–4 [p. 307.7–8]) and Averroes ("apes ex carnibus vaccarum et vespae magnae citrinae ex carnibus equorum," *Tafsīr*, Λ, 18, p. 1492.5–6 [fol. 303G]). In this case, Albertus assimilates the doctrine of Avicenna criticized by Averroes with that of Plato, previously expounded and refuted (pp. 468.62–469.25).

[38] Albertus includes possibly also Alexander of Aphrodisias, together with Avicenna, among the *quidam*: see *Tafsīr*, Λ, 5, p. 1426.11–12 [fol. 293K].

reports only the target of Averroes's criticism, omitting its source: thus, he presents the Avicennian doctrine criticized by Averroes as a more or less erroneous position held by Avicenna himself (criticism 3) or by *quidam* (criticism 10), but he does not ascribe the criticism of this doctrine to anyone (be he Averroes or someone else); he rather discards the Avicennian doctrine in question, more or less decidedly, by means of considerations that, though deriving from Averroes, are presented as his own. Conversely, Albertus occasionally ascribes the argument in question to Averroes, but he does not specify its target (second occurrence of criticism 7). In a third series of cases, finally, Albertus totally deprives Averroes's criticism of its polemical character and simply adopts the argument by means of which Averroes refutes Avicenna's doctrine: in these cases, he omits any indication of the existence of a target and a source of the argument in question (criticism 4; first occurrence of criticism 7).

It does not seem coincidental that the most elliptical ways of reporting the criticisms (the second and the third ways just recalled) regard entirely and exclusively the doctrine of transcendentals. Albertus seems to consider this doctrine as the most sensible area of dissent opposing Avicenna and Averroes and that which is most in need of rescue from a radical divergence between the two Arab authorities.

Also in this regard, the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is markedly different from all previous Aristotelian commentaries, in which Albertus does not hesitate to recall explicitly, even many times in one and the same commentary, the contrast of opinions between Avicenna and Averroes, speaking openly of a *dubitatio* and a *quaestio* determined by their opposition and of an *altercatio*, a *contradictio*, a *reprehensio*, a *redargutio*, and even a *persecutio* launched against Avicenna by Averroes, with some kind of negative moral representation of the latter's animosity against Avicenna.[39] In previous commentaries, the majority of criticisms are

[39] See *Super Ethicam*, I, 6, vol. 1, p. 26.29–46: "Sed contra hoc videtur esse, quod dicit Avicenna . . . Et sic tantum est verum dictum Avicennae; unde etiam Commentator de hoc dicto arguit ipsum"; *In Phys.*, I, 3, 18, vol. 1, p. 76.17–36: "[. . .] compositum esse compositum ex materia et forma accipit physicus a metaphysico, sicut bene dicit Avicenna, et tamen reprehendit eum de hoc Averroes, cum sua reprehensio non careat reprehensione. Compositio enim dupliciter consideratur [. . .]. Et ideo Avicenna non est reprehensibilis [. . .]"; *ibid.*, p. 76.37–45: "Est autem et alia reprehensio, qua reprehendit Averroes Avicennam, minus congrua. Dicit enim Avicenna verum, cum dicit non idem esse quaesitum in aliqua scientia et suppositum, deum autem et substantias sive formas separatas esse quaesitas in prima philosophia et ideo non vere suppositas in ipsa et ideo non esse subiectum primae philosophiae, quod nescio, quare Averroes reprehendit, cum ipsum sit necessarium, quod dixit Avicenna"; *ibid.*, II, 1, 3, vol. 1, p. 85.1–14: "Huic autem sententiae contrarie nititur

reported by Albertus in this "dramatic" way, with the two main characters on the stage: cases in which the confrontation is avoided, since only one of the two antagonists, or none of them, is explicitly mentioned, are much less frequent.[40] Indicative of Albertus's attempt to conceal the dissent in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is the fact that some criticisms of Avicenna in Averroes's *Tafsīr* are resumed explicitly in previous Aristotelian commentaries by Albertus, with reference to both Avicenna's and Averroes's names, whereas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* they are reported anonymously.[41] The same applies to some criticisms of Avicenna stemming from other commentaries by Averroes, which are resumed with mention of both Avicenna and Averroes in the corresponding commentary by Albertus, whereas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* they include the explicit mention only of Avicenna.[42]

This inclination to hide the dissent might be somehow causally related to Albertus's tendency to refer less frequently to Averroes and Avicenna as *auctoritates* in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* than in previous

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Averroes, eo quod ubique Avicennam persequitur, dicens [...]. Sed vera solutio est [...]"; *ibid.*, II, 1, 10, vol. 1, pp. 93.37–94.13: "Ad hoc autem dixit Averroes, cuius studium fuit contradicere semper paribus suis, quod Avicenna his rationibus concedit, quod physicus non considerat de materia prima, sed de quadam materia. Et arguit in contrarium sic [...]. Sed Averroes, si voluisset, potuisset de facili vidisse, quod materia prima est duplex [...]. Et sic patet perspicue, qualiter nulla est falsitas in verbis Avicennae"; *ibid.*, V, 1, 8, vol. 2, pp. 416.65–417.61; *ibid.*, VIII, 2, 10, vol. 2, pp. 612.65–613.25: "Sed hoc non videtur esse verum secundum Averroem [...]. Et ideo reprehendit Avicennam [...]. Et hanc reprehensionem ego non iudico convenientem generaliter" (see Hasse, "Spontaneous Generation," p. 163); *ibid.*, VIII, 4, 5, vol. 2, p. 649.42–63: "[...] sumit Averroes occasionem, quod reprehendit Avicennam [...]. Et haec reprehensio non est rationabilis [...]"; *In De Caelo*, I, 3, 4, pp. 63.61–65.7; *ibid.*, II, 3, 5, p. 151.52–65: "Et utitur tali modo loquendi Averroes reprehendens Avicennam [...]. Et hoc dictum absurdissimus est [...]. Et hoc idem dicit Averroes in libro suo, quem vocat *De natura et substantia orbis*, contradicens sibi ipsi"; *ibid.*, II, 3, 8, pp. 160.30–161.2: "Est autem sciendum hic esse altercationem Averrois contra Avicennam [...]. Est autem ista redargutio secundum nos omnino irrationabilis, quia opinamur Avicennam veritatem dixisse, et quod ipse [sc. Averroes] dicit de dextro et sinistro, non totam dicit rationem Avicennae [...] quod dicit orbes super idem centrum omnes constitui, ipse hoc dicit sine probatione, [...] et ideo Averroes errat graviter et sequentes inducit in gravem errorem [...]. Quod autem dicit, quod si celestia sint eiusdem naturae in genere et diversae in specie, sequitur ipsa esse generabilia: omnino falsum est. [...]"; *ibid.*, III, 2, 1, p. 221.3–6; *ibid.*, III, 2, 8, p. 241.14–45; *De causis proprietatum elementorum* I, 2, 13; *In De anima*, II, 3, 33, pp. 145.65–146.32.

[40] See, for example, *In Phys.*, II, 2, 3, where Avicenna is explicitly mentioned, whereas Averroes is inserted in the group of the *plurimi Peripateticorum*.

[41] On criticism 7 in the *Tafsīr*, cf. *Super Ethicam*, I, 6, vol. 1, p. 26.29–46: "Sed contra hoc videtur esse, quod dicit Avicenna [...] Et sic tantum est verum dictum Avicennae; unde etiam Commentator de hoc dicto arguit ipsum," with *In Met.*, V, 1, 11, p. 234.37–42.

[42] Cf. *In De Caelo*, I, 3, 4, pp. 63.61–65.7 (see also *In De Causis*, I, 4, 7, p. 53.3–69; II, 1, 12, p. 74.75–80), with *In Met.*, XI, 2, 34, p. 526.27–43; *ibid.*, XI, 3, 4.

commentaries, apparently a sign of his increasing assimilation of the Arabic philosophical heritage.[43] But it is unlikely that this greater independence from Avicenna and Averroes as philosophical sources can alone explain the absence of any explicit report of the criticisms of the former by the latter in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. In all likelihood, a precise decision on Albertus's part is also involved.

III.3. *The Doctrinal Strategy: "Eliminating the Dissent"*

From the point of view of Albertus's doctrinal preferences, three cases can be set apart. (i) Either Albertus endorses the standpoint of Averroes, whom he names, and discards Avicenna's position, which he ascribes to *alii* ("Giver of forms," criticism 18); (ii) or he rejects both the doctrine of Avicenna criticized by Averroes (ascribed to *quidam*) and the doctrine of Averroes (ascribed to *quidam alii*) on account of which this latter criticizes Avicenna (relationship metaphysics-natural philosophy, criticism 13); (iii) or he subscribes to Averroes's anti-Avicennian stances and arguments—saying that Averroes is right (criticism 7), that Avicenna's position, ascribed to *quidam*, is wrong (second occurrence of criticism 10), or anonymously adopting Averroes's stance (criticism 4; first occurrence of criticism 10)—but he also preliminarily shows that the position of Avicenna (whom this time he names) is not substantially different from the right one, namely, from the position of Averroes (whom he does not name), and can therefore be saved and justified (criticism 3). To put it schematically: according to Albertus, in the first case Avicenna is wrong and Averroes is right; in the second case, they are both wrong; in the third case, they are both right. Only in the first case is the dissent effective: in the other two, it is either made irrelevant (both alternatives are wrong) or eliminated (the contrast is more apparent than real). The last case regards the doctrine of transcendentals, which is the area of dissent on which

[43] In the Commentary on the *Physics*, one encounters 76 mentions of the name "Avicenna" (or "Albuali") and 60 mentions of the name "Averroes" (or "Commentator"); in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the mentions of "Avicenna" and "Averroes" are, respectively, 26 (grouped around 17 quotations) and 32 (grouped around 23 quotations). In the Commentary on the *Physics*, the titles of the corresponding works of Avicenna (*Sufficientia*, I, 3, 12, p. 60.67; II, 2, 12, p. 117.55; IV, 1, 10, p. 220.63) and of Averroes (*Commentum Physicorum Aristotelis*, VIII, 1, 11, p. 572.3–4) are mentioned, whereas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* the title of no work of Avicenna or Avicenna is mentioned. These data are the provisional result of an ongoing revision of the entries regarding Avicenna and Averroes in the Indices "Auctores ab Alberto ipso allegati" in the critical editions of the commentaries on *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.

Albertus focuses; it is the most interesting case, not only on account of the frequency of resumptions on Albertus's part but also from a theoretical perspective. I am going to analyze it more in detail in the following section.

With regard to previous commentaries, three differences are noteworthy. First, the strenuous defense of Avicenna against the criticisms of Averroes and the consequent accusations of error, irrationality, and inconsistency launched against Averroes, found in the Commentary on the *Physics* and in the Commentary on the *De Caelo*, are absent in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[44] In this latter, we encounter only an *excusatio* of Avicenna, and Averroes is never declared wrong in opposition to him. Second, in previous commentaries, Albertus sided with Averroes against Avicenna more rarely, agreeing with him hesitantly and with qualifications.[45] In the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* the situation is reversed, since Albertus, whenever he resumes a criticism, always agrees with Averroes against Avicenna (apart from the case in which he agrees with neither of them) and places the qualifications ("facile est excusare dicta Avicennae *si quis subtiliter dicta sua respiciat*") on Avicenna's side. Third, in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the effort to create a doctrinal consensus between Avicenna and Averroes takes place differently. In previous commentaries, Albertus arrived, at best, at some sort of compromise between the contrasting positions of his two main sources, by agreeing *partly* with both, on the basis of some distinction that was capable of accommodating both stances.[46] If he contended that both Avicenna and Averroes,

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[44] *In Phys.*, I, 3, 18, vol. 1, p. 76.17–36; *ibid.*, p. 76.37–45; *ibid.*, II, 1, 3, vol. 1, p. 85.1–14; *ibid.*, II, 1, 10, vol. 1, pp. 93.37–94.13; *ibid.*, VIII, 2, 10, vol. 2, pp. 612.65–613.25; *ibid.*, VIII, 4, 5, vol. 2, p. 649.42–63; *In De Caelo*, II, 3, 5, p. 151.52–65; *ibid.*, II, 3, 8, pp. 160.30–161.2 (texts quoted above, n. 39). This anti-Averroes attitude explains a sentence like "Averroes multas haereses dicit; unde non oportet, quod sustineatur," said by Albertus in support of Avicenna's position on the immortality of the individual human soul in *Super Ethicam*, VI, 8, vol. 1, p. 453.63–65.

[45] *In Phys.*, V, 1, 8, vol. 2, p. 417.37–40: "Et hoc [sc. Averrois dictum] videtur esse concedendum. *Tamen res subtilis est haec et magna indigens consideratione*. Et videtur hoc [sc. Avicennae dictum] non esse verum"; *In De Caelo*, I, 3, 4, pp. 63.61–65.7: "Sed tamen in hac materia intellectus sunt diversae sententiae Peripateticorum [...]. Et illa quidem quae est Aristotelis [...] est, quod intelligentia sit forma caeli [...]. Et in hanc sententiam omnimodo convenit Averroes [...] Avicenna autem et Theodorus parum ab ista declinant opinione. Dicunt enim [...] caeli esse duplicem motorem, animam videlicet et intelligentiam, et intelligentiam esse extra et animam intra [...]. Haec autem sententia non videtur conveniens [...]. *Erit autem alias locus de his latius tractandi*" (emphasis added).

[46] *In Phys.*, II, 1, 3, vol. 1, p. 85.1–14: "Huic autem sententiae contrarie nititur Averroes, eo quod ubique Avicennam persequitur, dicens quod simpliciter est impossibile demonstrare naturam esse, sicut dicit Aristoteles. Sed vera solutio est, quod de natura movente

despite the apparent opposition, in fact upheld one and the same thesis, this was, according to Albertus, Averroes's fault; Albertus reproached him for holding a certain thesis against Avicenna in a certain commentary but of professing a thesis totally compatible with Avicenna elsewhere, thus contradicting himself and creating a verbal rather than a real contrast.[47] The strategy at work in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is different: here Albertus points to an inner congruence, rather than a mechanical juxtaposition, between Avicenna's and Averroes's doctrines, declaring that a deep and subtle investigation is necessary for the former but also—as we are going to see—for the latter.

The first two differences appear to indicate that Albertus progressively adhered to Averroes's anti-Avicennian doctrinal positions.[48] But the third difference indicates that Avicenna remained for Albertus an indispensable help for understanding the doctrine of the Aristotelian *corpus*.

III.4. *Albertus's Elaboration of Avicenna's and Averroes's Positions on Transcendentals*

The three aforementioned strategies look interrelated: among the various criticisms of Avicenna by Averroes, Albertus concentrates on those pertaining to the transcendentals, omitting most of the others; he reports

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sive motore duplex potest esse quaestio, una quidem an sit [...] sicut dicit Avicenna. Alia autem quaestio est an differat a mobili [...] sicut ab Aristotele invenitur"; *ibid.*, II, 2, 3, p. 103.35–37, 73–77: "Nos autem dicimus [...] quod utraque istarum opinionum vera est secundum aliquem modum [...]. Et ideo quantum ad essentiam [...] verum dicit Avicenna [...] sed quantum ad esse verum dicunt alii [...]"; *De causis proprietatum elementorum*, I, 2, 13, p. 86.53–54: "Videtur autem mihi, quod utrique secundum aliquid consentiendum sit"; *In De anima*, II, 3, 7, p. 109.46–47 (on color): "Nos autem quantum intelligere possumus, utrosque [sc. Avicennam cum Avempace, et Averroem cum Alexandro] secundum aliquam partem verum dicere arbitramur."

47 *In De Caelo*, III, 2, 1, p. 221.3–6: "Et istud in suis libris tradunt Avicenna et Averroes, licet in *Caelo et mundo* Averroes contradicere videatur Avicennae, et est sua contradictio in verbis tantum." This statement is clarified later (*ibid.*, III, 2, 8, p. 241.14–15, 22–26, 44–45): "Propter quod etiam Averroes impingit crimen Avicennae ... In commento autem *Libri peri geneseos* Averroes consentit cum Avicenna [...] et ideo si Averroes hic contradicit Avicennam, ipse contradicit sibi ipsi. ... et non est secundum rem contradictio aliqua inter istos duos viros. [...]"

48 On the topic of criticism 18, for example, Albertus shows in the Commentary on the *Physics* a more equanimous attitude than in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*: see *In Phys.*, II, 2, 3, vol. 1, p. 103.35–37, 73–77: "Nos autem dicimus [...] quod utraque istarum opinionum vera est secundum aliquem modum [...]. Et ideo quantum ad essentiam [...] verum dicit Avicenna [...] sed quantum ad esse verum dicunt alii. [...]" One must take into account, however, that in this passage of the Commentary on the *Physics* Albertus explicitly mentions Avicenna.

these criticisms while abstaining, as much as possible, from referring nominally (or at all) to Avicenna and Averroes, in order to allow himself the liberty of reworking the content of these criticisms; finally, he reformulates the doctrines on which these criticisms revolve, in order to establish a precise harmony between Avicenna's and Averroes's positions. Let us observe more closely how this harmonization is performed.

On the issue of transcendentals, Averroes targets primarily Avicenna's famous distinction of essence and existence and his conception of unity. In particular, he rebukes the status of non-essential features that Avicenna ascribes to existence and unity and Avicenna's supposed confusion between transcendental and numerical unity, leading to the idea that unity is a quantitative accident of essence.[49] On both topics, Avicenna's position looks less antithetic to Aristotle's than Averroes would like, and more nuanced than in the Vulgate version widespread in modern scholarship (where he is credited with the so-called theory of the "indifference" of existence towards essence, against his avowed thesis that essence can never be deprived of—and therefore be indifferent to—existence);[50] Albertus, however, might have been unaware of this inner consonance of Avicenna with Aristotle, since the Latin translation of the *Ilāhiyyāt* multiplied the very few hints to the accidental character of existence that one finds in Avicenna's original text, and at the same time occulted some references to its essential character.[51] In any case, faced with this conflicting scenario, Albertus seeks a more encompassing perspective through which both positions can be reconciled. His strategy consists of three steps. First, he selects in the pivotal criticism 3 one of the two main targets of Averroes's attack. In particular, he gives priority to Averroes's polemic against Avicenna's conception of the mutual relationship of existence and unity (a point on which Averroes's criticism is inoffensive, since Avicenna and Averroes substantially agree with Aristotle on the real identity and conceptual distinction of "being" and "one"), substantially neglecting Averroes's polemic against Avicenna's doctrine of the distinction of essence, on the one hand, and existence and unity, on the other (the real non-Aristotelian aspect of Avicenna's account). Accordingly, Albertus rephrases Averroes's text so as to make the first issue the only reason for dissent

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[49] Criticisms 3–4, 6–7, 10–12.

[50] See Bertolacci, "The Distinction of Essence and Existence."

[51] I deal with this topic in Amos Bertolacci, "The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture," in: Peter Adamson, ed., *Interpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays* (Cambridge, Eng., 2013), pp. 242–69.

between Avicenna and Averroes, with the effect of rescuing Avicenna from Averroes's attack.[52] Second, he silently reports Avicenna's doctrine of unity, in which some confusion between transcendental and numerical unity can effectively be found, by introducing in it Averroes's distinction of these two kinds of unity.[53] To this distinction Albertus adheres both explicitly (second occurrence of criticism 7) and implicitly (first occurrence of criticism 7); on its basis he discards Avicenna's position attributed to the *quidam* in criticism 10. Finally, Albertus personally proposes a theory according to which existence and unity are joint effects of the essence, viewed as their cause: in virtue of the peculiar relationship of, at the same time, distinction and connection that links cause and effect, this theory somehow mediates between Avicenna's view of the separation of essence, on the one hand, and existence and unity, on the other, and Averroes's endorsement of their identity.[54] This view of the causal role of essence with respect to existence and unity allows Albertus to maintain Avicenna's standpoint on essence and existence that grounds other fundamental Avicennian theories, which Albertus endorses in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and repeats in other Aristotelian commentaries of his, for example, the doctrine of *ens* as the subject-matter of metaphysics and the doctrine of universals, as scholars have aptly noticed.[55] But this view also incorporates Averroes's position on the non-accidental relationship of existence and unity with respect to essence, which Albertus silently adopts (criticism 4).

Albertus's reception of Avicenna's and Averroes's stances on the doctrine of transcendentals is somehow the hallmark of his attitude towards

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[52] *In Met.*, V, 1, 4. See de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès"; Amos Bertolacci, "Albert the Great, *Metaph.* IV, 1, 5: From the *Refutatio* to the *Excusatio* of Avicenna's Theory of Unity," in: Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer, eds., *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M. 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt* (Miscellanea Medievalia) 26 (Berlin-New York, 1998), pp. 881–97.

[53] *In Met.*, V, 1, 8. See Amos Bertolacci, "The Reception of Avicenna's 'Philosophia Prima' in Albert the Great's Commentary on the 'Metaphysics': The Case of the Doctrine of Unity," in: *Albertus Magnus 1200–2000*, pp. 67–78.

[54] See, for example, *In Met.*, IV, 1, 4, p. 166.1–15.

[55] See, for example, *In Met.*, I, 1, 2, *in globo*, and *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, II, 8, p. 38.10–18: "Omni enim tempore verum est quod homo est animal, sive homo sit sive non sit, et quod animal est corpus animatum et quod corpus animatum est substania. Sed ex hoc non sequitur: 'ergo corpus animatum est ens secundum actum.' Et ideo dicit Avicenna in primo libro *Logicae* suae quod esse et ens accidit ei quod est. Verum enim est hominem esse animal, sive aliquod animal sit sive non sit, et accidit ei esse vel non esse." Other texts of this kind are mentioned in de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, pp. 245–64.

the metaphysics of the two Arab masters, as described above: it masterfully joins material strategy (it operates a selection among the various tenets of Averroes's polemic), stylistic strategy (it rests on a well oriented reformulation of Avicenna's and Averroes's texts), and doctrinal strategy (insofar as a common theoretical background of their dissent is sought).

Conclusion

In line with his philosophical project in the Aristotelian commentaries, Albertus assumes the unity of Peripatetic philosophy in general and of Peripatetic metaphysics in particular. For Albertus, Peripatetic metaphysics is essentially the account of this discipline transmitted by Avicenna and Averroes in the footsteps of Aristotle and his ancient commentators: therefore, in the face of Averroes's radical criticism of Avicenna's metaphysics, and consistent with his use of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* as the two main tools for the interpretation of the *Metaphysics*, Albertus shows that these two writings are complementary elements of a single, coherent, albeit multifaceted, metaphysical project, rather than two incompatible accounts of Aristotle's work. In other words, since Albertus understands his object of inquiry (in the present case, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) and presents it to his audience by means of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr*, Avicenna's and Averroes's versions of the *Metaphysics* in these two works cannot be, for him, irreducibly antithetical to one another.

The idea of a conflict between Avicenna and Averroes pervades Latin philosophy from the 13th century onwards, taking as its starting point and amplifying Averroes's criticisms.[56] This contrast becomes associated with alternative cultural institutions (the Avicennian sympathies of the theologians vs. the Averroean allegiance of the masters of arts)[57] and disciplinary fields (the "physician" Avicenna vs. the "commentator" Averroes);[58] it assumes religious connotations (the "pious" Avicenna vs. the "atheist" Averroes), corroborated by pseudoepigraphical writings (the ps.-Avicennian *Epistula ad Sanctum Augustinum* vs. the ps.-Averroean

[56] On the *fortuna* of Averroes's criticism of Avicenna's doctrine of unity in Latin philosophy, see de Libera, "D'Avicenne à Averroès."

[57] See Étienne Gilson, "Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age," *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 34 (1969), 89–121, esp. 95.

[58] One of the most famous attestations of this *topos* can be found in Dante's *Commedia* (*Inferno*, IV, 143–44).

Tractatus de tribus impostoribus);[59] it inspires fictive biographical tales reporting these two thinkers as murdering one another;[60] and it finds vivid expressions in iconography (the "prince" or "king" Avicenna vs. the Averroes defeated by Christian theologians).[61] The same opposition governs the school struggles of the late Middle Ages (the Avicennism of the Scotists vs. the Averroism of the Thomists)[62] and passes to Renaissance philosophy: thus Pietro Pomponazzi (d. 1524) disputes, in defense of Avicenna, with the Averroist Agostino Nifo (d. 1538) on human spontaneous generation, whereas a few decades later Jacopo Zabarella (d. 1589) gives an extreme anti-Avicennian spin to Averroes's doctrine of elementary mixture.[63] In this light, the *editio princeps* of Avicenna's *Philosophia*

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[59] See, respectively, Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Survivance et renaissance d'Avicenne à Venise et à Padoue," in: Agostino Pertusi, ed., *Venezia e l'Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Florence, 1966), pp. 75–102, esp. 75–85 (repr. in M.-T. d'Alverny, *Avicenne en Occident* [Paris, 1993], n. XV); and Ernest Renan, *Averroes et l'Averroisme: essai historique* (Paris, 1852), pp. 209–15.

[60] See d'Alverny, "Survivance et renaissance," pp. 80–83. At p. 83 of this study, d'Alverny reports a version of the legend, contained in a decree of Pietro Barozzi, bishop of Padua, of May 1489, according to which Avicenna would have succeeded in killing Averroes before being brought to death himself by this latter's poison. Dag N. Hasse ("Averroes in the Renaissance," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 69 [2002]. Supplement: *Averroes Latinus. A New Edition* [Bibliotheca] 4, pp. xv–xviii, esp. xvii) takes the world chronicle (*Supplementum chronicarum*, Venice 1486) by Giacomo Filippo Foresta (o: Foresti) da Bergamo (1434–1520) to be the immediate source of Barozzi's report. Cf. Dag N. Hasse, "King Avicenna: The Iconographic Consequences of a Mistranslation," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 60 (1997), 230–43, esp. 234 and note 22; Yahya (J.) Michot, "Avicenna's *Almahad* in 17th Century England: Sandys, Pococke, Digby, Baron, Cudworth et alii," in: Nevzat Bayhan, Mehmet Mazak, & Hattat Süleyman, eds., *Uluslararasi Ibn Sînâ Sempozyumu Bildiriler 22–24 May 2008, Istanbul. International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 2009), vol. 2, pp. 299–318, esp. 305 and note 28.

[61] A survey of the images of the *princeps* Avicenna is available in Hasse, "King Avicenna"; see also the illuminations portraying Avicenna in prayer and inspired by the Holy Spirit described by Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Avicennisme en Italie," in: *Oriente e Occidente nel Medioevo: Filosofia e Scienze*. Atti del Congresso Internazionale, 9–15 aprile 1969 (Atti dei Convegni Lincei) 13 (Rome, 1971), pp. 117–39 (repr. in d'Alverny, *Avicenne en Occident*, n. XVI), pp. 130–31, and Table A. For the various representations of the "haeretic" Averroes, defeated by Thomas Aquinas in this latter's *triumphi*, see Johannes Zahlten, "Disputation mit Averroes oder unterwerfung des 'Kommentators.' Zu seinem Bild in der Malerei des Mittelalters und der Renaissance," in: Andreas Speer & Lydia Wegener, eds., *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 33 (Berlin-New York, 2006), pp. 718–44.

[62] See Gilson, "Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age," p. 110 and n. 16.

[63] On Nifo's and Pomponazzi's resumption of the contrast between Avicenna and Averroes on spontaneous generation, see Hasse, "Spontaneous Generation," 170–72. On Zabarella's tendentious report of Averroes's theory of the four elements' mixture, see Heidrun Eichner in *Averroes' Mittlerer Kommentar zu Aristoteles' "De generatione et corruptione,"* ed. Heidrun Eichner (Paderborn-Munich-Wien-Zürich, 2005), p. 144.

prima (1495) can be taken as a sign of the reaction of some professors of Padua with Scotistic sympathies, against the Averroism otherwise dominating this university.[64] Albertus is certainly aware of the distance separating Avicenna from Averroes, and in his first Aristotelian commentaries (especially those on *Physica* and *De Caelo*) indulges in the *topos* of their antinomy. In his more mature commentaries, however, his attitude evolves, and rather than insisting on their differences, he tries to establish a "harmony" between the two Arab masters. The Commentary on the *Metaphysics* shows this tendency with particular clarity. Albertus's harmonizing strategy appears to have been successful and influential on later authors, as subsequent commentaries on the *Metaphysics* attest: the *media via* between Avicenna and Averroes on the issue of spontaneous generation, pursued in Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, for example, is probably indebted to Albertus's analogous stance on the issue.[65] In this light, it seems hardly coincidental that later commentaries on the *Metaphysics* depend on Albertus and, at the same time, use jointly Averroes's and Avicenna's contributions.[66]

To do philosophy by creating harmony among opposite philosophical views is the mandatory task of philosophers in times of crisis. This was the case of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists, with regard to Plato and Aristotle, in Greek ancient philosophy when Christianity started to prevail; and of al-Kindī, with respect to Peripatetism and Neoplatonism, at the beginning of Arabic philosophy and the transplantation of the Greek heritage in Islamic society.[67] The same aspiration to philosophical consistency seems also to characterize Albertus Magnus, with regard to the two main Arab interpreters of the *Metaphysics*, Avicenna and Averroes, at the time of the first entrance of the "new"—so to say—Aristotle into Latin in the 13th century. The crisis in his case is the effect of the opposition and resistance of traditional Latin philosophy against a foreign world-view that was rooted in a pagan master, Aristotle, and intimately linked to a heretic

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[64] This hypothesis is discussed by d'Alverny, "Survivance et renaissance," pp. 88–89.

[65] See Dag N. Hasse, "Arabic Philosophy and Averroism," in: James Hankins, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge, Eng., 2007), pp. 113–36, esp. 127.

[66] See the remarks on Alexander of Alexandria (d. 1314) in Fabrizio Amerini, "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria, and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

[67] The examples might in fact be multiplied, up to the point that someone speaks of "perennial attraction for philosophers and interpreters alike" exerted by the projects of harmonization (Rachel Barney, "Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority," *Antiquorum Philosophia* 3 [2009], 101–20, esp. 177).

religion, Islam. Albertus seems to be perfectly aware that the endorsement of Arabic philosophy marks an unbridgeable distance between his own interpretation of Aristotle and that of previous and contemporary Latin philosophers, who are still unaware of, or consciously hostile to, Arabic sources. His feelings of *horror* in front of the *deliramenta Latinorum* can be explained in this way.[68]

The originality and innovation that recent scholarship is evidencing in other attempts of harmonization in the history of philosophy and science[69] can also be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in Albertus Magnus's commentary on the *Metaphysics*. In the light of the present analysis, this commentary appears to be a *unicum* and an epoch-making work in Latin philosophy, on historical, textual, and doctrinal grounds, insofar as it is the first specimen of exegesis of the *Metaphysics* in which Avicenna's and Averroes's contributions are integrally reproduced and sufficiently elaborated to

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[68] See, for example, *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, VII, 2, pp. 117.41–46, and 118.46–47: "Sic igitur Arabes philosophi hanc Porphyrii reprehendunt accidentis descriptionem. Ad haec quidam Latinorum finxerunt quasdam responsiones, quas quia deliramenta reputamus, de eis nullam facimus mentionem … dicendum quod deliramentum est in veritate quod dicunt Latini. […]" Significantly, the title of *De Memoria et reminiscentia* I, 1, in which a harsh polemical reference to the *Latini* occurs (*De Memoria et reminiscentia*, I, 1, ed. Auguste Borgnet, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, vol. 9 [Paris, 1890], p. 97b: "Quia autem, ut mihi videtur, omnes fere aberraverunt Latini in cognitione harum virtutum quas memoriam et reminiscentiam appellamus […] ideo primo volumus ponere planam de memoria sententiam Peripateticorum, antequam Aristotelis sententiam prosequamur"), is: "Et est digressio declarans intentionem Avicennae et Averrois de memoria." Likewise, the Peripatetic position that Albertus defends against the *Latini* in *In Met*., I, 1, 2 (pp. 4.51–53; 5.34–49: "Ideo cum omnibus Peripateticis vera dicentibus dicendum videtur, quod ens est subiectum inquantum ens […]. Sunt autem quidam Latinorum logice persuasi, dicentes deum esse subiectum huius scientiae […] et huiusmodi multa ponunt secundum logicas et communes convenientias, et hi more Latinorum, qui omnem distinctionem solutionem esse reputant, dicentes subiectum tribus modis dici in scientia […]. Sed ego tales logicas convenientias in scientiis de rebus abhorreo, eo quod ad multos deducunt errores" [a passage discussed in Bertolacci, "The Reception of Averroes," pp. 470–75]) is that of Avicenna and Averroes. Kurt Flasch ("Albert der Große: Öffnung zur arabischen Welt," in Kurt Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Die Geburt der "Deutschen Mystik" aus dem Geist der arabischen Philosophie* [Munich, 2006], pp. 67–85, esp. 68) makes clear that Albertus's reception of Arabic philosophy is the counterpart of his criticism of previous Latin authors.

[69] With regard to Simplicius, see Barney, "Simplicius"; and Han Baltussen, "Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority," *Antiquorum Philosophia* 3 (2009), 121–36 (with further bibliography quoted). A harmonizing tendency can be detected also in Avicenna's zoology with regard to Aristotle's biology and Galen's medical theory; see Remke Kruk, "Ibn Sīnā on Animals: Between the First Teacher and the Physician," in: Jules Janssens & Daniel de Smet, eds., *Avicenna and His Heritage*. Proceedings of the International Colloquium *Avicenna and his Heritage*, Leuven-Louvain-la-Neuve, 8–11 September 1999 (Leuven, 2002), pp. 325–41, esp. 332; and F. Sanagustin, *Avicenne (XIe siècle), théoricien de la médecine et philosophe—Approche épistémologique* (Damascus, 2010).

be transformed into a new system of metaphysics. One might venture to say that, whereas Duns Scotus's conception of metaphysics as *scientia transcendens* derives primarily from Avicenna, Albertus conceives of metaphysics in similar terms as a discipline centered on the doctrine of transcendentals, but, differently from Scotus, he depends on both Avicenna and Averroes for the construction of the theoretical building whose cornerstone is the *transcendentia*. To explain this uniqueness, one might adduce the peculiar historical phase in which Albertus lived: before him the impact of the wide array of Averroes's commentaries translated into Latin was still incipient and their massive content still undigested; after him, conversely, the influence of Avicenna started to decline and to be mediated either by Averroes, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, or by previous receptors of Avicenna, as in the case of Duns Scotus through Henry of Ghent. In other words, one might say that only at the time of Albertus could the recourse to Arabic metaphysics in Latin philosophy avoid the risk of being one-sided, as it was both before and after him, with a prevalence of Avicenna earlier and of Averroes later. But the fact that Albertus Magnus stays at the cross-point of these two lines of reception, one descending, the other ascending, and that the full "maturity" of Latin philosophy with respect to the Arab heritage in its entirety coincides with his lifespan and figure, cannot be coincidental: it is due, to a large extent, to the genius of our author.

ENGLISH COMMENTARIES BEFORE SCOTUS
A CASE STUDY: THE DISCUSSION ON THE UNITY OF BEING*

Silvia Donati

1. Introduction

Although there is little statutory information about the teaching of the *Metaphysics* in the English universities in the 13th and in the early 14th century,[1] the large body of extant commentaries of English origin provides clear evidence that the *Metaphysics* was often read and commented upon by English masters. Single works belonging to this tradition, which for the most part is still unpublished, have been the object of investigation in the last decades, but no comprehensive examination of the tradition as a whole has been undertaken after Albert Zimmermann's pioneering research in the 1960s and in the early 1970s.[2] This paper explores the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* before Scotus. After a brief description of each single representative of the tradition, I will try to provide some insight into the nature and the distinctive features of this tradition by focusing on the exemplary case of the debate about the unity of being. As a parallel exploration of the commentary tradition of the *Physics* has shown, the 13th-century English commentators developed an original solution to this problem, which is not found in contemporary continental

* I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen) for his helpful remarks and corrections on a previous draft of this article and Cecilia Trifogli (Oxford) for revising my English. All remaining mistakes are my own. This article is part of a comprehensive investigation of the debate about the unity of being in the commentary tradition of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* in the 13th and early 14th centuries.

[1] See James A. Weisheipl, "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Medieval Studies* 26 (1964), 143–85, esp. 175–76; John M. Fletcher, "The Faculty of Arts," in: Jeremy A.I. Catto, ed., *The History of the University of Oxford*, vol. 1: *The Early Oxford Schools* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 369–99, esp. 376–77, 384–85; and Hastings Rashdall, F. Maurice Powicke, & Alfred B. Emden, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1936), vol. 1, pp. 285–86, 289–90.

[2] See Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 8 (Leiden-Cologne, 1965; revised edition, Leuven, 1998); Albert Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 9 (Leiden-Cologne, 1971).

commentaries. This solution first appeared in the commentaries of around 1250–60 but underwent an evolution during the following decades. It was then adopted by John Duns Scotus when he first addressed the issue of the unity of being in his philosophical commentaries in the 1290s, before proposing his new theory of the univocation of being in his theological works.[3] The debate about the unity of being thus seems to provide a promising topic of investigation for reaching a provisional classification of 13th-century commentaries on the *Metaphysics* of English origin.

2. Description of the Works

The Franciscan Richard Rufus of Cornwall may be the author of the earliest Latin commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Rufus's *Scriptum super Metaphysicam* is an extensive commentary on Books II, I, III–X, and XII,[4] which includes both a literal exposition and questions on the text. Like most early commentaries, it is based on the text of the *Metaphysica Nova*, i.e., the Arabic-Latin translation made by Michael Scot together with the translation of Averroes's commentary.[5] According to Rega Wood, the commentary was written before Rufus entered the Franciscan order (1238) and is the result of lectures given at the Parisian Faculty of Arts in the 1230s.[6] In contrast to Wood, Timothy Noone maintains that the commentary was written after Rufus entered the Franciscan order and derives from lectures given at the Franciscan convent at Oxford in the 1240s.[7] In addition to this commentary, Rega Wood has recently ascribed to Rufus a second commentary on the *Metaphysics* existing in a collection of short questions; Wood argues that this collection, which in some parts is closely related to Rufus's *Scriptum*, is a first version of Rufus's commentary and,

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[3] On the debate within the commentary tradition of the *Physics*, see Silvia Donati, "La discussione sull'unità del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della *Fisica*: commenti parigini degli anni 1270–1315 ca.," in: Martin Pickavé, ed., *Die Logik des Transzendentalen* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 30 (Berlin-New York, 2003), pp. 60–139. On Scotus's position and its evolution, see Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle," *Medioevo* 30 (2005), 69–110.

[4] See below, note 5.

[5] The *Metaphysica Nova* includes Books II, I, c. 5 (from 987a9)–c. 10, III–X, XII, cc. 1–10 (until 1075b11) of Aristotle's text; see *Metaphysica, Lib. I–XIV, Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, in: AL XXV 3.1 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1995), pp. 7–8.

[6] See Rega Wood, "The Works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall: The State of the Question in 2009," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 76.1 (2009), 1–73.

[7] See Timothy B. Noone, "Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Authorship of the *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*," *Franciscan Studies* 49 (1989), 55–91.

like the *Scriptum*, derives from lectures given at the university of Paris in the 1230s.[8] The four collections of questions ascribed to the English commentator Roger Bacon are also regarded as the result of lectures given by Bacon at the Parisian Faculty of Arts, possibly in the 1240s.[9] The following list includes the commentaries that with different degrees of probability can be considered as originating from the Faculty of Arts of English universities in the 13th century:

Ca. 1240–50

1. Adam of Buckfield, *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Books II, I, III–X, XII
   MS Oxford, Balliol College, 241, fols. 2ra–79vb (= *Exp. Met.-B*)[10]

Ca. 1255–65

2. Anonymous (= Geoffrey of Aspall), *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books II, I, III–X
   MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 509, fols. 52ra–123rb (= *Qq. Met.-G*^{1})
3. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books III–VII
   MS London, Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 333, fols. 111ra–121va, 124rb–150rb (= *Qq. Met.-L*)

Around 1270

4. Richard of Clive, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–V, VII–VIII
   MSS Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q. 13, fols. 116ra–155rb (= *Qq. Met.-W*)
   Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fols. 322ra–351rb (= *Qq. Met.-P*^{1})

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[8] See Rega Wood, "The Earliest Known Surviving Western Medieval *Metaphysics* Commentary," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 7 (1998), 39–49. Whatever its origin, it is evident that this text, which the author describes as a synopsis of the most discussed metaphysical issues, has a didactic character; see Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q. 290, fol. 46ra: "[…] ne […] famosarum maxime quaestionum veritas lateat non investigata […] licet nobis parumper de ipsa disserere, ut ipsius habeatur memoriale, et summatim ipsarum quaestionum maxime famosarum veritatem recolligere. […]"

[9] See Roger Bacon, *Questiones supra undecimum prime philosophie Aristotelis* (*Metaphysica* XII), ed. Robert Steele with Ferdinand M. Delorme (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi) 7 (Oxford, 1926); Roger Bacon, *Questiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis* (*Metaphysica* I, II, V–X), ed. Robert Steele with Ferdinand M. Delorme (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi) 10 (Oxford, 1930); and Roger Bacon, *Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis* (*Metaphysica* I–IV), ed. Robert Steele with Ferdinand M. Delorme (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi) 11 (Oxford, 1932). On the date of these commentaries, see Thomas S. Maloney, ed. and transl., *Roger Bacon. Compendium of the Study of Theology* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 20 (Leiden-New York-Copenhagen-Cologne, 1988), p. 3; and Jeremiah Hackett, "Roger Bacon: His Life, Career and Works," in: Jeremiah Hackett, ed., *Roger Bacon and the Sciences* (Texte und Studien zur Geistegeschichte des Mittelalters) 57 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1997), pp. 9–23, esp. 13–14.

[10] For further manuscript witnesses of Adam's commentary, see the bibliography listed below, note 12.

Around 1280

5. John Dinsdale, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–X, XII
   MS Durham, Cathedral Library, C. IV. 20, fols. 1ra–196va (= *Qq. Met.-D*)[11]

1292

6. William of Bonkes, *Questions on the Metaphysics* Books III–V, VII–X, XII
   MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344, fols. 28ra–91vb (= *Qq. Met.-G*^{2})

End of the 13th century

7. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–IV
   MS Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, III, fols. 1ra–24vb (= *Qq. Met.-P*^{2})
8. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–V, VII, XII
   MS Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, IV, fols. 1ra–53r (= *Qq. Met.-P*^{3})
9. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–VII
   MS Oxford, Oriel College, 33, fols. 199ra–261ra (= *Qq. Met.-O*^{1})
10. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Book VII
    MS Oxford, Oriel College, 33, fols. 262ra–268ra (= *Qq. Met.-O*^{2})
11. Anonymous, *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Books I–IV
    MS Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, 290, fols. 64ra–85rb (= *Qq. Met.-A*)

Adam of Buckfield († 1285) is the author of the earliest commentary on the *Metaphysics* whose origin is unquestionably connected to the University of Oxford. *Magister artium* by 1243, it is probably during his teaching at the University of Oxford in the 1240s that Adam of Buckfield wrote an impressive *corpus* of commentaries—all belonging to the literary genre of the literal exposition—on Aristotle's *libri naturales* and the *Metaphysica Nova.*[12] Adam's commentary on the *Metaphysics* is probably later than Rufus's *Scriptum*, since Adam's commentary seems to use Rufus's

[11] For a further manuscript witness of John's questions, see the bibliography listed below, note 26.

[12] A further commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Book I, chs. 1–2), preserved in Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. XIII Sin. 7, fols. 76r–91r, in marg. and based on the *Metaphysica Vetus* (the first Greek-Latin translation of the *Metaphysics*), has been attributed to Adam of Buckfield, but this attribution is considered doubtful. On Adam of Buckfield's literary production and its manuscript tradition, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, 9 vols. (Turnhout, 1994–2012), vol. 1: Repertoire des noms commencant par A-B (Turnhout, 1994), pp. 24–30; Silvia Donati, "Il commento alla *Fisica* di Adamo di Buckfield e un commento anonimo della sua scuola. Parte I," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 9 (1998), 111–78, esp. 111–16; and Richard Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540* (Turnhout, 2001^{2}), pp. 6–8. On the attribution to Buckfield of the Commentary on the *Metaphysica Vetus*, see Samuel Harrison Thomson, "The Works of Magister Adam of Bocfeld (Bochermefort)," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 2 (1944), 55–87, esp. 72–75.

Scriptum.[13] Like other commentaries by Adam, this work is also heavily indebted to Averroes's commentary. Despite its lack of originality, or possibly exactly because of its nature as a popularization of Averroes's commentary, Adam's exposition was rather successful. The comparatively high number of copies (some of which transmit it as a marginal running commentary on Aristotle's text) seems to indicate that, as long as the *Metaphysica Nova* was used, Adam's commentary served as the standard exposition of this Aristotelian work. After 1270, when the *Metaphysica Nova* was replaced by William of Moerbeke's new Greek-Latin translation, Thomas Aquinas's commentary probably superseded Adam's, as is proved by the fact that late 13th-century authors sometimes refer to Aquinas as the *Expositor* of the *Metaphysics*.[14] Whatever the reason may be, in the second half of the 13th century, English commentators show little interest in producing literal expositions of the *Metaphysics*, and almost all extant works belong to the literary genre of the question commentary.[15]

The earliest representative of the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* in the second half of the century is in all probability an anonymous commentary attributed by scholars to Geoffrey of Aspall († 1287). Geoffrey was a major figure of Oxford Aristotelianism in the mid-13th century.[16] *Magister artium* by 1262, he was active at Oxford in the years ca. 1255–65. Like Adam of Buckfield, he commented upon Aristotle's *libri naturales* and the *Metaphysics*.[17] However, whereas Adam wrote literal

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[13] See Silvia Donati, "Un nuovo testimone dello *Scriptum super Metaphysicam* di Riccardo Rufo di Cornwall (ms. Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2322)," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 45 (2003), 31–60, esp. 34–35, n. 16.

[14] See below, notes 27, 30, 31.

[15] Two further literal expositions on the *Metaphysica Nova* seem, in fact, to be only reworkings of the commentary by Adam of Buckfield: (1) Anonymous, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, Oxford, Merton College, 272, fols. 37ra–43va, and Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, H 105 inf., fols. 60ra–73ra; (2) Anonymous, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q. 290, fols. 28vb–29vb, 29v, in marg., 41vb–45ra. On the first of these two commentaries, see Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. XLV, 2 (Rome-Paris, 1985), pp. 121*–22*.

[16] On Geoffrey of Aspall's literary production and for bibliographical information about him, see Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, vol. 3: Répertoire des noms commençant par G (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 31–35; Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 120–21. For a short outline of his philosophical teaching, see Silvia Donati, "England: Die Artistenfakultät," in: Christoph Flüeler & Peter Schultess, eds., *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Das 13. Jahrhundert* (Basel, forthcoming).

[17] The attribution to Geoffrey of Aspall of the anonymous commentary in. Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 509 (*Qq. Met.-G*[1]) was first advanced by Daniel Callus in 1963 and has since never been questioned by scholars; see Daniel A. Callus, "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics According to Some Thirteenth Century Oxford Masters," in: Paul Wilpert,

expositions, Geoffrey's commentaries belong with almost no exceptions to the literary genre of the question commentary. Geoffrey's questions on the *Metaphysics* are an extensive commentary, including questions on Books II, I, and III–X of the *Metaphysics*. It was written after 1254–57, since it mentions Albert the Great's commentary on *De anima*.[18] It also shows acquaintance with Rufus's *Scriptum*, whose influence can be detected in the treatment of several topics.[19] Undoubtedly, it is a significant witness to the philosophical debates at Oxford around the middle of the century. A further work belonging to the English mid-century tradition is in all probability *Qq. Met.-L*, an anonymous collection of questions on Books III–VII of the *Metaphysics*, which in some parts is closely related to Geoffrey's and thus presumably originates from the same *milieu*.[20]

With the questions by Richard of Clive († after 1306) we come to the 1270s. Richard was *magister artium* by 1276, *magister theologiae* by 1288, and member of Merton College at Oxford in 1276 and again in 1285.[21] His two question commentaries on the *Physics* and on the *Metaphysics* probably date from the early 1270s and possibly are the result of notes taken by a student during his courses.[22] The questions on the *Metaphysics* are

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ed., *Die Metaphysik im Mittelater* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 2 (Berlin 1963), pp. 391–99, esp. 397–98; see also Enya Macrae, "Geoffrey of Aspall's Commentaries on Aristotle," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 6 (1968), 94–134, esp. 109–11. It is worth noting, however, that in its treatment of the issue of the unity of being, this commentary develops a sophisticated account that is rather distant from the more straightforward analysis contained in other works of certain authenticity, as, for example, the questions on the *Physics*. Specifically, in those works we do not find any mention of al-Ghazālī's position, which plays a major role in the analysis of the questions on the *Metaphysics*; see the works mentioned below, note 86. For a brief outline of Geoffrey's analysis in the questions on the *Physics*, see also Donati, "La discussione sull'unità," pp. 73–74. For the list of the titles of the questions of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, see Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 66–75.

[18] See Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia libri De anima*, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. XLV, 1 (Rome-Paris, 1984), p. 259*.

[19] See below, § 5.2.

[20] On this anonymous commentary, see Silvia Donati, "Per lo studio dei commenti alla *Fisica* del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese degli anni 1250–1270 ca.," Parte II, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 25–133, esp. 54–57.

[21] On Richard of Clive's literary production and its manuscript tradition, see Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 464–65; and Robert Andrews & Timothy B. Noone, "A Newly Identified Redaction of Richard Clive's *Quaestiones metaphysicae*: With Edition of Three Questions on Relation," *Manuscripta* 38 (1994), 23–41. For a short outline of Richard of Clive's philosophical teaching, see Donati, "England: Die Artistenfakultät." For a list of the titles of the questions of *Qq. Met.-P1* and *Qq. Met.-W*, see Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 113–18, and Andrews & Noone, "A Newly Identified Redaction," 26–34, respectively.

[22] See the colophon of the Commentary on the *Physics*, Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q. 13, fol. 116ra: "Expliciunt questiones libri Phisicorum notate a J. de Aston post

preserved in two slightly different versions of different extension.[23] As we shall see, Richard's questions include doctrinal elements that are typical of the English philosophical tradition,[24] but they also possibly show some influence of the contemporary Parisian philosophical tradition: for instance, Richard's view on the issue of the relationship between faith and philosophy is close to those of Parisian radical Aristotelians such as Boethius of Dacia.[25]

By the beginning of the 1280s, the influence of the continental philosophical tradition becomes clearly detectable in the English commentaries. Commentators of the late 13th century use extensively such works as the commentaries by Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne, and more generally they show acquaintance with topics of the Parisian contemporary philosophical debate. John Dinsdale († after 1286) is the author of a collection of questions on Books I–X, XII of the *Metaphysics* probably dating from the early 1280s.[26] Dinsdale, who in the 1280s was member of Merton College at Oxford, also authored questions on *De anima* and *Ethics*. While he obviously knows the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Thomas Aquinas, to whom he refers as the *Expositor*,[27] his questions show a closer relationship to later Parisian commentaries, as, for example, the questions by Peter of Auvergne, to which he sometimes is

magistrum Ricardum de Clive." But see also Andrews & Noone, "A Newly Identified Redaction," p. 24.

[23] On the hypothesis that the questions on Books VII and VIII contained in the Worcester MS are not by Richard, see Fabrizio Amerini, "Il problema dell'identità di una cosa e la sua essenza. Note sull'esegesi medievale di *Metafisica* Zeta 6," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 13 (2002), 435–505, esp. 489–90, 505.

[24] See below, § 5,3.

[25] See Silvia Donati, "Wissenschaft und Glaube bei der Frage nach dem Ursprung der Materie in einigen ungedruckten Physikkommentaren aus dem 13. bis zum Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts," in: Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg & Andreas Speer, eds., *Scientia und ars im Hoch-und Spätmittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 22, 1 (Berlin-New York, 1994), pp. 399–420, esp. 420, n. 73; and Luca Bianchi, *Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'université de Paris (XIIIe–XIVe siècles)* (Paris, 1999), pp. 185–87.

[26] On the literary production of John Dinsdale and its manuscript tradition, see Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 236–37; Linus J. Thro & Charles J. Ermatinger, "Questions on Aristotle, Metaphysics X and XII, by Master John Dymsdale," *Manuscripta* 36 (1992): 71–124; 37 (1993), pp. 107–67, esp. 36 (1992), 71–77. The colophon contained in the Durham ms. testifies to the date 1283, but it is not clear whether this date refers to Dinsdale's questions on both the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics* or only to the questions on the *Ethics* (fol. 258r: "Expliciunt questiones xii. librorum Metaphysice et similiter iiii. librorum Ethicorum disputate a Magistro Iohanne de ditensale anno domini M°C°C° octogesimo tertio"). For a short outline of Dinsdale's philosophical thought, see Donati, "England: Die Artistenfakultät."

[27] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 19rb. On Dinsdale's acquaintance with the continental commentary tradition, see below, § 5.4.

heavily indebted. Even if not particularly original, Dinsdale's questions on the *Metaphysics* enjoyed a more lasting influence than other 13th-century English commentaries. The questions on Books X and XII were printed under John Duns Scotus's name in the Wadding and Vivès editions as a completion to Scotus's commentary on Books I–IX of the *Metaphysics*.[28] The questions on the *Metaphysics* by William of Bonkes († after 1299) are later than Dinsdale's by about a decade, since in their only manuscript copy they are dated 1292.[29] *Magister regens* at the Arts Faculty at Oxford in 1293, William produced, in addition to the questions on the *Metaphysics*, questions on Priscian (*De constructionibus*) and on several Aristotelian works: *De interpretatione, De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione*, *Meteora*, and perhaps *Physics*. Unfortunately, the main manuscript witness of William's works, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344, is so badly damaged that a detailed reconstruction of his thought is virtually impossible. Judging from some sections that are better preserved, however, he must have been a typical representative of late 13th-century Oxford Aristotelianism. His questions on the *Metaphysics* also confirm the interest of the English late 13th-century commentators for the continental tradition, especially for Thomas Aquinas, whom Bonkes, like Dinsdale, calls the *Expositor* of the *Metaphysics*.[30]

If the date 1292 in the manuscript of William of Bonkes's questions is correct, then all the commentaries mentioned until now should antedate John Duns Scotus's questions on the *Metaphysics*, which, according to the opinion prevailing among contemporary scholars, were composed and revised in several stages over a long period of time, from the second half of the 1290s until shortly before Scotus's death (1308).[31] Additional works belonging to the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* include some collections of questions preserved in manuscripts of

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[28] See Thro & Ermatinger, "Questions on Aristotle," 71–77.

[29] On Willam of Bonkes's literary production and its manuscript tradition, see Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 754–55. The date 1292 is attested by the colophon of the commentary in Gonville and Caius College, 344, fol. 91vb: "Expl. quest. tocius Metaphisic? dicte a mag. Will. Bonkys a. d. m° ducenteno nonag. secundo"; Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, p. 8; Montague Rhodes James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1907–08), vol. 1, p. 387. For the list of the titles of the questions of William's commentary, see Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 75–79. On some aspects of William's metaphysical teaching, see Donati, "England: Die Artistenfakultät."

[30] Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G²*, fol. 40vb.

[31] See John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), pp. xlii–xlvi; and Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 72–73, 97, 108–09.

English origin, namely, *Qq. Met.-P²*, *Qq. Met.-P³*, *Qq. Met.-O¹*, *Qq. Met.-O²*, and *Qq. Met.-A*.[32] Although all these works are preserved anonymously, the similarity between the topics and the views discussed in them and those analyzed in John Dinsdale's and especially in William of Bonkes's questions clearly shows that they originate from the same *milieu*, that is, the English universities at the turn of the century. These commentaries are for the most part still almost unexplored, and to date them with more precision is not possible at the present stage of research, so their precise chronological relationship to Scotus's commentary remains unclear. At any rate, no compelling evidence has yet emerged indicating that they belong to a substantially later stage of the commentary tradition than William of Bonkes's questions. For instance, their treatment of the problem of the unity of being reveals no specific acquaintance with the doctrine of the univocation of being as expounded by Scotus in his theological works. If we take into account that the Oxford arts master Thomas Wylton seems to be already acquainted with Scotus's position in his questions on the *Physics* dating from around 1300,[33] this is a significant piece of evidence, even if only *e negativo*. Although these anonymous commentaries might be slightly later than William's questions and more or less contemporary to Scotus's, their discussion on the unity of being is set in a philosophical climate not yet affected by Scotus's innovations. It is therefore convenient to include them in the present investigation as a useful complement to the questions by William of Bonkes.

3. The Aristotelian Background

In *Met.* IV, 2 Aristotle introduces his famous theory of the *pros hen* equivocation of being: being is said in several ways (*pollachos legomenon*), but not homonymously, since in all these ways it is said with reference to one

[32] For a list of the titles of the questions of *Qq. Met.-P²*, *Qq. Met.-P³*, *Qq. Met.-O¹* and *Qq. Met.-O²*, see Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 118–26, 132–40. On *Qq. Met.-A*, which is probably no earlier than 1287, see Silvia Donati, "La discussione sulle dimensioni indeterminate in un commento alla *Metafisica* della fine del XIII secolo," *Medioevo* 25 (1999–2000), 237–312, esp. 239–47, 310–12 (list of the titles of the questions). As in other late 13th-century English commentaries, also in *Qq. Met.-A* Thomas Aquinas is mentioned as the *Expositor* of the *Metaphysics*; *ibid.*, p. 241, n. 11.

[33] For the date of Wylton's questions, which should be no later than 1304, when Wylton left Oxford to go to Paris, see Thomas Wylton, *On the Intellectual Soul*, ed. Lauge Nielsen & Cecilia Trifogli (Oxford, 2010), p. vii. For Wylton's acquaintance with Scotus's doctrine of the univocation of being, see Donati, "La discussione sull'unità," p. 78.

and the same thing.[34] The meaning of Aristotle's statement becomes clear if we read it in the light of his account of homonymy and synonymy in the *Categories*.[35] The *pros hen* relationship occurs when different things share the same name according to definitions that are different, but all related to a basic one as a focus. The relationship between the definitions mirrors the relationship between the different things sharing the name at the ontological level, so that sharing the same name is in some way based on the structure of reality. In this respect, the *pros hen* equivocation differs from pure homonymy, in which different things share the same name according to definitions that are not only different but also not related to each other, so that in this case sharing the same name is purely accidental. For Aristotle, predicates such as "healthy," "medical," and "being" are *pros hen* equivocals. Thus, "being" is said of the different categories according to definitions that are different, but all related to a basic one, namely, being in the sense of substance (*ousia*). This dependence at the level of the definition reflects the ontological dependence that links all beings to substance, which is the primary instance of being. In *Met.* IV Aristotle uses his doctrine of the *pros hen* equivocation of being to vindicate the possibility of a science of being *qua* being.[36] The metaphysical foundation of his doctrine will be laid down later in *Met.* VII, where Aristotle analyzes the ontological and epistemological primacy of substance with respect to accidents.[37]

By differentiating *pros hen* equivocation from pure homonymy in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle at least *prima facie* departs from his account in the *Categories*, where he only considers homonymy and synonymy, without any reference to *pros hen* equivocation. Whether this difference must be understood as the result of a doctrinal evolution or whether in the *Categories* Aristotle understands homonymy in a wide sense, as including also the *pollachos legomena* of the *Metaphysics*, has been the topic of discussion within Aristotelian scholarship from the Late Antiquity

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[34] Cf. *Met.*, IV, 2, 1003a33–1003b16. On Aristotle's doctrine, see Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian "Metaphysics"* (Toronto, 1963), pp. 107–35; Gwilym E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in: Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, & Richard Sorabji, eds., *Articles on Aristotle*, 4 vols. (London, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 12–32; Terence H. Irwin, "Homonymy in Aristotle," *The Review of Metaphysics* 34 (1981), 523–44; Aristotle, *Metaphysics: Books* Γ, Δ *and* E, Translated with Notes by Charles Kirwan (Oxford, 1993), pp. 79–86; and Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 76–78.

[35] Cf. *Cat.*, 1.

[36] Cf. *Met.*, IV, 2.

[37] Cf. *Met.*, VII, 1, 4, and 5.

onwards.[38] A recent investigation has shown that 13th-century English commentators on the *Physics* developed an original answer to this exegetical question.[39] This study aims to show that this original answer can also be found in the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics*.

The history of the evolution from Aristotle's doctrine of the *pros hen* equivocation of being to the medieval doctrine of the analogy of being has already been written.[40] Here, suffice it to mention some authors who played a major role as sources for the 13th-century debate. One of them is Averroes,[41] who in his commentary on *Metaphysics* IV provides a fairly faithful interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine. Averroes describes *pros hen* equivocation as intermediate between pure homonymy and synonymy and characterized as sharing the same name by different things that are related in different ways to the same focus. Averroes's analysis was very influential from the terminological point of view. The term that in the Latin translation of Averroes's commentary and in the Arab-Latin translation of the *Metaphysics* is used to indicate the ontological dependence on the focus is the word *attributio*, which will become a *terminus technicus* in the medieval Latin theories of analogy. Also, in analyzing Aristotle's examples, Averroes introduces a threefold division of the *pros hen* relationship based on the different roles played by the focus, namely, as the end (as in the case of the term "healthy"), as the agent cause (as in the case of the term "medical"), and as the subject (as in the case of the term "being"). This classification will become standard in later debates. From the philosophical point of view, Averroes's commentary provides the

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[38] For two modern interpretations, see Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics"; and Irwin, "Homonymy." On the debate in the Late Antiquity, see Alexander Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (*taškīk al-wuǧūd*, *analogia entis*) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010), 165–98, esp. 172–81.

[39] See Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 80–84.

[40] See Pierre Aubenque, "Sur la naissance de la doctrine pseudo-aristotélicienne de l'analogie de l'être," *Les études philosophiques* 3–4 (1989), 291–304; Alain de Libera, "Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être," *Les études philosophiques* 3–4 (1989), 319–45; Joël Lonfat, "Archéologie della notion d'analogie d'Aristote à saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 71 (2004), 35–107; Jean-François Courtine, *Inventio analogiae. Métaphysique et ontothéologie* (Paris, 2005), pp. 103–229; and E. Jennifer Ashworth, *Les Théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 2008).

[41] Cf. Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, IV, t.c. 2, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. VIII, fols. 65rbD–66rbE. On Averroes's analysis, see de Libera, "Les sources," pp. 337–45; and Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 29, 39–40.

model for a strongly substantialistic interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine. He understands Aristotle's statement that accidental categories are said to be beings in virtue of their relationship to substance in the sense that accidents have no reality apart from being modifications of substance, so that, for instance, not whiteness but only a white thing deserves to be labeled as a being. As we shall see, among 13th-century English commentators the decidedly substantialistic approach of Averroes will find supporters especially in the early stage of the tradition.

The second source is Avicenna. Compared to Averroes, Avicenna departs more radically from Aristotle's doctrine.[42] At the beginning of his *Metaphysics* Avicenna introduces "being" as a primary notion (*intentio*) of the intellect, different from the notions corresponding to the single categories and prior to them. Although Avicenna denies that being is a genus, unlike Aristotle and Averroes, he seems to posit a simple basic notion of being common to all categories. The logical and metaphysical presuppositions for the idea of a basic notion of being prior to the categories, although applied to them according to the prior and posterior, will be laid down by Avicenna at a later point in the *Metaphysics*. His explanation is based on the distinction between essence and existence. The possibility of a concept of being common to the different categories is accounted for by the fact that existence (*esse*), to which the concept of being ultimately refers, is something different from the essence of the categories, not constitutive of the essence but related to it as a mere concomitant; thus, the categories are ten radically different modes of being according to their essence, but they fall under a common concept of being insofar as they all participate in existence.[43] A complement to Avicenna's analysis in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifā'* is contained in his "Book of the Scientific Knowledge," a metaphysical *Summa* written in Persian.[44] In this work, the fact that the notion of being applies to the different categories according to

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[42] Cf. Avicenna Latinus, *Liber De Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, tr. 1, c. 5, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leuven-Leiden, 1977–80), pp. 31–42. On Avicenna's position, see Étienne Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 2 (1927), 89–149, esp. 107–11; Stephen Brown, "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being," *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), 117–50, esp. 117–19; Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 28–29; and Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion."

[43] See Avicenna Latinus, *Philosophia prima*, tr. 5, c. 6, pp. 280.68–281.93; and Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion," 196–98.

[44] See Parviz Morewedge, *The Metaphysics of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā). A Critical Translation-Commentary and Analysis of the Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna's "Metaphysica" in the "Dānish Nāma-i 'alā'ī" (The Book of Scientic Knowledge)* (London, 1973), pp. 30–32. I wish to thank Amos Bertolacci for bringing this Avicennian work to my attention.

the prior and posterior is traced back to the different ways in which existence is participated in by the categories, namely, primarily in the case of substance and secondarily in the case of accidental categories, since they exist through substance. Moreover, the distinction between essence and existence plays a key role in an anti-reductionistic conception of the categories which is distant from Aristotle's substantialistic approach and from Averroes's radical interpretation of it. Avicenna conceives the ten categories as ten distinct and independent essences (*res*) whose different modes of existence (i.e., as a self-subsistent thing in the case of substance and as inhering things in the case of accidents) only represent accidental circumstances of their being. Granted that the modality of its existence does not belong to the essence of a category, Avicenna furthermore concludes that the classification of the nine accidental categories as accidents does not capture their essence, but only describes them in their relation to an external thing, namely, the substrate. Unlike the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifā'*, the "Book of the Scientific Knowledge" was not translated into Latin. Thirteenth-century Latin-speaking thinkers, however, could read a fairly faithful exposition of Avicenna's doctrine in the so called *Metaphysics* of al-Ghazālī, a popularization of Avicenna's metaphysical thought inspired not only by the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifā'* but also by the "Book of the Scientific Knowledge." Some of Avicenna's basic views were also conveyed more briefly by al-Ghazālī in his *Logic*.[45] Both Avicenna's idea of a single concept of being prior to the categories, but participated in by them according to the prior and posterior, and his essentialistic interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories were influential on 13th-century metaphysical thought. As we shall see, however, in the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics*, Avicenna's essentialistic account made an impact earlier than his idea of a single concept of being.

4. The Debate Between the 13th and 14th Centuries: Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus

Turning to the medieval Latin tradition, three major figures are important to understand the debate about the unity of being in 13th-century English commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, namely, Richard Rufus of Cornwall

[45] See Algazel's *Metaphysics*. A Medieval Translation, I, 1, 4, ed. Joseph T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), pp. 24–26; and Charles H. Lohr, "*Logica Algazelis*: Introduction and Critical Text," *Traditio* 21 (1965), 223–90, esp. 246.

and Thomas Aquinas as sources, and John Duns Scotus as a later term of comparison. Rufus repeatedly addresses the question of the unity of being in his *Scriptum super Metaphysicam.* In his explanation of *Met.* IV, 2 he gives an exposition of Aristotle's doctrine of the *pros hen* equivocation of being that is heavily influenced by Averroes. Like Averroes, Rufus describes "being" as something intermediate between purely univocal and purely equivocal terms; more precisely, "being" is predicated according to the prior and posterior, in the sense that the primary analogate, i.e., substance, is said to be a being *per se*, whereas the secondary analogate, i.e., accident, is said to be a being only in virtue of its relationship (*attributio*) to substance.[46] Rufus's most significant addition to Averroes's exposition is probably the introduction of the word "analogy" for the *pros hen* equivocation and, more specifically, for the unity of being. In other contexts, however, he classifies "being" as a term "*multipliciter dictum*" and, more faithfully to Aristotle, reserves the term "analogy" for the case of an equality of ratios involving at least four terms (sometimes also called *analogia proportionalitatis* in medieval scholasticism), the case modeled on mathematical proportion.[47]

Rufus's interpretation of *Met.* VII, 1 and 4 makes it clear that he shares the ontological reductionism of Averroes's. For Rufus, an accident is only an *esse* of a substance so that, properly speaking, it does not have an essence of its own, but is only a mode of being of its substrate; therefore the only real entity signified by the term "being" is substance.[48] At the

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[46] Cf. Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, in: Donati, "Un nuovo testimone," pp. 45–46; see also Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 95va (see also Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 47ra): "Consequenter distinguit ens dicens quod ens dicitur multipliciter, non tamen aequivoce, sed analogice; ens enim dicitur de una natura primo, ut de substantia, et de aliis per posterius, ut de accidentibus, et hoc propter aliquam attributionem quam habent ad substantiam. Unde ista multiplicitas non est pura aequivocatio, sicut multiplicitas nominis dicti de duobus oppositis, ut non notum dicitur de noto et ignoto, de noto sophistice, de ignoto vere. [...] Talis autem non est multiplicitas entis, sed est analogia, qualis est multiplicitas huius nominis 'medicinale' dicti de corporibus et de herba et de actione et de instrumentis."

[47] Cf. Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 95va (see also Vat. Lat. 4538, fol. 47ra). On the medieval notion of "analogia proportionalitatis," see Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 44–44.

[48] Cf. Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 93vb (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 45ra): "Consequenter quaeratur de hoc quod dicit, quod accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia entis. [...] Ad haec dicendum quod accidens circumscripta omni natura substantiae nihil est aliud nisi esse ipsius substantiae"; *ibid.*, fol. 95va. For an overview on the different positions concerning the ontological status of accidents within the philosophical tradition of the 13th century and of the beginning of

semantic level, Rufus's reductionism is expressed by the claim that the term "being" is predicated directly (*in rectitudine*), in the form "A is B," only of a substance ("substantia est ens"), whereas it is predicated of an accident only indirectly (*oblique*), in the form "A is of B" ("accidens est entis"), which means that an accident is not itself a being, but only something that belongs to a being, i.e., to a substance.[49] For Rufus, the view that being is predicated of an accident indirectly is the faithful interpretation of the Aristotelian description of an accident as "ens quia entis."[50] As will be made clear by later criticism,[51] such a view is far from being unproblematic. A proposition of the form "substantia est ens" is a case of essential predication, in which a universal term is predicated of its inferiors in the line of essence. Hence, Rufus's rejection of this kind of predication in the case of an accident is tantamount to maintaining that "accident" is not related to "being" as its inferior, but only "substance" is, which, in turn, entails that "being" has only one significate, namely, substance. Such a position is obviously in keeping with Rufus's ontological reductionism, but, as we shall see, to some later commentators it seems incompatible with Aristotle's theory of being as being said in many ways (*pollachos legomenon*).

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the 14th century, see Fabrizio Amerini, "*Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis*. Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of Accidents," *Vivarium* 44 (2006), 96–150. Rufus's theory of accidents as mere modes of being of substance will be adopted by Albert the Great in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which, dating from the 1260s, is certainly later than Rufus's *Scriptum* and is clearly dependent on it on this issue. Probably through Albert, this theory will then be transmitted to the philosophical tradition within the German Dominican Order. For Albert's position, see Alberti Magni *Metaphysica*, IV, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster, 1964), p. 164.60–62: "Propter quod etiam quidam dicunt accidens non ens, sed esse quoddam esse et significare"; *ibid.*, VII, tr. 1, c. 1, pp. 316.64–317.62: "[...] Si autem color non dicat nisi ipsum esse talis substantiae [...]. Et ex his, quae iam diximus, duo intelliguntur: unum quidem, quod accidens vere non est nisi modus substantiae [...]"; see also below, note 52. For the date of Albert's commentary, *ibid.*, pp. VII–VIII. On the reception of the theory of accidents as mere modes of substance within the German Dominican tradition, see Ruedi Imbach, "Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik. Zur Diskussion zwischen Nikolaus von Straßburg und Dietrich von Freiberg über die Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien," *Theologie und Philosophie* 61 (1986), 359–95; and de Libera, "Les sources," pp. 337–45.

[49] Cf. Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, in: Donati, "Un nuovo testimone," p. 46: "Dicitur alio modo ens quia ipsum est dispositio veri entis, ut quantitas dicitur ens quia ipsa est mensura veri entis, et sic de rebus predicamentorum accidentium. Unde proprie loquendo dicitur ens de substantia in rectitudine et de aliis a substantia solum oblique."

[50] Cf. *Met.*, VII, 1, 1028a18–20. For other medieval interpretations of this much quoted passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, see Amerini, "*Utrum inhaerentia*," pp. 97–107.

[51] See below, § 5.3.

Despite his idea of the indirect predication of being in the case of accidents, Rufus does not want to go so far as to completely reject the traditional classification of an accident as a being ("accidens est ens"). He distinguishes between a metaphysical concept and a logical concept of being and maintains that the metaphysical concept gives a truthful account (*modus verus*) of reality, whereas the logical concept gives a non-truthful account (*modus non verus*). This difference between the two concepts is due to their respective objects. The primary object of the metaphysical concept of being is what is primary in reality, namely, the thing that is a being (*ens*). The primary object of the logical concept of being, by contrast, is what in reality is only secondary, namely, *esse*, which in reality presupposes something that is. An accident cannot fall under the metaphysical concept of being, since an accident is only an *esse* of a substance; therefore, in accordance with Aristotle's characterization in the *Metaphysics*, the metaphysician describes an accident as "something belonging to a being" ("accidens est entis"), not as a being. An accident can be classified as a being ("accidens est ens") only according to the logical concept of being, which does not give, however, a true account of reality.[52] In Rufus's view, then, the doctrine of the ten categories of being is not a genuinely metaphysical theory but only a logical one, given that only the items in the category of substance fall under the metaphysical concept of being.[53]

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[52] Cf. Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 96ra (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 47va): "Ad primum istorum dicendum quod logicus, considerando accidentia et esse et entitatem, ponit esse esse essentiam primo et ex esse derivat ens, et illud ens ponit habere quidditatem et definitionem. Et ideo, cum accidentia sint entia derivata ab esse, habent accidentia quidditatem et entitatem modo logico, id est prout logicus derivat ens ab esse. Philosophus autem, considerando veritatem rei, ponit ens primum et esse derivatum ab eo"; *ibid.*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 93vb (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 45ra): "Consequenter quaeratur de hoc quod dicit, quod accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia entis. […] Ad aliud quod accidentia sunt entia prout ens derivatur ab esse. Et iste modus est modus logicus dicendi ens et non verus. Verus autem modus est prout esse derivatur ab ente"; *ibid.*, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2232, fol. 95va (Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 47rb): "[…] Unde accidens non est ens nisi prout ens derivatur ab esse. Et hoc dicit Commentator expresse." For a partly similar view in Albert the Great's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, see Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, VII, tr. 1, c. 9, pp. 330.50–59: "Sicut enim ens est in omnibus, sed non similiter, sed secundum analogiam, et hoc est, quod huic praedicamento, quod est substantia, inest primum, illi autem quod est accidentis praedicamentum, inest consequenter: ita omnibus quidem inest 'quid' sive 'quid erat esse'; et simpliciter quidem inest substantiae sicut et ens; quodam autem modo inest aliis quae non sunt nisi modus entis, et sicut bene dicit Averroes, non sunt ens, nisi ens ab esse sit derivatum"; *ibid.*, c. 4, pp. 320.16–45. For Averroes's text, see Averroes, *In Met.*, VII, t.c. 15, fol. 165rbE–vaH.

[53] This is the conclusion of a later commentator in reporting Rufus's theory; see *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 143va: "Aliter respondent […] dicentes quod accidens nihil aliud est quam

While Rufus reduces the metaphysical notion of being to that of substance, Aquinas's interpretation is more respectful of Aristotle's idea of being as a *pollachos legomenon*. In his treatment of Aristotle's doctrine of the *pros hen* equivocation of being in the Commentary on *Met.* IV,[54] Aquinas introduces a classification of different types of predication that takes into account both the linguistic and the conceptual aspects (*nomen*, *ratio*). He classifies analogical predication as a kind of predication in which the same name is predicated of different things according to definitions that are partly different and partly identical: different insofar as they express the different relationships of secondary analogates to the primary one, identical insofar as the focus of these different relationships is the same, namely, the primary analogate.[55] The predication of "being" is the most significant example of analogical predication. Accordingly, "being" is predicated according to definitions that are partly different, insofar as they express the different relationships of the nine accidental categories to substance, and partly identical, insofar as the focus of these different relationships is the same, namely, substance.[56] This conceptual dependence at the level of definitions mirrors the ontological dependence of the accidental categories on substance.[57]

The model for analogical predication used by Aquinas in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is Aristotle's description of *pros hen* equivocation as illustrated by the example of the term "healthy": as "healthy" is predicated according to the prior and posterior of an animal, urine and diet in the sense that it is primarily predicated of an animal in which the

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solum esse substantiae et quod accidenti secundum se non respondet aliqua natura vel essentia, sed accidens, totum id quod est, ab alio causatum (eo causatur *ms.*) est et alterius, et ideo accidens, totum id quod est, non est nisi esse substantiae. [. . .] Logicus dicit quod ens differt ab esse et unum esse differt ab alio, et positio intelligit per ens substantiam et per esse intelligit accidens. Logicus enim considerat diversitates praedicamentorum, quae (praedictorum quem *ms.*) diversitates secundum ipsam opinionem (oppositionem *ms.*) non sunt diversitates secundum diversitatem entis ad ens sed esse ad esse. Et ideo logicus, dicendo (dividendo *ms.*) essentiam ab esse, dicit decem esse essentias sive decem praedicamenta."

[54] For an analysis of Thomas's position in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, see Giorgio Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia* (Pisa, 2002), pp. 39–42. For a systematic discussion of Thomas's doctrine of analogy, see Bernard Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Philosophes Médiévaux) 6 (Leuven-Paris, 1963); and Lonfat, "Archéologie," pp. 78–105. See also John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 65–93.

[55] Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, IV, lec. 1, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1950), n. 535.

[56] *Ibid.*, IV, lec. 1, n. 536; VII, lec. 1, n. 1251.

[57] *Ibid.*, IV, lect. 1, nn. 539–43.

quality of health exists, and secondarily of urine and diet in virtue of their relationships to the quality of health existing in the animal, so the term "being" is predicated according to the prior and posterior of substance and of accidental categories in the sense that it is primarily predicated of a substance and secondarily of accidental categories in virtue of their relationships to substance. In a well known passage of his earlier commentary on *Sent*. I, however, Aquinas gives a somewhat different threefold classification of analogy based on the consideration of the linguistic, conceptual, and ontological aspects (*nomen*, *intentio*, *esse*).[58] The first mode of analogy concerns the conceptual, but not the ontological level (*secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse*): it occurs when a single concept represents different things according to the prior and posterior, but the conceptual unity is not based on a common nature inhering in all the analogates, since the property signified by the concept only exists in the primary analogate, whereas the secondary analogates fall under the concept because of their relationships to that property, which is extrinsic to them. This mode of analogy is exemplified by the term "healthy": the concept of being healthy is applied according to the prior and posterior to an animal, diet and urine, but the property of health only exists in the animal. The second mode of analogy concerns the ontological but not the conceptual level (*secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*): it occurs when a single concept can indifferently represent many things, but the way in which the property signified by the concept is realized in those things is different. This mode of analogy is what, in technical terms, has been labeled "synonymic analogy" by scholars, who also stress its non-Aristotelian—in fact rather Platonic—flavor: it entails strict unity in definition and therefore can be reduced to synonymy, but different degrees of ontological perfection, so that it can also be classified as a kind of analogy.[59] For Thomas, it is exemplified by generic terms such as "body": the name "body" is predicated of sublunary corruptible bodies and

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[58] Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), p. 492. For an interpretation of this passage, see E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992), 94–135, esp. 122–30; Seung-Chan Park, *Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 65 (Leiden-Boston-Cologne, 1999), pp. 358–82; and Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 39–43.

[59] See Matteo di Giovanni, "Averroes on the Species of Celestial Bodies," in: Andreas Speer & Lydia Wegener, eds., *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 33 (Berlin-New York, 2006), pp. 438–64, esp. 448–55.

celestial incorruptible bodies according to the same intention of corporeity, i.e., the capability of receiving dimensions, but this conceptual unity is not grounded on a strict ontological unity, since the characteristic of corporeity is realized in different ways in the two kinds of bodies. Following a well established 13th-century interpretation, Thomas stresses the "synonymic" character of this second mode of analogy, for he claims that it is classified as a mode of analogy by the real philosopher, but is reduced to pure univocation by the logician.[60] The third mode of analogy—its most significant case is that of being—is something intermediate between the first two. It concerns both the conceptual and the ontological level (*secundum intentionem et secundum esse*), for it entails a distinction of degrees at both levels: it occurs when (i) one concept represents different things according to the prior and posterior, and (ii) this conceptual unity is based on a common nature existing in all the analogates, but participated in by them according to the prior and posterior.

Thomistic scholars have pointed out several differences between Aquinas's account in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and that in the Commentary on the *Sentences*. In the *Metaphysics* he understands analogy in terms of a plurality of related concepts, whereas in the *Sentences* he talks of a single concept representing different things according to the prior and posterior. Also, in the *Metaphysics* no distinction is drawn between the analogy of being and that of the term "healthy," but in the *Sentences* the analogy of being and that of "healthy" are contrasted as based on an intrinsic and on an extrinsic property respectively.[61] Tensions can also be found in Aquinas's analysis of metaphysical presuppositions of the analogy of being. In his philosophical works he defends a plainly substantialistic view, which considers the inherence in a substrate as a constitutive element of the essence of an accident. In his theological works, instead, he adopts a more subtle position, which is influenced by Avicenna's essentialistic account of the categories: by applying to the categories the distinction between essence and existence, Aquinas denies that inherence belongs to the essence of an accident and maintains that not the actual

[60] For Thomas's position, see Armand Maurer, "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism* 29 (1955), 127–44. The idea of the metaphysical (or physical) analogy versus logical univocation of the genus is already found in Roger Bacon's questions on the *Physics* (probably dating from the 1240s); see Roger Bacon, *Questiones supra libros octo Physicorum Aristotelis*, ed. Ferdinand M. Delorme & Robert Steele (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi) 13 (Oxford, 1935), p. 365.

[61] See Ashworth, *Les Théories*, p. 42.

inherence, but only the tendency to inhere in a substrate, is constitutive of an accidental category.[62]

Although Aquinas's treatment of the problem of the unity of being reveals some tensions, either due to a doctrinal evolution or to the different contexts of the discussion (philosophical vs. theological),[63] the basic assumption of a fundamental isomorphism between the ontological and the logical or conceptual level is an almost constant element—with the significant exception of the treatment of generic terms such as "body"—of Thomas's philosophical approach.[64] By contrast, the rejection of the idea of a perfect isomorphism between the ontological, the conceptual, and the linguistic levels lies at the core of Duns Scotus's conception. Scotus's well known distinction between the viewpoint of the metaphysician and the viewpoint of the logician concerning the problem of the unity of being is considered as a clear example of his philosophical attitude. As we have seen, before Scotus, Rufus had distinguished in a similar context the different approaches of the two sciences in order to explain why, on the one hand, the only real category is substance (according the metaphysician) and, on the other hand, we posit ten categories of being (according to the logician). Rufus's distinction reflects the traditional Aristotelian criticism of logic, i.e., dialectic, as a kind of abstract and therefore imperfect account of reality. Scotus's distinction is based on more specific epistemological grounds. Insofar as they are different sciences, metaphysics and logic have different subject matters: metaphysics considers things as they exist in reality, whereas logic considers things insofar as they are known through concepts and signified by words. Thus, for Scotus, the distinction in the subject-matters of metaphysics and logic explains the difference in the classifications of such *pollachos legomena* as the term "being" in the two sciences. Accordingly, in his Aristotelian commentaries, where Scotus endorses the traditional theory that different concepts of being correspond to different categories, he maintains that the term "being" can be classified both as equivocal and as analogous. It is classified as equivocal by the logician, who looks at the different concepts signified by the term "being," whereas it is regarded as analogous by the metaphysician, who

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[62] See Giorgio Pini, "Substance, Accident, and Inherence. Scotus and the Paris Debate on the Metaphysics of the Eucharist," in: Olivier Boulnois, Elisabeth Karger, Jean-Luc Solère, & Gérard Sondag, eds., *Duns Scot à Paris 1302–2002* Actes du Colloque de Paris, 2–4 septembre 2002 (Textes et Etudes du Moyen Age) 26 (Turnhout, 2004), pp. 273–311, esp. 276–83.

[63] See Pini, "Substance, Accident, and Inherence," pp. 281–83.

[64] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 25–28.

looks at the ontological mutual dependence of the categories.[65] In his theological writings, by contrast, Scotus grants the possibility of a simple concept of being univocally common, on the one hand, to substances and accidents and, on the other, to God and creatures. He still considers, however, the doctrine of the analogy of being as a valid metaphysical account of reality, describing extramental entities in their real relationships to each other.[66] Thus, whether being is classified as equivocal or univocal from the logical point of view, the distinction between the logical and the metaphysical approach represents a constant feature of Scotus's position. Another constant feature is its decidedly anti-reductionistic interpretation of the theory of the analogy of being, which is expressed by the ideas that the reality of accidents cannot be reduced to their dependence on a substance,[67] and that the categories are ten basic kinds of reality, none of which can be reduced to a more basic one.[68]

Recent scholarship has shown that the distinction between the viewpoint of logic and the viewpoint of metaphysics in the discussion on the unity of being is not distinctive of Scotus but, from the middle of the 13th century onwards, becomes a constitutive element of the "English way" on the unity of being.[69] This historical reconstruction has been based so far on the analysis of the English commentary tradition of the *Physics*. In the present study it will be confirmed by the examination of the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics*. The present investigation will also show that Scotus's anti-reductionistic interpretation of the theory of

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[65] For Scotus's position in his Aristotelian commentaries, see, e.g., Scotus's formulation in *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis*, q. 15, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 2, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 2004), pp. 337–38, §§ 20–21; Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 51–69; and Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," and the bibliography listed there.

[66] Of the huge bibliography on Scotus's doctrine of the univocy of being, see, e.g., Allan B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1946); Brown, "Avicenna and the Unity"; Ludger Honnefelder, *"Ens in quantum ens." Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F.) 16 (Münster i. W., 1979); Stephen Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," in: John Marenbon, ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. 3 (London-New York, 1998), pp. 291–328; and Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 69–73.

[67] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 169–90; and Pini, "Substance, Accident, and Inherence."

[68] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 143–68; and Giorgio Pini, "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 63–110.

[69] See Donati, "La discussione sull'unità," pp. 73–79, 137; and Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*."

the analogy of being has some forerunners in the preceding commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* in England.

5. The Debate within the English Commentary Tradition of the Metaphysics Before Scotus

In the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* before Duns Scotus there is a basic agreement on the issue of the unity of being: the commentators unanimously endorse the theory of the analogy of being. In their understanding of this traditional theory, however, we find both common and distinctive elements. In the following analysis I will distinguish five stages of the debate, which provide partly different interpretations of the theory: (i) the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* by Adam of Buckfield (ca. 1240–50); (ii) the questions by Geoffrey of Aspall and *Qq. Met.-L* (ca. 1255–65); (iii) the questions by Richard of Clive (a. 1270); (iv) the questions by John Dinsdale (a. 1280); and (v) the questions by William of Bonkes (1292) and other late 13th-century commentaries.

5.1. *The* Commentary on the Metaphysics *by Adam of Buckfield (ca. 1240–50)*

Adam of Buckfield's discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of *pros hen* equivocation of being in his commentary on *Met.* IV is a clear example of his sometimes slavish use of Averroes's commentary: his exposition is little more than a collection of excerpts from the corresponding section of the commentary by Averroes, to whom he explicitly refers twice. In Adam's exposition we find all the distinctive elements of Averroes's explanation: the classification of the *pros hen* equivocation as an intermediate relationship between pure equivocation and pure univocation; the use of the word "attribution" in the description of the ontological relationship linking secondary analogates to their focus; the classification of Aristotle's examples of *pros hen* equivocation according to the different roles played by the unity of reference (namely, the role of a final cause in the case of the term "healthy," and the role of an agent in the case of the term "medical"). Adam's only significant addition to Averroes's exposition is the introduction of the technical term "analogy" to describe the "pros hen" equivocation.[70] Even this term, however, might be borrowed, since, as we

[70] Cf. Adam of Buckfield, *Exp. Met.-B*, fol. 15rb–va: "[…] Ens, licet dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur pure aequivoce, sed secundum analogiam, sicut sanitas et medicina

have seen, it occurs in the same context in Richard Rufus's *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, on which Adam's commentary seems to be dependent.[71]

5.2. *The* Questions on the Metaphysics *by Geoffrey of Aspall and Qq. Met.-L (ca. 1255–65)*

Discussions on the unity of being are contained in Books IV and VII of the questions on the *Metaphysics* by Geoffrey of Aspall and of *Qq. Met.-L.* Although they endorse the doctrine of the analogy of being, Geoffrey and the author of *Qq. Met.-L* seem to hesitate between different interpretations of it. The following analysis will be mainly focused on Geoffrey's questions, which give the impression of greater originality, whereas *Qq. Met.-L* seem rather the result of a conflation between one of the solutions proposed by Geoffrey and Rufus's position. Our two commentators discuss both the ontological presuppositions and the semantic implications of the theory. As to the ontological presuppositions, in their treatment of *Met.* IV, 2 they appeal to al-Ghazālī for the claim that the analogy of being rests on the common participation of all categories in existence (*esse*). Their analysis of the unity of being is based on the comparison of the term "being" with univocal and equivocal terms. Univocation is characterized by the fact that the linguistic unity is based on a real unity: one and the same term can be applied to a plurality of items because all these items share one and the same entity, more precisely, one and the same nature, although multiplied according to the number of its participants. The paradigmatic model

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attribuuntur pluribus non aequivoce, sed secundumm analogiam. [...] Licet ens dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur pure aequivoce, sicut canis de latrabili et marino, nec univoce, sicut animal de homine et asino, sed est dicibilis de rebus attributis uni naturae (univoce ms.), quae quidem sunt media inter univoca et aequivoca. Sic exponit Commentator. Secundo, cum dicit: 'Sicut omne sanans,' explanat hoc per exemplum in illis quae attribuuntur uni respectu unius finis, ut scilicet sanitatis. [...] Tertio, cum dicit: 'Et similiter omne medicum,' explanat idem per exemplum in illis quae dicuntur per attributionem respectu unius agentis, sicut unius medicantis sive medicinae. [...] Quarto, cum dicit: 'Et similiter dicitur ens,' adaptat haec exempla ad suum propositum, dicens quod similiter dicitur ens multis modis sicut et praedicta, qui omnes modi attribuuntur uni naturae, scilicet primo significatae per ens, ut substantiae; quaedam enim dicuntur entia quia sunt substantiae et quaedam quia sunt passiones substantiarum, ut accidentia, quae non dicuntur entia nisi quia sunt dispositiones entis."

[71] In addition to the introduction of the term 'analogy,' in Rufus's and Adam's expositions of *Met.* IV, 2, there are also other elements of similarity that cannot be accounted for by their common dependence on Averroes. These similarities confirm the existence of a relationship between the two commentaries; see Richard Rufus, *Scriptum super Metaphysicam*, in: Donati, "Un nuovo testimone," pp. 45–46; and Adam of Buckfield, *Exp. Met.-B*, fol. 15rb–va.

of univocation is the case of specific terms, in which the same specific nature is shared by all members of the species. Equivocation, by contrast, is characterized by the fact that the linguistic unity has no foundation in reality. The analogical unity of being is classified as something intermediate between univocation and equivocation and is characterized by three distinctive features. (i) As in the case of univocation, the linguistic unity is grounded on a real unity, namely, something really common to the different categories. (ii) Unlike univocation, the analogical unity of being is not based on a common nature; following al-Ghazālī, the two commentators identify the common element on which such unity is based with the *esse*: the term "being" can be applied to substance and accident insofar as both substance and accident participate in the *esse*. (iii) Unlike the common nature that constitutes the foundation of univocation, *esse* is not participated in by substance and accidents in the same way but, rather, according to the prior and posterior: substances have *esse* through themselves, whereas accidents have *esse* through substance.[72]

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[72] Cf. *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 121ra: "Dicendum quod [sicut] in univoco (aequivoco *ms.*) est reperire aliquod unum aequaliter participatum a multis, non ita quod in ipsis sit aliquid unum numero, sed qualis forma reperitur in uno (una *ms.*), consimilis forma reperitur in alio individuo eiusdem speciei et contractio huius formae ad aliquod individuum signatum non impedit quin haec forma communis participetur uniformiter in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, et ideo, ubi (non ibi *ms.*) univocatio, ibidem est reperire aliquod unum, non unum numero sed unum universale et commune aequaliter participatum a pluribus, ubi autem est analogum, ibi est reperire aliquod unum a multis <non> uniformiter participatum, et id non unum numero, sed unum commune. Verbi gratia substantia habet esse et quantitas habet esse, et <sic> de aliis, et ita ab omnibus communiter aliquod commune <participatur>, ut esse, quia in substantia reperitur esse et (etc. *ms.*) in quantitate, et sic de aliis. Et hoc vult Algazel ubi arguit contra eos qui dixerunt substantiam et accidens non communicare in esse. Sed id esse <non> uniformiter participatur a substantia et accidente, quia per prius convenit substantiae et per posterius accidenti, mediante substantia. Item, id commune participatum <non> uniformiter a substantia et accidente non est aliqua essentia, sed esse eius (?). Et per illud commune dicitur ens de substantia et accidente et per prius et per posterius, et ita analogice"; Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 81ra–81rb: "Dicamus cum Aristotele, Commentatore et Algazele quod ens nec (ut *ms.*) est pure univocum nec pure aequivocum (esse notum *ms.*), sed analogum et quod conveniunt substantia et accidens in aliquo, ut (et *ms.*) dicit Algazel, scilicet in esse. Nec sequitur, ut ipse dicit: ens non est univocum, ergo est aequivocum, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit pure univocum oportet quod dictum sit de multis sine differentia potentiae et sine differentia debilitatis et sine differentia prioris et posterioris. Et sic dicitur homo de Sorte et Platone, ut dicit Algazel. Sic autem non dicitur ens de substantia et accidente, immo est defectus in omnibus tribus condicionibus. [...] Ad obiecta, <cum> dicitur quod, si solum nomen est commune, tunc est aequivocatio, si aliqua natura sit communis, quae est illa, dicendum secundum Algazelem quod illa natura est esse. Sicut enim in pure univocis est aliquid unum, quod non est unum numero dictum de multis uniformiter, ut homo de Sorte et Platone etc., sic est de analogia, ubi non est aequivocatio, quod est aliquid quod non est unum numero dictum de multis inuniformiter. Sic est de esse respectu substantiae et accidentis, quod

For Geoffrey and the author of *Qq. Met.-L*, the analogical unity of being is one of three kinds of analogy. The second kind is the analogy of genus, and the third kind is the analogy of the so-called "deliberate" versus "chance" equivocals. Their threefold classification of analogy coincides with that of Aquinas except for the third kind of analogy, which in Aquinas is Aristotle's paradigmatic example of *pros hen* equivocation, i.e., the term "healthy." This difference is historically significant, since compared to the example of "healthy" of the newly acquired Aristotelian *Metaphysics*, the traditional distinction of late ancient origin between deliberate and chance equivocals may be regarded as a little old-fashioned.[73] Also, our commentators' classification of analogy has an ontological foundation. The analogy of the genus is based on a strong unity, namely, the participation in one and the same nature, which is common to the different species according to the prior and posterior, since it is realized in the different species according to different degrees of perfection. Geoffrey describes the analogy of the genus as very similar to univocation. As the analogy of the term "healthy" in Aquinas, so also the analogy of deliberate equivocals in our commentators provides the model for a weaker kind of unity. Unlike the analogy of the genus, it is not based on the real participation in some common item, but only on a relationship linking the secondary analogate to the primary analogate. For instance, in the case of the term "man" predicated of a real and a painted man, there is a similarity of the painted man to the real one. Geoffrey describes the predication of "man" as a kind of analogy verging on pure equivocation. As in Aquinas so also in our commentators the analogy of being occupies an intermediate position between the other two kinds of analogy: on the one hand, it is based on the participation in something really common; on the other hand, the common element is not a common nature but the *esse*. Moreover, *esse* is shared by the different categories according to the prior and posterior in the sense that accidental categories participate in it only secondarily, namely, through substance. Geoffrey classifies the predication of being as

inuniformiter dicitur de his, quia primo dicitur esse de substantia et per derivationem (indirivationem *ms.*) reperitur esse in accidentibus, quod esse nec est simpliciter idem nec simpliciter aliud."

[73] On the Late Ancient distinction between chance and deliberate equivocation, see de Libera, "Les sources," pp. 320–24; Courtine, *Inventio analogiae*, pp. 177–80; Ashworth, *Les Théories*, 23–24; and Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion," 173–74.

a kind of analogy not very distant from equivocation; this is also the view, although formulated in different terms, of the author of *Qq. Met.-L*.[74]

The commentators' view about the semantic implications of the doctrine of the analogy of being is based on the assumption of a basic isomorphism between the ontological and the semantic levels. They seem to endorse a version of what in recent scholarship has been labeled "semantic" analogy,[75] namely, the idea that, as at the ontological level the things signified by an analogous term are ordered hierarchically, so at the semantic level the significations of this term are ordered hierarchically. Hence, just as being belongs both to substance and accidents, but belongs to substance primarily and to accidents secondarily, so the term "being" signifies both substance and accident, but signifies substance primarily and accidents only in a secondary way.[76]

Our commentator' position on the unity of being is not the same as that of Avicenna. As we have seen, in Avicenna's view and in al-Ghazālī's exposition of it, the common participation in the *esse* constitutes the ontological basis for a single notion of being common to the different categories. This idea gets rather close to describing being as univocal, although it falls short of pure univocation because the *esse*—and consequently the notion of being—is participated in according to the prior and posterior. This understanding of the analogy of being as a strong unity, however, does not seem to fit in well with other aspects of our commentators' solution, notably, their description of the analogy of being as a kind of equivocation or as coming close to equivocation, so that one may wonder whether they are fully aware of the philosophical import of the doctrine to which they are referring. In fact, after expounding the solution based on the common

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[74] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 81ra–b. The classification contained in *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 121ra–b is not completely identical with Geoffrey of Aspall's classification, since it also introduces the distinction between different kinds of equivocation; more specifically, the analogy of being is reduced to the so-called second mode of equivocation. For the text of these two passages, see below, note 87. On the distinction between different modes of equivocation, see below, § 5.5.

[75] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 46–49, 51–57; Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 82–84; and Ashwort, *Les théories*, pp. 66–70.

[76] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Metaph-G*[1], fol. 81va: "Dicendum quod ens non contractum potest stare pro modo secundario, scilicet pro accidente, sed ex consequenti; ens enim convenit accidenti per substantiam. [...] Ad aliud quod dictum simpliciter non stat pro dicto [simpliciter] secundum quid nisi habeat hoc ex impositione quod possit stare pro utroque [...]"; *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 121rb: "Dicendum quod, quando nomen analogum est acceptum per se, potest stare pro modo secundario aliquo modo; unde 'ens' per se dictum potest aliquo modo stare pro accidente, principaliter tamen [pro accidente] pro substantia, aliquo tamen modo stat pro accidente."

participation in the *esse*, Geoffrey briefly sketches an alternative solution, which completely rejects the idea of something really common to the different categories, and this second solution is the one that he adopts in Book VII of the commentary.

While in Book IV Geoffrey and the author of *Qq. Met.-L* primarily concentrate on the ontological presuppositions of the theory of the analogy of being, in Book VII the semantic aspects come more prominently to the fore. The two commentators take a reductionistic position, similar to that of Rufus. They endorse Rufus's idea that, properly speaking, direct predication of the term "being" is possible only in the case of substance ("substantia est *ens*"), whereas "being" is predicated of accidents obliquely ("accidens est *entis*"), so that like Rufus they seem to reduce the notion of being to the notion of substance. Geoffrey expresses this position in terms of "formal predication," that is, essential predication, by denying that "being" is predicated "formally" of accidents. As was shown above, the import of this position seems to be that the term "being" has only one proper significate, namely, substance, whereas accidental categories are not properly signified by the term "being," which is why "being" cannot be properly predicated of them.

As we have seen, Rufus had posited two different notions of being—that of the metaphysician and the weaker one of the logician—to make possible a direct predication of being in the case of accidents. The metaphysician classifies accidental categories as something merely belonging to a being ("accidens est entis"), but the logician can also classify them as beings by using the weaker notion of being. Geoffrey of Aspall rejects Rufus's distinction on the grounds that it is incompatible with Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation. Geoffrey's contention seems to be that in *pros hen* equivocation, the plurality of notions is related to a primary one, whereas in Rufus's theory the two concepts of being remain completely unconnected, so that "being" is not an analogical but a purely equivocal term. By contrast, the idea of a hierarchically ordered plurality of notions is the key element of Geoffrey's solution. This solution, which like Rufus's is characterized by a strongly substantialistic approach, rests on the notion of metaphor or transferred signification (*transumptio*): the ordering of the different notions of being is understood as the subordination of a derivative, i.e., metaphorical, meaning to the original one. For Geoffrey, although "being" cannot be predicated "formally" of accidents, it can be predicated "metaphorically" of them: the term "being" properly signifies only the category of substance, but it can be extended to signify accidental categories and, hence, can be predicated of them by way of semantic transference

(*transumptive*). This transference reflects the relationship that links accidents to substance (*attributio*) at the ontological level: the secondary significate of "being" expresses precisely the dependence of accidents on substance. Geoffrey clarifies his view by contrasting "formal predication" with "causal predication": as by saying that something is stones or wood we mean that it is *made of* stones or wood, similarly we can use the verb "is" as equivalent of "is *caused by*." For Geoffrey, the predication of "being" in the case of accidents is causal and not formal: to say that an accident is a being ("accidens est ens") is tantamount to saying that it is caused by something that is a being, namely, substance.[77]

By resorting to the notion of transferred signification in his interpretation of the analogy of being, Geoffrey takes inspiration from a 12th-century grammatical textbook, namely, Peter Helias's *Summa super Priscianum*.[78] This confirms the impression that Geoffrey is attracted by old-fashioned philosophical models. In Peter Helias's *Summa*, Geoffrey finds not only a semantic model but also an ontological one. Peter Helias not only maintains

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[77] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 96vb: "Dicitur quod ens non potest directe, proprie et directa praedicatione praedicari nisi de substantia. Si autem directe praedicaretur de accidente, hoc non erit proprie et formali praedicatione, sed per quandam transumptionem et attributionem accidentium [aliorum] ad substantiam. Et est praedicatio talis ut si dicatur: 'est lapides et ligna,' hoc est, quia est ex lapidibus et lignis. Et similiter si dicatur: 'accidens est ens,' hoc est: causatur ex vere ente, ut a substantia"; *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 142vb: "[…] Dicendum quod accidens non est ens nomine absoluto, sed entis, dicendo hoc esse huius, et hoc quia accidens, quod est, dependens est. Et ideo secundum Commentatorem entitas accidentis derivatur ab esse; unde dicit quod dicere unumquodque praedicamentum esse, hoc est intelligendum secundum quod ens derivatur ab esse substantiae"; *ibid.*, fol. 148vb: "Dicendum quod apud logicum ens dicitur de substantia et accidente secundum rectitudinem, apud metaphysicum dicitur tantum de substantia secundum rectitudinem et dicitur de accidente secundum obliquitatem. […]."

[78] Cf. Peter Helias, *Summa super Priscianum*, ed. Leo Reilly, 2 vols. (Studies and Texts) 113 (Toronto, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 508.38–509.53: "Ad discernenda itaque decem rerum genera reperta sunt decem vocabula generalissimorum, sicut in his que superius dicta fuerunt de significatione substantivorum diximus. Ad significandum vero substantiam ut unitiva est aliorum sibi et inter se repertum est hoc vocabulum 'ens.' Substantia namque ut a 'substando' dicitur unitiva est formarum tam substantialium quam accidentalium sibi et inter se, ut dictum est. Substantia vero nec sine formis esse potest nec forme sine substantia cui sunt unite. Quoniam ergo substantia aliter non existit nisi ut certas (*pro*: ceteras?) res sibi et inter se unit, idcirco 'ens' merito dicitur significare substantiam ut aliarum rerum unitiva est et sibi et inter se. Accidentia enim non proprie dicuntur esse sed inesse. Hoc ergo vocabulum 'ens' ratione significationis de accidente non dicitur sed transumptive solummodo ratione nominationis. Quoniam enim substantia dicitur proprie 'ens' secundum quod certa (*pro*: cetera?) unit, inde est quod ea que illi uniuntur nominat. Nichil tamen substantie et accidenti commune significat, unde equivoce dicitur de illis dici quoniam substantie convenit per significationem, accidenti transumptive, ut dictum est, et solummodo per nominationem."

that the term "being" can be predicated of accidents only metaphorically but also that there is nothing really common to substance and accidental categories, from which he draws the radical conclusion that, properly speaking, the term "being" is predicated of substance and accidental categories in a purely equivocal way. As we have seen above, the idea of the deep diversity among the categories was the central tenet of the position presented in Book IV as an alternative to the theory based on the common participation in the *esse*. In Book VII this idea makes its appearance again in the doctrine of the metaphorical predication of being. Like Peter Helias, Geoffrey describes the ten categories as realities that are radically different, that is, lacking any common element.[79] Therefore, the analogy of being is not based on the fact that the different analogates participate in something really common but only on the fact that they are linked to each other by some relationship: the term "being" can be predicated of accidents because accidents are linked to substance by their ontological dependence on it. In Book IV the model based on the existence of a relationship among the analogates (as opposed to the participation in a common element) was used to explain the analogy of deliberate equivocals: the analogical predication of the term "man" as applied to the real and the painted man is based not on something really common to the two analogates but on a relationship linking them, namely, the similarity of the painted man to the real one. We can conclude that the model of deliberate equivocation, which in Book IV was described as a weaker kind of analogy, bordering on pure equivocation, becomes the paradigm of the analogical predication of being in Geoffrey's account in Book VII.[80]

The "semantic" reductionism in Geoffrey's conception of the analogy of being in Book VII does not commit him to a strongly reductionistic ontology. He introduces three alternative positions on the metaphysical structure of accidental categories. One of them ascribes an essence only

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[79] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 97ra: "[…] Ens ergo penitus (ponetur *ms.*) aequivoce diceretur de substantia et accidente. Et si dicatur quod aliquo modo est idem esse, hoc erit non formaliter, quia nihil est commune formaliter substantiae et accidenti secundum Petrum Helias, sed solum causaliter, et tunc redit idem quod prius."

[80] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 81va: "Aliter dicitur de analogia (analogo *ms.*) entis, scilicet quod non est aliquid idem participatum a priori et posteriori, sed est natura diversa et diversa quae est in priori et posteriori, natura tamen illa quae est in posteriori non convenit ei nisi per illam naturam quae est in priori, cum tamen sint naturae (vere *ms.*) simpliciter diversae. Esse enim vel <in>esse non est in accidente nisi ab illa natura quae est in substantia. Unde quaedam proportio, scilicet causae <ad> causatum sive causae ad effectum, facit analogiam entis et non quod idem participetur a substantia et accidente, et haec proportio sufficit ad analogiam."

to substance and posits accidents as mere *esse* of a substance. This is the strongly reductionistic theory of Rufus. The second view draws a distinction between ontologically "stronger" and "weaker" accidental categories, ascribing an essence only to the "stronger" categories. Finally, the third view ascribes an essence to all accidental categories and accounts for the ontological priority of substance by distinguishing two different kinds of essence: the essence of substance is an absolute entity; the essence of an accident is a relational entity, that is, something intrinsically related to substance. In his questions on the *Metaphysics*, Geoffrey does not take a clear stance concerning these alternative views.[81] There is some evidence, however, that Geoffrey would reject a strongly reductionist ontology. In a parallel discussion contained in his questions on *De caelo*,[82] on the one hand, he subscribes to Rufus's contention that in the case of accidents the *esse* is primary, insofar as he claims that accidents originate from

[81] Cf. Geofffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G[1]*, fol. 97rb–va: "Circa (contra *ms.*) hoc diversae sunt positiones. Una autem dicit quod accidens in se aliquid non est, sed solum est esse substantiae. [...] Alii ponunt quod quaedam sunt accidentia quae non dicunt solam habitudinem, sed aliquam rem et naturam causatam (tantum *ms.*) ex principiis subiecti eorum, cuius<modi> sunt calidum, frigidum etc. et etiam color et huiusmodi; alia vero sunt accidentia quae magis dicunt habitudinem quam rem et naturam, ut relatio, sessio, statio et huiusmodi. Prima autem accidentia, praeter hoc quod sunt esse substantiae, sunt aliqua natura et essentia (esse *ms.*) in se. Accidentia secundo modo dicta (dicto *ms.*) praeter hoc quod sunt esse substantiae, nihil sunt. Alii ponunt quod omne accidens est aliquid in se, praeter hoc quod est esse substantiae, sed aliquod magis et aliquod (ante quod *ms.*) minus. Sed (se? *ms.*) accidens esse aliquid in se potest intelligi dupliciter: aut quod sit aliquid in se ita quod absolutum, aut quod sit aliquid in se ita quod sit dependens (de predictis *ms.*) ab alio. Et hoc ultimo modo est accidens aliquid in se praeter hoc quod est esse substantiae."

[82] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super De caelo et mundo*, Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 23, fol. 203vb–204ra (see also Cambridge, Peterhouse, 157, I, fol. 14vb–15ra): "Sed habentne accidentia essentiam? Dicitur quod sic. Sed essentia uno modo fluit ab esse, alio modo fluit esse ab essentia. Essentia primo modo dicta debetur accidentibus, secundo modo dicta debetur substantiae. Sed distinguo: si enim sumamus essentiam quae fluit ab esse, tunc haec essentia aut est causa alicuius habitudinis realis in subiecto aut mo<di> habitudinis. Si primo modo, sic reperitur essentia in qualitate et quantitate. Si secundo modo, sic reperitur natura in quando et ubi et aliis accidentibus quae non dicunt rem et naturam nec dicuntur entia adeo vere sicut et cetera accidentia. Si autem sumamus essentiam secundum quod ab ea fluit esse, hoc esse aut est substantiale aut accidentale. Si substantiale, tunc aut est esse absolutum aut est esse concretum in subiecto. [...] Si concretum, scilicet esse quod est actus entis, quod causatur ex concretione formae substantialis in materia, tale esse debetur individuo composito in genere substantiae. Et istud esse magis per accidens fluit ab essentia quam esse absolutum. Si autem istud esse sit accidentale, aut ergo est accidentale essentiae, et tale esse accidentale dicit proprium; unde proprium quodcumque per se convenit speciebus et per consequens sive secundario individuis, teste Porphyrio.Aut est accidentale enti, et a tali esse causantur accidentia communiter dicta, cuiusmodi sunt albedo et nigredo etc. [...]"

modes of being (*esse*) flowing from the substantial form.[83] On the other hand, he regards such modes of being as the foundation for real essences or natures, although of a lower kind than the essence of a substance. Moreover, he seems to maintain that all accidental categories possess an essence, although not of the same kind, differing according to the different ontological status of the single categories.

Also in Book VII, Geoffrey gives a classification of analogy. But since the case of being is reduced to that of deliberate equivocals, Geoffrey here distinguishes only two kinds of analogy: that of being and that of the genus. The analogy of the genus, which is characterized by a strong ontological unity, is classified as close to pure univocation. The analogy of being, which is characterized by a weak ontological unity, is classified as close to equivocation.[84] Associated to this twofold classification is the distinction between the metaphysical and the logical approach to analogy, a distinction that remains a distinctive feature of the English debate about

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[83] The idea of the essence of accidents as based on modes of being (*esse*) flowing from the substance is rather widespread in the early English philosophical tradition; see, e.g., an anonymous commentary on the *Physics* which is related to Geoffrey's commentary and thus probably originates from the same *milieu*: Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, III, q. 12, Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, L. III. 21, fol. 42rb, published in Cecilia Trifogli, *Liber tertius et quartus Physicorum Aristotelis. Commenti inglesi ca. 1250–1270*, CD (Florence, 2007): "Ad aliud quod quaeritur dico quod essentia est proprie et est essentia communiter. Essentia proprie substantiae correspondet et illis quibus respondent vera principia, ut materia et forma. Essentia communiter respondet omnibus quae habent principia aliquo modo, et ista essentia causatur ab esse substantiae, et est essentia accidentium. Et istud esse dividitur. Vnde uno modo est esse, ut per comparationem ad causam originalem, et alio modo dicitur essentia per relationem ad effectum, ut ad accidentia, et sic omnia genera differunt essentialiter. [. . .] Et per hoc patet ad rationes quia, sicut secundum essentiam differunt essentialiter et secundum quod habent comparationem ad effectum, per comparationem autem ad causam originalem sic differunt secundum esse." See also Roger Bacon, *Questiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis*, p. 213. On the anonymous commentary on the *Physics*, see Silvia Donati, "Per lo studio dei commenti alla *Fisica* del XIII secolo. I: Commenti di probabile origine inglese degli anni 1250–1270 ca. Parte I," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2 (1991), 361–441, esp. 396–409.

[84] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 102ra–b: "Istud est contrarium aliis qui dicunt quod nulla natura omnino, nec univoca (aequivoca *ms*.) nec analoga participatur a substantia et accidente. Unde distinguunt analogiam sic: est quaedam analogia per participationem <et est quaedam analogia> attributionis et dependentiae. Prima attribuitur generi respectu suarum specierum, secunda enti respectu substantiae et accidentis. Propter hoc enim quod accidens habet dependentiam a substantia, ideo per attributionem accidentis (entis *ms*.) ad substantiam quasi per quandam nominis transumptionem participatur ens ab accidente sive ei attribuitur. Prima analogia (*sc*. generis) magis accedit ad univocationem, haec autem magis ad aequivocationem. Rationes ergo quae concludunt quod nulla natura participatur a substantia et accidente concludunt verum, et tamen est analogia, sed propinqua aequivocationi. Et ideo logicus ponit ens (esse *ms*.) aequivocum ad haec."

the unity of being until Scotus. For the metaphysician, both the predication of the genus and the predication of being are instances of analogical predication. For the logician, however, the predication of the genus, being based on a stronger unity, is a case of straightforwardly univocal predication, whereas the predication of being, being based on a weaker unity, is a case of straightforward equivocation. As was shown above, Duns Scotus explains why being is analogous for the metaphysician and equivocal for the logician by calling attention to the different subject-matters of the two sciences.[85] Geoffrey of Aspall is familiar with this epistemological approach, which he uses in the discussion on the unity of being in other works.[86] In his questions on the *Metaphysics*, however, he does not elaborate on this point and restricts himself to positing the ontological classification mentioned above: since we can distinguish different kinds of

[85] See above, § 3.

[86] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Oxford, Merton College, 272, fol. 91ra: "Ad quartam sic, quod logicus non requirit ad suam aequivocationem nisi quod nomen dicatur de suis contentis secundum diversas rationes, et hoc quia solum respicit praedicatum sive modum praedicandi. Et ad univocationem non requirit nisi quod dicatur de eis secundum eandem definitionem. Et ideo, quia ens habet diversas definitiones secundum quod dicitur de contentis his, scilicet substantia et accidens, ideo logicus dicit ens dici de eis aequivoce. Naturalis autem et metaphysicus considerant de rebus non solum secundum praedicatum, sed secundum rei veritatem. [...] Et ideo non dicunt ens dici aequivoce, sed analogice"; Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super De caelo et mundo*, Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 23, fol. 184ra–b (see also Cambridge, Peterhouse, 157, I, fol. 6rb): "[...] Est univocatio naturalis sive metaphysica et est univocatio logica, similiter et aequivocatio. Aequivocatio autem logica <solum requirit diversas rationes in praedicando, ut scilicet nomen per diversas rationes praedicetur de multis. Univocatio vero logica solum> requirit quod nomen praedicetur de pluribus secundum eandem rationem. Et quia logicus considerat quod omne nomen aut praedicatur secundum eandem rationem aut secundum rationes diversas, ideo ponit quod omne nomen est pure aequivocum vel pure univocum et nullum analogum. Et ideo, cum consideret quod ens secundum aliam rationem et aliam dicatur de substantia et accidente, dicit quod ens est aequivocum. [...] Aequivocatio autem metaphysica vel naturalis requirit quod nomen attribuatur diversis secundum diversas rationes quarum rationum neutra dependet ab altera; requirit etiam quod nomen non (non quod nomen *ms.*) attribuatur uni propter aliud. Univocatio autem naturalis vel metaphysica requirit quod nomen attribuatur multis per unam rationem eis aeque primo convenientem. Sed hoc solum reperitur in specie specialissima. Unde quo ad metaphysicum et naturalem non est aliquod genus univocum aut aequivocum, immo analogum. Metaphysicus enim et naturalis ponunt analogiam mediam inter aequivocationem puram et univocationem. Sed est analogia duplex, quia prius et posterius aut sunt eiusdem rationis, et talis reperitur in genere, aut est prius et posterius diversarum rationum, ita quod una ratio depende<a>t ab alia et quod nomen attribuatur uni propter aliud, et talis analogia reperitur in ente. Prima analogia magis se tenet a parte univocationis, et ideo logicus ponit eam sub univocatione. Secunda autem analogia magis se tenet a parte aequivocationis, et ideo logicus ponit eam sub aequivocatione"; Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super De sensu et sensato*, Oxford, New College, 285, fol. 178vb; Donati, "La discussion sull'unità," pp. 73–74; Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 80–82.

analogical predication according to their different degree of ontological unity, the logician reduces the analogical predication based on a stronger unity to pure univocation and the one based on a weaker unity to pure equivocation.[87] Despite the difference from Scotus, Geoffrey's questions on the *Metaphysics* give clear evidence that the idea of being as analogous for the metaphysician and equivocal for the logician was well established in the English philosophical tradition several decades before Scotus.

5.3. *The* Questions on the Metaphysics *by Richard of Clive (around 1270)*

In his questions on Book IV of the *Metaphysics*, Richard of Clive describes analogy according to a standard pattern as something intermediate between pure univocation and pure equivocation. Following Aristotle's *Categories* he defines univocation as a relationship in which the same term signifies a plurality of things according to the same definition,[88] and

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[87] Cf. Geoffrey of Aspall, *Qq. Met.-G*[1], fol. 81rb: "Secunda (*sc.* analogia) non est aequivocatio, sed magis accedit ad aequivocationem (univocationem *ms.*) et propter hoc ponit logicus quod ens est aequivocum. [...] Tertia vero analogia compatitur (comparatur *ms.*) secum univocationem vel multum accedit ad univocationem, et ideo dicit logicus quod genus univoce dicitur de suis speciebus"; *ibid.*, fol. 102rb: "Rationes ergo quae concludunt quod nulla natura participatur a substantia et accidente concludunt verum, et tamen est analogia, sed propinqua aequivocationi. Et ideo logicus ponit ens (esse *ms.*) aequivocum ad haec." The distinction between the point of view of logic and that of the real sciences is introduced in the context of the classification of the different kinds of analogy also in *Qq. Met.-L.* In this work, however, such distinction is complicated by the already mentioned additional distinction between different modes of equivocation (see above, note 74); see *Qq. Met.-L*, fol. 121ra–b: "[...] Et tale analogum (*sc.* genus) potest distribui per sua supposita. Ideo secundum logicum non reducitur ad aliquod modum aequivocationis, quia logicus considerat modum praedicandi solum, sed secundum ipsum est pura univocatio. Metaphysicus autem, quia considerat naturas rerum et videt quod genus prius convenit speciei nobiliori quam ignobiliori, ideo ponit quod huiusmodi analogia ad secundum modum aequivocationis <reducitur>. [...] Alio modo dicitur analogia quando aliquod nomen dicitur de duobus per aliquod commune, ita quod commune attribuitur uni per alterum, et talis analogia reperitur in ente, quia in ente reperitur aliquod commune ratione cuius dicitur de substantia et accidente, et hoc commune est esse, et per prius attribuitur substantiae et accidenti mediante substantia. Et ille modus analogiae debet reduci secundum logicum, secundum naturalem et secundum metaphysicum ad secundum modum aequivocationis. Et tamen hoc non impedit quin hoc commune possit distribui unica distributione pro substantia et accidente, quia in eo reperitur aliquid, ut esse, ratione cuius potest distribui."

[88] Cf. Richard of Clive, *Qq. Met.-W*, fol. 122rb: "Univoca sunt etc. quando aliqua habent aliquam vocem eandem et rationem eandem secundum illud nomen, non ita quod illud nomen imponitur ad significandum unum, sed indifferenter sub quadam ratione communi non magis respiciente unum quam aliud, ut patet de animali respectu hominis et bovis. Et provenit haec communitas ex indeterminatione sua, quia non magis respicit unum quam aliud secundum quod sic significatur. Et haec est communitas rationis. Tamen alia erit haec res secundum speciem secundum quod est in homine et in bove."

equivocation as a relationship in which the same term signifies a plurality of things according to different definitions.[89] Analogy is intermediate between the two since it occurs when the same term signifies a plurality of things according to definitions that are different, but related to each other by some sort of coincidence (*convenientia*). This coincidence consists in one notion's being contained in the other or, more precisely, in one notion's being related to the other. The term "being" conforms to this model. It signifies a plurality of things according to definitions that are different, but all related to a primary one, i.e., the notion of substance.[90]

Richard's position of an ordered plurality of definitions corresponds to the classical version of the doctrine of the analogy of being, modeled on Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation. Of this theory, he gives a moderate interpretation, far from the reductionism of previous commentators, at both the semantic and the ontological levels. Richard's semantic position appears in his rejection of Geoffrey of Aspall's theory of the metaphorical, i.e., "causal," predication of the term "being" as applied to accidents, in two parallel questions in Books V and VII of his commentary.[91] His main contention is that Geoffrey's strongly "reductionistic" approach is not compatible with the Aristotelian teaching that the ten categories correspond to different significates of the term "being." If "being" properly signifies substance alone, and can be applied to accidents only in a metaphorical way—that is, inasmuch it expresses the causal dependence of accidents on substance—in reality, then, "being" has only one significate, namely, substance, so that "being" and "substance" are synonymous.[92] In

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[89] *Ibid.*: "Alia sunt quae habent eandem vocem et rationem diversam substantiae. Et talia sunt aequivoca quantum ad logicum, ita quod non imponuntur ad signandum aliquam rem communem istis, ut patet de hoc nomine 'canis,' quia est ibi diversitas realis."

[90] *Ibid.*: "Tertio modo ita quod aliquod nomen dicitur repraesentare duo ita quod rationes eorum diversae sint, ita tamen quod ratio substantialis unius consistat in ratione alterius. Ut patet de substantia et accidente: ratio accidentis et substantiae diversatur, sed tamen ratio substantiae est in ratione accidentis (accidentis […] substantiae *ms*.). Hoc nomen 'ens' repraesentat utrumque, sed non tamen (?) aequaliter, sed per se substantiae debetur et accidenti per substantiam"; Anonymous (= Richard of Clive), *Qq. Met.-P*[1], fol. 329ra: "Analoga vero dicuntur talia quorum nomen commune et rationes substantiales diversae, sic videlicet quod una non est alia, est tamen tantum de convenientia inter rationes quod ratio substantialis unius consistit in habitudine ad rationem substantialem alterius. Sicut est de substantia et accidente. Alia enim est ratio substantialis unius et alterius, non tamen sic alia sicut caelestis sideris et latrabilis, sed tamen 'ens' imponitur ad significandum entitatem, quae entitas primo reperitur in substantia, secundario in accidente."

[91] *Ibid.*, fol. 130va–b, 138ra–b.

[92] *Ibid.*, fol. 138ra: "Item, ista positio ponit quod ens et substantia sunt synonima, quod falsum est, quia dicitur in V quod totiens significat ens quotiens praedicatur; sed praedicatur de decem praedicamentis, et ita substantia et ens non sunt synonima"; *ibid.*,

opposition to Geoffrey's theory of "causal" predication, Richard supports the theory of "formal" predication, maintaining that "being" is predicated "formally" not only of substance but also of accidents. He clearly defines "formal predication" in terms of essential predication: "formal" predication occurs when the subject is one of the significates of the predicate while the predicate is part of the definition of the subject, that is, when a general term is predicated of its inferiors in the line of the essence. Therefore, that "being" is predicated "formally" not only of substance but also of accidental categories means that it is predicated *in quid* and according to the line of the essence of all categories. This is in Richard's view the correct understanding of Aristotle's teaching of the ten categories as the significates of "being."[93]

The ontological counterpart of the theory of "formal" predication of "being" as applied to accidents is the idea that accidental categories are endowed with an entity of their own. Obviously, if "being" is predicated of an accident "formally," i.e., essentially, this predication must be based on something inhering in the accident itself, namely, its entity. As Richard explicitly maintains, accidents, like substances, have an entity in virtue of which they are called beings. While keeping his distance from the reductionism of his predecessors, Richard does not go so far as to reject the Aristotelian tenet of the primacy of substance. In discussing the Aristotelian description of accident as "ens quia entis," he makes clear that although accidents possess an entity of their own, this entity is only a weak one, which requires the support of substance, insofar as it exists only in virtue of its relationship (*attributio*) to substance, i.e., because it is caused by substance. This causal dependence also implies a hierarchy between substance and accidents both at the ontological and the semantic levels. In order to appreciate the philosophical import of Richard's position, it is useful to compare it with the view of Duns Scotus, a later and more radical supporter of the theory of "formal" predication. From the premise that "being" is predicated formally both of substance and of accidents, Scotus draws the radical conclusion that substance and accidents are beings and

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fol. 130vb: "Item, ens imponitur ad significandum non tantum substantiam, sed aliquid aliud, ut accidens, et hoc vult Aristoteles et alii, ut Porphyrius."

93 *Ibid.*, fol. 138ra: "[…] Ideo dicunt quod 'ens' non praedicatur de accidente formaliter, sed causative tantum. […] Sed hoc dicere est inconveniens, scilicet quod sit praedicatio causalis tantum. […] Item, illud quod significat alterum et per ipsum etiam intelligitur praedicatur formaliter de ipso. Ens significat accidens, quoniam totiens significat quotiens praedicatur, sicut dictum est. <Et intelligitur per ipsum>, quia omne superius cadit in diffinitione inferioris et †albedo significat ens†. Et ideo formaliter praedicatur."

are signified by the term "being" in an equally primary way.[94] Compared to Scotus's, Richard's interpretation remains more faithful to Aristotle's substantialistic approach. From the assumption that the entity of accidents is caused by substance, he infers that substance and accidents are not called beings and signified by the term "being" in the same way: substance is said to be a being and is signified by the term "being" in a primary way (*primo*), whereas accidents only in a secondary way (*non primo*).[95]

Richard's discussion of the metaphysical structure of accidental categories provides further evidence of his anti-reductionistic ontology. It is clearly influenced by Avicenna's essentialistic doctrine of the categories.[96] Richard rejects the reductionistic views that regard inherence as a constitutive element of the essence of an accident and conceives of accidents as entities endowed with an essence that is different from and prior to their inherence in a substance. His analysis rests on the idea of inherence as a relative entity: since inherence is nothing else than a relationship (*habitudo*) connecting an accident to its subject, it cannot be identified with any of its two extremes;[97] consequently, it cannot be constitutive of the essence of an accident.[98] His point is that as the foundation of a relation is something different from and ontologically prior to the relation itself, similarly, the essence of an accident is something different from

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[94] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 183–90; below, §§ 5.4, 5.5.

[95] Cf. Richard of Clive, *Qq. Met.-W*, fol. 130vb: "[…] Hoc quod dicit Aristoteles, quod accidens est ens quia entis, hoc est: habet entitatem per attributionem ad primum ens; unde dicendum est quod praedicatio bona est: 'accidens est ens,' absque aliqua determinatione, non adeo primo sicut substantia; haec est vera: 'accidens est ens,' haec autem falsa: 'accidens ens per prius'"; *ibid.*, fol. 138ra–b: "[…] Ens praedicatur de accidente per se, non tamen primo. […] Accidens non est primo ens, sed entitatem ab alio habet, ut a substantia. Et accidens non est ens nisi quia entis, hoc est: nisi quia habet ab alio et in alio entitatem. Unde Aristoteles non negavit entitatem ab accidente, sed entitatem primo, quae est ipsius substantiae." *Ibid.*, fol. 138ra: "Ens significat accidens, non tamen primo. Nota quod ens praedicatur de accidente per se, non tamen primo; non enim sequitur: quod non primo praedicatur, ergo non absolute praedicatur; de illo primo praedicatur quod primo significat et de illo secundo quod secundario significat."

[96] For supporters of Avicenna's essentialistic approach within the Parisian commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics*, see Amerini, "*Utrum inhaerentia*," 105–07.

[97] Cf. Richard of Clive, *Qq. Met.-W*, fol. 138rb: "[…] Utrum inhaerentia accidentis sit eius essentia. […] Ad oppositum: inesse sive omnino inhaerentia est de genere relationis; sed accidens non est de genere relationis; ergo etc. Solet dici quod esse accidentis non est aliud ab inesse, quod si generaliter intelligitur capit falsitatem, quia inesse duo dicit, scilicet esse et in alio esse, quia quod inhaeret aliud ab eo cui inhaeret, alioquin inhaerentia non esset medium inter duo. Quod inhaeret est accidens, cui inheret est subiectum, inhaerentia habitudo media."

[98] *Ibid.*, fol. 138rb–va: "Si quaeratur utrum inhaerentia sit eius essentia, dico quod non."

and ontologically prior to its inherence in a substance.[99] Richard's idea of accidents as absolute entities ontologically prior to their dependence on substance is central in his reply to the following objection: if, according to Aristotle, the complete definition of an accident must include the subject, then the dependence of the accident on its subject necessarily belongs to its essence. In his reply, Richard pursues a line of reasoning that will be followed also by Scotus in his late works.[100] He maintains that the fact that the complete definition of an accident requires mention of the subject has no ontological explanation in the metaphysical structure of an accident, only an epistemological explanation in the way in which our intellect understands it. Richard explains his position by comparing our knowledge of accidental categories to our knowledge of separate substances. He makes the obvious point that from the fact that our knowledge of separate substances is attained through the consideration of their effects we cannot draw the conclusion that those effects are ontologically prior to separate substances, only that they are prior with respect to our intellect. Similarly, from the structure of the definition of accidents we cannot draw conclusions about their nature but only about the modalities of our knowledge of them.[101] If the inherence in a subject does not belong to the essence of an accident, neither can it be identified with the actual existence or *esse in effectu* of accidents. The existence in something else (*esse in alio*), which is entailed in the notion of inherence, is rather an additional property with respect to simple existence, although it is a necessary one, since no accident can exist in reality without inhering in something else. Therefore, although Richard draws a distinction between simple existence and inherence in a subject, he remains in the end faithful to the Aristotelian tenet of the inseparability of accidents.[102]

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[99] *Ibid.*, fol. 130vb: "Nota quod duplex est esse accidentis, scilicet esse quidditativum, quod indicat diffinitio et per quod accidens est in praedicamento, aliud est esse accidentis inesse quod habet in substantia. […] Unde [quantum ad (ad. *scr. sed exp. ms.*)] esse primum accidentis praecedit inesse quantum ad naturam, quamvis accidens esse non possit nisi in substantia, quia diminuta est essentia accidentis, non potens per se esse."

[100] On Duns Scotus, see Pini, "Substance, Accident, and Inherence," pp. 308–09.

[101] Cf. Richard of Clive, *Qq. Met.-W*, fol. 130vb: "Quantum ad cognitionem nostram et fieri cognitionis nostrae oportet ponere subiectum in diffinitione accidentis. Et sic inesse accidentis prius est quam esse quantum ad fieri cognitionis nostrae. Tamen primum esse accidentis <*sc.* esse quidditativum> praecedit inesse naturaliter. […] Quia non notificatur essentia accidentis nisi per subiectum, ideo dicunt quidam quod suum inesse prius est. Non valet. Quia non cognoscimus intelligentias et separata nisi per posteriora et effectus, nonne (?) ridiculum est dicere quod intelligentiae non sunt prius?"

[102] *Ibid.*, fol. 138va: "Esse in effectu accidentis non est idem simpliciter cum inesse eiusdem, sed quodam modo sic et quodam modo non. Nam inesse duo dicit, esse et in alio

In endorsing the traditional theory of the analogy of being, Richard follows the familiar distinction between the point of view of the metaphysician, according to which being is analogous, and that of the logician, according to which it is equivocal. Richard traces back this distinction to its epistemological presuppositions. In his questions on the *Physics*, he stresses that, unlike real sciences, i.e., metaphysics and physics, logic regards extramental natures from the point of view of the concepts through which they are understood (*res rationis*) and of the modalities of predication (*modi praedicandi*), thus abstracting from the concrete realizations of those natures. Therefore, since the genus is predicated of its different species according to one and the same notion, but is realized in them in different ways, it is predicated univocally for the logician and analogically for the physicist.[103] Conversely, since "being" is predicated of substance and accident according to notions that are different but related to each other, it is predicated equivocally for the logician and analogically for the metaphysician.[104]

5.4. *The* Questions on the Metaphysics *by John Dinsdale (around 1280)*

John Dinsdale's discussion of the unity of being testifies to the "virage vers 1'intérieur," the shift of attention towards the conceptual dimension,

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esse, scilicet proprietatem talis esse. Ratione primi, ut esse, est idem, ratione vero secundi, ut in alio scilicet, non. Inesse nominat esse accidentis in effectu cum inseparabili proprietate, ita quod, sicut esse in effectu se habet ad esse rei, sic inesse se habet ad esse. Ista proprietas de essentia accidentis non est, sed est de esse eius in effectu. Sed sequitur: si accidens est, ergo inest, et e converso. Sed non sunt idem, quia unum se habet per additamentum."

103 Cf. Richard of Clive, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q. 13, fol. 110ra: "Dicendum quod logicus considerat naturam animalis quantum ad res rationis et non est maior ratio nec diversitas animalis in una specie quam in alia, quia logicus non considerat animal in quantum reperitur in suis speciebus per diversas naturas speciales, sed prout commune quid est eis et abstrahitur ab eis. Naturalis vero determinat de animali in quantum salvatur in speciebus et in quantum habet comparationem ad species per quas completur. Et quia diversa est forma complens animal in diversis speciebus, ideo naturalis dicit quod in genere latent multa. Logicus vero non sic considerat, prout applicatur animal ad res, sed abstrahendo a diversitate, et ideo dicit logicus quod omnino univocum est, quia modos praedicandi considerat."

104 Cf. Richard of Clive, *Qq. Met.-W*, fol. 122rb: "Hoc nomen 'ens' repraesentat utrumque, sed non tamen (?) aequaliter, sed per se substantiae debetur et accidenti per substantiam. Unde quantum ad logicum est hic aequivocatio, quantum ad metaphysicum est analogia, hoc est per prius et posterius. Ratio substantialis diversa est, ideo est aequivocatio. Quia tamen una ratio est ab alia et in alia, est ibi quaedam identitas et, per consequens, diminutio ab aequivocatione, et vocatur analogia. Unde quantum ad realem philosophum est analogia, quantum ad logicum est aequivocatio. [...]"

which is regarded as a distinctive mark of the late 13th century.[105] A first indication of this shift is provided by the title of the question devoted to this topic: whether the term "being" is predicated of substance and accident according to one or two different notions. John rejects the view that being is predicated according to a single notion. He reports a version of this theory, which he ascribes to Parmenides and Plato and which he says stems from the mistaken assumption that being is a genus.[106] John is also acquainted with what seems to be a contemporary version of the same theory, which maintains that being is predicated of substance and accident according to a single notion in which the categories participate in different ways and which bears some similarity to doctrines that were in fashion at Paris in the last decades of the 13th century.[107] Dinsdale's solution is based on a threefold division of predicates into univocal, equivocal, and analogous. Analogous predication corresponds to Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation: it occurs when a term is predicated according to notions that are different but are all related to a primary one, as in the paradigmatic case of "healthy" predicated of animal, diet, and urine.[108] "Being" is another instance of analogical predication: it is predicated according

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[105] See Ashworth, *Les Théories*, p. 55.

[106] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 32va: "Ad illud dicitur quod ens secundum unam rationem dicitur de omni ente. Et huius ratio est: nam in omni genere est ponere unum primum ad quod reducuntur omnia illius generis, sicut in genere substantiae est ponere aliquod primum quod participat omnia quae sunt in genere substantiae, et idem est in genere qualitatis et quantitatis. In genere igitur entium est ponere aliquam rationem primam partecipantem omnia entia. Sed haec ratio non est nisi entis; igitur entis est una ratio. Illud videtur esse de mente Platonis; nam in omnibus his quae sunt unius naturae et unius rationis posuit aliquid unum separatum commune omnibus illis; sed posuit ideam entis separatam correspondentem omni enti; igitur posuit ens esse unius rationis. Illud etiam movebat Parmenidem; nam illud quod diversificat aliquid videtur esse sibi extraneum; nunc autem nihil est extraneum enti; igitur nihil, ut videtur, potest diversificare ens. Et ideo posuit rationem entis esse rationem unam quae per nihil aliud potest diversificari. Et propter illud posuit ipse tantum esse unum."

[107] *Ibid.*, fol. 32va: "Isti sic ponentes ponunt ipsum diversimode participari a diversis vel ipsam rationem, quemadmodum caliditas est unius rationis et tamen diversimode est in igne et diversimode in aliis." On the theory of a single notion of being within the late 13th century Parisian philosophical tradition, see Donati, "La discussion sull'unità," pp. 98–124, and the bibliography listed there; Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 57–59; see also below, note 171.

[108] *Ibid.*, fol. 33ra: "Sed dicendum est ad quaestionem quod aliquid praedicatur de pluribus tripliciter: uno modo secundum unam rationem, ut homo de Sorte et Platone, et hoc est pure univoce; alio modo secundum rationes penitus diversas, ut canis de marina belua et de caelesti sidere; tertio modo per diversas rationes habentes habitudinem ad aliquod unum, ut sanum de urina et de dieta. Dicitur enim sanum de animali tamquam de subiecto, de urina tamquam de signo et de dieta tamquam de conservante, et sic de aliis, et hoc per habitudinem ad aliquod unum; nam omne sanum respectum habet ad sanitatem in

to notions that are different but are all related to a primary significate, namely, substance.[109] In his account of the different ways in which the various kinds of beings are related to substance, Dinsdale uses a fourfold classification of beings that is entirely derived from Peter of Auvergne's questions on the *Metaphysics*.[110] The two commentators mention the authority of Simplicius's commentary on the *Categories* in its support. This classification has a wider extension than categorial being, since in addition to the categories it also includes changes and privations and is based on a concept of being derived from the notion of essence.[111] A being can either be an essence, and in this case either an essence existing in itself (substance) or an essence existing in something else (quantity, quality etc.), or the privation of an essence (privations) or the combination of an essence with a privation of an essence (changes).[112] This classification

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animali, quia eandem sanitatem quam defert animal significat urina, conservat dieta et sic de aliis. Et tale dicitur analogum."

[109] *Ibid.*, fol. 33ra: "Ens autem non praedicatur de substantia et accidente primo modo nec secundo, quia inter illa quae praedicantur primo modo et secundo non cadit ordo nec in essendo nec in cognoscendo nisi per accidens; esse enim Sortis non dependet a Platone nec e converso nec esse animalis latrabilis a caelesti sidere nec e converso nec eius cognitio."

[110] Cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, IV, q. 2, ed. Arthur Monahan, in: James R. O'Donnell, ed., *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto, 1955), pp. 145–81, esp. 160–61. On the date of Peter of Auvergne's Questions on the *Metaphysics* (probably not before ca. 1278), see Silvia Donati, "An Anonymous Commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione* from the Years before the Paris Condemnations of 1277," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 65.2 (1998), 194–247, esp. 228, and the bibliography mentioned there. Peter's classification is indebted to the classification developed in the same context by Thomas Aquinas, but it also contains some original elements that are not found in Thomas's. For Thomas's classification, see Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 1, nn. 539–43.

[111] Possibly, the idea of the derivation of the notion of being from the notion of essence does not express Dinsdale's own position, since in the same question he seems to adopt the Thomistic view (see below, note 123) according to which the notion of being is taken from the *actus essendi*; see John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 33rb: "[…] Dicendum quod qualis multiplicitas est in ente, talis multiplicitas est in proprietate a qua accipitur nomen 'entis'; nam actus essendi potest esse vel in se vel in alio sicut et ens."

[112] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 33ra–b: "Immo tertio modo praedicatur ens de entibus, quia ens statim est unumquodque praedicamentum et per se praedicatur de quolibet et per suam essentiam. Ens igitur tot rationes habet diversas quot sunt praedicamenta. Istae tamen rationes attributionem habent ad aliquod unum; aliquid enim est ens quia per se habet esse, et aliquid est ens quia est dispositio per se entis, et aliquid est ens quia est via ad per se ens, et aliquid est ens quia est privatio vel negatio entis. Unde secundum Simplicium super *Praedicamenta* omnia entia possunt reduci ad quattuor gradus; nam ens dicitur ab essentia; aut igitur illud quod dicitur ens est essentia aut privatio essentiae aut est mixtum ex essentia et privatione. Si essentia, dupliciter: aut enim est essentia per se habens esse et non in alio, et sic est substantia, aut est essentia, sed esse non habet in se, sed in alio, et sic est qualitas vel quantitas ens et consimilia. Si sit privatio essentiae, sic

makes it clear that any kind of being is predicated of its different instances insofar as they are related to substance as a focus, and consequently that being is predicated of them analogically.

In the late 13th-century debate, the most significant objections to the theory of a plurality of notions of being corresponding to the categories are of an epistemological nature and stem from Avicenna's idea of being as an absolutely simple and primary notion of the intellect. In defending this theory, Dinsdale discusses an objection based on the idea that each cognitive faculty has a primary object whereby it is defined; this primary object is the simplest and most general notion comprising all things considered by that faculty. In the case of the highest cognitive faculty, namely, the intellect, the primary object is the notion of being. Obviously, in order to play its role, the notion of being must be one. Consequently, if there is not a single notion but a plurality of notions of being, being will not meet the requirements of the primary object of the intellect. Like his fourfold classification of being, also Dinsdale's answer to this objection shows the dependence of his commentary on that of Peter of Auvergne. Peter maintains that the being that is the primary object of the intellect is not being understood in its most general extension, i.e., as common to all the categories, but being understood in its primary sense, i.e., substance. He justifies this conclusion by appealing to the ontological and epistemological primacy of substance with respect to accidental categories.[113] Dinsdale agrees with Peter that the primary object of the intellect is being conceived in its primary sense, namely, substance.[114] For Dinsdale, however, this solution is in conflict with a basic tenet of his epistemology, namely, the idea that, since our intellectual knowledge derives from sense perception, the essences of sensible substances, being not sensible in themselves, are not immediately accessible to the human intellect but are reached through a discursive process based on the knowledge of

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dicuntur negationes et privationes entia, quia non contingit intelligere nisi ens; sed negationes et privationes contingit intelligere et ratiocinare de eis sicut de entibus; unde talia sunt entia rationis etsi non naturae. Si sit mixtum, sic motus et generatio et talia dicuntur ens, quia motus est actus imperfectus et includit in se et essentiam et privationem."

[113] Cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, IV, q. 2, ed. Monahan, p. 161.

[114] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 33va–b: "Ad aliam dicendum quod ad unitatem obiecti non requiritur quod sit unius rationis simpliciter, sed sufficit quod omnia quae movent unam potentiam sint unius rationis vel ad aliquod unum referantur; sic enim est de obiecto respectu potentiae sicut de subiecto respectu scientiae. Nunc autem ad unitatem subiecti non requiritur quod sit unum secundum rationem; [vel] oportet tamen quod sit unum vel ad unum referatur. Nunc autem ens est proprium obiectum intellectus; sed illud quod est primum ens est proprium et proportionale obiectum intellectus. [...]"

their sensible accidents, more precisely their properties.[115] It seems, therefore, that epistemological primacy belongs not to substance but to the accidents.[116] Dinsdale answers this objection by distinguishing two different kinds of primacy: with respect to generation (*in via generationis*) and with respect to perfection (*in via perfectionis*). Primacy with respect to generation belongs to accidents, since our knowledge of substances starts from the perception of their properties. Given the ontological dependence of accidents, however, mere knowledge of properties is only an imperfect kind of knowledge, which does not satisfy our intellect's natural desire for knowledge. It is only after grasping the essence of a substance as the cause of its accidents that the natural desire of the intellect is satisfied. In other words, since substance and not accident is the ultimate principle of intelligibility, the role of proper and primary object of the intellect

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[115] *Ibid.*, fols. 114vb–115rb; see esp. fol. 115ra: "Sed intelligendum est quod per effectus potest intellectus cognoscere substantias <ali>qualiter. Nam, in cognoscendo effectus pervenit in cognitionem substantiae in quantum est causa, et ista cognitio accidentalis est, quia ratio causae ratio cuiusdam accidentis est. Secundo potest intellectus distinguere inter ipsam substantiam et causalitatem, considerando quod diversa sunt, et ista adhuc cognitio substantiae est accidentalis, quia diversitas quaedam relatio est. Tertio modo potest intellectus cognoscere quod substantia non est eius causalitas nec effectus, et ista cognitio similiter accidentalis est, quia per modum privationis. Sed quarto modo, postquam intellectus cognoverit substantiam esse causam effectus et diversam esse a causalitate, potest convertere se supra substantiam, non faciendo comparationem ad aliquod alterum, et tunc primo cognoscit ipsam, sicut proprium scilicet obiectum. Aliter tamen cognoscit intellectus per effectus substantias sensibiles et immateriales, quia aliqui effectus apparent nobis qui adaequant totam potentiam et virtutem substantiae sensibilis, sed nullus effectus apparet nobis qui totaliter adaequat potentiam et virtutem substantiarum separatarum, et ideo possumus devenire in cognitionem substantiarum sensibilium quid sunt, sed de substantiis tamen separatis non possumus cognoscere nisi quia sunt et quod causae sunt, sed quid sunt simpliciter nos ignoramus." See also the discussion of the same issue contained in Dinsdale's questions on *De anima*, in: Manuel O. Aguinagalde, ed., "Las cuestiones al libro tercero *De Anima* de John de Tytyngsale," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 57 (1990), 177–269, esp. 233–36. Dinsdale's analysis of the process involved in our apprehension of the essence of sensibile substances bears strong similarities to the discussion of the same topic in a problaby slightly earlier commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Parisian origin (mid-late 1270s); unlike Dinsdale, however, the anonymous commentator does not seem completely satisfied with the solution just outlined. See Anonymous Zimmermanni, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fol. 34ra–va. On this anonymous commentary, see Sten Ebbesen's contribution in this volume.

[116] *Ibid.*, fol. 106rb–va: "Utrum substantia sit primum ens. Et videtur quod non. [...] Praeterea, unumquodque in quantum est ens est intelligibile; quod igitur est primum intelligibile est primum ens et accidens est primum intelligibile, quia nihil intelligitur quod prius non fuit in sensu; sed in sensu solum cadit accidens, quia sensibile solum est in tertia specie qualitatis. Cum igitur accidens sit primum sensibile, et illud quod in sensu cadit, a condicionibus individualibus abstractum, movet intellectum, igitur accidens est primum intelligibile. [...]"

belongs not to accidents but to substance.[117] Dinsdale's distinctive interpretation of the objection of the primary object of the intellect is particularly interesting because, focusing on the issue of our knowledge of the essence of sensible substances, it draws attention to a problem that will also play a key role in Scotus's theory of the univocation of being. Like Dinsdale, Scotus will maintain that the essences of sensible substances can be reached by our intellect only through a discursive process based on the knowledge of their sensible accidents. However, while for Dinsdale at the end of this process our intellect produces an intelligible likeness (*species*) of the essence whereby the essence can be grasped by an act of simple apprehension,[118] Scotus's final position will be that no simple apprehension of the essence of sensible substances is possible for our intellect in this life; rather, such essence is only known through a complex description in which accidental properties are appended to the notion of "being" (i.e., "being endowed with X and Y properties"). But since also the concept of being originates from the elaboration of sensible data—that is, information gained through the perception of sensible accidents—in Scotus's view, a necessary condition for it to apply to substances is that it is univocally common to substances and accidents.[119]

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[117] *Ibid.*, fols. 106vb–107ra: "Ad aliud dicendum quod accidens non est primum intelligibile, quia ratio entis quod est substantia primo occurrit intellectui, quia in sensibilibus, quae sunt particularia, et in intelligibilibus, quae sunt universalia, est ordo contrarius, quia primum sensibile est accidens et primum intelligibile est substantia; illud enim quod est proprium obiectum intellectus est quod quid est substantiae. Et si quaeras causam huius, dicendum quod eadem est causa quae est quare color est proprium obiectum visus. Sed propter formam argumenti intelligendum est quod in omni eo quod procedit de potentia ad actum est considerare prius secundum generationem et secundum perfectionem et illud quod est prius secundum generationem est posterius secundum perfectionem et e converso. Si igitur intellectus noster procedit de potentia ad actum, ei (cui? *ms.*) primo occurrunt phantasmata accidentium, sed in eis non quiescit intellectus prius quam cognoscat substantiam, quae est causa et subiectum istorum accidentium. Unde etsi prius per generationem occurrat accidens intellectui, tamen perfectum obiectum eius est quod quid est substantiae; nam ex ipso devenit intellectus in cognitionem accidentium et passionum." *Ibid.*, fol. 33va–b: "[…] Nunc autem ens est proprium obiectum intellectus; sed illud quod est primum ens est proprium et proportionale obiectum intellectus. Licet enim accidentia sint notiora nobis in via generationis, substantia tamen est primum obiectum via perfectionis. Intellectus enim non quietatur in cognitione accidentium antequam cognoverit subiecta eorum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod substantia praecedit, scilicet accidens, definitione et cognitione."

[118] In Dindale's view, the intelligible likenesses of sensible substances differ from the intelligible likenesses of sensible accidents because they do not originate from the elaboration of sensible data (since we do not receive sensible likenesses of substances) but are instead produced by the intellect on its own account; see Aguinagalde, "Las cuestiones," 235–36.

[119] See Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Doing Metaphysics *in statu isto*," in: Mary Beth Ingham & Oleg Bychov, eds., *John Duns Scotus, Philosopher* (Archa Verbi. Subsidia) 3 (Münster, 2010),

Dinsdale's interpretation of the doctrine of analogy is characterized by an anti-reductionistic attitude both in semantics and in ontology. Like Richard of Clive, Dinsdale keeps his distance from the "semantic reductionism" of Richard Rufus and Geoffrey of Aspall. He maintains that the term "being" has as many significates as there are categories and can be predicated directly of each one of them ("substantia est ens," "accidens est ens").[120] Compared to Richard of Clive, however, he takes a more radical stance. Both commentators maintain that the term "being" has many significates, but Richard is committed to the idea of "semantic" analogy, whereas Dinsdale denies any hierarchy among these significates. In his view, the term "being" signifies substance and accidents in an equally primary way. As has been shown by recent scholarship and will be confirmed by the following analysis, Dinsdale's position finds wide support in the English philosophical tradition of the late 13th century. Dinsdale formulates his view in the context of a detailed analysis of the mode of signification of the terms usually considered as analogous. His main critical target is a version of the theory of "semantic" analogy in fashion among contemporary Parisian Arts masters, including Peter of Auvergne, who expounds it in his questions on the *Metaphysics*.[121] Leaving aside the more

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pp. 29–55. At an earlier stage, before arriving at the doctrine of the univocation of being, Scotus seems to have suscribed to a position not too far removed from Dinsdale's. On late 13th-century discussions on the issue of the knowability of substance, see Timothy B. Noone, "The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion from Eustachius of Arras to Vital du Four," in Kent Emery Jr., Russell L. Friedman, Andreas Speer, & Maxime Mauriege, eds., *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Studien und Texte zür Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 105 (Leiden-Boston, 2011), pp. 63–89.

[120] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 108ra–b: "Ad illud dicunt quidam quod haec est falsa: 'albedo est' vel 'albedo est ens,' quia analogum per se acceptum dicitur vel accipitur pro eo de quo dicitur per prius; sed ens est analogum et per prius dicitur de substantia, et ideo, cum dicitur: 'albedo est' significatur quod albedo sit substantia, quod falsum est. Et illud confirmatur per Philosophum in littera; dicit enim quod accidens est entis, sed quod est alicuius non est ipsum. [...] Cum igitur accidentia abstracta sint entis, non erunt entia. Sed illud non videtur verum, quia, licet ens sit analogum, nihil tamen effugit praedicationem entis nisi non ens, quia nihil latius entis per Commentatorem; unde ens non solum praedicatur de substantia absoluto nomine, sed de accidentibus, ut dicitur in principio V, nec analogia impedit praedicationem analogi de diversis absoluto nomine. [...] Nec dictum Philosophi concludit pro parte ista; Philosophus enim intendit quod accidentia habent habitudinem ad substantiam; unde ipse dicit quod sunt entia, quia modum essendi habent, et sunt entis, quia habitudinem habent ad principale ens."

[121] For an edition of the relevant question, see Sten Ebbesen, "Words and Signification in 13th-Century Questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Greque et Latin* 71 (2000), 71–114, esp. 82–88. See also Incerti Auctores *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi) VII (Copenhagen, 1977), pp. 129–31, 310–14; and Ashworth, *Les Théories*, pp. 85–88.

technical aspects, the most significant element of the theory criticized by Dinsdale is the assumption that there is a general isomorphism between *modi essendi*, *modi cognoscendi* and *modi significandi*, as supported by late 13th-century Parisian modism, and that this isomorphism accounts for the conformity between signification and reality. The metaphysical assumptions of this theory are clearly spelled out by Dinsdale in his exposition of it. For the supporters of this version of the theory of "semantic" analogy, the property of signifying according to the prior and posterior is imposed upon an analogical term by the act of imposition, but what makes this imposition possible is the isomorphism among reality, thought, and language: when a certain property belongs to different things according to the prior and posterior, it is reasonable to assume that it is known by the intellect and signified by words in the same way. In accordance with the assumption of a hierarchy among the significates of analogous terms, the supporters of this view maintain that, when an analogous term is used in itself and without further specifications, it does not stand indifferently for all its significates, only for its primary one.[122] Dinsdale rejects this doctrine. In opposition to the mainstream position of Parisian modism, he denies the existence of a necessary isomorphism between the ontological level, namely, the things signified by an analogical term, and the semantic level, namely, the mode of signification of that term, and maintains that the hierarchy distinctive of analogy concerns the things signified by analogous terms and not the signification of those terms.[123] In other words, he

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[122] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 62va: "Si quaeratur quae est causa huius, dicunt quod hoc est ex impositione. Ex eadem enim impositione <per> quam habet analogum quod per prius significat unum et postea aliud, ex eadem impositione habet quod per se positum solum repraesentet unum, quia rationale est rem esse conformem intellectui, et ideo, sicut res per prius participatur ab uno et per posterius ab altero, rationale est quod sic intelligatur et quod sic significetur. Et suppositio dependet ex significatione, et ideo rationale est quod sic supponat. Ex quo igitur non significat secundum nisi per habitudinem ad primum, rationale est quod non supponat pro secundo nisi cum habeatur ab alio vel cum alio quod denotat habitudinem ad primum." On 13th- and early 14th-century discussions about the signification of analogical terms, see Sten Ebbesen, "The Dead Man Is Alive," *Synthese* 40 (1979), 43–70.

[123] Dinsdale's position seems to leave some space for compromise, for he does not completely deny the existence of some conformity between the semantic and the ontological level. Indeed, in some passages, he seems to understand the capability, belonging to an analogical term, of signifying a plurality of things as a reflex of the relation that, at the ontological level, links the things signified by that term. He does, nevertheless, maintain that, properly speaking, analogy pertains to the things signified and not to the words themselves. See John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 61ra: "Ad argumenta. Ad primum dicendum quod analogia est principaliter ex parte rei et non ex parte vocis. Aliqua enim est proprietas quae per prius convenit uni rei quam alteri, sed nulla est proprietas quae magis conveniat sub-

rejects "semantic" analogy. In his view, the things signified by terms such as "healthy" and "being" are related to each other (for instance, accidents are linked to substance by a relationship of causal dependence) but no such relationship occurs at the level of signification: "healthy" and "being," e.g., signify all their various significates in an equally primary way. Accordingly, when such terms are used without specifications, they do not stand only for their primary significate but also stand indifferently for all their significates, and they therefore can be predicated indifferently of all their significates, so that the proposition "*accidens est ens*" is as well formed as the proposition "*substantia est ens*."

The analysis just sketched of the mode of signification of analogous terms is central to Dinsdale's interpretation of the traditional distinction between the metaphysician's and the logician's point of view about the unity of being. Like other English commentators, Dinsdale maintains that the doctrine of analogy is a metaphysical theory and is compatible with the doctrine of equivocation, which, for its part, expresses the logician's

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stantiae vocis quam alii. Et ideo in re est ordo principaliter et non ex parte vocis. Verumtamen ad argumentum potest dici quod vox dupliciter potest considerari: aut secundum suam substantiam aut secundum quod imponitur alicui primo ad significandum. Si primo modo, sic vocis non est analogia. Si secundo modo consideretur, sic in voce est analogia: per hoc quod vox uni rei imponitur ordinem habet ad designandum aliam rem quae habet habitudinem ad primum significatum"; *ibid.*, fol. 61rb–va: "Ad aliud dicendum quod una impositione potest vox determinari pluribus, quia sanitas est determinata commensuratio calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci in animali, et hanc commensurationem principaliter significat sanitas, sed in dieta potest esse determinata proportio calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci per habitudinem ad primam commensurationem, ita quod sit conservativa eius, et in medicina similiter potest esse determinata proportio quae sit factiva prioris commensurationis et in urina potest esse determinata proportio quantum ad colorem, substantiam et contenta, quae attestatur priorem commensurationem. Et ideo, etsi vox non imponatur ad significandum nisi sanum in animali, tamen transferri potest ad significandum alia vel dictam proportionem, quia habet habitudinem ad priorem proportionem. Et similiter, licet ens numquam esset impositum nisi substantiae, quia tamen ab actu essendi imponitur, et qualitas et quantitas actum essendi habent aliquo modo, ideo transferri potest ad qualitatem et quantitatem. Si ista translatio ad alterum dicatur impositio, tunc potest dici quod diversis impositionibus imponitur analogum diversis. Si tamen solum impositio dicatur quae fit a principali instituente, potest dici quod una impositio imponitur diversis; per hoc enim quod uni imponitur aptitudo est in voce ut aliis attribuatur. Ad formam argumenti dicendum tunc quod secunda impositio non attribuit vocem secundo significato nisi propter habitudinem ad primum significatum et propter primum significatum. Et ideo non est ibi aequivocatio. Praeterea, si ab una impositione imponatur et una impositio sumatur ab una ratione, non tamen oportet quod per unam rationem dicatur. Nomen enim sanitatis ab una ratione acceptum est sive proprietate et tamen dicerem quod alia est ratio sani in urina et dieta, tamen utrumque habet habitudinem ad tertium, et sic est de qualitate et quantitate. Unde diversae sunt rationes per quas analogum praedicatur de diversis; etsi nomen ab aliqua una ratione fuerit impositum, tamen per diversam rationem dicitur de diversis."

point of view. Dinsdale's interpretation of this traditional distinction is not essentially different from that of Geoffrey of Aspall or of Richard of Clive, but the theoretical framework within which it is developed does differ from that of previous versions. Dinsdale traces back the distinction between the metaphysical and logical classification of analogical terms to the distinction just mentioned between the ontological level of the things signified by those terms and the semantic level of their mode of signification. Since the things signified by terms such as "being" are linked together by relationships of causal dependence, real sciences, which focus on the things, regard these terms as intermediate between purely univocal and purely equivocal and classify them as "analogous." By contrast, since there is no order among acts of signification and no intermediate between signifying according to one and the same notion or according to different ones, logic, which focuses on concepts and modes of signification, does not admit an intermediate class between univocal and equivocal terms. Logic classifies terms signifying according to a single notion as straightforwardly univocal and terms signifying according to different notions as straightforwardly equivocal or, more precisely, as instances of the so-called "first mode" of equivocation, in which one and the same term signifies a plurality of things in an equally primary way.[124] Therefore, logic regards generic terms, which signify their various species according to the same notion, as purely univocal, and the term "being," which signifies the different categories according to different notions, as equivocal according to the first mode of equivocation.[125] As recent studies

[124] On the distinction between the so-called first and second mode of equivocation, see below, § 5.5.

[125] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 61ra–b: "Ad aliud dicendum quod logicus non considerat res naturae, sed res rationis, naturalis autem et metaphysicus res considerant. Quia igitur in rebus est ordo secundum prius et posterius quae tamen <habent> ordinem in una ratione, ideo naturalis et metaphysicus multa dicunt analoga quae logicus dicit univoca. Logicus enim dicit quod corpus dicitur univoce de corpore superiori et inferiori et naturalis dicit quod analogice; naturalis enim dicit quod in genere multae latent aequivocationes. Et logicus <non> ponit medium inter aequivocum et univocum, quia in ratione non est medium, sicut ponit naturalis et metaphysicus; immo illa quae proprie sunt analoga reducenda sunt ad primum modum aequivocationis. Non enim dicerem quod analogia faceret secundum modum aequivocationis, sed secundus modus est per Aristotelem in *Elenchis* quia soliti sumus sic dicere, quia ibi non est ordo, sed solum similitudo, ut si dicatur pratum ridere et expedire in bonis et malis, non habent ordinem sed quandam similitudinem"; *ibid.*, fols. 62vb–63ra: "Ideo videtur esse dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur vel tripliciter aliquid de pluribus secundum prius et posterius. Uno modo per eandem rationem, ut corpus de corpore caelesti et inferiori per prius et posterius et tamen per eandem rationem, et tunc (tamen *ms.*) tale nomen per se positum indifferenter supponit pro utroque, quare (quia *ms.*) apud logicum tale nomen est univocum, etsi ordo sit inter ea

have shown[126] and as will be confirmed in the present investigation, the semantic reading of the traditional distinction between the logical and metaphysical views of the unity of being becomes a common pattern in the late 13th-century English debate. Since Dinsdale is one of the earliest witnesses to this new turn of the traditional English theory, the fact that his position is a reaction to the theories of Parisian modism suggests that this new turn originates from the encounter of the traditional "English" view with the philosophical tradition of Parisian modism.

The counterpart of Dinsdale's refusal of "semantic" analogy is his anti-reductionistic view about the ontological status of accidental categories and his realistic interpretation of the distinction of the categories. Unlike his predecessor Richard of Clive, who does not mention the theological problem of the Eucharistic accidents in discussing the ontological status of accidents, Dinsdale has this theological problem clearly on his mind, and he seems to maintain that a satisfactory account of the ontological status of accidents must also reckon with the miraculous existence of Eucharistic accidents without a substrate.[127] Like Richard of Clive's, Dinsdale's treatment of the relationship between accidents and substance is influenced by Avicenna's essentialistic approach; possibly, it is

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de quibus dicitur secundum naturalem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid de diversis per diversam rationem secundum prius et posterius et praedicabile tamen est de utrisque, ut sanum dicitur sic de diversis. Et tale analogum per se positum est distinguendum, quia substantia est ens et qualitas similiter et quantitas. Si ens igitur accipitur per se, ex quo praedicabile est de utrisque, potest pro utroque accipi, et eodem modo de sano. [...] Si analogum praedicetur de diversis absoluto nomine, videtur quod potest accipi pro utroque. Licet enim ordo sit in re, ex parte tamen vocis vel modi significandi eius non est talis ordo. Et propter hoc logicus, quia considerat modum significandi, omne tale analogum, dummodo diversa significat ex impositione, dicit esse aequivocum. Et omne tale analogum habet reduci ad primum modum aequivocationis. Et ideo dicit Porphyrius quod qui omnia vocet aequivoce nuncupabit. Quia tamen ordo est in re, ideo naturalis et metaphysicus dicit talia esse analoga. Et ideo videtur quod talia nomina per se posita non oportet accipi pro primario significato, sed sunt diversa."

[126] See Donati, "La discussione sull'unità," pp. 75–77; and Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," 82–84.

[127] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 111rb–va: "Ad illud dicendum secundum quosdam quod inhaerentia est de essentia accidentis. [...] Licet ista sint probabilia, non tamen sunt vera, quia nullum agens, nec naturale nec supra naturam, potest separare aliquid ab altero quod est de eius essentia ipso manente, quia sic faceret duo contradictoria esse simul. Quia prima causa potest facere illud quod potest habere rationem facti vel obiecti, sed duo contradictoria non possunt habere rationem unius facti, et ideo non potest facere contradictoria simul. Nunc autem prima causa potest facere accidens habere esse praeter inhaerentiam ad alterum, ut in corpore Christi, et hoc est verum secundum fidem et probatum est per rationem."

also dependent on Peter of Auvergne's.[128] Dinsdale's view on inherence is very similar to Avicenna's idea that inherence is a modality of being that pertains to accidental categories, not in themselves and in their essence but in their relationship to their substrate. According to Dinsdale, an accident can be considered in two different ways: (i) in itself, as a being of a certain kind, distinct from other kinds of beings, for instance, as a quantity, as a quality etc.; or (ii) in its status as an accident, namely, as something supervening on something else according to the etymology of the term "*accidens*" as *ad aliud cadens*, in other words, as a determination of a substance.[129] If an accident is considered in itself, then inherence does not belong to its essence; it only constitutes a modality of its being. If an accident is considered in its status of supervening thing (*accidens*), then inherence belongs to its essence.[130] A corollary of this analysis is that since the term "*accidens*" expresses the dependence on substance, it does not indicate an essential property of accidents. In Dinsdale's view, this explains why the universal "accident" is not related to the nine accidental categories as a common genus to its inferiors, for a genus is predicated of its inferiors in the line of the essence.[131] Although he rejects the idea

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[128] Cf. Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fol. 195ra–b; on Peter's essentialistic position on the ontological status of accidents, see Amerini, "*Utrum inhaerentia*," 105–06.

[129] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 75rb: "[…] Cum dicitur enim quod albedo est color vel qualitas, significatur quod est quoddam ens secundum se, sed cum dicitur quod est accidens, significatur quidam respectus ad alterum; denotatur quod est passio alterius, quia accidens dicitur 'ad aliud cadens.' […]" For this etymology of the term 'accidens' see also Albertus Magnus, *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus*, tr. 1, c. 3, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, in: Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, t. 1.1A (Münster i. W., 2004), p. 119.42–45: "[…] Cum accidens dicatur quasi 'ad-cadens,' eo quod non sit simpliciter ens, sed cadens ad substantiam, quae simpliciter est ens, et sic potius entis quam ens […]."

[130] *Ibid.*, fol. 111va–b: "Ideo dicendum est ad quaestionem quod inhaerentia est de essentia quorundam accidentium et quorundam non. Nam de essentia inhaerentis vel accidentis est inhaerentia, non tamen huius quod est inhaerens vel accidens […] sicut albedo est de essentia albi, non tamen est de essentia eius quod est album. […] Ad rationes. Ad primam dicendum quod inesse non est accidentis esse vel illius quod accidit esse, immo sicut substare dicit proprietatem substantiae et non eius essentiam, sic inesse dicit quandam proprietatem albedinis et non eius esse. Nam praedicamenta se ipsis sunt diversa; unde qualitas aliquid est in se distinctum a substantia; est etiam passio substantiae. Et ideo duplex habet esse, esse tale vel tantum est eius esse absolutum, sed inesse est eius esse secundum quod ordinem habet ad substantiam. Ac si diceretur quod esse risibile est esse hominis non substantiale, sed accidentale. Et sic intelligi habet quod esse eorum quae accidunt est inesse."

[131] *Ibid.*, fol. 112ra: "Ad rationes positionis. Ad primam dicendum quod divisio entis per absolutum et comparatum non est divisio eius per differentias essentiales, quia sic ens esset genus, immo divisio eius est in diversos modos essendi; sicut enim absolutio sive privatio comparationis non est de essentia substantiae, sed est proprietas consequens ipsam

that the dependence on substance is constitutive of accidental categories, Dinsdale still wants to safeguard the traditional conception that accidents are intrinsically dependent beings. His account is based on the distinction between actual inherence, which does not necessarily belong to an accident, and aptitudinal or potential inherence, i.e., the tendency to inhere, which necessarily belongs to it. Since actual inherence does not necessarily belong to an accident, it is possible for it to exist without a substrate, as in the case of Eucharistic accidents; but even when it exists without a substrate, an accident still retains its aptitudinal inherence and thus its nature of an accident.[132] Dinsdale's distinction between an accident considered in its essence and considered in its relation to a substrate has its counterpart in a distinction between two kinds of definition for items of the accidental categories, namely, the definition consisting of genus and difference and the so-called definition *per additamentum*. Like Scotus,[133] Dinsdale maintains that it is possible to give a definition by genus and difference of an accident. Granted that an accident is intrinsically dependent on substance, however, this definition is incomplete since it does not include any external element to the essence of an accident. By contrast, the so-called definition *per additamentum*, which includes the mention of the substrate of an accident, accounts for its nature as dependent being and therefore is a complete description.[134] For his predecessor Richard of

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et dicens modum essendi ipsam, sic comparatio non est de essentia qualitatis vel quantitatis, sed proprietas quaedam est ipsorum, denotans modum essendi ipsa in re extra. Unde haec non est per se primo modo, sed secundo modo: 'albedo est comparatum.' "

[132] *Ibid.*, fol. 112ra: "Eodem modo dicendum est ad aliam quod accidens non dicit aliquid pertinens ad essentiam novem generum, sed significat modum essendi eorum per comparationem ad substantiam. Unde haec non est per se, 'albedo est accidens,' nisi secundo modo, quia accidens dicit habitudinem unius ad alterum. Verum tamen, sive albedo sit in subiecto vel extra, semper potest dici accidens, quia dependentia vel inhaerentia aptitudinalis facit quod accidens sit accidens. Nunc autem differentia est inter inhaerentiam et dependentiam: inhaerentia proprie respicit (recipit *ms.*) coniunctum, sed dependentia respicit coniunctum et separatum proprie. Inhaerentia tamen aptitudinalis non videtur differre a dependentia, et ideo, sive albedo inhaereat vel non, semper dependet et inhaerere nata est, et ideo semper dicetur accidens, ut homo dicitur risibilis sive rideat sive non."

[133] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, VIII, q. 4, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 4, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), pp. 126.11–127.13, §§ 23–26; see also Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 189–90.

[134] Cf. John Dinsdale, *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 117ra–b: "Dicendum quod accidens potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo in quantum est res distincta a substantia, et sic potest significari, intelligi et definiri. [...] Sic habet definiri per genus et differentiam, ut 'albedo est color talis.' Alio modo potest accidens considerari in quantum dependet ad substantiam et causatur ab ea, et sic in definitione eius habet primo subiectum, sive significetur per abstractum sive per concretum, quia definitio datur causa innotescendi rem, sed dependens secundum quod huiusmodi perfecte non potest cognosci nisi cognoscatur illud ad

Clive the mention of the subject in the definition of an accident is only due to epistemological reasons, that is, to the way in which our intellect knows an accident. For Dinsdale, instead, it is grounded on the structure of reality, namely, the intrinsic—if not essential—dependence of an accident on substance.

Dinsdale's realistic approach to the distinction of the categories is a clear element of similarity between his ontology and Scotus's. For Dinsdale, like for Scotus later, the ten categories indicate ten basic kinds of extramental entities really different from each other and none of which can be reduced to a more basic one. This realistic assumption holds not only for those accidental categories to which a "strong" ontological status is traditionally ascribed, namely, the absolute categories of quantity and quality, but also for those categories whose ontological status is traditionally regarded as "weak," namely, the category of relation and the so-called *sex principia*. Dinsdale specifically addresses the case of the categories of action, passion and relation. The category of relation indicates an entity (*res*) really distinct from the absolute determination that constitutes its foundation—for example the similarity between two white men is really distinct from the quality of whiteness on which it is grounded; similarly, the categories of action and passion indicate entities that are really different from the physical change on which they are both based and from each other.[135]

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quod dependet. Et ideo ad hoc quod accidens perfecte notificetur, oportet ipsum definiri per additamentum." The same distinction between different types of definitions of an accident occurs in Peter of Auvergne's questions on the *Metaphysics*; see ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fol. 195rb.

135 *Ibid.*, fol. 74rb–va: "Dicendum quod praedicamenta distinguuntur realiter; nam quaecumque sunt res et se ipsis diversa realiter sunt diversa. Sed praedicamenta significant res, significant enim entia extra animam, et se ipsis scilicet distinguuntur, alioquin in aliquo superiori convenirent. Realiter igitur distinguuntur, et propter hoc dicit Philosophus in V, capitulo de diverso genere, quod praedicamenta sunt diversa genere, quia nec reducuntur ad alterum nec ad se invicem; et ideo dicit Boethius in *Praedicamentis* quod Philosophus determinat ibi de decem vocibus decem genera rerum significantibus. Ad rationes. Ad primam dicendum quod actio et passio non sunt essentialiter motus vel quod motus non est de essentia actionis et passionis; immo actio et passio sunt duae essentiae fundatae in eodem, scilicet motu, secundum numerum, sicut Sors per eandem albedinem potest esse similis Platoni et dissimilis Crehoni (?), et ista similitudo et dissimilitudo fundantur in albedine et tamen in ipsa distinguuntur et a se invicem. Sic actio et passio fundantur in eodem motu et tamen distinguuntur a motu et a se invicem. [...] Unde actio et passio sunt duae naturae et per se distinctae. [...] Ad aliam rationem dicendum quod si Sors sit albus et Plato niger et transmutatur Plato, nova res est in Sorte quae prius non fuit, sed ista res non adquiritur per motum illius in quo est; et ideo probat Philosophus in V *Physicorum* quod in ad aliquid non est motus, quia res eius sine generari et corrumpi potest esse et non esse. Unde similitudo quae est in Sorte alia res est ab albedine. Sed quia ista res non

5.5. *The* Questions on the Metaphysics *by William of Bonkes (1292) and Other Late 13th-Century Commentaries*

The questions on the *Metaphysics* by William of Bonkes and the four anonymous collections of questions *Qq. Met.-P*[1]*, Qq. Met.-P*[2]*, Qq. Met.-O*[1] and *Qq. Met.-A* represent the stage of the English debate about the unity of being at the turn of the century.[136] Like Dinsdale's questions, these works show acquaintance with the late 13th-century Parisian philosophical tradition. While Dinsdale is heavily indebted to Peter of Auvergne's questions on the *Metaphysics*, these later commentators are influenced by a more remote source, namely, Thomas Aquinas. It is Aquinas's treatment of the unity of being in his commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, *Physics* and *Sentences* that provides the framework of the debate in these commentators. At the same time, their treatment of the logical-epistemological aspects also shows a strong similarity to Scotus's approach in his logical works, notably, in his commentary on the *Categories*. This remark reinforces the suggestion recently advanced by scholars that Scotus's view in his earliest works, namely, his logical commentaries (dating from the early 1290s) and the first redaction of the questions on the *Metaphysics* (completed before ca. 1297–98), reflects his initial commitment to the standard late 13th-century English position on the unity of being.[137] Scotus's commitment, however, does not extend to ontological theories, since, as we shall see, our commentators' approach to ontological issues is very different from Scotus's.

Like Dinsdale, these later commentators have a prevailing interest in the conceptual dimension of the problem of the unity of being. A sign of this interest is the way they formulate the problem, namely, whether being is predicated of the categories according to a single reason or a plurality of reasons. Some commentators show acquaintance with various versions of the theory of a single notion of being. For instance, the classical version of this theory (that is, Avicenna's doctrine and the exposition of it contained in al-Ghazālī's "Metaphysics") is reported in

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adquiritur per motum Sortis, ideo non est manifestum intellectui nostro utrum sit res vel non, sed haesitat intellectus. Sed quia manente albedine potest ista similitudo non esse, manifestum est quod realiter distinguitur ab albedine."

[136] A further probable representative of the English commentary tradition at the turn of the century, namely *Qq. Met.-O*[2], contains no treatment of the unity of being, since it includes only questions on *Met.* VII. Its closeness to the works just mentioned is testified by its analysis of the ontological status of accidents; see below, notes 163, 165, 168.

[137] See Pini, "Univocity in Scotus' *Quaestiones*," pp. 84–88, 95–97, 100.

Qq. Met.-A.[138] By contrast, the author of *Qq. Met.-P*^{2} discusses what seems to be a contemporary version of the theory, but in all probability not to be identified with Scotus's doctrine of the univocation of being.[139] Our commentators unanimously reject the idea of a single notion of being common to the categories. In endorsing the theory of analogical predication, some of them adopt the definition of analogy formulated by Aquinas in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* as a kind of predication in which the same term is predicated of a plurality of things according to notions that are partly identical and partly different. Central to their understanding of analogy is the concept of attribution: accidents are said beings in virtue of their relationship (*attributio*) to substance.[140]

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[138] Cf. *Qq. Met.-A*, fol. 79ra–rb: "Ad istud dicit Avicenna quod ens per unam rationem dicitur de substantia et accidentibus, sed ens tamen non est genus, et hoc quia ens et unum significant dispositiones additas rei; genus autem non significat aliquid additum suae speciei. Sed ipse decipiebatur in hoc quod non distinxit inter unum quod convertitur cum ente et unum quod est principium numeri; unde credidit quod, sicut unum quod est principium numeri, quod reperitur in determinato genere, est applicabile ad quodlibet praedicamentum tamquam importans dispositionem additam, sic et unum quod convertitur cum ente. Quod tamen non est verum, quia ens et unum in quid praedicantur de his de quibus praedicantur. Item, Algazel posuit ens per unam rationem dici de substantia et accidentibus propter duo: primo quia non contingit aliter dubitare de re an sit, quia de substantia non est dubitare an sit substantia, quoniam hoc est manifestum, nec etiam an sit accidens, quoniam hoc manifestum est esse falsum. Si ergo non esset alia ratio entis quam ratio substantiae vel ratio accidentium, non esset dubitare de re an sit, quod falsum est, quia haec est una de numero quaestionum. Secundo hoc probat, quia eadem est descriptio entis prout convenit substantiae et etiam accidentibus; Nam ens prout contrahitur ad substantiam dicitur esse id quod est; sic etiam describitur cum contrahitur ad accidentia; ens ergo per unam rationem dicitur de his. Sed ista positio est falsa, quia per Philosophum in littera ens multipliciter dicitur."

[139] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P*^{2}, fol. 18va–b: "Huic dicitur quod ens dicitur univoce de substantia et de accidentibus, et hoc propter rationem praedictam, quia ab ente simpliciter et ab ente comparato potest abstrahi una ratio communis utrique, sicut ab homine albo et nigro ratio hominis, quia istae differentiae, absolutum et comparatum, faciunt rationem compositiorem quam sit ratio entis de se, quia, si non, tunc sic dicto: 'ens absolutum,' esset nugatio, quia, si ens significaret idem quod absolutum, bis idem diceretur. Consimiliter, idem esset sic dic<t>o: 'ens comparatum.' Oportet igitur dicere, cum illa accipimus sicut sermones proprios, quod ens significat aliquam rationem communem cui adveniant istae differentiae, absolutum, comparatum, sicut animal significat rationem communem (causam *ms*.) cui supra addantur rationale et irrationale. Et si hoc, ens erit univocum ad substantiam (subiectum *ms*.) et accidens."

[140] Cf. *Qq. Met.-O*^{1}, fol. 219rb: "Quando igitur aliquod nomen praedicatur de multis secundum rationem penitus eandem, tunc dicitur univoce de eis, quando autem secundum rationes penitus diversas, tunc aequivoce. Et tertio modo, quando aliquid praedicatur de diversis secundum rationes partim easdem et partim diversas, tunc dicetur de eis analogice praedicari. In analogicis sunt rationes partim eaedem, in quantum ad unum et idem habent relationem, partim autem diversa,e in quantum ad illud unum secundum diversas habitudines referuntur, sicut hoc nomen 'sanum' analogice praedicatur de dieta, medicina et urina, quia secundum rationes partim easdem, quia secundum quod referuntur

These commentators devote a thorough discussion to the semantic aspects of the doctrine of the analogy of being. William of Bonkes and the author of *Met.-P*[2] use Aquinas's threefold division of analogy in the Commentary on the *Sentences*, according to which the analogy of being is an analogy according to the ontological and the conceptual order (*secundum esse et secundum intentionem*), and they focus their attention on the conceptual order (*secundum intentionem*). In their understanding, the conceptual order is the semantic order (*secundum intentionem nominis*). This is why they turn to the familiar problem of whether the acts of signification associated with an analogical term are ordered to each other as prior and posterior as the things signified by that term are, that is, they raise the question of whether analogy is not only an ontological but also a semantic phenomenon. Like Dinsdale and Scotus, these authors reject "semantic" analogy. They justify their position with sophisticated analyses of the relationship between reality, knowledge, and signification. Their polemical target is the modistic view of a perfect isomorphism among *modi essendi*, *modi cognoscendi*, and *modi significandi*. Our commentators, however, do not deny the existence of some sort of conformity among extramental reality, knowledge, and signification. As is pointed out by William of Bonkes, that some sort of isomorphism between extramental reality and our knowledge of it must exist is proved by the simple fact that this knowledge is caused by extramental objects. Furthermore, granted that true knowledge grasps reality as it is, to deny the existence of some conformity between knowledge and extramental reality is tantamount to denying any possibility of true knowledge.[141] This is relevant to the

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ad idem, ut ad sanitatem. Etiam secundum rationes partim diversas, in quantum huic sanitati attribuuntur secundum diversas habitudines, medicina in eo quod effectiva sanitatis, dieta in eo quod conservativa, urina in quantum signum. Isto tertio modo tantum praedicatur ens de his de quibus dicitur, eo quod omnia entia alia a substantia ad ipsam in ratione entitatis suae et in hoc quod entia habent attributionem, quantitas in eo quod mensura est substantiae, qualitas in eo quod dispositio, et ita de aliis"; *Qq. Met.-A*, fol. 79rb; *Qq. Met.-P*[2], fols. 18vb–19ra; *Qq. Met.-P*[3], fol. 13va: "Dicendum quod ens neque importat simpliciter eandem rationem in substantia et accidente neque simpliciter diversas [simpliciter], sed partim eandem, partim diversas: eandem in quantum omnia entia ad unum primum referuntur, diversas in quantum ad id unum referuntur secundum diversas habitudines; et ideo dicitur in littera quod nec aequivoce nec univoce praedicatur de his, sed analogice, quod est medio modo."

[141] Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*[2], fol. 35rb: "Contra ista arguitur: quod ens dicatur analogice quantum ad intentionem nominis sicut quantum ad esse probatio: intellectus movetur a re; igitur, sicut est in re, sic erit ad intellectum apprehendentem; si igitur ordo sit in rebus, ordo erit in intelligibilibus. Dicitur huic quod, etsi intellectus moveatur a re, non sequitur quod idem modus erit in intelligendo qui est in essendo, quia tunc intellectus

present issue because it entails that since accidental categories are essentially dependent on substance, to know the essence of an accident means to know it as essentially related to a substance, so that the dependence on a substance will necessarily be included in the notion of an accident. Furthermore, granted that extramental things can be signified by words only insofar as they are known through concepts, these commentators also acknowledge some sort of conformity between the semantic level and the conceptual level, but they deny that this correspondence can be understood as a perfect isomorphism. This point is made, for instance, in an anonymous commentary on the *Physics* that shows a close similarity with the questions on the *Metaphysics* by William of Bonkes on the issue of the unity of being. The author of this commentary points out that the claim that extramental things are signified insofar as they are known does not entail that all properties belonging to knowledge also belong to signification.[142] For the question at issue this implies that we must admit an asymmetry between the conceptual and the semantic orders: the hierarchy existing in reality between substance and accident is reflected by true knowledge of these things, but not also by the way in which these things are signified by words. Therefore, there is no hierarchical order obtaining between the acts through which substance and accident are signified by the term "being"; rather, it is the case that such acts are completely independent of each other, as is shown by the fact that, given the conventional character of language, the word "being" could be imposed to signify accident before being imposed to signify substance or could be imposed to signify accident without being imposed to signify substance.[143]

<non> potest intelligere universale; universale enim non est in rebus. Contra: si intellectus intelligat et modus sit oppositus ex parte rei, intelligit rem aliter quam est et, per consequens, intellectus erit falsus. [...]"

[142] Cf. Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344, fol. 109va: "[...] Si intelligitur quod talis sit ordo in actu significandi vocis qualis est intelligendo rem, est neganda, quia impossibile est intelligere accidens nisi cognoscatur substantia et tamen aliqua vox potest imponi accidenti ad significandum etsi non prius significaret substantiam. [...] Tu dices: significare sequitur intelligere, modus significandi (intelligendi *ms.*) modum intelligendi. Potest dici quod quod significare et (?) modus significandi non sequitur intelligere sub isto modo quod quaecumque proprietas inveniatur <in> intelligere et in modo (modum *ms.*) intelligendi quod talis modus inveniatur in significare et modo significandi. [...]" See also John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, q. 4, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 1, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1999), p. 283.5–13, § 33. On this anonymous commentary on the *Physics*, see Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 8–9, 196–205.

[143] See also William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*^{2}, fol. 35ra: "[...] Possibile est hoc nomen 'ens' imponi quantitati etsi numquam esset impositum substantiae, cum (?) impositio nominis

To fully understand the position of these authors, we must consider the two basic notions of imposition and signification. Imposition is the act in virtue of which a name is endowed with a signification. Signification is the act in virtue of which a name refers to some extramental entity. It is commonly agreed that in order to endow a name with signification we need a concept identifying the extramental object that this name is being imposed to signify, so that signification also involves some relationship to a mental concept.[144] A further tacit assumption of our commentators is that a specific concept identifying the object related to that name must correspond to each specific act of imposition, so that when a name is related to an extramental object through a specific act of imposition, then the object must be signified in virtue of a concept that is appropriate to that object and vice versa.[145] A corollary of this assumption seems to be that when a name is related to an object in virtue of a specific act of imposition and thus by means of a concept that is appropriate to it, then the object is signified independently of any other signification belonging to that name, that is, in a primary way. As our commentators point out, however, to say that a name signifies a plurality of things in such a way that each one is signified independently of any other is tantamount to saying that those things are signified by that name in a purely equivocal way, i.e., according to the first mode of equivocation.[146] Now, in the view of these authors, as for John Dinsdale before them, terms usually regarded as analogous, such as "being," are related to their different significates in this

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sit ad placitum. Unde sicut patet in quinto huius, nomen quandoque dicitur primo de eo quod tamen est posterius natura (?), ut patet de hoc nomine 'natura.'"

144 See E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Signification and modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), 39–67, esp. 43–46.

145 This assumption, which remains unspoken in the works here considered, is clearly stated by Scotus in his commentary on the *Sophistici Elenchi*; see John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum*, q. 15, p. 336.5–15, § 17. For an exposition of Scotus's argument, see Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 55–57.

146 Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*^{2}, fol. 35ra. Although this section of the manuscript is badly damaged, it is still possible to approssimatively reconstruct the line of the reasoning. For a similar argument, see Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344, fol. 109va: "[…] Unde si ordo sit accidentis ad substantiam, ens tamen imponitur accidenti ordinato ut illud significet sub ratione propria ac ut substantiam non significaret. Et quia ratio accidentis est simpliciter distincta a ratione substantiae, quoniam, eo ipso quod accidens est ordinatum ad substantiam et substantia non, est manifestum quod ratio accidentis est diversa simpliciter a ratione substantiae, ideo ratio entis ut significans accidens et substantiam est simpliciter diversa; ideo de vi vocis aequivoce significat." See also John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 4, p. 284.10–7, § 36.

way. That this is specifically the case for the term "being" is shown by an examination of its signification. The simple fact that the notion of being as accident includes the relationship to a substance, whereas the notion of being as substance does not include such a relationship, implies that the notion of accident is different from the notion of substance. Therefore, substance and accident are signified by the term "being" according to notions that are different from each other and proper to them. For our commentators, this means that they are signified in virtue of different acts of imposition and thus in virtue of acts of signification that are independent of each other; hence, they are signified in an equally primary way and, thus, purely equivocally.[147]

Some of our commentators, however, perceive the asymmetry between the conceptual and the semantic levels as problematic. They argue that since external things are signified insofar as they are known and since true knowledge conforms to reality, then the relationship which links extramental things to each other and is reflected by our concepts of them must also in some way affect the way in which things are signified by words. An interesting solution to this problem is provided by an anonymous English commentary on the *Physics* that is more or less contemporary to those on the *Metaphysics*. The author of this commentary distinguishes two elements in signification: active signification, i.e., the act in virtue of which a name refers to an external thing, and passive signification, i.e., the act in virtue of which the external thing is referred to by that name. He maintains that the way in which things exist does not affect active signification but does affect passive signification. Accordingly, although the order linking substance and accident in reality is not reflected by an order linking the acts in virtue of which the term "being" signifies substance and accident, it is reflected by the acts in virtue of which substance and accident are signified by the term "being." On the basis of this distinction, he concludes that analogy also pertains in a qualified way to the

147 Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*^{2}, fol. 35va: "[…] Ulterius, etsi in actu intelligendi quantitatem sit respectus ad substantiam, iste autem actus intelligendi est simpliciter alius et diversus ab actu intelligendi substantiae. Possibile est igitur nomen imponi primo actui etsi numquam imponatur secundo. Igitur potest significare utrumque ac si alterum non significaret et, per consequens, adhuc pure aequivoce. Unde aequivocatio est in quibuscumque ordinatis vel non ordinatis dummodo nomen imponatur cuilibet sub propria ratione, et hoc quia in comparatione ad actum significandi nominis non est ordo, etsi sit ordo in actibus intelligendi per se et in intellectis inter se." See also Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344, fol. 109va (see above, note 146).

signification of the term "being."[148] One of our commentators, the author of *Qq. Met.-P*^{2}, follows a partly similar route but reaches the opposite conclusion. The solution offered by this commentator involves splitting into two the conceptual element in the act of signification rather than the act of signification itself. The distinction is the traditional one between the notion that a name is imposed to signify (*ratio cui nomen imponitur*) and the notion with which a name is associated when it is first imposed to signify something (*ratio a qua nomen imponitur*).[149] The notion signified by a name is nothing else than the concept representing the nature of the object signified by that name; as such, it must reflect the nature of that object in order to be adequate. The notion associated to a name when the name is first imposed to signify something, by contrast, only reflects the knowledge of the object available to the original *impositor* at the moment of imposition. To put it in other words, it is only the nominal definition of the object; as such, it does not necessarily express essential properties of the object signified nor must it reflect its nature. Therefore, although the notion signified by the term "being" in the sense of accident must reflect the ontological dependence of accident on substance, the notion linked to the term "being" when it was first imposed to signify an accident does not need to reflect this dependence. Consequently, since what is constitutive of signification is the notion in virtue of which a name is imposed to signify something, for our commentator we should not assume that the acts of signification of a name are linked in the way in which the objects signified by that name are linked in reality. Thus, like other English

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[148] See Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, IV, fol. 58rb: "Contra. Ostendo quod [in] analogia sit non solum secundum esse rei, sed secundum intentionem nominis, quia, si ens nullam rationem communem substantiae et accidenti importet, oportet quod significet substantiam sub propria ratione et accidens sub propria ratione, et sic privationes etc. Propria ratio accidentis est ut sit dispositio substantiae; ergo significat accidens ut est dispositio[ne]; igitur in accidente ut significatur nomine entis includitur quidam ordo ad substantiam. Idem arguendum est de privatione et negatione ut importantur nomine entis. [...] Et ideo dici potest [propter] quod in ente est <analogia> quo ad intentionem. Nomen enim significat unum per prius, ut substantia, accidens per posterius, ita quod non solum attenditur ordo ex parte rei designatae, sed ex parte significationis vel actus significandi. Sed actus significandi attribuitur voci significanti et rei significatae; unde significatio activa est primo, passiva posterius. Quod sit ordo quantum ad primum actum significandi non video; vox vel est primum signum huius vel omnino non est signum. Sed ordo potest esse in secundo actu. Nam res ista quae accidens est posterius significatur nomine entis, quia per attributionem ad substantiam; non enim designat<ur> nisi ut est substantiae attributum, et hoc est per posterius, quia omne attributum posterius." On this anonymous commentary, see Donati, "Per lo studio," Parte I, 371–72.

[149] On this distinction, see Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying," 47–50.

authors, this commentator rejects "semantic" analogy and maintains that, from the semantic point of view, we can only talk either of univocation or of equivocation.[150]

Like Scotus in his commentary on the *Categories*, William of Bonkes too allows the possibility of interrelated significations, namely, that a signification of a certain term may be subordinated to another signification of the same term, but only in the case of the so-called second mode of equivocation, which these authors identify with metaphor or transferred signification. William points out that when a word originally endowed with a certain signification is transferred to signify something else, its secondary signification obviously presupposes its primary one and is subordinated to it, since it results from a modification of the primary signification.[151] As has been shown in a preceding section, the use of transferred signification as the model of the analogy of being had been supported by Geoffrey

[150] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P*^{3}, fol. 13vb: "Dicendum quod in intentione nominis duo considerantur: ratio rei quam significat nomen et ratio sub qua, hoc est ratio cui imponitur et ratio a qua. Quaesito ergo an in ente sit analogia respectu substantiae et accidentis secundum intentionem nominis, dico quod secundum rationem primam est anologia, penes secundam nulla. Ratio primi est ista: impossibile est essentialem rationem quantitatis apprehendere nisi in habitudine ad substantiam; sed quantitas secundum id quod est est mensura substantiae; ergo nomen huic impositum importabit habitudinem ad substantiam. Et sic in intentione nominis erit anologia. Et hoc probant primae rationes. Ratio secundi, scilicet a qua nomen imponitur, quia ratio a qua imponitur ens quantitati est secundum se diversa a ratione a qua imponitur substantiae nomen entis, in entibus talibus non est ordo anologiae. Et ideo, quia ratio a qua nomen imponitur est formale in intentione nominis, ratio cui est materiale, ideo nullum nomen est anologum quantum ad intentionem nominis, sed vel aequivocum, si diversa (?) significet sub diversis rationibus, vel univocum, si sub una ratione significet. Unde omnes communiter ponunt secundum modum aequivocationis, in quo est anologia nominis secundum intentionem nominis (?) ex hoc quod soliti sumus sic dicere. Et hoc est aequivocum secundum translationem. Hoc concludunt rationes ad oppositum. Praeterea, ostendit quod ens potest significare quantitatem non significando substantiam, quia in actibus significandi non contingit (?) ordo nec in rationibus a quibus imponitur istis duobus, sed in rebus significatis est ordo. Quod si haec vocemus intentiones nominum, tunc est anologia secundum intentionem nominis."

[151] Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*^{2}, fol. 35va: "Si quaeratur quomodo solvatur secundus modus aequivocationis, dicendo, sicut dicit Aristoteles, ex hoc quod soliti sumus sic dicere, sicut quia asinus est animal rude, ideo solemus appellare hominem rudem asinum. Unde est talis aequivocatio ex translatione, ubi necessario requiritur ordo in significando, quia intellectus non potest transferre nomen ab uno ad aliud nisi nomen prius illud significavit a quo est translatio." See also John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 4, p. 283.14–20, § 34. The idea that a dependence obtains at the semantic level in the case of metapher is rejected by Scotus in his commentary on the *Elenchi Sofistici*; in this work he maintains that the transference of meaning entailed by metapher is based not on a hierarchy among significates (*ordo*) but on a mere similarity; see John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum*, q. 15, pp. 338.26–339.11, §§ 22–23. The same position was supported before by John Dinsdale; see *Qq. Met.-D*, fol. 61ra–b (quoted above, note 125).

of Aspall and rejected by Richard of Clive. William sides with Richard of Clive. This negative view will also be approved by Scotus in his commentary on the *Categories*, where he appeals to the same argument used before by Richard of Clive: since "being" is predicated of all the categories in the line of the essence (*in quid*), it cannot be predicated of accidental categories only metaphorically; rather, it must be predicated of all categories according to notions that are appropriate to them.[152] Unlike Scotus, William does not feel the need to provide an argument for this position; he seems to regard as obvious that the term "being" is predicated of all categories according to notions that are appropriate to them and, consequently, not metaphorically.

William of Bonkes and the author of *Qq. Met.-P*[2] accept John Dinsdale's distinction between the ontological and the semantic level, maintaining that analogy concerns the former but not the latter, so that from the semantic point of view, "being" is a straightforwardly equivocal term. Unlike Dinsdale, however, they do not explicitly associate this idea with the theory of the metaphysical analogy and logical equivocation of being. Yet, it seems that they are committed to this idea. If metaphysics deals with things in themselves and logic deals with things insofar as they are signified by terms, then it is obvious that the theory of metaphysical analogy versus logical equivocation of being is entailed by the idea of analogy as an ontological but not semantic phenomenon, a conclusion which is also reinforced by other contemporary texts doctrinally close to the two commentaries here examined.[153]

The discussion of a classical objection against the theory of the analogy of being based on the Avicennian description of being as a primary notion of the intellect confirms the closeness between the views of these commentators and positions held by Scotus in his early works. Our com-

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[152] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 4, p. 284.5–9, § 35.

[153] See, for instance, William of Chelvestun, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, I, fol. 17ra: "Ad quaestionem dicitur quod ista analogia non est ex parte significationis ipsius entis nec ex parte modi significandi, sicut probatum est prius, quia, si ens imponatur ad significandum substantiam et accidens, ex parte ponentis non oportet quod sit analogia, nec (ut *ms.*) ex parte vocis, quia (quod *ms.*) vox nullam rem sibi determinat in significando. Analogia tamen est ex parte rerum significatarum: quia ipsum accidens attributionem habet ad substantiam, pro tanto dicitur quod ens significat ista duo analogice; non quia ista analogia proprie sistat ex parte imponentis nec ex parte vocis, quia nec quo ad significationem nec quo ad modum significandi, sed solum se tenet ex parte rerum significatarum. Et ideo dicit metaphysicus quod ens dicitur analogice, logicus vero, qui considerat modum praedicandi et modum significandi et etiam significationes vocis, dicit quod ens dicitur aequivoce de substantia et accidente." On this commentary, see Donati, "Per lo studio," Parte I, 371.

mentators agree with Peter of Auvergne and John Dinsdale that the primary object of the intellect is not being taken in its utmost generality, i.e., insofar as it is common to substance and accident, but taken in its primary signification, i.e., as coextensive with substance. The problem, however, is that even if what the intellect first grasps is substance, it does not grasp substance *qua* substance, but substance *qua* being; hence, there must be a notion of being in virtue of which substance is known by the intellect that is different from the notion of substance.[154] Some of our commentators solve this difficulty by resorting to the already familiar distinction between two different notions involved in signification, namely, the notion that is signified by the name (*cui nomen imponitur*) and the notion in virtue of which the name is imposed to signify something (*a qua nomen imponitur*). They maintain that when the term "being" is taken as coextensive with "substance," the notion signified by the two terms is the same, since the nature that they are both imposed to signify is that of substance, but the notions in virtue of which the two terms are imposed to signify this nature are different, since they result from the consideration of different properties. According to our commentators, the term "substance" signifies the nature of substance considered as the bearer of subsistence or, alternatively, as the substrate of accidents, whereas the term "being" signifies the nature of substance regarded as the bearer of the act of existence.[155] In positing that *esse* is the relevant property for the notion in virtue of which the term "being" is imposed to signify, they are probably following Aquinas's tenet that the transcendental notion "being" is taken from the *esse*, since it represents each thing insofar as it "is."[156] On the precise relationship between the different properties associated with the term "substance" and the term "being" insofar as it is

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[154] See, for instance, William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G²*, fol. 34va: "Praeterea, Avicenna dicit in eodem capitulo ubi prius quod res et ens et unum sunt quae homines primo imaginantur; unde nihil est notius ente, et ideo qui vult declarare ens incidet in involucrum. Ex hoc arguitur sic: si ens primo sit imaginatum et conceptum et decem genera non possunt primo concipi, igitur ens erit aliquid apud intellectum praeter decem genera. Sed hoc non potest esse nisi habeat unam rationem propriam. Huic dicitur quod substantia primo concipitur, sed tamen sub ratione entis. Contra: ex hoc videtur sequi propositum: si substantia concipiatur sub ratione entis primo et non sub ratione substantiae primo, igitur alia est ratio entis et ratio substantiae, quoniam ex opposito, si non sit alia ratio, igitur substantia concipitur sub ratione substantiae; non igitur oportet dicere quod sub ratione entis."

[155] This solution is probably supported by William of Bonkes (*Qq. Met.-G²*, fol. 35vb), but the manuscript is too badly damaged in this section to allow a precise reconstruction of the text.

[156] See Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 52 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1996), pp. 185–99.

coextensive with substance, there is no agreement among our commentators. The author of *Qq. Met.-P²*, for instance, maintains that the act of existence is a more general property than subsistence or the characteristic of serving as the substrate of accidents, since it is analogically common to substance and accidents.[157] The author of *Qq. Met.-A* regards the act of existence as more simple than the act of being the substrate of accidents, since existence belongs to a substance in itself, whereas being the substrate of accidents belongs to a substance in its relationship to something else, namely, the accidents.[158] Despite the disagreement about the onto-

[157] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P³*, fols. 13vb–14ra: "Ad aliud dicit Petrus Helias quod substantia quandoque imponitur a substando, prout praedicatur de materia (?), quandoque a subsistendo, ut quando praedicatur de forma, quandoque autem ab utroque, ut (?) cum (?) dicitur de substantia composita. Ens non potest imponi a substando nec subsistendo, nec omne ens habet materiam substantem nec formam subsistentem, sed (?) ponitur ens ab essendo, quod est commune omni enti. Et haec est proprietas notior quam substare vel subsistere. Per hoc ad rationem. Qui intelligit ens nihil (?) commune (?) substantiae et accidenti intelligit, sed vel substantiam vel accidens non sub ratione substandi (?) vel subsistendi, sed sub proprietate essendi, quae est communior et notior omni enti. Si ab Avicenna dicatur quod qui intelligit ens neque intelligit substantiam neque accidens, verum est non sub ratione substandi vel subsistendi, sed sub ratione essendi communi (communis *ms.*) utrique. Ad aliud, cum dicitur quod ens primo (?) occurrit intellectui, dico quod verum est; non tamen ens importat conceptum simpliciorem substantia." See also *Qq. Met.-O¹*, fol. 220ra.

[158] Cf. *Qq. Met.-A*, fol. 79vb: "Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod conceptus entis quod est substantia, prout est conceptus entis, prior est naturaliter et simplicior conceptu substantiae; nam conceptus entis quod est substantia est conceptus entis prout est conceptus rei secundum id quod est in se et absolute, conceptus autem substantiae, ut sic, est conceptus eiusdem rei in comparatione ad substare vel subsistere. Et ideo iste conceptus posterior est naturaliter, quia est quasi conceptus quodam modo comparati, non ita quod substantia significet ens comparatum simpliciter, sicut quantitas vel qualitas; nam rem comparari ad proprietatem secundum quam dicitur absoluta non est ipsam comparari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Unde cum substantia per proprietatem substandi comparatur ad accidens sicut absolutum ad simpliciter comparatum, hoc ergo non est substantiam comparari nisi secundum quid. […] Ad aliam rationem dicendum est quod consequentia non tenet, quia conceptus entis quod est substantia, ut conceptus entis est, est conceptus rei in se et absolute, conceptus substantiae est conceptus rei in habitudine ad substare, et isti <modi?> essendi et concipiendi ad aequalia se extendunt, quia se extendunt ad omnia quae sunt in genere substantiae per se vel per reductionem; ad tot enim se extendit substantia sub ratione substandi ad quot se extendit absolute accepta, ut distincta est ab accidentibus. Unde nec sequitur: 'formaliter conceptus entis est simplicior conceptu substantiae; ergo ad plura se extendit.' Nam, conceptus formae ignis simplicior est conceptu ignis, non tamen ad plura se extendit forma ignis quam ignis. Sed quodam modo simile est de conceptu entis et conceptu substantiae et de conceptu subiecti absolute et de conceptu eius in habitudine ad suam propriam passionem; sicut enim conceptus trianguli absolute simplicior est conceptu trianguli in comparatione ad habere tres et tamen conceptus trianguli absolute non pluribus convenit quam conceptus trianguli in comparatione ad habere tres, similiter quodam modo est de conceptu entis et de conceptu substantiae. Et dico 'quodam modo' quia differentia est in hoc quod habere tres addit aliquid supra

logical relationship between these properties, our commentators agree that the act of existence is more accessible to our intellect than the act of subsisting or the property of being the substrate of accidents. Therefore, although the concept signified (*ratio cui nomen imponitur*) by the term "substance" and that signified by the term "being" insofar as it is coextensive with "substance" are the same, it is possible to ascribe cognitive priority to "being" by taking into account the different properties with respect to which the two terms are imposed to signify. This position of our commentators is supported by Scotus in his commentary on the *Categories* and in the first redaction of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*[159] but is rejected in a later redaction of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[160] As recent scholarship has pointed out, the explanation of Scotus's rejection of this position is probably that at this later stage he regards the question of the cognitive primacy of being as concerning concepts and the essences signified by concepts, and not the linguistic level of impositions, to which the "ratio a qua nomen imponitur" pertains.[161]

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triangulum, sed proprietas substandi proprie non addit aliquid supra substantiam. Unde manifestum est quod simplicitas conceptus non semper arguit communitatem maiorem, sed solum quando conceptus est simplicior et accipitur a proprietate communiori, sicut proprietas substandi, a qua accipitur conceptus substantiae, communior est proprietate a qua accipitur conceptus corporis, et sic deinceps descendendo, et ideo conceptus sic simplicior est communior et ad plura se extendens. Et per hoc apparet ad tertiam rationem. Nam, si conceptus entis esset simplicior ita quod esset acceptus a proprietate communiori quam conceptus substantiae, tunc ens esset aliquid commune expectans additionem ad hoc quod descenderet in substantiam et alia praedicamenta, et ita non statim esset unumquodque ipsorum. Sed non sic conceptus entis est simplicior, sed solum quia accipitur ut sic a modo essendi simpliciori, non autem communiori, ut dictum est."

[159] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 4, p. 290.1–22, §§ 53–54; John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, IV, q. 1, p. 320.8–13, § 90; and Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 107–09.

[160] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, IV, q. 1, p. 320.14–21, § 91.

[161] See Pini, *Scoto e l'analogia*, pp. 109–10. Other authors reject this solution on the grounds that it is based on a purely artificial distinction. So, for instance, in his questions on the *Physics*, the late 13th-century English commentator William of Chelvestun stresses that to be for a substance is to be through itself (*esse per se*), but this is exactly what the word 'subsistere' means. See William of Chelvestun, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, I, fol. 17va: "Ad primam rationem, cum dicitur: 'quod resolvitur etc.,' dicitur quod resolutio substantiae in ens non est resolutio in aliquod simplicius. Sed apparet quod sit simplicius, quia videtur simplicior esse conceptus ipsius entis quam substantiae pro tanto, quia ens sumitur ab actu essendi, substantia a ratione subsistendi. Ratio autem essendi videtur esse simplicior ratione subsistendi, cum tamen non sit. Sed quia apparet; ideo dicit Avicenna quod qui dicit 'ens' neque dicit substantiam neque accidens. Ad aliud, cum dicitur: 'quando diversi conceptus etc.,' dicitur quod substantia non accipitur a ratione substantiae, sed a ratione subsistendi; et ratio essendi, secundum quod

As already stressed, the close similarities between the views of our commentators and those of the early Scotus about the logical and epistemological aspects of the problem of the unity of being do not also extend to the ontological aspects. Our commentators take a decidedly more substantialistic approach, which differs both from that of the previous commentators Richard of Clive and John Dinsdale and from that of Scotus. They develop their ontological analysis against the background of the distinction between two different ontological models: the unity of the genus and the unity of analogy understood along Aristotle's theory of *pros hen* equivocation. Generic unity is described according to the familiar pattern of one and the same nature formally existing in every single species but according to a different degree of perfection, so that the various species of a genus are arranged according to a scale which extends from the most perfect to the least perfect species. This model is inspired by Aquinas's idea in his commentary on the *Physics* that all species of a genus formally participate in the nature of the first and most perfect species, or equivalently that all species participate in the generic nature, which is realized in the first species according to the highest degree of perfection.[162] Analogical unity, by contrast, is not grounded on a common nature formally shared by all analogates but in a relationship linking secondary analogates to the primary one (*attributio*). Following Aquinas, our commentators associate the two ontological models with the positions of Plato and Aristotle respectively. In conceiving the unity of being as formal participation in a common nature, Plato reduces being to a genus and denies the status of beings to accidents, since they do not participate in the nature of being as realized in its primary instance, namely, substance. In understanding the unity of being as *pros hen* equivocation, by contrast, Aristotle can grant the status of beings to accidents: although they do not formally participate in the nature of being, they can be called beings in virtue of their relationship to substance. Late 13th-century English commentators agree in adopting Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation and in rejecting formal participation in a common nature as model for the unity of being.[163] The author of *Qq. Met.-P*^{2}, however, stands out for his decidedly reductionistic

competit substantiae, non est simplicior ratione subsistendi; per se enim esse, quod competit substantiae, est subsistere, et ratio per se essendi est ratio subsistendi."

[162] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, I, lec. 7, ed. Mariano Maggiòlo (Turin-Rome, 1954), n. 51.

[163] Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*^{2}, fols. 36ra–37ra; *Qq. Met.-A*, fol. 80va; *Qq. Met.- O*^{1}, fol. 220va–b; *Qq. Met.-O*^{2}, fol. 265rb; *Qq. Met.-P*^{2}, fol. 20ra–b; and *Qq. Met.-P*^{3}, fol. 14rb–va.

approach, which is reminiscent of Richard Rufus's. He stresses the similarity between the case of being and the Aristotelian example of the term "healthy" and maintains that in neither case does the secondary analogate participate in any way in the perfection of the primary analogate. From this he concludes that accidents do not possess any entity at all, so that, properly speaking, they are not beings, merely *modi essendi* of a being, namely, of substance. The ontological status of accidents is illustrated with the grammatical distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms. No specific concept corresponds to a syncategorematic term, which only adds a *modus intelligendi* to something else, since it signifies only in conjunction with something else. Similarly, an accident is not properly a being, only a *modus essendi* of something else.[164] Accidents, however, are real *modi essendi* (*modus essendi positivus realis*) and, in this respect, differ from negations and privations, which are mere *entia secundum rationem.*[165]

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[164] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P²*, fol. 20rb: "Ad primam questionem dicendum quod nullum accidens est per participationem primi entis, quia ubi aliqua posteriora participant primum, natura primi est in posterioribus cum aliquo defectu, sicut natura caliditatis in posterioribus calidis est cum tamen defectu alicuius gradus caliditatis primi calidi. Sed nihil naturae entitatis quae est in primo est in accidente cum defectu, quia, cum in primo nihil sit nisi substantia, si tunc accidens secundum se participaret aliquid primi, accidens esset substantia. [. . .] Propter quod dicendum quod accidentia non sunt entia quia ipsa (ipso *ms.*) secundum se participant naturam primi entis, sed solum sunt entia quia sunt entis quod secundum se participa[n]t naturam primi. Unde magis proprie dicendum est quod formae accidentales sunt modi essendi entis, ut substantiae. Et cum modus essendi non sit ens nisi quia entis, nec accidens dicetur ens nisi quia entis. Propter quod etiam sicut syncategorema ut syncategorema non secundum se habet intellectum, sed solum est modus intelligendi alterius quod designat intellectum, sic nec propri<e> accidens est ens, sed solum modus essendi illius quod (quae *ms.*) est ens. Propter quod Plato, ponens ens habere unam rationem et non dici aequivoce et cum hoc ponens solum illud esse ens quod participat naturam primi entis, posuit accidens esse non ens et solam substantiam esse ens. Verum (utrum *ms.*) tamen, quia (quod *ms.*) nos ponimus ens dici aequivoce, ideo nos ponimus accidens esse ens vocando (vocandi *ms.*) modum essendi quiddam ens aliquo modo. Ideo dicimus accidentia esse entia. Huic consentit Aristoteles; dicit enim quod, sicut dieta, urina se habent ad sanitatem in animali, sic accidentia se habent ad aliquod ens primum cui attribuuntur; sicut ergo dieta non participat aliquam naturam sanitatis in animali, quia sanitas in animali est proportio quattuor humorum in animali, nihil autem huius proportionis est in urina vel dieta vel instrumento, ergo a simili nihil naturae vel perfectionis illius entis ad quod attribuuntur accidentia erit in ipsis accidentibus. Sicut ergo dieta non participat aliquid proportionis quae est sanitas, sic nec accidens aliquid perfectionis primi entis." In describing accidents as "modi essendi" of substance, the author of *Qq. Met.-P²* is probably more directly indebted to Albert the Great; see above, note 48.

[165] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P²*, fol. 20va: "Quicquid enim attributionem habe[n]t ad ens potest dici ens, quia (quod *ms.*) ens attributum; negationes, privationes attribui non habent ad ens quia sicut (*pro*: sunt?) entis, sed alio modo quam accidentia positiva. Accidentia enim positiva, qualitas, quantitas, attribuu<ntur> ad ens sicut modi essendi positivi reales eius;

The other commentators do not share the radical reductionism of the author of *Qq. Met.-P²*, but their interpretation of Aristotle's ontology has nonetheless a decidedly substantialistic orientation. This comes to light in the discussion of the relationship between an accident and its inherence. On this topic they take a view opposite to that of Richard of Clive and John Dinsdale (and later of Scotus), according to which accidents are in themselves absolute entities, ontologically prior to their relationship to substance. They maintain that the dependence on the substrate is constitutive of the essence of an accident, so that the descriptions focusing on the relative being of an accident (*ens in alio, ens comparatum*) do capture its essence.[166] More specifically, according to William of Bonkes, the relationship to the substrate belongs to the formal notion (*ratio formalis*) of an accident considered in its most general nature as *ens in alio* (as opposed to the accident considered in its specific nature, as, for instance, "snubness").[167] For these commentators, the idea of accidental being as

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similiter generatio, corruptio, sunt via et attribuuntur sicut viae ad ens. Sed negationes, privationes debiliorem attributionem habent, cum secundum se nihil ponant formali ratione. Propter quod debiliora entia sunt et minus entia. Sicut enim in re negatio non habet attributionem realem, sed solum per rationem considerantem illam negationem ac si esset ens, sic nec negatio est ens secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem."

[166] Cf. *Qq. Met.-O²*, fol. 265rb: "[…] Si accipiatur inhaerens pro eo quod est in alio ens et inhaerentia pro entitate in alio, sic inhaerentia est ipsa essentia accidentis; accidens enim, ex hoc quod tale ens est, in alio est et alii inhaerens. Quod patet ex duobus. Aristoteles dicit quod accidens non est ens nisi quia est alterius, puta mensura vel dispositio aliqua; hoc enim est suum per se esse, in alio esse. Qui igitur ab essentia accidentis tollit esse in alio, ab eo tollit naturam accidentis. Cum enim ens per se dividatur in ens in alio, in ens non in alio, ens autem non in alio sit per se ens, ut substantia, ita quod auferens per se esse a substantia aufert ab ea esse substantiam, sic esse in alio est per se esse accidentis, quo ablato, aufertur per se esse accidentis. Et hoc est per se manifestum, quia, si accidens esset aliquod ens in se cui superadderetur esse in subiecto, accidens secundum suam propriam entitatem non esset ens comparatum, sed ens absolutum simpliciter. Quod autem est ens absolutum secundum se, est ens non in alio, et ita ens absolutum. Et quod est secundum se ens absolutum est substantia; accidens ergo erit substantia."

[167] In introducing this idea, William of Bonkes refers to such properties as *simum* and *ricum*; but since in his view the relationship to the substrate pertains to the formal notion of those properties considered in their most general nature as *entia in alio*, this must hold true for any kind of accident. See William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G²*, fol. 63va: "[…] Alia autem est habitudo simi ad nasum in quantum nasus habet formam a qua forma simum capit esse, sicut quodlibet accidens capit esse ab aliqua substantia in quantum hoc est ens et illud est ens. Sic formaliter simum definitur per nasum et ricum per crus. Et sicut in quantum nasus et crus habent esse per formam non distinguuntur, ita nec simum et ricum sic considerata distinguuntur. […] Ex his patet quod una habitudo simi ad nasum est de essentia simi formaliter, ut illa qua ad nasum comparatur in quantum utrumque est ens et simum per nasum. Alia autem habitudo tantum materialiter est de essentia simi, ut illa quam habet ad nasum in quantum nasus a crure distinguitur." See also *Qq. Met.-P³*, fol. 38va: "Ad quaestionem dicitur quod habitudo ad nasum in quantum nasus est quoddam

an essentially relational being lies at the core of the Aristotelian doctrine of the *pros hen* equivocation of being. They clarify this point with the Aristotelian example of the term "healthy": as the term "healthy," when applied to urine, does not indicate some nature different from and prior to its property of being a sign of health, similarly, accidental being does not include a nature different from and prior to its relationship to substance; it just consists in this relationship. If the entity of an accident were to include some absolute nature distinct from and prior to its relationship to substance, then being could not be predicated of an accident (considered in its essential core of absolute entity) in virtue of its relationship to substance, so that being would not be predicated of substance and accident analogically, but only equivocally.[168] Although our commentators are committed to the idea of accidental categories as essentially dependent beings, the theological problem of Eucharistic accidents leads them to distinguish the structural dependence of accidents on substance from their actual inherence in a substrate. They do so by using the familiar distinction between actual and aptitudinal inherence. According to William

(quidam *ms.*) ens est formalis ratio simitatis in quantum simitas est ens in alio. [. . .] Propter hoc dicitur aliter: in simo potest duplex habitudo ad nasum considerari: una terminata ad nasum in quantum nasus est substantia. [. . .] Prima habitudo est formalis in simitate in quantum simitas est accidens, quod secundum hoc est in alio. [. . .]"

[168] Cf. *Qq. Met.-P*[3], fol. 33va: "Ad quaestionem dicitur quod determinata habitudo ad substantiam est quidditas accidentis, ita quod impossibile est intelligere accidens esse quoddam ens cui accidat ista habitudo. Et hoc multipliciter ostenditur: ex habitudine accidentis ad substantiam et ad definitionem quid est eius indicantem et ex comparatione accidentis ad substantiam. Primum sic ostenditur. Aristoteles sic dicit, IV huius, quod ens dicitur multipliciter, non aequivoce nec univoce, sed prout multa referuntur ad unum et ad aliquam naturam, quemadmodum salubre dicitur tale in comparatione ad sanitatem, hoc quidem in conservatione sanitatis, in illo vero ut in signo, eodem modo dicitur ens de unoquoque accidente propter determinatam habitudinem eius ad substantiam, sicut sanum aut salubre de dieta vel urina propter sanitatem [in comparatione?] quae est in animali. Sed manifestum est quod solum (*pro*: scilicet ?) in dieta non est aliqua natura cui accidat relatio ad sanitatem in animali, sed secundum id quod est, est signum huius sanitatis; unde secundum quod variatur sanitas in diversis animalibus, similiter variatur in dieta; igitur quantitas non erit aliqua natura cui adveniat ista habitudo. Unde dicitur quod si quantitas esset aliquod ens in se praeter habitudinem eius ad substantiam, ista natura posset circumscribi ab ista habitudine; igitur, cum ens dicatur de substantia et de natura quantitatis, non dicetur de istis univoce, igitur aequivoce. [. . .] Sic patet quod unumquodque accidens, secundum id quod est, est in habitudine ad substantiam"; *Qq. Met.-O*[1], fol. 257rb–va; *Qq. Met.-O*[2], fol. 265rb. See also William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G*[2], fol. 63rb: "Contra ista, ut prius est declaratum, inhaerentia accidentis ad substantiam est de essentia accidentis, quia accidens, secundum id quod est, substantiae est, sicut urina est sana in quantum est signum sanitatis animalis, ut patet in quarto huius, et etiam quia accidens definitur ut entitatem habet, in hoc quod est substantiae. Unde entitas accidentis substantiae est, et ideo accidens, in quantum entitatem habet, substantiae inhaeret."

of Bonkes, what is constitutive of the ontological status of an accident is not actual but aptitudinal inherence. Therefore, as a heavy body, even when hindered from falling down by an external obstacle, still retains its natural tendency to fall and hence its nature of heavy body, likewise an accident that by virtue of divine agency exists without actually inhering in a substrate still retains its tendency to inhere and hence its nature of accident.[169]

6. Conclusion

The present article has investigated the exemplary case of the discussion on the unity of being to gain same insights into the still largely unexplored field of the English commentaries on the *Metaphysics* before Scotus. Focusing on the evolution of the debate about a single topic has turned out to be a useful way to test previous hypotheses concerning origin, dating, and mutual affiliations of these works as well as to obtain some information about their basic philosophical attitudes. Moreover, although the investigation of the contemporary commentary tradition of the *Physics* had already shown that 13th-century English commentators develop their own specific view on the subject of the unity of being, the present investigation has provided a more detailed understanding of the evolution of this theory as well as of the elements of continuity that link Scotus's early teaching to the previous English tradition.

The English commentators on the *Metaphysics* before Scotus all agree that the unity of being must be understood along the traditional theory

[169] Cf. William of Bonkes, *Qq. Met.-G²*, fol. 56va: "[…] Dicendum est quod accidens inhaeret substantiae per se quia habet aptitudinem ex sua natura esse in substantia, sicut grave existens sursum aptitudinem habet esse deorsum; unde sicut gravi non oportet aliquid addere ex parte gravis ut sit deorsum, ita nec accidenti aliquid addere oportet ut sit in subiecto, sed tantum habet alium modum essendi cum est in subiecto et non est in subiecto actu, et ille modus essendi non debet dici additum nec substantia nec accidens. Ad aliam rationem dicendum quod accidentis esse est inesse vel actu vel aptitudine, et in hoc sufficienter distinguitur a substantia, quia substantia per se semper est ens nec in alio aptitudine nec actualitate. […] Auctoritates probant quod secundum esse naturale accidentis nullo modo accidens potest separari a substantia. Et hoc est verum. Cum hoc tamen stat quod esse actu in substantia non est de ratione accidentis"; *Qq. Met.-P³*, fol. 33vb: "[…] Ad rationem substantiae non solum requiritur quod sit per se ens, sed quod non habeat aptitudinem essendi in (?) alio (?). […] Intentio substantiae est quod neque sit ens in alio nec aptum natum esse in alio, sed quantitas est apta nata esse in alio. […] Nullum accidens secundum se est aptum natum separari a substantia, per aliquid tamen extrinsecum potest."

of the analogy of being, but they formulate different interpretations of it. The early stage of the debate—represented by the questions on the *Metaphysics* by Geoffrey of Aspall and *Qq. Met.-L*—shows the influence of Richard Rufus's reductionistic interpretation. In particular, Geoffrey maintains that being is predicated of an accident in a merely metaphorical way. The following stage of the discussion—represented by the questions by Richard of Clive and John Dinsdale—testifies to a reaction to the reductionism of the earlier commentators both in semantics and in ontology. There are, however, some points of disagreement between Richard of Clive and John Dinsdale. Richard is committed to the idea of a basic isomorphism between the ontological and the semantic levels, that is, the idea of "semantic" analogy, according to which there is an order of priority and posteriority linking the different significates of an analogical term that reflects the hierarchical order linking the things signified by that term. By contrast, John Dinsdale and later English commentators reject "semantic" analogy and maintain that analogy only pertains to the ontological level. A point on which there is general agreement among 13th-century English commentators is the idea that the doctrine of the analogy of being supported by the metaphysician and the doctrine of the equivocation of being supported by the logician offer two distinct but compatible accounts of reality. This idea is quite widespread in the English commentaries from the middle of the 13th century onwards and seems to be a distinctive mark of the English "way" concerning the unity of being, no trace of which is to be found in the contemporary Parisian commentary tradition.[170]

As to the various philosophical traditions playing a role in the debate, the very first stage—represented by Richard Rufus's commentary—bears witness to a strong influence of Averroes's commentary. In Rufus's commentary, Averroes's influence appears both at the exegetical and, more

[170] A possible trace of the "English way" on the unity of being is found in a discussion about analogy contained in Simon of Faversham's commentary on the *Elenchi Sophistici*, a work which is otherwise strongly influenced by the contemporary Parisian philosophical tradition. Simon introduces a threefold division of analogy which shows similarities to the division contained in an anonymous Parisian commentary on the *Elenchi* which he often follows. Simon departs, however, from the anonymous commentator in his classification of the analogy of being. While for the anonymous the analogy of being is based on a single *ratio* shared by substance and accident according to the prior and posterior, for Simon there is no common *ratio* in the case of the analogy of being, which can thus be reduced to aequivocation. See Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum*, ed. Sten Ebbesen et al. (Toronto, 1984), pp. 123–24; Incertorum Auctorum *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, pp. 133–34, 315–17. I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen for calling Faversham's analysis to my attention.

significantly, at the speculative level: Rufus's reductionistic approach is clearly indebted to Averroes's substantialistic interpretation of Aristotle's theory of *pros hen* equivocation. At a merely exegetical level, the strong influence of Averroes is also seen in the probably later literal commentary by Adam of Buckfield. By contrast, the commentary by Geoffrey of Aspall betrays the influence of a plurality of different traditions. Finally, the later stages of the debate testify to the increasing influence of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. Richard of Clive's and John Dinsdale's anti-reductionistic attitudes about the categories can be traced back to Avicenna's essentialistic interpretation of the categories. While Avicenna's essentialistic ontology proves to be influential on the English tradition already in 1270s, this is not the case with the Avicennian doctrine of a single notion of being prior to the notions of the categories and common to them. Starting from the 1280s, the idea of a single notion of being common to the categories seems to be known to the English commentators both in the Avicennian and in some contemporary version, but the present investigation has brought to light no commentators subscribing to such doctrine before Scotus. This is a further distinctive mark of the English commentary tradition of the *Metaphysics* with respect to the Parisian tradition, in which the idea of a single notion of being common to the categories finds some support already in the late 13th century.[171]

The debate of the last decades of the 13th century also attests to the strong interest in the continental commentary tradition. The English commentators make extensive use of standard commentaries like Aquinas's and Peter of Auvergne's, but their positions also include original elements that are peculiar to the English tradition. A significant example of their originality is the rejection of "semantic" analogy, a position that seems to

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[171] For instance, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the Parisian master Radulphus Brito hesitates between the view that being is predicated of substance and accident according to a single notion and the view that it is predicated according to different notions; see Sten Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the *Metaphysics*," in: Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery Jr., & Andreas Speer, eds., *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrunderts. Studien und Texte* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 28 (Berlin-New York, 2001), pp. 456–92, esp. 458, 473–75. The author of an anonymous commentary already mentioned (above, note 115), probably dating from the 1270s, reports that he had previously upheld the theory of a single notion of being but no longer supports it; see Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fol. 6va. By contrast, this theory is supported by another late 13th century commentary of probable Parisian origin; see Anonymous, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fols. 302ra, 304va. On the theory of a single notion of being within the Parisian philosophical tradition of the late 13th century, see also the bibliography listed above, note 107.

derive from their criticism of the modistic theories in fashion at Paris in the last decades of the 13th century. Finally, the discussion on the unity of being is a testimony to the continuity between the late 13th-century English philosophical tradition and the "early" Scotus. The view of Scotus on this issue in his Aristotelian commentaries corresponds quite closely to the standard view of the English commentators of the last decades of the 13th century, including as its core elements the idea of the metaphysical analogy vs. logical equivocation of being as well as the refusal of "semantic analogy." Also Scotus's anti-reductionistic view about the categories is not entirely unprecedented in the earlier English tradition, a significant antecedent of it being the essentialistic interpretation developed by Richard of Clive and John Dinsdale.

AQUINAS'S COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS*

Gabriele Galluzzo

Introduction

As is known, Thomas Aquinas set out to comment on Aristotle's works rather late in his career. His first Aristotelian commentary, the *Sententia Libri De Anima*, dates back to 1267/68 when Aquinas was still in Rome to direct the recently founded Dominican *studium*.[1] At least at the beginning, Aquinas's activity as an Aristotelian commentator had a rather "private" character and was mainly prompted by Thomas's desire to enhance his knowledge of Aristotle's thought and philosophical jargon.[2] Even though polemical references to Averroes are not missing in Aquinas's commentaries, it is unlikely that the Dominican Master's intent was to build up a body of commentaries in order to replace Averroes's standard interpretation of Aristotle. Progressively, however, Aquinas's works gained in popularity, circulation, and importance so as to become a point of reference for any subsequent interpretation of Aristotle's texts. Thus, Aquinas's commentaries came soon to be regarded by both adversaries and followers as standard expositions of Aristotle's doctrine, to be compared to or set against Averroes's exegetical corpus.

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[1] Cf. Jean Pierre Torrell, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son oeuvre* (Fribourg-Paris, 1993), pp. 197–200.

[2] This view is defended in particular by René-Antoine Gauthier in the introduction to his edition of the *Sententia Libri De anima*. See Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. 45.1 (Rome-Paris, 1984), pp. 288*–94*. Gauthier also advances the suggestion that Aquinas's activity as a commentator may have served, at least at the beginning, as a preparation for the drafting of the different parts of the *Summa Theologiae*. According to James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 280–85, Aquinas regarded it as one of his apostolic duties to provide students and young professors with reliable expositions of Aristotle's philosophy, which could be shown to be fundamentally in agreement with the main tenets of Christian faith. There is no evidence, however, that Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries were drafted for anyone but Aquinas himself. It must also be recalled that it was not one of his institutional duties, as a theology master, to teach and write on Aristotle. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that Aquinas's commentaries may have circulated and rapidly become known to teachers and students. On the different opinions concerning Aquinas's motivations for commenting on Aristotle, see Torrell, *Initiation*, pp. 237–39.

The *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, the longest and arguably the most important of Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries, was drafted during Aquinas's second teaching in Paris (Autumn 1268–Spring 1972).[3] The *Sententia* falls into 12 books and so contains also an exposition of Book K. In the absence of a critical edition of the text, many details about its composition remain uncertain. Aquinas is likely to have started his writing in the academic year 1270–71. Since Aquinas became acquainted with William of Moerbeke's revision of the *Media* and translation of Book K in the second half of 1271, the work must have been completed towards the very end of Aquinas's teaching in Paris or, possibly, in the first months of his staying in Naples. Although Moerbeke's revision and translation is used throughout Aquinas's commentary as the main basis for his exposition of Aristotle's text, references are made also to other versions of the *Metaphysics*, including the *Media*, the *Vetus*, and the *Vetustissima*. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in the first books of the commentary. Thus, the hypothesis has been advanced that Aquinas may have revised the *Sententia* after his acquaintance with Moerbeke's new version.

The critical edition should also shed some light on the nature of Aquinas's sources. The presence of Avicenna and Averroes, whom Aquinas explicitly quotes and criticizes, is beyond dispute. Albertus Magnus's commentary is never referred to, nor does it seem to be present implicitly in Aquinas's exposition. Work still needs to be done on the possible presence of other 13th-century commentators such as Adam of Buckfield, Riccardus Rufus, or Geoffrey of Aspall. The general impression, however, is that Aquinas proceeds rather autonomously in his appropriation of

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[3] Despite its importance, Aquinas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* has received comparatively little attention from scholars. See, in any case: James C. Doig, *Aquinas on the Metaphysics. A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics* (The Hague, 1972); Suzanne Mansion, "L'intelligibilité métaphysique d'après le Proemium du Commentaire de Saint Thomas à la Metaphysique d'Aristote," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 70 (1978), 49–62; Leo Elders, "Saint Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle," in: Leo Elders, ed., *Autour de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Recuil d'études sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique*, 2 vols. (Brugge, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 123–45; and John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics," in: John F. Wippel, ed., *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy) 47 (Washington, D.C., 2007), pp. 240–71. I take the liberty of adding to the list some papers by myself to which I shall make reference in the course of this chapter: Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 159–226; "Aquinas's Interpretation of *Metaphysics*, Book Beta," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 11–40; and "Aquinas's Interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book Zeta," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 74.2 (2007), 423–81.

Aristotle's text—which is not surprising given the nature of his activity as an Aristotelian commentator.

One of the distinctive characters of Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* is its robustly Aristotelian and, as it were, internal perspective: although some typical themes of Aquinas's metaphysics—such as the distinction between essence and existence, participation, and the doctrine of the different levels of ontological composition—crop up occasionally in the course of the exposition, more often the explanation of Aristotle's text is conducted on the basis of entirely Aristotelian tools and conceptual material.[4] This fact has led some scholars to raise the question as to whether the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* as well as all the other Aristotelian commentaries by Aquinas should be regarded as the expression of the Dominican Master's genuine thought or rather as intelligent and noncommittal expositions of Aristotle's doctrine.[5] Although clear, this way of phrasing the question is, I think, rather misleading. For it seems to presuppose that Aquinas could have approached Aristotle's text in a entirely fresh and uncontaminated way. We all know, on the contrary, that Aquinas's theological and philosophical system was mainly built around an appropriation of the cornerstones of Aristotle's philosophy. Thus, Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries are expositions of a doctrine with which Aquinas generally finds himself in agreement. This is confirmed by the fact that, when Aristotle's doctrine needs qualification, revision, or correction, Aquinas does not fail to point it out by explicitly indicating what is missing in Aristotle's approach or solution. As we shall see, Aquinas's commentary on *Metaphysics*, Book Λ is a case in point. In

[4] Although Gauthier (*Sentencia Libri De anima*, pp. 288*–94*) may be right, generally speaking, to insist that Aquinas's commentaries cannot be understood outside his general theological enterprise (for a similar view, see Joseph Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in: Armand Maurer et al., eds., *St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274–1974. Commemorative Studies*, 2 vols. [Toronto, 1974], vol. 1, pp. 213–38), I agree with Francis Chevenal and Ruedi Imbach (*Thomas von Aquin. Prologe zur den Aristoteles-Kommentaren* [Frankfurt a. M., 1993]), and John F. Wippel (*The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* [Washington, D.C., 2001], p. xx), that Aquinas's commentaries are intended to be philosophical expositions of a philosophical system.

[5] The view according to which Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries should be taken as philosophical exercises rather than an expression of Thomas's personal opinions has been defended by Etienne Gilson in *The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956) and *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York, 1962). Gilson's extreme stance has been criticized (rightly in my view) by Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. xx. According to Wippel, nonetheless, "considerable care must be exercised when we consult them as sources for Aquinas's personal philosophical thinking." As I shall try to make clear in a few lines, I find the sharp opposition on which the debate rests fundamentally misguided.

the course of his exposition of this book, in fact, Aquinas is as careful as one can be in marking the difference between Aristotle's and his own understanding of the nature of God as well as in indicating the validity or invalidity of Aristotle's arguments for the existence of a Prime Mover. In general, therefore, the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* should be taken as the exposition of a doctrine Aquinas generally endorses, even though, of course, the way in which such a doctrine is presented reflects the flow of Aristotle's text and not Aquinas's design.

Another, crucial aspect of Aquinas's reading of the *Metaphysics* is its systematic nature. For Aquinas, the *Metaphysics* is an orderly and well-structured exposition of first philosophy, where each book finds its place within Aristotle's general argumentative plan. Thomas's systematic reading extends also to Aristotle's *corpus* as a whole: the different Aristotelian treatises are different and coordinated parts of the whole human science. If there are apparent conflicts or contradictions between one work and another, they must be generally explained away. Endorsing this approach, however, does not prevent Aquinas from bringing out the main nervatures of Aristotle's general strategy or from seeing the peculiarities and difficulties of single sections of the text.

This chapter falls into three parts. In the first, I shall present Aquinas's reconstruction of Aristotle's view on the nature of metaphysics as a scientific investigation. My focus will be on the subject of metaphysics (§ 1.1), the analogy of being (§ 1.2), and the general structure of the *Metaphysics* (§ 1.3). In Part II, I shall take up some major themes from Aquinas's analysis of Books Z and H, i.e., the investigation into sensible substances: substance (§ 2.1), the essence and definition of sensible substances (§ 2.2), the nature of accidents (§ 2.3), and the essence-existence distinction (§ 2.4). In the final part, I shall deal with Aquinas's treatment of separate substances by first presenting Thomas's interpretation of Book Λ (§ 3.1) and then outlining his view on the different levels of ontological composition (§ 3.2).

1. Metaphysics as a Scientific Investigation

1.1. *The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics and the* Posterior Analytics *Model*

Aquinas is famous for his view that the subject of metaphysics, i.e., the proper object of a metaphysical investigation, is being as being (*ens qua ens*) or being in general (*ens commune*), not God and separate substances. He is also known for restricting the notion of being as being to created

being and so for maintaining that God does not follow within the subject of metaphysics. Aquinas deals with the question of the subject of metaphysics in several texts and especially in q. 5 (aa. 1 and 4) of his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*. Although the discussion in the *De Trinitate* is rich with details and powerful theoretical insights, nowhere does Aquinas express himself so neatly with regard to the subject of metaphysics as in the preface to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. What is peculiar about the preface is that it brings to the fore the contrast, which is already present in Aristotle, between two different intuitions regarding what metaphysics is about: the contrast, in other words, between metaphysics as a universal science over and above the special sciences, i.e., the science that studies all beings insofar as they are beings; and metaphysics as a dignified special science, i.e., the science that deals with the most eminent kind of being, namely, separate or immaterial substances in general and God in particular. Not surprisingly, therefore, while solving this contrast, Aquinas's preface also gives us information about the status of metaphysics as a scientific investigation.[6]

Aquinas's starting point in the preface is that all sciences and all arts are ordered to one single end, i.e., the perfection and happiness of human beings. Therefore, one of those sciences or arts should rule over the others and hence properly deserves the title of Wisdom. This science, which is of course metaphysics, must be the most intellectual science, and the most intellectual science must in turn be identified with the one that studies the most intelligible objects. One can, however, understand the expression "the most intelligible objects" differently, depending on the point of view one chooses to endorse. Basically, there are three ways of understanding the notion of "the most intelligible object."

i One possibility is to look at the *order* of knowledge, i.e., at the relationships of grounding and being grounded upon obtaining among our different contents of knowledge. When so proceeding, one will be inclined to locate an object's intelligibility in its capacity to produce certainty in the intellect and so ground other pieces of knowledge. According to this line of thought, therefore, causes will turn out to be the most intelligible objects. For the knowledge of causes grounds the knowledge of the things

[6] For a detailed presentation of Aquinas's view on the subject of metaphysics, which also reviews the main interpretative options, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 1–62. I basically agree with Wippel's account.

of which they are the causes. This way of looking at metaphysics is in keeping with Aristotle's account in *Met.* A 1–2, according to which metaphysics is the science of causes.

ii Alternatively, one can appeal to a comparison between senses and intellect. Since perception is always of particulars objects, while the intellect is concerned with universals, in this perspective intelligibility should be located with universality. Accordingly, the most intelligible objects should be identified with the most universal concepts such as being, one, potentiality and actuality, and the like. As is easily seen, this is Aristotle's characterization of metaphysics in *Met.* Γ 1–2 and in the first part of *Met.* E 1 (1025b3–17). Metaphysics is here described as the study of being as being as well as of the general properties of being, i.e., one and the like.

iii Finally, the intelligibility of an object can be considered from the point of view of the very nature of the intellect's understanding, i.e., of what makes the intellect capable of understanding. This road leads up to immateriality and so identifies the most intelligible objects with immaterial objects. For the intellect is capable of understanding other things in that it is immaterial. Moreover, there must be some proportion between intellect and intelligible object. As a result, the intelligible object must be immaterial, for, otherwise, its materiality would not be compatible with the immateriality of the intellect. If it is true that the more an object is immaterial, the more it is intelligible, then separate substances turn out to be the most intelligible objects according to this understanding of intelligibility. For they are separate from matter both in understanding (they can be understood without making reference to matter) and in being (they are neither made of matter, nor do they exist in matter). This characterization of metaphysics corresponds to Aristotle's understanding in the second part of *Met.* E 1 (1026a6–32), where metaphysics is described as the study of the most eminent kind of substance, i.e., separate substances.

How to accommodate the three aforementioned characterizations of metaphysics into one single science? First of all, Aquinas identifies (i) with (iii). Separate substances are the most universal causes of being, and so the study of primary causes is just the study of separate substances. Second, Aquinas distinguishes between the things that are considered in some way or another by metaphysics and the *proper subject* of metaphysics. Being as being (and, secondarily, its general properties) is the proper subject of metaphysics, while separate substances, though being studied by metaphysics, are studied only because they bear a certain relationship to the subject of this science, i.e., insofar as they are the causes of being.

This fact, however, does not rule against the scientific unity of metaphysics. For it is the task of one and the same science to study both a certain genus (and its general properties) and the primary and universal causes thereof. Aquinas appeals to the parallel example of physics, which studies both the natural body in general and the causes of natural body. Analogously, metaphysics studies both being as being, which is its proper subject, and the causes of being as being. In line with his standard doctrine, Thomas also maintains that being as being turns out to be the most intelligible object not only according to consideration (ii), i.e., with regard to universality, but also according to consideration (iii), i.e., with regard to immateriality. For to be separate from matter in understanding and being does not apply only to things that are necessarily immaterial, such as separate substances, but also to those that need not be immaterial, such as being as being. Interpreters usually distinguish in this context between a positive sense of "immaterial," which applies to separate substances, and a negative or neutral sense, which applies to being as being.[7] Aquinas's introduction of a negative sense of "immaterial" is grounded on the thought that that in virtue of which something is a being, i.e., exists, is not that in virtue of which something is a particular kind of being. To come to the case at issue: that in virtue of which something is a being is not that in virtue of which something is a material being. Thus, a being, insofar as it is a being, *need not* be material. The use of the modal expression "need not be material" indicates that in our understanding of being, i.e., of what exists, there is at least implicit the *possibility* of there existing beings that are not material. No exclusion of positive immateriality, in other words, is contained in the notion of being as being.

From how Aquinas expresses himself in the preface, it might seem that the proper subject of metaphysics, being as being, is restricted to material being, i.e., material substances and their accidental properties: separate substances, i.e., God and intelligences, do not seem to fall within being as being and so are studied by metaphysics only insofar as they are the causes of being as being. This is certainly true of God, Who, according to Aquinas, falls outside the scope of being as being. God is certainly a being, is something that exists, but the way in which He exists is not able to be assimilated to the way in which created beings exist. Thus, it is clear that

[7] For this distinction see in particular: John F. Wippel, "Metaphysics and Separation in Thomas Aquinas," in: John F. Wippel, ed., *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 69–104.

being as being or common being is restricted to created being. The status of separate substances other than God, i.e., the intelligences or angels, is more ambiguous. In the preface Aquinas introduces them as the causes of being as being and so seems to exclude them from the scope of being as being as much he excludes God. This, however, should not probably be taken in the sense that separate intelligences totally fall outside the scope of being as being. On the contrary, since intelligences are created beings, they must fall within being as being. Aquinas's thought, therefore, must rather be that some knowledge of separate substances is reached only later in the course of a metaphysical investigation. This squares with the view that the knowledge of the causes of the subject of a science must be posterior in time to that of the subject itself, even if some of such causes may, strictly speaking, fall within the subject. No knowledge of separate substances, in other words, is presupposed at the start of the metaphysical investigation. Upon reflection, this train of thought is also implicit in Aquinas's characterization of being as being as *negatively* immaterial: the notion of being does not exclude the existence of immaterial beings, but does not imply it, either. In itself, being need not be immaterial, but this does not mean that our enquiry into being presupposes our previous acquaintance with some positive instances of immaterial beings.

In addition to offering a clear presentation of Aquinas's view on the subject of metaphysics, the preface is interesting also because it presupposes a certain understanding of the scientific status of metaphysics. As it emerges, metaphysics studies three things: being as being, the general or *per se* properties of being, and the primary and general causes of being. All such things are dealt with in one and the same science because it is the task of one and the same science to study a certain genus-subject, its properties, and its causes. The scheme *subjectum-passiones subjecti-principia subjecti* which Aquinas employs to guarantee the scientific status of metaphysics is some sort of adaptation of the general model of science developed by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*.[8] I say "adaptation" because in the *Posterior Analytics* model, the principles of the subject are not beings or ontological principles, as they are in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, but rather logical principles, i.e., the propositions from which certain conclusions can be derived. According to the *Posterior Analytics*, in other words, a science consists of three elements: the genus-subject, i.e., the domain of objects of which we prove certain properties to hold;

[8] See, in particular, Aristotle's discussion in *Post. An.*, A 7, 10 and 11.

the properties themselves that are proved to belong to the genus-subject through demonstration; and the propositions, be they proper to the genus in question or common to more than one genus, from which other and less general propositions can be derived.[9] Thus, technically speaking, the principles of a certain science are general propositions. Upon reflection, however, the scheme Aquinas employs in the preface to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is not extraneous to Aristotle's model of science in the *Posterior Analytics*. For one thing, in *Post. An.* A 2 (72b10–12), Aristotle employs the notion of cause in order to clarify that of scientific understanding: to know something scientifically clearly presupposes to know the cause in virtue of which something is the case. Admittedly, Aristotle may simply have in mind the point that the premises of a syllogism are in some sense the causes of the conclusion and so may be referring once again to propositional principles alone, to the exclusion of properly metaphysical principles. This, however, seems to be ruled out by his explicit attempt in *Post. Anal.*, Book B, to integrate the theory of the four causes into his general model of demonstrative science. In B 11, for instance, he argues at length that each of the four kinds of cause (material, formal, efficient, or final) can contribute to demonstrative science by figuring as the middle term of a scientific syllogism. Although the details of Aristotle's argument are difficult and controversial, his point must be that, in general, a cause explains why the property that is said to belong to the subject in the conclusion of a syllogism must in fact belong to it. The explanation is provided by the middle term of the syllogism, which explains the predicative link obtaining between the subject and the predicate in the conclusion. What is more, the explanation may vary depending on the kind of cause (material, formal, efficient, or final) that is relevant to explaining the conclusion that one intends to prove. Thus, the idea that the causes, including the agent or the final cause, may be considered to be scientific principles in some technical sense of "principle" is well in the front of Aristotle's mind in the *Posterior Analytics*.[10] Aquinas's use, therefore, of the

[9] Aquinas is perfectly aware of this technical notion of principle. See, for instance, Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 52 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1996), pp. 136–41, who convincingly shows that Thomas puts it to full use in his analysis of the structure of Book Γ of the *Metaphysics*.

[10] For Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's doctrine in *Post. An.* B 11, see Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Posteriorum*, II, 9, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. I* 2 (Rome-Paris, 1989), pp. 205–10. See also: *In octo libros Physicorum Expositio*, I, lec. 1, ed. Mariano Maggiòlo (Turin-Rome, 1954), n. 5. In the latter passage, Aquinas

tripartite scheme *subjectum-passiones subjecti-principia subjecti* should be thought of as a conscious attempt to provide metaphysics with the status of a science along the lines of Aristotle's model of scientific investigation. Of course, Aquinas is well aware of the fact that metaphysics is not always a demonstrative science and does not always proceed through syllogisms. However, from a structural point of view, metaphysics is not so different from the special sciences Aristotle describes in the *Posterior Analytics* and exhibits the same tripartite structure.

1.2. *Metaphysics as the Science of Substance: The Analogy of Being*

In presenting Aquinas's view on the subject of metaphysics, I have described being as being as the genus-subject of metaphysics. "Genus-subject," however, should be taken here in a loose sense, for Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that being is not a genus. In his commentary on *Met.* Δ 7, for instance, Aquinas argues that being, what exists, is not divided into the ten categories in the way in which a genus is divided into its species.[11] For a genus is divided into its species through specific differentiae. Being, however, cannot be divided into the ten categories through specific differentiae. For a differentia is external to its genus, i.e., falls outside the essence of the genus it divides. Thus, if being were divided through differentiae, it should be divided through differentiae that fall outside the essence of being, i.e., through differentiae that are not being. But this is impossible, because nothing falls outside the essence of being. What falls outside the essence of being, in other words, is absolutely nothing. Therefore, being cannot be divided into the ten categories in the way a genus is divided into its species. While rejecting the genus model for the case of being, Aquinas also advances his positive solution to the problem of how being is divided.[12] Being, Aquinas argues, is contracted to different kinds of being, i.e., to the different categories, according to different modes of predication, which in turn follow upon different modes of being. Intuitively, Aquinas's idea is that being is divided *immediately* into different

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maintains that mathematics demontrates only through the formal cause, metaphysics mainly makes use of formal and final causes, but employs efficient causes as well, while physics uses all kinds of cause.

[11] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, V, lec. 9, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 889 (henceforth *Exp. Met.*). As Aquinas himself recognizes, the argument he employs to show that being is not a genus is basically the same as Aristotle's in *Met.*, B 3, 998b22–27 (cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 8, n. 433).

[12] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 9, n. 890.

kinds of being, the ten categories. These different kinds of being are not external to being in that they represent different ways or modes in which things are beings, i.e., things exist. These different ways or modes can in turn be revealed through an analysis of the different modes of predication, i.e., of the different predicates we use when talking about things—substantial, qualitative, quantitative, relational predicates, and so on and so forth.

If being is not a genus, however, the problem arises of understanding how the different kinds of being, substance and the nine kinds of accident, can be studied by one and the same science. For in order for the different kinds of being to fall within the scope of one and the same scientific investigation, they must be connected in some relevant way and display some relevant relationship to one another. This problem is explicitly taken up by Aquinas when commenting on *Met*. Γ 2. As is known, in the chapter Aristotle introduces his theory of πρὸς ἕν or "focal meaning."[13] "Being"—Aristotle says—is said in many ways, but always with reference to one principle: some things are called "beings" because they are substances, some others because they are affections of substances, some because they are processes towards substance, or corruptions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of the things which are said with reference to substance, or even negations, whether of these things or of substance itself. As the rest of the discussion makes clear, Aristotle's long remark seems to contain two claims, a semantic claim and an ontological one. As for semantics, the point seems to be that "being" has different senses, a primary sense, which applies to substance, and a series of secondary senses, which apply to the entities in the accidental categories. All the secondary senses of "being" share their being applied only with reference to the primary sense of "being," the sense which applies to substance. Thus, accidents are called "beings" only because the sense in which they are called "beings" makes reference to that in which "being" is applied to substance. This semantic consideration is grounded on an ontological one. There are different modes of being: a primary mode, which belongs to substances; and a series of secondary modes, which belong to the entities falling under the accidental categories. What all the secondary modes of being have in common is the fact of bearing some relationship to the primary mode of being, the being of substances. Thus, the entities belonging to the secondary kinds of being

[13] See in particular Aristotele, *Met*., Γ 2, 1003a33–1003b12.

are beings only because they bear some relationship to the beings that are substances. In other words, entities belonging to the accidental categories *depend* on substances for their very existence.

In his commentary on Γ 2, Aquinas expands on Aristotle's twofold analysis. At the semantic level, Aquinas insists that "being" is predicated neither univocally nor purely equivocally but analogically.[14] A term—Aquinas further comments—can be predicated of many different things in different ways:[15] (i) according to a fully identical definition, and hence it is predicated univocally of the many things of which it is predicated, as "animal" is predicated of horses and cows; (ii) according to totally different definitions, and then the term is predicated equivocally, as "dog" is predicated both of the star and the animal. (iii) Finally, a term can be predicated of many things according to definitions that are partly different and partly non-different; in this case, the term will be predicated analogically or proportionally. The different definitions that characterize analogical predication are different because they involve different relationships, while they are non-different in that such relationships all make reference to one and the same thing. Aquinas speaks of "definitions" (*rationes*), but we can freely talk of "senses": analogical terms are said of different things according to different senses, but all the different senses contain a reference to one and the same thing. Aquinas also remarks that, in the case of analogical predication, the thing to which all the different senses make reference is one in number and not only one in definition, as in the case with univocal predication.[16] What Aquinas means becomes clearer if we examine his interpretation of one of the two examples Aristotle puts forward in order to explain analogical predication, i.e., "healthy." For "healthy" is not said univocally of diet, medicine, urine, and animal but, rather, according to different senses. It

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[14] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 1, nn. 534–39. On Aquinas's doctrine of the analogy of being see: Ralph M. McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of Aquinas* (The Hague, 1961); E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), 39–67; E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1991), 94–135; Gyula Klima, "The Semantic Principle Underlying Saint Thomas's Metaphysics of Being," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), 87–141; Ralph M. McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, D.C., 1996); and Gyula Klima, "Aquinas' Theory of the Copula and the Analogy of Being," *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* 5 (2002), 159–76, and "Being," in: Henrik Lagerlund, ed., *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (Dordrecht, 2011), pt. 2, 150–59.

[15] *Ibid.*, n. 535.

[16] *Ibid.*, n. 536.

is according to different senses of "healthy" that the diet, the medicine, the urine, and the animal are healthy. However, all such senses contain a reference to one and the same thing, i.e., health: the diet is said to be healthy because it preserves health; medicine because it produces health; and the urine because it is a sign of health. The animal, finally, is healthy because it possesses health. Moreover, it is one and the same health that the diet preserves, the medicine produces, the urine is a sign of, and the animal possesses. In the case of analogical predication, therefore, all analogates are grouped together thanks to their relationship to one and the same thing. In the case of univocal predication, by contrast, all animals are called "animals" not with reference to one and the same thing but simply because the same definition, the definition of "animal," is truly predicated of all of them. Aquinas offers the same analysis of the other Aristotelian example of analogical predication, i.e., "medical," which we may disregard here.[17]

If we apply Aquinas's treatment of analogy to the case of "being," the result is that "being" is predicated of the things belonging to the different categories according to different senses. "Being" is predicated of substance in its primary sense, while it is predicated of all the other things according to secondary senses. All the secondary senses make reference, however, to the primary sense of "being," the sense in which substances are beings. Since Aquinas talks both of being (*ens*) and existence (*esse*), his view seems also to imply that what it means for a substance to exist is not the same thing as what it means for each of the other kinds of thing to exist. Thus, also the "is" of existence has different senses when it is applied to things belonging to different categories: substance exists in the primary sense of "existing," while all the other things exist in secondary senses. As Aquinas's treatment of the case of being makes clear, the semantics of analogy is grounded on how things are in reality, i.e., on ontology. This point is made explicit towards the end of his treatment of the analogy of being. The different senses according to which "being" is predicated reflect different modes of being. More in particular, Aquinas observes that the different entities which Aristotle lists in *Met*. Γ 2 introduce four modes of being.[18]

[17] *Ibid.*, n. 538. Aquinas's explanation in this case is that all the different senses of "medical" are said with reference to one and the same efficient cause, i.e., the medical art.

[18] *Ibid.*, nn. 540–43.

1) The weakest mode of being is the being of privations and negations, which is purely mental. We call such forms of being *beings of reason* because our reason deals with them as if they were some beings by forming true affirmative and negative propositions about them.

2) Very close to privations and negations are generations, corruptions, and motions, which possess something of the character of privations and negations, as is testified by Aristotle's definition of motion as an *imperfect* actuality.

3) The third mode of being is the being of accidental properties. Accidents have nothing of the character of not-being but still are a weak form of being in that they exist in something else and not *per se*.

4) Finally, there comes the most perfect mode of being, which possesses an extramental existence totally unmixed with privation and negation, exists *per se*, and hence is a firm and solid kind of being.

The fourth kind of being is, of course, the being of substances with reference to which all the other beings can be said to be beings. Aquinas's ontological reading of the analogy of being is also apparent in the way he assesses the case of "being" with respect to the other two examples of analogical term which Aristotle introduces in Γ 2. While the thing to which all the different senses of "health" make reference is an end or final cause (and the thing to which all the different senses of "medical" refer is an efficient cause),[19] the thing to which all the different senses of "being" refer is a subject, i.e., substance.[20] As is clear, the notion of subject points to some kind of ontological or existential dependence: all the other modes of being exist because they bear some relationship to substance, i.e., because they depend for their very being on the substance in which they exist in some way or other.

What does Aquinas's discussion of the analogy of being tell us about the scope and status of metaphysics? At a very first level, it is clear that the analogy of being provides metaphysics with enough unity for it to qualify as a proper scientific investigation. For not only things that can be grouped together according to univocal predication are the object of one and the same science, but also those which can be grouped according to analogical predication. There is, however, one deeper conclusion to be drawn from Aquinas's discussion of analogy. In some sense, metaphysics, insofar as it is the science of being as being, is the science of substance.

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[19] Cf. above, note 17.

[20] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 1, n. 539.

This claim too can be read both at a semantic and at an ontological level. As to semantics, since "being" in the sense of "substance" is the primary sense of "being," i.e., the sense with reference to which all the other senses of "being" are said, we can fully understand what it means to be for the things that are beings in the secondary senses of "being" only once we have understood what it means to be for the things that are beings in the primary sense of "being." Once again, however, semantic facts are grounded on ontological facts. Since accidents are dependent modes of being and so are beings only because they bear some relationship to what is an independent mode of being, i.e., substance, we can fully understand what it is to be the kind of being that an accident is only once we have understood what it is to be the kind of being that a substance is. In other words, since accidents depend for their being on substances, a full understanding of accidents can be reached only through an understanding of the kind of being accidents depend upon. Thus, in some sense, the study of being as being reduces itself to the study of substance. For only through an understanding of substance can we have a full grasp of everything that there is.

1.3. *Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle's* Metaphysics

Three main claims emerge from my previous discussion of Aquinas's view on the object of metaphysics. (1) Metaphysics is a scientific investigation to be conceived of according to the model *subiectum, passiones subiecti, causae subiecti*. (2) The subject of metaphysics is being as being, while separate substances are studied by metaphysics only insofar as they are the causes of being as being. One of them, i.e., God, falls altogether outside the scope of being as being, while the others, i.e., separate intelligences, while falling within being as being, are nonetheless considered at a second stage of the enquiry, i.e., only when the causes of being as being are sought for. (3) In some sense, the study of being as being reduces itself to the study of substance. Do these three claims affect Aquinas's understanding of the structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*? Yes, indeed, they do. In this section I shall try to show how.[21]

If we look at Aquinas's *divisio textus*, we shall see that the part of the *Metaphysics* which perfectly corresponds to the tripartite schema

[21] For some more detail on the theme of this section, see Galluzzo, "Aquinas on the Structure."

subiectum, passiones subiecti, causae subiecti is the second half, i.e., Books Z–Λ (VII–XII). This suggests that, according Aquinas, the metaphysical investigation proper is carried out in the second half of Aristotle's book, while the first six books have, although in different ways, a preliminary character. As a matter of fact, the study of the subject of metaphysics, being as being, is conducted in Books Z and H, the *per se* properties of being are dealt with in Θ and I (Θ being devoted to potentiality and actuality, and I to the one and to related notions), while K and Λ take up the issue of separate substances.[22] In light of claim 3) above, it is not surprising that the study of being should start with an analysis of substance, for the study of being in some sense reduces itself to the study of substance. Admittedly, the official beginning of Aristotle's enquiry into being is Book E. However, it is not difficult to see that the book is still concerned with some preliminary issues. E 1, for instance, goes back to the division of the theoretical sciences and to the problem of the subject of metaphysics.[23] Moreover, in E 2–4 Aristotle aims to further clarify what we must understand when it is said that metaphysics deals with the notion of being. He distinguishes in particular four ways in which being can be understood—accidental being, being as true and false, being according to the ten categories, and being as potentiality and actuality—in order to make it clear that only being as divided according to the categories and being as potentiality and actuality will fall within the scope of the metaphysical investigation.[24] Thus, Aristotle's aim in Book E is to clear the ground from possible misunderstandings about the notion of being, to insist that it is extramental being and its properties that will be under scrutiny in the *Metaphysics*.

As to the sense in which the first five books of the *Metaphysics* must be regarded as preliminary to the principal investigation, a good starting point is Aquinas's reading of Book B.[25] According to Thomas, Book B is a dialectical discussion of the main issues dealt with in the *Metaphysics*: Aristotle raises certain problems and then advances opposed solutions without committing himself to any view in particular. Thus, Book B is a sort of map of or agenda for the *Metaphysics*. Aquinas splits up the issues raised in B into two main categories, i.e., issues related to metaphysics as a science

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[22] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 1, n. 1245; IX, lec. 1, n. 1768; X, lec. 1, n. 1920; XI, lec. 1, n. 2146; XII, lec. 1, n. 2416.

[23] *Ibid.*, VI, lec. 1, n. 1144.

[24] *Ibid.*, VI, lec. 1, n. 1144; VI, lec. 2, n. 1171.

[25] For more on the importance of Book Beta, see Galluzzo, "Aquinas's Interpretation."

and issues related to the contents of the metaphysical investigation.[26] The latter group comprises some major metaphysical questions which will be tackled in the second half of the *Metaphysics*, while the former group of issues are somehow preliminary, having to do with the status and scope of metaphysics. Thus, they are taken up in Book Γ, where Aristotle describes metaphysics as the science of being as being and explains why it must be regarded as a unitary discipline. Book Γ, therefore, is still preliminary in that it is occupied with some general problems concerning the scientific status of metaphysics. In this perspective we can understand why Book Δ is preliminary as well. Book Δ is a sophisticated philosophical dictionary where Aristotle lays down and discusses the different meanings and uses of the terms we employ when doing metaphysics, with particular, if not exclusive, reference to the problems dealt with in the main part of the *Metaphysics*, i.e., Books Z–Λ. Therefore, Book Δ constitutes a particularly appropriate introduction to the main metaphysical investigation in that the discussion of substances, their properties, and causes presupposes a previous grasp of the central notions that we employ in metaphysics.[27] As to Book A and α, their introductory character is uncontroversial, as is already suggested by their position at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. In conclusion, the first six books are all preliminary to the main metaphysical investigation, although their function in the economy and structure of the *Metaphysics* is clearly different from one book to another.

There is one final and important aspect of Aquinas's understanding of the structure of the *Metaphysics* which is worth mentioning. When presenting the internal articulation of the second half of the *Metaphysics*, i.e., Books Z–Λ, Thomas puts emphasis on the central role played by Books Z and H and comparatively downplays the importance of Books K and Λ. Thus, the analysis of sensible substances and their structure which Aristotle accomplishes in Books Z and H is, according to Aquinas, the theoretical core of the *Metaphysics*. Why is this so? My suggestion is that this has to do with Aquinas's view on the subject of metaphysics, as expressed in claims (2) and (3) above. Separate substances are studied by metaphysics not as the main object of enquiry but only insofar as they are the universal causes of the main object of enquiry, i.e., being as being. Thus, separate substances are arrived at only later in the course of the metaphysical enquiry, that is, only when the notion of being is sufficiently clarified and

[26] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 2, n. 346.
[27] *Ibid.*, V, lec. 1, n. 749.

we set out to look for the causes of being. Now, we have also seen that, for Aquinas, the study of being as being in some sense reduces itself to the study of substance. But it is not built into the very notion of substance that there actually are separate substances. Our notion of substance, as well as our notion of being, does not rule out that separate substances in fact exist, but this is something which we must discover only as the enquiry into being proceeds. So, we had better start our analysis of being with sensible substances. This point is clearly in agreement with the general scientific methodology Aristotle often recommends: we always start an enquiry from the things we are more familiar with, then move on to those that are less known to us.[28] And separate substances are less known to us than the things of which they are the causes, i.e., sensible substances. All these considerations explain why the analysis of sensible substances which Aristotle carries out in Z and H is the place where the notion of being as being is chiefly clarified.

There is an additional problem for Aquinas. His idea is that metaphysics is a general science, namely, a science that studies being in general and not a particular kind of being. Separate substances, however, are instances of a particular kind of being. It is true that, unlike God, intelligences or angels fall within the scope of being as being. However, they do so only *qua* beings and not *qua* the particular kind of being they are. So why should the *Metaphysics* present a specific treatment of separate substances? In his commentaries on Books K and Λ, Aquinas appeals to the idea of completeness.[29] If metaphysics did not study separate substances, they would be left completely uninvestigated, because, clearly, none of the special sciences could include them in their domain of enquiry. Aquinas's remarks do not imply any idea of value. On the contrary, he insists that the study of separate substances is the goal of metaphysics and so of all human cognition. His point is rather that Books K and Λ complete the investigation into substance by studying the highest and most eminent kind of substance. However, the study of separate substances cannot be the place where the notion of being as being is properly investigated. For, when taken as a particular kind of being and not as instances of being in general, separate substances are only the causes of being in general and so are a secondary object of study for the metaphysician. And it is as a particular kind of being that they are dealt with in Books K and Λ.

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[28] Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.*, A 1, 184a16–21; *Met.*, Z 3, 1029b3–12; *Nic. Eth.*, A 4, 1095b3–4.
[29] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, XI, lec. 1, n. 2146; XII, lec. 1, n. 2416.

2. The Theory of Sensible Substance: Some Major Themes

2.1. *The Fundamental Agreement Between the* Categories *and the* Metaphysics

As we have seen, Aquinas's view on the object of metaphysics pushes him to regard the study of sensible substance carried out in the so-called central books (Z–H–Θ) as the theoretical core of the metaphysical investigation. One of the main interpretative problems concerning Aristotle's ontology in the central books is the question whether the *Metaphysics* marks a major departure from the ontology sketched out in the *Categories*.[30] The nature of the problem can be outlined in the following terms. In the *Categories*, ordinary particular objects, things such as individual men and horses, are called "primary substances."[31] Being a primary substance means to be a basic or fundamental entity, i.e., the kind of entity on whose existence the existence of everything else rests. Aristotle's intuition in the *Categories* is that ordinary particular objects are primary in that they ground the existence of all the other kinds of things.[32] Accidents, be they universal or particular, exist because they inhere in primary substances, i.e., because they are properties of primary substances. Substantial universals, i.e., species and genera, exist, but they do so only because they are essentially predicated of primary substances. Ordinary particular objects are primary also in the sense that they are unanalyzed wholes, i.e., they cannot be analyzed into ontological constituents and so into entities that may be regarded as more fundamental than them.

The central books of the *Metaphysics* present us with a different picture. In the *Metaphysics* framework, particular sensible objects are no longer unanalyzed wholes but are viewed as composites of matter and form. Thus, in the *Metaphysics* there are some ontological constituents in terms of which individual sensible objects can be analyzed, i.e., their matter and form. This immediately raises the question as to whether the constituents in terms of which sensible objects can be analyzed lay better claims than sensible objects themselves to being called primary substances. In several passages in the central books, Aristotle defends the view that the

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[30] On the topic of this section, see Gabriele Galluzzo, "Averroes and Aquinas on Aristotle's Criterion of Substantiality," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), 157–87.

[31] Cf. Aristotle, *Cat.*, 5, 2a11–14.

[32] Cf. *Cat.*, 5, 2b5–6.

form of sensible objects is their substance.[33] Occasionally, form is also labeled "primary substance."[34] The question might be raised, therefore, as to whether these claims simply amount to saying that form replaces the sensible objects of which it is the form in the role of primary substances the *Categories* assigns to them. One reason why we may wish to endorse this view is the following. If form is the substance of sensible objects, it must be so because it is the ontological constituent which explains why sensible objects are substances. But then, if form explains why sensible objects are substances, it must be *for this very reason* more substance than the sensible objects whose substantiality it explains. For, in general, what explains the character of something must possess that character to a higher degree. This view presupposes that forms and sensible objects, i.e., composites of matter and form, be substances in the very same sense of "substance." More precisely, it presupposes that there be only one sense of "substance," which applies primarily to forms in virtue of their explanatory function and only secondarily to the composites of matter and form. Endorsing this view implies also disregarding as inessential some important differences between the way in which forms and sensible objects exist, such as the fact that sensible objects exist independently, while the forms of sensible objects do not exist independently, because they only exist in matter. I have argued elsewhere that Averroes endorses this line of argument and draws the conclusion that, in the *Metaphysics*, form replaces sensible objects in the role of primary substances that the *Categories* assigns to them.[35]

It is perfectly clear, by contrast, that Aquinas rejects this line of argument. For him, sensible objects remain primary substances even within the *Metaphysics* hylomorphic framework. The main reason why Thomas takes this position is that he regards independent existence as one of the distinguishing marks of substantiality. Form may well explain why sensible objects are substances, but this fact alone does not promote it to the role of primary substance. For the form of sensible objects is a dependent entity insofar as it needs something else, i.e., matter, to exist as an independent object, while individual sensible objects need nothing else (at least, within the domain of created beings) in order to exist. In direct opposition to Averroes's view, Aquinas consequently distinguishes between two

[33] See, for instance, *Met.*, Z 7, 1032b1–2; 10, 1035b15–17; 11, 1037a27–31; 17, 1041b8–9.
[34] Cf. *Met.*, Z 7, 1032b1–2; 11, 1037a28.
[35] See again Galluzzo, "Averroes and Aquinas," pp. 168–79.

senses of "substance", i.e., "substance" in the absolute sense and "substance" in the sense of "the substance of." He also maintains that the absolute sense of substance is more significant than the "substance of" sense when it comes to adjudicating on primary substantiality. Sensible objects, which are composites of matter and form, are substances in the absolute sense, i.e., autonomous and independent objects. The forms of sensible objects, by contrast, are not substances in the absolute sense, i.e., are not autonomous and independent objects but are simply the substance of sensible objects, the kind of ontological constituent or principle that explains the fundamental character of sensible objects. To be an explanatory principle, however, is not to be a substance in the same sense as and on par with the objects of which the principle is a principle. Forms lack independent existence, and this is enough for them not to qualify as substances in the absolute sense of the term. In more general terms, what Aquinas comes down to saying is that the question of substantiality is solved once and for all in the *Categories*: individual sensible objects are primary substances. With respect to this conclusion, the *Metaphysics* only introduces a further level of analysis by raising the question as to which constituent of sensible objects explains their substantiality. But this question is not supposed to reopen the issue of substantiality in the absolute sense. For the constituents of sensible objects lack independent existence and so cannot count as primary substances in the absolute sense of the term.

Aquinas's strategy is best understood when seen at work. In *Met.* Z 3, Aristotle explores the suggestion that matter may be primary substance. This conclusion results from a difficult argument—known in the literature as the "stripping-away" argument—which pushes to the extreme the notion of subjecthood.[36] According to the argument, matter counts as primary substance because it is what underlies all the properties of a sensible object, what, in other words, we are left with once all the properties of an object are stripped off. Aquinas understands the argument in terms of predication: accidents are (accidentally) predicated of the individual sensible substance, and form is (accidentally) predicated of matter. Matter,

[36] Cf. *Met.*, Z 3, 1029a10–30. On the meaning of the controversial "stripping-away" argument, see Malcolm Schofield, "*Met.* Z 3: Some Suggestions," *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 97–101; Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts about Substances," *Philosophical Review* 87 (1978), 372–413; Donald E. Stahl, "Stripped Away: Some Contemporary Obscurities Surrounding *Met.* Z 3," *Phronesis* 26 (1981), 177–88; Michael Frede & Günther Patzig, *Aristoteles* Metaphysik Z. *Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 33–56; and Michael J. Loux, *Primary "Ousia." An Essay on Aristotle's "Metaphysics Z" and "H"* (Ithaca-London, 1991), pp. 49–71.

therefore, is the ultimate subject, what underlies all the properties of an object. For Aquinas, the argument, as it stands, is flawed. For the subject of accidental properties is not matter but, rather, the sensible object, the composite of matter and form. Thus, transitivity does not apply: from the fact that the sensible object underlies accidents and matter underlies form, we cannot conclude that matter underlies everything. This, however, is not the aspect of Aquinas's reasoning that most interests me. For, whether it is the ultimate subject or not—Aquinas argues—matter cannot be primary substance. For it does not meet two important requirements for something to count as a primary substance: being separable and being a τόδε τι (*hoc aliquid*).[37] Although Aquinas employs the notions of separation, being separable, and the like in different senses, in this instance being separable simply amounts to being an autonomous and independent object. Neither matter nor form are autonomous and independent objects, and hence neither of them counts as primary substance according to the separability requirement. Only the composite of matter and form is an autonomous and independent object, and so only the composite, the sensible object, counts as a primary substance according to the separability requirement. Analogous conclusions can be reached by looking at the τόδε τι requirement. From Aquinas's treatment of the notion of τόδε τι outside the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, it clearly emerges that to be a τόδε τι involves two things: (i) being capable of subsisting *per se*; and (ii) being a complete and full-fledged member of a certain species.[38] Condition (i) is nothing but separability, i.e., being an autonomous and independent object. It is clear, therefore, that neither matter nor form satisfies condition (i). It is also clear, however, that they do not satisfy condition (ii) either. Neither matter nor form are complete and full-fledged members of a natural species; matter and form are only *parts* or *constituents* of a full-fledged member of a natural species.[39] In this case as well, only the composite of matter and form satisfies condition (ii): only the composite is a complete individual belonging to a natural kind.

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[37] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 2, n. 1292.

[38] Cf. in particular Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae De anima*, q. 1, ed. Bernardo C. Bazán, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. 24.1 (Rome-Paris, 1996), p. 7.192–205. But see also *Sententia Libri De anima*, II, 1, p. 69.97–117; *Summa Theologiae*, I^{a}, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1 (Rome, 1962), p. 345; and *Scriptum super librum Sententiarum*, II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1929), vol. 2, p. 418.

[39] For this important point, see in particular: Thomas Aquinas, *Qu. De an.*, q. 1, ad 13, p. 12.439–41; q. 9, ad 18, p. 86.524–26.

The outcome of Aquinas's reasoning is that neither matter nor form counts as primary substances in that neither of them is separable and τόδε τι. It is interesting to note that, although Aquinas's observations are mainly directed to reject matter's claim to primary substantiality, they apply to form as well. Certainly, form is not on par with matter, because it is the constituent of sensible objects that explains their substantiality and so can be rightly called *the substance of* sensible objects—a title to which matter cannot aspire. Thus, form, and not matter, is that in virtue of which a sensible object is both separable and a τόδε τι. Nonetheless, form is not an autonomous and independent object and so, exactly like matter, it is not a substance in the absolute sense of the term. This is in some sense the central tenet of Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's theory of substance.

2.2. *The Essence and Definition of Sensible Substances*

Aquinas's preference for the composite of matter and form is also apparent in his treatment of the issue of the essence and definition of sensible substances.[40] In a famous digression within his commentary on Book Z, Thomas presents two different positions concerning the essence and definition of sensible objects.[41] According to one view, the essence and definition of sensible objects only contain their form to the exclusion of any material characteristics. Aquinas attributes the view in question to Averroes and some of his followers.[42] I have argued elsewhere that this attribution is correct, at least insofar as Averroes is concerned.[43] Thomas also describes this first position in more technical terms by having recourse to the distinction between *forma partis* (the standard Aristotelian form,

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[40] On the topic of this section, see Gabriele Galluzzo, "Il problema dell'oggetto della definizione nel commento di Tommaso d'Aquino a *Metafisica* Z 10–11," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), 417–65, and "Aquinas's Interpretation," pp. 451–61. See also: Fabrizio Amerini, "Aristotle, Averroes and Thomas Aquinas on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 79–122, and "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

[41] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 9, nn. 1467–69.

[42] *Ibid.*, n. 1467.

[43] Cf. Galluzzo, "Averroes and Aquinas," pp. 174–79. For a more nuanced position, see Matteo Di Giovanni, "La definizione delle sostanze sensibili nel *Commento Grande* (*Tafsīr*) di Averroè a *Metafisica* Z 10," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 27–63; Fabrizio Amerini, "Aristotle, Averroes," pp. 106–09; and Matteo di Giovanni, *Averroes on Substance* (Ph.D. dissertation, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, 2008), pp. 75–96.

e.g., the soul of a human being) and *forma totius* (the essence, e.g., the humanity in virtue of which a human being is a human being): the position in question—Aquinas observes—implies that *forma partis* and *forma totius* are really, i.e., mind-independently, identical and only conceptually distinct. Aquinas's point can be presented in a more intuitive way. There are two things about an individual sensible object that we need to explain: one is that the matter of the object, which is in itself a potential being, is an actual being, i.e., an actually and independently existing object; the other is that the individual object as a whole belongs to a certain natural kind. The position that Aquinas is presenting holds that these two facts are explained not by two different principles of the object but, rather, by one and the same principle. It is the form of the sensible object, form as opposed to matter, that accounts both for the fact that matter is an actual being and for the further fact that the individual sensible object as a whole belongs to a natural kind. At most, we are entitled to speak of different *functions*—turning matter into an actual being and placing the object in a natural kind—played by one and the same principle, and in this sense we can also speak of a conceptual distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius*. Independently of our conceptual apparatus, however, there is one and only one principle in reality accounting for the facts to be explained.

After Averroes's position, Aquinas introduces the view he himself is willing to endorse, according to which both form and matter are part of the essence and definition of sensible substances.[44] As is known, Aquinas's view is not that the matter of this or that particular object, i.e., what may be called "individual matter," belongs to its essence and so is mentioned in its definition. What figures in the essence and definition of sensible objects is rather the kind of matter that characterizes a certain natural species, the so-called "common matter," the matter that all individuals of a certain species share. If the matter of human beings, for instance, is flesh and bones, the matter that figures in the essence and definition of human beings will be flesh and bones in general and not the particular flesh and bones of this or that individual human being. In direct opposition to Averroes's view, Aquinas's position implies a mind-independent distinction between *forma partis* and *forma totius*. The fact that matter is an actual individual and the further fact that the individual itself belongs to a natural kind are explained by two distinct principles:

[44] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 9, nn. 1468–69.

form accounts for matter's being an actual individual, while essence, which contains common matter in addition to form, explains why the individual as a whole belongs to a natural kind. In addition to being Avicenna's position—Aquinas remarks—the second view is also Aristotle's view in the *Metaphysics*.[45]

Aquinas's motivations for attributing this view to Aristotle emerge if we consider the text he quotes in support of his view, i.e., *Met.* E 1.[46] The passage is part of a series of texts, both within and outside the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle seems to contrast natural with mathematical objects on the grounds that the former are, while the latter are not, essentially material.[47] Sensible substances are natural objects and so are essentially material.[48] Matter, therefore, must be mentioned in its definition because the definition of substances perfectly reflects the content of their essence, without adding or leaving out anything. What both Aquinas and Aristotle seem to have in mind is the following general idea. A geometrical form can be realized in more than one kind of sensible matter: the form of the circle, for instance, can indifferently be realized in iron, wood, bronze, and so on. The form of a natural object, by contrast, can be realized, of necessity, only in one kind of sensible material: the form of human beings, for instance, can be realized only in flesh and bones. As modern philosophers sometimes put it, geometrical objects are "compositionally plastic," i.e., can be realized in many types of material, while natural objects are "compositionally rigid," i.e., can be realized in only one kind of material. The idea, therefore, is that this intrinsic difference between geometrical and natural objects must be reflected in their definition: geometrical objects do not have sensible matter in their definition, while natural objects do. Since both Aristotle and Aquinas distinguish between necessary and essential by maintaining that there are necessary features of a thing that are not essential, it is important to stress that the compositional rigidity of natural objects is a matter of essence, i.e., directly

[45] *Ibid*.

[46] Cf. in particular Aristotle, *Met.*, E 1, 1025b28–1026a6.

[47] Cf. Aristotle, *Met*., Z 10, 1035a22–b1; 11, 1036b21–32; H 2, 1043a14–28; 1043b23–32; *Phys.*, B 2, 193b22–194a1; *De an.*, A 1, 403a29–b19.

[48] In *Met*., Z 17, 1041b28–30 Aristotle contends that artificial objects are not substances. Furthermore, in *Met*., Z 11, 1036a31–b3 he clearly maintains that the forms of artificial objects can be realized in more than one kind of material. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that artefacts are not substances on the grounds that their forms are not substantial but accidental forms (see, for instance: *Exp. Phys*., I, lec. 2, n. 14).

flows from the very nature of such objects and of their forms.[49] This is the reason why the kind of sensible matter that characterizes a certain species of sensible substance must be mentioned in its definition.[50]

Clearly, Aquinas's view on essence and definition is perfectly in keeping with his general understanding of Aristotle's theory of substance. Since it is composites of matter and form that are primary substances, it is composites of matter and form that we primarily define. For definability is one of the hallmarks of substantiality. What is more, since composites of matter and form are essentially material, their definition must mention both their form and their (common) matter.

2.3. *The Nature of Accidents*

In addition to discussing the nature and structure of sensible substances, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* Aquinas deals at some length also with the problem of the relationship between substances and their accidental properties as well as with the nature of accidents.[51] Generally speaking, we can say that Aquinas defends two claims about the ontological status of accidents: (1) accidents depend *existentially* on substances, i.e., depend on substances for their very existence in that they inhere in substances; and (2) accidents depend also *essentially* on substances, i.e., the essence of a certain kind of accident depends on the kind of substance

[49] On the distinction between necessary and essential properties in Aristotle, see Joan Kung, "Aristotle on Essence and Explantion," *Philosophical Studies* 31 (1977), 361–83. The basic intuition is that only those necessary properties which are explanatory are essential. Thus, there are necessary properties, the non-explanatory ones, that are not essential.

[50] Admittedly, there is some kind of matter which is an essential part of geometrical objects, i.e., intelligible matter. What is more, Aquinas standardly distinguishes between common intelligible matter and individual intelligible matter (*Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 11, nn. 1521–22). The distinction must be between some general notion of extension in space and the individual portion of geometrical space which a certain, individual figure occupies. By analogy with the case of sensible substances, common intelligible matter must figure in the definition of mathematical objects, while individual intelligible matter should be left out of it: geometrical objects must be extended in space but must not necessarily occupy some particular portion of space. Here, I do not intend to go into the difficult topic of intelligible matter. I shall confine myself to pointing out that intelligible matter is not relevant to the discussion of the distinction between natural and geometrical objects, where "matter" is taken throughout in the sense of "sensible matter." The possession of intelligible matter does not make geometrical objects material in the relevant sense, for intelligible matter is some kind of abstraction from sensible matter and so lacks the relevant kind of concreteness which sensible matter possesses.

[51] On these topics, see Fabrizio Amerini, "Il problema dell'essenza delle sostanze e degli accidenti nel Commento alla *Metafisica* di Tommaso d'Aquino," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), 359–416.

the accident invariably inheres in. In this section, I shall present briefly each of these claims and then draw some general conclusions about Aquinas's view on the nature of accidents. My final observations are mainly designed to prevent a deflationary (and mistaken) reading of what Aquinas has to say about the ontological status of accidents.

Claim (1) can be further specified by saying that, according to Aquinas, accidents are ontologically equivalent to accidental composites, that is, from the point of view of its concrete existence, an accident is nothing but an accidental composite. An accidental composite is a composite of a substance and an accident: the accidental composite *white man*, for instance, is a composite of the accident *white* and the substance *man*. Aquinas's claim, therefore, is that in their concrete existence, accidents are things like *white man*, composites of a substance and an accident. This claim is consistently defended throughout Aquinas's commentary on *Met*. Z 4–5.[52] To say that an accident is ontologically equivalent to an accidental composite is, first of all, a claim about *individual* accidents. Like many other medieval philosophers, Aquinas holds the view that accidents are made individual by their bearers: what makes an individual accident the individual accident it is, is the individual substance in which it inheres. Thus, Socrates's paleness, to take a classic example, is the particular paleness it is because it inheres in Socrates and is consequently distinct from Plato's paleness because it inheres in Socrates and not in Plato. As a result, Socrates's paleness cannot and could not possibly be had by any other substance, even though other substances may have exactly the same shade of color as Socrates: Plato's paleness may be of exactly the same shade of color as the color of Socrates, but it cannot be numerically the same as it. Thus, at a first level, Aquinas's claim turns out to amount to the view that, in its concrete existence, a particular accident is nothing but that particular accident in the particular substance in which it exists.

The radical dependence of accidents on substances concerns not only the level of individuals but also that of *kinds*, i.e., of *universals*. It is not only the case that a particular accident is bound up with the particular substance it inheres in, but it is also the case that a certain kind of accident invariably inheres in a particular kind of substance. In *Met*. Z 5, Aristotle discusses the difficulties arising with a particular category of accidents, that is, the so-called "coupled accidents," accidents, in other

[52] But see, in particular: Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 3, nn. 1315–23.

words, that seem to have built into themselves a reference to the kind of substance they invariably inhere in. *Snub* is Aristotle's standard example of a coupled accident: it is only a nose that can be snub, and snubness is a particular shape of noses. In his treatment of accidents, Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in maintaining that, once the proper subject of inherence is specified, all accidents are coupled accidents, are things like *snub*.[53] Many accidents may seem to be different from *snub* and the like because we do not restrict the application of the corresponding predicate to one particular kind of subject: we say, for instance, that many kinds of things are white, and so *white* may seem to be an accident which is not bound up with one particular kind of substance. This usage, however, is improper and derivative, and finally only imputable to linguistic practice. At a closer inspection, when we consider the true nature of things and single out the proper subject of inherence for *white*, say *surface*, *white* is like *snub* in invariably inhering in only one kind of accident.

Like Aristotle, Aquinas interprets the dependence at the level of *kinds* as an essential dependence (Claim (2) above).[54] Accidents—Aquinas remarks, echoing Aristotle's text—either do not have an essence at all or, if they have one, have a secondary and derivative essence as compared to the essence of substances.[55] The two formulations come to the same thing and emphasize the fact that accidents have a dependent kind of essence, just as they depend existentially on the substances in which they inhere. The essential dependence of accidents on substances is brought out by the analysis of the definition of accidents. In keeping with Aristotle's doctrine in *Met*. Z 4–5, Aquinas maintains that, unlike the definitions of substances, the definitions of accidents are "by addition": the definitions of accidents, in other words, include a reference to something external to the accident, i.e., the kind of substance the accident in question invariably inheres in.[56] Aquinas is clear enough that the subject that is mentioned in the definition of accidents is not part of their essence.[57] However, he also insists that we could not grasp the essence of an accident, we could not understand what an accident is, without also taking into account the subject in which it inheres. But why?

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[53] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 4, nn. 1350–54.
[54] *Ibid.*, n. 1352.
[55] *Ibid.*, nn. 1331, 1351–52, with Aristotle, *Met.*, Z 4, 1030a11–17 and 1030b3–6; Z 5, 1031a1–11.
[56] *Ibid.*, nn. 1342, 1350, 1352.
[57] *Ibid.*, n. 1352.

The answer lies in Aquinas's explanation of what it means for an entity to have an essence. In his commentary on *Met.* Z 4, Thomas rejects a purely logical understanding of the notion of essence.[58] The main idea behind the logical understanding is that, just as substances have names and formulae explaining the meaning of their names, so accidents have names and formulae explaining the meaning of such names. Accidents, therefore, are definable just as substances are, and so should have an essence, just as substances do. One general problem with this understanding of essence is that it compels us to posit an essence for all things possessing a meaningful name and a formula explaining the meaning of that name. But this can hardly be a reasonable conception of essence. For there are many things possessing a meaningful name, which nonetheless lack unity and so are not instances of natures or kinds. And being an instance of a nature or kind seems to be precisely that in which having an essence consists. According to the logical understanding of essence, for instance, the Trojan War has an essence, because it has a name, "Iliad," and a formula explaining the meaning of the name, i.e., Homer's poem.[59] The great number of people, actions, and events that constitute the Trojan War, however, do not represent one single nature and so can hardly count among the things that have a genuine essence. More relevant for the case of accidents, the logical approach does not enable us to distinguish between primary and secondary essences—which can be done only by introducing ontological considerations, i.e., only by looking at the nature of things and the way they exist. A definition of an accident that does not mention the kind of substance in which it inheres does not reflect the real nature of the accident; nor does it take account of the way accidents exist. The fact that accidents exist in substances and existentially depend on them corresponds with some kind of essential dependence of accidents on substances. The essences of accidents, in other words, are dependent essences. Thus, the essence of a certain accident, although distinct from the essence of its proper subject, cannot be grasped without taking into account the subject itself, i.e., without bringing into light the accident's essential dependence on substances. This is the reason why the subject must be mentioned in the definition of accidents.

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[58] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 3, n. 1324. This understanding is rejected by Aristotle himself. See *Met.*, Z 4, 1030a7–11, 14–17, and 1030b7–12.

[59] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 3, n. 1325.

I wish to end this section by making some final considerations about Aquinas's view on accidents and, in particular, about his claim that accidents are in some sense ontologically equivalent to accidental composites. Aquinas's claim should not be taken in a deflationary, let alone eliminativist, sense, as if Thomas's intent were to eliminate accidents from the ontology. As emerges from Aquinas's commentary on *Met.* Δ 7, Aristotle's chapter on the meaning of "being," Aquinas takes the ten categories (with the possible exception of some relations) to introduce ten mind-independent kinds of being.[60] This thought is reinforced by the claim to which I have already alluded, that the essence of a certain kind of accident is distinct from that of its proper subject of inherence. Admittedly, Aquinas explicitly states that, if an accident has an essence, it has that of the corresponding accidental composite.[61] But I take this to be a strongly worded way of pressing the point that the essence of an accident cannot be grasped separately from the kind of subject in which it inheres. The same is true of the existential counterpart of Aquinas's claim, i.e., the claim that an accident always exists as an accidental composite. In this case as well, the accidental composite is a thing composed of two distinct natures, that of the substance and that of the accident, neither of which can be altogether eliminated. This point too, it seems to me, is confirmed by Aquinas's commentary on *Met.* Δ and, in particular, by his analysis of Chapter 6, Aristotle's explanation of the different meaning of "one." As is known, Aristotle distinguishes in the chapter between things that are one *per se* and things that are only accidentally one.[62] Accidental composites, i.e., things resulting from an accident's inhering in a substance, are standard examples of accidental unities. As Aquinas clearly implies, the main reason why an accidental composite lacks *per se* unity is that it is composed of two distinct natures, i.e., is the result of two simple things of different natures.[63] This further confirms that substances and accidents are irreducible kinds of being. In conclusion, to emphasize the radical dependence of accidents on substances does not imply for Aquinas to deny the ontological distinctness of these two kinds of entities.

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[60] *Ibid.*, V, lec. 9, n. 890.

[61] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 3, n. 1322.

[62] Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Δ 6, 1015b16–36 (for the things that are accidentally one) and 1015b36–1016b17 (for the things that are one *per se*).

[63] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 7, nn. 842–47 (esp. n. 843). See also: *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 9, nn. 886–88 for the related notion of accidental being.

2.4. *Avicenna, Averroes and the Essence-Existence Distinction*

As I have said in the Introduction, Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* is rather Aristotelian in character, that is, it makes use of typical Aristotelian notions without introducing any external doctrine or conceptual scheme. One particularly striking absence is Avicenna's doctrine of essence. Only in one place does Aquinas put to significant use Avicenna's distinction between the essence in itself and its different modes of existence, i.e., in interpreting Aristotle's claim in *Met*. Z 13 that no universal is substance.[64] Aquinas remarks that "universal" can be taken in two ways. (i) In one way, it refers to the nature upon which the intellect confers universality. Taken in this way, universals, e.g., human being or animal, are the natures of the extramental things of which they are predicated. (ii) In another way, "universal" can refer to the universal *qua* universal, i.e., to the nature insofar as it is subject to universality and so bears a uniform relationship to all the things falling under it. Taken in this second way, universals are not the natures of the things falling under them. Aquinas's distinction should be read in the light of Avicenna's doctrine of essence, according to which an essence in itself is neither universal nor particular but acquires one property or the other depending on the different modes of existence it assumes.[65] An essence becomes universal in the intellect, where it exists as a universal concept representing all the individuals of a certain species or genus, while it becomes particular in the extramental world, where it exists in particulars. Thus, Aquinas's point seems to be that, when taken as the nature of extramental particulars, an essence is not universal. For it is universal only in the intellect, where it exists as a universal concept.[66] What is more, the essence of particulars does not exist separate from them but, rather, in them. Plato's mistake, which Aristotle intends to correct in the *Metaphysics*, consisted precisely in supposing that universals *qua* universals could exist outside the mind, while they exist as such only in the mind.[67] Consequently, he conceived of the nature of sensible things as separate entities over and above the particulars of which they are the natures. In other words, Plato did not distinguish between the two senses in which the word "universal" can be

[64] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 13, nn. 1570–71.

[65] For this piece of doctrine, see Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina I–X*, V, 1, ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Leuven, Louvain-la-Neuve-Leiden, 1977–83).

[66] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, n. 1570.

[67] *Ibid.*, VII, lec. 13, nn. 1570–71.

understood and ended up attributing to the essence as it exists extramentally characteristics it possesses only when existing in the mind. In the passage at issue, Aquinas says nothing about the relationship between extramental particulars and the natures existing in them: he does not explain, in other words, whether the essences of extramental things are fully identical with them or not. He contents himself with employing Avicenna's conceptual machinery to reject Plato's position.

Apart from this brief passage, Avicenna's doctrine of essence does not play any significant role in Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of substance. There is, however, one famous passage in Aquinas's commentary on *Met*. Γ where he strongly criticizes Avicenna's way of conceiving of the distinction between essence and existence (and extramental existence in particular).[68] Thomas's criticism arises in the context of Aristotle's discussion of the signification of "being" and "one."[69] According to Avicenna—Aquinas alleges—both "being" and "one" do not signify the essence of extramental things, but rather something added to the essence, i.e., an accident of the essence.[70] Presumably, Aquinas is here referring to Avicenna's treatment of three crucial transcendental notions, *thing, existent*, and *one*. To be a thing means to have an essence, to be something possessing an essence. Thus, the doctrine Aquinas is crediting Avicenna with is that to have an essence and to be existent are only accidentally related as much as to have an essence and to be one are accidentally related.[71] After leveling his general criticism, Aquinas examines the two parts of Avicenna's doctrine separately:[72] for one thing, Avicenna misconceives the relationship between essence and existence in each created thing; for another, he misunderstands also the relationship between essence and unity. According to the Dominican Master, the second mistake presupposes a certain confusion between one taken as a transcendental, which is not accidentally related to the essence of things, and one as the principle of number, which is a quantity and so is just an accident of the things to which it belongs.[73] For lack of space, I shall focus here exclusively on the essence-existence distinction.

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[68] *Ibid.*, IV, lec. 2, nn. 556–60.
[69] Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Γ, 2, 1003b22–32.
[70] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 2, n. 556.
[71] *Ibid.*, nn. 556–57.
[72] *Ibid.*, n. 558 for the notion of existent and nn. 559–60 for the notion of one.
[73] *Ibid.*, nn. 557 and 560.

Aquinas reproaches Avicenna for maintaining that the existence of an extramental thing is added to its essence in the manner of an accident. In reply, Aquinas advances his own understanding of the essence-existence distinction according to which the existence of a thing is really (i.e., mind-independently) distinct from its essence but is not added to the essence in the manner of an accident: the existence of a thing is something somehow constituted by the principles of the essence.[74] Although Aquinas's remark may be useful to clarify his own reading of the essence-existence distinction, it cannot be taken as a correct interpretation of Avicenna's way of construing the distinction. Let me first explain this latter point. Probably, the source of Aquinas's misunderstanding of Avicenna is Averroes's *Long Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*. In some texts, Averroes addresses to Avicenna the same criticisms that we find in Aquinas's *Sententia super Metaphysicam*: the basic idea is that both existence and unity are accidents of a thing's essence.[75] But at least insofar as the essence-existence distinction is concerned, Averroes cannot be right. The mistake which both Averroes and Aquinas incur stems from not clearly distinguishing two senses of "accident" and "accidental": "accidental" in the strict sense, i.e., "accidental" in the sense of "contingent" as opposed to "necessary"; and "accidental" in the broad sense, i.e., "accidental" in the sense of "non-essential" as opposed to "essential." According to the strict sense, all the necessary properties of a thing are not accidental, while according to the broad sense, some necessary properties of a thing may turn out to be non-essential and so accidental. Now, when Avicenna says that the existence of a thing is accidental to its essence, what he means is that the existence of a thing falls outside its essence.[76] It is not built into the essence of a thing that it exists. In saying so, Avicenna is taking "accidental" in the broad sense, as opposed to "essential." In all likelihood, however, he does not want to imply that existence is also an accident in the strict sense of the term. For he maintains that an essence must always exist in some way or another: essences, in other words, either exist mentally or extramentally. So, mental and extramental existence

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[74] *Ibid.*, n. 558.

[75] Cf. Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII, cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, IV, t.c. 3, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. 8, fol. 67B–E; X, t.c. 8, fols. 257E–G and 257K.

[76] For the distinction between essence and existence see: Avicenna Latinus, *Philosophia Prima,* I, 5, pp. 33.25–40, 54; V, 1, *passim*. See also the texts concerning the relationships among being, one and quiddity: Avicenna Latinus, *Philosophia Prima*, III, 1, p. 106.45ff.; III, 2, p. 114.17–20; III, 3, p. 117.80–86; pp. 119.19–122.71; VII, 1, p. 349.7–18.

are disjunctively necessary properties of an essence and not mere accidents thereof. Probably, however, we can even go farther than that. For Avicenna seems to have subscribed to some version of the principle of plenitude, according to which all genuine possibilities must be realized at some time or another. Since essences are genuine possibilities, there is a sense in which a genuine essence *must* exist extramentally at some time or another.[77] Therefore, in no sense can existence be conceived of as a mere accident of an essence. Averroes may have had polemical reasons to misdescribe Avicenna's position. Not so Aquinas, who is generally in agreement with Avicenna's doctrine of essence. The most likely possibility is that the Dominican Master is here mislead by Averroes's remark.

Though being philologically incorrect, Aquinas's remark sheds some light on the way he himself construes the essence-existence distinction. Thomas says that existence, although being mind-independently distinct from essence, is something somehow constituted by the principles of the essence. What Aquinas means is that to exist for some thing is just to actualize a certain possible way of existing: to exist for a human being is to actualize the way of existence which is proper to human beings, i.e., to exist as a human being. In some sense, therefore, the essence determines the way in which a thing exists, if it exists, and existing is just the actualization of this way of existing. Of course, we must distinguish within a certain thing the essence-principle from the existence-principle, for the existence of any created thing is not included in its essence but, rather, falls outside it. However, essence and existence are not related as a thing and its accidents but, rather, as potentiality and actuality. And the relationship between potentiality and actuality is not merely accidental, in that existing in actuality is just realizing a certain way of existing in potentiality and hence does not amount to an addition of a property.

3. Beyond Sensible Substances

3.1. *Aquinas on* Metaphysics *Lambda*

As we have seen, for Aquinas K and Λ are the books of the *Metaphysics* specifically devoted to the study of separate substances. As a matter

[77] On this and related issues see: Deborah L. Black, "Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 8 (1997), 425–53.

of fact, K is not so much about separate substances but is a rather miscellaneous book which assembles material from Books B and Δ of the *Metaphysics* and from Books B, Γ, and E of the *Physics*. This has led some modern scholars to raise doubts about its authenticity. Without going as far as that, Aquinas recognizes the peculiar character of the book by observing that it is a sort of *résumé* of various topics one should deal with as a preliminary to the study of substance.[78] In particular, in Aquinas's understanding, the book recalls: (i) some of Book B's aporiae (with regard to both metaphysics as a scientific investigation and the contents of the investigation); (ii) Book Γ's solutions to the aporiae concerning the scientific status of metaphysics; and (iii) the discussions of accident, motion, and infinity presented partly in Books α and E of the *Metaphysics* and partly in Book Γ of the *Physics*.[79] Thus, for Aquinas as well, it is, strictly speaking, Book Λ which offers a full treatment of the topic of separate substances.

Aquinas also has some interesting observations to make about the internal structure of Λ's argument. According to modern interpreters, Book Λ was not intended to be the final treatise of the *Metaphysics* as it has come down to us but, rather, a short and independent treatment of the topic of substance, which focuses on two main topics: how many kinds of substance (sensible and corruptible, sensible and incorruptible, insensible and incorruptible) there are and whether the principles of all substances are the same or different.[80] The nature of the book is revealed, modern interpreters insist, by the consideration that the first five chapters of the Book cover exactly the same ground as *Met.* Z and H, i.e., the analysis of sensible substances, while it is only in the last five chapters that Aristotle sets out to talk about separate substances. Book Λ, in other words, was intended to be a complete treatment of the nature of substances and their principles. As I said in the Introduction, Aquinas offers a very systematic reading of the *Metaphysics*. For him, the *Metaphysics* is a well ordered and systematic treatise, where each book finds its place within the general argumentative structure. Endorsing this point of view, however, does not prevent him from making some insightful observations about Aristotle's strategy. Book Λ is a case in point. Aquinas remarks, in

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[78] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XI, lec. 1, n. 2146.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] On *Met.* Λ in general, see Michael Frede, "Introduction," in: Michael Frede & David Charles, eds., *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Lambda*. *Symposium Aristotelicum Series* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1–52.

fact, that in Chapters 1–5 Aristotle does nothing but recall, in a concise form, the main achievements of his treatment of substance in *Met.* Z and H as well as some important points from Books E and Z of the *Physics*.[81] It is only with Chapter 6 that Aristotle starts to enquire into the nature of separate substances. Thus, for Aquinas too, Aristotle's treatment of separate substances, Aristotle's theology, is very short indeed.

I have also said that Aquinas's exposition of Λ 6–10 is a good test case to weigh up the Dominican Master's attitude towards Aristotle in the *Sententia super Metaphysicam*. More than one time in this section, Aquinas breaks the flow of his linear explanation of the text to introduce some words of qualification concerning the assumptions from which Aristotle moves. Let me give three examples. In Λ 7, Aristotle establishes that the Prime Mover moves as an object of thought and intellectual desire.[82] On this basis, he further concludes that the first moved body, i.e., the heaven, must think of and desire the Prime Mover.[83] Aquinas observes that this conclusion only follows from Aristotle's assumption that the heaven is an animated body, capable of thought and desire—an assumption which Aquinas usually rejects.[84] Analogously, in Λ 8, Aristotle establishes the number of secondary movers (the angels on Aquinas's understanding) on the basis of the number of planetary and celestial motions to be counted. Although Aquinas does not entirely reject this procedure, he regards it as insufficient and to some extent misguided. There can be, in fact, higher rank separate substances, which are not the final causes of any celestial body. After all, Aquinas remarks, separate substance do not exist for the sake of corporeal substances; rather, corporeal substances exist for the sake of separate ones.[85]

Examples of Aquinas's qualifications and corrections could be multiplied. By far the most important are Aquinas's comments on Aristotle's proof of the existence of a Prime Mover in *Met.* Λ 6. The proof, as Aquinas himself recognizes, closely follows the one Aristotle provides in Book Θ of the *Physics*. It hinges upon the idea that, since the primary motion, the motion of the heaven, is continuous and eternal, it can be accounted for only by an eternal moving cause, unmixed with potentiality. From the absence of potentiality, Aristotle also concludes the immateriality of

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[81] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 1, n. 2416.
[82] Cf. *Met.*, Λ 7, 1072a26–1072b3.
[83] Cf. *Met.*, Λ 7, 1072b3–14.
[84] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 8, n. 2536.
[85] *Ibid.*, XII, lec. 10, n. 2589.

the Prime Mover. It is not my intention to dwell on the details of Aristotle's argument. My focus is, rather, Aquinas's reaction to it, which is particularly interesting. Clearly, Aquinas believes that the argument, as it stands, is not conclusive. Thus, he remarks that both the argument here in *Met.* Λ and the parallel one in *Phys*. Θ are not demonstrative but merely probable arguments, possibly prompted by the desire to refute the Presocratics' conception of motion.[86] What is wrong with Aristotle's arguments, according to Aquinas, is the assumption of the backwards eternity of both motion and time. Aquinas exposes this mistake insofar as time is concerned.[87] The conclusion that time must be backwards eternal is reached by reasoning that the claim that time has a beginning is self-defeating. Suppose that time had a beginning, so the reasoning goes; then there would be a time at which time does not exist. But if there is a time at which time does not exist, then there is time before time begins—which is absurd. Aquinas explicitly rejects the reasoning by observing that, if time has a beginning, then the time at which time does not exist is not real, only the product of our imagination.[88] We imagine a time before time begins, but that time is not out there; it is only in our mind. Although Aquinas believes that Aristotle's argument is faulty, he explicitly remarks that the conclusion of the argument, the existence of an eternal and immaterial cause, is true, as can be seen once Aristotle's premises are replaced with appropriate and necessary ones.[89] Aquinas sketches out the kind of argument he has in mind.[90] If the world is not eternal—and it is not—it must have been brought into being by something else. And if this cause of being in turn is not eternal, it must have been brought into being by a second cause, and so on and so forth ad infinitum. Since, as Aristotle himself shows in *Met*. α 2, a backwards infinite chain of causes is impossible, we must conclude the existence of an eternal substance. Such a substance must be unmixed with potentiality and, hence, must be immaterial. Although somehow elegantly, therefore, Aquinas reproaches Aristotle for overlooking the main argument in favor of the existence of God, namely, the contingency of the world. Only by shifting the argument from the explanation of motion to the explanation of being itself can one conclude to the existence of an eternal substance, unmixed with potentiality.

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[86] *Ibid.*, XII, lec. 5, n. 2497.
[87] *Ibid.*, n. 2496.
[88] *Ibid.*, n. 2498.
[89] *Ibid.*, n. 2499.
[90] *Ibid.*, n. 2499.

It is not surprising that Aquinas should have something to say about Aristotle's conception of God. What is more important, for our purposes, is that the Dominican Master makes explicit his disagreement with Aristotle. In the *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, Aquinas is explaining a series of doctrines with which he is basically in agreement. When he is not, he lets us know.

3.2. *Levels of Ontological Composition and Hierarchies of Beings in the Commentary on the* Metaphysics

One of the cornerstones of Aquinas's metaphysical thought is the view that the substances which occupy different levels of the ontological hierarchy also display different levels or layers of ontological composition. The crucial tenet is that God, Who occupies the highest rank in the hierarchy, is absolutely simple. All creatures, by contrast, are composite, i.e., non-simple. Angelic substances or intelligences display fewer levels of composition, being closer to the first principle, while sensible substances are composite according to more levels of composition in that they are more removed from the first principle. Aquinas singles out three different layers of composition: (1) the essence-existence composition; (2) the essence-principle of individuation composition; and (3) the matter-form composition. In all three cases, what Aquinas has in mind when he talks of "composition" is a real or mind-independent composition, i.e., a distinction of constituents which is given, in reality, independently of our mental activity, even though the degree of distinction may vary from one kind of composition to another.[91] Compositions of types (1) and (3) are essential to the structure of Aquinas's hierarchical metaphysics. According to Thomas, in fact, the essence-existence composition is the distinguishing mark of creaturality: the most basic sense in which creatures can be said not to be simple is that they are composed of essence and existence. Thus, both angelic and sensible substances are composed of essence and existence. I have already alluded to Aquinas's basic intuition in Section 2.4. An essence is just a certain potentiality for existing in a certain way, and hence having an essence is just having a certain potentiality for existing in a certain way. In order for such a potentiality to be

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[91] On this particular point, see Gabriele Galluzzo, "Two Senses of 'Common.' Avicenna's Doctrine of Essence and Aquinas's View on Individuation," in: Amos Bertolacci & Dag N. Hasse, eds., *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's "Metaphysics"* (Berlin, 2011), pp. 309–38.

actual, another principle must be added to the essence, a principle which, not being contained in the essence, is external to it and so distinct from it. Although being distinct, essence and existence are, nonetheless, not unconnected or strictly accidental to one another but, rather, related as potentiality and actuality: the existence-principle does nothing but actualize a certain possible way of existing. If both angels and sensible substances are composed of essence and existence, how do we distinguish them? Thanks to composition of type (3). Sensible substances, besides being composed of essence and existence, are also composed of matter and form, while angels are immaterial and so are not composed of matter and form. Angels, in other words, are pure forms. The role of composition of type (2) is more uncertain. Throughout his career, Aquinas consistently maintains that an individual sensible substance is not identical with its essence. The reason is that an individual sensible substance is not simply an essence but is, rather, an essence plus an individuating principle, i.e., a principle that accounts for what makes of the individual substance the individual substance it is and what differentiates it from the other cospecific substances. I argued elsewhere that endorsing this view just amounts to some form of *realism* concerning the structure of sensible substances:[92] Aquinas believes that each individual sensible substance is composed of a common constituent, the essence, which accounts for what it has in common with the other cospecific substances, and an individuating constituent, individual matter, which accounts for what differentiates an individual sensible substance from all the other cospecific substances. Standardly, Aquinas also maintains that, by contrast, an individual angelic substance *is* identical with its essence.[93] Aquinas takes this view because he thinks that existence does not contribute anything to individuation: we can talk of an individual angel before we take into account its existing or not existing. To put things otherwise, we can talk of both actual and possible individual angels. On this understanding, angels are conceived of as primitively individual essences: the individuality of an angel must not be accounted for by positing a principle external to the essence that somehow enters into composition with it. Only in one text, i.e., *Quodlibet* II,

[92] Cf. Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 71.1 (2004), 131–71; "Two Senses of 'Common.'"

[93] Cf., for instance, Thomas Aquinas, *Liber De Veritate Catholicae Fidei seu Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, 40, ed. Ceslao Pera, Pietro Marc, & Pietro Caramello, 3 vols. (Turin-Rome, 1961), vol. 3, n. 3779; *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei*, q. 9, a. 1, ed. Paul M. Pession, 2 vols. (Turin-Rome, 1965), vol. 1, p. 226.

q. 2, a. 2, does Aquinas distance himself from his standard view by maintaining that an individual angel is *not* identical with its essence.[94] In this text, he seems to think that the existence principle cannot be left out of the picture when talking about individual angels. But, clearly, if an individual angel is not just an essence but, rather, essence plus existence, it cannot be identical with its essence. For no thing can be identical with one of its distinct constituents. The result of this discussion is that, according to Aquinas's standard view, composition of type (2) turns out to be coextensive with composition of type (3), i.e., the matter-form composition: all and only those things that are composed of matter and form are also composed of essence and principle of individuation. According to the view in *Quod.* II.2.2, by contrast, composition of type (2) becomes coextensive with composition of type (1), the essence-existence composition: all and only those things that are composed of essence and existence are also non-identical with their essence.

Is there any trace, in Aquinas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* of such a sophisticated metaphysical machinery? Do we see any hint at the doctrine of the levels of ontological composition? The presence of composition of type (1), i.e., matter-form composition, is uncontroversial. The main line of enquiry in the central books consists in evaluating the impact of the matter-form composition on the question of the substantiality of sensible objects. As we have seen, Aquinas explores the consequences of the matter-form analysis not only at the level of the concrete existence of sensible objects, but also at that of their essence, by maintaining that sensible objects are essentially composed of matter and form and so must be defined accordingly. It is important to note, however, that Aquinas employs the matter-form composition not only to characterize the nature of sensible objects but also to contrast their nature with that of separate substances, thereby emphasizing the hierarchical structure of reality. Separate substances, including here both God and angels, are described as positively immaterial, i.e., free from matter, as early as in the preface to the commentary, where Thomas is trying to determine the subject of metaphysics.[95] If intelligibility consists in being separate from matter, Aquinas remarks, then separate substances deserve to be called the most intelligible objects. For they are separate from matter not only

[94] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de quolibet*, II, q. 2, a. 2, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. 25.2 (Rome-Paris, 1996), pp. 215–18, esp. 217.85–102.

[95] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, Proem.

in understanding but also in being. Consistently, throughout his commentary on Book Λ, Aquinas presents immateriality as one of the distinguishing marks both of God and of angelic intelligences.[96]

Also, composition of type (2), i.e., the essence-principle of individuation composition, plays a role in the *Sententia super Metaphysicam*. As said, distinguishing between essence and the principle of individuation implies distinguishing between an individual thing and its essence. Aristotle discusses the question as to whether a thing is identical with its essence in *Met*. Z 6. He then briefly goes back to it at the end of *Met*. Z 11 (1037a33–b7), when summing up the main achievements of his discussion of essence. It is especially in his commentary on *Met*. Z 11 that Aquinas provides a full interpretation of Aristotle's answer to the problem of the identity or non-identity between a thing and its essence. Although Aristotle speaks generally of whether *a thing* is identical with its essence so as to include every kind of thing, be it a substance, an accident, or an accidental composite, Aquinas is mainly interested in whether individual *substances* are identical with their essence, the question, in more technical terms, whether a supposit, i.e., an individual substance, is identical with its essence. In his commentary on *Met*. Z 11, Aquinas clearly remarks that sensible substances are not identical with their essence and explains also why:

> And it is necessary not only to exclude [i.e., from the identity with their essence] accidental things, but also to exclude material substances. For, as was said above, what the definition signifies is the essence, and definitions are not assigned to individuals but to species; and therefore individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, is distinct from the essence. But in reality it is impossible for a species to exist except in a particular individual. Hence if any natural thing has matter which is part of its species, and this pertains to the essence, it must also have individual matter, which does not pertain to its essence. Therefore, if any natural thing has matter, it is not its own essence; for example, Socrates is not humanity but something having humanity. And if it were possible for a man to be composed of body and soul and not be this particular man composed of this body and this soul, he would still be his own essence, even though he contained matter.[97]

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[96] Cf., by way of example, Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 5, n. 2495; VII, lec. 7, n. 2519; VII, lec. 9, n. 2553; VII, lec. 10, n. 2589.

[97] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 11, n. 1535: "Oportet autem non solum ista excludi, sed etiam substantias materiales. Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod quid erat esse est id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem non assignatur individuis, sed speciebus; et ideo materia individualis, quae est individuationis principium, est praeter id quod est quod quid erat esse. Impossibile est autem in rerum natura esse speciem nisi in hoc individuo. Unde

In the passage quoted, Aquinas clearly states that an individual sensible substance is not identical with its essence. The reason is that an individual sensible substance is not only essence but essence plus the principle of individuation, which Aquinas identifies here with the so-called individual matter. Sensible substances, therefore, display the essence-principle of individuation composition. It is interesting to see that, a few lines below, Aquinas employs such a kind of composition to contrast the case of sensible substances with that of separate ones:

> Moreover, it follows that those substances which are subsistent forms alone do not have any principle individuating them which is extrinsic to the formula (of the thing or of the species) which signifies their essence. Concerning these things, then, it is true that each of them is unqualifiedly the same as its own essence.[98]

In this text, Aquinas explicitly asserts that separate substances are identical with their own essence. Consequently, they do not display the essence-principle of individuation composition. Moreover, Aquinas's description of separate substances as "subsistent forms" clearly indicates that it is the case of angelic substances that he has chiefly in mind. Thus, in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Aquinas follows his standard view, according to which angels are identical with their essence, and not the "unorthodox" stance he takes in *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, a. 2.

The case of composition of type (3), i.e., the essence-existence composition, is, admittedly, more complicated. We have seen in Section 2.4 that Aquinas reproaches Avicenna for misconceiving the nature of the essence-existence distinction. According to Aquinas, existence is related to essence not in the manner of an accidental property but, rather, in the way actuality is related to potentiality. So far so good. The question, however, is whether Aquinas ever employs in his commentary the

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oportet quod quaelibet res naturae, si habeat materiam quae est pars speciei, quae est pertinens ad quod quid est, quod etiam habeat materiam individualem, quae non pertinet ad quod quid est. Unde nulla res naturae, si materiam habeat, est ipsum quod quid est, sed est habens illud. Sicut Socrates non est humanitas, sed est humanitatem habens. Si autem esset possibile esse hominem compositum ex corpore et anima, qui non esset hic homo ex hoc corpore et ex hac anima compositus, nihilominus esset suum quod quid erat esset, quamvis haberet materiam." English translation: Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* Metaphysics, trans. by John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), p. 575.

98 Cf. *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 11, n. 1535: "Relinquitur autem quod illae substantiae quae sunt formae tantum subsistentes, non habent aliquid per quod individuentur, quod sit extra rationem rei vel speciei significantem quod quid est. Et ideo in illis simpliciter verum est, quod quaelibet illarum est suum quod quid erat esse" (Rowan's English translation, p. 575, slightly modified).

essence-existence machinery to describe the hierarchical structure of reality, that is, to contrast creatures, which are composed of essence and existence, with God, Who has no ontological constituents at all. Probably, the best way to try to answer this question is to see whether in his treatment of separate substances Aquinas ever distinguishes between the ontological status of God and that of the other separate substances, i.e., the angelic intelligences. In Book Λ, Aristotle first proves, in Chapter 6, the existence of some eternal, immaterial, and unmoved substance and then goes on, in Chapter 7, to give some more details about its nature. Only in Chapter 8 does he finally raise the question as to whether there is more than one separate substance and enquire into the number of such substances. Aristotle's argument in Λ contains an ambiguity: it is not clear whether Aristotle wishes to prove the necessary existence of the *kind* of substance of which both the Prime Unmoved Mover (God, in Aquinas's understanding) and the secondary movers (the angels) are examples and then show that there is more than one substance of the kind; or whether he wants to prove the existence of the Prime Mover and then pass on to the further question of whether we need to posit secondary unmoved movers as well. This ambiguity is also reflected in Aquinas's commentary. However, it is clear from the way the Dominican Master expresses himself that a good number of the things Aristotle says in Chapters 6 and 7 about separate substances are attributable only to God as opposed to the other immaterial substances. Two examples are particularly striking. In Chapter 6, Aristotle argues that it is necessary for the eternal continuity of motion that the eternal and unmoved substance whose nature he is describing, i.e., the unmoved mover, be also eternally in actuality.[99] The thought is that only a continuously acting substance can explain the continuous passage from potentiality to actuality in which motion properly consists. Aristotle further strengthens his claim by saying that, in order to explain the eternity of motion, it is not enough that we posit an eternally moving and acting substance; it is also necessary that the very essence of such a substance be actuality: something whose very essence is not actuality, in fact, could in principle stop existing and so imparting motion with the result that motion would not be eternal.[100] Although Aristotle's characterization of an essentially actual being perfectly fits the case of the Prime Mover, nothing of what he says excludes that it might apply to the secondary

[99] Cf. *Met.*, Λ 6, 1071b12–22.
[100] Cf. *Met.*, Λ 7, 1071b17–20 with Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 5, n. 2494.

unmoved movers as well: the secondary unmoved movers, in other words, can perfectly be conceived of as essentially actual beings. In his commentary on the beginning of Λ 7, by contrast, Aquinas makes it clear that this characterization should be restricted to the Prime Mover alone.[101] Clearly, the Dominican Master is somehow trying to read into Aristotle's text his claim that in all substances other than God, i.e., in all creatures, there is a mixture of potentiality and actuality. The imperfection of all created things, in other words, consists in their not being absolutely simple but, rather, composed of potentiality and actuality. This is because they receive being from outside, because they participate in being, i.e., because they have being only insofar as they bear some relationship to what is essentially being. Distinguishing between God and the other things on the basis of the potentiality-actuality composition is just another way of saying that things other than God are composed of essence and existence. For, as we have seen, the potentiality-actuality distinction is Aquinas's standard way of cashing out his talk of the essence-existence composition. Not surprisingly, in his commentary on Λ 6, Aquinas characterizes things other than God in terms of their contingency: things, in other words, that are mixed with potentiality are contingent, that is, they can both be and not be. This is a result of their receiving existence from outside.[102] Thus, Aquinas seems after all to introduce implicitly the essence-existence distinction in his explanation of Aristotle's treatment of separate substances.

This point can be shown also by focusing on a different theme, the kind of cognition that characterizes separate substances. In *Met.* Λ 7, after establishing the point that the kind of immaterial substance he is describing moves as an object of thought and intellectual desire, Aristotle further shows that such a kind of substance must also be intelligent to the highest degree.[103] This is certainly one of the sections in Λ 6–7 where Aristotle may be taken to be referring to the Prime Mover alone and not also to the secondary movers. Be that as it may, this is clearly the way Aquinas takes the text. It is only in his commentary on *Met.* Λ 9 that Aquinas presents a full-fledged explanation of the kind of cognition that characterizes God in opposition to all other intelligent beings. This is reasonable enough, for it is in fact in Λ 9–10 that Aristotle describes in some detail how we should conceive of the intellectual activity of separate substances. Aquinas

[101] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 6, n. 2518.
[102] Cf. *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 5, n. 2494.
[103] Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Λ 7, 1072b14–28.

remarks that an intelligent being can relate to its own intellection, i.e., to its own intellectual activity, in three different ways.[104] (i) One possibility is that an intellectual being never possesses intellection in actuality, only in potentiality. (ii) Another is that an intellectual being understands things in actuality, but in such a way that it is not identical with its activity of understanding, i.e., its intellectual activity or intellection. (iii) The final possibility is that an intellectual being is simply identical with its intellection. Predictably, Thomas concludes that God's case is case (iii): God is simply identical with His activity of intellection. It is not difficult to see that Aquinas is here alluding to three different ranks of intellectual being: human beings, angels, and God. The equation of human beings with case (i) needs, of course, a word of qualification. As is evident, Aquinas does not mean to say that human beings never exercise their intellectual activity or that their intellects are somehow dormant. However, as he always emphasizes, human cognition involves a passage from understanding in potentiality to understanding in actuality, i.e., from something being understood in potentiality to something being understood in actuality. Human beings, in other words, sometimes consider a certain intellectual content, while sometimes they do not . Thence the necessity of positing in them a possible intellect, i.e., a faculty which is capable of storing intellectual contents to be fished out, as it were, by the intellect's consideration. The most interesting case for us is case (ii), i.e., the case of angels. Some light on the implications of Aquinas's characterization of case (ii) can be shed by looking at the Dominican Master's discussion of angelic cognition in *S. Th.*, I^{a}, q. 54. In a. 4, for instance, Aquinas makes it clear that angels always exercise their intellectual activity. Their intellection, in other words, does not involve any passage from potentiality to actuality, i.e., from something being understood in potentiality to something being understood in actuality. Therefore, they do not need any possible intellect for storing in intellectual contents. In aa. 1 and 2, however, Aquinas makes it clear that angels are not identical with the intellectual activity they always exercise. More particularly, the intellectual activity of an angel is identical neither with their essence nor with their existence. In other words, the intellectual activity of an angel is one of its accidents. Now, what is important for our purposes is that the reason why angels are not identical with their intellection is that they are not pure actualities but are, rather, mixed to some degree with potentiality. And everything that

[104] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 11, nn. 2601–02.

has some degree of potentiality must also have something transpassing the boundaries of its nature, i.e., some accidental properties. Thus, although the intellection of angels does not pass from a potential state to an actual one and is, instead, always actual, angels are involved with potentiality at a deeper level, i.e., at the level of their ontological structure. But to say that angels are composed of potentiality and actuality is for Aquinas just another way of saying that they are composed of essence and existence. Thus, when in his commentary on Λ 9 Aquinas maintains that angels are not identical with their intellectual activity, he wishes to allude to their contingency, to their composed character and to the essence-existence composition which they exhibit.

I conclude, therefore, that even though the essence-existence composition is not one of the central themes of Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, it crops up more or less directly in Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of separate substances. In line with Aquinas's standard doctrine, the essence-existence distinction serves to demarcate God from all created beings, including angelic intelligences.

GILES OF ROME'S QUESTIONS ON THE *METAPHYSICS*

Alessandro D. Conti

Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), O.E.S.A. (Rome, ca.1243–Avignon, 1316) was one of the most important and well known theologians active at the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th.[1] He brought to completion Aquinas's shift from Augustine's approach in philosophy to Aristotle's and heavily influenced the philosophical and theological orientation of his Order.[2]

Until the 1960s, he had been described as a Thomist, a judgment that nowadays scholars resolutely deny. Indeed, despite his general agreement with him on many points, Giles can scarcely be represented as a disciple of Thomas Aquinas, since it is evident that he agreed with Thomas as a result of original considerations. He was an independent thinker who worked out his own theories, using Thomas's doctrines as starting points for his own. Moreover, very often the arguments he uses for supporting the theses he shares with Aquinas are different from those employed by

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[1] On Giles's life and works, see Francesco del Punta, Silvia Donati, & Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romeno," in: AA.VV., *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 42 (Rome, 1993), pp. 319–41. For a short but complete introduction to his thought, see Roberto Lambertini, "Giles of Rome," in: Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Spring 2009 Edition*) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/giles/> (accessed on September 1st, 2013). On his metaphysical doctrines, see Edagr Hocedez, "Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réelle (1276–87)," *Gregorianum* 8 (1927), 358–84; Marcel Chossat, "L'averroisme de St. Thomas. Notes sur la distinction d'essence et d' existence à la fin du XIII siècle," *Archives de philosophie* 9 (1932), 130–77; Jean O. Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et Gilles of Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 15–17 (1940–42), 323–58; Peter W. Nash, "Giles of Rome on Boethius' *Diversum est esse et id quod est*," *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), 57–91; Peter W. Nash, "The Accidentality of *esse* According to Giles of Rome," *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), 103–15; Girolamo Trapé, "*Esse* partecipato e distinzione reale in Egidio Romeno," *Aquinas* 12 (1969), 443–68; John F. Wippel, "The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo," in: Parviz Morewedge, ed., *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval* (New York, 1982), pp. 131–64; Silvia Donati, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romeno," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 149–233; and Giorgio Pini, "La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romeno," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 271–304.

[2] In 1287 at Florence, the general chapter of the Hermits of St. Augustine decreed that Giles's works, not only in regard to what he had already written but even the future ones, should be considered as the official doctrine of the Order.

the Dominican Master. And finally, he did not hesitate to correct and, sometimes, sharply criticize Aquinas's opinions in significant aspects.

Among Giles's many Aristotelian commentaries, the *Quaestiones metaphysicales* is an early work: the *reportatio* made by a student of a course of lessons given by Giles, probably in the years in between 1269 and 1272,[3] when Giles was a young bachelor in theology at Paris, during Aquinas's second teaching period there. He commented on only a few books (the first, second, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and eleventh) and to an uneven extent, as he discusses 27 questions related to the first book, 22 to the second, 14 to the fourth, two to the sixth, 12 to the seventh, five to the eighth, six to the tenth, and three to the eleventh.[4] His commentary is lacking in real doctrinal focus, is very short, and, in some respect, is quite superficial and unproblematic. The Venetian edition of 1499, the oldest of the four Venetian editions which reproduce the text of this commentary, consists of no more than 38 folios. As many as 49 of its 91 questions concern the first two books of the *Metaphysics*, which constitute a sort of introduction to the work, since the first book illustrates the notion of a scientific discipline which deals with the first principles or causes of things and draws a brief history of the subject, and the second is a rapid methodological preamble, which deals with some themes connected with the notion of truth. As a result, Giles's commentary discusses few really metaphysical topics and appears to be devoted to articulating a sort of meta-discourse on the object (or subject-matter—*subiectum*), goal (*finis*), boundaries, and nature of the metaphysical science as well. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw from it some hints for reconstructing Giles's (early) metaphysical view.

The main sources of the work appears to be Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima* and Averroes's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which are cited in many questions but also frequently corrected and sometimes openly criticized. As far as Aquinas's writings are concerned, Giles shows himself to be acquainted with Thomas's main philosophical theses, but he quotes Aquinas's opinions very infrequently and always *ad sensum*.

In what follows I will offer a (tentatively systematic) glimpse into Giles's (early) metaphysical system together with an account of his conception of metaphysics as a scientific discipline. So the first section of the chapter will briefly deal with metaphysics seen as the science of being *qua* being.

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[3] Cf. Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romeno. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), 1–111, esp. 14–32.

[4] See the list of the 91 questions in the Appendix.

The second section will concern Giles's theory of analogy, which is the logical counterpart of his doctrine of being. In the third section, I shall focus on Giles's main ideas about the metaphysical composition of substances and shall sketch his peculiar solution to the question of the composition of essence and being. The fourth section will be about the notion of truth. And finally, in the last section I shall draw some conclusions about the general significance of Giles's (early) conception of the world.

1. Metaphysics as a Science

As is well known, in the first book of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle describes primary philosophy as a science which studies the explanatory principles and causes of everything (A 2, 982b7–9), whilst in the fourth book he speaks of it in terms of a science which investigates being *qua* being and the attributes belonging to it in virtue of its own nature (Γ 1, 1003a21–22). Yet, in Book VI he seems to argue that primary philosophy is (a form of) theology, in that it is mainly about divine being (E 1, 1026a27–32). So in his commentary, Giles tackles the question as to whether the object of the metaphysical investigation is God (I, q. 5), or the four causes (I, q. 11), or being *qua* being (IV, q. 1). His answer is that being *qua* being is the object of metaphysics (*ens secundum quod ens est subiectum istius scientiae*).

He argues that any science whose object of inquiry is a particular kind of being, such as the mobile being (*ens mobile ad ubi*), is itself particular, since sciences derive their own features from the features proper to their objects. But metaphysics is the most comprehensive among sciences. Therefore, its object must be the most general of all. And that is being. Moreover, being must be considered from the most universal and abstract point of view, since metaphysics is also the most abstract among sciences. Therefore, metaphysics must abstract from any type of matter as well as from the particular aspects of beings (namely, those things that can be said to be) and must consider them merely *qua* beings, without any other qualification. Natural science and mathematics also study being, but in different ways and under different aspects. Natural philosopher studies being, insofar as it is subject to the laws of nature and insofar it is that which moves and undergoes changes. The mathematician studies being *qua* abstract from matter, but insofar as it is countable and measurable.[5] This does not mean that metaphysics does not deal with God at all. Giles

[5] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphisicales*, IV, q. 1 (Venice, 1499), fol. c6rb (hereafter *Qu. Met.*).

explains that we can distinguish between the main object of a science considered by itself and properly (*subiectum principale per se et primo*) and the object of a science considered in a derivative way (*ex consequenti*). Being *qua* being is the object of metaphysics by itself and properly, but God is the main object of metaphysics in a derivative way, since the *ratio entis* is better realized in God himself than in any other being—namely, God *is* in the strictest sense of the term, since essence and being are the same in Him, and any other being *is* only insofar as it shares the being of God in accordance with its own nature.[6]

Finally, the four causes cannot be the object of inquiry of metaphysics because the subject-matter of a science is what is taken into consideration by that science, but the four causes *as such* cannot be taken into consideration by any science. In fact, causes (as such) are that by which something is proved (by a science) about something else, while the proper object of a science is that about which something is proved. As a consequence, although being the cause of something and being the object of a science are not absolutely incompatible properties, causes as such cannot be the object of any science because, in this particular case, they should be the causes of themselves.[7]

2. Being and Analogy

The point of departure of Giles's metaphysics is the notion of being (*ens*), which occupies the central place in his ontology—as we have seen. Given that the *Quaestiones metaphysicales* was written far before Duns Scotus worked out his theory of the univocity of being, in this work there is no discussion of Scotus's thesis (which, in contrast, was full of important consequences for the development of 14th-century philosophy), and the treatment of the topic is in line with the 13th-century realist tradition.

As is well known, in the Middle Ages the real issue was the knotty theological problem of the relationship among the notion of being, God, and

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[6] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 5, fol. a3rb–va. See also *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, th. 19, ed. Edgar Hocedez (Leuven, 1930), pp. 127 and 134; and *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 9 (Venice, 1503), fol. 20vb; q. 11, fol. 24vb; q. 12, fols. 27rb and 29ra.

[7] *Ibid.*, q. 11, fol. a5va–b: "Subiectum in scientia est illud de quo probatur aliquid in scientia; causa autem, secundum quod causa, est illud per quod probatur aliquid in scientia de subiecto; cum ergo esse illud de quo aliquid probatur (probari *ed.*) et esse illud per quod aliquid probatur in scientia sint rationes penitus diversae, patet quod, licet illud quod est causa possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae, tamen causa secundum quod causa non est subiectum alicuius scientiae."

creatures. Yet, in his *Metaphysics* (Δ 2, 1003a33–35), Aristotle raises the general problem of the word "being" and its different senses in relation to the categorial items only. He denies that "being" is a merely equivocal term, for all the many senses (*rationes*, in Latin) according to which "being" can be said of are related to a single sense, that in which substance is said to be. Although Giles devotes two questions to the analogy of being (the third and fourth of Book IV), he has little to say about analogy as such. What is more, as a faithful interpreter of Aristotle's thought, he is only concerned with the problem of the relation among being, substance, and accidents and does not examine the theological implications of the theory.

In discussing the first question, whether being is equivocal or analogous (*utrum ens sit aequivocum an analogum*), the Italian master mentions two different divisions of analogy. The first was common in the second half of the 13th century and is inspired by Aristotle's treatment of equivocity in the *Sophistical Refutations*;[8] while the second, which is simpler but more effective, is Giles's own. The general premise of both divisions is that equivocation, univocation, and analogy depend on the ways according to which the form, or forms, signified by the term at issue are related to the things to which the term refers.[9] If there are two or more forms connected with the term, it is equivocal.[10] If there is only one form, the term may be univocal or analogous. It is totally (*penitus*) univocal if the form is present in all the things in the same way (*aequaliter*); otherwise it is analogous. In their turn, analogous terms are divided into three sub-types. The first kind of analogy is very similar to univocity (as a matter of fact, it satisfies the conditions for univocity as traditionally defined on the basis of the first chapter of the *Categories*), since the form at issue is equally present in all the things that participate in it, but the things themselves are not precisely of the same type (or kind), since some of them are more perfect than the others. For instance, men and dogs participate equally in the

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[8] Cf. E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy," in: Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Spring 2009 Edition*) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/en-tries/analogy-medieval/> (accessed on September 1st, 2013).

[9] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. c6vb: "Ad istam quaestionem est intelligendum quod tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma; unde et Philosophus vocat formam quod quid est. Et in II *Physicorum* dicitur quod forma est ratio essendi. Unde ipsa definitio datur per formam. Unde etsi in definitione ponatur materia, hoc non est nisi in quantum materia participat naturam formae et in quantum est sub forma."

[10] *Ibid.*, fol. c6vb: "Unde si aliquod nomen imponatur pluribus per comparationem ad diversas formas, tunc, cum tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma, illud nomen dicitur de eis aequivoce."

form of animality but are not themselves equal, since men are much more perfect than dogs. This type of analogy is characteristic of (natural) genera only and was introduced in response to Aristotle's observation that many equivocations are hidden in a genus.[11] A second kind of analogy is very close to equivocity (as a matter of fact, it coincides with Boethius's first subdivision of equivocation).[12] Analogous in this sense are those things which happen to have the same name, but the form signified by the name is really present only in some of the things to which the term refers, while it is attributed to the others because of their likeness (*similitudo*) in relation to the former. According to Giles, an example of this kind of analogy is the noun "animal" when it is said of both real animals and pictured animals. The latter are called animals not because the form of animality is really present in them but because their external shape is the same as that of living animals.[13] The third kind of analogy is intermediary between equivocity and pure univocity. Those terms are analogical in the sense that they have only one form signified by them, but the things to which the terms refer participate in the form itself in different ways (i.e., *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*). "Being" is such a term, since substance alone *is* in an absolute way, whereas accidents *are* only in virtue of their relations to substance, and so derivatively.[14]

In Giles's opinion, the second partition he mentions is closer to Aristotle's intention. According to this partition, terms are divided into equivocal, univocal, and analogical. Those terms are equivocal which are matched by two or more forms, while those terms to which one form only corresponds are univocal or analogous. If the form is directly present in all the things to which the term refers, then there is univocity. If the form is directly present in some of the things to which the term refers and not in all of them, and it can be attributed to those in which it is not present in an indirect way, then there is analogy. "Being" is such an analogous term, since the form signified by it, namely, entity (*entitas*), is directly

[11] Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, H 3, 249a22–25.

[12] Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, in: *Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–1902), t. 64.

[13] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. dıra. This example is that analyzed by Aristotle in the first chapter of the *Categories*. As E. Jennifer Ashworth remarks in the above-quoted "Medieval Theories of Analogy," medieval logicians were unaware of the fact that the Greek word employed by Aristotle, and translated as 'animal' by Boethius, was genuinely polysemous, meaning both animal and image.

[14] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. dıra.

present in substance only and not in the accidents, which, in relation to being, are the analogical things (*analoga*).[15]

Giles maintains that the things which are said to be analogical in this sense are said to be such in relation to a form which is, in principle, one in number if considered by itself and in relation to them (namely, those things in which the form is not directly present)—even if it is actually multiplied in many things at once (namely, those where it is directly present), and so it is one in species in relation to the latter.[16] In order to better understand such claims, which look inconsistent at a first glance, it is necessary to keep in mind that (1) accidents are caused by primary substances[17] and properly inhere only in them, which are individual and so one in number; and (2) everything which properly belongs to a primary substance is *ipso facto* individual, or individualized, and so one in number.[18]

3. The Metaphysical Composition of Particular Substances

Giles is a realist, since for him the structure of scientific explanation mirrors the composition of the reality for which it accounts. The main problem of every medieval realist metaphysics was that of the metaphysical composition of individual substances, which is at the confluence of the main ontological problems at issue in that period: the relationships

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[15] *Ibid.*: "Sed si nos vellemus dare aliam di-stinctionem, possemus sic dicere, et melius credo, ad intentionem Philosophi: nam, sicut dictum est, tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma, et ideo si sit diversitas in forma erit aequivocatio, sicut dictum est. Si autem sit unitas (veritas *ed.*) in forma, aut est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per preadicationem aut est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per attributionem. Et est intelligendum quod quando est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per praedicationem, tunc est univocatio. Quando autem est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per attributionem, tunc erit analogia. [...] Quando aliqua plura sunt talia per aliquid quod est in eis, tunc est unitas per praedicationem; et est univocatio. [...] Sed quando aliqua plura sunt talia non per aliquid quod est in eis, sed per aliquid quod est in alio, tunc non dicuntur talia univoce, sed analogice. Sicut omnia entia dicuntur esse entia non per aliquid quod est in eis, sed per aliquid quod est in alio, sicut in substantia. Unde etsi accidentia dicuntur esse entia, hoc non est per entitatem quae est in eis, sed per entitatem quae est in substantia, sicut patebit in VII huius. Et ideo ens analogice dicitur et non aequivoce. Et hoc videtur esse intentio Philosophi, si aliquis bene consideret."

[16] *Ibid.*, IV, q. 4, fol. d1rb.

[17] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 1, fol. d5ra: "Item, illum dictum Philosophi aut intelligitur de accidente simpliciter aut de illo accidente quod est in substantia a qua causatur."

[18] This is true only for material substances, given that separate substances are not properly individual and one in number, because of the absence of the general form of quantity in them—see *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 10, fol. d3rb–va.

between essence and being, between universals and particulars, between substance and accidents, and the process of individuation. Individuation is, in a certain sense, the synthesis of all of them, since the question at stake—namely, how to explain the derivation of individuals (i.e., things that are self-subsistent and unique, existing here and now, and, in the case of material substances, capable of affecting our senses) from common natures, which are, by contrast, existentially incomplete and dependent, and accessible only to thought—is closely connected with all the others, and so the solution to the problem of individuation affects all the others. Most of the questions of Book VII—especially the seventh one, on whether particulars can be defined—deal with such topics. Giles's point of view in treating all this matter is epistemological rather than metaphysical, for his main concern seems to be to clarify *how* we can reach a proper understanding of the various levels of reality and of the different relationships among the elementary constituents of the world.

The distinction between things which exist in the primary way, namely, substances, and things which exist in a derivative way, namely, accidents, is one of the cornerstones of Giles's metaphysics. Accidents depend upon substances and have a feebler entity than substances.[19] Both substances and accidents are simple entities;[20] however, particular substances (or *res*) are in a sense composite because they are reducible to something else, i.e., essence and existence,[21] and have *partes reales*, i.e., matter and form, which are really different from the composite substance.[22] Even though all the accidents inhere in substance because of the matter and form taken together,[23] the main component of substance is its form (*forma*), or essence (*essentia*), or quiddity (*quidditas* or *quid est*). In fact, according to Giles, who echoes the first chapter of the *De ente et essentia* of Aquinas, all these terms—"form," "essence," and "quiddity"—refer to the same entity considered from different points of view. The form is an abstract entity by itself, common to a multiplicity of individuals (*particularia*, according to Giles's terminology), and so it has a definition in the strict sense of the term (*vera et propria definitio*) that particulars do not have, because

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[19] Cf., for instance, Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 2, fols. d4vb–d5ra.

[20] An item is said to be simple if and only if either it has no constituent parts, like the *summa genera*, or if its constituent parts cannot subsist separately.

[21] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e2ra.

[22] *Ibid.*, q. 9, fol. e2vb: "Res secundum suum esse actuale habet partes reales, scilicet materia et forma, quae sunt partes compositi. […] Nam pars realis realiter differt a suo toto, et ideo non praedicatur de ipso."

[23] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 8, fol. e2rb.

of the necessary presence in them of matter determined by dimensive quantity (*materia signata*). Such a *materia signata* acts as the principle of individuation, insofar as it multiplies substantial forms and individualizes them.[24] On the contrary, accidents do not have a true definition, since their being is not separated from that of substance,[25] and consequently in their peculiar form of definition (*per additamentum*) it is necessary to add an explicit reference to their substrate of inherence (*subiectum*).[26] The final result is that in the definition of accidents the relationship between genus and difference is just the opposite of that holding between them in the definition of substance. In fact, the genus is not the potential part of the definition and the difference the actual one, as it happens in the substances. Quite the reverse: it is the genus which is the actual part, as it contains a reference to the subject, while the difference acts as the potential part which needs to be determined. For instance, according to Giles, when we defined *simus* as *nasus cavus, cavus*, which is the difference, is determined (and so actualized) by *nasus*, which is the genus.[27]

As is well known, Thomas Aquinas had postulated a real composition of essence and *esse* in creatures, in order to account for the dependence of the world upon God at a merely philosophical level. He thought that because the essence of a creature receives its being from God, essence and being are distinct from each other, but related one to the other just as potency (essence) and act (being). Giles pursued the same line of thought, as he admitted a distinction between essence and being as between two things. The clearest exposition of his view is set in a passage from his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, where he states that every material substance has three different levels of being: categorial (*esse in praedicamento*), propositional (*esse rei quod dicit veritatem propositionis*), and actual (*esse actuale rei*).[28] The first one is the potential being that

[24] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e1va–b; and VIII, q. 5, fol. e6rb–va.
[25] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5va.
[26] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5rb.
[27] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5va–b.
[28] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super Analytica Posteriora*, II (Venice, 1488), fol. N1rb–va: "Dicendum quod possumus distinguere triplex esse. [...] Est autem primum esse rei per quod res est in praedicamento. [...] Tale esse potest competere rei ea non existente actualiter; ut non existente rosa in actu, verum est de ea quod sit res praedicamenti <substantiae>. [...] Ad tale autem esse sufficit quod res sit in suis causis, quia si est in suis causis, cum scire sit per causas, de ea poterit esse scientia. [...] Ergo quod habet tale esse, videlicet in suis causis, est res praedicamenti, et de eo potest esse scientia, et de eo possunt formari propositiones verae. [...] Est autem secundum esse rei quod dicit veritatem propositionis. Et tale esse praesupponit primum esse. Primo enim intelligitur quod aliquid sit res

everything has in its causes, both universal (genus, species) and particular. This level of reality is closely connected with the essence of the singular substance and is independent of its actual existence. It is what Giles sometimes calls "essential being" (*esse essentiae*) as well. It is the object of the act of simple apprehension and is presupposed by any other level of being of the thing.[29] The propositional being is any state of a thing designated by a declarative sentence, like "*homo est animal*" or "*Sortes est albus*."[30] It is the object of the act of judging. Finally, the actual being is the actual existence in time of a finite being as an earthly thing. It is the kind of being to which sense-cognition testifies.

In his *Quaestiones metaphysicales*, however, Giles seems to hold a simplified doctrine in relation to the more mature one. In fact, he distinguishes two main kinds of being, the *esse essentiale* (or *esse essentiae*) and the *esse actuale*. The first kind of being is proper to universals and the second to the particulars considered as such.[31] Thus, in Giles's view, the essence and the essential being of a thing are one and the same reality considered from two diverse points of view. The *esse essentiale* of a given thing is nothing but the specific form (or essence) considered together with its own mode of being. It is something real, while the genus, from which, in a certain way, it derives, exists only as the potential part of the specific form and cannot be apart from it. So, genera can exist only *qua* constitutive parts of species.[32] What plays a dominant role in this process is the difference (no matter whether generic or specific), as it is the formal principle (*ratio*) which causes the passage from a categorial item to its inferior in the *linea praedicamentalis*.[33]

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praedicamenti et quod habeat habitudines ad debita principia et ad debitas proprietates, et postea de tali re formentur propositiones verae. Propositio ergo vera explicat illas habitudines quas res habet. Tale autem esse quod dicit veritatem propositionis demonstratio concludit. [...] Tertium autem esse est esse actuale rei. Hoc autem per accidens se habet ad demonstrationem. Probat enim demonstrator quod tringulus habet tres <angulos>, quod est figura plana etc., et forte nihil tale est in actu, quia forte nihil est omnino planum vel nihil omnino rectum."

[29] Cf. also Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra.

[30] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra–b.

[31] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e2ra: "Dicendum quod duplex est esse, scilicet essentiale et esse actuale. Esse vero essentiale est magis proprium speciei et universalium, esse autem actuale proprium individuorum, quoniam individua sunt proprie quae corrumpuntur secundum esse actuale. Universale autem non corrumpitur secundum esse sibi proprium, scilicet secundum esse essentiae, sed corrumpitur secundum accidens, scilicet in quantum esse actuale individuo<rum> corrumpitur."

[32] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5rb.

[33] *Ibid.*, VII, q, 5, fol. e1ra.

Giles's account of the composition of finite beings tacitly identifies the opposition between essence and being, which was fundamental in the philosophical and theological systems of the end of the 13th century, with the opposition between universals and individuals. Giles thinks of the essence as a universal form and the existence (taken in the strict sense, as being in act) as the mode of being proper to primary substances. Thus, at this point of his intellectual development, Giles seems to maintain that between essence and existence there is the same kind of distinction which holds between universals and individuals. The universality, namely, the property of being apt to be present in many things and to be predicated of them, is possessed only potentially by substantial forms, even instantiated by particulars, and it is because of an intervention of the human mind that this property becomes wholly actual, as the individual substances considered in themselves are intelligible only *in potentia*.[34]

As a consequence, the most important results of such an approach to the question of the metaphysical composition of the finite (corporeal) beings seem to be the following three: (1) extension of the range of the notion of being; (2) distinction between being and existence, as the former is the universal condition of every kind of reality and the latter the mode of being peculiar to individual substances only; and (3) a sort of assimilation of the distinction between essence and existence to the distinction between universal and singular.

4. Truth

Many of the 22 questions of the second book are devoted to the notion of truth and the process of understanding.[35] Giles defines truth in the same way as Aquinas in his *De veritate, veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei*,[36] but then interprets this definition in a different manner. When Aquinas speaks of *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, he tries to embrace and combine into an unique formula and doctrine the two opposite approaches of Anselm and of Aristotle: in his view, truth is really present in both the things and the intellect. In contrast, Giles thinks that truth is in the intellect only and

[34] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 9, fol. e2vb.

[35] On Giles's theory of knowledge, see Alessandro D. Conti, "Intelletto ed astrazione nella teoria della conoscenza di Egidio Romeno," *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 95 (1989), 123–64, and "Conoscenza e verità in Egidio Romeno," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 305–61.

[36] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. b3vb.

denies that it is really present in the things—so he seems to exclude that the relation of adequation (or correspondence) that holds between the intellect and the things is symmetrical. According to him, truth, conceived as a real relation of correspondence between two objects, is only present in our intellects, not in the things.[37] In the latter, a relation of reason is present, since the things are the cause of the existence in the intellect of the real relation of correspondence in which the truth consists.[38] Hence, the things are said to be true denominatively in virtue of the truth present in the intellect, and not because of a truth present in them.[39] Moreover, a real relation of correspondence is present in the intellect only when it judges in the right way, that is, when it recognizes how things are (or are not) arranged in the world. In fact, the adequate significate of an act of judging of the intellect (as expressed by a true declarative sentence) is distinct from the thing signified by the subject of that sentence.[40] Because of Giles's peculiar interpretation of the notion of *adaequatio*, to use such a term can somehow hide the lack of symmetry in the relation holding between the (true) intellect and the things—and this fact explains why in his later works (like the *Quodlibeta*) Giles utilizes the term "assimilation" (*assimilatio*) instead of "adequation" (*adaequatio*). Though the (true) intellect corresponds to the things understood because it conforms to them, the things correspond to the intellect not because they conform to it but because the intellect conforms to them.[41] The logical results of this

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[37] *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4ra: "Ad istam quaestionem <scilicet utrum veritas in ipso intellectu habeat esse> dico quod veritas, sicut accipimus hic veritatem pro adaequatione, est in ipso intellectu."

[38] *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4rb: "Sic ista adaequatio non ponit aliquid reale nisi in ipso intellectu; unde ista adaequatio secundum rem est in ipso intellectu et non est in ipsis rebus nisi secundum rationem, scilicet propter hoc quod ipsa adaequatio dependet ex ipsis rebus."

[39] *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4rb: "Dicitur etiam res vera non propter veritatem quae sit in ipsa, sed propter veritatem quae st in ipso intellectu, sive in anima."

[40] *Ibid.*, II, q. 3, fols. b4rb–va.

[41] *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4ra–b; see also *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7 (Leuven, 1646), p. 215: "Memi<ni>mus enim assignasse nos causam quare veritas sit in intellectu et non in rebus eo quod veritas consistat in quadam adaequatione, et quia intellectus noster dependet a rebus (sicut scientia dependet a scibili), et quia adaequatio quandam relationem importat (sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam non per relationem quae sit in ipso, sed per relationem quae est in scientia), sic res adaequatur intellectui nostro non per adaequationem quae est in rebus, sed per adaequationem quae est in intellectu. Res enim praeexistunt, intellectus vero imitatur eas ad adaequatur ipsis; imitatio ergo et adaequatio est in ipso intellectu. Intellectus ergo noster adaequatur rebus per adaequationem quae est in intellectu. Si autem res ipsae dicantur adaequatae intellectui, hoc non est quia ipsae res adaequantur, sed quia intellectus adaequatur. Et quia adaequatio est in ipso intellectu, veritas etiam, quae adaequationem importat, dicetur esse in intellectu."

choice are the following: (1) there is no truth but in relation to an intellect; (2) truth is an asymmetrical relation, since Giles's *adaequatio* is so; and (3) by truly judging about the metaphysical composition of a thing, the intellect becomes similar to that thing.

Although the first conclusion is already present in the writings of Aquinas, Giles attributes to it a different value. According to the supporters of the ontological theory of truth, the relation of a thing to the (divine) intellect was a necessary requisite too: things are true insofar as they are ordered to the (divine) intellect. For Thomas, the truth of a thing includes the *entity* of that thing and a relation of adequation to the (divine) intellect. Giles reads this relation to the intellect (whether divine, angelic, or human intellect) in terms of being known by it. As a consequence, in his view, the truth of a thing does includes not its absolute being (or entity) and a relation of adequation to the (divine) intellect but its being known by an intellect and a relation of likeness to the thing itself. Both these elements are present in the intellect (and not in the thing) as in their substrate of existence. For Aquinas, a thing is true if and only if it is actually existent and conformable to its exemplar in the mind of God; for Giles, a thing is true only derivatively, when and as far as it is known by an intellect. In other words: unlike Thomas, Giles connects the truth of a thing with its essence and therefore with its possible (and not actual) being—according to what he states in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* and in his *Quodlibet* II, where he equates the *esse essentiae* with the *esse in potentia* (*ad esse*).[42] So, paradoxically, a thing can be rightly understood, and thus it can be said (in a derivative way) to be true, even though it is not actually existent outside the soul.[43]

This close tie between essence and truth is confirmed by what he says in analyzing the notion of *adaequatio* in relation to the intellect. As we have already seen, in Giles's opinion, the quiddity (*quidditas*) of things as

[42] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 12, fols. 27rb and 29ra; *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, p. 51. On this subject, see Nash's papers mentioned above, note 1.

[43] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 214: "Sciendum quod res dicitur vera prout est ab intellectu cognita, sicut dicitur bona prout est ab appetitu volita. Est enim verum obiectum intellectus, sicut bonum est obiectum appetitus. Res autem non cognoscitur per cognitionem quae est in ipsa, nec per aliud quod est in ipsa, sed per illud quod est in intellectu. Sunt enim res cognitae non prout sunt in seipsis, sed prout sunt in cognoscente; ideo sunt verae non per veritatem quae sit in ipsis formaliter, sed per id quod est in cognoscente. Sed non sic est ex parte bonitatis. [...] Existente enim forma balnei in intellectu, etiam non existente balneo in re extra, possumus intelligere balneum et proprietates balnei, et quaecumque pertinent ad naturam balnei. Ad intellectum ergo balnei sufficit balneum ut est in intellectu, etiam si nihil esset de balneo in re extra."

expressed by their definitions is the object of our understanding.[44] That being said, he affirms many times that the true (*verum*) is the object of the intellect. Then, in his view, the true is somehow identical to the essence. The true is the essence itself *qua* known by the intellect. And the truth (*veritas*) is the relation of becoming similar to that inheres in an intellect and joins it to an essence by means of the intentional nature of the *species intelligibilis*. In turn, the *adaequatio* is threefold, since there are three kinds of intellect at issue. In fact, when it is known by the divine intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to be caused by the intellect (*apta nata causari ab intellectu*). When it is known by the angelic intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to be caused by a superior intellect, just as its intelligible species present in the angelic intellect—since both the essence and its intelligible species are caused by the divine intellect. Finally, when it is known by a human intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to cause a mental picture in the intellect (*apta natua causare similitudinem in intellectu*).[45] Those essences which are unable to cause any such effects in an intellect are empty and fictitious, like the concept of the chimera.[46]

These remarks help us to appreciate the peculiar nature of Giles's *adaequatio*. It is a relation, and the principle (*ratio*) itself of the truth. It assumes different values according to the different kinds of intellect to which it is referred. In the case of the angelic and human intellects, the *adaequatio* is a real relation, while it is a relation of reason in the case of the divine intellect, since the knowledge of the human (and angelic) intellect depends on the thing understood, whereas any possible thing depends on God's cognition. Although the *adaequatio* always entails a certain form of *similitudo*, nevertheless the *adaequatio* proper to the human intellect is not a standard relation of similarity, as it is asymmetrical and has no *fundamentum*.[47] It is a relation of *reproduction* (or copying, so to

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[44] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q, 5, fol. e1ra. See also *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, qq. 6 and 9 (Venice, 1503), fols. 89va–b and 101va–b; *Quodlibet* V, q. 9, pp. 289–91.

[45] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 214–15.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 215: "Si vero esset talis adaequatio, quae nec esset apta nata causari a rebus, nec causare res, nec causari a tertio, sicut est conceptus chimerae, vel alicuius figmenti, in tali intellectu non acciperetur veritas, sed diceretur huiusmodi intellectus esse vanus et cassus."

[47] The *fundamentum* of a relation is that absolute entity in virtue of which the relation inheres in its substrate and entails a reference to another substance; for instance, the generative power is the foundation of the relation of paternity.

say) rather than a relation of similarity. The intellect must be said to be (or become) similar to the essence understood, when it rightly judges about it. Yet, no essence is said to be similar to its knowledge present in the human intellect, no matter whether adequate or not. This asymmetry originates from the intentional nature of the mental acts of understanding (both simple and complex). Through these acts the intellect tries to bring about a mental replica of the thing understood, which it assumes as the pattern of its act of reproduction.

Since for Giles the truth is the *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*, one may ask why the simple apprehension of an essence and the act of judging are linked to each other; and why we can properly speak of truth (and falsity) only in the case of an act of judging of our intellect and not in the case of a simple apprehension of the essence of a thing.

As Giles points out,[48] it is the apprehension itself of an essence that necessarily gives rise to an act of judging whereby our intellect expresses, in a definition, the metaphysical structure of the essence understood. Because of its organization, our intellect can get the nature of things, which is simple and unitary in reality, only through its internal composition. The cause of this is to be found in the modalities of functioning of our intellect, which can grasp only separately the different aspects of a thing that in empirical reality is one and the same.[49] The things understood are the standards that guide our intellect in its actions of composition (when it produces an affirmative statement) and division (when it produces a negative statement) about themselves. So, the sense-cognition testifies to the actual existence of a thing; the intellectual abstraction enables us to recognize the type the thing belongs to; but it is by the act of judging that we can think of the inner metaphysical principles of a thing as principles of that thing; their mutual relationships; and the extramental things themselves as bearers of accidental properties.

The process of knowledge, which is aimed at reproducing the internal structure of and the various states connected with the essence of things, can fail to achieve its goal, since in the act of judging our will plays an

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[48] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra. See also *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 215–16; and *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, pp. 280–82; *Super Analytica Posteriora*, I, fol. A8ra–vb.

[49] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q, 3, fol. b4ra. *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 215–16; *Super Analytica Posteriora*, I, fol. A8ra: "Intellectus de rebus potest sibi formare conceptum completum, ut non solum sciat nomen referre in suum significatum, quod dicitur esse quid nominis, sed etiam ipsum significatum sciat resovere in sua propria principia; et inde sciat formare definitionem, quae dicitur esse quid rei."

eminent role.[50] The final stage of the process of knowing is therefore different from the sense-cognition and the abstraction (or simple apprehension of an essence), since the latter are totally passive and unintentional, while the former is a voluntary action. As such, the judgment is open to fault. It is in this possibility of an erroneous judgment that the truth is rooted. The idea of Giles, inspired by Aristotle (*De anima*, Γ 6, 430a28–b6) and Aquinas,[51] is that "truth" and "falsehood," properly speaking, are (like the notions of truth and falsehood we have today) antonymous, and where their (paradigmatic) opposition fails, we can speak of truth only in a secondary and derivative sense.[52] Sense-cognition and abstraction in a certain way are always true, since no mistake is possible in the simple apprehension of the existence of a thing or in the intellection of its essence. Only if the intellect, through an act of judging, forms a statement about a thing, is it possible to compare our knowledge, as expressed by a declarative sentence, with the thing itself, and so to give rise to the opposite relations of truth and falsehood.[53]

Giles's position is, therefore, far from Thomas's view as stated in the *De veritate* and in the *Summa theologiae*, given that he is more faithful to Aristotle than the Dominican Master. If we compare Giles's remarks on truth in the Commentary on the *Sentences* (which was written in the same years as the *Quaestiones metaphysicales*) with Thomas's conception as developed in his commentary on the same work, the difference between them is still greater. Giles openly criticizes some chief theses of Thomas's (earlier) doctrine. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas had maintained that the being of the truth is similar to the being of the universal. Giles argues that this thesis is not consistent with Aristotle's claim that truth is present in the judging intellect as in its own substrate of inherence.[54] As he remarks, the term "*fundamentum*" has a twofold meaning: it designates either the substrate of existence (*subiectum*) of a thing; or something existing outside the soul which corresponds to and/or is the cause of a certain operation of the intellect. In his opinion, when Thomas says that the universal has its *fundamentum* in the things existing outside the soul, he speaks of *fundamentum* in the first of the two senses just

[50] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 8, fol. b6rb–va; *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, p. 281.
[51] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 17, a. 1 and a. 4.
[52] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fols. b4vb–5ra; q. 8, fol. b6va; *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 216.
[53] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 216.
[54] Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super librum I Sententiarum*, d. 19, p. 2, q. 1 (Venice, 1521), fol. 111rb.

mentioned. Because of the parallelism between universality and truth, the same holds for truth. As a consequence, truth is in the things (and not in the intellect) as in its own substrate of existence—a conclusion which is just the opposite of what Aristotle had thought.[55] So, at the end of a long passage, Giles restates that things can be said to be true only derivatively, in virtue of the truth present in the intellect, since truth is a quality that has in the intellect its own substrate of inherence. Things can be said to be true only in the sense that in them there is a (partial) conformity to their own metaphysical principles, so that they are truthful, so to say, about themselves. Real truth is nothing but the entity itself of the things.[56]

5. Concluding Remarks

Giles's *Quaestiones metaphysicales* is a "paradoxical" work, since it cannot be considered as a real contribution to metaphysics, according to Giles's own view. The Italian master claims that metaphysics deals with being *qua* being; but only very few of his *Quaestiones* discuss the structure of the main kinds of beings and the relationships among the basic constituents of reality. However, if the foregoing analysis is correct, something can be said about Giles's ("early") world. First of all, his is already a (medieval) Aristotelian world, no less than Aquinas's. Like any other (medieval) Aristotelian world, it seems to consist of things (both singular and universal, such as individual substances, accidental forms, and common natures or essences) and a sort of state of affairs connected with them (namely, *complex things* such as that something of a certain nature exists, or that something, which exists, is such and such). To be a particular substance is the main and basic property within Giles's system, the cornerstone of his ontology, since, from the point of view of full existence, accidents and substantial essences always presuppose particular substances. Substantial essences and accidents are not self-subsistent entities; they can exist only in individual substances. In Giles's view, the beings of substantial essences as well as those of the concrete accidental forms inhering in a singular substance somehow coincide with the actual being of the singular substance. For instance, if considered from the point of view of his being, Socrates is a simple object, namely, a singular substance, while if considered from the point of view of his internal structure, he is a compound of

[55] *Ibid.*, fol. 111rb–va.
[56] *Ibid.*, fol. 111vb. See also the *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. b5ra.

really different forms which can be something actually real only in him, as his components, and through his actual being. It is impossible to find a particular substance which does not belong to a certain species and without any accident inhering in it, however. Given that (1) to be a particular substance is to be an independent singular existing item, whereas (2) to be an essence (or common nature) is to be the type of a singular substance, and (3) to be an accident is to be a formal aspect of a singular substance, then the distinction between accidents and substantial essences derives from their different relations to particular substances. Common natures are parts of the essential being of substances, by means of which they can be classified and defined. By contrast, those items which simply affect particular substances without being actually parts of their *esse essentiale* are accidents. This implies that the relationship between substantial essences and singular substances is ultimately grounded on individuation, since no instantiation is possible without individuation. Individuation is fundamental to both universals and singulars, essence and existence, and substances and accidents. Individual substances can exist as metaphysical entities, located at a particular place in space and time, and can be identified as tokens of a given type only by means of the process of individuation through which common natures produce them. This means that, within Giles's world, the *materia signata*, which is the cause of individuation, is the principle for the existence of anything in the sublunary world, in that no being could pass from a state of pure potentiality (proper to what is common) to a state of actual being (proper to what is singular) without matter.

APPENDIX
LIST (TABULA) OF GILES'S QUAESTIONES METAPHYSICALES

Liber I

q. 01 Utrum metaphysica sit finis sive beatitudo ipsius hominis
q. 02 Utrum unumquodque naturaliter feratur in suum finem
q. 03 Utrum homines naturaliter appetitu scientiam desiderent
q. 04 Utrum omnes homines appetant metaphysicam
q. 05 Utrum Deus sit subiectum in metaphysica
q. 06 Utrum idem sit esse de consideratione alicuius scientiae et esse subiectum illius scientiae
q. 07 Utrum Deus sit subiectum alicuius
q. 08 Utrum Deus sit de consideration alicuius scientiae specialis
q. 09 Utrum Deus possit esse de consideratione metaphysici
q. 10 Utrum scientia sit nobilior ex eo quod non considerat Deum pro subiecto sed considerat ipsum in quantum ens
q. 11 Utrum causa sit subiectum istius scientiae metaphysicae
q. 12 Utrum sensus prater utilitatem vitae debeat diligi
q. 13 Utrum probare dilectionem scientiae per dilectionem sensus sit probare dilectionem scientiae per signum
q. 14 Utrum visus sit magis diligenus inter omnes sensus
q. 15 Utrum visus differentias plurium rerum nobis ostendat
q. 16 Utrum bruta habeant prudentiam
q. 17 Utrum solus auditus sit sensus disciplinabilis
q. 18 Utrum experimentum sit ex pluribus memoriis
q. 19 Utrum ars generetur experimentum
q. 20 Utrum artifex sit melior experto
q. 21 Utrum artes mechanicae sint meliores speculativis
q. 22 Utrum sapientia sit omnia scire
q. 23 Utrum sapientia sive metaphysica sit difficilis
q. 24 Utrum scientia ista sit certissima
q. 25 Utrum ista scientia sit libera vel serva
q. 26 Utrum ista scientia habeat regulare alias
q. 27 Utrum substantiis competat suscipere magis et minus

Liber II

q. 01 Utrum veritas sit possibilis
q. 02 Utrum veritas habeat esse in ipso intellectu
q. 03 Utrum aliqua veritas sit incomplexa
q. 04 Utrum veritas et scientia different
q. 05 Utrum veritas incomplexa sit difficilis ad cognoscendum
q. 06 Utrum veritas sit difficilis
q. 07 Utrum veritas sit impossibilis ad cognoscendum
q. 08 Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis sit ex parte nostra an ex parte rerum
q. 09 Utrum intellectus humanus corpori corruptibili coniunctus possit Deum et substantias separatas intelligere

q. 10 Utrum dato quod intellectus esset praeparatio quaedam, sicut posuit Anaxagoras, possemus per talme praeparationem intelligere substantias separatas
q. 11 Utrum intellectus noster per intellectionem illarum quidditatum inferiorum possit substantias separatas intelligere
q. 12 Utrum intellectus noster per hoc quod seipsum intelligit possit huiusmodi substantias intelligere et etiam materiales
q. 13 Utrum dignius sit ipsum intellectum intelligere substantias immateriales (materiales *ed.*) quam materiales (immateriales *ed.*)
q. 14 Utrum ex unione nostri intellectus and intellectum agentem possumus substantias separatas intelligere
q. 15 Utrum homo in hac via possit huiusmodi substantias intelligere
q. 16 Utrum sit una aliqua veritas simplex
q. 17 Utrum ab una veritate omnia vera possent dici vera
q. 18 Utrum sit status in causis efficientibus
q. 19 Utrum sit status in causis materialibus
q. 20 Utrum sit status in causis finalibus
q. 21 Utrum sit status in causis formalibus
q. 22 Utrum sit eadem dispositio rei in sua veritate et in sua entitate

Liber IV

q. 01 Utrum aliqua scientia possit considerare ens secundum quod ens
q. 02 Utrum ista scientia sit una
q. 03 Utrum ens sit aequivocum an analogum
q. 04 Utrum omnia quae dicuntur analoga dicantur <talia> per analogiam ad unum numero
q. 05 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri convertatur cum ente
q. 06 Utrum possit esse aliquid unum quod convertatur cum ente
q. 07 Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens
q. 08 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri differat ad unum quod convertitur cum ente
q. 09 Utrum unum addat aliquid rationis supra ens
q. 10 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri inveniatur in substantiis separatis
q. 11 Utrum de unitate quae est principium numeri possit praedicari quantitas
q. 12 Utrum circa illud principium, impossibile est aliquid simul esse et non esse, possibilis sit error
q. 13 Utrum illud principium, impossibile est aliquid simul esse et non esse, possit demonstrari
q. 14 Utrum substantia de aliquo demonstretur

Liber VI

q. 01 Utrum una cognitione declaretur quod quid (quicquid *ed.*) est <et si est> vel esse
q. 02 Utrum accidentia habeant aliquam entitatem <et naturam>

Liber VII

q. 01 Utrum substantia sit prior accidente <cognitione, definitione et> tempore
q. 02 Utrum accidentia habeant definitionem per additamentum
q. 03 Utrum res sit idem cum sua quidditate

q. 04 Utrum quidditatis (quidditas *ed.*) sit quidditas
q. 05 Utrum definitio habeat partes
5.1 quaeritur quales partes habeat definitio
q. 06 Utrum particulare mathematicum sit incorruptibile
q. 07 Utrum particularia possint definiri
q. 08 Utrum partes quantitativae ingrediantur definitionem totius
q. 09 Utrum genus in definitione ponatur ut materia
q. 10 Utrum differentia habeat rationem actualitatis et dicat quid in actu
q. 11 Utrum addendo differentiam generi in definitione fiat nugatio
q. 12 Utrum substantiae separatae habeant definitionem

Liber VIII

q. 01 Utrum per nomen significetur forma aut aggregatum
q. 02 Utrum in corporibus caelestibus sit materia
q. 03 Utrum eadem sit materia in corporibus caelestibus et in illis inferioribus
q. 04 Utrum dimensiones indeterminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia
q. 05 [Utrum] Quomodo dimensiones in<de>terminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia

Liber X

q. 01 Utrum mensura sit in eodem genere cum mensurato
q. 02 Utrum omnia quae mensurantur mensurentur una mensura
q. 03 Utrum omnia mensurentur minimo sui generis
q. 04 Utrum omnium substantiarum sit una mensura
q. 05 [Utrum] Quomodo opponantur unum et multa
q. 06 Utrum ratio mensurae competat Deo proprie aut transumptive

Liber XI

q. 01 Utrum, si materia est una et agens <est unum>, [quod] esset semper effectus unus
q. 02 Utrum generatum a simili et generatum non a simili sint eiusdem speciei
q. 03 Utrum illa propositio Aristotelis quod omne quod sit sit a simili in specie sit vera

FIVE PARISIAN SETS OF QUESTIONS ON THE *METAPHYSICS* FROM THE 1270s TO THE 1290s[1]

Sten Ebbesen

1. The Texts and Their Authors

We still possess several sizeable collections of questions on the *Metaphysics* produced at the University of Paris between ca. 1270 and ca. 1300. This chapter will deal with five of them, viz., (in an approximately chronological order): Anonymus Lipsiensis (I–VII),[2] Siger of Brabant (on Books II–VII), Anonymus Zimmermanni (I–IX), Peter of Auvergne (I–IX, XII), and Radulphus Brito (I–X).[3] Out of the great number of topics dealt with in these commentaries I have selected a few which I consider to be of particular interest at the present junction in research, and the treatment of which by the several authors sheds light both on the general situation for the artists at the time and on the particular philosophical physiognomy of each of them. Some of these topics are closely linked, others not, and so the reader should not expect one clear line of argumentation from the beginning of the present chapter till the end.

Of the five authors, the two *anonymi* seem to have had little impact on other commentators (though one of them possibly influenced the other), whereas Siger certainly influenced Anonymus Zimmermanni, Peter, and Radulphus. Radulphus also made extensive use of Peter's work. His own

[1] Work on this article was carried out at *Centre for the Aristotelian Tradition* in the Saxo Institute, University of Copenhagen. The centre was created in 2009 thanks to a grant from the Velux Foundation. Before submission, the article was read by the four other resident members of the centre (Drs. David Bloch, Jakob Fink, Heine Hansen, and Ana Maria Mora), who offered useful comments. In addition, I owe warm thanks to Dr. Silvia Donati, who also read it and pointed out some passages that needed more precision, additional information, or substantial correction. Readers should be warned that I do not necessarily respect the editors' orthography and punctuation in quotations from printed editions of Latin texts. Similarly, I impose my own classicizing orthography on texts quoted from manuscripts. In my quotations from manuscript sources, some minor slips have been tacitly corrected.

[2] It is uncertain whether the questions on Book VII have the same author as those on I–VI. See Gianfranco Fioravanti, "Introduction" to Anonymus Lipsiensis *Qu. Met.*, pp. 176–77 (see the Appendix for the abbreviations used in the notes).

[3] Only Siger and Anonymus Lipsiensis have been edited. For editions of those works and manuscripts of the remaining ones, see the Appendix.

possible influence on later commentators on the *Metaphysics* remains to be studied.

There is probably little reason to bemoan the loss of several other question commentaries from the period, except for one. The exception is Boethius of Dacia's, which—judging by his preserved works—must have been of a higher philosophical quality than any of the others. Anonymus Lipsiensis has been shown to have used it in a few instances,[4] and there may well be traces of it in some of the other preserved commentaries, but unless new evidence turns up there is no way to reconstruct any significant part of this lost work.

Siger's questions can be safely dated to the 1270s, and before 1277. At least one of the four preserved versions can be no earlier than 1274, as it refers to Thomas Aquinas as a man of the past.[5] The *C* and *M* versions share the slightly unusual trait of containing summaries of the Aristotelian text sandwiched between groups of questions.

Anonymus Lipsiensis's date is less certain. His work seems to belong to the 1270s, and the editor has argued for a date shortly before Siger's.[6] A reference to Proclus rules out any date before 1269. The author probably used not only Boethius's lost questions (date unknown) but also Giles of Rome's (ca. 1270).[7]

Anonymus Zimmermanni, who shares much material with Anonymus Lipsiensis[8] and contains extensive loans from Siger in at least one question (IV, q. 3), must have composed his questions after 1277, as III, q. 10 almost certainly alludes to one or more of the articles condemned by Stephen Tempier in that year.[9] In I, q. 21 the author tells us that he used to hold that there are three types of analogy, one of which is a subtype of univocation, another a subtype of equivocation, and a third

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[4] See Fioravanti, "Introduction," pp. 177–84.

[5] See Armand Maurer, "Introduction," to the edition of versions *C* and *P* of Siger's *Qu. Met.* (full title in the Appendix), p. 32.

[6] See Fioravanti, "Introduction," p. 177.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 175–77, discusses the evidence without reaching a clear conclusion, but I think probability favors the view that Giles was used. Silvia Donati ("Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285—I commenti aristotelici," *Documenti et studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 [1990], 1–111) has convincingly dated Giles's *Quaestiones Metaphysicales* ca. 1268–73, and probably before 1271.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 172, suggests direct dependence of Anonymus Zimmermanni on Anonymus Lipsiensis.

[9] See § 6.2, below. The veiled reference to the *articuli Parisini* was recognized by Fioravanti, "Introduction," p. 170, who (*ibid.*, p. 171) suggests a date as late as ca. 1287 because, he claims, IV.3 shows acquaintance with a debate between Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent. Cf. note 42, below.

something in between.[10] Rather unsurprisingly, this shows that the questions on the *Metaphysics* were not the first-fruits of Anonymus Zimmermanni's teaching. But the passage also provides a link to another anonymous, the author of the *SF* questions on the *Elenchi*, who presents, and espouses, the theory of three types of analogy in very similar words.[11] *SF* probably dates from the mid to late 1270s, and it is known to have other points of contact with Anonymus Zimmermanni.[12]

It is commonly, and probably rightly, assumed that the Peter of Auvergne who composed questions on the *Metaphysics* was the one who became rector of the University of Paris in 1275, and that he is also identical with the Peter who in 1296 became Master of Theology, in 1302 bishop of Clermont, and died in 1304. Peter has left a vast amount of work relating to the subjects taught in the arts faculty: several sizeable sophismata and a long list of commentaries on Aristotle—logic, biology, metaphysics, politics etc.[13]

Several of Peter's works appear in more than one redaction, and on several occasions two similar sets of questions which are unlikely to be by the same author both carry manuscript attributions to Peter. Those are the characteristics of a highly successful arts master. There are also three versions of his *Questions on the Metaphysics* (one of which is alone in having questions on Book X). The manuscripts used for this chapter offer the standard version ("university tradition").[14] Peter's questions are

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[10] Cf. Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 21, *P* fol. 6va: "Dicebam aliquando quod <ens> non est proprie univocum ad substantiam et accidens, nec pure aequivocum, sed analogum. Triplex tamen invenitur analogia [...]. Prima analogia univocatio est, quoniam est ibi unitas rationis simpliciter. Sed tertia analogia est aequivocatio. Secunda vero est media [...]. Credo tamen quod ista analogia media est contra intentionem Aristotelis."

[11] The *SF* commentary consists of qq. 0–106 in Incerti Auctores, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, ed. Sten Ebbesen (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi) VII (Copenhagen, 1977). The doctrine of the triple analogy is propounded in q. 57. The *SF* commentary is a reworking of the *C* commentary (early 1270s) published as quu. 80off. in the same volume. The corresponding *C* question is 823, and it contains the same doctrine, but Anonymus Zimmermanni seems closer to *SF* q. 57.

[12] See Sten Ebbesen & Jan Pinborg, "Studies in the Logical Writings Attributed to Boethius de Dacia," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 3 (1970), 1–54, esp. 35–37. What was there called "[Boethius Dacus] SE q. 94" is the same as Incerti Auctores, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, q. 92.

[13] See Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 8: *Répertoire des noms commençant par P* (Turnhout, 2007), p. 95. See also Christoph Flüeler, ed., *Peter of Auvergne. A University Master of the 13th Century* (Berlin-New York, forthcoming).

[14] For a survey of the tradition and references to earlier literature, see Silvia Donati, "An Anonymous Commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione* from the Years before

not interspaced with summaries of Aristotle the way Siger's are, but he often puts a question in its context by mentioning that it is occasioned by a *dictum Commentatoris*.[15]

Peter's appointment to the rectorate in 1275 suggests that he had finished his studies in the early 1270s, and so his earliest works are unlikely to have been produced more than a few years before 1275. It is more difficult to determine when he stopped producing arts-related works, as he may have continued to teach and write about the arts after starting as a student of theology, but by 1290 he probably had nothing but divinity in his head. So far, no one has managed to establish a chronological order of Peter's writings. All I can say is that his *Questions on the Metaphysics* do not appear to be a beginner's product. A date in the late 1270s or early 1280s would be my best guess. This is late enough to allow him some maturing, and early enough to allow his work some time to have become famous, but not yet outdated, by the time when it was Radulphus Brito's turn to compose *Questions on the Metaphysics*, for this is likely to have been in the early 1290s, and Brito owes a very obvious debt to Peter.

The reason for dating Brito's commentary to the early 1290s is that a manuscript of his questions on the *Topics* carries the date 1296.[16] His later career makes it unlikely that it had been composed much earlier or that he had been an arts master for many years by the mid-1290s. Nevertheless, the *Metaphysics* commentary, while displaying several of Brito's characteristic doctrines, appears to be a less mature work than some of the logical ones.[17]

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the Paris Condemnations of 1277," *Revue de Théologie et Philosophie Médievales* 65 (1998), 194–247, esp. 215–17.

[15] See, e.g., Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 8, *P* fol. 135vb: "Quaeritur de quodam dicto Commentatoris. Dicit enim supra istum secundum quod illud quod inest causae et causato verius inest causae quam causato." II, q. 23, *P* fol. 142ra: "Quaeritur circa partem istam *Qui vero ideas posuerunt*, ubi Philosophus improbat opinionem Platonis et quantum ad modum ponendi et etiam quantum ad rationem positionis. Tangit autem Commentator super rationem quandam Aristotelis inductam contra Platonem quod universalia actu non sunt in re extra animam sed in intellectu. Et ideo quaeratur utrum hoc fuerit verum."

[16] Erfurt, *Universitätsbibliothek*, CA 4^0 276. See Niels J. Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages: The Commentaries on Aristotle's and Boethius' Topics* (Munich, 1984), p. 392. For Brito's life, see William J. Courtenay, "Radulphus Brito, Master of Arts and Theology," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 76 (2005), 131–58.

[17] See Sten Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics," in: Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery Jr., & Andreas Speer, eds., *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 28 (Berlin-New York, 2001), pp. 450–92 (repr. without text appendix in Sten Ebbesen, *Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th–14th Centuries: Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen*, vol. 2 [Aldershot, 2009]).

2. Use of Authorities and Predecessors

All commentators share the normal reverent attitude towards Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes. Simplicius turns up as an authority in Peter and Radulphus,[18] but use of another late ancient Neoplatonist, Proclus, may be more revealing about philosophical inclinations.

Aquinas in his *Metaphysics* commentary never refers to Proclus's *Elements of Theology*. Anonymus Lipsiensis cites it just once, but Siger does so on no fewer than eight occasions, and mostly with approval. Anonymus Zimmermanni, who—while trying to keep on Aristotle's side of the fence—shows an extraordinary interest in the occasions for discussing Platonic doctrine offered by Book I, also refers to Proclus on three occasions, but, remarkably, seems to ignore *Liber de causis*, which until the 1270s had been the artists' main source of Proclian doctrine and continued to be used even after William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elements of Theology* became commonly available.[19]

Peter introduces Proclus already in his proem, when he mentions Algazel, Avicenna, and Proclus as important post-Aristotelian metaphysicians, adding that while Algazel and Avicenna mainly follow Aristotle, Proclus instead follows Plato.[20] However, Proclus's Platonism does not prevent Peter from referring to his *Elementatio theologica* in at least six questions. By contrast, I have so far found only one mention of Proclus in Radulphus (IX, q. 1), and that one is a loan from Peter's question IX, q. 1.

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[18] Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 11, quotes Simplicius on *De caelo*. Brito, *Qu. Met.* refers to Simplicius on *Categories* in the proem, I, q. 12; V, q. 16, and V, q. 26.

[19] Cf. Anonymus Lipsiensis, *Qu. Met.*, who refers to Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, proposition 11 at V, q. 10. Siger refers to props. 1 (III, q. 12 *M* ≈ III, q. 5 *C*), 7 (II, q. 7 *MC*; V, q. 16 *M*; V, q. 40 *C*), 11 (II, q. 8 *MC*; III, q. 7 *M* ≈ III, q. 5 *C*; III, q. 8 *M*; III, q. 12 *M* ≈ III, q. 5 *C*) and 46 (VII, com. 2 *C*). Anonymus Zimmermanni to props. 7 (V, q. 39) and 11 (I, q. 17; I, q. 26); furthermore, there is a 'quotation' in I, q. 26 that cannot be pinned to one particular place in Proclus. Donati, "Studi per una cronologia," pp. 31–32, reports that Giles of Rome's *Quaest. Metaph* contains one certain reference (to prop. 1) plus a probable one (to prop. 15).

[20] See Arthur Monahan, "Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia," in: J. Reginal O'Donnell, ed., *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto, 1955), pp. 145–81, esp. 151: "Iterum et sequentes Aristotelis circa hanc scientiam laboraverunt, ut Algazel, Avicenna, Proclus; quorum Algazel et Avicenna magis sequuntur Aristotelem in hac parte scientiae, parum addendo tamen vel immutando, Proclus autem magis sequitur Platonem." Peter further refers to Proclus in II, q. 8 (prop. 7, a loan from Siger II, q. 7 *MC*, but Peter seems to have looked up the source); III, q. 14 (prop. 29); V, q. 30, IX, q. 1 and XII, q. 7 (prop. 103); IX, q. 2 (perhaps prop. 177), and possibly in more places as well.

With the possible exception of Anonymus Lipsiensis's, all our texts betray acquaintance with Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which fast established itself as the standard exposition of that work, to the degree that *Expositor* in a *Metaphysics* context came to mean "Thomas in his exposition." Mostly, Thomas's identity is hidden under the designation *quidam, aliqui*, or *alii*, but Anonymus Zimmermanni and Brito each twice refers to the *Expositor*'s interpretation of passages in Book VII.[21] Siger once refers to the *Expositor* and twice mentions Thomas by name,[22] while Anonymus Zimmermanni and Brito seem to call him by name only once each (in IV, q. 3 and IV, q. 2, respectively), and in the same context, namely, a rejection of Thomas's distinction between *esse* and *essentia* that they had inherited from Siger. Peter seems to have systematically suppressed Thomas's name in favour of *quidam*, as when in I, q. 10 he objects to "some people's" explanation of an apparent discrepancy between a passage in *Metaphysics* II and one in *Physics* I.[23]

As already mentioned, Anonymus Lipsiensis appears to have used Boethius of Dacia's lost questions on the *Metaphysics*, and possibly Giles

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[21] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 3, *P* fol. 33vb: "Expositor [. . .] sic assumit quod aliqua substantia prior est omni accidente ita quod substantia potest existere quando non existit accidens, et accidens non potest existere quando non existit substantia, et ideo substantia prior est secundum tempus omni accidente.—Istud non videtur habere veritatem." VII, q. 23, *P* fol. 39vA: "Et hoc idem dicit Expositor. Dicit enim quod circulus et quod quid est circuli sunt idem, tamen hic circulus et quod quid est eius non sunt idem." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, VII, lec. 1, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 1257, and VII, lec. 10, n. 1493, respectively. Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 11, *F* fol. 295ra: "Secundum primam opinionem quiditas et illud cuius est non sunt idem, quia substantia composita includit materiam et formam, cuius substantiae est quod quid est proprie, forma autem illa separata materiam non includit, et ideo compositum [addit] super illam formam addit materiam, quae materia differt a forma. § Ista opinio est falsa, et imponitur Commentatori ab Expositore propter hoc quia dicit Commentator de quaestione sophistarum quod quiditas hominis quodammodo est homo et quodammodo non, est enim homo qui est forma et non est homo qui est materia." VII, q. 22, *F* fol. 298va: "Aliqui voluerunt quod quiditas in substantiis compositis esset solum forma, ut anima quiditas hominis. Et ista opinio attribuitur Averroi, sed non credo quod Commentatoris fuerit ista intentio. Et attribuitur sibi ab Expositore propter illud dictum de quaestione sophistarum." The place referred to in both cases must be Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 9, n. 1467.

[22] "Expositor": Siger, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 34 *C*. "(Frater) Thomas": 0, q. 7 *MC*; V, com. 14 *C*.

[23] Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 10, *P* fol. 133va: "Dicitur a quibusdam quod maxime universalia possunt considerari vel quantum ad simplicitatem apprehensionis, et sic sunt primo nota et maxime quoniam maxime universale ut ens primo occurrit intellectui; vel possunt considerari quantum ad universales passiones quae probantur de ipsis, sic minus universalia sunt magis nota, per illa enim proceditur in cognitionem universalium passionum quae probantur de ente." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, II, lec. 1, n. 283.

of Rome's as well. In all probability, one or more lost or unidentified work(s) were also consulted by the other four authors.

3. Subject-Matter of the Metaphysics

What is the subject-matter of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the book about what he himself referred to both as first and divine philosophy? Two answers to the question were standardly contrasted, as happens in the initial words of Radulphus's very first question: "The first question is about the subject, whether the subject of this science is being, as Avicenna claims, or God and the intelligences, as the Commentator claims."[24] On the Avicennian view, the separate substances, God included, could not be the subject because the work includes a proof of God's existence in Book XII, and a science cannot prove the existence of its own subject, which it must take for granted. Averroes, in contrast, held that the metaphysician can presuppose the existence of God because it has been proved in *Physics* VIII.[25]

Whereas the philosophers from the late 13th century prefer Averroes to Avicenna in most matters, the commentators on the *Metaphysics* studied in this chapter are unanimous in siding with Avicenna on the question of the subject of the work, pointing out, among other things, that Aristotle's work does, in fact, deal with the properties of being in general and not just the properties of separate substances.[26] This being so, it would seem that

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[24] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, q. 0, *F* fol. 265rb: "Et primo quaeritur de subiecto, utrum subiectum huius scientiae sit ens, ut vult Avicenna, vel deus et intelligentiae, ut vult Commentator."

[25] For Avicenna's own statement of his view, see his *Philosophia Prima*, I, 1–2. For Averroes's with a critique of Avicenna, see Averroes, *Aristotelis De Physico auditu libri octo. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, I, t.c. 83, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. IV, fol. 47E–L. For a comprehensive study of the debate in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* (Leiden, 1965; 2nd ed. Leuven, 1998). Zimmermann deals with three of the authors discussed in this chapter (Siger, Anonymus Zimmermanni, Peter). My presentation of the issue owes a heavy debt to Zimmermann's. A pioneering discussion of Peter's views was presented by Arthur Monahan, "The Subject of Metaphysics for Peter of Auvergne," *Mediaeval Studies* 16 (1954), 118–30.

[26] See, e.g., Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1 (Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, p. 24): "Proprietates quae quaeruntur in scientia, et passiones et principia, debent esse illius quod subiectum est in scientia. Nunc autem in scientia divina quaeruntur proprietates entis universaliter, non tantum substantiarum separatarum—cuiusmodi sunt unum, multa, et causa, et sic de aliis, quae sunt proprietates cuiuslibet entis inquantum ens. Ideo etc."

making God the subject would require making him a principle of being as such, in order to be able to claim that scientific statements about him would be scientific statements about being in general. But if God were a principle of being, he would not be a being. Since, as our authors assume, God is a being, there can be no such principle, because, as Siger tersely puts it: "There is no principle for the being *qua* being, because [if there were,] then every being would have a principle"[27]—and positing a principle prior to God was not acceptable.

To our commentators, then, separate substances are just one sort of being among those that the general science of being is about. In this, they might seem to agree with Thomas Aquinas, but with an important difference. Whereas he claimed that metaphysics is about being in general, its causes and properties, and thus also about separate substances which are "the universal and first causes of being,"[28] our five artists avoid making God or, more broadly, separate substances the causes or principles of being in general.

Peter of Auvergne formulates four characteristics of the subject of a science: (1) it is that under the aspect (*ratio*) of which all things considered in the science are considered; (2) among the things considered it is that which first meets the intellect; (3) it is that among the things considered in the science which is most obvious to the intellect; and (4) It is such that, once cognized, it leads one to the cognition of everything else in the science.[29] These requirements to the subject were hardly controversial, and God cannot meet them all—at least not (2) and (3). As Brito puts it, "it is obvious that God is not what we know first of all; what we know first of all is universals, for being, thing and something are the items that are

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[27] Siger, *Qu. Met.*, 0, q. 2 *C* (ed. Maurer, p. 26.17–18): "Tamen enti secundum quod ens non est principium, quia tunc omne ens haberet principium." The same point is made in IV, q. 1 *C*.

[28] Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, Prooem., pp. I–II: "praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum, sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae."

[29] Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, 0, q. 1 (Monahan, "Quaestiones," p. 152, where the question is called I, q. 1): "Sciendum quod subiectum in scientia quattuor requirit condiciones. Subiectum enim in scientia est illud sub cuius ratione considerantur omnia quae considerantur in scientia illa. Iterum, ipsum est quod primo inter alia quae considerantur occurrit intellectui nostro. Iterum, oportet quod subiectum de his quae considerantur in scientia manifestissimum sit intellectui. Quarto requiritur quod sit tale ex cuius cognitione procedatur ad cognitionem omnium aliorum."

first imprinted in the intellect, as Avicenna says."[30] Moreover, it is not too difficult to argue that the being (*qua* being) can satisfy conditions (1) and (4). Conditions (2) and (3) are more problematic. However, with respect to (2), the artists of the late 13th century tended to accept Avicenna's claim that what first strikes the intellect is being,[31] and Peter seems to have thought that satisfying (3) follows from satisfying (2).[32]

Although, then, metaphysics does not have the divine for its subject, the fact that it *also* deals with the divine means that our commentators have no problems with accepting the Aristotelian designation of his first philosophy as a divine (*Met.*, I, 2) or theological (*Met.*, VI, 1) sort of knowledge. Siger and Anonymus Zimmermanni, however, take care to distinguish it from revealed theology, which, they claim, is both nobler and more certain and encompasses more than metaphysics because, being based on divine revelation, it is not limited by man's imperfect natural cognitive abilities.[33] This looks like an act of kowtowing to the powerful theologians, but, as we shall see in § 6.2, Anonymus Zimmermanni was not willing to bow to their every demand without protest.

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[30] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, q. 0, *F* fol. 265v: "manifestum enim est quod deus non est primo notus nobis, sed universalia sunt nobis primo nota, unde ens, res, aliquid sunt illa quae primo imprimuntur intellectui secundum Avicennam."

[31] The Avicennian claim is cited without attribution by Anonymus Lipsisensis, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 6 and Peter, *Qu. Met.*, 0, q. 1 (Monahan, "Quaestiones," p. 153); with attribution by Peter 0, q. 3 (Monahan, "Quaestiones": p. 156), and by Brito in the text just quoted.

[32] Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, 0, q. 3 (Monahan, "Quaestiones," p. 156).

[33] Siger, *Qu. Met.*, VI, com. 1 *CV*. Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 12, *P* fol. 4rb: "dico quod theologia et scientia ista non considerant de eisdem nec eodem modo. Differunt enim quantum ad modum considerandi; secundo quantum ad considerata; tertio quantum ad communitatem; quarto quantum ad finem; quinto quanto ad certitudinem; sexto quantum ad dignitatem. Primum patet quoniam scientia ista considerat de entibus divinis ex principiis cognitis lumine rationis humanae, sed theologia ex principiis <cognitis> lumine revelationis divinae. Secundum patet quoniam scientia ista considerat de entibus divinis et solum quae per rationem humanam investigari possunt, theologia autem considerat ea quae per rationem humanam investigari possunt et quae per revelationem sunt accepta. Et ex hoc patet tertia condicio, sc. quod alia(?) theologia communior est quam ista, quia plura considerat, ut dictum est. Quarto differunt quantum ad finem, quoniam alia est magis practica, considerat enim de entibus divinis quantum ad ea quae per revelationem sunt accepta, revelabilia autem possunt esse practica et speculativa. Quinto{*scripsi*: sexto *P*} patet quod theologia certior est, quoniam est de hiis quae per revelationem divinam sunt accepta; nunc autem \in/ intellectu humano facilius cadit error quam in intellectu divino. Item est dignior, quoniam magis est de entibus divinis quam scientia ista, ut patet ex dictis." Anonymus Zimmermannus's text follows Siger's in all essentials.

4. Why Study the *Metaphysics*?

If metaphysics is not essentially a science about the divine, what then recommends it to the attention of serious students? In the late 13th century, the first lesson of every course on an Aristotelian work was, it seems, dedicated to an exposition of why it is a good thing to study the work in question and its subject. Written "question commentaries" usually have a proem extolling the life of the intellectual and explaining how the study of this particular work contributes to the goal of achieving intellectual bliss, the sort of bliss promised by Aristotle in *Ethics* X and eloquently advocated by Boethius of Dacia in *De summo bono*.

There are such proems in Anonymus Zimmermanni, Peter, and Radulphus. The three share several commonplaces about the nobility of the discipline which, as Brito puts it, "is the primary branch of knowledge, which ranks and provides the rules for the rest" (*ordinatrix, princeps et regulatrix aliarum scientiarum*), and even though all three authors deny that God is its subject, they all emphasize the nobility conferred on it by its having separate substances and even God among the objects of study. Brito's proem, however, differs from the two others by subordinating the other excellences of metaphysics to the freedom that it enjoys and confers upon its students. Thus, the fact that metaphysics is the pinnacle in the hierarchy of branches of knowledge means that it is the freest. Metaphysics is also the most intellectual of all branches of knowledge, and as more intellectual means freer, it is the freest branch of knowledge and makes its students free. The conclusion from such arguments is clear: "Anyone who wishes to be truly free must study first philosophy."[34]

As Brito points out, Aristotle himself in *Metaphysics* I, 2, claims that metaphysics is the only free branch of knowledge. Against this background, it is remarkable that the two other commentators do not mention freedom among the excellences of the discipline. Moreover, Brito is the only one among the five studied here to make Aristotle's remark the

[34] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, Prooem.: "Cum ergo philosophia sit tantum propter scire, philosophia ergo erit libera et possessorem suum facit liberum; ergo per servire philosophiae contingit homini vera libertas; ergo per alias artes fit homo servus, quia omnes ordinantur ad philosophiam primam. Unde qui vere vult esse liber istam philosophiam primam debet addiscere." For the context, see Sten Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito. The Last of the Great Arts Masters. Or: Philosophy and Freedom," in: Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer, eds., *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 27 (Berlin-New York, 1999), pp. 231–51 (repr. in Ebbesen, *Topics*), where a considerable extract from the proem is printed.

occasion for a question, asking in I, q. 12, *Utrum ista scientia sit libera.*[35] The importance that Brito allots to freedom both in his *Metaphysics* commentary and elsewhere[36] hardly implies a great difference from the others as regards his views about metaphysics, but it does tell us something about what it was he found really attractive about the life of an intellectual. He would have liked the German popular song *Die Gedanken sind frei*, and in particular the verses

> Und fesselt man mich im finsteren Kerker,
> so sind doch das nur vergebliche Werke,
> denn meine Gedanken zerreißen die Schranken
> und Mauern entzwei, die Gedanken sind frei![37]

5. Essence and Being

Siger in 0, q. 7 *MC* asks whether being (*esse*) belongs to the essence of things caused (i.e., of creatures), or whether it is an additional item over and above the essence. As so often in medieval metaphysics, the framework for the debate is provided by a disagreement between Avicenna, according to whom being (i.e., existence) is accidental to an essence, and Averroes, who claims that a thing is (exists) by virtue of its essence—introducing some sort of additional feature to account for the fact that the thing exists just shifts the question to that additional feature: Does it owe its being to its essence or to something else? And so on *ad infinitum.*

From a medieval point of view, one of the strongest arguments in favour of some variant of the Avicennian theory was the need to differentiate created separate substances (intelligences) from the First Separate Substance, i.e., the Creator. If the essence and the existence of an intelligence were identical, such a separate substance would seem to possess necessary existence and thus trespass on the privileges of the Creator. The proper distance between The First and lower-ranking separate substances could be obtained by claiming that, although not composed of matter and form, created "pure forms" are nevertheless composite because they consist of essence and being, as opposed to the utterly simple First Cause. Among the authors examined in this chapter, Anonymus Lipsiensis gives this view about the constitution of intelligences his cautious support, and Peter of

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[35] Text in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito."
[36] See Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito."
[37] "And if they chain me in a dark dungeon, that will be a waste of effort, for my thoughts tear the bars apart and the walls asunder. Thoughts are free!"

Auvergne endorses a watered-down version according to which there is a distinction of reason, though not a real one, between an intelligence's essence and its existence, and this, he thinks, is sufficient to set the intelligence apart from God.[38] By extending the essence/being distinction to material creatures like humans, one could also underline the contingency of all creaturely existence as opposed to the necessary existence of God.

Siger, however, will have none of any of the current variants of the Avicennian theory and points out, among other things, that one could differentiate intelligences from God by other means, e.g., by their different means of cognizing. Nor does he think it a useful idea to make creatures composites of essence and being in order to account for the fact that they owe their existence to the First Cause—doing so suggests that they do not owe their essence to the very same First Cause. In fact, the worry of those in the Avicennian camp that creatures will become self-actualizing if their being is not something distinct from their essence rests on a misunderstanding. "No essence without being" or "Every thing *is* by virtue of itself" does not rule out an external *efficient* cause of its being. It only means that every thing has the *formal* cause of its being in itself.

To Siger, *res* and *ens* signify the same, albeit in different ways, and similarly with *essentia* and *esse*. Siger expressly mentions Albert the Great[39] as an adherent of a version of the Avicennian theory and further singles out "some" (*alias* Thomas Aquinas), who seem to try to ride the fence by holding both that in creatures there is an essence/being composition *and* that being is not an accident of the essence. This, Siger declares, is an unintelligible doctrine.[40]

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[38] Cf. Anonymus Lipsiensis, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, ed. Fioravanti, p. 217: "ad quiditatem rei materialis pertinet materia et forma. Item, quiditas rei materialis non est separata a materia secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem. Et contrarium utriusque istorum est in substantiis separatis, quia quiditas earum non est composita ex materia et forma, sed forte compositio essentiae cum esse, et iterum quiditas rei materialis non est separata, sed ista est separata." Cf. III, q. 9, p. 248; IV, q. 4, p. 278. For Peter, see note 45 below, and, for the distinction being only one of reason, his *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 3, in Monahan, "Quaestiones," p. 176.

[39] A comparison with Anonymus Zimmermanni shows that at pp. 43–44 of Dunphy's edition of the *M* version, "Haec est opinio Alberti Commentatoris" is a misreading (whether the editor's or the scribe's) of "Haec est opinio Alberti Coloniensis."

[40] Cf. Siger, *Qu. Met.*, *M* 0, q. 7, ed. Dunphy, p. 44.10–13: "Ponunt autem quidam modo medio quod esse est aliquid additum essentiae rei, non pertinens ad essentiam rei, nec ponunt quod sit accidens, sed est aliquid additum quasi per essentiam constitutum sive ex principiis essentiae. Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum tamen ponendi non intelligo, quia esse quod pertinet ad rem aut est pars essentiae rei, ut materia vel forma, aut res ipsa composita ex his, aut accidens. [. . .] Sed dicere quod esse sit aliquid additum essentiae

Anonymus Zimmermanni and Radulphus concur. The Thomist position is unintelligible. Unlike Siger, they both call Thomas by name (*frater Thomas*), and Anonymus Zimmermanni adds Giles of Rome as another representative of fundamentally the same opinion.[41] But not only that: Anonymus Zimmermanni and Radulphus agree with Siger on just about every point, and very obviously both depend on him, whether directly or via an unknown intermediary, but neither of them depends on the other.

Anonymus Zimmermanni mentions an attempt to avoid Averroes's argument that one can ask about a feature that is added to essence what *it* owes its being to, etc. Some, he says, introduce a distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse actualis existentiae.* If, then, one asks "Is a man a being (*ens*) by virtue of his essence or of some added feature," the answer is "By virtue of his essence" if the question regards essential being and "By

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rei ita quod non sit res ipsa neque pars essentiae, ut materia vel forma, et dicere quod non sit accidens, est ponere quartam naturam in entibus." Siger's presentation of *quidam*'s position paraphrases Thomas Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 2, n. 558: "Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae."

[41] Cf. Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, *Utrum omnia entia causata sint entia per essentiam suam vel per dispositionem additam essentiae, P* fol. 15ra: "Frater Thomas reprobat Avicennam in hoc quod posuit esse additum essentiae sicut accidens, concedit enim quod ens sit additum essentiae, non tamen est additum sicut accidens, sed eiusdem generis cum eo constitutum per principia essentialia rei. Et idem ponit frater Aegidius. Dicit enim quod esse hominis est in genere eodem <in> quo est homo, non per se sed per reductionem, et esse quodcumque, sicut motus ad substantiam in genere substantiae per reductionem." The report of Thomas's view is further removed from the original text than Siger's (preceding note), and probably dependent on his, although headed by a piece of information not given by Siger, namely, that the author of the unintelligible opinion was Thomas. The reference to Giles is unlikely to concern his *Quaestiones Metaphysicales* (ca. 1270), in which he does critizice Avicenna's view in IV, q. 7, but not in words even remotely similar to what Anonymus Zimmermanni reports. Silvia Donati (personal communication) points instead to *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, theorem 22, and to *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 9, fol. 20vb, the latter of which actually speaks of reduction: "Punctus sic est quid additum lineae quod non est in genere per se sed reducitur ad idem genus in quo est linea. Sic esse ita est superadditum substantiae quod non est in genere per se sed reducitur ad idem genus cum ipsa substantia in qua recipitur." If, indeed, Anonymus Zimmermanni was thinking of *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, a date in the late 1280s seems indicated, as assumed by Fioravanti, "Introduction," p. 171. See Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2 (in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics," p. 476): "Frater Thomas videtur dicere quod non est idem cum essentia sed aliquid additum, et dicit quod <non> est accidens, est tamen constitutum ex principiis rei. Sed non intelligo, quia quicquid est in re vel est pars essentialis sibi, sicut materia vel forma, vel ipsa res vel accidens ipsi rei. Et si dicatur quod sit ibi aliud, hoc erit figmentum. Si autem intelligatur quod immediate componatur ex principiis rei, tunc est ipsa res vel compositum; si autem intelligatur quod non immediate constituatur ex principiis rei, est accidens."

virtue of an added feature" if the question regards the being of actual existence. But, our author rightly says, this is begging the question and leaves Averroes's argument intact, for it concerns actual existence.

Remarkably, Peter of Auvergne has no question directly addressing the *esse/essentia* issue.[42] He does, however, on at least one occasion reveal that he recognizes a distinction between *esse essentiae* or *esse essentiale* and *esse in effectu* (another way of saying *esse* (*actualis*) *existentiae*). The context is a discussion of whether the what-it-is-to-be (*quod quid est*) for an accident is separate (*absolutum*) from that of a substance. Peter concludes that the accident's dependence on a substance is not included in the very quiddity or notion (*quiditas, ratio essentialis*) of the accident, though it is its trusty companion, and so it is separate from substance according to its essential notion and nature, and thus also according to its essential being, though not according to its actual being (= existence).[43]

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[42] He does, however, take up the subject in his *Quodlibet* II, q. 4, edited in Monahan, "Quaestiones," pp. 177–81.

[43] Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 12, *O* fol. 309ra–b, *P* fol. 195ra-b: –Ad quaestionem, cum quaeritur utrum quod quid est accidentis sit absolutum a quod quid est substantiae, dicendum quod aliquid ad praesens potest dici absolutum duobus modis: aut secundum rationem essentialem et naturam, aut secundum esse [. . .] Quod habet intellectum separatum habet et quod quid est separatum, quia intellectus est quod quid est erat esse: sed accidens habet intellectum separatum a substantia, contingit enim intelligere accidens praeter substantiam nec ut dependens ad substantiam, quod declarant nomina significantia in abstracto, nihil enim separate significatur nisi quod separate intelligitur. Manifestum est igitur quod quod quid est accidentis est separatum ita quod dependentia qua accidens habet habitudinem ad substantiam est aliquid diversum a quiditate accidentis nec ponitur in ipsa. Quamvis autem non sit in ratione accidentis, tamen immediate fundatur super ipsam, ita quod sicut duplicitas fundatur super duo, et tamen non pertinet ad rationem duorum, ut dicitur quinto huius, similiter dependentia ad subiectum fundatur super naturam accidentis, tamen non est de ratione eius essentiali, sed aliquid consequens ipsum quod inest sibi per se secundo modo dicendi per se. Si autem loquamur de absolutione secundo modo dicta, puta de absolutione secundum esse, sic dicendum est quod quod quid est accidentis non est separatum a quod quid est substantiae, et loquor hic de esse in effectu, quod dico quia esse duplex est: quoddam enim est esse essentiae et quoddam est esse in effectu. Esse essentiae accidentis idem est quod natura accidentis, nec differt hoc ab illo nisi solum in modo, quod enim nomine esse significatur verbaliter et per modum fieri, nomine essentiae significatur per modum habitus; unde 'esse' illud {illud *scripsi*: idem *OP*} quod significat significat verbaliter, puta dicendo 'esse album' vel 'magnum.' Et si loquamur de esse essentiae dico quod sicut essentia accidentis distincta est ab essentia substantiae, ita esse essentiale accidentis ab esse essentiali substantiae; unde Philosophus in primo Physicorum dicit quod aliud est esse albo et susceptibili, et loquitur de esse essentiali. Propter quod dicendum est quod loquendo de isto esse quod quid est accidentis est absolutum secundum esse a quod quid est substantiae. Loquendo autem de esse in effectu dico quod hoc modo quod quid est {quid est *scripsi*: quidem *OP*} accidentis non est absolutum secundum esse, quoniam accidentis esse est inesse, ut vult Commentator super quartum huius, et ideo, sicut accidentia semper inhaerent substantiis,

Finally, the idea of an *essentia-esse* composition turns up in Peter's question IX, q. 2, "Whether one should posit a passive potency in immaterial substances other than the first one." He there argues that such substances must poses a potency for being (*esse*) and for acting (*operatio*) as well as a potency for receiving information (*species*). To make it credible that an unchangeable form may possess the last-mentioned potency, he claims that it is of a different sort from the similar potency in a material thing such as a man. As regards the potency for being, Peter uses the argument that we have already mentioned, namely, that if existence (*esse*) belonged to the essence of all intelligences, then there would be more necessary beings than one; as this is false, the existence of non-first intelligences cannot be included in their essence, but then, since they do poses existence, their essence must have a potency for that.[44]

Radulphus's IX, q. 2, is a direct reply to Peter and his arguments. Separate substances are not compounds, Brito holds, whether of matter or form, of being and existence, or of substance and accident. Peter had argued that then there would not be the proper distance between God and the intelligences. This is not true, says Brito, for one being may be less perfect than another for other reasons than by being more composite. Thus, there is a ranking of the four elements by perfection, with fire at the top and earth at the bottom of the scale, yet they are all simple bodies.[45]

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ita semper sunt cum substantiis, et inde album non est nisi cum aliud quoddam sit quod sit album, sicut dicitur primo Posteriorum."

[44] Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, IX, q. 2, *O* fol. 322ra, *P* fol. 211va: "in omni eo in quo invenitur aliquid quod non pertinet ad essentiam eius secundum quod huiusmodi invenitur potentia ad illud, ex quo enim est in eo et non est in essentia sua, tunc essentia sua est in potentia ad illud. In substantiis autem immaterialibus aliis a prima est reperire esse, et esse non est in natura earum, si enim detur quod sic, tunc ex se haberent esse, et sic ex se necesse esset eas esse, essent ergo tunc plura <quae> ex se necesse <est> esse, quod falsum est, tantum enim est unum tale quod ex se necesse est esse; quare essentia ipsarum est in potentia ad esse, et haec non est potentia activa, non enim sunt activae sui esse, sed aliud quod est prius egis; igitur sunt in potentia passiva ad suum esse, quare in eis est potentia passiva."

[45] Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, IX, q. 2, *F* fol. 303vb: "cum dicitur quod in substantiis separatis est compositio, dico quod ibi nulla est compositio, neque ex materia et forma, neque ex esse et essentia neque ex subiecto et accidente. Et tu dicis quod omne quod recedit a primo est compositum—verum est: si ratione simplicitatis recedit a primo, sed si ratione perfectionis, non oportet quod accedat ad compositionem. Modo illo modo, ratione perfectionis, recedunt substantiae separatae aliae a primo ab ipso primo. Et istud patet in exemplo naturali: videmus enim quod inter omnia corpora simplicia ignis est perfectius corpus quam alia simplicia, et aer perfectius corpus quam aqua, et aqua quam terra; tamen unum non est magis compositum quam aliud, quia omnia ista corpora sunt corpora simplicia ex quibus alia componuntur, et tamen unum istorum est perfectius alio.

To brush away the worry about the intelligences becoming self-actualizing if they lack a distinction between existence and essence, Brito follows Siger in pointing out that having being by itself *formaliter* does not imply having being by itself *effective*, i.e., it is perfectly possible for something to have an internal formal cause while having an external efficient cause.[46]

The last important argument Brito had to rebut was the one about the intelligences having a potency for cognizing by means of species. This he correctly identifies as an un-Aristotelian argument, but he sort of accepts it because—and only because—it has the weight of the theologians behind it:[47]

> I believe that according to Truth other intelligences than The First understand by means of species different from themselves, but according to the Philosopher no passive potency is to be found there, whether with regard their understanding or to their being, for their being does not differ from their essence. [. . .] But we must hold that there is there a potency for understanding. But concerning a potency for being, there is no article.

Articles 71 and 76 of the 1277 condemnations may be the ones that forced Brito to this tongue-in-cheek statement. They censure the claims that "In separate substances no change is possible and they are not in potency to anything because they are eternal and impervious to matter" and "That an angel does not acquire any new understanding."[48] Brito was willing to capitulate when confronted with overwhelming force, but only then—"concerning a potency for being, there is no article."

Ita ergo substantiae separatae recedunt a primo ratione perfectionis et non ratione simplicitatis, quare non valet ratio."

[46] *Ibid.*, fol. 303va: "Cum dicitur quod si essent puri actus haberent esse per se, verum est—formaliter; modo non habent per se esse, ut dicit Avicenna—verum est illo modo quod effective non sint ab alio, sed per se habent esse et formaliter, sicut homo est animal formaliter per formam suam, tamen effective habet esse ab alio; eodem modo in intelligentia esse est de essentia, quia per ipsum esse formaliter habet esse per se, licet effective habeat totum esse ab alio, et essentia sua et suum esse."

[47] *Ibid.*, fol. 303va–b: "Credo quod secundum veritatem aliae intelligentiae a primo intelligunt per species alia<s> a se, sed secundum Philosophum non videtur ibi esse potentia passiva, neque propter intelligere neque etiam propter suum esse, quia esse non differt ab essentia ipsarum. [. . .] Sed tenendum est quod sit ibi potentia ad intelligere, sed de potentia ad esse non est articulus."

[48] See David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277* (Paris, 1999), p. 103: "71. Quod in substantiis separatis nulla est possibilis transmutatio, neque sunt in potentia ad aliquid, quia aeternae et immunes sunt a materia. [. . .] 76. Quod angelus nihil intelligit de novo."

6. Individuation

6.1. *Siger*

In his V, q. 20 *MC*,[49] Siger presents two theories concerning the individuation of material things, one which he says he used to hold, but now wants to recant, and his current theory. His first theory:

> (α) A thing is individual and one in number by the being (essence) of its matter (*Aliquid est individuum et unum numero per essentiam materiae*).
>
> For: (Criterion) A thing is individual due to a lack of capacity for being in many things (*Aliquid est individuum ex eo quod non est natum esse in multis*).

But this criterion works differently according to which type of form with which we are dealing. (1) A separate form cannot be in anything, and *a fortiori* not in many things. So, its individuation is an immediate consequence of the sort of form it is. But (2.1) A material form has a natural capacity for being in several things, so (2.2) it must be individualized by being associated with something that does not have the same capacity; and (2.3) that can only be matter.

> (β) Further: it is not necessarily the case that what individualizes something is also what distinguishes it from other individuals. In fact, what produces the distinction is quantity, for this is what carves up ("divides") matter.

Against this former theory of his, Siger raises two objections:

> (Against β) What is an individual is *eo ipso* "undivided in itself," but it cannot be so unless it is "divided from other things"; for, assume it were not, then it would potentially be several other things. Therefore, it must be the same factor that individualizes something and "divides" it from others.

> (Against α) The criterion is valid and so is the account of separate forms in (1). But (2.1–3) does not hold.

Siger's second theory:

> Any material form, matter and compound of material form and matter has the capacity for being in several things. Thus the individuating factor must be something additional to the form-matter compound, something which lacks the capacity for being in several things; and that must be determinate and distinct dimensions. Quantity, he holds, is self-individualizing.

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[49] In my presentation I follow the *C* version (ed. Maurer, pp. 230–35), which is the most thorough one.

Siger's discussion is free of references to matters theological, except for the quiet remark about separate substances, which he takes to have built-in individuation.

6.2. *The Anonymi*

Anonymus Lipsiensis, in his III, q. 9, takes "being here and now" (*esse hic et nunc*) to be what individualizes material things, humans included, but he also speaks of determinate quantity (*quantitas determinata*) without, apparently, making a distinction between the two. Separate substances, in contrast, are individualized by their form, and so the concepts of species and individual coincide. The question is neither very long nor very deep, and perhaps most remarkable for its repeated references to "the Commentator," i.e., Averroes—all of them, apparently, spurious.

Anonymus Zimmermanni offers a more thorough treatment of individuation in his III, q. 10, "Whether individuals of the same species differ according to their substance or just by means of some accident." Two views are presented and rejected before the author gives his final answer.

> View 1: Individuals of the same species differ only by some accident, for if we set aside all accidents and think only of the substance of their matter and form, the several individuals are indiscernible.[50]
>
> View 2: Individuals of the same species differ by virtue of their substance, but "effectively" (*effective*) their difference comes about through quantity. Socrates and Plato do not differ in substance in the way a man and a horse do, nor merely accidentally in the way Socrates qua white differs from Socrates qua musical. Hence they differ partly "substantially," partly through something accidental, namely, quantity.[51]

Siger had already presented a version of (2) in V, q. 26 *C*, and had rejected it. Using an argument of his, Anonymus Zimmermanni also rejects (2),

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[50] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 10, *P* fol. 13rb: "Aliqui dicunt quoniam individua eiusdem speciei differunt solo accidente et non substantialiter. Si enim in diversis individuis attendamus ad substantiam materiae et formae circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus nihil inveniemus {n.i.: in + *spat. vac. P*} per quod possimus unum discernere ab alio, quia non differunt quantum ad {ad: et *P*} materiam <quae> pertinet ad speciem."

[51] *Ibid.*: "Aliqui vero dicunt quod diversa individua eiusdem speciei differunt substantialiter, ista tamen diversitas eorum est effective per quantitatem, quoniam videmus quod Socrates et Plato non differunt sicut homo et equus, iterum nec sicut Socrates albus <et musicus>; Socrates ergo et Plato non differunt penitus substantialiter sicut homo et asinus, nec differunt solo accidente sicut Socrates albus et musicus; quare differunt partim substantialiter et partim accidentaliter, ita quod diversitas in substantia est formaliter in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei, sed effective a quodam alio, sc. a quantitate."

because for it not to clash with the maxim "From whatever something derives its existence (*esse*) it also derives its unity," individuals would have to owe their substance to quantity. He also rejects (1), but explicitly does so only because, according to *moderni theologi*, it is incompatible with faith, since it would make the naked substances of Socrates and Plato, stripped of all accidents, identical, and it is, in fact, possible for them to exist as naked substances; i.e., taking view (1) would mean embracing Averroes's monopsychism.[52]

The *moderni theologi* almost certainly are Stephen Tempier and his helpers, who drew up the 1277 list of condemnable theses, and our author probably was thinking in particular of article 96, "That God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter" and/or article 97, "That individuals of the same species, such as Socrates and Plato, differ only by the position of their matter."[53] Calling the authors of the condemnation *moderni theologi* sounds like an act of defiance, as the appellation suggests that older and wiser theologians had thought otherwise than those recent ones with their new-fangled doctrines.

To satisfy the theologians of his day, Anonymus Zimmermanni resorts to an *ad hoc* solution. There are three types of form, he says: (1) One which is the form of some matter and has been educed from the potency of the matter; (2) another which is not the form of any matter nor educed from

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[52] *Ibid.*: "Istud dicere universaliter falsum est et contra fidem, sicut moderni theologi dicunt, solum propter animam intellectivam. Si enim dicatur quod Socrates et Plato solum differant in accidentibus, si possibile esset substantiam Socratis et Platonis per se existere praeter accidentia, tunc Socrates et Plato essent eadem substantialiter, et ita cum possibile sit substantiam Socratis et Platonis aliquando per se existere, sequeretur quod forma substantialis utriusque esset una numero, <et sic> essent unum numero, et sic rediret opinio Commentatoris." The tripartition of form is repeated in VIII, q. 1, *Utrum forma materialis secundum esse sit separabilis a materia*, to provide a determination *secundum veritatem. P* fol. 43vb: "Dicendum igitur secundum veritatem distinguendo: quaedam est {est: esse *P*} forma materialis quae per transmutationem agentis educitur de potentia materiae et ista totaliter est immersa materiae, unde talis forma per se non habet esse sed per solam(?) compositionem habet esse. Est alia forma quae nullo modo habet respectum ad materiam sicut intelligentia. Est tertia forma media, quae partim habet naturam formae materialis et partim naturam substantiae separatae, et ista non educitur de potentia materiae per transmutationem agentis, sed materia summe disposita infundit eam deus materiae, et haec est intellectus. Tunc dico quod forma materialis quae totaliter immersa est materiae non est separabilis a materia secundum esse, forma autem quae non educitur a potentia materiae, est tamen perfectio materiae data ab extrinseco, bene est separabilis secundum esse."

[53] See Piché, *La condamnation*, p. 108: "Quod deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia" and "Quod individua eiusdem speciei, ut Socrates et Plato, differunt sola positione materiae suae." Cf. also article 81: "Quod, quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, deus non posset plures eiudem speciei facere."

the potency of any matter; and (3) a third which is the form of some matter but not educed from the potency of the matter. (1) covers the forms of ordinary material objects which are individuated by their matter or accidents—he seems not to distinguish between individuation by matter and by accidents. (2) will cover the intelligences, but whatever the anonymous said about their individuation has been lost in a lacuna in the text. (3) is the human intellective soul, and that two such souls are two substances is simply due to the will of their creator![54]

6.3. *Peter*

Peter of Auvergne treats of individuation at lengths in his VII, q. 25, which was analyzed by Hocedez as early as 1934 and edited by Monahan in 1955. Hocedez noticed a striking difference between Peter's account of individuation in the *Metaphysics* questions and in his later *Quodlibet II*, as well as an affinity of the former to Henry of Ghent's and of the latter to Godfrey of Fontaines'. In VII, q. 25, Peter first eliminates a number of candidates for the position of principle of individuation:

> (1) A composite substance or its quiddity cannot individualize, whether by itself, in virtue of its matter or in virtue of its form, for it is by nature such as to have several instantiations.
>
> (2) Accidents cannot individualize because a this-something (*hoc aliquid*) and individual in the category of substance must be that which by itself and primarily possesses actual existence. Moreover, accidents are by nature

[54] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 10, *P* fol. 13rb–va: "intelligendum quod quaedam est forma materialis, quae est perfectio materiae, quae etiam educitur de potentia materiae; quaedam est forma immaterialis, quae nec est perfectio materiae nec educitur de potentia materiae; quaedam vero est forma media, quae est perfectio materiae, non tamen educitur de potentia materiae, ut <anima> intellectiva. Forma autem primo modo individuatur per materiam, <*** Forma vero tertio modo non individuatur per materiam;> si enim individuaretur anima Socratis per materiam Socratis et anima Platonis per materiam Platonis, et haec esset causa diversitatis eorum, tunc, cum animae Socratis et Platonis separarentur a materia, et forma substantialis, Socrates et Plato essent eadem numero, sicut arguit Commentator. Et ideo, cum anima intellectiva in isto sit diversa ab anima intellectiva in illo, hoc non est per solam materiam. Sed hoc est ex sola voluntate producentis talem animam, et †i(de)o ind()ns quod sunt† speciei humanae. Et hoc est verum, quia sc. illa differunt secundum substantiam, non solo accidente. In aliis tamen materialibus individua unius speciei differunt solo accidente, ubi forma materialis individuatur per materiam et educitur de potentia materiae. § Sed intelligendum quod aliud est dicere quod Socrates et Plato differunt secundum substantiam et quod Socrates et Plato sint substantiae differentes. Cum enim dico quod differunt secundum substantiam, significo quod causa diversitatis ipsorum sit aliquid substantiale in illis, et sic Socrates et Plato non differunt secundum substantiam, licet possit dici quod sint substantiae differentes."

> shareable (*communia*), and this trait will not go away even if one gathers a heap of them. Peter refers to Avicenna for this last observation, which is ultimately directed against Porphyry's description of an individual as something consisting of properties the complete set of which can never be found elsewhere.[55]
>
> (3) Quantity has already been eliminated in (2), since it is an accident. But what about "quantity insofar as it is this [quantity]"? Saying so just shifts the problem, for what makes it "this quantity" and "this accident"? Whatever is proposed, one may ask the same question again, and so on *ad infinitum.*

Having finished the elimination process, Peter puts forward his own theory, a main feature of which, he stresses, is that individuation is not brought about by anything being added to the substance. Initially, he introduces a distinction between this-something and individual. Though in the category of substance the two coincide in one nature, they are notionally (*ratione*) different and have different causes. A substance is called an individual when it not divided into several numerically different substances. It is called this-something because it subsists and has being by itself, and that is how it differs from [the same] substance taken absolutely.

Now, indivision is a privation of the same sort as one-ness; in fact, being an individual is being one in number, Peter tells us, and privations have only one type of cause, a material cause, for they need some substrate matter to carry them. Lack of a dividing principle to carve them up is what makes individuals individuals, and this explanation, Peter claims, holds for material substances, accidents, heavenly bodies, and separate substances. This suggests that all forms, including such as never have any matter, have a potential for being the substrate of the corresponding positive property (*habitus*) of being multiplied. Peter offers no elucidation of this point, and he may not have thought much about it, but it just could be a safety valve to avoid problems with *articulus Parisiensis* 81, "That, since intelligences have no matter, God could not produce several of the same species."[56]

So much for indivision and individual, but what about this-somethingness? According to Peter, a substance is a this-something in virtue of being the end of the action that produces it, which means that it has a relation (*respectus*) to its producer—in the case of a human, directly to

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[55] Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, ed. Adolf Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca) IV, 1 (Berlin, 1887), p. 7.21–23.

[56] See Piché, *La condamnation*, p. 104: "Quod, quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere."

the father, but ultimately to a first agent which is a this-something by itself and in which there is no conceptual distinction between species and subsistence. In the case of separate substances, they are directly linked to the first agent as terms of this relation of production (*factio*), but in material things,

> this-somethingness is due to a relation to an agent insofar as they are the terms of this action and this agent and this matter, so that the immediate cause of the unity of the thing generated is the unity of the action, and the immediate cause of the unity of the action is the unity of the matter. And therefore we say that matter, qua designated, is the cause of individuation.[57]

Here Peter seems to have forgotten his own distinction between individuality and this-somethingness and an earlier claim that indivision is what gives unity. It also looks as if he wants to both have his cake and eat it. His main idea seems to be that being a product implies being a this-something (which, though he does not say so, is equivalent to making this-somethingness an immediate consequence of existence for all creatures). That would seem to make any appeal to designated matter superfluous, but he could not make himself jettison this venerable item in the account of individuation. He also fails to explain how disembodied souls can be individual, but he might, presumably, claim that the soul-part of man is individualized by being a direct product of the first agent, while the individuality of the whole man needs some further explanation because his matter is only indirectly the creator's product.

6.4. *Radulphus*

Radulphus Brito deals with individuation both in V, q. 12, "Whether it is true that matter is the principle of individuation, or that something else

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[57] Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 25, ed. Monahan, p. 172: "Et tu dices: 'Substantia est hoc aliquid per respectum ad hoc agens. Quaeram unde agens est hoc aliquid. Oportet dare consimiliter quod per respectum ad hoc agens, et illud per respectum ad aliud agens, quod etiam fit hoc aliquid; et sic ulterius procedendo quousque deveniatur ad agens quod non est hoc aliquid per respectum ad aliud.' § Dico quod hoc verum est. Et ideo concedo quod est devenire ad agens primum, quod secundum se est hoc aliquid, in quo non differt ratio speciei et subsistentiae per quam substantia dicitur hoc aliquid. In aliis autem substantiis immaterialibus est hoc aliquid inquantum sunt termini talis factionis absolute, in istis vero materialibus est hoc aliquid per rationem habitam vel per respectum ad agens inquantum sunt termini huius actionis et huius agentis ex hac materia, ita quod immediate unitas rei generatae est ex unitate actionis, et unitas actionis ex unitate materiae. Et ideo dicimus materiam secundum quod signata est esse causam individuationis."

is so," and in VII, q. 20, "Whether matter is the principle of individuation, or form, or some accident." In both questions he criticizes Peter's theory of individuation. A main objection is that it makes individuality depend on a mere relation, and since there are real predicates, namely, ordinary accidents, which primarily belong to individuals and not to universals, there ought to be something *in* the individuals that make them proper bearers of such predicates.[58]

In V, q. 12, Brito mentions and rejects what I called "View 2" in Section § 6.2 about Anonymus Zimmermanni, above. In that view, form is the formal and quantity the efficient principle. Brito objects that if two individuals differed due to their form, they would belong to different species. Moreover, mathematical "objects" such as quantity cannot act as efficient causes. He accuses the adherents of View 2 of having invented it out of sheer cowardice: "because they did not have the courage to say that two individuals differ only by some accident."[59]

Brito did have the courage required. He agrees with Peter that indivision is a mere privation, and he accepts it as a formal principle of individuation. He also agrees with Peter that something else is needed to make the individual subsistent by itself, but rejects Peter's solution and opts for quantity instead. Undivided quantity (*quantitas indivisa*) is what makes a thing be in a certain place and nowhere else, and undivided quantity automatically confers numerical unity, just as divided quantity confers

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[58] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 22, *F* fol. 282va: "Alii dixerunt quod forma, et dicunt quod diversimode potest forma considerari: uno modo secundum se et absolute, et sic est principium speciei; vel in quantum est terminus generationis, et sic est principium individuationis. § Istud non valet, quia tunc individuum esset individuum per aliquid relatum, quia secundum ipsos non est principium secundum se sed ut est terminus, et melius est ponere quod sit individum per accidens absolutum quam relatum." VII, q. 20, *F* fol. 297vb: "Et ideo isti homines hoc dicentes dicunt quod substantia est hoc aliquid per rationem sicut per respectum ad agens, per hoc sc. quod est terminus talis actionis determinatae a tali agente determinato. Sed ista positio non videtur conveniens, quia cum aliqua praedicata realia, saltem accidentia communia, primo competant individuis, secundo speciei, videtur quod individuum aliquid habeat per quod tale praedicatum sibi conveniat."

[59] *Ibid.*: "Aliqui dixerunt quod forma est principium individuationis formaliter, tamen quantitas effective est principium, quia non erant ausi dicere quod duo individua solum differrent secundum accidens, sed effective per quantitatem aliquid dicitur individuum secundum ipsos. § Hoc est falsum, quia si differrent duo individua formaliter secundum formam, tunc differrent specie, quia differentia per formam est differentia secundum speciem. Item, male dicunt quod quantitas sit effective principium individuationis, quia in tertio huius dicit Philosophus quod in mathematicis non est bonum neque efficiens; quantitas autem est quid mathematicum."

plurality.[60] In the main, this seems to be a return to Siger's position. It remains, however, somewhat mysterious how the quantity manages to make the individual subsistent by itself.

Separate substances are different, of course. They are simply self-individualizing forms, forms that can exist by themselves, but not in matter, and so each is a species and an individual for the same reason.[61] About disembodied souls Brito utters not a word.

7. Plurality of Substantial Forms?

All the commentators considered here either directly or indirectly reject the notion that the form of man, e.g., is a sort of composite of a form of corporeality, another of living organism (the vegetative soul), a third one of animality and a final properly human form. Siger briefly mentions the controversy over the singularity or plurality of substantial forms in III, q. 14 *M* without undertaking a rebuttal of the plurality theory. But both he and the four others implicitly reject it by denying that generic concepts and differentiae have different real foundations. Whereas adherents of the plurality theory would take the adage *operatio arguit* [or: *fecit scire*] *formam* ("function reveals form") to imply a distinct form corresponding to each function, our artists simply assume that one form can reveal itself through several functions, which in turn can give rise to several concepts,

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[60] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 20, *F* fol. 298ra: "Oportet ergo quod sit quoddam aliud quod sit principium individuationis aliud a subiecto, et oportet quod sit accidens ex quo non est substantia. Istud autem accidens credo quod sit quantitas indivisa. Et ratio huius est quia sicut se habet quantitas divisa ad multitudinem numeralem, ita se habet quantitas indivisa ad unitatem numeralem; [ita se habet quantitas] sed numerus qui est multitudo causatur ex divisione continui, ut patet tertio Physicorum; ergo unitas numeralis causatur ex indivisione continui, et istud continuum indivisum est quantitas indivisa, indivisum enim vel individuum habet formam in materia sub determinatis dimensionibus <ut> hic sit [autem] et non alibi. Et ideo individuum per illud est individuum per quod competit sibi esse hic et non alibi. Hoc autem non est per formam, quia forma bene habet esse alibi; sed competit istud sibi per hoc quod habet formam in materia sub determinata quantitate hic et non alibi."

[61] *Ibid.*: "In substantiis autem separatis quid sit illud per quod est ibi individum, planum est ex dictis quia cum in istis coniunctis cum materia per idem competat alicui esse individuum per quod sibi competit per se subsistere, ita et ibi, et hoc in separatis est forma quae non est nata existere in materia sed nata est existere per se, et ideo per formam est ibi individuum et est species, quia species est per formam, et ideo per formam est species et individuum aliquid ibi. Non sic autem per formam materiale individuum est individuum, quia forma sua nata est existere in materia determinata sub determinatis dimensionibus, et competit etiam sibi quod sit determinati temporis."

more or less precisely grasping the same thing. The concept of animal is not a concept of something different from what is grasped by the concepts of man, donkey, etc., or by the concepts of something rational, braying, etc. It is just a looser grasp of the same things.[62]

The key notion in this theory is the manifestation via a function. This is called an *operatio apparens* or, for short, an *apparens* by Siger in VII, q. 22 *C*, and the verb *apparere* also occurs prominently in Peter of Auvergne's

[62] Cf. Anonymus Lipsiensis, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 21; Siger, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 22 *C*; Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 8; Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 10; and Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 10 (edition in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics," pp. 471–72) and VII, q. 24. Radulphus is very indebted to Peter, from whose II, q. 10, I quote a central passage (*O* fols. 264vb–265ra, *P* fol. 50rb–va): "intelligendum est quod genus importat totam naturam huius speciei et illius, similiter importat totum id quod importatur nomine differentiae, et hoc patet: si enim genus non diceret totam essentiam speciei sed partem, similiter et differentia, tunc neutrum praedicaretur per se de specie praedicatione dicente 'Hoc est hoc'; pars enim de toto non praedicatur praedicatione dicente 'Hoc est illud.' Si ergo <genus> praedicetur per se de hac specie et de illa, necesse est quod praedicet totam essentiam huius speciei et illius; similiter differentia, cum per se praedicetur de specie, oportet quod dicat totum id quod est species. Licet autem genus et differentia totam naturam speciei importent, hoc tamen non est secundum unam rationem, quia si secundum eandem rationem, tunc sequeretur quod esset nugatio in definitionibus, nam cum in definitione ponantur genus et differentia, si idem tunc importarent et sub una ratione, sequeretur quod esset inutilis repetitio unius et eiusdem sub eadem ratione. Non ergo genus et differentia significant essentiam speciei sub eadem ratione, sed genus dicit totum quod est in una specie sub ratione non determinati et per modum determinabilis, differentia vero per modum eius quo aliquid determinatur seu per modum determinantis. Unde genus rationem materiae habet, differentia vero rationem formae, istae autem diversae rationes fundantur in una natura speciei. Et hoc est possibile, nam in natura una et indivisa secundum actum potest intellectus fundare diversas rationes secundum diversa quae apparent de natura illa, et quia in specie una apparet aliqua operatio in qua communicat cum alia specie, iterum in ipsa alia operatio apparet per quam differt a specie alia, ideo intellectus ratione unius operationis considerat naturam illus speciei non ut determinatam, ratione vero alterius considerat eam ut determinatam vel ut determinantem. Et cum comprehenditur sub ratione non determinata constituitur intellectus generis, cum autem sub ratione determinantis intellectus differentiae, ita quod genus significat id quod et sua species sub ratione non determinata, determinabili tamen, differentia vero totum quod est in specie dicit sub ratione determinantis. Verbi gratia in homine sunt ista: rationale et animal. Et haec de ipso praedicantur in quid, nam de homine apparent ista duo, videlicet et quod sentit et quod ratiocinatur, et ideo potest intellectus accipere hominem ut sensibilis est vel etiam ut ratiocinativus est. Intellectus autem hominis ut sentiens est constituit intellectum animalis, ita quod animal dicit totum id quod est in homine sub ratione qua sentit, in qua quidem ratione convenit homo cum asino, propter quod et animal indifferenter se habet ad hominem et ad asinum, et ratio eius est ratio non determinati. Et quia ratio generis est ratio non determinati, ideo animal est genus ad utramque speciem. Intellectus vero hominis ut est habens rationem se habet in ratione determinantis respectu sensibilis, ita quod rationale praedicatum de homine praedicat totam essentiam hominis sub ratione determinantis."

account, but it was left for Radulphus to make the substantivized neuter participle *apparens* a central technical term of his epistemology.[63]

Anonymus Zimmermanni and Radulphus explicitly argue against a plurality of substantial forms, the former attributing the theory to "the old interpreters of Aristotle" and the latter to "other [thinkers], even some recent ones."[64] They point out that the plurality theory is un-Aristotelian, which, of course, makes it very doubtful that it can be incorporated into an otherwise strongly Aristotelian view of the world. Among several standard objections, they point out that per definition, a substantial form is what makes a substance what it is, so positing several such forms in one substance will transform every substance into many substances, or, alternatively, the specific form will be accidental to the generic one, as the theory presupposes that the generic form has actual being prior to the advent of the specific form. Against the developed version of the plurality theory that employs the notion of steps or degrees (*gradus*) of completeness rather than simply different forms, Anonymus Zimmermanni objects that wherever there are several degrees there is a more-and-less, but there can be no gradation in a substantial form: you cannot be more or less a human being, either you are a human or you are not.[65]

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[63] See Heinrich Roos, "Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Terminus *apparens* in den logischen Schriften des ausgehenden 13. Jahrhunderts," in: Joseph Möller & Helmut Kohlenberger, eds., *Virtus Politica. Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel* (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 323–34, and Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics," pp. 460–61.

[64] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 29, *P* fol. 41rb: "Alia est opinio antiquorum expositorum Aristotelis, et est quod in substantia rei sunt diversi gradus formarum, et secundum ordinem praedicatorum in quid, ut quod ponebant hominem per aliam formam esse corpus et substantiam et animal, ita quod ponebant genus superius esse materiale respectu generis inferioris, volentes per hoc assignare unitatem definitionis." Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 24, *F* fols. 298vb–299ra: "Alii ponunt, et moderni aliqui, quod sit alia forma hominis per quam est homo, et per quam est animal, et per quam est corpus, et sic de aliis. Et dicunt quod illa forma communis est illa a qua accipitur ratio generis. Et dicunt quod est coniuncta cum aliis formis propriis. Et dicunt quod destructa forma propria non oportet omnes formas alias destrui, sicut destructa forma humana per quam homo est homo non oportet quod forma per quam homo est corpus destruatur."

[65] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 29, *P* fol. 41rb: "Qui dicunt quod in eadem substantia est multitudo formarum substantialium aut intelligunt <1> quod in ista substantia sit gradus formarum substantialium completarum secundum multitudinem praedicatorum, aut <2> quod sit multitudo graduum formae substantialis, qui gradus differunt secundum completum et incompletum. <*Ad* 1> Primum est impossibile, forma enim actualis et completa dat esse actuale et completum; si igitur in eadem substantia essent multae formae completae, iam sequeretur quod una substantia esset actu plura entia. <*Ad* 2> Nec potest intelligi secundo modo, ita quod homo sit homo per formam substantialem in qua essent multi gradus, et per unum gradum sit ens, per alium corpus, quia omnis forma habens gradus perfectiores et imperfectiones divisibilis est et suscipit magis et minus, unde illud est magis album quod participat albedinem sub esse perfectiori, et minus

Radulphus mentions the strongest argument in favour of the plurality theory, namely, that it allows a dead man's body to be the same thing as the living man's body, as the disappearance of the forms associated with living does not entail the disappearance of the form of corporality.[66] He does nothing, however, to refute the argument. Anonymus Zimmermanni, for his part, tries to refute the related argument that a plurality of forms is needed to explain the step-wise development of embryos. True, he says, an embryo can grow before it can sense, but this is not because it has to wait for a sensitive soul to be placed on top of its vegetative soul. It is simply because the embryo's innate capacity for sensing cannot be exercised until certain material conditions are fulfilled.[67]

8. Reality of Relations

Aristotle lists types of relations in *Metaphysics*, V, 15. What more natural for a commentator than to use the opportunity to discuss the ontological status of relations? Neither Averroes nor Thomas, however, seizes the opportunity, nor does Anonymus Lipsiensis. Siger comments briefly on the matter in V, com. 5 *C*, telling us that Avicenna had raised the question whether there are relations in things independently of whether a mind is comparing the relata. Avicenna's solution, Siger says, was that some relations are mind-independent, namely, such as are founded on two existing relata, as is, e.g., the father-son relation. Other relations depend on a mind

album quod participat formam sub gradu minus perfecto. Sed forma substantialis non est divisibilis, nec suscipit magis et minus, ut patet per Aristotelem 8 huius, ubi dicit Aristoteles quod substantiae rerum assimilantur numeris in hoc quod sicut additio vel subtractio cuiuscumque indivisibilis in numero variat speciem, ita est in substantia rei."

[66] See quotation in note 64.

[67] Cf. Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 29, *P* fol. 41va: "Ad aliud, cum dicitur 'Quae distincta sunt secundum generationem sunt distincta secundum esse et naturam,' dicendum quod verum est. Cum dicitur 'Animal et rationale distincta sunt secundum generationem,' dicendum quod non, immo simul tempore et natura est embryo animal et rationale. § Ad probationem dicendum quod vivere non significat naturam cuius est operatio, sed operationem, sicut actus vivendi. Nunc autem embryo prius habet operationem vegetativae quam sensitivae et sentitivae quam intellectivae; cum hoc tamen stat quod simul tempore habeat hanc virtutem et illam. Quoniam operatio potentiae vegetativae et sensitivae est operatio potentiae materialis, forma quae est principium istarum operationum indiget organis determinatis existentibus sub determinata dispositione, ut possit in suas operationes, et ideo si instrumentum vegetativae prius dispositum sit ad operationem quam sensitivae, prius potest in suam operationem. Nunc autem hoc est possibile. Et si dicatur 'Intellectus non indiget corpore,' dicendum quod verum est—sicut instrumento, tamen indiget sicut obiecto, unde indiget virtute sensitiva existente sub debita dispositione."

for their existence, such as the relationship between a present potential and a future actual thing.

The theme is taken up again by Anonymus Zimmermanni, who first repeats the Avicennian distinction but then wonders whether to upgrade somewhat the status of relations of the second class, because even the relation of earlier to later that obtains between a presently existing Socrates and a future Plato has some foundation in a real thing.[68]

Peter of Auvergne also spends a question on the matter, asking in V, q. 27, "Utrum relatio sit ens?" He answers in the affirmative, because: (a) relations are the cause of other beings, namely, the six small categories (action, passion, etc.); and (b) we have a definite understanding (*intellectus determinatus*) of relation. But only a being can be the cause of other beings and of a definite understanding.[69]

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[68] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 33, *Utrum relatio sit ens rationis solum vel ens reale*, *P* fol. 28va–b: "Intelligendum quod entium quaedam sunt entia vera extra animam, quaedam entia rationis et intellectus. Dicitur autem ens verum quod haberet esse si anima non esset, ut Avicenna dicit. Entia rationis sunt quae non essent si intellectus non esset. Nunc autem multae sunt relationes quae esse haberent si anima non esset comparans unum extremum relationis ad aliud, ut relatio patris ad filium; similiter relatio quae est inter Socratem et Platonem si similes sint in albedine; ideo etc. § Item, ponamus quod Socrates sit generatus et Plato generandus, inter Socratem et Platonem est relatio prioris ad posterius, ista tamen relatio non est nisi ens rationis, quoniam, sicut dicit Avicenna, relatio non habet esse corrupto altero extremo relationis, et ideo relatio vera extra animam exigit duo extrema secundum rem. Relatio ergo quae habet unum extremum secundum rem aliud non, est relatio ens secundum rationem solum. Similiter est de relatione eiusdem ad se, ut Avicenna dicit, quia talis relatio non habet duo extrema secundum rem sed secundum rationem. § Relationes igitur quae fundantur super intentiones causatas ab intellectu sunt entia rationis. Sed quid dicendum est de relatione absolute, quae est pars entis divisi in X praedicamenta? Dicendum quod est ens reale, et relationes quae fundantur super intentiones causatas ab intellectu vel non sunt sicut partes entis quod dividitur in X praedicamenta, vel si dicantur, hoc est propter attributionem aliquam ad ens reale, quia sc. fundantur super aliquod ens verum, ut relatio quae est Socratis generati ad Platonem generandum et relationes quae fundantur super intentiones causatas ab intellectu—quae quidem intentiones, quia fundantur super res veras, ideo et relationes istae similiter fundantur super aliquid reale, saltem mediate. § Avicenna tamen aliter posuit. Distinxit enim duo genera relationis, et in uno istorum posuit relationes reales, in alio autem relationes secundum rationem et intellectum."

[69] Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 27, *Utrum relatio sit ens*, *O* fol. 295rb, *P* fol. 181rb–va: "Dicendum quod relationem necesse est esse ens. Et hoc apparet primo sic: quoniam illud ex quo causantur alia quaedam entia secundum quod huiusmodi oportet esse aliquod ens; sed ex ipsa relatione causantur alia quaedam entia, puta actio et passio, situs, habitus, quando et ubi. Omnia enim ista consistunt in relatione unius ad alterum, vel saltem derelinquuntur ex tali relatione vel habitudine. Quare manifestum est quod relatio est aliquod ens. § Item, hoc apparet ex alio: Quod habet rationem determinatam secundum quam constituit intellectum determinatum, oportet habere determinatam rationem entis, quia intellectus non fertur nisi in id quod habet rationem entis, et ideo nec intellectus determinatus nisi in in quod habet rationem entis determinatam; unde

This apparently robust endorsement of the reality of relations is followed, however, by a statement to the effect that there is no agreement whether a relation is by itself a thing or some nature, after which we are offered three meanings of "thing" (*res*): (1) that by which something is what it is, i.e., an essence; (2) that about which something may be enounced, i.e., whatever can be the object of our intellect or imagination; and (3) what has established and firm being (*esse ratum et firmum*). Peter says no more about (1), presumably because it is obvious that a relation is no thing's essence. All relations, whether real or of reason, are things in sense (2), but not in sense (3), he holds, and their lack of type (3) thingness means that a genuine thing does not become more composite by acquiring a new relation. The addition of a relation does not result in a thing-thing composite.[70]

Radulphus clearly had Peter's V, q. 27, at his elbow when he composed his own (V, q. 22) about whether a relation is a being. He starts the determination by saying that it is, indeed, a being, and he proves this

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sicut visus non est cognoscitivus alicuius nisi secundum quod rationem coloris habet vel luminosi, sic nec intellectus est comprehensivus alicuius nisi in quantum habet rationem entis. Si igitur relatio determinatum modum intelligendi habeat, necessario habet aliquam determinatam rationem entis."

[70] *Ibid.*, *O* fol. 295rb, *P* fol. 181va (continuation of the text in the preceding quote): "Sed utrum relatio secundum se sit res et natura aliqua vel non, diversimode dicitur a diversis. Nihilominus intelligendum quod res potest dici tribus modis: Uno modo appellando rem id quo aliquid est hoc quod est, secundum quod res dicitur essentia. Alio modo potest dici res id de quo aliquid potest enuntiari, et hoc est quod potest cadere sub intellectu vel imaginatione, quicquid sit illud, secundum quod nomen rei solebamus dicere de 'reor, reris.' Tertio modo potest accipi res secundum quod habet esse firmum, secundum quod nomen rei solebamus dicere de 'ratus, rata, ratum,' eo quod res hoc modo accepta esse ratum et firmum habet. § Loquendo autem de re secundum quod res dicitur id de quo potest aliquid enuntiari, sic dico quod relatio est aliqua res sive fuerit relatio rei sive rationis. Quod apparet, quoniam relatio secundum se est aliquod ens, ut prius ostensum est; quod autem est ens potest comprehendi ab intellectu vel imaginatione, et de eo verum erit aliquid enuntiare, saltem quod ipsum est; et ideo relatio huiusmodi est quod de ea possibile est aliquid enuntiare, propter quod et res est, secundum quod res dicitur de 'reor, reris,' ut prius accipiebatur. § Alio autem modo accipiendo rem, secundum quod dicitur de 'ratus, rata, ratum,' dico quod relatio non est res aliqua, nam relatio esse firmum non habet sed est dependens et in habitudine unius ad alterum. Et propter hoc contingit quod si alicui accidat relatio, non dicetur per hoc esse magis compositum, sicut apparet in aliis. Aliquid enim habens formam ex eo quod est agens secundum formam illam non est magis compositum, quia ratio agentis, cum sit ratio relationis, non habet rationem rei ratione cuius faciat compositionem eius cum illo quod praeexistebat. Similiter nec materia secundum quod refertur ad formam magis est composita quam materia secundum se, et hoc compositione quae est rei ad rem. Quia igitur relatio non est res nisi secundum quod res dicitur habitudo rei ad rem absolute, ut dictum est prius, ideo relatio adveniens alicui non causat in eo maiorem compositionem quam prius erat ibi."

by means of Peter's argument (a) about the six last categories. But then he goes on to criticize Peter's distinction between two sorts of thing and his claim that the addition of a relation does not make a thing composite. This is only true, Brito holds, for relations founded on intentions, i.e., relations of reason, not for relations with a foundation in extramental beings. Such real relations—the equality between two equally big things, for instance—are mind-independent, and when something acquires such a relation it acquires a genuine new form.[71] He returns to the problem in a later question "Whether a relation differs from its foundation," and once again stresses that a real relation must be counted as a real thing, and he even mocks Peter for worrying about becoming fatter by acquiring new relations.[72]

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[71] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 22, *F* fol. 287ra: "Dicendum est quod relatio est ens. Et ratio huius est quia illud quod est causa multorum entium verorum est ens; relatio est huiusmodi, quia est causa omnium sex principiorum, quia omnia ista sex principia derelinquuntur ex quibusdam habitudinibus, sicut ipsum quando derelinquitur ex habitudine rei temporalis ad tempus, et ubi similiter ex habitudine rei locatae ad locum, et etiam omnia alia; ergo relatio est ens. § Aliqui autem dicunt quod res dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur res a 'reor, reris,' alio modo dicitur res a 'ratus, rata, ratum.' Et dicunt quod relatio est res quae dicitur a 'reor, reris' et non res quae dicitur a 'ratus, rata, ratum,' et accipitur ibi res secundum quod de ipsa potest aliquid enuntiari vel ut ipsa res potest de altero enuntiari. Et dicunt quod quia relatio non est vera res quod nullam compositionem facit cum eo cui advenit. § Non credo istud. Verum enim est quod relatio quae fundatur supra intentiones non est realis neque facit compositionem realem, sed relatio quae fundatur supra entia extra animam est realis et facit compositionem realem, quia circumscripto intellectu adhuc bene habet esse aequalitas inter duo aequalia, et Philosophus etiam distinxit ens extra animam in decem. § Verumtamen aliqui ponunt quod relatio non est ens extra animam, et per consequens ponunt etiam idem de aliis sex ultimis. § Quod autem dicunt quod nullam compositionem facit cum eo cui advenit, falsum est: immo si aliquid absolutum referatur ad aliud, hoc est per additionem novae formae quam prius non habebat <***> sunt duo quanta vel qualia." The full text of V, q. 22, was published in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics," pp. 480–83.

[72] Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 26, *F* fols. 287vb–288ra: "Sine dubio, licet aliqui dicant quod relatio non differat essentialiter a suo fundamento et dicant quod non facit aliquam compositionem realem cum subiecto cui advenit, sicut quod ego <sum> albus et similis alteri <non me facit compositiorem> quam si solum sim albus et non similis—Simplicius tamen super Praedicamenta vult oppositum. Dicit enim quod non est idem quale et simile. Et hoc patet sic, quia quando aliquid per se est absolutum, si fiat respectivum, hoc est per additionem novae essentiae, quia da quod sibi non addatur aliqua nova essentia, semper erit per se et secundum se absolutum, sed fundamentum ipsius relationis est aliquid, sicut quale, quantum et alia, super quae fundatur; ergo si fiat respectivum, hoc est per additionem novae essentiae; sed per relationem fit aliquid respectivum; ergo relatio aliquam novam essentiam realem addit super illud cui advenit, specialiter in illis in quibus utrumque per se refertur ad alterum, quia oportet quod illud quod refertur ad alterum per se referatur per aliquid quod est in eo. [. . .] Quod autem aliqui dicunt quod per adventum relationis non fit aliquid compositius, credo bene quod per similitudinem quae est quaedam relatio non fiam grossior; sed si intelligant per compositionem quod non habea[n]t

One might think that this apparently robust reality of Brito's relations would make relational differences as important as differences in respect of other categories, but as we saw in § 6.4, above, he did not go that far.

9. Participation and *scala naturae*

The Platonic notion of participation and the concomitant notion of a ladder of nature with entities placed on different rungs according to their perfection and proximity to the first cause were part of the common conceptual outfit of late 13th-century thinkers, including our five authors, although they seem not to actually employ the ladder metaphor. Anonymus Zimmermanni may serve as an illustration of how our philosophers attempted to integrate such notions into an Aristotelian framework.

In I, q. 26, the anonymous asks "Whether God is the formal cause of all beings." The two first *rationes quod sic* are as follow. (1) The Platonists reason, and Proclus proves, that all beings are through participation in The First; whatever is a being by participation is a compound of the participated and the participating, as Proclus says; but in such a composition, the participated has the role of form, the participating that of subject; *ergo etc.* (2) Plato reasoned that universals belong to the "what it is for them to be" of particulars, and the more universal to that of a greater number of particulars; hence, The First, which is the most universal of all, belongs to the "what it is for them to be" of all beings.[73]

The reader expects that those two arguments will later be refuted. But this expectation is only halfway fulfilled. God is in some sense the formal cause of all beings, Anonymus Zimmermanni says in his determination, but only in some sense, for one must distinguish between a real form and an exemplary form and between a universal in virtue of participation

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aliquam rem quam prius non habebat ante adventum relationis, falsum est." The joke about growing fatter also appears in Brito's *Quaestions on the Categories*, q. 23.

[73] Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 26, *P* fol. 7va–b: "Quaeritur consequenter utrum deus sit causa formalis omnium entium. <1.> Videtur quod sic: <1.1> Ratione Platonicorum: omnia entia universaliter entia sunt participatione primi, ut probat Proclus; nunc autem omne ens participatione compositum est ex participato et participante, ut dicit Proclus, ergo omne ens compositum est ex participante et participato, ut ex primo; sed participatum in tali compositione rationem formae habet, participans rationem subiecti; ergo etc. <1.2> Item hoc arguitur ratione Platonis quae ponitur tertio huius, universalia pertinent ad quod quid est particularium, ut animal ad quod quid est hominis, et quanto universaliora, tanto ad plurium particularium quod quid est pertinere videtur; istud ergo quod in entibus est universalissimum ad quod quid est omnium entium pertinere videtur, hoc autem est ipsum primum; quare etc."

and a universal in virtue of causality. Real forms are not separate from the particulars, but God causes them by means of exemplary forms, which do not, in fact, differ from his essence. So, *qua* exemplary form, he is the formal cause of all beings. Plato and the Platonists probably meant the right thing, but confused matters by using "participation" for the imitation of the divine exemplars, not just for the relationship between a subject and its properties.[74]

A variant of the same problem returns in I, q. 29, where Anonymus Zimmermanni asks "Whether God is truly a donkey." The first *ratio quod sic* runs: Whatever is something by participation is reducible to something which is such by essence, particular donkeys are donkeys by participation, so they must be reducible to something which is essentially a donkey. There are only two candidates for the job: a Platonic idea or God. Platonic ideas, however, should not be posited; *ergo etc.*[75]

In the determination, our author considers the answer that God is not a donkey because "donkey" predicates a compound of form and matter, and

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[74] *Ibid.*, *P* fol. 7vb: "<3.> Intelligendum est tamen quod deus aliquo modo potest dici causa formalis entium, quoniam cuiuslibet effectus qui producitur ab agente per cognitionem duplex est forma, sc. realis quae perficit rem et forma exemplaris. Dicit enim Aristoteles in septimo <*Met.*, VII, 7, 1032a32–b2> quod "ea fiunt ab arte quorumcumque species est in anima, dico autem speciem substantiam sine materia et quod quid erat esse," ita quod species ipsa sive(?) quod quid est domus sine materia dicitur forma exemplaris domus; patet ergo maior; nunc autem deus est causa omnium entium agens per cognitionem et intellectum, et ideo cuiuslibet entis causati est quaedam forma realis coniuncta, et est alia forma exemplaris ad cuius similitudinem deus producit omnia ista entia, ista autem species et similitudo non differt(?) a substantia dei, non enim intelligit per aliquid extra se; ideo etc. Et si hoc intellexit Plato, recte intellexit; si aliter intellexit, non recte. <*Ad* 1.1> Ad rationem dicendum quod omnia entia entia sunt participatione primi, sed cum dicitur "Omne ens participatione compositum est," dicendum quod aliquid potest esse ens participative <*a*> vel formaliter, sicut cum dicitur 'lignum est album' quia participat albedine formaliter, <*b*> vel imitative sicut Plato dicebat quod entia sunt entia participatione ipsius primi ita quod imitentur ipsum primum. Unde nomen imitationis mutavit in nomen participationis et econverso. Tunc dico quod ens participatione formaliter compositum est, non tamen oportet quod hoc sit verum de eo quod est ens participatione per imitationem. Sic autem entia ista dicuntur entia participatione. Ideo etc. <*Ad* 1.2> Ad aliud dicendum quod duplex est universale: \quoddam/ secundum participationem, et tale pertinet ad quod quid est particularium, non separatum ab illis. Aliud est universale secundum causalitatem, et illud bene est separatum a particularibus; hoc modo autem deus dicitur esse universale; ideo etc."

[75] *Ibid.*, q. 29, *P* fol. 8vb: "Quaeritur utrum deus vere sit asinus. [. . .] <1.1> Omne tale per essentiam prius et verius est tale quam quod est tale per participationem; sed isti asini particulares sunt asini per participationem; deus vero est asinus per essentiam, quoniam omne tale per participationem reducitur ad tale per essentiam. Si igitur asini particulares sint asini per participationem, tunc reducuntur ad aliquid quod est asinus per essentiam, et illud vel erit idea Platonis vel deus; nunc autem non est ponere ideas Platonis; quare deus erit asinus per essentiam."

God has no matter. He does not, however, find this answer satisfactory, because it forgets that there are two ways in which something can merit a predicate: *formaliter* and *effective*, i.e., by being informed and "perfected" by the form signified by the predicate, or by being the cause of the form. In the second sense, God is, indeed, a donkey, and more truly so than any ordinary donkey.[76]

The anonymous's solution is, in fact, a variation on the time-honored theological explanation of how certain predicates such as "just" can apply to both God and creatures: a man is just by participating in justice, God by being the cause of justice. A similar solution is offered in Peter of Auvergne V, q. 30, "Whether the perfections of all beings are found in the first principle (*Utrum perfectiones omnium entium reperiantur in primo principio*). The occasion for the question was offered by a traditional interpretation of Averroes's comments on the Aristotelian definition of "perfect" in *Metaphysics* V, q. 16, reported as follows by the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*:[77]

> The perfect is that outside of which there is nothing; and it is twofold: (a) the simply perfect, outside of which there simply is nothing, and that is what the Commentator says, that this is the disposition of the first principle, in which the perfections and nobilities of all beings are in a nobler way than in those beings themselves; (b) the generically perfect is that outside of which there is nothing of some particular genus.

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[76] *Ibid.*: "Ratio ista <*that 'donkey' cannot be a predicate of a pure form*> pro parte verum concludit, pro parte non. Quoniam aliqua denominantur ab aliquo formaliter, aliqua vero effective, sicut ignis dicitur calidus formaliter, corpora autem superiora dicuntur calida quia nata facere caliditatem. Tunc igitur 'asinus' potest alicui attribui vel formaliter vel effective. Nunc autem deus formaliter non est asinus, forma enim asini non perficit deum; est tamen asinus effective, unde omne tale per participationem reducitur ad tale per essentiam, non formaliter sed effective. Et illud quod est tale effective verius est tale quam quod formaliter tale, quia quod est tale effective non est tale ex alio; et ideo verius deus potest dici asinus—effective tamen—quam iste asinus particularis."

[77] See *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 1, n. 138, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Leuven-Paris, 1974), p. 126: "Perfectum est extra quod nihil est. Et est duplex: sc. perfectum simpliciter, extra quod nihil est simpliciter, et hoc est quod dicit Commentator quod illa est dispositio primi principii in quo sunt perfectiones et nobilitates omnium entium nobiliori modo quam sunt in se ipsis; sed perfectum in genere est extra quod nihil est alicuius determinati generis." Averroes himself is less eloquent, and less clear. Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, V, t.c. 21, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. VIII, fol. 131B–C: "Definitio erum universaliter est talis: Perfecta sunt illa quorum nihil invenitur in eis per quod dicuntur imperfecta, in eis aut extrinsecum. Et ista est dispositio primi principii, sc. dei. Et forte intelligit per hoc quod dixit 'et quibus nihil est extra' i.e., et a quibus nihil deminuitur ex eis quae sunt. Et hoc potest intelligi per hoc quod dixit, ita quod in eis non est nobilitas in unoquoque generum, i.e., quando de eis non deminutiur nobilitas ex eo quod invenitur in unoquoque generum."

In his question, Peter fleshes out what he thinks Proclus meant by saying that everything is in everything, the inferior things in the superior ones and the superior in the inferior, but the proper ones in each one. In fact, Proclus did not say exactly that, but he did say something very similar.[78] Siger, in his qu. V.40C (≈ V.12 V), had asked the same question as Peter and had reached a similar result, he too fortifying his reasoning with a quotation of Proclus, though not the same one that Peter was to use. Even Radulphus Brito, who probably deserves the distinction of being called the least Neoplatonic of our commentators, says something to the same effect about the presence in God of the perfections of all things.[79]

Let us finally look at a question that is treated in very similar ways by Anonymus Lipsiensis III.11, Siger III.13 C, and Anonymus Zimmermanni III.9. The question is whether two species of the same genus can be equally perfect or whether one must hold priority over the other. *Prima facie* the answer appears to be easy: there is no order of priority among two Aristotelian species of the same genus, as we are explicitly told in *Categories* 13. A horse is as much an animal as is a man.

Siger recognizes this, but still holds that there cannot be two equally perfect species of the same genus, for there are other sorts of priority than logical priority, or priority "of participating in the predication of the genus," as he puts it. Ordering by perfection is a totally different matter, and, in fact, there cannot be two equally perfect species of one genus. This Siger proves by means of some heavy-handed interpretations of *Metaphysics*, III, 3, and X, 1, to the effect that all species of one genus are

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78 Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 30, *P* fol. 182vb: "Intelligendum quod necesse est dicere sicut Commentator dicit, quos sc. omnes perfectiones quae reperiuntur in entibus reperiuntur aliquo modo in primo. Cuius declaratio est: quae reperiuntur in effectu aliquo modo reperiuntur in causa, secundum enim quod probat Proclus omnia in omnibus, inferiora in superioribus, et superiora in inferioribus, propria autem in unoquoque. Superiora enim in inferioribus tamquam causae in suis effectibus, et inferiora in superioribus tam quam effectus in suis causis." Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, transl. Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. Helmut Boese (Leuven, 1987), prop. 103: "Omnia in omnibus, proprie autem in unoquoque."

79 Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.*, IX, q. 1, *Utrum in primo principio sit potentia passiva*, *P* fol. 303rb: "Cum dicitur 'Quicquid est in effectu, aliquo modo est in causa,' verum est quod quicquid pertinet ad perfectionem effectus dei debet attribui ipsi deo, quia perfectiones omnium entium sunt in ipso primo, licet non sint secundum eandem rationem secundum quam sunt in entibus, sed modo excellentiori sunt in ipso primo, quia secundum quod sunt in ipso sunt in substantia sua, quae est in in finitum nobilior(?) omnibus aliis substantiis. Et ideo omnes perfectiones rerum cuiuscumque praedicamenti debent attribui ipsi deo; sed si sint ibi imperfectiones aliquae, non debent sibi attribui, sicut quod sit iniustus. Tunc ergo vera est maior quod quicquid est in effectu etc.—si illud pertineat ad perfectionem effectus."

like the natural numbers, which form an ordered series and are more or less perfect according to their degree of participation in the unity, which is the principle of number. Moreover, genera are divided into species by means of a positive and a negative differentia, and what has something is more perfect than what lacks it.

The two *anonymi* basically agree, but they mention a counterargument that does not occur in Siger: every creature is infinitely distant from the creator, and one infinity is not greater than another. They answer this by means of a distinction: *infinite*$_1$ = having neither beginning nor end, *infinite*$_2$ = having a beginning but no end. The relevant type of infinity is infinity$_2$, and that is supposed to allow an ordering of creatures by distance. If this is to work, the distances still being infinite, though infinite$_2$, it seems that one has to take "infinite$_2$" to mean just "unimaginably big," though actually finite, but the two *anonymi* are less than clear on this point.[80]

10. Epilogue

God is not the subject of the *Metaphysics*, the commentators agree. But there is a lot more about God in their questions than in the work commented on. They all to varying degrees and with varying success try to keep Christian theology at arm's length, and the post-1277 writers try to steer clear of Tempier's condemnations—Peter of Auvergne generally without misgivings, while in the cases of Anonymus Zimmermanni and Brito it is hard not to feel that they are somewhat annoyed with meddlesome theologians who have no business interfering with Aristotelian philosophy.[81]

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[80] Cf. Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.*, III, q. 9, *P* fol. 13rb: "Ad aliud dicendum quod duae species oppositae alicuius generis non aequaliter distant <distantia> infinita. Potest enim intelligi distantia infinita per privationem terminorum, alio modo intelligitur non per privationem terminorum sed per privationem distantiae maioris. Primo modo accipiendo 'infinitum' una distantia infinita non est maior alia, sed sic non dicitur esse hic distantia infinita ad primum principium. Hoc modo tamen dicimus quod ista entia in infinitum distant a primo quoniam principium primum se habet in ratione termini huius distantiae, sed dicitur distantia ista infinita per privationem distantiae maioris, quia non potest maior distantia inveniri quam est inter ista causata et principium primum, saltim ex parte principii primi, licet {licet: sed *P*} possit inveniri maior distantia ex parte causati, quia unum ens causatum potest inveniri quod sit {i.q.s.: invenire quod fit *P*} perfectius alio."

[81] For Brito and the theologians, see also Ebbesen, "Radulpus Brito on the Metaphysics," pp. 464–65; and Silvia Donati, "*Utrum accidens possit existere sine subiecto*. Aristotelische

At the same time, a sort of Neoplatonizing theological ontology turns up every now and again, and in all the commentators, although not to the same degree. Brito seems to have been less amenable than the others to the charms of Proclus and Neoplatonism in general, but even he was under its spell. In most other philosophical disciplines, the artists of the late 13th century could be fairly faithful to Aristotle, but wittingly or unwittingly they found it hard to be faithful Aristotelians in metaphysics.

Metaphysik und Christliche Theologie in den Physikkommentaren des 13. Jahrhunderts," in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 577–617, esp. 596.

APPENDIX

Anonymus Lipsiensis, *Qu. Met.* = *Anonymi Boethio Daco usi Quaestiones Metaphysicae*, ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi) XIV (Copenhagen, 2009), pp. 149–358. I call the author Anonymus Lipsiensis after the Leipzig MS that has conserved his work. The "name" given him in the edition reflects the fact that his use of Boethius of Dacia's lost commentary was decisive for including his work in the *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum*.

Anonymus Zimmermanni, *Qu. Met.* = *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. *P* = Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fols. 1r–49v. List of questions in Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 98–106. Edition of I, q. 1 in Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 46–50; IV, q. 9 in Sten Ebbesen, "Words and Signification in 13th-century Questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age grec et latin* 71 (2000), 71–114; IX, q. 14 in Albert Zimmermann, "Eine anonyme Quaestio: *Utrum haec sit vera: Homo est animal homine non existente*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 49 (1967), 183–200.

Peter of Auvergne (Petrus de Alvernia), *Qu. Met.* = *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. Several MSS. I use *P* = Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, fols. 129r–224v, and *O* = Oxford, Merton College, 292, fols. 240r–323v. List of questions in Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis*, pp. 80–88 (whose numbering I follow, calling the proemial questions 0, q. 1 etc.). List with summaries of questions in Edgar Hocedez, "Les Quaestiones in Metaphysicam de Pierre d'Auvergne," *Études d'histoire de la philosophie* 9 (1932), 179–234. Edition of proem. and questions 0, qq. 1–3; IV, qq. 1–2; V, q. 3; VII, q. 25 and IX, q. 3 in Monahan, "Quaestiones"; IV, q. 16 in Ebbesen, "Words and Signification"; V, q. 18 in Sten Ebbesen, "*Termini accidentales concreti*. Texts from the late 13th Century," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 53 (1986), 37–150. Extracts of V, q. 27 and VII, q. 19 in the footnotes of the text appendix of Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics." My quotations are sometimes based on *P* alone, sometimes on a collation with *O*. Insignificant differences between the two mss are not recorded.

Radulphus Brito, *Qu. Met.* = *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. *F* = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, *conv. soppr.* E. I. 252, fols. 265–310. Edition of proem (partial) and I, q. 11 in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito," pp. 231–51; of IV, qq. 10–13 in Ebbesen, "Words and Signification," and of III, q. 10; IV, q. 1; IV, q. 2; IV, q. 12; IV, q. 13; V, q. 22; VII, q. 3; VII, q. 14; VII, q. 24; VII, q. 25; IX, q. 6 in Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics." Part of VIII, q. 4 in Fabrizio Amerini, "The Semantics of Substantial Names: The Tradition of the Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médievales* 75 (2008), 437–38.

Siger of Brabant (Sigerus de Brabantia), *Qu. Met.* = *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*. (a) *Édition revue de la reportation de Munich, texte inédit de la reportation de Vienne*, ed. William Dunphy (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981). (b) *Texte inédit de la reportation de Cambridge, édition revue de la reportation de Paris*, ed. Armand Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983). In referring to Siger's work I use *M* for the Munich and *V* for the Vienna version published in (a), *C* for the Cambridge

and *P* for the Vienna version published in (b). Thus "V, q. 40 *C*" means question 40 on Book V in the C version; "II, q. 7 *MC*" means question 7 on Book II in both the *M* and the *C* versions. "0, q. 7" means question 7 in the initial section called "Introductio" by the editors. "V, com. 5" refers to what the editor calls "commentum 5" in Book V.

ALEXANDER OF ALESSANDRIA'S COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS*

Fabrizio Amerini

In his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (ca. 1420), Paul of Venice at times refers to a certain Alexander as one of his sources. Under investigation, the Alexander in question is the Franciscan theologian Alexander of Alessandria (ca. 1270–1314). Such a reference may at first be surprising, considered that Alexander is a minor author and that his writings predate those of Paul by a century. More surprisingly, an analysis of Paul's *Commentary on the Metaphysics, Book* Z,[1] has shown that Alexander is the principal source for Paul's Commentary. In most cases, Paul simply takes from Alexander materials for the composition of his Commentary. But there are also cases in which Paul directly discusses Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle. Elsewhere I have considered a pair of these cases, viz., Paul's refusal of Alexander's account of accidental being and his acceptance of Alexander's theory of essence.[2] It is not easy to explain the paramount importance of Alexander for Paul. One reason is surely connected to Paul's epitomizing approach towards medieval sources. Since Alexander's Commentary was erroneously attributed to Alexander of Hales (†1245), Paul could have regarded Alexander's Commentary as the first full-fledged Franciscan Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. What is more, because of this attribution, he could have considered it as coming before the fundamental commentaries of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Such an erroneous attribution is probably one of the reasons explaining the large diffusion of Alexander's Commentary. But another reason why Paul is so interested in Alexander could possibly be that Paul aims to comment on both Aristotle and Averroes, and Alexander of Alessandria provides him with an invaluable aid, as we shall see, in achieving this goal.

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[1] Cf. Gabriele Galluzzo, *The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2 vols. (Leiden-Boston, 2013).

[2] See Fabrizio Amerini, "Alessandro di Alessandria sulla natura degli accidenti," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* XVI (2005), 179–235; and "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria, and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* XV (2004), 541–89.

The present chapter is intended to offer an overview of Alexander's metaphysical thought. I shall begin by giving a few remarks on the origin and structure of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*; then, I shall reconstruct Alexander's position concerning some key metaphysical issues.

1. Alexander's Commentary on the Metaphysics

Alexander is normally presented as a theologian and a philosopher outside Scotist lines of thought. This is fundamentally true. For example, Alexander polemically dismisses Scotus's explanation of the principle of substantial individuation or his doctrine of the formal distinction.[3] Nevertheless there are doctrines with respect to which Alexander agrees with Scotus. This is the case, for instance, for Alexander's doctrine of categorial being. As to this, it must be noted that Alexander displays different attitudes towards Scotus according to whether he speaks as a philosopher or as a theologian. While in philosophy the influence of Thomas Aquinas is predominant, in theology Alexander is instead closer to Scotus. As we shall see below, though, his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* confirms the image of Alexander as a fundamentally non-Scotist thinker. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, rather than Scotus, are the key authorities for understanding Alexander's metaphysics.

1.1. *Place and Date of Composition*

We know precisely the place of composition of the commentary. Alexander wrote it when he was lector at the Franciscan *Studium* of Bologna. A marginal annotation in one of the manuscripts transmitting the text explicitly indicates Bologna as the place of composition.[4] Since Alexander was lector at Bologna between 1303 and 1307, i.e., in between his Parisian

[3] On this, see Bernhard Jansen, "Beiträge zur geschichtliche Entwicklung der *Distinctio formalis*," *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 53 (1929), 317–44 and 517–44, esp. 532–43. See also Feliks Krause, "L'attitude d'Alexandre Bonini d'Alessandria à l'égard du principe d'individuation," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 34–35 (2000), 147–55.

[4] Cf. Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 386 Scaff. XVIII, fol. 1r: "Quod composuit apud Bononiam." This reference has been pointed out for the first time by Andrea Tabarroni in "Gentile da Cingoli e Angelo d'Arezzo sul *Peryermenias* e i maestri di logica a Bologna all'inizio del XIV secolo," in: Dino Buzzetti, Maurizio Ferriani, & Andrea Tabarroni, eds., *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo* (Bologna, 1992), pp. 393–423, esp. 422–23.

readings of the *Sentences*,[5] by that indication we also know, even though approximately, the date of composition. The *Metaphysics* commentary was probably composed before the *Commentary on the De anima*, the one other extant philosophical commentary by Alexander, for this latter seems to contain references to the former.[6]

The Commentary on the *Metaphysics* was printed for the first time in Venice in 1572, as a work erroneously attributed to Alexander of Hales. To my knowledge, the Commentary is conserved, entirely or partially, in the following manuscripts: Cordoba, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 57 and 129 Est. 3; Erfurt, Stadtbibliothek, Ampl. F 325; Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, 84 cod. 15; Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 650; Munich, Staatsbibliothek, Clm 11591; Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII. E. 2, and VIII. E. 37; and Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 386 Scaff. XVIII. The critical edition is in preparation.

1.2. *Nature of the Commentary*

Technically, Alexander's Commentary belongs to the literary genus of "commentary with questions" (*commentarium cum quaestionibus*). Cross

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[5] For the life and works of Alexander, see Leon Veuthey, *Alexandre d'Alexandrie, maître de Paris et ministre général des frères mineurs. Pour l'histoire de la philosophie scholastique. Extrait des Études franciscaines 1931–1932* (Paris, 1932). See also Maarten van der Heijden & Bert Roest, "Alexander of Alessandria," at <http://users.bart.nl/~roestb/franciscan/franauta.htm> (accessed on September 1st, 2013) for further bibliographical references. In the following, every quotation from Alexander's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (henceforth *Met.*) refers to the 1572 Venice edition *apud Simonem Galignanum*.

[6] Cf. Feliks Krause, "Filozoficzne poglady Aleksandra z Aleksandrii i ich wplywna universytet Krakówski," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 23.2 (1985), 1–164. Through his papers, Feliks Krause has made a substantial contribution to reconstructing Alexander of Alessandria's philosophical thought and to establishing the relative chronology of his works. Moreover, Krause has had the merit of drawing attention to the influence exerted by Alexander on philosophers at Krakow during the XV century. See Feliks Krause, "Abriss der Erkenntnistheorie bei Alexander von Alessandria," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 20 (1980), 91–125; "Die Erkenntniskkonzeption von Alexander Bonini aus Alessandria," in: Jan P. Beckmann, ed., *Sprache und Erkenntnis in Mittelalter*. 6. Internationaler Kongress fur Mittelalterische Philosophie, Bonn, 29 August–3 September 1977 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 13 (Berlin-New York, 1981), pp. 1074–83; and "Die Charakteristik des Begriffs Substanz bei Alexander Bonini aus Alexandria," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 28 (1986), 33–39. In recent years, Marco Lamanna has pointed out the fortune of Alexander's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* in Germany during the XVI century; see Marco Lamanna, "*De eo enim metaphysicus agit logice*. Un confronto tra Pererius e Goclenius," *Medioevo* 34 (2009), 315–60. As has been said, the fortune of Alexander's commentary seems to be due principally to its erroneous attribution to Alexander of Hales. In his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1597), for example, Francisco Suárez quotes on two occasions (II, sect. 2, § 26; II, sect. 3, § 7) Alexander's commentary and both times attributes it to Alexander of Hales.

references and numeration reveal such a structure and the existence of a coherent editorial project. Usually, Alexander analyzes the *littera* of Aristotle's text in the lessons and quite often, before explaining it, spends some time to give syllogistic form to Aristotle's reasoning. Alexander reads the *littera* with great accuracy, distinguishing when its ambiguity or obscurity is due to Aristotle's text[7] and when it is consequent upon the Latin translations of it.[8] At times, Alexander also dwells on the *littera* that is at the basis of the Latin translation of Averroes's *Great Commentary* (*littera commenti*): in this case, Alexander contrasts it with the Latin translations of Aristotle's work[9] and clarifies discrepancies when present.[10] For the division of the text, Averroes and Aquinas are the principal sources. Usually, Alexander divides the *littera* according to the macro sections corresponding to Averroes's *textus commenti*, but the identification and numeration of arguments and micro-sections for the most part replicates that of Aquinas.

After explaining the *littera*, Alexander raises questions. They are 442 in total: 34 in Book A; 43 in α; 41 in B; 17 in Γ; 105 in Δ; 19 in E; 67 in Z; 24 in H; 29 in Θ; 29 in I; 9 in K; and 25 in Λ. Questions concern three different levels of the text. The majority of questions deal with the clarification or comprehension of the *littera*[11] or Averroes's Commentary.[12] Some questions deal instead with doctrinal aspects entailed by the *littera*, such as the logic of Aristotle's arguments, the coherence or inner consistency of Aristotle's doctrine, preliminary philosophical doubts stimulated by Aristotle's text or Averroes's Commentary,[13] and so on. Finally, some questions treat more general topics, such as the relationship between metaphysics and logic, and similar philosophical themes. Of particular note is the fact that Alexander introduces as *quaestiones* the majority of the

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[7] See, e.g., *Met.*, III, fol. 67vb; VII, fols. 203ra with 205rb.

[8] *Ibid.*, IX, fol. 267ra.

[9] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 194ra–b; V, fol. 109va.

[10] Cf. *Met.*, V, fol. 135rb: "Commentator aliam litteram habet […]"; see Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem Commentariis*, V, t.c. 18, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562), vol. VIII, fol. 125vaH–I (hereafter *In Met.*); Arist., *Met.*, Δ 13, 1020a30–31; *Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, AL XXV 3.2 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1995), p. 111.542–44.

[11] See, e.g., *Met.*, X, fol. 278vb.

[12] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 153va.

[13] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 87va–b. Compare with Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, IV, lec. 7, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 635 (hereafter *Exp. Met.*); *Met.*, V, fols. 109ra, 135rb.

doctrinal or textual digressions that he finds in Averroes's and Aquinas's Commentaries.[14]

1.3. *Sources*

1.3.1. *Averroes*

The hallmark of Alexander's Commentary is the attention reserved for Averroes. The Arab philosopher is the most frequently and explicitly quoted authority. Alexander's examination of Averroes's *Great Commentary* is very close, but it would be misleading to imagine that Alexander merely echoes Averroes. Averroes's Commentary is an institutional instrument of work, with which a commentator is obliged to deal. Thus, it is not surprising to find Alexander resorting to Averroes's Commentary in order to make sense of Aristotle's text, nor is it surprising to find him reconciling as often as possible Averroes's interpretation with Aristotle's text.[15] Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that there are also cases where Alexander does not fail to note doctrinal discrepancies between Averroes and Aristotle.[16] In general, no rule seems to be behind Alexander's citations of Averroes, but one can note some general tendencies. First, Alexander quotes Averroes whenever Averroes introduces a personal digression or annotation,[17] or an argument diverging from or conflicting with that of the main expositor, namely, Thomas Aquinas.[18] Often Averroes is introduced in the same way that Paul of Venice will introduce him, namely, by a *Notandum*,[19] which is at times a device for introducing Averroes's own *notabilia*.[20] If reconciling Averroes and Aristotle is the principal task, in some places Alexander instead tends to juxtapose Averroes's Commentary and Aristotle's text. Significantly, juxtapositions concern not only Averroes and Aristotle but also Alexander's own interpretation and Averroes's.[21] So, if Alexander in most cases cites Averroes to confirm his personal reading,[22]

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[14] For an example, compare *Met.*, V, fol. 135vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 15, n. 986.

[15] See *Met.*, V, fol. 146vb, and IX, fol. 266vb, for some clear examples.

[16] Cf. e.g., *Met.*, III, fol. 71va–b; V, fol. 165va–b: "Et hoc est quod dixit Philosophus [...]. Si tamen volumus sequi Commentatorem, possumus dicere quod [...]."

[17] See, e.g., *Met.*, V, fol. 135rb.

[18] Compare, for example, *Met.*, V, fol. 135va, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 15, nn. 984–86.

[19] For a clear example, see *Met.*, VI, fol. 178va–b and fol. 180ra–b.

[20] See, e.g., *Met.*, XII, fol. 334va.

[21] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 185vb–186ra; IX, fol. 261ra; X, fol. 281ra.

[22] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 201ra, or IX, fol. 270va.

there are a few cases where he presents Averroes in opposition to himself and, albeit fewer, cases where Averroes is presented as open to different interpretations[23] or as only one of the possible commentators.[24]

From Book Δ onward, references to Averroes markedly increase in number. This also holds for the questions, where Alexander frequently takes up Averroes's solution.[25] Nonetheless, a reader can find places where Alexander is uncertain about the right interpretation of Averroes. For example, in E 4, 107b29ff., Aristotle opposes being *qua* true and false to extramental being, which is said to be divided into categories. Aristotle further claims that some categories are the result of an act of comparison fulfilled by the mind. Alexander is uncertain whether Averroes understands Aristotle as setting apart substance from any other category or only from the last seven ones.[26]

The relationship with Averroes becomes more complicated in Book Λ, where some conclusions drawn by Averroes come into conflict with the truths of Christian faith. In such cases, Alexander proceeds with extreme caution: either Alexander expressly distinguishes Averroes's interpretation from Christian faith,[27] or he makes it clear that he is only introducing Averroes's interpretation without discussing whether it is reconcilable or not with the truths of Christian faith.[28] Alexander has the same attitude towards Aristotle. There are some cases where Alexander says he is uncertain about Aristotle's real position,[29] while in other cases he stresses the strictly philosophical perspective endorsed by Aristotle in order to avoid charging him with heterodox formulations.[30]

In conclusion, if it is true on the one hand that Alexander's Commentary is characterized by a great interest in Averroes, on the other hand it is also true that Alexander makes a free and critical use of the Arab commentator. Unlike Aristotle, Averroes is not a second authoritative text that must be commented on but the principal exegetical aid for commenting on Aristotle. For this reason, it would be improper to describe Alexander's Commentary as a sort of "double commentary."

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[23] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 203vb–204ra.
[24] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 185vb–186rb.
[25] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 160ra.
[26] Cf. *Met.*, VI, fol. 182ra.
[27] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 346ra.
[28] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 346vb.
[29] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 340ra.
[30] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 347rb, for a clear example.

1.3.2. *Thomas Aquinas*

Unlike Averroes, Thomas Aquinas is never quoted by Alexander in an explicit way.[31] Alexander's usage of Aquinas is nonetheless extensive. Alexander appears to have written his Commentary with Aquinas's text in front of him. Alexander incorporates Aquinas's exposition in his Commentary in various ways—usually in the shape of a *dubitatio*[32]—and at various levels. First, he follows Aquinas's way of dividing the text, that is, Alexander inherits Aquinas's enumeration of arguments, identification of questions, solutions, doubts, exemplifications, and the like. Second, Alexander adopts some of Aquinas's major philosophical theses, such as the analogy of the concept of *being*, the unicity of substantial form, or the hylomorphic account of sensible substances' essence. Third, Aquinas also exerts an influence on Alexander's stance towards the Latin translations, for Alexander discusses only those textual problems that Aquinas also discussed.[33] There are, however, a few cases where Alexander deviates from Aquinas. Normally, Alexander's variants rectify minor or peripheral points of Aquinas's exposition,[34] but occasionally Alexander corrects some points of doctrine. Remarkably, discrepancies of interpretation with Aquinas may be occasioned by different readings of Averroes,[35] although Alexander, despite his general agreement with Averroes, does not always react to Aquinas's criticism of Averroes. We shall give some crucial examples in the following sections.

1.3.3. *Albert the Great*

Unlike Averroes and Aquinas, Albert the Great's presence, through his *Expositio Metaphysicae*, is absolutely marginal. A closer investigation in the future might reveal other cases, perhaps, but so far I have discovered only two clear references to Albert. The first occurs in Alexander's

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[31] Alexander alludes to him only occasionally. Compare e.g., *Met.*, V, fol. 107va–b, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 4, nn. 796–98.

[32] For some illuminating examples, one can compare *Met.*, III, fol. 66ra–va and 67va, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 8, n. 442, and lec. 9, nn. 446, 455, and 447; *Met.*, III, fol. 68ra–va, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 10, nn. 460–65; *Met.*, IV, fol. 80vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 4, nn. 575–76.

[33] Compare e.g., *Met.*, I, fol. 27vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, I, lec. 14, n. 209. There are, however, some exceptions. For example, Alexander does not always introduce Aquinas's discussions of the so-called *littera Boethii*. For some cases, compare *Met.*, III, fol. 70vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 11, n. 486; *Met.*, III, fol. 93rb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 12, n. 674; and *Met.*, III, fol. 93va, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 12, n. 676.

[34] Compare, for example, *Met.*, X, fol. 301rb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, X, lec. 10, n. 2124.

[35] For a clear example, compare *Met.*, III, fol. 52rb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 4, n. 371, and Averroes, *In Met.*, III, t.c. 3, fol. 41raA.

commentary on E 2, 1026b10. Aristotle there affirms that a geometer does not have to consider the accidents of the figures he investigates. Alexander first reports the exposition of someone (*quidam*) who relates Aristotle's reference to accidentality to the problem of the identification of the subject underlying the accidental properties of figures.[36] This is the exposition of Albert, followed partially by Aquinas.[37] Then, Alexander contrasts this exposition to that of Averroes, who relates Aristotle's reference to accidentality with the problem of the identification of the properties rather than of the subject.[38] The second reference to Albert occurs in Alexander's commentary on Λ 3, 1070a9–10, where Aristotle affirms that matter is a "this something" and hence a substance only in appearance. Alexander lists four interpretations of such a difficult text.[39] The first one, which is that of Aquinas,[40] takes Aristotle as meaning that it appears to many people that matter expresses the entire essence of a thing, although it is not so. According to a second interpretation, which is that of Albert the Great,[41] Aristotle considers matter as substance, for it is that in virtue of which form appears and is perceived. Alexander further mentions the interpretation of those who take the text to mean that matter is a "this something" in appearance because natural matter is cognized by means of artificial matter, which is the only matter that can be perceived. Finally, Alexander reports a fourth interpretation, according to which matter is called a "this something" in virtue of form, which appears and is cognized. Alexander does not express his preference, limiting himself to point out that Averroes seems to advocate the final interpretation.

1.3.4. *Avicenna*

Avicenna is mentioned on several occasions, and in some cases he is quoted at great length. Alexander seems to privilege four topics for his long quotations from Avicenna: (1) the connection between metaphysics and truth (II, fols. 37ra–39ra); (2) the connection between metaphysics and universal causes (III, fol. 53va–b); (3) the discussion of the four reasons given by the Platonists for positing separate Ideas (III, fols. 58rb–59rb); and (4) the differences between integral and universal whole (V, fol. 162ra–va).

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[36] Cf. *Met.*, VI, fol. 174rb.

[37] See Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, VI, tr. 2, ch. 2, ed. Bernhard Geyer, vol. 2 (Münster i. W., 1964), p. 307.35–47; Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VI, lec. 2, n. 1175.

[38] See Averroes, *In Met.*, VI, t.c. 4, fol. 148raB.

[39] See *Met.*, XII, fol. 333va–b.

[40] See Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XII, lec. 3, n. 2446.

[41] See *Metaphysica*, XI, tr. 1, ch. 7, pp. 467.32–468.18.

Moreover, Avicenna is cited in the commentary on Δ for explaining the difference between equivocal and univocal agents (fol. 104ra–b), and in the commentary on Z, in opposition to Averroes's interpretation of spontaneous generation (fol. 208rb, although in this case Alexander reconstructs Avicenna's position from the way in which Averroes summarizes it in his *Commentary on the Physics*, VIII). Such digressions reveal two things: first, Avicenna's *Metaphysics* was currently read during the lessons; second, Avicenna rather than Averroes is regarded as the privileged authority for the first four books of the *Metaphysics*. In the case of Alexander, the reason depends on the fact that Alexander subscribes to Avicenna's view of the subject-matter of the *Metaphysics*, thus, he endorses Avicenna's arguments for proving the scientific value of metaphysics.

1.3.5. *Other Sources*

For the redaction of his Commentary, Alexander uses no *Metaphysics* commentaries other than those mentioned above, although he occasionally shows familiarity with some Parisian debates belonging to such a commentary tradition.[42] Other sources, external to this tradition, are more uncertain and difficult to identify. Especially when Alexander disputes questions, he seems to import theological or logical themes and problems. This is particularly evident whenever he makes use of distinctions recurrent in logic or raises questions dealing with epistemology or scientific knowledge. There are, moreover, questions where Alexander accurately reports the position of other commentators.[43] In most of these cases, no similar discussion recurs in other coeval *Metaphysics* commentaries. The most significant case occurs in Alexander's commentary on Δ 16. Alexander raises the question *Utrum sit verum quod perfectiones omnium creaturarum sint in Deo*.[44] He gives three examples—that of warm, that of the duration of the prime mover's motion, and that of God as unity—for proving that the first principle possesses all the perfections. Alexander rejects the first two examples and accepts the third. No commentator raises a similar question on this chapter of the *Metaphysics*, with the exception of Siger of Brabant. Siger discusses the same question as Alexander

[42] For details on this, see Fabrizio Amerini, "The Semantics of Substantial Names: The Tradition of the Commentaries on the Metaphysics," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévale* 74.2 (2008), 395–440.

[43] See, e.g., *Met.*, V, fol. 152ra–vb (q. *Utrum ista sit secundum se "Callia est animal"*; a similar question is formulated by Siger of Brabant: *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, Reportatio* of Wien, V, q. 13); VI, fol. 170rb–va and fol. 172vb; X, fol. 286ra–va; X, fols. 297vb–298rb.

[44] See *Met.*, V, fol. 150ra–vb.

(*Reportatio* of Wien, q. 12), although none of Alexander's examples is present in Siger's work.

2. Some Key Metaphysical Issues

2.1. *The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics*

After glancing at the principal sources of Alexander's Commentary—in the case of the philosophical questions, other sources will be illustrated in the following—let us turn now to its contents. What is metaphysics for Alexander?

It is known that Aristotle provides different and somehow conflicting characterizations of metaphysics. Metaphysics is depicted as the wisdom dealing with the first causes in Book A (981b27ff.), while in Book α (993b19–20) it is presented as the science of truth; in Book Γ (1030a20–21), moreover, metaphysics is famously characterized as the science of being *qua* being, while in Books E (1026a10ff.) and Λ (1069a 18ff.) as the science of the things separated from motion and matter. As was anticipated, it is Avicenna who furnishes Alexander with the tools for harmonizing these different characterizations of metaphysics. Specifically, Alexander inherits from Avicenna the idea that metaphysics is a science and that, like every science, metaphysics is subordinate to some general principles. As for other sciences, *Posterior Analytics* offers the normative model also for metaphysics. Two rules in particular are noteworthy: (i) first, the subject-matter of a science and its principles cannot be demonstrated by that science: they are "what is presupposed" (*id quod praescitur*) in a science; (ii) second, a science must demonstrate the properties and proper features of its subject-matter: they are "what is searched for" (*id quod quaeritur*) in a science.[45] On the basis of these meta-principles, Alexander recalls that in his time there were two opinions about the subject-matter of metaphysics: some philosophers promoted the view of metaphysics as the science of being *qua* being, others that of metaphysics as the science of separate beings. Alexander calls the first opinion common (*communis*): according to this opinion, separate beings are investigated by the metaphysician only insofar as they are a part, viz., the most eminent one, of the all-comprehensive sphere of being *qua* being. According to the second opinion, instead, being is investigated to the extent that it displays some

[45] See *Met.*, III, fols. 48vb–49rb.

sort of analogy to separate being, which is the proper subject-matter of metaphysics. Alexander recognizes that it is especially in Book E that Aristotle characterizes the universality of metaphysics in terms of analogy; nonetheless, he says, he prefers the characterization of metaphysics as the science of being *qua* being, in line with what Aristotle says in Book Γ. The reason is that metaphysics can prove the existence of God, so in virtue of rule (i), God cannot be taken to be the subject-matter of metaphysics. As a result, Alexander thinks it is better to explain the universality of metaphysics in terms of the universal predicability of the notion of being rather than in terms of the universal causal attribution (and analogy) of every being to separate being.[46] Such universality is a sufficient condition for metaphysics to be considered as the most universal science: metaphysics investigates being *qua* being, that is, every being insofar as it is not this or that particular being but insofar as it is a being exhibiting some general kind of being, that is, insofar as the concept of *being* can be predicated of every being.[47]

The fact that being *qua* being is the subject-matter of metaphysics entails, for Alexander, on the ground of rule (i), that the metaphysician cannot demonstrate the existence of being and of its principles. On the ground of rule (ii), the metaphysician is called only to disclose properties and whatever ensues from being *qua* being, namely, the articulation and modes or types of being. In Alexander's view, those who hold that metaphysics principally deals with being *qua* being also hold that separate substances and God are *a part* of being *qua* being. Quite curiously, Alexander does not mention those, like Thomas Aquinas, who instead argue that God is not a part of the subject-matter but, rather, the principle of it.[48] Here there is a problem which Alexander does not explicitly recognize. Since Alexander allows that the metaphysician can prove God's

[46] Cf. *Met.*, VI, fol. 173va: "Dupliciter consuevit assignari subiectum in ista scientia. Dicunt enim communiter omnes quod subiectum in ista scientia est ens inquantum ens, et secundum istum modum ponendi substantia separata non est subiectum, sed pars subiecti. Alii autem aliqui ponunt quod substantia separata est subiectum primum, ad quod habet analogiam totum ens." For further details on Alexander's position on this topic, see Fabrizio Amerini, "Alessandro di Alessandria su natura e soggetto della metafisica," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 477–93.

[47] *Ibid.*, VI, fol. 173va–b.

[48] According to Aquinas, however, there is a broad sense according to which the principle of the subject-matter can be said to be a part of it. See, e.g., *Super Boethium De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Pierre-M. J. Gils, in: Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Opera Omnia*, vol. L (Rome-Paris, 1992), p. 96.118–24.

existence,[49] God should not be considered as a part of the subject-matter. Alexander shows some hesitation on this point. On the one hand, he considers God as what is investigated and what is presupposed in metaphysics. In a question on Book E, for example, he excludes that God is a part of the subject-matter, concluding that God simply is the principle of the subject-matter and of its parts.[50] But on the other hand, in a question on Book A, Alexander presents God as that in which the subject-matter of metaphysics, i.e., being *qua* being, is principally reserved.[51]

Implicitly, however, Alexander gives us some indications on how to reconcile the view that God is a part of the subject-matter with the view that God is the principle and not a part of it. Alexander's idea seems to be that being *qua* being is composed of two parts, one of which, i.e., separate being, must be treated as an uncaused cause and as the principle of the complementary part of being *qua* being, namely, non-separate being.[52] In particular, in the wake of Aquinas and Avicenna, Alexander notes that the metaphysician investigates not only beings that are separated from matter in reality but also being-in-common (*esse commune*) which, while being not necessarily separated from matter in reality, is not necessarily in matter, and for this reason it can also be investigated in separation from matter.[53] Thus, the metaphysician starts with being *qua* being, but he searches for the principle of being *qua* being. Being *qua* being coincides with separate being broadly understood, while the principle of being *qua* being coincides with separate being strictly understood. Since what is the principle of a thing's being has to be most eminently counted as being, then being *qua* separate being turns out to be the most eminent part of being *qua* being. It is Aquinas's way of interpreting Avicenna's conception of the separability of being *qua* being that leads Alexander to account for separate being both as the principle and as the most eminent part of being *qua* being.

2.2. *The Nature of Being*

If being *qua* being is the subject-matter of metaphysics, what is, for Alexander, the nature of being? In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*,

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[49] Cf. *Met.*, I, fol. 10rb–va.
[50] *Ibid.*, VI, fol. 172rb.
[51] *Ibid.*, I, fol. 10rb–va.
[52] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 330rb–va.
[53] *Ibid.*, VI, fol. 172rb; compare it with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VI, lec. 1, n. 1165.

Alexander unequivocally advocates the doctrine of the analogy of the concept of *being*, which is supported with some traditional arguments.[54] First of all, Alexander excludes that being is a genus. If being were a genus, the differentiae dividing being and constituting each species of being would be external to the concept of *being*, hence resulting in a non-being. But since it is not possible to put something outside being, Alexander's conclusion is that it is not possible to divide being by way of specific differentiae. Moreover, if being were a genus, the categories would be mixed with each other with respect to the common concept of *being*.[55] Excluding this possibility, Alexander states that being immediately gets divided into the categories.[56] If no kind of being can be given beyond or before the categorial kinds of being, this means that to be, for a thing, precisely amounts to being a thing of a given categorial kind.[57] Despite the fact that nothing is really common to the categories, Alexander allows that there is nonetheless a sense according to which being can be called common to them. This point is founded once again on the authority of Avicenna, who differentiated the property of being common by containment (*secundum continentiam*) from that of being common by convenience (*secundum convenientiam*). For Alexander, being can be said to be common in the second way, insofar as it can be predicated of each category.[58]

If being is not a genus, neither is it a univocal concept. Alexander holds that being is an analogical concept, although it functions in metaphysics as a univocal concept. This claim is a consequence of Avicenna's view that being is the first concept impressed on our mind.[59] As such, being is so radically universal that it turns to be something absolutely indeterminate as to its content. Here Alexander appears to be significantly influenced by Henry of Ghent. As Henry explained, it is the indeterminacy of the

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[54] *Ibid.*, VI, fol. 173ra–b; X, fol. 280rb, and XI, fol. 308va–b, for a précis of the analogy of being. See also *Met.*, I, fols. 1ra–2ra, esp. fol. 1ra; IV, fol. 76ra–vb; and VII, fols. 195vb–196ra.

[55] *Ibid.*, III, fol. 63rb–vb.

[56] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 120rb–va; X, fol. 276vb; XII, fol. 335va. On the derivation of categories, see *Met.*, V, fols. 119vb–120ra (Alexander follows Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 9, nn. 889–90). Note, however, that for Alexander the ten categories are not a classification of things as they extramentally exist but of things' concepts or *rationes*. This explains why two categorially different items can have one and the same extramental counterpart (see *Met.*, V, fols. 135va, 147va–148rb). For the exclusion of concrete external things from categories, see *Met.*, III, fol. 50ra.

[57] *Ibid.*, V, fols. 118va–121vb.

[58] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 289rb–va.

[59] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 129rb.

concept of *being* that leads us to regard being as a univocal concept. But under inspection, being is a complex and confused concept, for it includes two opposite modes of being, namely, finite and infinite being, and this shows that being can be more accurately described as an analogical concept.[60] What, therefore, is what Alexander calls the reason of being (*ratio entis*)? Here Alexander is not completely clear. In principle, he does not seem to see any incompatibility between univocity and analogy, for a collection of things can be said to be analogically related to one other only if they have something unifying and something distinguishing. Thus, in one sense, being can be said to have a reason (*ratio*), so that being can be referred to different things according to the different ways in which such things exemplify such a reason. Alexander expresses this idea by stating that being is a concept that, while not being a genus, nonetheless functions as a genus.[61] But there is also a sense according to which being cannot be said to have a reason, for it does not have such a clear and distinct reason that is actually different from any categorial reason. Therefore, one can summarize Alexander's position on being by saying that being expresses a reason to the extent that we can experience the concept of being indeterminately and separately from any other concept, but being does not express a reason to the extent that we cannot separately isolate and define its conceptual content. This is the reason why Alexander affirms that being functions as a univocal concept, although it is an analogical concept. By such a distinction, Alexander means that extramental things exist in different *ways*, which are nonetheless related to each other, and this difference is the extramental ground to state that being is an analogical concept. But such a difference does not entail that external things exist according to different *senses* of existing, and this suffices to state that being functions as a univocal concept.

2.3. *The Relationship between Being and Essence*

If being is not a univocal concept, it is not possible to set being entirely apart from essence (understood as a categorial kind of being). In his Commentary, Alexander returns to the relationship between being and

[60] For Henry of Ghent's view of being, see Stephen D. Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," in: John Marenbon, ed., *Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. III: Medieval Philosophy* (London and New York, 1998), pp. 291–328, esp. 297ff. (see there for other references).

[61] See *Met.*, V, fol. 121rb.

essence several times. In general, being has, for Alexander, the force of a variable: in the abstract, the term "being" designates nothing but the actuality of whatever it is (*ens*);[62] as such, it is employed to indicate both being of essence (*esse essentiae*) and being of existence (*esse existentiae*). In Aristotle, being is normally taken as shorthand for being of essence, since Aristotle's metaphysical investigation focuses on the species of things and species are intended to express the essence of the individual things that fall under them; being is instead connected to being of existence when concrete individuals are concerned.

It is in his commentary on Book Γ that Alexander makes fully manifest his thought on being and essence. Like Aquinas, Alexander starts by reconstructing the dispute between Avicenna and Averroes. In Alexander's account, Avicenna regards essence and being as really distinct, just like a substance and an accident are. For Avicenna, it is the metaphysical distinction between beings that exist in virtue of themselves and beings that exist in virtue of something else, and the epistemological distinction between to know what a thing is and to know whether a thing is, that require the distinction between being and essence.[63] Averroes replied that if being and essence were really distinct, we would fall back into an infinite regress. Alexander sides with Averroes. After resuming the dispute, Alexander raises the question of "Whether *ens* adds something to the *esse* of a thing" (*Utrum ens dicat aliquid additum esse rei*). He interestingly records four different ways of answering the question. The first is that of those who qualify the relationship between *ens* and *esse* by distinguishing being of essence (*esse essentiae*) from being of existence (*esse existentiae*). They prove that *ens* is identical with *esse* according to being of essence but different from it according to being of existence by insisting on three points: (i) the potentiality of *ens* to *esse*; (ii) the contraction of *esse* realized by *ens*; and (iii) the composite or hylomorphic character of *ens*. The second way champions the full identity between *ens* and *esse*. Such a response seems to be more in line with Aristotle, but Alexander charges that it clashes with Averroes's Commentary. The third way assumes that *ens* and *esse* are distinct according to the different modalities of signification (i.e., *per modum habitus* and *per modum actus*) of one and the same thing. The fourth way, finally, explains the difference between *ens* and *esse* in terms of the different relations that an existent thing bears to the

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[62] *Ibid.*, I, fol. 4ra.

[63] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 77va–b; compare with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 2, n. 556.

Divine Intellect and the Divine Will. While the first and third solutions trace back to Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines, the latter solution depends on Henry of Ghent. Alexander expresses his preference for the final answer.

According to this proposal, Alexander argues for the real identity but intentional distinction of a thing's being and essence. In his doctrine, while on the one hand it is impossible in practice to differentiate really an existent thing from its being and its essence, on the other hand, the conditions explaining a thing's essence and a thing's being do not amount to exactly the same. For this reason, *being* and *essence* indicate different notions or intentions. This means that one single thing can be accounted for both as a thing exemplifying a certain kind of being (when it is related to God's intellect) and as an existent thing (when it is related to God's will), although a thing can never be separated in the reality from its being or its essence; consequently, neither can a thing's being be separated in the reality from a thing's essence. As a final step, Alexander challenges Aquinas's idea that the distinction between being and essence is required by the doctrine of analogy: in Alexander's reconstruction of Aquinas's argument, if a creature were identical with its being, it would not have its being by participation. For Alexander, this is a misunderstanding of the notion of participation. A thing participates in being not if it receives the very same being in number its cause possesses but if it instantiates or replies such a being at a minor degree.[64]

2.4. *The Nature and Structure of the* Metaphysics

As has been already noted, Alexander structures metaphysics according to a triadic scheme that he inherits from Avicenna via Aquinas: the metaphysician has a *subject-matter* and searches for both the *properties* and the *principles* of the subject-matter. Its subject-matter is being *qua* being. At the very beginning of his Commentary, Alexander explains that metaphysics is called wisdom (*sapientia*) rather than science (*scientia*) because it deals with being *qua* being and the most universal principles, while every other science deals only with a part of being, viz., material being, and particular principles.[65] But since metaphysics is universal in such a radical way, Alexander concludes that metaphysics can be also called science. Specifically, it is necessary that there be such a science as

[64] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 119ra.
[65] *Ibid.*, I, fols. 1ra–2ra, 7ra–b; IV, fol. 75vb.

metaphysics.[66] According to Alexander, Aristotle gives two arguments for proving the necessity of a science dealing with being *qua* being. First, if each particular science dealt with being *qua* being, the knowledge of being *qua* being would be replicated in every particular science, and so it would be redundant. Second, no particular science considers universal causes, but metaphysics considers the causes of every being; therefore, it is necessary that there be a science that considers being *qua* being.[67]

On the force of this characterization of metaphysics, Alexander excludes the possibility that first causes can be the subject-matter of metaphysics. First, if causes were the subject-matter, the properties studied by the metaphysician would have greater extension than that of their subject; this cannot be conceded, however, for it goes against the prescriptions given by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*. Second, the concept of *cause* is not a primitive concept, for it is a respective concept and, *qua* respective, it can be reduced to an absolute concept. Alexander takes both arguments from Avicenna.[68]

Alexander easily reconciles Aristotle's other characterizations of metaphysics with that formulated above. Metaphysics can be denominated differently, according to the different relationship it bears to its *object* and its *goal*. Metaphysics can be denominated by its object in two ways: insofar as metaphysics focuses on being, it is properly called "metaphysics," because being *qua* being goes beyond material being, as was said; insofar as metaphysics focuses on the reason of being (*ratio entis*), it is called "Divine Science," because God is what exhibits the reason of being in the highest way. If it is considered according to the goal, metaphysics is instead called "philosophy of truth" (*philosophia veritatis*).[69] Alexander sees no problem in reconciling the characterization of metaphysics as science of truth with the characterization of metaphysics as science of being *qua* being.

If metaphysics searches for the properties of being *qua* being, it especially has to consider the property of being true, since being true (just like any other transcendental notion) is coextensive and convertible with being; in a certain sense, it can be called a proper passion of being.[70] In Alexander's interpretation, Aristotle seems to give three main

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[66] *Ibid.*, I, fols. 1ra–2ra, esp. fol. 1ra.

[67] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 75rb–va; 82va–b (compare with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 5, n. 593); VI, fol. 168va.

[68] *Ibid.*, III, fol. 53va–b.

[69] *Ibid.*, II, fol. 36rb.

[70] *Ibid.*, II, fol. 33vb.

arguments in Books Γ and I for proving the convertibility of transcendentals. They insist, first, on the trans-categorial predicability of transcendentals; second, on the immediacy of the transcendental articulation of being; and, third, on the semantic equivalence of such expressions as "being *x*," "being one *x*," or "being true x."[71] Alexander's position on transcendentals is not without obscurities. Nonetheless, one thing is clear, namely, that Alexander shares with Aquinas and especially with Henry of Ghent the conviction that the transcendental terms have the same denotation but a different connotation.[72] Unlike Thomas, though, Alexander puts emphasis on the fact that the transcendental notions have a distinct though not separate foundation in the outer world. In his Commentary, Alexander invokes Henry of Ghent's technical notion of "intentional distinction" for explaining the relationship that the inner metaphysical constituents of a thing bear to each other and to the thing itself. Thus, not only substantial concepts such as *man* and *animal* (or even *being* and *essence*, as was seen) can be called intentionally distinct; so also can the transcendentals. This entails that two really identical things, or—what amounts to the same—a really and numerically one thing, can be conceptualized differently, and this can be so either because our mind takes one and the same thing as if it were two things or because two definitionally non-identical concepts can be extracted from and truly referred to one and the very same thing.[73] In his Commentary, Alexander pays no attention to Scotus's notion of formal distinction, and seems to be because he regards formal distinction as completely equivalent (and hence reducible) to Henry of Ghent's notion of intentional distinction. For Alexander, two things can be said to be formally diverse, different, or distinct only if they exhibit different formalities, meaning by "formality" none other than a conceptual content or intention that can be discovered in and abstracted from those things.[74]

The fact that transcendentals somehow have a distinct counterpart in external reality, as signaled by their different definitions, is the proof

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[71] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 284rb–va.

[72] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 77rb (compare with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 2, nn. 548–49); see also V, fol. 125ra; VI, fol. 171vb; and XI, fol. 309ra.

[73] *Ibid.*, V, fols. 124vb–125rb, 134va, and 147va.

[74] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 126ra. For a characterization of intention echoing that of Henry of Ghent (*Quodlibet* V, q. 6, ed. Iodocus Badius Ascensius [Paris, 1518], fol. 161r), see *Met.*, V, fol. 148rb: "Intentio hic vocatur aliquid pertinens ad realitatem primo modo, quod natum est preconcipi absque aliquo alio quod est in eadem realitate [. . .] et ideo intentio dicitur quasi intus tendentia, quia intellectus tendens in intraneitatem rei, infra eandem intraneitatem reperit duos conceptus, quos conceptus propter sui intraneitatem intentiones possumus appellare [. . .] intentio vocatur conceptus in re inventus."

that metaphysics is a real and not a mere nominal or logical science. Its scientific power consists precisely in that it can prove of being in general and of any kind of being in particular its properties or proper passions.[75] Alexander portrays scientific practice as a sort of intellectual factory (*fabrica intellectus*) in which something is presupposed and something searched for. In general, the existence of the subject of which a science demonstrates its propositions is not investigated by that science. A science does not demonstrate whether a subject exists (*si est*), but it presupposes the existence of such a subject. What is investigated is whether a proper passion exists, and answering this question amounts to elaborating a procedure for making manifest what the subject is (*quid est*), that is, the inherence of the passion in the subject. Alexander stresses that a science adds nothing really new to the subject, for otherwise it would deal with accidental aspects of the subject. So, since a science does not prove the existence of the subject, it follows that proving a passion of a subject turns out to be equivalent to clarifying the hidden nature of the subject. A science, therefore, is said to explain not in the sense that it proves the existence of the subject of the passions that it searches for but in the sense that it aims to specify the nature of the subject that has been initially presupposed. From this perspective, a universal science such as metaphysics is called to make explicit and to prove those passions that are fully convertible with the concept of *being*.[76]

2.5. *The Architecture of the* Metaphysics

According to this conception of metaphysics, at the very beginning of his Commentary Alexander deduces the articulation of the *Metaphysics* in two ways. He notes that one can say that the principal meaning of the term "being" is substance and so can structure the *Metaphysics* according to the different kinds of substance. But one can also articulate the *Metaphysics* according to the different divisions of being.[77] In both cases, one arrives at the same architecture of the *Metaphysics*. For Alexander, it is the following. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is divided into two main parts: the first 11 books (A–K) and the twelfth book (Λ). In the last book, Aristotle investigates immaterial substances and necessary being, proving the existence

[75] *Ibid.*, XI, fol. 309va–b.
[76] *Ibid.*, VI, fol. 169ra–b.
[77] *Ibid.*, I, fol. 1ra–b.

of God as the first mover, the final goal, and the prime and pure actuality;[78] in the first 11 books, instead, Aristotle focuses on material substances and possible being. In turn, the first part is subdivided into two main sections: the first six books (A–E) are reserved to introduce the themes and tools useful for the subsequent investigation; from Book 7 (Z), the effective treatment of metaphysics begins. As usually, Alexander does not comment on Books M and N, devoted to the opinions of the pre-Aristotelian thinkers about separate substances.[79] The distribution of themes in the second section is made according to the triadic scheme mentioned before (*subiectum-proprietates subiecti-principia subiecti*): Books 7–9 (Z–Θ) deal with the articulation of the *subject-matter*, while Books 10 and 11 (I–K) illustrate the fundamental *properties* of being *qua* being and Book 12 (Λ) the *principles* of the subject-matter.[80]

Alexander's explanation of the *Metaphysics* architecture is deeply influenced by Aquinas. As a matter of fact, Alexander describes the contents of each book in exactly the same way as Aquinas does. Book A is considered as a sort of proemial and doxographic book, while α as a book where Aristotle examines the relationship between metaphysics and cognition. Like Aquinas, Alexander regards B as an aporematic book, and Γ as the book where Aristotle begins to introduce his own doctrine.[81] In particular, B is seen as a pivotal book since it furnishes the agenda of the *Metaphysics*. Aquinas helps Alexander to single out each aporia[82] and the place where Aristotle solves them. Alexander's use of Aquinas is, however, unsystematic. For example, he omits discussing those cases in which Aquinas shows to be uncertain about the right place where an aporia is solved and those in which Aquinas refers the solution to Books M and N;[83] Alexander instead follows Aquinas in all the other cases.[84] Moreover, Aquinas always

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[78] *Ibid.*, IV, fol. 76rb.

[79] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 182rb–va; XII, fol. 338vb.

[80] On this scheme in Aquinas, see Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas's Interpretation of *Metaphysics Book* Beta," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 413–27.

[81] Compare *Met.*, IV, fol. 84rb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 6, n. 605.

[82] Compare e.g., *Met.*, III, fols. 49va–50vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 2, n. 346ff.; fols. 50vb–52ra, with III, lec. 3, n. 355ff.; and fol. 52ra–b, with III, lec. 4, n. 369ff.

[83] Compare *Met.*, III, fols. 52rb, 54ra–va, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 4, nn. 369, 376, 384; fol. 57vb, with III, lec. 7, nn. 403, 422; fol. 67va, with III, lec. 10, nn. 456, 459; fol. 68va, with III, lec. 11, nn. 466, 487; fol. 71ra, with III, lec. 12, nn. 488, 501; fol. 74ra, with III, lec. 13, nn. 502, 514; fol. 74va, with III, lec. 14, nn. 515, 518; and fol. 74vb, with III, lec. 15, nn. 519, 522.

[84] Compare *Met.*, III, fols. 56rb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, III, lec. 5, n. 392; fol. 57ra, with III, lec. 6, nn. 398, 402; fol. 66ra, with III, lec. 8, n. 442; fol. 66rb, with III, lec. 9, n. 446;

recalls such a correspondence when he comes to comment on the solution of the aporiae, while Alexander only occasionally does it.[85] But like Aquinas, Alexander recalls the solutions of all the aporiae at the beginning of the recapitulatory Book K.[86]

Returning to the contents of each book, Alexander assumes that Book Δ illustrates what is the matter of metaphysics, i.e., the articulation of being *qua* being. Aristotle's approach is linguistic, for Aristotle clarifies the matter by clarifying the meaning of the terms designating the matter. The architecture of the book mirrors the general scheme governing the *Metaphysics*: Δ is divided into four parts, in which Aristotle examines the terms designating the principles and causes (Chapters 1–5), the subject-matter (Chapters 6–8), the parts of the subject-matter (Chapters 9–15) and its passions (Chapters 16–30).

With Book E, Aristotle returns to the subject-matter of metaphysics, clarifying the modality of investigation of metaphysics, its practical nature, its necessity and universality, and the relationship it bears to such sciences as physics and mathematics. Aristotle removes from the subject-matter of metaphysics being *secundum accidens* and being *qua* true and false. Unlike Thomas, Alexander refers to the last chapter of Book Θ as the place where Aristotle reconsiders the theme of being *qua* true and false, only superficially treated in Book E.[87]

From Book Z to I, Aristotle investigates the most relevant divisions of the subject-matter. The deduction of the themes is the following: whatever exists can exist with matter or without matter. First, Aristotle investigates the realm of material being (Books Z–K), then the realm of immaterial being (Books Λ–N). Whatever exists in the material world falls into the categorial table. It follows that whatever exists can exist either in virtue of itself or in virtue of something else, so the first division of being is that into substance and accident (Books Z and H). This realm of being can be further subdivided, since both substance and accident can exist either in

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fol. 67va, with III, lec. 9, n. 455; fol. 68va, with III, lec. 10, n. 465; and fol. 75ra, with III, lec. 15, n. 528.

85 Compare e.g., *Met.*, IV, fol. 80ra, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, IV, lec. 3, n. 569.

86 Compare *Met.*, XI, fol. 304vb, with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, XI, lec. 1, n. 2149; fol. 304vb, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2151; fol. 305ra, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2153; fol. 305ra, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2155; fol. 305rb, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2157; fol. 305va, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2159; fol. 305vb, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2162; fol. 306ra, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2167; fol. 306rb, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2170; fol. 306va, with XI, lec. 1, n. 2172; fol. 306vb, with XI, lec. 2, n. 2174; fol. 307rb, with XI, lec. 2, n. 2179; and fol. 307va, with XI, lec. 2, n. 2181 and n. 2187).

87 See *Met.*, IX, fol. 274va.

potentiality or in actuality (Book Θ), as one or multiple, as finite or infinite (Book I).

3. Special Issues

3.1. *Metaphysics and Substantiality: The Pivotal Place of Book Z*

Alexander's explanation of the architecture of the *Metaphysics* sketched out above gives us important information about the way in which Alexander approaches some major philosophical issues. From such a division it is evident that substance is, for Alexander, the principal meaning of the term "being," so it is not surprising to find him understanding Books Z and H as the heart of the *Metaphysics*. In particular, he holds that in Book Z Aristotle begins with investigating substance in an abstract and "logical" way, while moving to investigate substance in more metaphysical way from Book H. Here a difference with Aquinas occurs. Aristotle's statement at the beginning of Z 4 that the investigation into substance will be developed in a "logical" way is understood by Aquinas as covering the entire Book Z.[88] For Aquinas, Aristotle's inquiry is logical, for it is abstract and carried out in a predicative way. That is, Aristotle deduces the way in which things are from the way in which they are predicated. When Aristotle in Book Z at times scrutinizes substance by referring to matter and form—Aquinas explains—Aristotle is there anticipating what he will do in Book H and is somehow introducing an exception with respect to the general perspective of Book Z.[89] Alexander instead prefers to follow Averroes and assume that the logical investigation of Book Z has to do not only with the mode of investigation but also with its contents, viz., with the fact that Aristotle begins his inquiry by endorsing some formulations extracted from the logical writings—formulations such as "substance is that of which any other thing is predicated while it is not predicated of anything else" or "essence is what is answered to the question 'What is it?'" (*quid est*).[90] Following the suggestion of Averroes, therefore, Alexander identifies the core subject of Book Z with the *quod quid erat esse* and

[88] See Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 3, n. 1308; see also VII, lec. 3, nn. 1575–76; and VII, lec. 17, nn. 1648 and 1658 for the meaning of '*logice*.' On this, see Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 353–85.

[89] See, e.g., Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 11, n. 1536.

[90] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 191va; also fols. 182vb–183ra.

its definability. The reason is that Aristotle adopts a causal standpoint in the *Metaphysics* and, like Aquinas, Alexander understands the *quod quid erat esse* as the Aristotle's privileged (linguistic) procedure to grasp the essential properties of a thing. Specifically, such properties are those that serve an explanatory function with respect to all the other properties possessed by the thing. According to this intuition, Alexander holds that Aristotle proceeds in the book as follows. Aristotle first introduces the different meanings of the term "being" and argues that that of substance is the fundamental one, since substance precedes accidents in time, in cognition, and in definition (Z 1); then, Aristotle moves to present the different meanings of the term "substance"—viz., substance as substrate, as essence, as universal, and as genus—and to discuss the first of them (Z 3). In Alexander's reading, in the remaining part of the book, Aristotle develops his investigation on substance as essence, or *quod quid erat esse*, in seven points.

i First, Aristotle investigates the domain of things of which the *quod quid erat esse* is predicated and provides two solutions to the problem of what things have *quod quid erat esse* (Z 4–5). The first is strict. Since essence is what is expressed by a definition, Aristotle makes it clear that definition has to concern things that are "something" (*aliquid*), and "something" is whatever is intrinsically one and primary; in turn, one and primary is everything whose being is not expressed by predicating something of something else; as a result, only the species of a substantial genus can have definition and hence essence. Accidental species—as Averroes explained in his Commentary—designate copulated being (*entia in copulatione*), for they express something "of something else" (*alicuius*) rather than a mere "something" (*aliquid*), so they are neither intrinsically one nor primary, and for this reason they do not have definition and essence.[91] Aristotle's second solution is instead blander. It applies the doctrine of the analogy of being and concludes that essence and definition pertain to substances primarily and to accidents secondarily. For Alexander, the two solutions are equivalent: one can say that only substances have

[91] Alexander gives two reasons for excluding the species of accidents (*Met.*, VII, fol. 194ra). The first is that of Aquinas (*Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 3, nn. 1327–28): only the species of substance can have essence, because only such species can be defined and predicated essentially of a thing. For Averroes, instead, who reads at 1030a11–13 *alicuius formarum carentium generis* instead of *non generis specierum*, the species of accidents are excluded because, even if they are forms, they nonetheless lack a genus.

definition and essence, or that accidents as well have definition and essence albeit not primarily.[92]

ii Second, Aristotle answers the question whether the *quod quid erat esse* is identical with the thing of which it is predicated (Z 6). Aristotle provides a qualified solution. In the case of accidents, Aristotle proves that an accident is identical with its essence when it is taken in the abstract, i.e., as meaning an accidental form, while when it is taken in the concrete, i.e., as meaning an accidental compound or the accidental form as it exists in a subject, is not identical. Instead, a substance is always identical with its essence. Unlike many modern-day interpreters, Alexander refers Aristotle's thesis of the full identity between a primary substance and its essence to categorial primary substances, not to the substantial forms of such substances, and he endows this thesis exclusively with anti-Platonic significance. In his account, the thesis implies that if essences were non-identical with, and hence separated from, primary substances, then essences would be not existent and primary substances would be not knowable.[93] Like Aquinas, Alexander takes this as the first criticism that Aristotle addresses to Plato in Book Z.

iii Third, Aristotle proves that the *quod quid erat esse* cannot be generated and that to posit separate Ideas is useless to explain both the generation and cognition of sensible substances, regardless of whether such Ideas are accounted for as exemplars or as efficient causes; in fact, it is enough to assume that the generating agent and the generated thing share one and specifically the same substantial form (Z 7–9). Again following Aquinas, Alexander holds that Aristotle here addresses to Plato the second criticism concerning the separation of Ideas from sensible substances.

iv Four, Aristotle illustrates what are the constituents of the *quod quid erat esse* (Z 10–11), by scrutinizing the problem of the relationship between the parts of a definition and the parts of the defined thing. Alexander thinks that Aristotle solves the problem by introducing some qualifications. First, following Averroes, Alexander explains that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of parts, namely, *quantitative* and *qualitative* parts: while the first ones relate to individual matter and so cannot be included in a definition (for a definition concerns the species and not the

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[92] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 193rbff.

[93] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 202ra–b. For modern-day interpretations, see Gabriele Galluzzo & Mauro Mariani, *Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Zeta: The Contemporary Debate* (Pisa, 2006).

individuals), the second ones concern the species and can be included in a definition. Second, Aristotle distinguishes two different kinds of priority: there is a sense (connected to material and efficient causality) according to which the parts of a whole can be said to be prior to the whole, and a sense (connected to formal and final causality) according to which it is the whole that can be said to be prior to its parts (or to some of them).[94] Alexander notes that much of the problem of the inclusion or not of matter in the essence of a sensible substance rests upon such distinctions as well as upon the ambiguity of such terms as "substance" and "species": whether by "substance" Aristotle meant to refer to a separately existing thing that can be pointed to as a substance or to the principle of a thing's substantiality; and whether by "species" Aristotle meant to designate the substantial form of a thing or its specific form: while a substantial form (say, the soul in the case of human beings) may be described as particular in character, the specific form (e.g., humanity) may be described as a universal compound of a certain kind of matter and form.[95]

v Five, Aristotle explains the essential unity of the *quod quid erat esse* and definition, in spite of its mereological composition (Z 12). He clarifies the sense in which the specific differentia determines the genus and constitutes the species. Three intuitions govern Aristotle's reasoning: first, the genus *qua* genus cannot exist beyond the species: if it does, it can no longer be considered as a genus but must be seen as the matter of the things exemplifying the species; second, each specific differentia reabsorbs in itself the prime genus and the precedent differentiae; third, the ultimate differentia makes one with the species. In order to prove that a definition is one because it is the definition of one thing, Aristotle explains what the exact division of a genus by way of differentiae is. Alexander underscores two criteria: (a) two opposite differentiae must divide the genus immediately and exhaustively; and (b) such differentiae must be predicated *per se* of the genus, although they are not essential parts of it.[96]

vi Six, Aristotle abandons the main theme for a long digression on two questions: first, whether the universal—which is the third meaning of "substance" listed at the beginning of Z 3—is a very true substance (Z 13–16, 1040b16); and second, whether one and being taken as a genus—which is the four meaning of "substance"—are a very true substance

[94] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 218vb and 221ra–b.
[95] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 219rb and 222ra.
[96] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 229ra.

(Z 16, 1040b16–1041a4). In particular, in Alexander's reading, Aristotle in Z 13 discusses not the question of whether universals are separately existent substances but the more specific question of whether universals do express the substance of the things of which they are predicated. In that chapter, Aristotle resumes the different meanings of "substance" given in Z 3. Unlike Aquinas, Alexander does not see any remarkable difference between the two lists.[97] From Z 14 to Z 16, moreover, Aristotle demonstrates that no Idea can be substance (Z 14) and that no Idea can be defined because of its singularity (Z 15). In this part, he addresses his third criticism to Plato.

vii Seven, Aristotle returns to the *quod quid erat esse* and explains what it is (Z 17). Here he anticipates the investigation of Book H, for he characterizes the *quod quid erat esse* as the principle of matter's and the compound's being. In particular, he adds two details to the picture: first, he proves that the *quod quid erat esse* is a certain (i.e., formal) principle; second, he proves that it can be neither explained as a material element nor as composed of material elements. Significantly, Aristotle affirms the equivalence between the questions "What is it?" (*quid est*) and "Why is it?" (*propter quid*) in the case of substances as well. The question "What is a man?" for example, is equivalent to the question "Why is a man, a man?"; and this second question is in turn equivalent to the question "Why is this matter, this form?" i.e., a matter arranged in this or that way. Logically speaking, the *quod quid erat esse* can include every kind of cause, although metaphysically speaking, only intrinsic causes, such as form (matter and form, for Aquinas),[98] is relevant for answering the question "Why is it?"[99]

In sum, Alexander thinks that Book Z is a central book. In it Aristotle focuses on the *quod quid erat esse* or essence of a thing, reaching some important results. First, Aristotle characterizes the *quod quid erat esse* as a linguistic formula that is able to intercept the essential properties of a thing. Then, he proves that both substances and accidents have a *quod quid erat esse*, although accidents in a qualified way, and that the *quod quid erat esse* is identical with (i.e., non-separated from) the thing of which it is essentially predicated. In a further step, Aristotle concludes that the *quod quid erat esse* cannot be generated or corrupted

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[97] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 231ra (compare with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, n. 1567).
[98] See Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 17, n. 1658.
[99] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 240va.

and that it must include a reference to both the material and the formal properties of a material thing. Finally, Aristotle proves that the *quod quid erat esse* is universal in character, although it does not exist separately as universal, and that it expresses the principle of a material thing's substantiality. With respect to this picture, in Alexander's interpretation, Aristotle in Book H does nothing but complete his investigation on substance, by explaining the contributions that matter and form respectively give to the *quod quid erat esse* of a material thing.

3.2. *The Nature of Accidents*

With respect to the architecture of the *Metaphysics*, Book Z plays a core role in Alexander's interpretation, for it deals with the fundamental division of being, namely, that in substance and accident. Since Alexander holds that being immediately divides into the categories, it follows that substantial and accidental being exhaust the domain of what it is.[100] Specifically, the concept of *substance* sums up the feature of being *per se*, while the concept of *accident* expresses the feature of being *in alio*. Although in his theological writings Alexander tends to promote a different image of accidents,[101] in the *Metaphysics* Commentary he emphasizes the inherential nature of accidents, to the point that he denies that accidents can be separated in actuality from the substances in which they actually inhere. The fact that accidents are inseparable from substances, however, does not entail that accidents can be eliminated in favor of substances or be reduced to substances' modes of being. Inseparability from substance—notes Alexander—only means that substances can be described as genuinely *per se* beings, while accidents are beings insofar as they are something of what is a genuinely *per se* being.[102] Alexander's position on accidents is articulate, since it resorts to the distinction between accidents' essence and accidents' being. In light of this distinction, Alexander qualifies his position as follows: accidents are beings *per se* insofar as they are what they essentially are in virtue of themselves; but they are beings *in alio* insofar as they depend on a substance for their actual being or existence.[103] This is to say that accidents are absolute and *per se* natures that are nonetheless made in such a way that they have

[100] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 185va.
[101] On this, see Amerini, "Alessandro di Alessandria sulla natura degli accidenti."
[102] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 183ra.
[103] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 184ra–va.

the capacity of inhering in something else, and this capacity of inhering can never be removed from an accident's essence, although an accident can exceptionally lose its actual inherence in a substance (as happens to accidents in the case of Eucharist).

This general view of accidental being has two major consequences. First, accidents can undergo a process of intensive increment or decrement, and this gradation concerns both the being and the essence of accidents.[104] Whiteness, for example, can be more or less white both in virtue of itself and in virtue of its inherence in a subject. Such an intension does not entail that one of these degrees gives rise to a different and more eminent form of whiteness, only that one and the same form of whiteness can be more or less intense. More precisely, Alexander observes that the property of being "greater or lesser" (*maior vel minor*) regards the essence of accidents, while the property of being "more or less" (*magis vel minus*) regards their being in a matter.[105] It is not completely clear what Alexander means by such a distinction. He seems to suggest on the one hand that the property of differing intensively is equivalent to the property of differing formally;[106] but if differing formally amounts to having two different (species of) forms, then, if two accidents differ intensively, they also differ formally, and so they result in two different (species of) forms. In this case, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that different degrees of whiteness give rise to specifically different forms of whiteness. This could lead an interpreter to attribute to Alexander a trope theory of accidents.

On the other hand, though, Alexander does not seem to deviate from the traditional view that accidents can be numerically distinguished and multiplied only in virtue of the relationship they bear to the subject in which they inhere. It is according to this view that Alexander rejects the possibility for two accidents, only numerically different, to exist in the same subject. The underlying conviction is that matter has different potentialities towards two specifically different accidents, but only one and the same potentiality towards two numerically different accidents.[107] Another reason for excluding a trope interpretation of Alexander's view of accidents is that Alexander holds that the property of increasing and

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[104] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 252vb.

[105] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 253ra; Alexander here is polemizing against Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VIII, lec. 3, n. 1727.

[106] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 289vb.

[107] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 128ra–b. For different senses of numerical distinction, see also *Met.*, X, fols. 286va, 292vb, and 301ra.

decreasing pertains to both accidents and substances. The advocate of the position that substances do not receive intension and remission usually invokes Aristotle's dictum that forms are like numbers (H3, 1044a10): if a differentia is added or subtracted, a form changes its species. Without entering into the details of Alexander's argument, for our purpose it suffices to note that, for Alexander, this is not the only possible reading of Aristotle. For him, substances can be treated analogously to accidents, they too can undergo a process of intensification.[108] At the end of the day, by the above distinction between "greater and lesser" and "more or less," Alexander seems to suggest that accidents' capacity of increasing or decreasing depends on accidents' essence, although the condition concretely permitting the realization of such a capacity, and hence the determination of the degree of intensity of accidents, is the accidents' actual inherence in a subject.

A second consequence following from the view that accidents are *per se* natures is that accidents, in that they are beings *per se*, are also beings that can be conceptualized *per se*. No reification is involved in such a process, for Alexander agrees with Aquinas that to conceive an accident in separation from its subject only means to conceive selectively an accident, i.e., to conceive an accident without conceiving by the same act of conception its subject, and not to conceive that an accident exists without its subject.[109] However, this does not entail that accidents can be perfectly conceptualized without referring to the subject. Definitions of accidents omitting the subject are contemplated by Aristotle, for example in Book I.[110] But Alexander notes that they are logical, incomplete, or insufficient definitions. A complete definition of an accident must be always "by addition" (*ex additione*), that is, must mention always the subject in which the accident inheres, although the subject is not part of the essence of the defined accident.[111] As a result, no accident can be a proper object of definition (*proprie diffinibile*), for in the case of accidents, a definition cannot delimitate (*terminare*) an accident's essence in an appropriate way.[112] This view is not incompatible with Alexander's conviction that both concrete and abstract accidental terms signify only the accident and not the subject. It is the mode of signifying that makes possible the abstraction of the

[108] *Ibid.*, VIII, fol. 253rb.
[109] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 184vb–185ra.
[110] *Ibid.*, X, fols. 299rb, 301vb; also VII, fols. 194vb–195ra.
[111] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 194ra, 196vb–197ra.
[112] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 218ra–b.

accident from the subject of inherence, which must be nonetheless included in the complete concept and definition of the accident.[113]

3.3. *The Nature of Substance: Matter, Form, and the Compound*

There is no doubt that, for Alexander, Aristotle composed the *Metaphysics* in order to reject Plato's theory of separate Ideas and his doctrine of being as a genus. In Alexander's view, Plato's metaphysics ensues from two erroneous assumptions. First, Plato separated essence from substance. This separation transforms essences into substances and paves the way to an infinite regress of essences. Second, he assigned to matter a kind of actual being before matter received a given substantial form. This led Plato to treat substantial forms as special kinds of accidental forms, for he thought them as separable from matter and as participations of separate Ideas. For Alexander, these assumptions undermine the possibility of predicating essential predicates of sensible substances.[114] Set in such an anti-Platonic context, Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of substance is quintessentially the same as Aquinas's.[115]

In his Commentary on Δ 8, explaining the second meaning of the term "substance," Alexander wonders whether "substance" may be predicated of form, matter, and the compound in the same way. His answer is negative. He rectifies the traditional etymology of the term "substance": it means "what subsists or exists *per se*" (from *sub-sistere*) rather than "what stands beneath" (from *sub-stare*), and such a characterization of "substance" applies to matter, form, and the compound differently, that is, in an analogical way. Form can be called substance insofar as it is the cause and the actuality of a thing's being *per se*; the compound can be called substance precisely because it is what is a being *per se*; matter can be called substance insofar as it is potentially what can be a being *per se*, so that matter's being is not different in actuality from the compound's being.[116] As Alexander explains extensively in his Commentary on Z, form plays the key role in the metaphysical constitution of a substance.

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[113] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 120va–b.

[114] *Ibid.*, I, fol. 21va–b.

[115] On this, see Krause, "Die Charakteristik"; and Fabrizio Amerini, "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alessandria, and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

[116] See *Met.*, V, fol. 122ra–b; VII, fols. 188rb–189ra; see also VIII, fol. 254ra–va, for a sharp description of the mechanisms of derivation/resolution of the compound from-and-to prime matter.

In particular, Alexander subscribes to Aquinas's doctrine of the unicity of human soul and substantial form, which is thought as immediately and instantaneously actualizing prime matter.

Substantial form serves various functions with respect to matter and the compound. It first actualizes the primitive potentiality of prime matter and, in doing so, orients matter towards a specific goal: matter reaches this goal by transiting through a series of subsequent, more restricted, and non-reversible potentialities, because each actualization of a potentiality necessarily rules out other potentialities.[117] This process ends with the formation of a compound. Every property of the compound (both accidental and substantial) ultimately depends on the substantial form, although not all the properties of the compound are directly consequent upon the substantial form. By this process, substantial form extends its being to the compound as well. To the extent that substantial form is causally responsible for both matter's being and the compound's being, substantial form is also responsible for the intrinsic unity and identity of the compound.[118] This means that, for Alexander, substantial form is the principle that permits the identification and discernment (metaphysically and epistemologically) of two substantial compounds sharing one and the same form. With respect to form, matter serves the complementary function of distinguishing and numerically multiplying two formally identical substantial compounds.[119]

Here Alexander rejects Aquinas's view that only matter can numerically multiply a form, so that in the things separated from matter only a numerically one form can be given. According to Alexander, separate substances can be numerically multiplied also according to the supposit (*suppositum*).[120] Alexander instead takes up Aquinas's view that the substantial form, or the form of the part (e.g., the soul in the case of human beings), and the specific form, or the form of the whole (e.g., humanity), do not amount to the same form, although they are causally and

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[117] *Ibid.*, XII, fol. 332rb.

[118] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 241rb–242rb, and VIII, fol. 259va–b.

[119] Precisely, it is matter taken under determinate dimensions that plays this role (*Met.*, V, fol. 108ra; cf. Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, V, lec. 8, n. 876. For other details on the relationship between matter and dimensions, see *Met.*, V, fols. 123ra, 125ra, and VII, fol. 190va). Alexander instead rejects Scotus's view that individuals can be distinguished from each other formally. If a species were divided into individuals by means of formal differentiae, necessarily (i) the individual form would be more "form" than the specific form; (ii) individuals would be essentially ordered; and (iii) a species would be a genus (*Met.*, V, fols. 127va–128ra).

[120] See, e.g., *Met.*, V, fols. 118vb and 133vb–134ra.

mereologically ordered. According to this claim, Alexander holds that the terms "form," "essence," and "quiddity" designate different items of the ontology: by "form" Aristotle normally means a particular thing's form of the part, although sometimes—as Averroes pointed out—Aristotle also uses this term to indicate the form of the part taken universally (i.e., the soul in general), the form of the whole, or even the species; by "essence" (or, more precisely, *quid est* or *quod quid erat esse*) Aristotle instead means a thing's nature, so in the case of material things, essence must contain properties of both the material and the formal type; "quiddity," finally, denotes the same thing as "essence," but in addition it connotes the relationship of a thing's nature to the intellect: while "essence" indicates a thing's nature *qua* extramentally existing, "quiddity" indicates a thing's nature *qua* received by the mind and expressed by a definition. So, unlike "essence," "quiddity" only expresses properties of the formal type, for it is the substantial form that makes a thing belonging to a given species and therefore makes possible its knowledge.[121]

Unlike the account of form, which largely depends on Aquinas, Alexander's account of matter completely sets in the Franciscan tradition of thought. Alexander makes two basic claims concerning matter. The first is that prime matter is unknowable in itself but knowable by inference (from motion), by analogy (with artifacts), and by predication (on the impossibility of having an infinite regress in a chain of denominative predications).[122] The second claim is that prime matter's essence is that of being in potentiality not only to every form but also to every actuality.[123] If matter were in actuality, matter would become the true primary substance and the substantial form would be reduced to an accidental form.[124] The claim that matter's essence does consist in potentiality has two main consequences: first, matter has no potentiality to a form before it received a form whatsoever and second, matter cannot actualize its potentiality by itself.[125] All that is quite in line with Thomas Aquinas's doctrine. Like Aquinas, in fact, Alexander denies that prime matter can have an actual

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[121] *Ibid.*, V, fols. 122vb–123ra; VII, fols. 194va–b, 200ra–b, and, especially, 222ra–b.

[122] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 188va; VIII, fol. 245ra–b; IX, fols. 267ra, 268rb–vb; XII, fols. 331rb–332rb.

[123] Cf. *Met.*, I, fol. 12vb: "dicere ergo quod sit ens in actu et quod sit materia est implicatio contradictionis." Alexander refers to the standard dictum of Averroes's *De substantia orbis* ("materia substantiatur per posse") at fol. 113rb (see also VII, fols. 245va–246ra and 256vb; XII, fol. 346va).

[124] *Ibid.*, I, fol. 32ra; VII, fol. 187vaff.

[125] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 190ra.

being on its own account. But unlike Aquinas, Alexander rejects the idea that prime matter, being pure potentiality, lacks any being at all, for, if prime matter were not endowed somewhat with a kind or degree of being, it simply could not receive any other form and actuality. In his Commentary on Book H, Alexander gives three arguments for conferring to matter a certain—eminently non-categorial—being.[126] He calls such a kind of being "diminished being" (*esse secundum quid*) or "entitative being" (*esse entitativum*), and he opposes this being to actual or formal being.[127]

While accidents and accidental compounds are not properly definable, as was said, substantial compounds are regarded by Alexander as the proper objects of definition. Specifically, it is the species of substantial compounds that counts as the true real object of definition. As said, definition is tasked by Alexander with expressing a thing's essence,[128] and definition can do that by gathering up all the properties of the defined thing that permit us a correct conceptualization of the thing. In order to understand Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of substance, it is important to bear in mind that the essence that is expressed by a definition is not, for Alexander, the essence as extramentally existent but the essence as grasped by the mind. This claim first leads Alexander to propose a reconciliation of Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of essence with that of Averroes, by stressing the "conceptualistic" perspective involved in Averroes's usual speaking of *quiddity* instead of *essence*. At the same time, that claim also enables Alexander to explain why the specific form rather than the substantial form, which is only a part of the substantial compound, is what a definition is called to express, and why a definition has to include all the parts of the defined thing without which such a thing, taken as a whole, cannot be correctly or completely conceptualized.[129] Since it is the substantial form that allows our mind to grasp

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[126] *Ibid.*, VIII, fol. 246rb–va; also VII, fol. 187vb.

[127] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 110vb, and VIII, fol. 246vb.

[128] Cf. *Met.*, V, fol. 166rb: "diffinitio [...] est instrumentum intellectus deducens intellectum ad explicandum notitiam essentie." See also *Met.*, VI, fols. 166rb, 169vb, 171ra–b; VII, fol. 219ra, 235rb–vb, 237rb.

[129] Cf. *Met.*, VII, fol. 219ra; fol. 223va–b: "Diffinitio enim non est nisi universalis et speciei, cuius sunt partes rationis et non partes materiales; nisi ergo cognoscatur differentia inter partes materiales et partes rationis, ratio rei non erit manifesta. Notandum est quod partes rationis vocantur sine quibus quidditas rei concipi non potest; partes autem materiales vocantur in quibus quidditas rei concipitur secundum esse. Quia ergo diffinitio rei sequitur esse in conceptu et non esse in essentia, ideo partes rationis, que non possunt separari a conceptu, accipiuntur in diffinitione; partes autem materiales que, et si non possunt separari ab essentia, tamen separantur a conceptu, non accipiuntur in

an external thing's essence, it follows that it is the substantial form that governs our activity of selecting and ordering the essential properties of external things.[130] In the case of sensible substances, in particular, Alexander holds that a certain kind of matter has to be included, if not openly mentioned, in their definition.[131] The metaphysical reason for this conclusion is that the substantial form's task is that of actualizing the potentiality of matter to be a substance.

For Alexander, it is especially in Z 11 that Aristotle gives the criteria for spelling out the proper parts of a definition. In that chapter, Aristotle investigates whether the correspondence between definition and defined thing also holds for the parts of the definition and those of the defined thing. On Alexander's reading, Aristotle argues that in the case of specific forms that can be realized in more than one matter, it is plain that matter does not belong to the essence of such forms. This is the case of the form of sphere, which can be realized in wood, bronze, and other materials. Aristotle further notes that even if spheres were realized only in bronze, it could be still possible to separate mentally the form of sphere from bronze, although it would be difficult in fact to fulfill such a separation; in virtue of this possibility, however, bronze would continue to be regarded as unessential to the definition of the form of sphere. The same can be said for mathematical forms, which are always realized in an intelligible matter, but the same cannot be said for the form of man. Aristotle states that the form of man is realized only in flesh and bones; but unlike bronze, in this case it is not only difficult in fact but also impossible to separate the form of man from flesh and bones.[132] Aristotle does not explain why it is impossible, and today interpreters have proposed different explanations of this text. Nor does Alexander clarify this point. In Alexander's interpretation, the reason for distinguishing the case of the form of man from that of the form of sphere seems to be that man

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diffinitione [. . .]. Ratio Philosophi fundatur super duas propositiones. Prima est quod ea que separantur in esse, separantur a conceptu, licet non e converso. Secunda est quod illa que separantur in conceptu ab alio, non sunt de essentia illius"; fol. 224ra: "essentia autem rei sequitur esse in conceptu, non esse rei in effectu." This interpretation is induced by the interpretations of Thomas Aquinas (*Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 10, nn. 1490–91) and Averroes (*In Met.*, VII, t.c. 35, fol. 187vaG–H) and by the Latin translation of the crucial text of Z 10, 1035b27–1036a1, where the ambiguous Greek term λόγος is rendered as *species* (see AL XXV 3.2, 151.536–45).

[130] See *Met.*, III, fols. 50vb–51ra and 64ra; V, fols. 115va–b, 159rb–160ra–vb, and 163vb–164rb; and VII, fol. 227va–b.

[131] *Ibid.*, II, fol. 44rb–va, and VIII, fol. 248rb–vb.

[132] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 224ra–b and 224vb.

and every living being exhibits such a complex biological functioning that only an extremely sophisticated type of matter (which is supposed to be unique in principle) is able to sustain the functions associated to the form of man. Alexander calls this matter "proximate matter," that is, matter *qua* organized by the substantial form. As a result, Alexander assumes that both the properties directly depending on the substantial form and those depending on the proximate matter must belong to the definition of the species of a material substance, for both are necessary for a correct conceptualization of this kind of substance.[133] Such properties are what is summed up, respectively, by the differentia "rational" and by the genus "animal" in the standard definition of the species "man."

3.4. *Substance and Universality*

In the previous sections we noted that Avicenna importantly influences Alexander's understanding of metaphysics and his doctrine of being. Throughout the Commentary, however, a reader finds no place where Alexander presents Avicenna's doctrine of essence as the key for solving the vexed question of universals. Nonetheless, it is absolutely clear that Avicenna's doctrine is precisely what enables Alexander to get the point. Specifically, Avicenna's confidence in the possibility of distinguishing an extramental thing's nature from the so-called intentional properties (such as universality) that the mind can attach to that nature is the clue for resolving the aporia of substance of Z 13. As is known, the aporia concerns how to reconcile Aristotle's claims (i) that form is substance and (ii) that form is universal with the claim (iii) that universal is not substance. Here Alexander's proposal slightly deviates from Aquinas's. Indeed, according to Aquinas, Aristotle proves that no universal is substance on the principle that every universal can be predicated of many things, while substance cannot be predicated of anything. Aquinas's main argument is that if the universal were substance, it would be the substance of something; from this it follows that the universal is either the substance of all the things of which it is predicated or only of one of them; since both solutions are untenable, then the universal cannot be the substance of anything; therefore, it is not substance.[134] Alexander is less clear. Sometimes one can have the impression that, in Alexander's interpretation, Aristotle wants to prove that no universal can be *the substance of the things of which it is*

[133] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 221vb–222ra.

[134] See Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, nn. 1569 and 1572–73.

predicated.[135] But on some other occasions, the impression is rather that Aristotle's purpose is to prove that the universals are not *substances* in precisely the same way in which the individuals are. The first reading, however, seems to be that preferred by Alexander. Alexander lists five arguments in Z 13 for denying that universals are substances, and Alexander reads such arguments in the light of a couple of qualifications.

First, Alexander observes that a thing must satisfy two conditions in order for it to be substance: (i) it must be an item belonging to the category of substance; and (ii) it must be a *per se* existent thing. With respect to such conditions, a *Categories* primary substance (such as *this man*) satisfies both conditions, while a *Categories* secondary substance (such as *man*) satisfies only the first one. According to Alexander, the goal of Aristotle's first main argument of Z 13 (1038b8–15) is precisely that of proving that the universals do not satisfy the second condition.[136] Second, Alexander further observes that a universal such as *man* can be considered in two ways, namely, (i) as a nature disjoined from the accidental property of being universal that the mind can attach to it; or (ii) as a nature conjoined with it. (i) In the first case, *man* is considered as a nature abstracted from the individuals and taken according to some indifference (*sub quadam indifferentia*); understood in this way, *man* cannot express the substance of any of the things from which it has been abstracted.[137] According to Alexander, however, what makes *man* in one case to be substance and in the other case to be not substance at all is the fact that *man* in the first case can be said to be *the substance* of something. It is the contraction of *man* to a given matter that makes *man* to be substance: it is *man* as contracted to Socrates, for example, that expresses the substance of Socrates, and this contraction obtains precisely when *man* is predicated of Socrates; *man* considered as non-contracted, by contrast, indeterminately expresses the substance of all the things of which it is predicated, so it does not express the substance of any of them. (ii) When *man* is instead taken under the property of being universal, i.e., as a mental entity, then it cannot be neither a substance nor express the substance of anything.[138]

Aristotle's second main argument—substance is what is not predicated of a subject, but the universals are predicated of individual subjects,

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[135] See, e.g., *Met.*, VII, fol. 231rb.

[136] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 231va–b.

[137] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 231vb and fol. 232va; Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, n. 1570; Averroes, *In Met.*, VII, t.c. 46, fol. 198D.

[138] *Ibid.*, X, fol. 283rb.

therefore the universals are not substances (1038b15–16)—raises two problems for Alexander: First, why is not the universal a substance if it is object of definition? Second, how can this argument be reconciled with the doctrine of the *Categories*, where the universal, despite its being predicated of a (primary) substance, is nonetheless said to be a (secondary) substance? Alexander proposes different responses to the first question. In the explanation of the text, he simply rephrases Aquinas: irrespective of its definability or not, the universal continues to be something existing in something else, and for this reason it cannot be counted as a substance.[139] But in a subsequent annotation, Alexander observes that someone could also answer this question differently: either saying that the fact that a thing is defined is not a sufficient condition for conferring the title of substance to such a thing, since the act of defining, being a mental operation, has no effect on the real nature of the defined thing; or saying that the fact that a thing is defined is not a sufficient condition for conferring a *per se* being to such a thing.[140]

The second question is occasioned by a similar discussion of Aquinas. The Dominican Master solved it by distinguishing the logical perspective that Aristotle endorses in the *Categories* from the metaphysical perspective that he endorses in the *Metaphysics*. While, logically speaking, the property of *being said of a subject* can be differentiated from the property of *being in a subject* and made compatible with the property of being a substance, this is not the case if one speaks metaphysically.[141] Alexander does not follow Aquinas's response but prefers a different solution: for him, Aristotle's argument aims to prove only that the universals are not substances in a perfect way. Applying the doctrine of the *Categories*, Alexander notes that the universals do not designate a "this something" (*hoc aliquid*)—although they seem to do that because of the (nominal) form of their expression—but a "qualified something" (*quale quid*), that is, a thing's mode of being. Such a mode of being is not of the accidental type, though, for it expresses a mode of being that a thing cannot cease to have without ceasing to be what it is. The metaphysical reason for this qualification is that, unlike accidents, the universals exist in something else as in a supposit and not as in a subject, and this is the why the universals can be said to be substances to a certain degree: while a subject already

139 *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 232ra (compare with Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, nn. 1577–78).
140 *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 232ra–b.
141 See Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 13, nn. 1575–76.

has its own identity before receiving a form, a supposit acquires its own identity only in consequence of its receiving a form. Thus, a universal proposition such as "Socrates is a man" linguistically mirrors the result of the process of essentially structuring a material supposit operated by a substantial form.[142]

In conclusion, in Alexander's reading, Aristotle seems to establish in Z 13 that no universal is a substance if considered *qua* universal but that, nonetheless, each universal (i.e., each nature to which the accidental property of being universal can be attached) does express indeterminately the substance of the things of which it can be predicated, although it does not express determinately the proper substance of any of them unless it is considered as contracted to the particular thing of which it is predicated.

4. Metaphysics vs. Categories: Alexander's Technique of Interpretation

Thus far we have reconstructed Alexander's position on some special metaphysical issue, such as the nature of substance and essence, the status of accidents, and the relationship between substance and universality. They all revolve around the ontology that can be extracted from Book Z, the "philosophical" Book of the *Metaphysics*. A last aspect needs to be inspected, namely, the relationship between the ontology of the *Metaphysics* and that of the *Categories*. As we shall see in this paragraph, Alexander advocates a "compatibilist" reading of the two Aristotelian works.

Alexander explicitly assumes that the individual substantial compounds to which Aristotle refers in the *Metaphysics* coincide with the primary substances of which he speaks in the *Categories*.[143] He nonetheless acknowledges that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle at times stresses the primary substantiality of items such as man or soul, items that in the *Categories* were respectively counted as secondary substances and parts of primary substances. This divergence calls for explanation, and Alexander explains it with the argument that Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* changes perspective, not doctrine.[144] Unlike in the *Categories*, in the *Metaphysics*

[142] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 232rb.
[143] *Ibid.*, V, fol. 123ra.
[144] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 182vb and 186rb–va.

Aristotle elaborates an *explanatory* account of substance, along the lines of the theory of explanation devised in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*. This change of perspective is enough to account for Aristotle's accent on the primary substantiality of (substantial or specific) form. Form is supposed to perform an explanatory function with respect to the individual compound, and in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle is seeking precisely what item is responsible of the substantiality of a thing. For the reasons illustrated above, it is certain that, from Alexander's perspective, no substantial form can properly be called a primary substance. Thus, when Aristotle calls a substantial form such as soul "primary substance," it is true, no doubt, that he means to refer to a different thing than in the *Categories*, but the reason is not that Aristotle changes his ontology but that such an expression does not recur with the same meaning in the two works. Alexander proposes various devices for reconciling Aristotle's claim in the *Metaphysics* with the doctrine of the *Categories*.

(i) In most cases—Alexander glosses—by calling the substantial form "primary substance" Aristotle simply means that the substantial form is the primary or ultimate cause (viz., the "primary cause" or "primary form") of the substantiality of a true primary substance, as is the compound, or the main responsible of the specific being of an individual sensible substance (see, e.g., Z 7, 1032b1–2 or Z 10, 1035b14–16).[145] (ii) There are, moreover, cases in which Aristotle is introducing some hypothetical situations: in Z 11, 1037b3–4, for example, Aristotle hypothetically indicates curvedness, which is an accidental form in reality, as an instance of primary substance.[146] (iii) In some other cases, for example Z 11, 1037b25–29, or H 3, 1043b1–4, finally, Aristotle is interested in opposing universals to individuals, like the universal soul to this particular soul.[147] Let me clarify this latter point, which is a controversial point among modern-day interpreters. In some places—see, e.g., Z 6, 1032a4–6—Aristotle argues that only in the case of primary substances is there a full identity between a thing and its being. Aristotle cites the human soul as an example of primary substance. Why does Aristotle call the human soul a primary substance? Some modern-day interpreters of Aristotle read these cases as a

[145] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 208va and 225vb; *Met.*, V, fol. 103va: "Prima forma hic vocatur a Philosopho 'species,' quia ipsa est a qua principaliter sumitur ratio speciei."

[146] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 226rb: "Voco autem primam substantiam quod non est aliud in alio, idest quidditas in alio recepta. In tali enim quidditas non differt ab eo cuius est quidditas, ut si curvitas esset prima substantia, idem esset curvitas et curvitas esse."

[147] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 222va; VIII, fol. 249vb; and XI, fol. 226rb.

proof that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle goes beyond the ontology of the *Categories*.[148] Alexander gives a different interpretation. For him, Aristotle in those cases introduces the human soul as an instance of universal, i.e., Aristotle wants to oppose human soul in general to this human soul in particular. What does Aristotle therefore mean by "identity between a thing and its being"? Alexander explains that when Aristotle affirms such an identity, he means two things: first, that such an identity holds in the case of the universals and not in the case of the individuals; and, second, that being cannot be separated from a thing. Specifically, in the case of the human soul, Aristotle is suggesting that the human soul is the same as its being, that is, that the human soul is nothing but to be a soul, and since a soul is the form of a body, it follows that the human soul and to be the form of a body are precisely one and the same thing. The identification between the human soul and the human soul's being serves for Aristotle as a statement of the inseparability between a body and its soul. This allows him to avoid the infinite regress of essences that would be generated if the soul were separated both from the body and from its own being. It is the anti-Platonic context in which Aristotle sets his speculation of the *Metaphysics* that induces Alexander to introduce such warnings and interpretative devices.[149]

It therefore is not a surprise to find Alexander endorsing a "compatibilist" reading of the relationship between the *Metaphysics* and the *Categories*. This is somehow a commonplace and a foregone conclusion for a medieval commentator. Nonetheless, Alexander recognizes that Aristotle introduced some adjustments in the *Metaphysics* with respect to the ontology of the *Categories*. This especially happens in Z 3, when Aristotle argues that the characterization of substance in the *Categories*—viz., substance is that of which every thing is predicated, while it is not predicated of anything else—is insufficient. The main reason is that such a characterization leads to identifying prime matter with the primary substance, since form is somehow predicated of matter.[150] Aristotle denies that prime matter be the primary substance, however, for matter is unknowable in itself. So, he suggests adding two other conditions to the *Categories* characterization, that is, those of being separable and being a "this something." Aristotle concludes that, according to the new conditions, form and the compound

[148] For a discussion of this interpretation, see Galluzzo & Mariani, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*.
[149] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 189ra, and VIII, fol. 249va–b.
[150] See *Met.*, VII, fol. 189rb.

of matter and form are more being and more substance than is matter. But what is the order of priority between form and the compound? Aristotle's argument is that if form is more being than is matter (and this is the case because form satisfies the two supplementary conditions), then form is also more being than is the compound. Both Averroes and Aquinas endorse this argument, and both stress that, adopting the viewpoint of the *Metaphysics*, what is the cause of a thing's being can be called being more than the caused thing (this conviction is summarized by the slogan *propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis*). Quite strangely, though, Aquinas accepts this rule in his commentary on Z 3,[151] while he rejects it when he comments on H 3, 1043a29–b4, a portion of text where Aristotle reaffirms this principle and that Aquinas instead reads as introducing a Platonic position.[152] By contrast, Averroes took the argument of H 3 as a genuine piece of Aristotelian doctrine.[153] Alexander shows himself to be more sympathetic with Averroes. For him, there is nothing wrong in saying that form is more being and more substance than are matter or the compound. This is because in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle scrutinizes substance from a causal viewpoint (*causaliter loquendo*), and from such a perspective the substantial form is the most eminent substance, for it plays the core role in explaining the substantiality of a thing.[154]

It is interesting to note that Alexander largely bases his "compatibilist" reading on Averroes,[155] attempting to reconcile Averroes's interpretation with Aristotle's text and Aquinas's interpretation.[156] As was said, Alexander sees no significant difference between the notions of *essence* and *quiddity*. For him, both collect matter and form. The presence of matter in the essence of material substances is defended by Alexander with a pair of traditional arguments: the first is connected to the typology of sciences and definitions put forward by Aristotle at the beginning of E 1, while the second is connected to the fact that, if it were not so, definitions of substances too would be by addition.

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[151] Cf. Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VII, lec. 2, nn. 1278–79.

[152] Cf. Aquinas, *Exp. Met.*, VIII, lec. 3, n. 1707.

[153] Cf. Averroes, *In Met.*, VIII, t.c. 7, fol. 215vbK–L.

[154] Cf. *Met.*, VII, fol. 188vb.

[155] *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 182vb, 183rb–va.

[156] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 218vb–219ra. On Aquinas's vs. Averroes's theory of essence, see Laurence Bauloye, *La question de l'essence. Averroès et Thomas d'Aquin, commentateurs d'Aristote, Métaphysique Z1* (Leuven, 1997); Fabrizio Amerini, "Aristotle, Averroes and Thomas Aquinas on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 79–122; and Gabriele Galluzzo, "Averroes and Aquinas on Aristotle's Criterion of Substantiality," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), 157–87.

As to the presence of matter in the quiddity, here the problem seems to be, above all, of stipulation. Alexander knows that there are some commentators who identify form and quiddity. They trace this position back to Averroes and invoke such texts as Averroes's commentary on Z 6, where Averroes states that the quiddity of man is the same as man in one respect, i.e., when man is understood as form, and is not the same in another respect, i.e., when man is understood as a compound.[157] Alexander acknowledges that several texts of Aristotle support this interpretation.[158] In commenting on H 6, 1045b2, for example, Alexander misunderstands Averroes's text and attributes also to Averroes the distinction between essence (composed of matter and form) and quiddity (composed only of form).[159] However, Alexander thinks that this distinction cannot be founded on Aristotle's text, so he decides to follow the position of those who, like Thomas Aquinas, draw no distinction between essence and quiddity.[160] In any case, it is clear for Alexander that the identity between a thing and its essence cannot hold for individual material things, regardless of whether form is assumed to exhaust the whole quiddity or to express only a part of it.[161] Once he endorsed this position, how to explain Averroes's text? In his commentary on Book H, Alexander recognizes the ambiguity of Aristotle's speech: sometimes Aristotle takes quiddity as equivalent to the entire essence of a composite thing, and in this case a thing's form is not the same as a thing's quiddity; but in some other cases, Aristotle takes quiddity as indicating that from which both matter and the compound receive their being, and in this case a thing's form is the same as a thing's quiddity.[162] As to Averroes's text of Z 6, Alexander observes that the text does not support any identification between form and quiddity. It simply states that man is identical with his quiddity if man is considered abstractly or universally, i.e., as designating a specific form, while if man is taken as designating an individual compound, it is not identical with his quiddity. In order to get this interpretation,

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157 See Averroes, *In Met.*, VII, t.c. 21, fol. 171vaI.

158 Cf. *Met.*, VII, fol. 222rb: "pro isto modo dicendi multum sonant verba Philosophi in multis locis, ubi dicit quod in forma idem est quidditas cum eo cuius est quidditas, sicut statim dicit quod anima et esse anime idem sunt."

159 *Ibid.*, VIII, fols. 258vb–259ra.

160 *Ibid.*, VII, fol. 222rb–va.

161 Cf. *Met.*, XI, fol. 322ra: "et quia forma vel est essentia rei et quidditas, vel ab ea est principaliter quidditas et essentia, ideo differunt quidditas et cuius est quidditas."

162 *Ibid.*, VIII, fol. 250rb (q. *Utrum quidditas et forma sint idem*).

Alexander resorts to a further device, that is, to the distinction between form and formal (*formale*), on the one hand, and matter and material (*materiale*), on the other hand. Specifically, formal is what is primarily signified by a substantial term (e.g., what is signified by "humanity," i.e., the pure form of humanity), while material is what is secondarily signified by a substantial term (what is co-signified by "man," i.e., the bearer of the form, what has humanity).[163] What is formal collects all the essential properties of the signified thing, while what is material collects accidental properties. In the case of living beings, what is formal includes the *qualitative* features of the thing, while what is material includes only *quantitative* features. As was said, qualitative features relate to both matter and form, while quantitative features relate to the individual matter. Viewed in this way, the term "formal" designates the quiddity of a thing, while the term "material" designates the individual supposit receiving quiddity, what has quiddity. This apparatus enables Alexander both to defend the non-synonymy between concrete and abstract substantial terms and to reconcile, on a different level, Averroes's text with Aquinas's fundamental distinction between common and individual matter: the former but not the latter is included in the essence and the definition of a sensible substance, so quiddity can be said to include all the *formal* aspects of a thing, although not only the aspects consequent upon the *form*.

5. Conclusion

The *Commentary on the Metaphysics* is an Alexander's early work. It is simple and scholastic in structure. As a commentary, it appears not particularly innovative because of its large dependence—textual and doctrinal—on Aquinas. Alexander's work is not, however, a mere summary of Aquinas's *Expositio Metaphysicorum*. Alexander had the merit of having proposed an original organization of the *Metaphysics* contents, characterized by a close reading of Averroes's *Great Commentary* and by an attempt to harmonize, when possible, Averroes's interpretation with Aquinas's. Rarely does Alexander take a personal position on the philosophical issues discussed throughout the Commentary. His main purpose is, rather, to gather different interpretations of the text. Among the others

[163] *Ibid.*, VII, fols. 219rb–220ra.

sources, we saw that Henry of Ghent exerted an important influence on Alexander's metaphysical thought and his "conceptualistic" interpretation of Aristotle's theory of essence and substance. All these aspects are signs of originality and can help to explain the fortune of Alexander's Commentary in some university centers during the 15th century—beyond its erroneous attribution to Alexander of Hales.

THE QUESTIONS ON THE *METAPHYSICS* BY JOHN DUNS SCOTUS: A VINDICATION OF PURE INTELLECT

Giorgio Pini

Scotus authored two works on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the *Questions on the Metaphysics* (*Quaestiones super Aristotelis Metaphysicam*) and the *Remarks on the Metaphysics* (*Notabilia super Metaphysicam*). Even though he probably conceived of them as two parts of one commentary, these two works had different destinies. The *Questions* was copied several times and was soon regarded as one of Scotus's major works. By contrast, even Scotus's closest associates seem to have had no access to the *Remarks*. That work disappeared from circulation until it was newly identified in 1996. As a critical edition of the *Remarks* is still under preparation, in this chapter I focus on the *Questions*.[1]

Scotus most probably worked on the *Questions* over a considerable number of years. Some sections of the *Questions* are likely to date to the mid- or late 1290s, whereas other parts were almost surely written after 1300.[2] It is also clear that Scotus's *Questions* is not a polished work. First, it stops rather abruptly at the end of Book 9 rather than Book 12, as was usually the case. Second, many paragraphs read more like argument

[1] See Giorgio Pini, "*Notabilia Scoti super Metaphysicam*: una testimonianza ritrovata dell'insegnamento di Scoto sulla *Metafisica*," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 89 (1996), 137–80. In what follows, all references to Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics* (= *Questions*) are to John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, ed. Robert Andrews et al., in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3 (Libri I–V) and vol. 4 (Libri VI–IX) (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1996 and 1997). There are three other works on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* attributed to Scotus in Luke Wadding's 17th-century edition of Scotus's *Opera Omnia* (republished at Paris at the end of the 19th century by Louis Vivès). They are the *Expositio literalis super Metaphysicam*, the *Conclusiones metaphysicae*, and the questions on Books X and XII. None of these works is by Scotus. The first is the work of Scotus's student, Antontius Andreae. The second is the work of Scotus's master, Gonsalve of Spain. The third is the work of the Oxford arts master John Dinsdale. See Benedikt Gölz, "Die echten und unechten Werke des Duns Scotus nach dem gegenwärtigen Stand der Forschung," in: *Sechste und siebte Lektoren Konferenz der deutschen Franziskaner für Philosophie und Theologie* (Werl i. W., 1934), pp. 53–60; "Introduction" to *Questions* (*OPh* 3, pp. xxxix–xlii); and Linus J. Thro & Charles J. Ermatinger, "Questions on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X and XII, by Master John Dymsdale," *Manuscripta* 36 (1992), 71–124 and 37 (1993), 107–67. On John Dinsdale, see also Silvia Donati's paper in this volume.

[2] See "Introduction" to *Questions* (*OPh* 3, pp. xlii–xlvi).

rehearsals in favor of or against a certain thesis. In addition, several passages sit uncomfortably with what Scotus held elsewhere or in the very same work, and it is often not clear what opinion Scotus actually endorsed among the different alternatives he presented. As Scotus's student Peter Thomae wrote, a few years after his master's death, in the *Questions* Scotus often spoke in a dialectical way (*collative*).[3] Third and finally, the presence of many additions and corrections makes it clear that Scotus returned to his *Questions* at least once after writing a first draft but that he never had the opportunity to polish his work for publication. Sometimes, Scotus added only a few paragraphs to his original draft. Other times, however, he added a whole new section to his question. These additions were subsequently copied together with the original text, sometimes at the end of the first draft of the relevant question, other times interspersed with it. Thus, the *Questions* is now an intricate mixture of old and new. Even though the first copyists took some pain to distinguish what belonged to Scotus's original draft and what should be considered as an addition, navigating Scotus's textual maze has proved frustrating even to the best intentioned among his readers.[4]

Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that Scotus's *Questions* acquired a reputation as a difficult and perplexing work, which would be unfit for beginners.[5] Some 20 years after Scotus's death (1308), his student Antonius Andreae prepared a heavily edited and simplified version of his master's *Questions* with the needs of a philosophically less sophisticated readership in mind. The result was a big success. Andreae's work was read more widely than Scotus's original *Questions* and became a "best seller" in the schools and universities of 15th- and 16th-century Europe.[6]

Students and scholars have sometimes tried to justify their unease when faced with Scotus's *Questions* by regarding it as a youthful work that could be neglected without too much of a loss. This assessment, however,

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[3] See Stephen D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. The 'De ente' of Peter Thomae," *Mediaeval Studies* 50 (1988), 188–256, at 200–01.

[4] See the fourth and fifth sections of the "Introduction" to *Questions*, "Scotus's *Chaos Metaphysicum*," as well as appendices 2 and 3 to that volume (*OPh* 3, pp. xxviii–xxxvii and 699–705).

[5] This is the opinion the editor of the first printed edition of the *Questions* (1497), Maurice O'Fihely, expressed in his dedicatory epistle to Antonio Trombeta. See John Duns Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Luke Wadding, 12 vols. (Lyon, 1639), vol. 1, p. 508.

[6] See Giorgio Pini, "Sulla fortuna delle *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* di Duns Scoto: le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* di Antonio Andrea," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 6 (1995), 281–361; and Damian R. Leader, "Philosophy at Oxford and Cambridge in the Fifteenth Century," *History of Universities* 4 (1984), 25–46, at 35–37.

is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the presence of many additions and some clear evidence of an attempted revision indicate that the *Questions* cannot be dismissed as "just" a youthful work. Rather, Scotus returned to the *Questions* after writing a first draft, and, as a result, some passages reflect the high degree of sophistication of Scotus's most mature works.[7] Second, there are many brilliant arguments in the *Questions* that it would just be a shame to ignore. Scotus's *Questions* is not just one of the most original interpretations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; it is also a powerful philosophical work in its own terms. Readers of the *Questions* will be disappointed only if they expect to find an orderly exposition of Scotus's main philosophical tenets. Quite simply, this is not what the *Questions* is intended to be. Rather, the *Questions* should be regarded as a philosophical laboratory where Scotus explored some of the deepest metaphysical issues and tried out new solutions and arguments. If considered in that way, the *Questions* turns out to be an extremely rewarding, if admittedly difficult, read.

Undoubtedly, the first and foremost element of interest in Scotus's *Questions* are the arguments he gave to deal with several specific metaphysical issues such as the concept of being, the way God is considered in metaphysics, the relationship between substances and accidents, the principle of individuation, the status of non-individual natures as constituents of the world, the relationship between form and matter, the concepts of potentiality and possibility, and many others. I also contend, however, that there is a common thread running through Scotus's *Questions*. From among the many topics addressed, there seems to be one that particularly concerned Scotus, namely, the very nature of metaphysics and the possibility of carrying out an inquiry into the structure of reality in a situation as cognitively impaired as the one Scotus thought we currently experience. In other words, one of Scotus's dominant preoccupations in his *Questions* was with issues of what is now called "metametaphysics," i.e., questions concerning our inquiry into the structure of reality rather than the structure of reality itself.

Scotus raised a series of problems concerning the role and method of metaphysics as well as its relationship with other branches of knowledge, both in some sections devoted specifically to this sort of issues (e.g., the

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[7] See Stephen D. Dumont, "The Question on Individuation in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*," in: *Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti*, Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome, 1995), pp. 193–227; and "Introduction" to *Questions* (*OPh* 3, pp. xlii–xlvi).

prologue to the *Questions* or the first question on Book 6 about the distinction among theoretical sciences) and when dealing with other issues, such as the nature of the concept of being and of other general concepts, the principle of non-contradiction, and the primacy of substance. As is the case with so much else in the *Questions*, Scotus did not give a clear and orderly presentation of his position. Rather, he tried out several alternative solutions. In at least one instance, it is possible to detect a clear evolution in some of his thoughts about the nature of metaphysics. But I contend that, behind Scotus's revisions and additions, it is also possible to grasp the contours of a coherent picture.

Scotus's remarks on the nature of metaphysics have not been the object of a specific interest in the literature devoted to his metaphysics in general and to the *Questions* in particular.[8] Apart from the intrinsic interest of this issue, a close study of Scotus's views on the nature, method, and limits of metaphysics in the *Questions* provides us with an access key to an otherwise intractable work.

In my reconstruction, Scotus's conception of the nature and method of metaphysics in his *Questions* is characterized by three distinctive aspects. First, Scotus had a particularly lofty conception of metaphysics as the discipline that both considers anything whatsoever with regard to its most general features and inquires into the deeper structure of reality. Second, Scotus was acutely aware of some severe cognitive limitations that actually mar our current practice of metaphysics. In his estimate, these limitations are due to our intellect's current reliance on the senses. Third, Scotus developed an original conception of how it is possible to overcome the current cognitive limitations and grasp the deeper structure of reality by the exercise of purely intellectual powers. In what follows, I analyze each of these aspects separately.

1. What Metaphysics Is in Itself

Scotus had a fairly traditional understanding of the nature and method of metaphysics in itself, i.e., what metaphysics would be like if it could

[8] For a short and neat presentation of the *Questions*, see Timothy B. Noone, "John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* (ca. 1300)," in: Jorge J.E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg, & Bernard N. Schumacher, eds., *The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 167–76; for an excellent treatment of Scotus's main metaphysical views, see Peter O. King, "Metaphysics," in: Thomas Williams, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* (Cambridge, Eng., 2003), pp. 15–68.

be carried out in optimal conditions. He thought that metaphysics is a distinctive discipline both with regard to its scope and with regard to its method.

With regard to the scope of metaphysics, Scotus was familiar with three distinct conceptions of metaphysics that confronted (and still confront) Aristotle's readers. According to the first conception, metaphysics deals mostly with a specific class of things, i.e., non-material things whose existence is independent of matter, such as God and the so-called separate substances, as opposed to both material things and to the human soul, which is immaterial but whose existence is in some way dependent on matter. By contrast, material things are considered in metaphysics only to the extent that they provide an indirect way to get information about non-material things. According to the second conception, metaphysics deals with anything whatsoever considered with respect to its most general features, i.e., as a thing and as the general sort of kind of thing it is—where Scotus means by "thing" a real constituent of the world that is ontologically irreducible to other constituents of the world and by "basic kind of thing" one of the ten Aristotelian categories. According to the third conception, metaphysics deals mostly with a basic kind of things, i.e., substances, on which all other things are ontologically dependent. Substances are the objects of metaphysical demonstrations, i.e., that of which some properties are demonstrated to pertain. Anything else is treated in metaphysics only to the extent that it is attributed to substances, i.e., dependent on substances.[9]

Aristotle's text lends itself to each of these possibilities. The first conception was associated with Averroes. The second conception was associated with Avicenna. The third conception is probably the one that is

[9] Cf. *Questions*, I, q. 1 (*OPh* 3, pp. 15–72). On the medieval controversy on the subject matter of metaphysics, see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 8 (Leiden-Cologne, 1965; revised edition, Leuven, 1998). On Scotus's treatment in the *Questions*, see Steven D. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works," *Franciscan Studies* 43 (1983), 347–95, at 356–57; Dominique Demange, "Pourquoi Duns Scot a critiqué Avicenne," in: Martin Carbajo Nuñez, ed., *Giovanni Duns Scoto: Studi e ricerche nel VII centario della sua morte in onore di P. César Saco Alarcón*, 2 vols. (Medioevo) 15 (Rome, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 195–208; Rega Wood, "First Entity as the Subject of Metaphysics," in: Ludwig Honnefelder, Hannes Möhle, & Susana Bullido del Barrio, eds., *Johannes Duns Scotus 1308–2008: Investigations into His Philosophy | Johannes Duns Scotus 1308–2008: Perspektiven seines Werkes*. Proceedings of "The Quadruple Congress" on John Duns Scotus. Part 3 (Archa Verbi. Subsidia) 5 (Münster i. W.-St. Bonaventure, New York, 2010), pp. 87–105.

favored by contemporary interpreters of Aristotle. Each conception carries within itself both a specific understanding of the metaphysician's task and a specific interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. According to the first conception, the metaphysician is a specialist of separate substances, i.e., a natural theologian. Correspondingly, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* culminates in Books 12–14, to which all the previous books are just a long prelude. According to the second conception, the metaphysician is a generalist dealing with the most common aspects of reality. Thus, the focus of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is Book 4, devoted to the notion of being and one and to the most common principle of all, i.e., the principle of non-contradiction. According to the third conception, the metaphysician is a specialist of substances, and the focus of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is Books 7 and 8.

There is some evidence that in the *Questions* Scotus initially endorsed the first conception of metaphysics, according to which metaphysics is the first science because it deals with the first class of things, i.e., non-material things. These things are first causally, because all other things causally depend on them but not the other way around. When Scotus embraced this conception, he also thought that non-material things enjoy an epistemological primacy with regard to everything else, not because they are the first things to be known by us but because they are the only things that can be known with absolute certainty, when they are known at all. For material things can only be cognized via the senses, and the senses are constitutionally unable to give us certainty.[10]

It is clear, however, that Scotus at some point abandoned that conception of metaphysics. He then gave some serious attention to the third conception of metaphysics as the science of substances. His first question may still reflect a stage in which he actually embraced that conception.[11] But in the *Questions* itself, Scotus ended up adopting the view that metaphysics is the first science because it deals with anything whatsoever considered according to its most general features, i.e., as a real constituent of the world and as an item belonging to one of the categories. Another way to make the same point is to say that metaphysics is the science of being as being and that the subject-matter of metaphysics is being as being, where "being as being" is taken to mean anything considered insofar as it is a thing or a real constituent of the world.[12] Scotus explained that metaphysics is

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[10] *Questions*, I, nn. 130–36, 137–63 (*OPh* 3, pp. 59–63).

[11] *Ibid.*, nn. 67 and 91–96 (*OPh* 3, pp. 46–49).

[12] Cf. *Questions*, VI, q. 1, n. 47 (*OPh* 4, pp. 19–20). This is the position Scotus adopted in his commentary on the *Sentences*. See, for example, *Ordinatio*, Prol., p. 3, qq. 1–3, n. 193, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Vatican City, 1950), p. 129.

a science dealing with quiddities, i.e., with real things or essences whose identity is independent of the way we may describe them and even of whether we think of them or not. In that respect, metaphysics is just like any other real science, such as, for example, natural philosophy. Any real science deals with real constituents of the world, i.e., things whose identity is mind independent. What is specific about metaphysics among real sciences is that it deals with quiddities *insofar as* they are quiddities, namely, according to their most general features as real constituents of the world and as the general kind of things they are, e.g., as substances or qualities or quantities.[13]

With regard to the method of metaphysics, Scotus adopted the fairly traditional view that metaphysics conforms to the divisive, definitive, and collective mode of proceeding that is typical of any scientific discipline. Thus, metaphysicians first divide their subject matter, i.e., what really is, into different kinds—the ten categories and their species. Then, they define the essences belonging to those species. Finally, they find out the relationships holding among those essences by demonstrating some conclusions about them. What is specific to metaphysicians as opposed to the practitioners of other real sciences is that metaphysicians carry out their divisions, formulate their definitions, and draw their conclusions by considering only the most basic essential features pertaining to something. To make some examples where Scotus provided none, physicists consider something insofar as it is a moving body, distinguish different kinds of bodies according to their movements, define bodies according to the features that pertain to them insofar as they move, and draw some conclusions about bodies as they are the subject of movement. Similarly, biologists consider something insofar as it is a living body, they divide and define bodies according to the features that pertain to them insofar as they are living, and they demonstrate that some properties belong to bodies as bodies are alive. By contrast, metaphysicians consider something insofar as it is a real thing belonging to a certain category, say a substance or a quality, define that thing by taking into consideration only the essential features that pertains to it insofar as it is a real thing and the general kind of real thing it is, and proceed to demonstrate that some features pertain to insofar as it is a mind-independent thing belonging to one of the categories.[14]

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[13] *Questions*, I, 9, especially at no. 42 (OPh III, 178).

[14] *Questions*, Prol., nn. 24 and 26. It was commonly assumed that any science conformed to the threefold method of dividing, defining, and bringing together the results of

Specifically concerning the third aspect of the method of metaphysics as a real science, i.e., its adopting what is called "the collective method," Scotus noticed that the demonstrations metaphysicians carry out about real essences have essential causes as middle terms.[15] Thus, metaphysical demonstrations are remarkable both because they are based on essential rather than accidental features of their subjects and because they are not inferences proceeding from effects to causes but deductions going from causes to effects. In Aristotelian jargon, the latter point is made by saying that metaphysical demonstrations are *propter quid* and not *quia* demonstrations. The causes from which metaphysical demonstrations start are the specific essences that constitute the building blocks of the world. By contrast, the effects that are demonstrated to follow from those essences are the properties or *per se* attributes (*propria*) of those specific essences. For example, metaphysicians demonstrate that substances have the property of being ontologically prior to accidents (what Aristotle calls "priority in time") and that that priority is reflected in an epistemic and definitional priority (what Aristotle calls "priority in knowledge" and "in definition," respectively).[16]

Thanks to its distinctions, definitions, and demonstrations concerning real essences, metaphysics provides a unique access to the deep structure of reality. Its practice satisfies the natural human desire to acquire knowledge in an ultimate way, as beyond the answers found in metaphysics no further question can be asked.[17] God himself is the main agent responsible for the possibility of getting this knowledge—as Scotus says, God is the main efficient cause of metaphysics. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gave us a map to the structure of reality, but he played a merely instrumental role as compared to God. For, as Aristotle himself claimed, God has perfect knowledge of the structure of the world, and since God is good and not envious, he wanted to transmit that knowledge to human beings, just as he wanted to communicate his other perfections to them.[18]

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its divisions and definitions (*modus divisivus, definitivus, et collectivus*). See, for example, Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, Tract. Introduc. q. 1, a. 4, arg. 2, in: Alexandri de Hales *Summa theologica*, ed. pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 vols. (Quaracchi-Florence, 1924–47), vol. 1 (1924), p. 8.

[15] *Questions*, Prol., n. 26 (*OPh* 3, p. 13).

[16] *Questions*, I, q. 1, n. 97 (*OPh* 3, pp. 49–50). Scotus assumed that metaphysics in itself is a *propter quid* science at nn. 63 and 121 (*OPh* 3, pp. 36–37 and 57).

[17] *Ibid.*, Prol., n. 23 (*OPh* 3, p. 12).

[18] *Ibid.*, n. 22 (*OPh* 3, p. 11).

As I have said, this conception of the scope and method of metaphysics is fairly traditional. Scotus was certainly familiar with Thomas Aquinas's version of this view. Specifically, Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* can be considered as a remarkable attempt to make Aristotle's book conform to that conception. There is solid evidence that Scotus used Aquinas's commentary when writing his *Questions* (as well as his *Remarks on the Metaphysics*).[19] Thus, if Scotus had stopped at this conception, his innovations as a metaphysician would be important but merely local, concerning a specific conception of being, for example, or a specific conception of essences. Scotus's originality in his *Questions*, however, is not limited to such important but local changes to a standard conception of metaphysics. Rather, he challenged the very foundations of that conception in an original way—not by rejecting it but by reinterpreting its value in the light of our current metaphysical practice.

2. The Current Practice of Metaphysics and Its Limits

In the *Questions*, Scotus maintained the exalted conception of metaphysics I have just described side by side with an extremely grim assessment of our current practice of that science. Just after presenting the nature and method of metaphysics I have been considering so far, he went on to remark:

> In and of itself, metaphysics would be knowable in that way. But it is not so that we know it, nor does one find it handed down by Aristotle in that way. For, due to our intellect's weakness, it is by way of what is sensible and in itself less known that we come to know immaterial things, which in themselves are more known and in metaphysics should be considered as the principles by which other things are known.[20]

Scotus detailed the consequences of this situation on the way metaphysics is currently practiced. If the things that metaphysics considers were known as they were naturally suited to be known, i.e., according to their essences, metaphysics would be a *propter quid* science, whose demonstrations start from a cause to deduce its effect. As metaphysics is known to us, however, it is inevitably a *quia* science, whose demonstrations are

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[19] See the list of references to Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* in *OPh* 3, p. 727, and *OPh* 4, p. 74. See also Pini, "*Notabilia Scoti*," for some evidence of Scotus's possessing a copy of Aquinas's commentary.

[20] Cf. *Questions*, Prol, n. 27 (*OPh* 3, p. 13). All English translations are mine.

inferences from effects to causes. This disenchanted assessment of metaphysics is matched by a similarly disillusioned judgment on Aristotle. Scotus remarked that Aristotle described metaphysics as it could be known if we were able to know its objects as they are supposed to be known. Presumably, Scotus was thinking of Aristotle's claims about the lofty status of first philosophy as wisdom and the knowledge of causes in the first book of the *Metaphysics*. But Scotus added that to this exalted description there corresponds something quite different with regard to the actual practice of metaphysics, as all that Aristotle did was barely hand down metaphysics as it is known to us, i.e., as a *quia* and inferential science.[21] As Scotus wrote in a remark that he subsequently deleted, "Look if in this entire book you can find just one *propter quid* metaphysical demonstration," where the implied the answer is "no."[22]

Admittedly, in the passages I have just mentioned, Scotus was referring to the conception of metaphysics as the sort of knowledge primarily concerned with God and separate substances (i.e., the first conception I have listed above). Thus, one may speculate that, once Scotus abandoned that conception of metaphysics to embrace the more worldly view of metaphysics as the science of being as being, he also left behind his doubts about our capacity to do metaphysics. But this is not the case. For Scotus happened to have some very good reasons to keep his negative assessment of our current practice of metaphysics, even when he changed his mind about the subject-matter of metaphysics.

Scotus held that what accounts for the sharp contrast between the way things are supposed to be known and the way we actually know them is a characteristic feature of our current condition, namely, our intellect's dependence on the senses.[23] Elsewhere, Scotus speculated about the possible cause of this dependence. It may be due to God's will to coordinate the cognitive workings of our intellect and our senses as long as our soul

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[21] *Questions*, I, q. 1, n. 121 (*OPh* 3, p. 57): "Licet enim metaphysica, considerata a parte scibilium, hoc est, si sic sciretur sicut scibilia nata essent sciri, esset scientia propter quid, tamen metaphysica, ut est a nobis scibilis, est necessario scientia quia de Deo, ut patebit. Primam depingit Philosophus; vix secundam tradit." See also Prol., n. 27 (*OPh* 3, p. 13): "Hoc modo esset metaphysica secundum se scibilis, non tamen sic eam scimus, nec sic invenitur ab Aristotele tradita, quia, propter impotentiam intellectus nostri, ex sensibilibus et minus notis secundum se devenimus in cognitionem immaterialium, quae secundum se notiora sunt et tanquam principia cognoscendi alia in metaphysica essent accipienda." See also I, q. 1, n. 150 (*OPh* 3, p. 67).

[22] *Ibid.*, Prol., n. 27, note d (*OPh* 3, p. 13): "Quaere si in toto libro invenias unam demonstrationem metaphysicam propter quid."

[23] *Ibid.*, I, q. 1, n. 136 (*OPh* 3, pp. 62–63).

is conjoined to our body in its current condition. Alternatively, it may be part of God's plan to punish us for the original sin. Be that as it may, Scotus held that the intellect's dependence on the senses is a contingent fact that is not dictated by our nature but is imposed by God. Things could be different, as they were before the Fall and will be in the blessed status.[24]

When noticing our intellect's dependence on the senses, Scotus was just following an illustrious tradition. That dependence can, in turn, be explained as both genetic and operational. First, from a genetic point of view, the intellect needs the senses in order to get its object. Without the input coming from senses, human beings would not be able to think about anything. In an Aristotelian framework, cognition can be generally described as taking in or absorbing some structure from the world (i.e., a form, no matter whether it is the same form that exists in the world and in the cognizer or whether the form in the cognizer is a representation of the form in the world). The basic idea is that the cognizer takes in a structure from the world by way of the senses. That structure is then progressively purified in the internal senses, the imagination, and finally the intellect. Without the senses' activation and taking in of a structure from the world, the cognitive process would not get started. Second, from an operational point of view, human beings need a sensory image not only to have something to think about but also to make their intellect pass from a dispositional state in which they can think about something to an occurrent state in which they actually think about it. For example, I may be able to think about a horse, but I cannot actually think about it without entertaining the image of a horse that makes my intellect pass from a state of dispositional knowledge to a state of occurrent knowledge. Even though thoughts are not images, we need images to think.

This is the account of the relationship between the intellect and the senses that we find in Thomas Aquinas.[25] Scotus was familiar with that account and with the corresponding view that our intellect's proper object is the quiddity of material things, namely, that we are naturally suited to think about the essences of material things because it is the structure of

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[24] Cf. *Ordinatio*, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 187, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 3, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Vatican City, 1954), pp. 113–14. See Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Doing Metaphysics *in statu isto*," In: Mary B. Ingham and Oleg Bychkov, eds., *John Duns Scotus, Philosopher*. Proceedings of "The Quadruple Congress" on John Duns Scotus. Part 1 (Archa Verbi. Subsidia) 3 (Münster, 2010), pp. 29–55.

[25] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 73; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1; *Quodlibet* XII, q. 9, a. 1. See Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75–89* (Cambridge, Eng., 2002), pp. 278–95.

those essences that we take in via the senses.[26] According to that view, all the other things we can think about (our own soul, separate substances, God) can be thought about only to the extent that we can make inferences about them from the essences of material things.

Scotus criticized that view on the object of our intellect for several reasons.[27] But he agreed that we are currently unable to think about anything if some content to our thoughts is not provided by the senses. Also, he agreed that we are currently unable to actually think about anything if our intellect's activity is not triggered by a sensory image. Scotus's assessment of this situation, however, differs from Aquinas's in two respects. First, Scotus held that the intellect's dependence on the senses is a contingent fact, whereas Aquinas thought that it was a constitutional feature of our being human. Second, Scotus held that the intellect's dependence on the senses is the cause of the severe cognitive impairment that characterizes our current situation, whereas Aquinas thought that it is part and parcel of the mechanisms by which we get cognitive access to the world.[28] What for Aquinas was a transparent vehicle of information was, for Scotus, an opaque screen between our intellect and the world.

It is the second of these two differences that is of great consequence for Scotus's understanding of metaphysics in the *Questions*. In and of itself, the world is completely intelligible. Its structure is just such that can be grasped by the intellect—be it God's, an angel's or a human being's intellect. If things are, as a matter of fact, difficult to know, this does not depend on any opacity intrinsic in things themselves. This is true not only for the objects that seem to be best suited to be grasped by an intellect, i.e., the specific essences of material things that are the building blocks of the world. Even lofty objects such as separate substances are in themselves transparent to the intellect.[29] What is possibly even more interesting, Scotus held that such was the case even for the aspects of reality that had been traditionally regarded as constitutionally unable to be grasped by the intellect because of their intrinsic obscurity—not because they are above the intellect's power but because they are far too low, so to speak. Matter, individuals, and the features that make an individual different

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[26] Scotus, *Questions*, II, qq. 2–3, nn. 21–26 (*OPh* 3, pp. 206–08); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 84, a. 7. See Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, pp. 296–302.

[27] *Questions*, II, qq. 2–3, nn. 27–79 (*OPh* 3, pp. 208–24).

[28] See above, note 21. See also *Ord.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 185–88 (ed. Vat. 3, pp. 112–15). See Robert Pasnau, "Cognition," in: *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, pp. 285–309, at 294–95.

[29] Cf. *Questions*, II, qq. 2–3, nn. 124–29 (*OPh* 3, pp. 235–37).

from another are all aspects of reality that Scotus holds to be intelligible in themselves. If it is admittedly difficult both to pick them out and to know what they are, this is due not to their alleged limited intelligibility but to the current weakness of our intellect.[30] Whereas for Aquinas the contours of the world are intrinsically blurred in their lower tiers, Scotus held that the world is clear-cut from top to bottom—it is we who are contingently near-sighted and unable to grasp all its details. Our inability to latch onto the structure of the world and to practice metaphysics as it should be done is entirely due to our intellect's dependence on the senses as a source of information about the world and as the device that provides our intellect with the sensory images necessary to trigger its activity of thinking.

Scotus seems to have had three reasons to think that the senses cannot be trusted as a key to the structure of reality. First, the senses are constitutionally unable to give us certainty. Scotus was not only thinking here of the traditional complaint that the senses provide us with varying evidence about the world and that we lack a criterion to assess which between two competing pieces of evidence is true—a square tower looks round from far away, and a sip of wine tastes sweet to me and bitter to you, and any attempt to find out which appearance corresponds to reality is open to further challenge. Rather, Scotus's worry was mostly that the senses provide us with instantaneous and disconnected data, qualities such as "white," "hot," "loud," and so on. Our senses register these sensible qualities without taking in any intrinsic organization. In other words, the senses operate in a non-propositional way; they only provide us with simple content. But simple content (e.g., "white," "hot," "loud") is just the sort of thing that can be neither true nor false and, consequently, can be neither assented to nor denied. Now, certainty is a property pertaining to propositions, i.e., the kind of things that can be assented to or denied. So what is certain (or for that matter, doubtful) is that this is white and that is hot, not just "white" and "hot." Now, certainty is an essential component of scientific knowledge. Thus, since the senses are constitutionally unable to give us the sort of things that can be certain (i.e., content organized

[30] On the intelligibility of matter in itself, at least as conceived as what can receive a form by change, see *Questions*, VII, q. 5, nn. 26–28 (*OPh* 3, pp. 138–39); on the intelligibility of individuals and of the individual differentia, i.e., what makes an individual the individual it is, see *Questions*, VII, q. 14 and especially q. 15 (*OPh* 3, pp. 281–309). As the editors of the *Questions* notice, the former question is likely to be a first draft of the latter question.

in a propositional way), they are at best irrelevant for the acquisition of science.[31]

Second, the senses are constitutionally unable to get beyond the surface of things. Thus, they are inadequate to allow us to grasp the deeper structure of reality. Specifically, the senses are naturally focused on picking out sensible qualities, i.e., items such as "white," "hot," "loud," etc. These items are all accidents. The senses cannot get beyond those accidents and grasp the substances they inhere in. Thus, the senses can give us much information about what happens to material substances, i.e., the sort of substances in which sensible qualities inhere: they are colored, hot or cold, noisy, etc. But the senses can tell us nothing about those substances in themselves. As a matter of fact, they cannot even tell us whether there is any substance beyond the sensible qualities they grasp. As Scotus remarked, not only separate substances are out of the reach of the senses. This would be hardly surprising. Rather, no substance whatsoever can be reached by the senses, because a substance is just the sort of thing that cannot be sensed, as only accidents (actually, only a certain class of accidents) can be sensed, and a substance is not an accident.[32]

Third, the senses are not fine grained enough to pick out all the details of things. Specifically, the senses miss what is individual about any sensible quality they grasp, and, as a consequence, they cannot discriminate between two qualities that are sufficiently alike. Thus, I may not be able to distinguish two numerically distinct sips of the same kind of wine if I am not given further information in addition to what my sense of taste tells me.[33]

Since the intellect currently depends on the senses both to acquire the content of thoughts and to carry out its activity, we have to reckon with

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[31] Cf. *Questions*, I, q. 4, n. 47 (*OPh* 3, pp. 110–11). It should be noted that for Scotus, just as for other medieval thinkers, certainty is a property pertaining first to propositions and derivatively to the subject assenting to or denying that proposition. Some of the standard skeptical arguments concerning the senses are rehearsed in Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, I, q. 2, in: Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, vol. 21 (*Summa* [*Quaestiones ordinariae*] *art. I–V*), ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leuven, 2005), pp. 43–45. See Martin Pickavé, "Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Skepticism and the Possibility of Naturally Acquired Knowledge," in: Henrik Lagerlund, ed., *Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 103 (Leiden-Boston, 2010), pp. 61–96.

[32] Scotus made this assumption explicit in *Ord.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 139 (ed. Vat. 3, p. 87). See Pini, "Scotus on Doing Metaphysics."

[33] Cf. *Questions*, I, q. 6, n. 46 (*OPh* 3, pp. 146–47); VII, q. 13, n. 157 (*OPh* 4, p. 271); and VII, q. 15, n. 20 (*OPh* 4, p. 301). See also *Ord.*, II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 21, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 7, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Vatican City, 1973), p. 399.

each of these three aspects of the senses when we use our intellect to inquire into the structure of reality. As I will show below, Scotus held that the first aspect is the least worrisome. Even though the intellect is currently linked to the senses, it maintains its ability to combine the contents it gets from the senses into propositions. What is more, the intellect maintains its ability to assent to a proposition when it recognizes it as true and to deny a proposition when it recognizes it as false. What is even more, the intellect has the natural capacity to recognize a special class of propositions as certain and to assent to them, and that capacity, which is called "natural light" (*lumen naturale*), is completely sense-independent in its workings. Scotus also held that the intellect has the capacity to overcome the second limitation of the senses and to get at the deep structure of reality beyond the superficial sensible qualities to which the senses have direct access, even though the intellect reaches that result in a roundabout way. There is, however, no way our intellect can overcome the third limitation of the senses in our current state. Since our intellect must rely on sensory images in its activity of thinking, and since sensory images are not sufficiently fine grained to pick out individuals in such a way that those individuals can be distinguished from one another, it follows that the intellect is currently unable to think about individuals as individuals. This situation, however, will change in the next life, when the intellect will not rely on sensory images for its own working.[34]

In the next section, I consider the way Scotus thought the intellect can successfully deal with the first and the second limitation of the senses, i.e., their not being able to provide certainty and their remaining at the surface of things.

3. The Power of Pure Intellect and the Current Practice of Metaphysics

In several passages of his *Questions*, Scotus developed a strategy to overcome the cognitive limitations due to our intellect's current dependence on the senses. He never gave a full-fledged, unitary treatment of how this is possible. Rather, the basic elements of his plan must be gathered from remarks scattered in different places of his *Questions*. Also, it is clear that he did not approach this issue with a clear solution already in mind. Rather,

[34] Cf. *Ord*., III, d. 14, q. 4, n. 123, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 9, ed. Barnaba Hechich et al. (Vatican City, 2006), pp. 473–74.

he developed his solution while writing and thinking about this issue. As a result, his account of how we can do metaphysics notwithstanding our current cognitive impairment is very sketchy. Many details are missing, and, in the absence of any clear indication of Scotus's intentions, we are just left to guess how he would have fleshed them out. Nevertheless, the general outline of Scotus's approach is clear enough. If what follows is admittedly a reconstruction, all its elements are grounded on the text, and I hope that the result does not betray Scotus's intentions.

Scotus's basic move in what can be described as his vindication of our current practice of metaphysics is the contention that the intellect is not *entirely* dependent on the senses, even in its present state. As I have mentioned, that dependence was usually thought to be both genetic (the direct, i.e., non-inferential contents of thoughts come from the senses; therefore, our intellect is dependent on the senses with regard to what can be thought—without input from the senses there is nothing to think about) and operational (our acts of thinking are triggered by sensory images; therefore, our intellect is dependent on the senses with regard to its very operation—without input from the senses our intellect cannot work). Scotus qualified both claims. He did so by focusing on the first two of the three ways the intellect operates, i.e., the act of forming simple concepts (which can be described as the act or operation of abstraction) and the act of combining those simple concepts in complexes (which can be described as the combinatorial/assertoric act).[35] Scotus argued that in the exercise of both acts, our intellect is indeed partially dependent on sensory input, but that this is ultimately irrelevant.

Let me consider each of these two aspects separately.

3.1. *The Most General Concepts*

As I have said, our intellect, in its current condition, can form concepts only by abstraction, i.e., through an act of generalization and dematerialization carried out on material provided by the senses. So, in its current condition, the intellect needs the senses to get access to reality. What is worth noting about the intellect's act of abstraction, however, is the level of generality it can reach. Specifically, the intellect can form some concepts so general that they would still be applied to something even though the sensory input out of which they are abstracted were erroneous. For

[35] Aristotle, *De an.*, Γ 6, 43a26–28. Medieval thinkers also listed a third act, by which the intellect forms arguments.

example, suppose that I were tricked into feeling hot what is actually cold. If that were the case, the concept I form by abstraction from some sensory input, vitiated by an error in my sensory apparatus, would not be a concept of hotness, contrary to my beliefs. Accordingly, my thoughts about what hotness is would fail to capture the real quality of hotness (as it happens, they would capture the real quality of coldness). Even in the case of misperception, however, I can carry out the act of generalization to a point where it does not matter anymore whether there is a mistake in my processing the sensory input coming from the world. The first and foremost of those most general concepts formed by the intellect is the concept of being. That concept is so general that it applies to everything independently of whether we perceive or categorize that thing correctly. Suppose that my senses mislead me and that I feel something as hot when it is actually cold. Still, what I feel is a being—something real:

> [. . .] it must be considered that the intellect can apprehend the simple and at once the most universal concepts from the senses, no matter whether the sense errs or not.[36]

By forming the concept of being, the intellect can circumvent the fallibility of the senses. Such a concept is real, i.e., it refers to something in the world, even though it may have been formed by an act of abstraction carried out on erroneous sensory information.[37]

In the *Questions*, the view of the generality of the concept of being is important because it allows us to apply the concept of being beyond the limits of our immediate experience. Even though we may have acquired the concept of being from sensible qualities, such a concept can be applied—with exactly the same content—to things that are not sensible qualities but are, nevertheless, something. Thus, in order for us to be able to think about something under the most general description of "a being," it is not necessary for that thing to actually leave a sense impression in us. Notably, substances do not leave an impression (a *species*) on our senses. All

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[36] Cf. *Questions*, I, q. 4, nn. 43–44 (*OPh* 3, p. 108): "[. . .] est considerandum quod a sensu, sive errante sive non, potest intellectus apprehendere simplicia et statim universalissima." Scotus focused on cases of misperception. But he also considered a more extreme case, in which a person who was born blind receives the visual species of sensible things from God. I take that case into account below.

[37] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 1, n. 47 (*OPh* 4, p. 19). Scotus was at least sometimes willing to claim that any abstractive act of the intellect results in a correct concept, no matter whether the sensory input is deceiving or not. See *ibid.*, I, q. 4, n. 56 (*OPh* 3, p. 112). But it is his point concerning the most common concepts that is particularly relevant for metaphysics.

the same, it is possible to arrive at the concept of a substance and at the knowledge of specific substances by describing them as the sort of being underlying accidents (some of which are directly perceived by us).[38]

Being is actually only the most important among several other general concepts having the same characteristics of generality and simplicity. Other concepts of that kind are one and true. Scotus called those concepts by the traditional name of "transcendentals" (*transcendentia*). In the *Questions*, he made some interesting additions to their list, notably the conceptual couple of cause and effect (which are described as "to be that by virtue of which something else is" and "to be by virtue of something else").[39] He also stressed the role transcendentals have in metaphysics, which he described as the science "about the transcendentals."[40] For the same reason, Scotus also called those concepts by the self-explanatory name of "*metaphysicalia*." Thanks to their general applicability, they are the tools by which our intellect can overcome the cognitive limitations of our senses. Everything whatsoever is being, one, and true, etc., no matter whether our perception of it is correct or not and no matter whether we have had or can actually have sense experience of it or not.[41]

3.2. *The Intellect's Power to Assent to First Principles*

In addition to its abstractive power, our intellect has also the ability to combine simple concepts into complexes, and specifically into propositions. As Scotus argued in the *Questions*, this combinatorial power is accompanied by our intellect's ability to assent to or reject the propositions it has formed—i.e., to judge whether something is or is not the case. For example, the intellect has both the ability to form the proposition "snow is white" and to assent to it. These two abilities are closely linked but should be distinguished from one another.[42] It is important to stress that our intellect maintains both abilities intact even in its current state of dependence on the senses.

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[38] *Ibid.*, II, qq. 2–3, nn. 67–75 and 115–16 (*OPh* 3, pp. 221–23 and 233–34).
[39] *Ibid.*, IX, qq. 3–4, n. 16 (*OPh* 4, pp. 539–40).
[40] *Ibid.*, Prol., n. 18 (*OPh* 3, pp. 8–9).
[41] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 1, n. 64 (*OPh* 4, p. 25).
[42] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 3, nn. 36–39 (*OPh* 4, pp. 69–70). See Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A Comparison with Aquinas," in: Alfonso Maierù & Luisa Valente, eds., *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language*. Acts of the 14. European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics: Rome, June 11–15, 2002 (Florence, 2004), pp. 307–31.

Among the propositions our intellect forms and assents to, Scotus focused on a special class as epistemologically fundamental. There are some propositions whose truth depends on the meanings of their terms. For example, the proposition "human being is a rational animal" is true because to be a rational animal is part of what "human being" means. Several other people, including Thomas Aquinas, had called attention to this class of propositions, which were usually called "known *per se*" and were contrasted to propositions whose truth depends not the meanings of their terms but on a contingent matter of fact, e.g., "Some human beings are tall."[43] The distinction between these two classes of proposition clearly has much in common with our current distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual truths (or analytic *versus* synthetic propositions or truths of reason *versus* truths of fact). The former propositions are true by definition and are necessarily true; the latter propositions are not true by definition and are contingently true. There is an important difference, however, between the medieval and the modern distinction. According to Aquinas, Scotus, and the other medieval thinkers who made use of the distinction I have mentioned, to say that a proposition is true by virtue of (the meaning of) its terms does not entail that the truth of that proposition is entirely dependent on linguistic or conceptual factors. Rather, terms were taken to signify real items in the world (specifically, real essences), and definitions were intended to describe the inner structure of those real items. Thus, "human being is a rational animal" tells us something about the meaning of "human being" but also about what it is to be a human being and the inner structure of the real essence *humanity*. That proposition tells us something about the world, not just about linguistic or mental items.

The feature that Scotus found particularly interesting about the propositions true by virtue of their terms concerns the way we come to know that those propositions are true and to assent to them. Even though the meaning of the terms of that proposition is ordinarily acquired through the senses, the intellect's ability to assent to those propositions, i.e., to judge that things are just as they are described by those propositions, is independent of any input received from the senses. If I have acquired the concept of human being, I am in a position to judge that "human being is a rational animal" is true. Even though the senses play an essential role

[43] See, among other places, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 2, a. 1. For Scotus, see *Questions*, VI, q. 3.

in my acquisition of the concept of human being, once I have acquired that concept, the senses play no role in my judging of the truth of "human being is a rational animal." By contrast, consider propositions that are not true by virtue of their terms, such as "Some human beings are tall." I may have a correct concept of what a human being is and of what to be tall means, but in order to judge whether "Some human beings are tall" is true I have to take into account some further evidence in addition to the meaning of the terms.[44] That further evidence is usually grounded on the senses (whether my own senses or by trusting the testimony of other people).

Thus, even in the current condition, our intellect is operationally independent on the senses in a very important respect—its ability to judge of the truth of a specific class of propositions, i.e., those propositions that are true by virtue of their terms. We judge that those propositions are true by virtue of natural light (*ex lumine naturali*), as Scotus said, i.e., by a specifically intellectual power, whose exercise is independent of any input coming from the senses. Thus, it is true that there can currently be no knowledge that does not originate from the senses. But there is no need to rely on the senses and their input in order to judge the truth about propositions that are true by definition.[45]

So the senses do not provide the intellect with evidence for the truth of propositions true by virtue of their terms they only provide the intellect with the means or occasion (Scotus used the term *occasionaliter*) by which the intellect becomes aware of those propositions. In our (but not the medieval) way of talking of *a priori*, we can say that our intellect is able to know *a priori* the truth of propositions true by virtue of their terms. In the knowledge of the truth of those principles, the intellect never errs even when the sensory input may be deceiving.[46]

Before considering the important consequences that all this has on our current practice of metaphysics, it should be noted that this feature of our intellect accounts for our ability to acquire certitude concerning the principles of specific sciences (such as natural philosophy and the sciences subordinated to it). Even though the principles of specific sciences are

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[44] Cf. *Questions*, VI, q. 3, nn. 52–55 (*OPh* 4, pp. 74–76).

[45] *Ibid.*, II, q. 1, n. 4 (*OPh* 3, p. 194). See also *ibid.*, I, q. 4, nn. 43–46 (*OPh* 3, pp. 108–10). Scotus developed a similar position in his defense of our intellect's capacity to reach genuine truth without any special illumination, in opposition to Henry of Ghent, in *Ord.*, I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, nn. 202–80 (ed. Vat. 3, pp. 123–72).

[46] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, nn. 52 and 56 (*OPh* 3, pp. 111 and 112–13).

taken from the senses and so are potentially open to being doubted, we can be certain about them, as their truth depends on their terms and the intellect is able to assent to those propositions in virtue of natural light. Thus, any specific science is grounded on certain principles.[47] In turn, those principles function as the foundations from which most propositions in that science are deduced. Accordingly, the propositions deduced from first principles are derivatively certain, as they owe their certainty to the first principles, of whose truth we are certain because of natural light. What remains outside certitude is the propositions that cannot be deduced from first principles. Scotus admits of their existence within a certain science, but those propositions are not beyond the uncertainty of the senses (at least in our current scientific practice).[48]

In order to illustrate his point concerning the possibility of having genuine, certain science even in the current condition, Scotus took into account the possible case of a born-blind person who is given impressions of all colors in her dreams. The point of this double assumption—the person is both born blind and receives color images in a dream—seems to be, first, that those impressions are not genuine instances of sense perceptions, as they are images in a dream to which no present object corresponds, and, second, that the person receiving those images is not able to distinguish them from genuine instances of visual perceptions because she does not have any genuine visual perception, because she was born blind. As a consequence, according to Scotus, that person's imagination would take those images for real sensible qualities. In other words, the born-blind person would not be able to distinguish her dreamed colors from real colors and would mistake the dreamed colors for perceived colors. This would be a case of radical sensory error, as that person would not just be making a local mistake in her perception (for example, by seeing white what is actually red). Rather, she would believe that she is seeing something when she is not even seeing but only being given sensory images in a dream. Even in that extreme case, however, that person would still be able to come up with all the propositions concerning colors that a seeing person could come up with—both the first principles concerning colors and the propositions deduced from first principles. The only propositions that a blind person could not know would be the propositions

[47] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 1, n. 65 (*OPh* 3, p. 25).
[48] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, n. 46 (*OPh* 3, p. 110).

that require some actual use of the senses, as well as the propositions deduced from those.[49]

So let us now turn back to metaphysics. Because metaphysics is grounded on first principles that are true by virtue of their terms and are cognized as such by our intellect without relying on the senses, metaphysics is as certain as any other science. Because the terms of the principles of metaphysics are the most general concepts applying to everything no matter whether we are being misled in our perceptions or not, metaphysics reaches some general conclusions that are true of everything whatsoever, no matter what kind of thing it is. From the most general principles, it is then possible to descend to more specific propositions by way of division and distinction. In that way, metaphysics can get at the structure of reality beyond the limits of our immediate experience:

> Once the simple concepts are apprehended from the senses, no matter whether the they are in error or not, some propositions are formed by virtue of the intellect's own power, first about the more universal concepts, then about the others. With regard to the most universal propositions, which are made up of common concepts, the intellect assents to them immediately, not by virtue of the senses—rather, it assents to them with certainty even greater than that by which it could assent to them thanks to the senses, if it indeed received the knowledge of the truth of those propositions from the senses. The intellect also forms other immediate propositions about less universal concepts, but those propositions are neither immediately known nor known to be immediate, because their terms are not known. But in the inquiry about what their terms mean, the intellect is directed by the common concepts in its act of dividing and removing one concept from and attributing another concept to [a certain subject].[50]

Scotus was, unfortunately, not generous with examples that may illustrate in detail how this is supposed to work. The first principle that is reached in metaphysics is the principle of non-contradiction, where the concept of being plays the role of term and whose truth is immediately recognized

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[49] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, n. 46 (*OPh* 3, pp. 109–10).

[50] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, n. 44 (*OPh* 3, pp. 108–09): "Simplicibus apprehensis a sensu vero vel falso, propositiones fiunt virtute propria intellectus: primo de universalioribus, postea de aliis. De universalissimis, factis communibus conceptionibus, statim intellectus illis assentit, non propter sensum, immo certius quam posset per sensum, dato quod a sensu accepisset cognitionem veritatis illarum propositionum. Alias propositiones facit et immediatas de minus universalibus, sed non statim notas nec scitas esse immediatas, quia termini non cognoscuntur. Inquirendo vero quid dicitur per terminos, regulatur intellectus dividendo et amovendo unum, et attribuendo aliud per communes conceptiones."

by the intellect.[51] Other propositions in metaphysics are supposed to be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction and, so, are supposed to derive their certainty from it.[52]

So Scotus is a foundationalist about the internal structure of any science, including metaphysics. What is specific of metaphysics, however, is that the basic concepts out of which its propositions are constituted are most general and simple. It is because of their generality and simplicity that metaphysics can study the structure of things no matter what specific kind of things they are. What is more, metaphysics can also study how things are related to one another, thanks to relationships of ontological priority and posteriority and, thus, can reconstruct the deep structure of reality beyond the surface at which our senses condemn us to remain. Specifically, the metaphysician is able to recognize that things are organized in some fundamental kinds (substances) on which other kinds (accidents) are dependent.[53] Scotus gave some brief illustration of how this is supposed to happen. In his illustration, a large role seems to be played by the concept of ontological priority and posteriority, which is one of the basic *metaphysicalia*. Thanks to that concept, the metaphysician is able to go beyond the limits of our immediate sensory input, as we only sense accidents (and a specific class of accidents: sensible qualities). Metaphysicians come to recognize that there must exist substances as a subject underlying sensible qualities.[54] Similarly, metaphysicians also come to recognize that there are other accidents, even though Scotus's presentation is, unfortunately, lacking with regard to the specifics of how this is supposed to happen.

Scotus, however, is not a foundationalist concerning the relationship between metaphysics and other sciences. Metaphysics is not more certain than other sciences, and it does not provide other sciences with either their principles or their contents. Metaphysics indeed has some priority with regard to other sciences, but not because its principles are more certain than those of other sciences or because other sciences derive their principles from metaphysics; rather, because the terms of the metaphysical

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[51] *Ibid.*, IV, q. 3 (*OPh* 3, pp. 365–75).

[52] An example of what Scotus may have had in mind is his treatment of how we come to the knowledge of substances. See *ibid.*, II, qq. 2–3, n. 115 (*OPh* 3, pp. 233–34).

[53] *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, n. 24 (*OPh* 4, p. 111).

[54] *Ibid.*, II, qq. 2–3, n. 115 (*OPh* 3, pp. 233–34). See Pini, "Scotus on Doing Metaphysics."

principles are known prior to the more specific terms of the principles of other sciences.[55]

What metaphysics gives other sciences is not certainty or their principles but distinct knowledge of their subject matter. The specific essence that is considered in a certain science is never arrived at as the conclusion of a demonstration in that very science. For example, botany does not demonstrate what a plant is; rather, it assumes it. This is also the case for metaphysics. Metaphysics does not demonstrate what being is; rather, it assumes what it is and that there is some being. But the difference lies in the kind of knowledge that is assumed in metaphysics versus the kind of knowledge that is assumed in other sciences. Scotus did not explain why metaphysics is better off than other sciences in this respect, but his argument is probably that, even though metaphysics takes the knowledge of being from abstraction from the senses, that knowledge is as distinct as it can be. Scotus remarked that other sciences too take the knowledge of what their subject-matter is from the senses, but that knowledge is not distinct but confused. For example, optics takes the notions of light and colors from the senses, but that knowledge is confused, for in optics it is not clear what kind of things light and colors are, i.e., whether they are substances or accidents and, if they are accidents, which kind of accidents. Sometimes, a science may need to have distinct knowledge of what its subject-matter is. For example, a botanist (my example) needs to know what a plant is or a student of human beings (Scotus's example) needs to know what a human being is. In that case, however, a science depends on metaphysics for the knowledge of what its subject is, as only metaphysics can give distinct knowledge of what something is on the basis of its most general concepts. For example, in order to know what a plant is, it is necessary to know that it is a being of a certain kind, i.e., a living substance. And only metaphysics can provide this information. Also, metaphysics provides knowledge of first principles such as the principles of non-contradiction, which are used as a tool in the process of division proper to each specific science.[56]

Do Scotus's arguments in his *Questions* conform to this method? Did he draw his conclusions starting from the concepts of being and the other

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[55] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, n. 44 (*OPh* 3, pp. 108–09).

[56] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 1, n. 87 (*OPh* 4, p. 33). Scotus held that something is known distinctly when it is known as it is expressed by its definition whereas something is known confusedly when it is known as it is expressed by its name. See *Ord.*, I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 73 (ed. Vat. 3, p. 50).

transcendentals and then working down to his specific points by virtue of the principle of non-contradictions and other general principles? What we have is a very interesting piece of theory concerning the way we can reach certain knowledge of the deep structure of reality, notwithstanding the severe current limitations that the senses pose on the working of our intellect. But it is far from clear whether Scotus's own metaphysics conforms to this lofty ideal of a science of the pure intellect. Still, Scotus proposed an original model to think about the practice of metaphysics, which can be seen as an important correction of the Aristotelian stress on the cognitive role of the senses and a step towards the recognition of the power of intellect's natural light in the inquiry of the structure of reality.

4. Conclusion

Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics* is a complex work. Its rich philosophical content cannot be reduced to a short list of key positions. Also, textual matters compound its difficulty, as it is possible to identify several drafts of the same questions, and many sections were added without any serious attempt to fit them with the original version. Nevertheless, a possible key to access such an intricate work is offered by the many passages where Scotus took up issues concerning the nature and method of metaphysics, both as it should be carried out in an ideal situation and as it is commonly practiced. Specifically, Scotus held that the intellect's current dependence on the senses in a number of key issues constitutes a limit that severely impairs our attempts to inquire into the structure of reality. Such dependence on the senses was commonly assumed in Scotus's times, especially among Aristotelians. Scotus's point was that such dependence is not an asset but a limit—in explicit opposition to Aquinas and his followers. The senses are both a source of uncertainty and a factor threatening any attempt to go beyond the surface of reality. Accordingly, Scotus developed an alternative way to practice metaphysics, based not on taking stock of the senses but on the little the intellect can do independently of the senses, even in the current condition. Scotus identified two key aspects in which the intellect overcomes the sensory limits to which we are otherwise condemned. First, the intellect has the ability to form a class of very general concepts, which can be applied correctly to anything even though we may be deceived as to what we are sensing. Second, the intellect maintains the power to assent to a specific class of propositions, i.e., the propositions that are true by virtue of their terms, and it can do

so on the basis of natural light and without relying on any evidence coming from the senses. Once those propositions are identified and judged as true by the intellect, they can serve as the foundations from which other propositions are deduced. So metaphysics is a deductive science grounded on some principles that owe their evidence to the natural light of the intellect, not to the senses. Even though it is not always clear how Scotus intended to apply this method to spell out specific conclusions, this is the theory he proposed in the *Questions* about the current practice of metaphysics. Admittedly, this is not the method we find in Aristotle. Scotus himself was fully aware of this. He acknowledged that Aristotle seemed to be unaware of the limits that the senses pose on our intellect. According to Scotus, if Aristotle indeed reached some positive results, it is because he did metaphysics in the correct way and ignored his wrong theory. It is the correct theory that Scotus tried to give in the *Questions*, which can accordingly be regarded as a vindication of our current practice of metaphysics.

JANDUN'S QUESTION-COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

Roberto Lambertini

Known as "*princeps averroistarum*," John of Jandun owes a great part of his philosophical fame to his defense of the doctrines of the Commentator, obviously in the form in which they were interpreted in the milieu of the Parisian Arts Faculty in the last decades of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th. As is well known, the Paduan "averroism" of the 16th century inspired great interest in Jandun's commentaries and contributed, thanks to the editorial care of Marcantonio Zimara, to promote the knowledge of his commentaries on Aristotle through early prints that have been used up to our days.[1] Given the main tenets that characterize the trend of thought commonly designed as "averroism," it is not surprising that Jandun's Commentary on *De anima* attracted most of the attention of the scholars. Jean-Baptiste Brenet's excellent monograph on this Parisian master, *Trasferts du sujet*,[2] is no exception to this point of view. Understandably enough, Brenet's references to the Commentary on *De anima* outnumber by far those to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Interestingly, the situation of contemporary literature on the subject mirrors the relationship between the high number of extant manuscripts containing the Commentary on *De Anima* and the few witnesses of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[3] Since the beginning, the interest of Jandun's readers was focused mainly on his theory of knowledge and his doctrines concerning the nature of the intellect.

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[1] About Zimara's intellectual milieu, nothing has surpassed Bruno Nardi, *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI* (Florence, 1958); and see Antonio Antonaci, *Ricerche sull'aristotelismo del Rinascimento: Marcantonio Zimara* (Galatina, 1971).

[2] See Jean-Baptiste Brenet, *Trasferts du sujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon Jean de Jandun* (Paris, 2003).

[3] This is apparent already in Stuart MacClintock, *Perversity and Error. Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun* (Bloomington, Ind., 1956), esp. pp. 120–24. See also Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors Jacobus-Johannes," *Traditio* 26 (1970), 135–216, esp. 209; and updated list of works by Jandun in Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, 9 vols. (Turnhout, 1994–2012), vol. 5: *Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir de Johannes D.)* (Turnhout, 2003), pp. 92–104.

This state of affairs explains why we do not possess any comprehensive study of this work; still, many particular investigations carried out so far show that Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, in addition to being an important chapter in the history of the medieval reception of Aristotelian metaphysical discourse, can also provide a better insight into the thought of Jandun himself and of the intellectual milieu of the Parisian Arts Faculty at the beginning of the 14th century. The present chapter therefore collects information about this Commentary, from different approaches and different trends of contemporary scholarship. Highlighting some of the most important aspects investigated so far, it aims to show that it would be worthwhile to continue study of this text and, if possible, provide scholars with a critical text.

1. The Manuscript Tradition

The manuscript tradition of Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is not rich, but it is complex. It is, in fact, handed down to us in only two complete manuscript witnesses explicitly attributed to the Parisian master, that is: Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 1363[4] and Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 366, Scaff. XVI.[5] To these complete witnesses a fragmentary tradition can be added: a few questions from the commentary on Book XII of the *Metaphysics*, transmitted by a Munich manuscript, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 4377;[6] and a long fragment contained in the codex Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Faesul. 161, where the text is attributed to Marsilius of Padua.[7]

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[4] A description of this manuscript can be read in Zdzislaw Kuksewicz & Maria Cristina Vitali, "Notes sur le deux rédactions des *Quaestiones de Anima* de Jean de Jandun," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 27 (1984), 3–24, esp. 5–6, n. 6. In the following, this manuscript will be referred to as *L*.

[5] A description of this manuscript, which could, however, be substantially improved, is published in Giuseppe Abate & Giovanni Luisetto, *Codici Manoscritti della Biblioteca Antoniana* (Vicenza, 1975), p. 575. In the following, this manuscript will be referred to as *A*.

[6] Only two questions from the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics* are transmitted by this manuscript; see *Catalogus codicum latinorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis*, 3 vols. (Munich 1968), vol. 3, n. 1058.

[7] Descriptions of the contents of this very well known manuscript can be found in Celestino Piana, "Nuovo contributo allo studio delle correnti dottrinali nell'Università di Bologna nel sec. XIV," *Antonianum* 23 (1948), 221–54; see also Charles J. Ermatinger, "Averroism in Early Fourteenth Century Bologna," *Mediaeval Studies* 16 (1954), 35–56, esp. 35–36; and Alessandro Ghisalberti, *Le "Quaestiones de Anima" attribuite a Matteo da Gubbio* (Milan, 1981), pp. 39–41. Very handy access to further bibliographical information is

The attribution contained in Faesul. 161 attracted the attention of scholars who considered it as a source for Marsilius's thought previous to the *Defensor pacis*. We owe the editions of some questions from the commentary to such interest. Piero Di Vona's interest in metaphysics led to the publication of the first questions form Book IV.[8] Also, Jeannine Quillet's publication of other *quaestiones* is connected to her studies on Marsilius's political thought and its sources.[9]

More than 20 years ago, a first attempt to investigate the tradition of this fragmentary work attributed to Marsilius, confronting it with the copies of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* attributed to Jandun, led to the following results: The two complete manuscripts (that is, *A* and *L*) bear witness to two slightly different redactions of the commentary. One of these redactions, which extends only to the eighth question on Book V, is most probably a re-working of the first one and is contained in the Leipzig manuscript: Surprisingly enough, the text attributed to Marsilius in Faesul. 161 is almost identical with the redaction transmitted by *A*, so that between the text attributed to Jandun (*A*) and that which goes under the name of the Paduan Master Marsilius (Faesul. 161), the differences can be reduced to the usual textual variants between manuscript copies of the same work. The two different redactions (the one contained in *A*, and the one witnessed by the first part of *L*) are, on the contrary, attributed to the same author, namely, Jandun.[10]

The fact that one version of the Commentary is attributed, in one manuscript, to Marsilius of Padua can be interpreted in different ways. The attribution could depend on a mere error or could point to an involvement of Marsilius himself in the redaction of Commentary, although it is difficult to ascertain, or even imagine, what kind of role it could have

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provided by http://opac.bml.firenze.sbn.it/Bibliografia.htm?idlist=1&record=49951242177 (accessed on September 1st, 2013).

[8] See Piero di Vona, "L'ontologia di Marsilio da Padova nelle Quaestiones I–II super IV librum Metaphysicae," in: *Atti dell'Accademia di scienze morali e politiche*, vol. 89 (Naples, 1979), pp. 251–81; for di Vona's approach to this problem, see also Piero di Vona, *I princìpi del* Defensor pacis (Naples, 1974).

[9] See Jeannine Quillet, "L'aristotélisme de Marsile de Padoue et ses rapports avec l'averroïsme," *Medioevo* 5–6 (1979–80), 81–142, publishes the first two question of Book I; see her previous contribution: "Brèves remarques sur les Questiones super metaphysice libros I–VI (Codex fesulano 161, fols. 1ra–41ra) et leurs relations avec l'aristotélisme hétérodoxe," in: Albert Zimmermann, ed., *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 10 (Berlin-New York, 1976), pp. 361–85.

[10] These results are exposed in detail and argued for in Roberto Lambertini & Andrea Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Giovanni di Jandun. Osservazioni e problemi," *Medioevo* 10 (1984), 41–104.

been. From this point of view, the Commentary does show some parallels to that of the *Defensor pacis*. As is well known, this masterpiece of medieval political thought has been attributed, for several years after its diffusion, to both authors, to the point that not only Marsilius, but also Jandun was condemned in 1327 for the opinions defended in that treatise.[11] This notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship tried in vain to discover traces of this alleged double authorship in the redaction of the *Defensor pacis*.[12] In a similar way, if one accepts Marsilius's co-authorship of the Commentary of the *Metaphysics*, it would be impossible to distinguish his contribution from that of Jandun. Although some specialists are persuaded that the claim of Marsilius's paternity cannot be totally dismissed,[13] for the purpose of the present chapter it is not necessary to try to solve this problem, since there can be no doubt that the long fragment of the Commentary contained in Faesul. 161 is also a reliable source of Jandun's thought, although it does not offer any information that is substantially different from that transmitted by the copies undoubtedly attributed to the Parisian Master.

This state of affairs is indirectly confirmed by the printed tradition of Jandun's Commentary. The very well known edition[14] by Marcantonio Zimara, a representative figure of the Faculty of Philosophy in 16th-century Padua,[15] has been used by scholars as textual basis for their investigations of Jandun's thought, but it does not correspond to any of the versions handed down to us by the manuscripts. An attentive comparison of the printed text with the manuscript tradition persuades scholars that

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[11] For a recent article on the condemnation of the *Defensor pacis*, see Stefano Simonetta, "Realtà e propaganda: la condanna di Marsilio nel 1327," *Pensiero Politico Medievale* 5 (2007), 119–30.

[12] See Carlo Dolcini, *Introduzione a Marsilio da Padova* (Rome-Bari, 1995), p. 15, speaks of an "ideological joint responsibility" of the two authors.

[13] See Dolcini, *Introduzione*, p. 15.

[14] The first edition of Jandun's *Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae iuxta Aristotelis et magni Commentatoris intentionem disputatae* was printed in 1505 by Octavianus Scotus; the reprint published in 1966 by Minerva Verlag reproduces the edition of 1553. In the following, I will refer to it as *Z*.

[15] Recent contributions to the knowledge of different aspects of Zimara's philosophical attitude include: Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols. (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History) 48–49 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1994–95), vol. 2: *Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy*, pp. 103–09; and Luca Bianchi, "Rusticus mendax. Marcantonio Zimara e la fortuna di Alberto Magno nel Rinascimento italiano," in: Francis Cheneval, Ruedi Imbach, & Thomas Ricklin, eds., *Albert le Grand et sa réception au moyen âge. Hommage à Zénon Kaluza* (Fribourg, 1998), pp. 264–78.

the text edited by Zimara goes back to a process of revision and enrichment that resulted in a longer and more refined version of the Commentary. In addition, Charles Ermatinger has already shown that some of the materials inserted in the printed edition are not by Jandun himself but by other masters who were connected to the Parisian Faculty of Arts.[16] These additions of inauthentic materials could also go back to an editing process in which Jandun was not involved. At the present state of knowledge, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Parisian master was responsible for such insertions. This practice was not unusual in the Parisian milieu. For example, the *reportatio* of Jandun's Commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* (transmitted by only one manuscript) is but an abbreviation of the extremely influential work by Bartholomaeus of Bruges,[17] another outstanding figure of the Parisian Arts Faculty who was involved also in a philosophical controversy about the *sensus agens* with the same Jandun.[18] While the editing process that led to the insertion of unauthentic materials in Jandun's commentary escapes—as for now—our possibility of investigation, the analysis of the portions of the text that have parallels in the manuscript tradition leads to the result, as already mentioned above, that the printed text can be seen as a further step of elaboration of the text, which goes from limited changes in the framing of the arguments, to the insertion of new quotations, to the addition of new questions that tackle problems less developed or, in some cases, only hinted at in the manuscript versions.

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[16] See Charles J. Ermatinger, "John of Jandun in his Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians," in: *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age. Actes du quatrième Congres international de philosophie medievale: Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada, 27 août–2 septembre 1967* (Montréal-Paris, 1969), pp. 1173–84; see also Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones*," p. 53.

[17] Cf. Christoph Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 28 and 171–72, and "Die stemmatischen Verhältnisse der Aristoteleskommentare dargelegt anhand der Kommentare zur Yconomica," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 48 (2001), 182–90. On Barthomaeus of Bruges's commentary on *Oeconomica*, see also Pavel Blažek, *Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe. Von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (1246/1247–1309)* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions) 117 (Leiden-Boston, 2007), esp. pp. 199–384.

[18] See Charles J. Ermatinger, "Some Unstudied Sources for the History of Philosophy in the Fourteenth Century," *Manuscripta* 14 (1970), 3–28 and 67–87; and Auguste A. Pattin, *Pour l'histoire du sens agent. La controverse entre Barthélemy de Bruges et Jean de Jandun: ses antécédents et son évolution. Etudes et textes inédits* (Leuven, 1988).

2. Date of Composition

Although Jandun's works are rich in references to opinions of contemporary masters—and some of them can be identified with certainty—the assessment of the exact date of many of his commentaries is extremely awkward, if for no other reason than because many of them are transmitted in different redactions. As far as the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is concerned, the *terminus post quem* can be the date of an opinion Peter Auriol, according to Anneliese Maier, put forward for the first time in his *De principiis naturae*, that is 1312.[19] A very likely, although not absolute, *terminus ante quem* for the manuscript redactions of the Commentary is 1323, since all manuscript copies refer to Aquinas as *frater Thomas*. For the expanded redaction, one can only assert that it must have been written after the redactions contained in the manuscripts. Since it is difficult to imagine that Jandun could have found time to write after he joined the court of Louis the Bavarian, the absolute *terminus ante quem* is 1326. There is, in fact, no agreement among scholars about the time Marsilius (together with Jandun) reached the German *rex romanorum* in Nuremberg, but the latest date taken into consideration is still 1326.[20] Unfortunately, the time span 1312–26 covers a great part of Jandun's academic activity, so that the results reached so far cannot be said to be very informative.[21]

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[19] See Annalise Maier, *An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft. Die Struktur der materiellen Substanz. Das Problem der Gravitation. Die Mathematik der Formlatituden* (Rome, 1952), p. 69, n. 38. I would like to thank William Duba (Fribourg) for his kind help concerning the dates of Auriol's work.

[20] See Carlo Dolcini, "Qualche osservazione su la biografia di Marsilio. L'epistola metrica del Mussato, gli studi universitari di teologia, la data di nascita," *Pensiero politico medievale* 6 (2008), 89–102. Not convincing is Frank Godthardt, "The Philosopher as Political Actor—Marsilius of Padua at the Court of Ludwig the Bavarian: The Sources Revisited," in: Gerson Moreno-Riaño, ed., *The World of Marsilius of Padua* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 29–46.

[21] Some progress could come from the investigation of the relationship between Thomas Wylton and John of Jandun; see Cecilia Trifogli, "Il problema dello statuto ontologico del tempo nelle *Quaestiones super Physicam* di Thomas Wylton e di Giovanni di Jandun," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), 491–548, esp. 492–93, nn. 7–8. The existence of a double redaction of Jandun's commentary on the *Physics*, however, is still an obstacle to reliable conclusions. This is the case also for Ludwig Schmugge's hypotethical suggestion: see Ludwig Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun (1285/1289–1328)* (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 130. For a recent and reliable assessment concerning Wylton's quodlibetal questions, see Cecilia Trifogli, "The Quodlibet of Thomas Wylton," in: Chris Schabel, ed., *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition) 7 (Leiden-Boston, 2007), pp. 231–66. An edition with English translation of Wylton's influential *quaestio de anima intellectiva* is Lauge O. Nielsen & Cecilia Trifogli, eds., *Thomas Wylton. On the Intellectual Soul* (Oxford, 2010).

3. Jandun's Idea of Philosophy

The first question of Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is devoted to the relationship between philosophy and human happiness. Here he claims that it consists without any doubt in *sapientia*, conceived as the most excellent among intellectual virtues. In its proper sense, happiness coincides with the knowledge of God and of the first principles that can be achieved through demonstration, more precisely, at the completion of a process which culminates in a discursive (as opposed to intuitive) cognition of God.[22] Jandun harbors no doubts about the possibility of attaining happiness in this life through philosophy and does not refrain from referring to a quotation from Seneca, according to which the perfect philosopher is similar to a god in a human body. Apart from the opinions of pagan philosophers, Jandun is persuaded that all religions agree on the conclusion that happiness is rooted in a similarity to God and that the speculative philosopher acquires the highest degree of such similarity. In particular, John argues at length that perfect happiness is not limited to an intuitive knowledge of God but requires *sapientia*, that is, a fully developed, demonstrative discursive knowledge of the supreme being. In this way, as Brenet explains with clarity, John finds a mediation between the diverging accounts of happiness he reads in Aristotle and Averroes. According to him, Averroes focuses on the first, preliminary stage of the process that leads to *felicitas*.[23]

Of course, John is well aware of the existence of different opinions. Doctors[24] disagree—he remarks—about happiness. Some of them maintain that it consists *in actu sapientiae*; for others it coincides with will, love, and caritas; and a third group claims that it consists in both. According to John, however, such a discussion goes beyond the limits of philosophy.[25] Already in the first question of the Commentary, the reader is therefore confronted with a characteristic feature of Jandun's

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[22] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 1, fols. 1–2, esp. fol. 1va: "Et cum dicitur quod foelicitas humana habetur per adeptionem intellectus agentis, dicedum quod verum est dispositive, non autem completive, quia iste habitus est alius ab habitu sapientie in quo formaliter et completive consistit foelicitas."

[23] See Brenet, *Transferts*, pp. 401–05, who refers also to the passages from the Commentary on *De anima* where Jandun defends the same position; Brenet points also to *Z*, II, q. 4, *Utrum intellectus noster coniunctus magnitudini possit cognoscere substantias abstractas ut Deum*, fols. 22M–26M.

[24] Instead of "*doctores*," *A*, I, q. 1, fol. 2ra writes "*theologi*."

[25] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 1, fol. 1vb: "Aliqui dicunt quod foelicitas consistit in actu sapientie. Alii dicunt quod consistit in voluptate, charitate et amore dei. Alii dicunt quod in utroque

conception of philosophy as clearly separated from the methods adopted in the Faculty of Theology. On many issues, such as human knowledge of separate substances or God's omnipotence or knowledge of particular beings existing outside him, Jandun stresses that he argues exclusively within the boundaries of philosophy, although he knows that his conclusions diverge from theological truth.[26]

In the following questions of Book I, Jandun presents further features of metaphysics. Identical with *sapientia*, this science is by far more honorable than all other *habitus*, be it speculative or practical. Such superiority is grounded in the ontological superiority of its object, which means, as a consequence, that *prudentia*, while being second to metaphysics, enjoys a higher degree of honor than speculative *habitus*, whose objects belong to a lower ontological level than human beings.[27] Vis-à-vis other sciences, metaphysics enjoys a priority, not in a chronological sense, since it represents the fulfillment of knowledge and therefore is apprehended later than others, preliminary disciplines, but in dignity.[28] Furthermore, metaphysics is free, because it is not subservient to any other purpose, be it of practical or theoretical nature. As perfection of human knowledge,

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consistat. Hoc non spectat ad naturam philosophiae."; *A*, I, q. 2, fol. 2ra: "[…] non spectat ad terminos philosophiae."

[26] Cf. e.g., *Z*, II, q. 4, *Utrum intellectus noster coniunctus magnitudini possit intelligere substantias abstractas ut Deum*, fol. 25Q: "Et dicit Albertus primo de generatione 'Quid mihi de miraculis dicitur cum de naturalibus disseramus ?,' sic possum dicere quod nos cum loquamur de illis quae possunt convinci ex sensatis tantum, quid mihi de potentia supernaturali quam sensus capere non potest? et sic loquebatur naturaliter Aristoteles et Commentator, et eorum rationes procedunt sic via naturali et per consequens solvuntur non solutionibus naturalibus sicut aliqui volunt, sed supernaturalibus solutionibus, quia potentia divina magis potest quam natura, unde certe, firmiter et simpliciter assero, quod deus sit infinitus in vigore, et per consequens perfecte non potest cognosci et hoc sacrae theologiae doctoribus in hoc, sicut in aliis quae miraculis dei probantur, firmiter assentiendo, sed hoc nescio probare demonstratione ex sensatis orta, sed simpliciter credo et ex hoc erit meritum. […]"; these reflections are not developed in the same way in the manuscript version: cf. *A*, II, q. 4, *Utrum intellectus noster coniunctus magnitudini possit intelligere substantias separatas*, fols. 17va–20va and *L*, fols. 29ra–30vb. Scholars have been debating about the exact significance of such positions, which had been traditionally put in connection the doctrine of "double truth"; on this issue see the recent synthesis by Luca Bianchi, *Pour une historie de la "double vérité"* (Paris, 2008).

[27] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 17, *Utrum habitus speculativi sint honorabiliores practicis*, fols. 13ra–14ra, esp. fol. 13va. Rather surprisingly, this discussion is not taken into consideration by Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, "Jean de Jandun et sa conception de la philosophie," in: Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer, eds., *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter*. Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M. 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 26 (Berlin-New York, 1998), pp. 428–34, who insists on the practical function of philosophy according to Jandun.

[28] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 2, *Utrum metaphysica sit prior aliis scientiis*, fols. 2ra–3ra.

it is, in fact, desirable for its own sake, not in view of further goals.[29] In this context, Jandun discusses a possible objection based on the fact that Aristotle speaks of politics as the "architectural science." He counters that the directive role attributed to politics is limited to the realm of practical reason. One can at most recognize that metaphysics follows the direction of politics, in the sense that the latter establishes where and when lessons of metaphysics can be held. The Arts master Jandun can therefore hardly imagine an exercise of metaphysics that is different from a teaching activity.[30]

4. Between Logic and Metaphysics

Epistemological issues, such as the definition of the proper object of logic, which were vigorously debated in his days, are also approached in Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. A telling example is his question *Utrum entia rationis sint in predicamento*, where he discusses, as Jan Pinborg pointed out many years ago, the opinions held by Peter Auriol and Radulphus Brito.[31] Against Auriol, or at least against a summarizing account of his position, John puts forward objections that mainly concern the ontological status of *entia rationis* that according to him cannot be placed outside *predicamenta*, as Auriol's *entia in prospectu* would be.[32] In his argumentation, Jandun overtly denies the possibility of entities that exist neither *subiective* in the mind nor in the extramental things.[33] Radulphus Brito, for his part, had maintained that *entia rationis* exist as

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[29] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 22, *Utrum metaphysica sit scientia libera*, fols. 18D–19I, esp. fol. 18N. On this point, Jandun is in agreement with his adversary Radulphus Brito: see Sten Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito. The Last of the Great Arts Masters. Or: Philosophy and Freedom," in: Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer, eds., *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 27 (Berlin-New York, 1999), pp. 231–51.

[30] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 22, *Utrum metaphysica sit scientia libera*, fol. 18Q: "Unde dicendum quod politicus non potest determinare vel precipere geometre, quod sic vel sic concludat unam conclusionem, quia concludere talem conclusionem sic vel sic sunt essentialia scientiae; et quo ad illa non habet praecipere politicus sapienti sed bene praecipit quo ad actus extrinsecos et usus, scilicet quod talis debita hora legat, et tales personas instruat [...]." On this particular issue *A*. I, 13, fols. 15va–16va is less detailed.

[31] See Jan Pinborg, "A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 21 (1975), 286–96 (repr. in Sten Ebbesen, ed., *Medieval Semantics. Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grammar* [London, 1984], n. X).

[32] Peter Auriol has been object of many studies: for a very rich bibliography and access to edition in progress, see Russell L. Friedman, *The Peter Auriol Homepage*, at <http://www.peterauriol.net> (accessed on September 1st, 2013).

[33] Cf. *Z*, VI, q. 9, *Utrum entia rationis sint in predicamento*, fols. 83M–84M.

accidents of the mind but cannot be reduced to any of the Aristotelian categories. After a detailed confutation of this second opinion, Jandun concludes that *entia rationis* could belong to different categories, depending on the way they are considered. As received in the intellect they are passions, as a product of the agent intellect and of the object they are actions, and as form in the intellect they belong to the category of quality, more precisely, to its first species.[34] One can easily understand why John, raising the questions *Utrum metaphysica et dialectica versentur circa idem*, dismisses the common opinion that the object of logic are second intentions. In his opinion, on the contrary, logic deals with real things, just as metaphysics does. The distinction between the two sciences, therefore, is not based on a different object but on a different *ratio considerandi* the same object.[35]

Pinborg remarked that Jandun dissents from Radulphus Brito also on the issue of the actual production—by human intellect—of concepts such as "*homo*" or "*animal*," "*species*" or "*genus*." Radulphus based his account on the theory of *modi essendi* or *apparentia* of the thing known;[36] Jandun rejects this idea in favor of a direct derivation from the essence of the object.[37] While Radulphus's adoption of "*apparentia*" could be used to explain how different essential concepts could be derived from only one substantial form, Jandun's dismissal of this possibility is linked to his adherence to the doctrine of plurality of forms. What Jean-Baptiste

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[34] See also the edition of the manuscript version, in: Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones*," 80–85.

[35] Cf. *Z*, IV, q. 6, fol. 50G–M, esp. fol. 50H: "Ista opinio supponit quod logica primo et per se considerat intentiones et non res: quod non valet [. . .]." The manuscript version does not include this question. Cf. also *Z*, VI, q. 3, *Utrum divisio scientiae, imo philosophiae speculativae, in naturalem, mathematicam et divinam sit sufficiens*, fols. 79ra–K-80G, where Jandun stresses that logic is at the same time practical and *realis*.

[36] For Radulphus's position, see Jan Pinborg's groundbreaking articles, e.g., "Radulphus Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions," *Vivarium* 13 (1975), 119–52; "Raduphus Brito on Universals," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 35 (1980), 56–142; but also Sten Ebbesen, "The Sophism *Rationale est animal* by Radulphus Brito," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 24 (1978), 85–120. See also Roberto Lambertini, "*Utrum genus possit salvari in unica specie*. Problemi di semantica dei termini universali tra Gentile da Cingoli e Radulphus Brito," in: Giovanna Corsi, Corrado Mangione, & Massimo Mugnai, eds., *Le teorie delle modalità*. Atti Congresso di Storia della Logica della Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia della Scienza, svoltosi a San Gimignano dal 5 all'8 dicembre 1987 (Bologna, 1989), pp. 283–88. For a recent introduction to Radulphus Brito and his work, see Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito"; and Jacopo Costa, *Le questiones di Radulfo Brito sull' "Etica nicomachea." Introduzione e testo critico* (Turnhout, 2008), pp. 99–103.

[37] See Pinborg, "A Note," p. 293; cf. *Z*, III, q. 12, *Utrum genus praedicetur de differentia per se*, fols. 41I–43F, esp. fol. 410P; the manuscript version, *A*, III, q. 3, fol. 29va–b, although touching on the same issues, is much less developed.

Brenet rightly underlines for the composite nature of human beings is therefore common to the ontological structure of every created being.[38] In several passages of this commentary, Jandun advocates the doctrine of the plurality of forms, for example where he discusses problems concerning predication,[39] but also in Book VI, q. 34, where he raises a question concerning the composition of the species. Here he exposes at length Auriol's position and then refutes it.[40] Jandun believes to have detected a sort of Platonism in Auriol's thought.[41]

A peculiar emphasis on the role played by form in the ontological "texture" of the world can be observed also in Jandun's treatment of other issues, such as, for example, the controversy about the meaning of concrete accidental terms. The terms of the discussion, in which many *magistri* took the floor, have been masterly explained in a ground-breaking article by Sten Ebbesen.[42] Now, Jandun defends the solution that such a term signifies both form and subject, but in the first place the form, and only as a consequence also the *subiectum*; a very similar opinion had been held also by Siger of Brabant. However, Jandun explicitly attributes the position he supports to the teaching of Averroes.[43]

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[38] See Jean-Baptiste Brenet, "Ame intellective, âme cogitative: Jean de Jandun et la duplex forma propria de l'homme," *Vivarium* 46 (2008), 318–44.

[39] Cf. *Z*, III, q. 12, *Utrum genus praedicetur de differentia per se*, fols. 41I–43F, esp. fol. 41O: "[…] ista opinio fundatur super hoc quod genus et differentia important unam essentiam et formam, et tamen differunt secundum rationes diversas acceptas a diversis modis essendi. Istud fundamentum non valet […]." A detailed presentation of Jandun's own position also in *Z*, II, q. 10, *Utrum partes diffinitionis logicae sint diversae formae realiter*, fols. 30P–35M.

[40] Cf. *Z*, V, q. 34, *Utrum species realiter sit composita ex genere et differentia*, fols. 73LM–76C, esp. fol. 73Q, where he summarizes Auriol's position in the following terms: "[…] per conceptum generis et differentiae intelligo alium et alium conceptum obiectivum quem fecit intellectus de ipsa re et super quem intellectus aspectum suum figit […]."

[41] Actually, in one passage Jandun attributes Auriol's terminology to Plato; see *Z*, VII, q. 24, *Utrum universalia sint separata a singularibus sensibilibus et corruptibilibus*, fol. 104B: "Licet tamen aliqui moderni incidant in illum errorem Platonis qui posuit conceptus obiectales et in prospectu […]."

[42] See Sten Ebbesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms. Late Thirteenth Century Debates About Problems Relating to Such Terms as 'album,'" in: Norman Kretzmann, ed., *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg* (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 107–74; editions of related texts in Sten Ebbesen, "Termini accidentales concreti. Texts from the late 13th Century," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 53 (1986), 37–150; cf. also Roberto Lambertini, "Intentions in Fourteenth Century Bologna: Jandun, Alnwick and the Mysterious 'G,'" in: Sten Ebbesen & Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*. Acts of the Symposium *The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy*, January 10–13, 1996 (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 431–51.

[43] Cf. *Z*, V, q. 15, *Utrum terminus concretus accidentalis significet primo formam vel subiectum vel aggregatum ex forma et subiecto*, fols. 63O–64H, esp. fol. 64E–F: "Intelligendum tamen, ut dicit Commentator, quod terminus concretus significet duo, hoc non est

John stressed the role of form as opposed to that of the composite also in the debate concerning the *terminus generationis*. The investigations of previous scholars showed that Jandun carried out a long discussion about this topic with Bartholomaeus of Bruges.[44] Bartholomaeus had maintained that the composite is the *terminus generationis* in its proper sense, and this notion had been criticized by Jandun in a *sophisma* entitled *Utrum forma substantialis perficiens materiam sit corruptibilis*, published for the first time by Kuksewicz under the name of Jordanus de Tridento, later more correctly attributed to Jandun.[45] Bartholomaeus reacted to this criticism in another *sophisma*. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*—although only in the version transmitted by the manuscripts—John refers explicitly to a previous phase of the discussion.[46] Already in the 1950s, Anneliese Maier drew the attention of scholars to Jandun's participation in the debate concerning intension and remission of substantial forms.[47] In his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the Parisian Arts Master connects this problem with the issue of the permanence of elements in a mixture.[48] Against a solution put forward by Auriol, who argued that substantial forms do not remain in the mixture, Jandun argues that they do remain, although in a, so to speak, weaker form. Jandun speaks of "*esse diminutum*" or "*esse refractum*": this implies that substantial forms can exist in different degrees. On this basis, in Book VIII Jandun can maintain that substantial forms can change according to "more or less," that is, they experience intension and remission. In this way, the forms of the elements possess an ontological status intermediate between accidental forms and

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quocumque modo, unde secundum Commentatorem terminus concretus primo significat formam, et secundario subiectum primum; probatur: quia illus significat primo terminus, cuius est ratio sub qua terminus significat." *A*, V, q. 6, *Utrum terminus concretus significet formam et subiectum*, fol. 44va–b is much shorter and does not devote the same attention to other *opiniones*.

44 For updated and reliable information about this Arts master, see Marco Toste, "Bartholomaeus de Brugis," in: Michael Lapidge, Gian Carlo Garfagnini, & Claudio Leonardi, eds., *C.A.L.M.A. Compendium Auctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi (500–1500)* (Florence, 2003), fasc. I.6, pp. 700–04.

45 Cf. Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Questiones*," p. 61; edition in Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, *Averroisme bolonais au XIV*^{e} siècle (Wrocław-Warsaw-Krakow, 1965), pp. 197–215.

46 The text of the manuscript version is edited in Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Questiones*," pp. 85–93; in particular at 87: "Modo dicendum est ad questionem, et licet aliter dixerim alias quam nunc, quoad secundum membrum […]. Tertio dicendum est quod forma est per se et primo terminus generationis tertio modo primitatis et perseitatis"; as mentioned in the text, this reference to previous interventions in the debate is absent in *Z*, VII, q. 16, fols. 95B–96C.

47 See Maier, *An der Grenze*, pp. 42–43.

48 Cf. *Z*, V, q. 6, *Utrum formae elementorum remaneant in mixto*, fols. 59M–60O.

substantial forms of the mixtures of which they are a part.[49] Somebody could object that nouns designating elements, such as "*aqua*" or "*ignis*," do not admit any degree of comparison. Jandun argues that nouns not always reflect reality, and forms such as "*igneior*" are prohibited by grammar only because they are cacophonous.[50] Actually—John observes—physicians make continuously use of expressions that are equivalent to a comparative, when they speak of "*magis igneum*" or "*magis acqueum*."[51]

As it happens, in particular, in his treatment of *termini accidentales concreti*, Jandun is very accurate in tracing back his own position to the teachings of the Commentator. As already mentioned, this feature of his style in commenting on Aristotle's texts earned him the title of *princeps averroistarum* and led some interpreters to classify his work as a mere transposition of Averroes's thought in the context of the Parisian Arts Faculty at the beginning of the 14th century. Recent and thorough-going comparisons of his thought with that of the master of Cordova have shown important differences between the two thinkers.[52] Jandun's Commentary on *De anima* is surely the most appropriate and informative source for an examination of Jandun's relationship to Averroes. This notwithstanding, also his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* shows interesting influences of Averroes's noetics. A telling example is Jandun's treatment of a *quaestio* that was often raised in the context of the commentaries on Book IV of the *Metaphysics*, that is, *Utrum opiniones contradictoriorum sint contrarie*. Based on Aristotle's assertion in the context of his discussion about the "first principle," the usual answer is positive.[53] As a matter of fact, Jandun formulates the main answer of his *quaestio* in the same way (*sicut communiter dicitur*): Contradictory opinions oppose each other as contraries,

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[49] Cf. *Z*, VIII, q. 5, *Utrum forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus*, fols. 109F–110E–F.

[50] *Ibid.*, fol. 110E.

[51] This example can be read also in *A*, VIII, q. 2, fol. 73vb.

[52] Brenet insists on this point not only in his monograph but also in some important articles, such as: "Perfection de la philosophie ou philosophe parfait? Jean de Jandun lecteur d'Averroes," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 68.2 (2001), 310–48; "Du phantasme à l'espèce intelligible: la ruine d'Averroès par l' 'averroiste' Jean de Jandun," in: Maria C. Pacheco & José F. Meirinhos, eds., *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Actes du 11. Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002*, 3 vols. (Turnhout, 2006), vol. 2, pp. 1179–90.

[53] Cf. *Z*, IV, q. 12, fol. 53B–L, esp. fol. 63C: "Ad questionem dicitur communiter quod opiniones contradictoriorum sunt contrarie."

which cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject. At this point of his treatment, Jandun raises a doubt founded on Averroes's doctrine of the unicity of the possible intellect in all human beings.[54] Since it is evident that different human beings can hold contradictory *opiniones* at the same time, from the first conclusion of the *quaestio* it would necessary follow that contraries are simultaneously present in the same subject, namely, in the intellect, that is common to the whole human species.[55]

Some try to escape from this unwelcome consequence—Jandun says—arguing that two contrary opinions are incompossible in the same subject only if they refer to the same person. John dismisses such an explanation, however, because he is persuaded that such opinions are positive entities existing in the intellect. Their respects to different thinking persons are only accidental features that cannot influence contrariety.[56] In the end, Jandun feels himself compelled to admit that contradictory opinions are not contrary. As a consequence, to avoid a patent disagreement with Aristotle, he claims that, in the relevant passages, the Stagirite is not expressing his own opinion but is only arguing *ex suppositione*.[57]

5. God's Omnipotence

Question 15 on Book XII bears the title *Utrum primum principium sit infiniti vigoris*.[58] After explaining that the problem at issue does not concern

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[54] The contrast between the first answer after "dicendum ad questionem" and Jandun's own position, cast in the context of a *dubium*, is particularly striking in the versions preserved in the manuscripts; the edition of both *recensiones* of this question in Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Questiones*," pp. 70–80. In the printed version, the passage is smoother.

[55] Cf. *Utrum opiniones contradictoriorum sint contrarie*, in: Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones*," p. 73: "Non videtur esse verum, quia Commentator in 3° De anima vult quod non est nisi unus intellectus numero in omnibus hominibus et dicit hoc esse de intentione Aristotelis incontradicibilter. Sed omnis opinio est in intellectu quia omnis opinio est universalium, sed diversi homines possunt opinari contradictoria simul, hoc est per se notum, in eodem instanti. Ex hoc sic: si opiniones huiusmodi essent contrarie, tunc contraria essent simul in eodem subiecto indivisibili [...]."; cf. *Z*, IV, q. 12, fol. 53E–F.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 80: "nec dico propter respectum, sicut aliqui dicunt, quia isti respectus nihil faciunt ad hoc, quod sint simul vel non, cum accidant opinionibus. Unde non impediunt contrarietatem." Cf. *Z*, IV, q. 12, fol. 53L.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 75: "Unde Aristoteles simpliciter et absolute non affirmat nisi ex suppositione, ut si adversarius concedit quod contradictoria simul verificantur de eodem, tunc contraria sunt simul in te." Cf. *Z*, IV, q. 12, fol. 53G. Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, p. 130, refers to an indipendent *Quaestio de simultate contradictoriorum*, attributed to Jandun in Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, 2° 178, fols. 146rb–149va, carrying the date 3 September 1320, but remarks that it does not offer any clue for dating the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

[58] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 15, fols. 136M–138G. According to the numbering in *A*, *Utrum deus sit infiniti vigoris intensive* (fols. 76rb–77ra) is q. 2 of the same book.

infinity in time, which would not be controversial, but infinity in actual intensity, *intensive*, John expounds the arguments in favor of the negative. The main obstacle for admitting intensive infinity in God consists in the consequences that it would have for the explication of universal motion. According to Aristotle and Averroes, Jandun remarks, a principle of motion endowed with infinite force would be able to move objects in no time, which is instantaneously, and is absurd.[59] Moreover, the infinity of the first principle could be proved only on the basis of the effects it produces. Its effects, however, such as time and motion, are finite. The philosopher cannot accept propositions that contradict the evidence of his experience.[60] At this point, Jandun refers explicitly to Aquinas and to his attempt at countering this argument in his commentary on Book VIII of the *Physics*. *Sanctus Thomas* (or, as *A* writes, *frater Thomas*)[61] had based his objection on the fact that the first principle possesses will and intellect and can, therefore, adapt his force (which in itself is infinite) to the finite motions he wants to produce.[62] For his part, Jandun refutes Aquinas's objection, maintaining that Aristotle would not accept the mutability in the will of the first principle that is implied by the argument of the Dominican Master.[63]

To such conclusions, which can be derived from Aristotle and Averroes, John opposes the solution grounded on sole faith: God is *infiniti vigoris intensive*.[64] The philosophers could not share this position because they

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[59] *Ibid.*, fol. 136N–O: "Secundo est dicendum ad questionem secundum intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris. Prima est quod Deus non est infiniti vigoris intensive. Et causa est: si Deus esset infiniti vigoris intensive, tunc moveret in non tempore, sed hoc est falsum, quia motus non fit in instanti."

[60] *Ibid.*, fol. 136P–Q: "Item, nihil debet poni in philosophia, nisi possit convinci ex manifestis sensui [. . .] quod primum principium sit infiniti vigoris non potest convinci ex sensatis ex parte substantiae eius, quia substantia eius non est sensibilis, nec ex parte effectuum [. . .] quia motus et tempus sunt finita et limitata."

[61] Cf. *A*, XII, q. 2, fol. 76vb: "Nota quod frater Thomas in 8 Physicorum conatur infringere rationem Aristotelis."

[62] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 15, fols. 136Q–137A: "Nota quod aliqui volunt impedire istam rationem, et dicunt quod differentia est inter agens et movens secundum naturam, et agens et movens per voluntatem et intellectum [. . .] et ista est obiectio sancti Thomae octavo physicorum."

[63] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 15, fol. 137A: "Ad hoc diceret Aristoteles quod verum est de voluntate et intellectu transmutabili [. . .] sed agens per intellectum et semper quantum potest et amat et appetit semper eodem modo."

[64] Thomas Wylton's *Quodlibet* has been identified as a source for this position of Jandun's; see Elzbieta Jung-Palczewska, "La question quodlibétique *De infinitate vigoris Dei* de Thomas de Wylton," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 64 (1997), 335–403. Textual dependence, however, was proved only for Jandun's disputed question bearing the same title: cf. Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, "Johannes de Janduno *De infinitate vigoris Dei*," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 24 (1985), 112–52.

were arguing *naturaliter*, basing themselves only on sense experience. As the version contained in *A* puts it, there can be little surprise that God, being the author of nature, can do more than nature can understand. His infinity, therefore, must be believed without any demonstration.[65] A similar, sharp divergence between philosophy and faith exists, according to Jandun, in relation to the interpretation of the scope of God's omnipotence. In the same *quaestio* he claims that God is omnipotent in the sense that he can do whatever is possible, while the capacity of other beings is limited to some possibilities. To think that God can do what is not possible does not increase his dignity but, on the contrary, is based on a mistake.[66] Such an interpretation of God's omnipotence is strictly connected to John of Jandun's determinism. The issue undergoes a specific analysis in Book IX, where John raises the question whether a possibility can lack being put into effect forever or, better, *Utrum aliquid sit possible in rerum natura quod numquam erit*.[67] He distinguishes between two kinds of necessity: the first is continuous, in the sense that applies to every moment of time; the second kind is called *necessitas intercisa* and concerns events that take place only in certain moments of time; on their part, such events can be predictable or not. The fact, however, that we are not able to predict them does not affect their natural necessity.[68] The Parisian master does not ignore that such a position is subject to usual objections appealing to freedom of choice and the like. Still, he believes that the attribute "*liberum*," in "*liberum arbitrium*" does not imply the possibility of willing in a different way, or not willing, but, in a much more appropriate way, that the choice is made according to reason and for its own sake.[69] Jandun

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[65] Cf. *A*, XII, q. 2, fol. 76v: "Nec mirum si Deus, qui est auctor nature, potest plus facere quam natura certum de se potest intelligere, quia sicut ipse omnia excedit in infinitum, sic etiam in potentia agendi. Et est credendum firmiter sine aliqua demonstratione sacrosanctae ecclesiae doctoribus etc."

[66] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 16, fol. 137M.

[67] Cf. *Z*, IX, 5, fols. 114K–115O.

[68] *Ibid.*, fol. 115C: "sed necessitas intercisa et et indeterminata nobis, determinata tamen nature etc., certa naturaliter quanto tempore non erit et in quo tempore erit, sed nobis est incertum, quia non possumus mensurare naturaliter, quanto tempore non erit et in quo tempore erit [. . .]." To this issue John devoted a disputed question, bearing the title *Omne generabile de necessitate generabitur*: see McClintock, *Perversity and Error*, p. 119; and Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, p. 130.

[69] *Ibid.*, fol. 115E: "Ad aliud quod periret liberum arbitrium negatur, quia libertas arbitrii non est ad hoc quod aliquis possit eligere aliud et non eligere, qua contradictoria essent simul, sed sufficit ad libertatem quod aliquis eligat secundum rationem et gratia sui"; in *A*, IX, q. 1, *Utrum aliquid sit possibile in rerum natura quod numquam erit*, fol. 74va, Jandun attributes to *quidam legista* a sentence (*potestas addita peccandi non auget libertatem*)

cannot conceal, however, that this conclusion is divergent from Christian faith. He adds, therefore, that according to faith and to the doctors in Holy Scripture, some real possibilities never come true, and to believe it is meritorious.[70]

6. Politics in Metaphysics

Although a Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is unlikely to be the context where one expresses one's views about politics, some clues nevertheless surface in some questions, and these have been investigated by the scholars who were mainly interested in exploring possible connections to the ideas defended in the *Defensor pacis*. The harvest of such investigations was not very rich, but led many specialists to the persuasion that there is a significant gap between the opinions contained in the Commentary and the political theory of the *Defensor pacis*.[71]

The question of the relationship between Marsilius's political masterpiece and the few elements of political theory contained in John's Commentary cannot be examined, let alone solved here, but it can be useful to summarize the political opinions that surface directly or indirectly in his question on the *Metaphysics*. Already in the first question of Book I, John adopts the traditional distinction between *felicitas politica* and *felicitas speculativa*.[72] He is surely not original in maintaining that *felicitas politica* (or *practica*, for that matter) is attained through the acts of moral virtues and prudence.[73] The peculiarity of his position, however, emerges when

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that, as matter of fact, strongly recalls Anselm's *De libero arbitrio*. This puzzling reference is not present in *Z*.

[70] *Ibid.*, fol. 115M; in this passage John speaks in the third person; in *A*, fol. 75ra, he uses impersonal expression: "Ita diceret Aristoteles et Commentator ut credo secundum sua fundamenta. Tamen (*A: tunc*) aliter est dicendum secundum fidem et veritatem, quod imo est credendum firmiter sine demonstratione, quia aliter non haberemus meritum." A summarizing presentation of Jandun's position in Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 88–93.

[71] About this problem, see, in particular, Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 67–87; more updated Dolcini, *Introduzione a Marsilio*.

[72] In my opinion, the originality of Jandun's position consists not in subordinating *felicitas politica* to *felicitas speculativa* (an opinion that was shared by many authors) but, rather, in the way he conceives of the terms of this relationship; for another, contemporary interpretation of Jandun's stance, see Emanuele Coccia, *La trasparenza delle immagini. Averroè e l'averroismo* (Milan, 2005), esp. 191.

[73] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 1, fol. 1rb: "quedam est felicitas politica vel practica, que consistit in compositione virtutum moralium." Cf. Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 65–67, who deals with this issue as it is discussed in all works by Jandun.

it comes to describing in a more detailed way in what political happiness consists. In the first place, John distinguishes between the *virtus* of the prince and those of his subjects, arguing (in the wake of a trend in the reception of Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*)[74] that they must differ, since the prince should be by far excellent in every respect in comparison to his *subditi*.[75] Political happiness consists, therefore, in a most perfect act of prudence, as it exists in the prince. According to Jandun, this coincides with the act of ordering the subjects to devote themselves to knowing God. In this respect, John remarks, one notices an admirable agreement between philosophy and the doctrine "*piissimi legislatoris domini nostri Jesu Christi*," who expressly taught that the most important commandment is to love God.[76] For his part, although aware of dissenting opinions on this point, Jandun thinks that loving and knowing God do not differ substantially, only in their relation to extrinsic operations, such as giving alms or fasting, which are expressions of love for God.[77]

John's particular stress on the role of the ruler is consistent with his idea, expressed in his question *Utrum metaphysica sit libera*, according to which subordination among human beings is not only natural but also necessary to the well-being of a political community. Some persons are, in fact, naturally inclined toward being subjects, while others are endowed by nature with the gifts needed for freedom. According to Jandun, who on this point is clearly influenced by the medieval reception of Aristotle's political writings, this amounts to saying that the distinction between

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[74] Cf., e.g., Roberto Lambertini, "Political Prudence in Some Medieval Commentaries on the Sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics," in: Istvan P. Bejczy, ed., *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History) 160 (Leiden-Boston, 2008), pp. 223–46, esp. 232–34; more detailed Marco Toste, "Virtue and the City: The Virtues of the Ruler and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of the Politics," in: Istvan P. Bejczy & Cary J. Nederman, eds., *Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200–1500* (Turnhout, 2007), pp. 75–100.

[75] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 19, fol. 14va: "Tunc dicendum quod felicitas practica consistit in actu prudentiae quae est in principe, cum virtus principis debeat superexcellere omnes alios, sed proprius actus principis est actus precipiendi [...] in illo actu precipiendi consistit felicitas politica in precipere operanti ad cognitionem dei."

[76] *Ibid.*: "Et hec doctrina mirabiliter propinqua est doctrinae piissimi legislatoris domini nostri Iesu christi, qui cum ab eo quaereretur quod est primum mandatum in lege, respondit dilige deum tuum."

[77] *Ibid.*: "Utrum autem actus dilectionis et cognitionis dei sint idem vel diversi sunt opiniones, tamen mihi videtur quod non sit aliqua diversitas realis, licet differant per habitudinem ad exstrinseca, quia cognitio dei est secundum substantiam et secundum se, sed dilectio dei est per comparationem ad extrinseca, ut quo ad dare elemosynam et ieiunare."

those who rule and those who are ruled goes back to nature.[78] Revealing that he is interpreting Aristotle's political concepts through the mediation of his own experience of late medieval society, John feels the need to distinguish between freedom and nobility: freedom is a natural inclination toward virtue that can be possessed also by an individual; nobility, in contrast, designates a natural inclination towards virtue that is inherited from his forefathers.[79]

Against this background, Jandun adopts Aristotle's classification of different constitutions.[80] As Schmugge rightly pointed out, John's description of *democratia*, that is, the corrupted form of the government of the many, is of particular interest. Going beyond what is suggested by the Aristotelian text, in fact, John writes that in democratic constitutions the poor rule, neglecting the good of the prince and of the rich *propter libertatem* and claim that all men are equal in freedom, because they are all children of Adam.[81] It goes without saying that such claims possess a distinct medieval and Christian flavor. As noted above, Jandun find such egalitarian ideas alien, because he is persuaded that every political community should consist of those who rule and others that are ruled.[82] Moreover, John voices in several passages his preference for monarchy, not only in the last question on Book XII but also elsewhere.[83]

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[78] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 22, *Utrum metaphysica sit scientia libera*, fols. 18D–19I, esp. fol. 18K–M. For this aspet of Aristotle's reception, see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*, vol. I, pp. 35–75; also Christoph Flüeler, "Ontologie und Politik: *Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex racione actus et potencie*," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 41 (1994), 445–62.

[79] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 22, fol. 18L: "Unde liber differt a nobili, quia liber est qui habet naturalem inclinationem ad virtutes, non ex progenitoribus, unde potest esse quod ex mala progenie sit liber." In this context, Jandun distinguishes further between "*nobilis*" and "*ingenuus*" suggesting that "*ingenuus*" refers to ancient nobility. The same distinction is only sketched in the manuscript version: cf. *A*, I, q. 13, fol. 16ra. Cf. Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 76–80.

[80] John's treatment of this issue is inserted in his *quaestio Z*, I, q. 18, *Utrum philosophi pure speculativi sint permittendi in politica*, fols. 14ra–15ra.

[81] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 18, fol. 14va: "vel egeni dominantur propter proprium bonum neglecto bono principis et divitum, unde ibi dominantur pauperes propter libertatem, quia dicunt quod unus est ita liber, sicut alius, quia omnes filii ade sumus, et talis dicitur dimocratia."

[82] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 12, fol. 18G: "Modo foelicitas est finis in politia, et politia non potest esse felix sine libero et subdito."

[83] For example, *Z*, I, q. 22, fol. 19, where he speaks of "*foelix politia*" and "*regalis monarchia*" as if these expressions were synonyms: "Alio modo persuasio potest accipi pro cognitione bonorum, ad quorum imitationem et sequelam debet institui felix politia et regalis monarchia." In *Z*, XII, q. 22, *Utrum in toto universo debeat esse unus princeps, et hoc est quaerere, utrum in toto universo sit unus deus vel plures*, fols. 143H–144Q the whole argument turns around the analogy between the order of the universe, and the political

He also seems persuaded that all goods existing in the political community belong to the king;[84] this issue had been traditionally discussed with different results among medieval doctors in civil law, it had been already tackled also in the *de potestate papae* literature, on the occasion of the controversy between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair, and solved in quite a different way by John of Paris, to cite one example.[85]

In the last question of Book XII, Jandun is also confronted with an objection based on the political situation of his time. Arguing in favor of the uniqueness of God, John has recourse to natural but also political analogies. A *ratio in contrarium* points out that in the human community there are two rulers, namely, the king and the pope, and neither accepts being subject to the other.[86] In his answer, John claims that there should be only one ruler for the whole mankind and that the king is subject to the pope, but only in spiritual matters. To the further objection that the validity of such an answer is limited to Christianity, Jandun counters that in principle and according to right reason, all human beings should embrace the only true faith, and insofar as they refuse to do so, they act contrary to *recta ratio*.[87]

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community: both need to be ruled by only one sovereign. Cf. Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 68–71.

[84] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 18, fol. 15va: "[…] omnia in civitate sunt principis, quia politicus vir est in cuius potestate sunt omnia subiacentia […]." In *A*., I, q. 10, fol. 13va, one reads "*politicus rex*" instead of "*politicus vir*."

[85] On this issue, see Janet Coleman, "Medieval Discussions of Property: *ratio* and *dominium* according to John of Paris and Marsilius of Padua," *History of Political Thought* 4 (1983), 209–28, and "*Dominium* in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth Century Political Thought and its Seventeenth-Century Heirs: John of Paris and Locke," *Political Studies* 33 (1985), 73–100; more recently, Karl Ubl & Lars Vinx, "Kirche, Arbeit und Eigentum bei Johannes Quidort von Paris O.P. (†1306)," in: Christoph Egger & Herwig Weigl, eds., *Text-Schrift-Codex. Quellenkundliche Arbeiten aus dem Institut für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung* (Munich, 2000), pp. 304–44; Karl Ubl, "Johannes Quidorts Weg zur Sozialphilosophie," *Francia* 30.1 (2003), 43–72.

[86] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 22, fol. 143I: "in homine sunt plures dominantes, quorum unus non est sub alio, nec obedit sibi, ut rex et summus pontifex, quia neuter vult esse subiectus alteri, ergo non est unus."

[87] Cf. *Z*, XII, q. 22, fol. 144C carries a rather corrupted text that does not seem to make sense at all; Jandun's position emerges more clearly in *A*, XII, q. 6, fols. 80vb–81ra: "Dicendum quod rex subest summo pontifici, saltim quo ad spiritualia. Si dicas: tu solum loqueris de christianis, dicendum quod sufficit quod omnes cuiuscumque legis quantum est de condigno deberent subici legi christianorum quia ipsa est probata per tot et tanta evidentia miracula, que per nullum nisi per deum fieri poterunt; unde quantum est de condigno omnes deberent subici legi christianorum et per consequens summo pontifici, ymmo eo ipso plus errant et deficiunt a racta ratione quanto plus resistunt legi christiane." Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun,* p. 94, puts forward an interpretation based only on the printed text, which I can share only in general, not in its details.

Understandably, many scholars focused their attention on question 11 of Book II, where, following a suggestion contained in Averroes's commentary on the *Metaphysics*,[88] John asks whether *consuetudo in legibus* can be an obstacle in learning philosophy. Since the term "leges" refers to not only laws but also religions, one could reasonably look for traces of the rationalist attitude towards faith that is notoriously attributed to "averroist" thinkers [89] As a matter of fact, Jandun denies overtly that, differently from the pagan religions, Islam and Judaism, the Christian faith, being true, can create difficulties in acquiring philosophical knowledge.[90] In another passage, he claims that the faith of ordinary people (*fides vulgi*) is stronger than the faith of the philosophers (as Averroes complains) only in the countries where a false religion is observed.[91] His discussion, however, does not stop here, since he embarks on a distinction between natural and positive law. Natural law, being an expression of the first practical principles (conceived of in analogy to the first principles of metaphysics), cannot possibly represent an obstacle to the attainment of philosophical truth. Only positive laws, in case they are not derived from the principles of natural law by deduction or further determination (Jandun uses the terms "*contractio*" and "*specificatio*"), as they should, can play a negative, misleading role.[92] Such a doctrine, embedded as it is in terms that are strongly reminiscent of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, represents a widespread way of representing the relationship between practical truths and positive, written rules governing the life of a political community.[93]

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[88] Cf. *Z*, II, q. 11, fols. 34N–35N.

[89] About this issue, see the ground-breaking article by Mario Grignaschi, "Indagine sui passi del 'Commento' suscettibili di avere promosso la formazione di un averroismo politico," in: *L'averroismo in Italia.* Convegno Internazionale: Rome, 18–20 aprile 1977 (Atti dei Convegni Lincei) 40 (Rome, 1977), pp. 237–78; this article has been reprinted, albeit without footnotes in Arabic and without appendix in Carlo Dolcini, ed., *Il pensiero politico medievale* (Bologna, 1983), pp. 273–312.

[90] Cf. *Z*, II, q. 11, fol. 35C: "Secundo modo oritur lex propria a lege communi sine admixtione erroris, ita quod nihil est in ea contra rationem, sicut in nostra lege christiana [...]. Tertio dicendum quod lex propria que est cum admixtione erroris, illa est fortissimum impedimentum in cognitione veritatis."

[91] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 17, fol. 14ra. "Et quando Commentator dixit quod fides vulgi fortior est fide philosophorum, intellexit in legibus falsis, et non in veris."

[92] Cf. *Z*, II, q. 11, fol. 35B: "[...] unde lex propria, secundum quam scriptam homines vivunt debet inniti legi communi, non sicut conclusio quae innititur principiis eius ex quibus de necessitate infertur, sed innititur legi communi alio modo, scilicet per modum contractionis et specificationis superadditae."

[93] As a matter of fact, in *Summa Theologiae*, $I^{a}II^{ae}$, q. 94, a. 2, Aquinas speaks of "*determinatio*" and "*specificatio*" and does not rule out the possibility that some human laws can derive from natural law as conclusions derive from premises.

One of the main tenets of the *Defensor pacis*, in contrast, consists of weakening the role of natural law in political and legal theory, emphasizing—as is well known—the key role played by positive law, thought of not as a derivation from higher principles but as a coercive rule founded on the consent of the citizens.[94] This undeniable and striking difference allowed Carlo Dolcini to write that the opinion held in the Commentary on *Metaphysics* must have been at some point abandoned by Marsilius and Jandun, if the second was involved in some way in the redaction of the *Defensor pacis*, which the Italian scholar judges to be very likely.[95]

Consistent with his idea of philosophy, John thinks that philosophers in the proper sense of the term should devote themselves exclusively to pure speculation. His position is confirmed by a *questio* he discusses in the first book of his commentary, although he admits that the issue belongs more to moral philosophy than to metaphysics: *Utrum philosophi pure speculativi sint admittendi in politica*.[96] In the discussion, Jandun criticizes a very widespread medieval opinion, namely, that philosophers contribute to the well-being of the political community by acting as counselors of the sovereign. This in itself rather commonsensical claim[97] could be found, for example, in one of the most successful mirrors for princes of his age, the *De regimine principum* by Giles of Rome.[98] Jandun counters that philosophers or, more precisely, purely speculative philosophers do not deal with practical matters, so that they cannot be useful to the sovereign with their advice.

Having ruled out this possibility, however, Jandun is confronted with the necessity of defining a different role that speculative philosophers can play in the political community, since he has previously conceded that they should be excluded from the *civitas* unless it can be proved that they are useful to the community. Jandun conceives, in fact, of such utility in a

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[94] See Dolcini, *Introduzione a Marsilio*, esp. pp. 28–30; Cary J. Nederman, *Community and Consent. The Secular Political Theory of Marsilio of Padua's Defensor pacis* (Lanham, Md., 1995); and Jurgen Miethke, De potestate papae. *Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham* (Tübingen, 2000), pp. 204–21.

[95] See Dolcini, *Introduzione*, p. 17.

[96] Cf. *Z*, I, q. 18, fols. 14ra–15va.

[97] Most probably for this reason, Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, p. 72, was mistakenly led to attribute the same idea to Jandun himself. Cf. Roberto Lambertini, "Felicitas politica und speculatio. Die Idee der Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Politik nach Johannes von Jandun," in: *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter*, pp. 984–90.

[98] See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III, 4 and 17–19, ed. Hieronymus Samaritanius (Rome, 1607; repr. Aalen, 1967), pp. 460, 497–506.

rather original way: they can teach the sovereign how to reach the knowledge of God, a knowledge that is necessary to his role that is leading the community to the *felicitas politica*. Differently from many other interpreters of Aristotle's practical philosophy, according to whom political happiness is linked to peace and welfare of the political community, Jandun stresses that *felicitas politica* for the sovereign consists essentially in ordering his subjects to pursue the knowledge of God. This is not possible, John remarks, unless the sovereign himself possesses such a knowledge, which can be taught to him only by speculative philosophers. In Jandun's opinion, therefore, God's cognition is the goal of the whole human community. Speculative philosophers, however, reach it by themselves, while the ruler (at least in some cases) needs to be taught about it by those who already possess it. Most likely, although Jandun does not go into detail on this issue, the same holds true for the rest of populace. Not surprisingly, according to Jandun, speculative philosophers are not merely useful to the political community but play an essential, necessary role in it. It is only consistent with this claim that he seems to suggest a comparison of their position with that held in ancient Egypt by priests who, in his interpretation, free from all temporal care, enjoyed the possibility of devoting themselves totally to speculation.[99] In a recent contribution of his, Jean-Baptiste Brenet has argued, on the basis of Jandun's interpretation of the attainment of philosophical perfection as a collective performance, against the tendency of scholars to see in Jandun an "elitist."[100] In the same paper, however, Brenet rightly emphasizes some lack of consistency in John's position. For example, the Parisian Arts master does not conceal his diffidence towards the multitude: "*Homines ut in pluribus sunt proni ad malum*."[101]

7. Influence

As for now, the results of current research are still far from allowing a comprehensive assessment of the influence Jandun's Commentary on the

[99] For a detailed discussion of the whole question, see Lambertini, "Felicitas politica."
[100] See Brenet, "Perfection de la philosophie," pp. 341–47.
[101] Cf. *Z*, II, q. 4, *Utrum intellectus noster coniunctus magnitudini possit cognoscere substantias abstractas et Deum*, fols. 22M–26M, the quotation is from fol. 26AB, where John continues: "Videtur autem aliquid quidem in ipsis praeter rationem innatum, quod adversatur et obviat rationi."

Metaphysics exerted on his contemporaries and later medieval authors.[102] The Arts masters from Bologna, the so-called "Bolognese averroists" have long been an obvious test case in this respect, but even in this milieu, evidence is not univocal. Studies concerning Jandun's noetics, as exposed in his Commentary on *De anima*, revealed a significant reception of his doctrines by some Bolognese masters, but also by authors active in Erfurt or Krakow.[103] The relationship between John and Anthony of Parma, active both in Paris and in Bologna, needs further assessment.[104] Already in the 1950s, Sofia Vanni Rovighi could show that Thaddaeus of Parma derived a great part of his commentary on Book III of *De anima* from the Parisian master.[105] Also, Thaddaeus's doctrine of *sensus agens* is strongly influenced, as Adriaan Pattin established some years ago, by Jandun's controversial position.[106] For his part, James of Piacenza is clearly acquainted with Jandun's interpretation not only of Aristotle's noetics but also of Averroes's exegesis of the Aristotelian text.[107] Examples of this sort could be

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[102] Schmugge, *Johannes von Jandun*, pp. 38–44, devotes his attention to the reception of Jandun in general; very interesting, but focused on the reception of Jandun's noetics, is Jean-Baptiste Brenet, "Moi qui pense, moi qui souffre: l'identité du composé humain dans l'anti-averroïsme de Pierre d'Auriole et Grégoire de Rimini," in: Olivier Boulnois, ed., *Généalogies du sujet. De saint Anselme à Malebranche* (Paris, 2007), pp. 151–69.

[103] Not by chance, the pioneering study by Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l'intellect chez les averroistes latin des XIIIe et XIVe siècles* (Wrocław-Warsaw-Krakow, 1968), which deals with the Bolognese milieu especially at pp. 315–452, carries in its subtitle a significant limitation to the "intellect-theory." Kuksewicz later published many articles on authors or on edited and united texts that he defined "averroists": cf., e.g., "Hugo d'Utrecht (de Traiecto), un averroiste parisien du XIVe siècle méconnu," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 28 (1986), 185–90; "One more Erfurt Averroistic Commentary?" in: Olaf Pluta, ed., *Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstanty Michalsky (1879–1947)* (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie) 10 (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 353–71; "Petrus of Modena. Philosopher, Astronomer, Physician—a Student of the Famous Fourteenth Century Averroist John of Jandun," *Medioevo* 15 (1989), 111–42; and "Der lateinische Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der früh-Renaissance," in: Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, Jacob H.J. Schneider, & Georg Wieland, eds., *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance) 6 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1995), pp. 371–86.

[104] I owe to Emanuele Coccia's kindness the opportunity to read the article by Dragos Calma & Emanuele Coccia, "Antoine de Parme, un averroïste oublié," in: *Averroïsme et Antiaverroïsme*, Actes du colloque international de la S.I.E.P.M., Genève 3–6 octobre 2006 (Turnhout, forthcoming).

[105] Cf. Thaddeus of Parma, *Quaestiones de anima*, ed. Sofia Vanni Rovighi (Milan, 1951), esp. pp. xiii–xx. Additional information is in Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, "Un texte intermédiaire entre Taddeo de Parme et Jean de Jandun?," *Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum* 27 (1984), 25–63.

[106] See Pattin, *Pour l'histoire*, pp. 391–411.

[107] See James of Piacenza, *Lectura cum quaestionibus super tertium de Anima*, ed. Zdzislaw Kuksewicz (Wrocław-Warsaw-Krakow, 1967), esp. 170.

multiplied. Most probably, a critical reception of Jandun's position is witnessed already by William of Alnwick's Bolognese disputed questions.[108]

Thaddaeus of Parma is the Bolognese author who most probably could have been acquainted also with Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[109] Some clues emerge, in fact, from one of the scattered questions on the *Metaphysics* preserved in the manuscript Vat. Lat. 6768 attributed to him.[110] Francis Cheneval edited this question, entitled *Utrum omnia de necessitate eveniant*, rightly referring to Jandun's question *utrum aliquid sit possibile in rerum natura quod numquam erit*[111] as a possible source of inspiration, although it was not possible to establish a literal dependence of Thaddaeus on Jandun.[112] Comparisons with other Bolognese authors could not ascertain that they had a direct knowledge of Jandun's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, although some of his positions were known in Bologna, sometimes on the basis of his disputed question, as it emerges from the texts edited by Kuksewicz in his *Averroisme bolonais*.[113]

The meager harvest of the investigations carried out until now could be explained in part by the fact that we do not possess a complete Bolognese commentary on the *Metaphysics*, but also by the circumstance that the Bolognese masters did not share some of Jandun's [emendation correct?] metaphysical tenets, as Alessandro Ghisalberti pointed out in the introduction to his edition of the questions on *de anima* attributed to Matthew of Gubbio.[114] From this point of view, the most striking issue is

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[108] See Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, "Wilhelma Alnwicka trzy Kwestie antyawerroistyczne o duszi intelektuyalnej," *Studia mediewistzyczne* 7 (1966), 3–76, esp. 23: "Verumptamen est advertendum, quod aliqui sequaces opinionis commentatoris distinguunt de homine, sicut distinguebat Respondens, quod uno modo homo accipitur pro toto aggregato ex corpore et virtute cogitativa ex una parte et anima intellectiva ex alia parte, que est forma hominis per appropriationem."

[109] About him, see Valeria Sorge, *Profili dell'averroismo bolognese: metafisica e scienza in Taddeo da Parma* (Naples, 2001).

[110] See Anneliese Maier, "Die italienischen Averroisten des Codex vat. lat. 6768," *Manuscripta* 8 (1964), 68–82 (repr. in Anneliese Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts* [Rome, 1967], vol. 2, pp. 351–66, esp. 358–66).

[111] Cf. *Z*, IX, q. 5, fols. 114K–O.

[112] See Francis Cheneval, "*Utrum omnia eveniant de necessitate*. Textedition und Studie der gleichnamigen Quaestio von Thaddeus von Parma (Cod. Vat. Lat. 6768)," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Theologie* 35 (1988), 175–99; see also Valeria Sorge, "*Necessità e possibilità in Taddeo da Parma*," in: Giancarlo Marchetti, Orsola Rignani, & Valeria Sorge, eds., *Ratio et superstitio. Essays in Honor of Graziella Federici Vescovini* (Turnhout, 2003), pp. 155–71.

[113] See Kuksewicz, *Averroisme bolonais*, pp. 113, 338.

[114] See Ghisalberti, *Le* Quaestiones de anima, pp. 17–24.

most probably the option for the uniqueness of substantial form, which differentiates many Bolognese authors (with the exception of Thaddaeus of Parma) from Jandun.[115] This "ontological commitment" reverberates also on logical questions, such as the predicability of genus and specific difference. While Thaddaeus's disputed question on this issue shows some connection to Jandun (without quoting him directly), in Matthew of Gubbio's treatment of the same issue, the position of the Parisian Master is not even mentioned among the *opiniones* Matthew presents and subsequently refutes. As a matter of fact, the so-called Bolognese averroists seem under the influence of what we could define as a "modistic" approach to semantics and theory of logic. What they share with Jandun is the refusal of theories of *esse obiective*; he would not concur with them, however, in their appeal to *intentiones* in order to identify the proper object of logic.[116]

In addition to Bologna, also Erfurt[117] and Krakow have been studied as milieus where Jandun's thought exerted some influence, directly or through the mediation of other thinkers (mostly labeled as "averroists"). Jan Pinborg thought that Johannes Aurifaber, the author of one of the best-known treatises, *Destructiones modorum significandi*, could be considered a follower of Jandun's.[118] However, we owe to Andrea Tabarroni the discovery of a Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, attributed to Hermann of Winterswijk, which reveals an explicit and in all probability firsthand acquaintance with the Commentary of the much more famous Parisian master.[119]

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[115] See Roberto Lambertini, "La teoria delle intentiones da Gentile da Cingoli a Matteo da Gubbio. Fonti e linee di tendenza," in: Dino Buzzetti, Maurizio Ferriani, & Andrea Tabarroni, eds., *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo* (Bologna, 1992), pp. 277–351, esp. 302–05.

[116] See Lambertini, "La teoria," pp. 295–315.

[117] An informative and reliable assessment may be found in Sönke Lorenz, "*Studium generale Erfordense*: Neue Forschungen zum Erfurter Schulleben," *Traditio* 46 (1991), 261–89, esp. 261–78.

[118] See Pinborg, "A Note," pp. 288–89, partially correcting the position he expressed in his previous works. About Aurifaber's theory of signs, see Joel Biard, *Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1989), pp. 239–88; for additional information concerning criticism of speculative grammar, see Ludger Kaczmarek, ed., *Destructiones modorum significandi* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 1994); and Costantino Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330. La semiotica dei Modisti* (Rome, 1994), esp. pp. 472–96.

[119] See Lambertini & Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones*," pp. 61–62; and Andrea Tabarroni, "Thomas Wilton on the Metaphysics: Some New Evidence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), 119–78, about Hermann and his commentary, in particular pp. 121–23.

8. Conclusion

Many aspects of Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* still await deeper investigation, starting from its manuscript tradition, which, despite the rather small number of witnesses, has proved to be quite complex. Some of the polemical targets of John's discussions have been identified, as is the case for Peter Auriol or Radulphus Brito. The role of Thomas Wylton, who was very influential on Jandun's noetics, is still waiting for an assessment. In the reception of Jandun's thought, the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* did not play a pivotal role and was probably not considered as representative of John's philosophy as other works of his. It seems that John's contribution to the commentary tradition concerning Aristotle's *Metaphysics* received more attention in the 16th century than in the century at whose beginning he was active. Such a judgment, as justified as it might be on the basis of the present state of research, will be most probably more nuanced in the future because, as already mentioned above, our knowledge of the developments occurring in the European Faculty of Arts in the 14th century is still limited to some trends of thought and needs substantial improvement. Further investigations about John's commentary and its reception would, therefore, be not only interesting in themselves but also could shed more light on a whole chapter of the history of late medieval philosophy.

THREE FRANCISCAN METAPHYSICIANS AFTER SCOTUS: ANTONIUS ANDREAE, FRANCIS OF MARCHIA, AND NICHOLAS BONET*

William O. Duba

Antonius Andreae, Francis of Marchia, and Nicholas Bonet often appear in close succession in recent studies of 14th-century metaphysics. Antonius made evident John Duns Scotus's conception of metaphysics as the science of being *qua* being. Francis of Marchia went further, distinguishing between general and special, or particular, metaphysics, the former occupying itself with being *qua* being and the latter considering God, the first being. Nicholas Bonet solidifies the split, treating first and second philosophy separately as his metaphysics and theology, respectively. These three Franciscan philosophers develop an increasingly clear conception of the split between metaphysics as ontology and metaphysics as theology.[1]

This compelling narrative only covers part of the story of these three philosophers. While their conception of the science of metaphysics neatly tracks a progressive split between ontology and theology, what they said about being—that is, their ontology—differed greatly. Antonius Andreae remained a strict Scotist; Francis of Marchia criticized Scotus and even his own previous thought, developing Scotus's doctrine, at least in his discussion of truth, towards a more conceptualist understanding; Nicholas Bonet takes a syncretist approach and, combining Scotus's thought with

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[1] See, for example, Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 8 (Leiden-Cologne, 1965; revised edition, Leuven, 1998); Wouter Goris, "After Scotus. Dispersions of Metaphysics, of the Scope of Intelligibility, and of the Transcendental in the Early 14th Century," *Quaestio* 8 (2008), 140–56; Marco Forlivesi, "*Quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor videntur humanum ingenium superare*. Scotus, Andrés, Bonet, Zerbi and Trombetta Confronting the Nature of Metaphysics," *Quaestio* 8 (2008), 219–77; Jan A. Aertsen, "The Transformation of Metaphysics in the Middle Ages," in: Kent Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman, & Andreas Speer, eds., *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 105 (Leiden, 2011), pp. 17–40; and Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: from Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suàrez* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 107 (Leiden-Boston, 2012), esp. pp. 371–513.

that of his opponents such as Peter Auriol, interpreted dialectically to arrive at an extreme realist position.

The argumentation alone inadequately expresses the thought of these philosophers: the text, layout, and apparent purpose make evident their goal. Antonius Andreae assembles his commentary from the sayings of Duns Scotus, working them into a regular and clear structure so that the Subtle Doctor's meaning is apparent; he sets out to explain how to read the *Metaphysics* in light of Scotus's doctrine. Francis of Marchia produced a typical question commentary on the *Metaphysics*, setting forth his position, probably as part of lectures in the Franciscan *studia*. Nicholas Bonet explicitly rewrites (Aristotelian) philosophy to reflect the teaching of Scotus and the Parisian Scotists.

Understood in this way, the importance of these three works for the history of philosophy becomes clear: Antonius Andreae's commentary became one of the primary ways later thinkers studied the thought of Scotus. Francis of Marchia's commentary did not have a wide diffusion, but subsequent generations of philosophers picked up and discussed the original and innovative ideas that he defended. Contrary to the current scholarly assumption, Nicholas Bonet did not write a commentary on the *Metaphysics* at all; his work is the first *Metaphysica* in the history of philosophy to have been so named by its author.

This chapter is divided into three sections, one for each author. A brief biographical description precedes a discussion of each author's works, followed by a focus on the *Metaphysics*-related texts, what survives, what access may be had to it, how the works are organized, and what the author's main doctrinal points are. After a few words on the reception of the work, each section concludes with an examination of doctrine that illustrates the work being considered, reveals the thinker's approach to philosophy, and situates his thought in the context of the author's other works and the Franciscan tradition after Scotus.

1. Antonius Andreae

John Duns Scotus left a vast and complex legacy that challenged and overwhelmed even his brightest and most enthusiastic disciples. Many of his works were incomplete and marked by heavy revision and rearrangement over the course of a fruitful decade of reflection. Scotus's followers sought to build a school around their master's thought, but that required deciding what that thought was and presenting it in a clear and systematic way.

Scotus's *Questions super Metaphysicam* reflects these problems: apparently an early text, it went through numerous revisions and redactions, and yet never got beyond the questions on Book IX; moreover, in these questions, Scotus seems more interested in providing a view of possible contemporary opinions rather than defending his own metaphysical doctrine. These issues make Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics* a challenging texts for experts, and, indeed, the introduction to the critical edition speaks of "Scotus's *Chaos metaphysicum*."[2] For the purposes of teaching Scotus's metaphysics, a more complete and, frankly, more Scotistic text was needed. Fifteenth-century Scotists found their textbook in Antonius Andreae's *Metaphysics* Commentary or, rather, in part of it.

Antonius Andreae did not set out to produce precisely a textbook of Scotist metaphysics. His *Metaphysics* Commentary is explicitly an attempt to present Aristotle's *Metaphysics* from the perspective of John Duns Scotus and, from there, to explain the underlying system of thought corresponding to the *Metaphysics*, especially epistemology (Books I–VI) and ontology (Books VII–XII), according to Scotus, and preferably using Scotus's own words. Scotus did not treat every possible topic, however, and Antonius brings in material that, while even claiming explicit fidelity to Scotus, cannot be found anywhere in the Subtle Doctor's work.[3]

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[2] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, ed. Robert Andrews et al., in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3 (Libri I–V) and vol. 4 (Libri VI–IX) (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1996 and 1997); on Scotus's *Metaphysics* commentary, see Giorgio Pini's contribution to this volume.

[3] On Antonius Andreae's *Metaphysics* commentary, see, in particular, Camille Bérubé, "Antoine André, témoin et interprète de Scot," *Antonianum* 54 (1979), 386–446; Giorgio Pini, "Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonius Andreas's *Expositio* and *Quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics*," in: Leonardo Sileo, ed., *Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti* (Rome, 1995), pp. 375–89; Giorgio Pini, "Una lettura scotista della *Metafisica* di Aristotele: l'*Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum* di Antonio Andrea," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2 (1991), 529–86; Giorgio Pini, "Sulla fortuna delle *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* di Duns Scoto: le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* di Antonio Andrea," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 6 (1995), 281–361; and some articles by Marek Gensler: "Antonius Andreae—the Faithful Pupil?" *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 31 (1992), 23–38; "The Making of *Doctor Dulcifluus*. Antonius Andreae's Contribution to the Formation of Scotism," and "Antonius Andreae's *De tribus principiis naturae*: The Spanish Handbook of Scotism," *Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia* (1996), 57–67 and 68–79, respectively; and "Antonius Andreae's *opus magnum*: The *Metaphysics* Commentary," and "The Philosophical Issues in Antonius Andreae's *Scriptum in Artem Veterem* and *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti*," *Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia* (1997), 39–50 and 51–61, respectively. See also Sebastián García Navarro, "Antonio de Andrés (s. XIV). Estudio bibliográfico-crítico," *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval* 3 (1996), 85–100. Among recent studies on topics in Antonius Andreae's commentary, see especially Femke J. Kok, "What Can We Know about God? John Buridan and Marsilius

1.1. *Life and Works*

William J. Courtenay concludes the most recent biographical study, "all that we can say with certainty is that Antonius Andreae was an important Catalan Scotist in the early 14th century before 1333, who may or may not have studied at Paris or known Scotus personally. He certainly played a major role in the diffusion of Scotism in the province of Aragon."[4] While his biographical details are obscure, thanks to the work of numerous scholars, most recently Marek Gensler and Giorgio Pini, we know quite a bit about his work.

Antonius Andreae is chiefly known for three works that circulated in numerous manuscripts and early modern editions: his commentaries on the Old Logic, those on the *Metaphysics*, and a treatise entitled the *Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalium*, the latter being a series of questions on matter, form and privation.[5] On the basis of internal references, Gensler has identified the order of composition as being first the *De tribus principiis*, then the *Metaphysics*, and finally the *Scriptum in artem veterem*. For example, in the *Metaphysics*, Antonius begins a few questions with a variation on the formula:

> Although this question could fill a large treatise, insofar as it asks about the multitude and plurality of forms, concerning which material I recall that I spoke more extensively in a certain ordinary question (*quaestio ordinaria*), nevertheless for the present let it suffice if I proceed in this way [. . .].[6]

The *Quaestiones de tribus principiis* (*DTP*) have a text that matches the reference, and it seems that at least some copyists understood the reference as pointing to the *DTP*.[7] Likewise, Gensler shows that the commentary

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of Inghen on the Intellect's Natural Capacity for Knowing God's Essence," *Recherche de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 77.1 (2010), 137–71, at 145–74; and Forlivesi, "*Quae in hac quaestione*," esp. 242–48.

[4] See William J. Courtenay, "Early Scotists at Paris: A Reconsideration," *Franciscan Studies* 69 (2011), 175–220, at 218.

[5] For a complete catalogue of manuscripts and printed editions of works ascribed to Antonius Andreae, see Marek Gensler, "Catalogue of Works by or Ascribed to Antonius Andreae," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 31 (1992), 147–55.

[6] Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis (=AQSM)*, 1. VII, q. 17 (=VII:17) (Venice, 1495, fol. 40vb): "licet ista questio posset habere magnum tractatum, quatenus querit de multitudine et pluralitate formarum, de qua materia recolo me prolixius dixisse in quadam questione ordinaria, tamen quantum ad presens sufficit sic procedam [. . .]" (an online version is available at <http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0004/bsb00040852/images/>, accessed on September 1st, 2013).

[7] The copy of the *AQSM* and the treatise *De tribus principiis (=DTP)* in Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, 668, for example, systematically leaves out of the *Metaphysics*

on the Old Logic has references to both the *DTP* and the *Metaphysics* commentary.

Gensler also cites the colophon to the Erfurt witness of the *DTP*, which states "These questions are 11 in all, which brother Antonius Andreae determined in the year in which he was reading the *naturalia* in Monzón."[8] On the basis that the *DTP* has a total of 13 questions, and the last is the only one to mention Peter Auriol, Gensler argues that the colophon comes from a previous version, given before Antonius's contact with Auriol's doctrine, and that the first and last questions are subsequent additions.[9]

Alongside these three works and a few sermons, there are other texts attributed to Antonius Andreae that still require that authorship be confirmed: chief among these are a *Tractatus de modis distinctionum*, the introduction to a *Sentences* commentary, and the *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti*. In addition, a question commentary on the *De anima* has been attributed to Antonius Andreae.[10]

1.2. *Antonius Andreae's Commentaries on the* Metaphysics

Antonius Andreae's masterpiece is a commentary on the *Metaphysics* that elaborates a Scotistic understanding of Aristotle's text. It is composed of a literal commentary, based on Aquinas's *Sententia libri Metaphysicae* but with systematic interventions when Aquinas's explanation of the literal sense goes against what Antonius has determined are the key principles of Scotus's thought. After the exposition of the text, Antonius frequently adds longer discussions in the form of *notanda* or *quaestiones*; the overwhelming majority of these come from Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics*, with some additions from his *Sentences* commentaries, and apparently some of Antonius's own contributions.

Antonius's commentary traditionally divides into the *Expositio* and the *Quaestiones*. Only one manuscript, Oxford, Oriel College 65, contains

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questions that begin with this reference, although the question list at the end mentions them: in other words, the question list attests to them (excluding the possibility that the manuscript witnesses a prior redaction), but they were not copied, presumably because, in a manuscript witnessing both the *AQSM* and the *DTP* questions, the *AQSM* versions on the same topic were judged superfluous.

[8] See Gensler, "Antonius Andreae's *De tribus principiis*," citing Erfurt, Biblioteca Amploniana, F 359: "Istae questiones sunt in universo undecimae, quas frater Antonius Andreae determinavit anno quo legit naturalia in Montebono."

[9] *Ibid*. For a detailed discussion of the structure and content of the *DTP*, see Gensler, "Antonius Andreae's *De tribus principiis naturae*."

[10] Timothy Noone and Paul J.J.M. Bakker are preparing an edition of this work.

both; all the other witnesses either have one or the other. In the *Expositio* Antonius explains the *littera* of Aristotle's text, *sententiando*, while in the *Quaestiones* Antonius argues, *notando*, philosophical points raised *in littera*. Giorgio Pini and Mark Gensler have established the scholarly consensus that these were originally one work. Both texts circulated with the same introductory sermon, *Gyrum celi circuivi sola*, and Pini has counted 31 references from the *Expositio* to the *Quaestiones* and six from the *Quaestiones* to the *Expositio*. In addition, six of the *Notanda* in the *Expositio* also appear as separate *Quaestiones*.

Gensler's catalogue records 13 manuscript witnesses and three early modern printed editions of the *Expositio*, culminating with Wadding's publication of it as part of Scotus's *Opera omnia*. The *Quaestiones* saw even greater success, surviving in at least 49 manuscripts and 21 printed editions.[11] By comparison, Scotus's own *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* survive in 18 complete and three fragmentary manuscript witnesses and a half-dozen editions before Wadding. Therefore, more late medieval thinkers probably knew the *Metaphysics* of Scotus through the mediation of Antonius Andreae than directly.

To facilitate the discussion that follows, the following conventions will be used to refer to the texts:

Met. = *Metaphysics*
Exp. = Antonius Andreae, *Expositio litteralis super Metaphysicam*
AQSM = Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis*
DTP = Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones de tribus principiis*
SQSM = Ioannis Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*

1.2.1. *The* Expositio

Antonius Andreae bases the *Exp.* on Thomas Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*. He copies from the Angelic Doctor, word for word, the divisions of the text and the explanation of the sense of the passage. Pini

[11] See Gensler, "Catalogue of Works," pp. 149–50; Pini, "Sulla fortuna," pp. 311–12. Consequently, and in addition, the *Expositio* was reprinted in volumes V and VI of Vivès's edition of Scotus's *Opera Omnia*, which text serves as the basis for the present study; for the *Quaestiones*, the reference text used by Pini and others is the ca. 1500 Italian edition available as reel 437 of the collection *Italian Books Before 1601*, sold by Normal Ross Publishing and now made available online by the Bibliothèque nationale de France *Gallica* project. Since, however, this edition is, at least in the *Gallica* scan, without foliation, we refer to the Venice edition of 1495 (=V), having also consulted the Venice editions of ca. 1475, 1491, and 1523, as well as Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, 668.

has identified two ways in which Antonius departs from Thomas's text, one formal, the other doctrinal.[12] Formally, Antonius Andreae makes additions for clarity, explaining terms that a student might find difficult and untangling possible ambiguities that such a person might perceive. Antonius also completes syllogisms, filling in the premises that are assumed, and he makes the argumentation limpid. Doctrinally, Antonius Andreae omits from, modifies, or adds to Thomas's text to bring it in line with a series of teachings and principles that he believes reflects Scotus's view, particularly on the doctrines of the univocity of being (drawing on *Ordinatio* I, dd. 3 and 8) and on less-than-numeric unity, as well as on the principle of individuation (using *Ordinatio* II, d. 3).

In his groundbreaking 1991 article, Giorgio Pini distills Antonius's approach:

> Questo è dunque il metodo seguito da Antonio Andrea: ricava da Duns Scoto, ed in particolare dalla sua *Ordinatio*, un insieme di *principia* e estraendo dal loro contesto originale, li proietta sul Commento alla *Metafisica* di Tommaso: di esso può dunque mantenere la *littera* tranne per quei punti in cui essa entri chiaramente in contrasto con tali principi. In questo modo, trasformando in criteri di esegesi aristotelica delle dottrine scotiste, nate per lo più in sede teologica, ed applicandole al Commento di Tommaso, Antonio Andrea può affermare, come fa alla fine dell'*Expositio*, di essersi mantenuto fedele al suo maestro Duns Scoto e di averne ripreso le parole. Benché nei fatti venga seguito da vicino il Commento di Tommaso, il risultato conseguito è quello di una *Expositio* fedele ai *principia* ricavati da Duns Scoto.[13]

1.2.2. *The* Quaestiones super Metaphysicam

Like the *Exp.*, the *Quaestiones* are based on a pre-existing commentary, in this case Duns Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*. Again, Antonius's hand can be seen in revising Scotus's text, both for form and content. In formal terms, most of Antonius's questions have the same structure: question title, followed by *Videtur quod sic* or *non*, then *Contra* (often *Contra: Aristoteles hic in littera*), then *Respondeo*. If the response involves more than one article, Antonius immediately follows with a division into articles stating their number and type, for example:

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[12] What follows is a summary of Pini, "Una lettura scotista," pp. 541–51. A complete catalogue of doctrinal changes occurs on 568–86. The reader is directed there for further details.

[13] See Pini, "Una lettura scotista," p. 551.

> Respondeo. In ista quaestione primo quasdam distinctiones praemittam et declarabo; secundo quoddam dubium tangam et removebo; tertio dicam ad quaestionem.[14]

Articles always begin with *Quantum ad* followed by the article number (*Quantum ad primum*, *secundum*, etc.), and, if they have subarticles, they enumerate them immediately afterwards. Subarticles always begin with *De* followed by the article number (*De primo*, *de secundo*, etc.). Enumerations of the senses of terms and expressions are almost always called *distinctiones*, and the answer to the question is frequently articulated into *conclusiones*.

With respect to content, Antonius Andreae adjusts Scotus's text to varying degrees, and Pini has provided a typology, according to five levels of intervention:[15]

A. 16 questions are taken almost word for word from the *SQSM*, with, however, extensive omissions aimed at presenting the text in a clear and homogeneous fashion.
B. 28 questions fulfill all the criteria for A but also include some additions to complete Scotus's thought.
C. 14 questions have entire sections added (often from the *Ordinatio*) to address related themes.
D. 4 questions have been completely reorganized.
E. 28 questions are entirely new; of these, 15 address topics not covered by Scotus in the *SQSM*, and the remaining 13 cover Books X–XII, that is, the part of the *Met.* to which Scotus's questions do not extend.

In Pini's description, Antonius Andreae is constantly adjusting Scotus's work for clarity and structural integrity, as well as bringing in material from the *Ordinatio* and elsewhere. Unlike rough contemporaries, such as Landulphus Caracciolo, Antonius does not systematically defend the Subtle Doctor's doctrine from its later critics; the only post-Scotus author he mentions is Peter Auriol, and there Antonius makes sporadic reference to his criticism on specific points.[16]

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[14] Cf. *AQSM* V:4 (V fol. 22rb).

[15] For further details, see Pini, "Sulla fortuna," pp. 294–98; an appendix, cit., pp. 327–61 lists the individual questions in each group, their sources (in particular, the corresponding passages in Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics* and the *Ordinatio*), and even the questions from Scotus's commentary that Antonius Andreae does not use, most notably, 12 of the 15 questions on Book IX (Antonius Andreae' commentary only has four questions on Book IX).

[16] While the citations of Auriol may have come from his *Tractatus de principiis naturae*, finished by 1312 at Bologna, the only references to Auriol so far positively identified are

A few examples reveal Antonius Andreae's systematic rigor. In *SQSM* VII:3, Scotus uses a term that appears, as far as I know, nowhere else in his writings, *animastice*. Referring to how a substance is more cognizable than its accidents, Scotus argues that substance has greater cognizability in that we would cognize it more perfectly, if we could cognize a substance in this life. Thus, Scotus says, "the saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as being metaphysically said, not *animastically*. This distinction comes from the question 'On the singular.'" The editors helpfully point us to VII:15, "Utrum singulare sit per se intelligibile a nobis," where the *solutio* states (par. 12): "I respond. This question is metaphysical insofar as it investigates intelligibility without restriction, but it pertains to the book *De anima* insofar as it pertains to the intellectuality of the singular with respect to our intellect." Indeed, this could be interpreted, and probably should be interpreted, as the distinction between *metaphysice* and *animastice* that Scotus is referring to, but nowhere is that made explicit.

Antonius Andreae's *AQSM* has passages parallel to both the reference (in VII:3) and the target (in VII:15):

Table 1. *The Internal Reference in SQSM VI:3 and AQSM VII:4*

Scotus, *SQSM* VII:3 (vol. 2, pp. 118-119)	Antonius Andreae, *AQSM* VII:4 (V fol. 47vb)
Tunc dico quod "perfectius cognoscitur cuius species est in intellectu" verum est secundum proportionem cognoscibilitatis suae, et tamen substantia de se est perfectius cognoscibile, et in se et a nobis, si possemus ad illam pertingere; sed non in vita ista, **ut habetur in II, 3 quaestione**. Et tunc dictum Philosophi intelligitur metaphysice dictum, non animastice. Distinctio haec **habetur in quaestione "De singulari."**	Ad formam, cum dicitur quod illud perfectius cognoscitur cuius species in intellectu, dico quod verum est secundum proportionem suae cognoscibilitatis et tamen hoc non obstante substantia de se est perfectius cognoscibile in se et etiam in nobis, si possemus ad illam pertingere; sed non possumus in ista vita. **Propositio ergo Philosophi est sic intelligenda quod substantia est primum cognoscibile primitate perfectionis simpliciter et in se, licet non nobis,** ut sic dictum Philosophi intelligatur metaphysice et non animastice, quae distinctio **patebit inferius in hoc eodem VII**.

to his 1316 *Scriptum in primum Sententiarium*; see Gensler, "The Making," who also calls Auriol "probably [Antonius's] only contemporary he finds worthy of mentioning by name" (p. 61).

With respect to Duns Scotus, Antonius has made three principal changes. First, he has omitted Scotus's reference to q. II:3, although Antonius's own II:3 follows Scotus's text in considering how immaterial substances can be cognized by the intellect of the *viator*.[17] More relevantly, Antonius adds an explicit statement for how to understand the Aristotelian passage at hand: "The Philosopher's proposition is to be understood such that substance is the first cognizable thing by primacy of perfection in absolute and in itself, although not for us." Finally, after repeating the distinction between *metaphysice* and *animastice*, Antonius changes Scotus's reference from indicating a question by its general topic to specifically naming the same seventh book.

Then, in the target of that reference, Antonius makes absolutely clear that here is the distinction between a *quaestio metaphysica* and a *quaestio animastica*:

Table 2. Responsio *in* SQSM *VII:15 and* AQSM *VII:13*

Scotus, *SQSM* VII:15 (vol. 2, p. 297)	Antonius Andreae, *AQSM* VII:13 (V fol. 54vb)
Responsio: quaestio est metaphysica quatenus quaerit de intelligibilitate simpliciter; pertinet autem ad librum *De anima* quatenus quaerit de intellectualitate singularis respectu intellectus nostri.	Respondeo. Ista quaestione est metaphysica quantum quaerit de intellectione simpliciter **singularium; et est etiam animastica. id est** pertinens ad librum *De anima*, quatenus quaerit de intellectione singularium respectu intellectus nostri.

By inserting the word *animastica* here, Antonius Andreae makes the connection between the two passages clear. At the same time, he gives traction to Scotus's *animastice*, identifying the *De anima* with an adjective, *animasticus*, that relates to it as *metaphysicus* relates to the *Metaphysics*. This slight adjustment for the sake of coherence thus codifies a distinction found once in Scotus's works and implies that the *scientia de anima* is not so much a branch of natural philosophy as a line of investigation complementary to metaphysics; as such, this minor linguistic shift may form the seed for the 15th-century development of the discipline of *scientia animastica*, that is, philosophical psychology.[18]

[17] On this discussion, see also the comments in Paul J.J.M. Bakker's chapter in this volume.

[18] On the development of the *scientia de anima* in 13th- and 14th-century *De anima* commentaries, see Sander W. De Boer, *The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition*

In general, Antonius Andreae takes pains to make explicit the connections between the discussions: in addition to the references between the *Exp*. and the *AQSM* noted by Pini, there are also extensive cross-references within the *Quaestiones* to discussions in other questions. Perhaps most spectacular in this regard is the first question of Book VI, which has no corresponding question in Scotus's *Metaphysics*. In considering the question "Whether practical science takes its being practical from its being ordered to a goal that is *praxis* or from its object," Antonius's whole first article consists in a list of dependencies:

> I respond. In this question first some things are supposed; second, the question will be addressed.
> With respect to the first, there must be presupposed here some things that are shown in Book I, in the prologue to this book [the *Metaphysics*], and also in Book V.
> The first is what praxis is.
> The second is that there are two types of goal, namely, the goal for the sake of which and the goal by means of which, concerning which was discussed in Book V.
> Likewise third, that the extension by which practical science is extended to *praxis* consists in two types of relations or respects of aptitude: namely, in a respect of natural priority and in a respect of conformity.
> Fourth, one must presuppose that scientific knowledge is caused by its object and by a power, by means of its act, as by two partial causes that constitute one whole efficient cause.[19]

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on Aristotle's De anima, c. 1260–c. 1360 (Leuven, 2013). On the coming-to-be of the *scientia animastica*, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in-between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the Science of the Soul," in: Paul J.J.M. Bakker & Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, eds., *Mind, Cognition and Representation. The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle's* De anima (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 151–77. Scotus *SQSM* I:1 (vol. 1, p. 29), confirms this division, placing between the sciences of *physica* and *logica*: "Similiter in libro *De anima* tractatur de definitione animae et passionibus et partibus eius, quamvis subiectum illius scientiae ponatur corpus animatum cuius anima est principium." The same quote can be found in Antonius Andreae *AQSM* I:1 (V 4vb).

[19] Cf. *AQSM* VI:1 (V fol. 27vb): "Respondeo: In ista questione primo aliqua supponentur. Secundo ad questionem dicetur.—Quantum ad primum, oportet hic presupponere aliqua que in Io sunt ostensa in prologo huius et etiam in Vo.—Primum est quid sit praxis (I:11).—Secundum est quod duplex est finis, scilicet finis gratia cuius et finis quo, de quo dictum in V libro (V:2).—Similiter tertio, quod extensio qua scientia practica extenditur ad praxim stat in duplici relatione vel respectu aptitudinali, scilicet in respectu prioritatis naturalis, et in respectu conformitatis (I:11).—Quarto oportet presupponere quod scientia causatur ab obiecto et a potentia mediante actu ut a duabus causis partialibus integrantibus unam totalem causam effectivam."

The first article thus ends, leaving the second to argue that practical science takes practicality from its object. In this list of presupposed elements, the first and third are discussed in I:11, and the second appears in V:2. The fourth element is probably what is meant by the reference to the "Prologue" and is borne out by the first question of Book I (I:1). This question addresses itself to the "Prologue" to the *Met.*, and considers the role of being in the univocal sense serving as the subject of metaphysics. It could therefore be what is indicated by the notion of the object and the intellect co-causing scientific knowledge.

1.3. *Antonius Andreae's Doctrine of Matter, Form and Definition*

Antonius Andreae's systematizing leads to an articulation of Scotistic thought at the broadest scale as well. In explaining how matter can serve as the principle of individuation, Antonius Andreae specifies a pair of meanings for matter, corresponding to the senses of form as *forma totius* (specific form) and *forma partis* (substantial form). His discussion of the doctrine of *forma totius* and *forma partis* also includes a series of distinctions concerning the terms *species*, *forma, materia*, and *simul totum*. Antonius's presentation has strong parallels to the *Quaestiones de tribus principiis*, which is supposed to be an earlier work, yet here shows signs of being later than the *Metaphysics* commentary. Further, Antonius's texts are more closely related to each other than to any of Scotus's surviving works, although, at least for the passages under examination here, Antonius's methodology seems more to have been to take a passage from Scotus's Oxford *Sentences* lectures and integrate it with material from Scotus's *Metaphysics* commentary than the other way around. The act of organizing Scotus's material further requires some adjustment to Scotus's teaching on matter.

The discussion begins with Antonius deviating from the literal commentary of Aquinas. In Δ 6, 1016b31–33, Aristotle enumerates the ways in which things can be one and states that "those things are one in number whose matter is one." Thomas Aquinas, commenting on this passage, says "for matter, insofar as it exists under determinate dimensions, is the principle of individuation of the form. And for this reason, a particular owes to matter the fact that it is numerically one, distinct from the others."[20]

[20] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, V, lec. 8, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 876: "Numero quidem sunt unum, quorum materia est una. Materia enim, secundum quod stat sub dimensionibus signatis, est principium

Antonius Andreae, as a proper Scotist, cannot accept that matter serves as the individuating principle. In a question related to this chapter, q. 6, he explicitly refers to the content of Aquinas's passage. Echoing the same lemma from *Met*. Δ, he states:

> A certain *expositor* explains that numeric unity is caused from a single matter insofar as it is subject to determinate dimensions (*dimensiones terminatae*), and thus denies that there can be a plurality of immaterial individuals of the same species.[21]

The *Expositio* therefore explains this passage differently:

> *For those things are one in number whose matter is one*, that is, the difference or individual property, which is the precise cause of individuation.[22]

Andreae's gloss tells the reader not to read "matter" in this passage as the complement of substantial form but, rather, as something else, a difference or property that causes individuation. At the end of his literal exposition of the passage, he returns to criticize those who would argue on the basis of this passage that matter, properly speaking, is the principle of individuation. To be precise, Andreae distinguishes between two meanings of "matter," as what combines to constitute a compound and as what combines to constitute an individual. In the first sense, as what combines with form to constitute a compound, "matter" does not bring about a distinction between two members of the same species. Antonius builds his argument in reaction to the interpretation of Thomas and his ilk:

> It should be noted, that from this passage, where it is said that those things are one in number whose matter is one, some find the argument that matter, in the sense of what is the other part of the compound, is the cause of individuation. But against this opinion it is argued: if matter is the cause of individuation, where there is the same matter, there will be the same individual.[23]

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individuationis formae. Et propter hoc ex materia habet singulare quod sit unum numero ab aliis divisum."

[21] Cf. *AQSM* V:6 (V fol. 23rb): "Aliter exponit quidam expositor quod unitas numeralis causatur ex una materia secundum quod substat dimensionibus terminatis, et ideo negat immaterialibus pluralitatem individuorum sub una specie." In the *Metaphysics* questions, Antonius often refers to Thomas as *unus expositor* (I:3), or, as in this case, *quidam expositor* (I:1, V:6).

[22] Cf. *Exp*. V,6 (Vivès VI, p. 43): "*numero quidem sunt unum, quorum materia est una*, id est, differentia, sive proprietas individualis, quae est praecisa causa individuationis."

[23] *Ibid*.: "Notandum, quod ex hoc loco quo dicitur quod illa sunt unum numero, quorum materia est una, sumunt quidam argumentum, quod materia quae est altera pars compositi est causa individuationis. Sed contra istam opinionem arguitur, quia si materia

After opposing this position, stating notably that matter in this sense is described by the essence of the species and therefore cannot be used to discriminate one individual from another, Andreae specifies that "matter" has another sense beyond what makes with form a hylomorphic composite. This other sense of matter is what, when combined with the description of what a thing is (its quiddity), produces an individual of that species. Referring back to the passage under commentary, Andreae concludes:

> Nor is the authority cited here compelling, since "matter" is used here in an equivocal sense. To make this evident, it should be noted that matter and form are mutually opposed, from II *Physics*, and one of a pair of opposites is said in as many ways the other, from I *Topics*. But form (insofar as it pertains to the present discussion) is taken in two ways, namely, for the form of the part, which is one of the two parts of the compound, and for the form of the whole, which is its quiddity. Likewise, matter is correspondingly said in two ways, because there is the matter that is opposed to the form of the part, and this is the matter that is an essential principle of a thing, constituting with the form a *per se* single being. And there is the matter that is formally outside the notion of the quiddity of a thing, and this is the matter that is the difference, or individual property, which is the proper cause of haecceity and individuation, and which can be called the matter of haecceity. Therefore, when the Philosopher says that "those things are one in number whose matter is one," he is speaking of the matter not in the first way, but in the second way, which suitably and properly can be called matter, insofar as it constitutes the thing in its ultimate subjectible and material being, but not in formal being, since, as was said, it does not pertain formally to the formal quiddity of the thing. And this exposition is in accordance with the letter of the Philosopher; for he adds "those are one in species whose formula (*ratio*) is one"; indeed, "formula" is used in the sense of "quiddity," which is said to be the form with respect to individual beings.[24]

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est causa individuationis, ubi eadem materia, ibi erit idem individuum." This *Notandum* in the *Exp.* is verbatim identical to *AQSM* V:5, with the sole exception of how it begins. *AQSM* V:5 starts (V fol. 22vb): "Utrum materia que est altera pars compositi sit causa individuationis. Et arguitur quod sic, nam V *Metaphysice* dicitur: 'illa sunt unum numero quorum materia est una.' Sed contra illam opinionem arguitur, quia si materia est causa individuationis, ubi eadem materia, ibi idem est individuum." The texts remain identical all the way through q. 5's *explicit* ("respectu esse individualis," as in the note immediately following this one).

[24] Cf. *Exp*. V,6 (Vivès VI, p. 44): "Nec auctoritas hic posita cogit, nam hic aequivoce capitur materia. Ad cuius evidentiam notandum quod materia et forma opponuntur relative, ex II *Physic*. text. com. 26, et quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dicitur et reliquum, ex primo *Topic*., c. 12. Forma autem (quantum ad praesens spectat) accipitur dupliciter, scilicet pro forma partis, quae est altera pars compositi; vel pro forma totius,

When Antonius states that this individual property "can be called matter, insofar as it constitutes the thing in its ultimate subjectible and material being," he has in mind a distinction that Scotus makes at the level of propositions. In *SQSM* VII:13, Scotus argues that the individual difference is "material":

> This individual difference is not the principle of constituting anything by virtue of being predicable, but rather by virtue of being subjectible, and it is so by the greatest degree of subjectibility. Moreover, the subject is material with respect to the predicate. Therefore, for these reasons, it can thus be called "material difference," and it is thus not a principle of definition, which properly is a predicate and a means of demonstration.[25]

Scotus's point is that the individual difference gives to a thing the greatest degree of serving as a subject in a proposition. In the proposition "this is a human being," "this" singles out the individual as subject, of which the species, "human being" is predicated. At the same time, "this" is the least predicable of anything else: we do not normally say "human being is this" or "white is this." Because Aristotle likens the subject in predication to matter with respect to the predicate-form, Scotus says that, in this limited sense, the individual difference "can be called 'material difference.'"

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quae est ipsa quidditas. Similiter materia correspondenter dicitur dupliciter, quia quaedam est materia quae opponitur formae partis, et haec est materiae quae est principium essentiale rei constituens cum forma unum ens per se; quaedam est materia quae opponitur formae totius, et ipsi quidditati, et per consequens est extra rationem quidditatis rei formaliter, et haec est materia quae est differentia sive proprietas individualis, quae est causa propria haecceitatis et individuationis, quae potest nominari haecceitatis. Cum ergo dicit Philosophus quod illa sunt unum numero, quorum materia est una, loquitur de materia non primo modo, sed secundo modo dicta, quae congrue et proprie vocatur materia, quatenus constituit rem in esse ultimo subiicibili et materiali, non autem in esse formali, quia, ut dictum est, non pertinet formaliter ad formalem quidditatem rei, et ista expositio consonat litterae Philosophi; subdit enim quod illa sunt unum specie, quorum ratio est una; *ratio* quidem sumitur pro quidditate, quae dicitur formae respectu esse individualis."

[25] Cf. *SQSM* VII:13 (vol. 2, p. 261): "Haec differentia individualis, quia non est principium constituendi aliquid in ratione praedicabilis sed tantum subicibilis et hoc maxima subicibilitate, et subiectum est materiale respectu praedicati, sic potest vocari 'materialis differentia,' et ideo non est principium definitionis, quae proprie est praedicatum et medium demonstrationis. Sic etiam differentia specifica posset dici 'materialis' aliquo modo, quia principium subicibilis respectu generis. Et sic in V, cap. 'De causa': 'omnes partes definitionis dicuntur formae' verum est respectu definiti, non inter se, sed differentia, vere informativa generis, ut actus potentialis-materialis respectu eius, non per se sed pro constituto in subicibilitate respectu eius; sic haec differentia magis materialis et aliquo modo formalis; sic patet ad hoc."

Antonius Andreae takes Scotus's distinction and passes from the level of predication to the level of being: because the individual property "constitutes *the thing* in its ultimate subjectible and material *being*," it "suitably and properly can be called matter." Since haecceity makes an individual a subject of inherence, it is matter. With such inflections, Antonius is relentlessly Scotist in explaining how to understand Aristotle's statement that matter makes things numerically one. "Form" can refer to what, along with matter, constitutes a compound, but this sense is different from the sense in which "form" describes what that whole compound is. So too matter can be what with the form (in the first sense, as *forma partis*) makes a compound, or what, with the form (in the second sense, *as forma totius*), makes an individual. In this latter sense "matter" is the "matter of haecceity," that is, the matter of being a "this thing."[26] Antonius asserts that this reading is faithful to Aristotle.

1.3.1. *Species, materia, and simul totum in the* Exp. *and* AQSM

Met. VII,10 constitutes the classic place in the *Metaphysics* for discussions of the distinction between the *forma totius* and the *forma partis*, and in commenting on the text, Antonius Andreae provides the most systematic discussion of these problems. His source, Thomas Aquinas's commentary, distinguishes clearly between the interpretations: Averroes and his followers posit a rational distinction between *forma totius* and *forma partis*: the same form is understood as the *forma partis* when referring to its act of perfecting matter and as *forma totius* when referring to positing an instance of the species into being. Aquinas rejects this view, saying that Aristotle holds natural things to have matter in their definition; therefore, the proper Aristotelian interpretation is that of Avicenna, according to which the two types of form are really distinguished, as a whole is distinct

[26] Gensler ("Antonius Andreae's *opus magnum*") distills Antonius's argumentation to a concise paragraph that finishes: "The suggested solution is somewhat unexpected, even though it is hinted at by Scotus himself in his *Metaphysics* questions: the matter that corresponds to the form of the whole (the quiddity) is nothing else but *haecceitas*. Had it not been already mentioned in the discussion of the individuating principle, it would have been difficult to believe. Fortunately, Antonius is quick to dispel our doubts: haecceity is called 'matter' because it opposes a form with which it forms a unity of an individual; however it is neither prime matter nor particular matter, but is a 'matter' in more or less the same sense that genus is a matter of its specific difference." For a complete and detailed analysis of Antonius Andreae's position on the principle of individuation in *AQSM* VII:5 and 6 and in the *DTP*, see Gensler, "Antonius Andreae—The Faithful Pupil?"

from its part.[27] Antonius Andreae, in contrast, takes the opportunity in the *Expositio* to distinguish between three types of form, as well as three submeanings for matter corresponding to the *forma partis*, and even three senses for *simul totum*, the *súnolos* or hylomorphic composite:

Species, the Latin translation of *eîdos*, Antonius says, is taken in three ways:

A. The *forma partis*, which, together with the matter, makes a compound.
B. The *forma totius* and quiddity, which provides the full description of what a thing is, including its material elements.
C. The abstracted universal, which is distinguished from the particular.[28]

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[27] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lec. 9, nn. 1467–69: "Ad evidentiam autem horum, quae in hoc capitulo dicuntur, sciendum est, quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias, duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt, quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt, quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequentium eum.—Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim superius in sexto, quod res naturales habent in sui definitione materiam sensibilem, et in hoc differunt a mathematicis. Non autem potest dici, quod substantiae naturales definiantur per id quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. unde relinquitur quod materia sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de individuis, sed de speciebus.—Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam quidditas speciei, est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias. Et haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo, quam introducit ad excludendum opinionem Platonis de ideis. Dicebat enim species rerum naturalium esse per se existentes sine materia sensibili, quasi materia sensibilis non esset aliquo modo pars speciei. Ostenso ergo, quod materia sensibilis sit pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, ostenditur quod impossibile est esse species rerum naturalium sine materia sensibili, sicut hominem sine carnibus et ossibus, et sic de aliis."

[28] Cf. *Exp.* VII, s. 2, ch. 10 (Vivès VI, pp. 214b–215a): "Prima est quod species tripliciter accipitur a Philosopho: accipitur uno modo species pro forma quae est altera pars intrinseca compositi, de qua habetur V huius, cap. de Causa, et hic statim post.—Alio modo dicitur species ipsa rei quidditas et forma totius, puta humanitas, de ista specifice dicitur infra, *speciem autem dico quod quid erat esse*, ubi etiam vult Philosophus quod materia est pars speciei.—Alio modo accipitur species pro universali abstracto, quod distinguitur contra particulare, cuius secundum Aristotelem est primo quod quid est. Unde parum post dicetur: *ex quibus est speciei ratio non concavitatis*, et vocat concavitatem formam partis, et infra, universalis et speciei est definitio."

Matter, in the sense of what constitutes the compound with the *forma partis*, has three senses:

A. Matter considered in absolute as constituting the potential principle of what it belongs to, and as such this matter is included in the description given by the *forma totius*.
B. Matter as contracted to an individual, possibly (the text is corrupt) divided into two sub-senses, (B1) one abstracted from actual existence (*universaliter*) and (B2) one in reference to an actually existing thing (*in particulari*), as is the case with the concrete whole (see below).[29]
C. Matter as contracted accidentally, either (C1) necessarily, as when posterior material parts (as opposed to the parts of the essence), such as two semicircles, are said to constitute the matter of a whole (what he will call a remote integral part), in this case a circle; or (C2) non-necessarily, in the way that, in the case of a wax syllable, the wax can be said to be the matter of the syllable, even though the description of what a syllable is does not include a reference to matter.[30]

Finally, Antonius distinguishes between the meanings of concrete whole, *simul totum*:

A. The universal compound, that is the compound of form and matter considered by senses (A) of matter and form.
B. The individual substance, which can be considered:
   1. In a broad sense, that is, as a concrete individual without reference to its existence.
   2. In a strict sense, that is as a concrete individual existing in time.[31]

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[29] The text in Vivès here has "materialiter, alias numeraliter et in particulari. However, from the discussion that follows and the parallel in the *DTP*, one suspects the original text might have had something on the order of "aut universaliter, aut in particulari."

[30] *Ibid.* (p. 215a): "Secunda distinctio est de materia quae est altera pars compositi, nam hoc modo tripliciter accipitur materia a Philosopho. Uno modo ut non est contracta per aliquod sibi adveniens, sed solum absolute accepta, ut est principium potentiale illius cuius est, et sic est pertinens ad quidditatem rerum materialium, ut dicetur.—Alio modo accipitur materia non in universali ut prius, sed ut contracta per individuitatem, prout scilicet accipitur materialiter, alias numeraliter et in particulari.—Alio modo accipitur materia magis contracte, ut contrahitur per accidens, secundum quod materia contrahitur per existentiam, et hoc dupliciter: quia vel per accidens necessario requisitum, sicut est pars integralis non remota, eo modo quo semicirculus dicitur pars materialis circuli, unde semicirculus non cadit in definitionem circuli, sed ut sic accidit circulo; est tamen materia circuli magis propinqua quam aes vel ferrum, tale enim accidens est necessario requisitum. Vel alio modo, qui est tertius, accipitur magis per accidens ad quod contrahitur materia, scilicet accidens praeter necessarium, eo modo quo cera, vel litterae cereae dicuntur materia syllabae, quia syllaba potest esse sine illis, et e converso."

[31] *Ibid.* (p. 215a–b) "Tertia distinctio est de simul toto, nam simul totum aliquando accipitur ab Aristotele pro composito universali, ut infra dicetur sic: *homo vero et equus et quaecumque ita considerantur in singularibus universaliter ante non sunt substantia*, id est formaliter, sed simul totum ipsum universale compositum ex materia et forma

Antonius uses these distinctions in the question associated with the *Exp*. text, *SQSM* VII:12 "Whether in natural things matter is a part of the specific quiddity of the thing," in other words, whether matter appears in the description of what a given species is. As one would anticipate from his presentation of the sense of *forma totius*, Antonius says that it does so appear in the description:

> The other [=my] opinion holds the affirmative. To make it evident, presupposing the three distinctions set out *sententiando* [that is, in the literal exposition], the first being concerning species, the second matter and the last the concrete whole, I will prove five conclusions.[32]

The first conclusion states that "uncontracted [to an individual] matter that is a potential part [that is, the sense of guaranteeing the being-in-potency], taken in absolute and universal, pertains to the specific quiddity." Antonius repeats all elements of sense A for matter above, and argues that as such it enters into the description of what a given species is.[33]

The second conclusion is "matter contracted by individuation pertains to the quiddity of the concrete whole as distinct from the universal." That is, constituent matter in sense B, most likely B1, pertains to what a particular concrete whole (that is, *simul totum* sense B) is.[34]

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universaliter acceptis.—Aliquando accipitur simul totum pro individuo substantiae, et hoc dupliciter, secundum quod individuum substantiae dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo large, prout scilicet individuum substantiae abstrahit ab existentia et tempore, et per consequens individuum sic acceptum per se est in praedicamento, et tale individuum nihil includit in sua ratione quare sibi repugnat suscipere praedicationem naturae et ipsius quod quid est. Unde talia individua non generantur nec corrumpatur per se, sicut nec universalia.—Alio modo accipitur individuum substantiae et simul totum stricte, prout includit existentiam et tempus, ut hic homo existens et hic lapis existens, et talia sunt quae per se generantur et corrumpuntur. Et de talibus non est scientia, nec definitio proprie, quia cum abstrahuntur a sensu, ignotum est utrum sint vel non. Eorum tamen in absentia potest esse opinio."

[32] Cf. *AQSM*, VII:12 (V fol. 37ra): "Alia est opinio tenens partem affirmativam. Ad cuius evidentiam suppositis tribus distinctionibus positis in sententiando, quarum prima est de specie, alia de materia, alia de simul toto, declarabo quinque conclusiones."

[33] *Ibid*.: "Prima conclusio sit ista: materia non contracta que est pars potentialis accepta absolute et universaliter pertinet ad quidditatem specificam."

[34] *Ibid.* (V fol. 37rb): "Secunda conclusio sit ista: materia contracta per individuationem pertinet ad quidditatem simul totius quod est individuum substantie distinctum contra universale. Hanc ostendo sic: singularium sunt cause singulares, ex quinto huius, capitulo de causa. Materia autem et forma sunt cause intrinsece rei; ergo individui erunt cause individue; materia ergo individua erit causa intrinseca et quidditativa individui et substantie sic accepta."

The third conclusion—"matter contracted by existence pertains to the quiddity of an existing concrete whole"—applies directly to particular concrete whole in sense B2.[35]

The fourth conclusion reads: "matter taken as a remote integral part pertains to the quiddity of a thing, not properly and directly, but by reduction." Matter in sense C1, according to which semicircles are said to be the matter of circles, constitutes the proximate matter of the thing, and as such, can be reduced to what a thing is.[36]

The fifth and final conclusion, "matter contracted accidentally and non-necessarily in no way pertains to the quiddity of a thing." Matter in sense C2 has nothing to do with what a thing is.[37]

Antonius finishes the discussion by emphasizing the exclusion of any sense of individuation from the quiddity of the species:

> But it should be noted that matter that is contracted to an individual in any way whatsoever does not enter into the notion of specific quiddity, for specific nature abstracts from any contraction whatsoever that is taken according to the last four conclusions, and therefore only matter understood as abstracted and in universal belongs to the essence of the species, as the first conclusion shows.[38]

The structure of VII:12, with the associated senses of *species*, *materia*, and *simul totum* can be summarized as follows:

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[35] *Ibid.*: "Tertia conclusio sit ista: materia contracta per existentiam pertinet ad quidditatem simul totius existentis. Probatio huius: principia essentialia compositi existentis sunt existentia; non enim est intelligibile quod ex non-existentibus componitur intrinsece aliquod existens. Sed materia est principium essentiale rei. Ergo compositi existentis erit materia existens."

[36] *Ibid.*: "Quarta conclusio sit ista: materia accepta pro parte integrali remota pertinet ad quidditatem rei, non proprie et directe sed per reductionem. Quod non proprie et directe ostendo sic: illud quod non intrat diffinitionem rei non pertinet proprie et directe ad quidditatem eius, nam diffinitio est res includens quicquid est de quidditate rei; sed materia accepta pro parte integrali remota non intrat diffinitionem rei, quia semicirculus non est de diffinitione circuli, ut dicitur hic in littera, ergo etc."

[37] *Ibid.* (V fol. 37rb–va): "Quinta conclusio sic: ista materia contracta per accidens preter necessarium nullo modo pertinet ad quiditatem rei. Hanc ostendo sic: quod potest perfecte esse et perfecte intelligi in sua quidditate sine alio non dependet ab eo nec includit illud in sua quiditate; sed sillaba composita ex litteris cereis potest perfecte esse et intelligi in sua quiditate sine cera vel litteris cereis; ergo cera vel littere ceree non pertinent ad quidditatem sillabe nisi dicas sillabe ceree. Maior patet et minor etiam, quia hec sillaba *ba* potest esse et intelligi perfecte sine *a* et *b* cereis, quia *b* et *a* possunt esse cupree vel ferree, vel sine omni tali materia posset proferri hec sillaba *ba*."

[38] *Ibid.* (V fol. 37va): "Advertendum tamen quod materia contracta quocumque modo non est de ratione quidditatis specifice, nam natura specifica abstrahit a quacumque contractione accepta secundum quattuor conclusiones ultimas, et ideo solum materia accepta modo abstracta et in universali est de essentia speciei ut prima conclusio concedit."

Table 3. AQSM *VII:12*: Conclusiones *Expressed in Terms of the Senses Given in* Exp.*VII,10*

Conclusio 1: materia-A pertinet ad speciem-B
Conclusio 2: materia-B1 pertinet ad simul totum-B1
Conclusio 3: materia-B2 pertinet ad simul totum-B2
Conclusio 4: materia-C1 pertinet ad speciem-B per reductionem
Conclusio 5: materia-C2 nullo modo pertinet ad speciem-B

Discussing how matter enters into the definition or description of things, and how it does not, Antonius Andreae is extremely clear. The structure of the text is very polished, and there are consistent internal references, showing how the *Expositio* and the *Quaestiones* constitute, in a sense, a specific unity, even if, for the most part, it exists in its remote integral parts.

1.3.2. *Matter, Form, and Definition in the* DTP

Antonius Andreae's explanation in *Exp*. VII,10 and *AQSM* VII:12 forms a coherent whole, expressing his doctrine. Materially, however, the words come from Scotus. Pini classifies VII:12 as belonging to the group (C) of questions that are based on Scotus's questions on the *Met.*, in this case *SQSM* VII:16, but with extensive parts added, here from *Lectura* III, d. 22, q. un.[39] In addition, the three *distinctiones* in the *Expositio* come from the same sources. Furthermore, as close as the texts are to Scotus's wording, they are even closer to q. 5 of part 1 of Antonius's *Quaestiones de tribus principiis* (*DTP*).

Antonius Andreae's method and contribution become evident when his *Met.* commentary is considered together with the parallel treatment in the *DTP*: while internal references point to it being the earlier text, the *DTP* as it survives appears to be a revision of the parallel texts conserved in the

[39] See Pini, "Sulla fortuna," pp. 350–51. In fact, *Ordinatio*, III, d. 22, q. un., is the same text as that recently published as Scotus's *Lectura*, III, d. 22, q. un. (see Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera omnia*, vol. 21, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Vatican City, 2004), pp. 68–96). It is an open question whether Antonius Andreae knew this text as the *Lectura*. The text the editors present as the *Lectura* III had a late and extremely limited diffusion; the edition is based on two 15th-century manuscripts copied by John Reinbold and a fragmentary, end-of-14th-century witness preserved in Krakow. While it may certainly be the case, as the editors assert (*ibid*., p. 12*), that the *Ordinatio* copied this question from the *Lectura*, given Antonius Andreae's documented dependency elsewhere on the *Ordinatio*, such a copying must have occurred before Antonius's commentary. A study of the reception of Scotus among authors such as Antonius Andreae would help refine our understanding of Scotus's works themselves.

Exp. and *AQSM*. Tracing both these texts back to their sources in Scotus, it becomes apparent that, while the *SQSM* has strong parallels, the closest text in Scotus's surviving works appears in his *Sentences* commentaries.

The role of matter in definition appears in *DTP* I:5. That question by its title immediately evokes the parallel: "whether in natural things composed of matter and form matter is something essentially pertaining to the description of the specific quiddity."[40] Antonius's response begins with a confession of fidelity to Scotus:

> In this question, following the traces of that distinguished doctor, namely, John the Scot, explaining him as much as I grasp him, I will proceed in this way: first I will set forth some distinctions; second, I will adduce some conclusions.[41]

Indeed, the two articles correspond to the distinctions in the *Exp*. and the conclusions of the *AQSM*, but with additional material:

Table 4. *Outline of* DTP *I:5*

Bold: passages parallel to *Exp*. VII,10 or *AQSM* VII:12. *Italics*: verbatim parallels
Utrum in rebus naturalibus compositis ex materia et forma materia sit aliquid pertinens essentialiter ad rationem quidditatis specifice
Articulus primus: Aliquae distinctiones
Distinctio 1: *De materia ut ad formam comparatur*
Forma sive species
Materia autem dicitur tripliciter correspondenter (pars compositi, proprietas individualis, individuum)
Distinctio 2: ***materia ut est altera pars compositi***
Quod materia possit accipi universaliter et particulariter (et etiam forma)
Distinctio 3: ***de simul toto***
Distinctio 4: de habente quidditatem
Articulus secundus: novem conclusiones
Conclusio 1: materia ut proprietas individualis non pertinet ad quidditatem rei
Conclusio 2: materia-A pertinet ad formam-B
Conclusio 3: materia B1 pertinet ad simul totum-B1
Conclusio 4: materia B2 pertinet ad simul totum-B2

[40] Cf. Antonius Andreae, *De tribus principiis* (=*DTP*), I:5 (Padua, 1475, fol. 7r): "quinto, utrum in rebus naturalibus compositis ex materia et forma materia sit aliquid pertinens essentialiter ad rationem quidditatis specifice."

[41] Cf. *DTP* (Padua, 1475, fol. 21va): "Respondeo. In ista questione sequendo vestigia illius eximii doctoris, scilicet Ioannis Scoti, explanando eum quantum capio, sic procedam: primo premittam aliquas distinctiones; secundo adducam aliquas conclusiones."

TABLE 4 (*cont.*)

Conclusio 5: materia-C1 pertinet ad speciem-B per reductionem
Conclusio 6: materia-C2 nullo modo pertinet ad speciem-B
Conclusiones 7–9: quod quid est est idem cum eo cuius est

The *DTP* has arguments, distinctions, and conclusions that the *Exp.* and *AQSM* do not have. In the first article, first distinction, the *DTP* complements the three senses of *forma* or *species* with three senses of *materia*: as the constituent part, individual property (as in *Exp*. V,10 and *AQSM* V:5), and particular as opposed to universal. Outside of this addition, the first through third distinctions provide the same set of senses as those found in *Exp*. VII. The parallel passages are often verbatim the same.

Also noteworthy is that the *DTP* has a fourth distinction, on the senses of *habens quidditatem*. This distinction is unlike the other three, which all concern the meaning of terms, state those terms, and provide a separate argument for each sense. This fourth distinction, however, articulates reality: "some things have quiddity *primo et per se*," and so on, and then argues for each articulated member.[42]

The second article has nine *conclusiones* to the five of *AQSM* VII:12. *Conclusiones* 2–6 correspond to *AQSM*'s 1–5; The first *conclusio* in the *DTP* version excludes matter in the sense of "individual property" from belonging to the quiddity of a thing, and the last three *conclusiones* depend on the fourth distinction, arguing that a thing's essence, in the sense of "what the thing is" (*quod quid est*) is identical with its type in the same sense as it can be said to have a quiddity. These last three conclusions are treated together, like the last distinction in the first article.[43]

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[42] Cf. *DTP* (Padua, 1475, fol. 22vb): "Quarta distinctio est quod quedam habet quidditatem primo et per se, ut homo et quelibet species universalis composita–unde specierum est quidditas primo et per se–; quedam habent quidditatem per se sed non primo, ut hic homo abstrahens ab existentia et tempore; quedam habent quidditatem non primo nec per se sed per accidens, ut hic homo existens et ens in tempore; ulterius, si homo albus habet quidditatem, habet eam magis per accidens.—Primum membrum probatur: illud dicitur habere quidditatem primo et per se cui convenit quidditas per nihil aliud, sed aliis convenit per ipsum; hoc enim est esse vel habere aliquid primo, ex primo *Posteriorum*. Sed homo et quelibet species est huiusmodi quod habent quidditatem per nihil aliud et aliis, puta individuis, convenit habere quidditatem per speciem, nam eo modo habent quidditatem inquantum participant speciem.—Secundum membrum probatur […]—Tertium membrum probatur […]—Quartum membrum etiam patet per rationem […]."

[43] Cf. *DTP* I:5 (Padua, 1475, fol. 25ra): "Septima conclusio sit ista: in habentibus quidditatem primo et per se, quod quid est est idem cum eo cuius est primo et per se.—Octava conclusio sit ista: in habentibus quidditatem per se sed non primo, quod quid est est idem

Nothing in Antonius Andreae's *Met.* commentary on these sections is not also in *DTP* I:5. What is in *DTP* I:5 that is not in the *Met.* commentary, however, is different in style, purpose, and structure. This points to both the commentary on the *Met.* and the *DTP* sharing an original "core text," to which the *Met.* commentary is closer than the *DTP*. The *DTP* appears to build upon the core, adding the distinction of having quiddity and all the permutations that result.

1.3.3. *The Relationship with Scotus's* Quaestiones super Metaphysicam *and* Sentences *Commentary*

While some similarity to the *distinctiones* found in the *Exp*. and the *DTP* can be found in Scotus's *Metaphysics* questions, the version presented in Scotus's commentaries on Book III, d. 22 of the *Sentences* is much closer to Antonius's text.

The *solutio* to *SQSM* VII:16 parallels Antonius Andreae's *distinctiones*, but there are some significant divergences. Where Antonius Andreae treats in the "core text" the distinctions in the order *species, materia, simul totum*, and, in the *DTP, habens quidditatem*, Scotus's *Met*. discusses the senses of the terms *materia, simul totum, species, quid* (although apparently only in one sense), and *habens quid*, in that order. Among the divisions, *materia* is divided into *in universali, in particulari, per se*, and *per accidens*, this last subdivided into *large* and *proprie*, and the last of these into necessary and non-necessary matter.[44] With some interpretation, Antonius Andreae's division of *materia* into absolute, individuated, and accidental matter can be extracted, but the relation is not direct. Similarly, Scotus lists two senses for *simul totum* in the *Questions on the Metaphysics*: as a universal composite and as an individual contracted with existence, so that there is nothing corresponding to Antonius's *large* sense (B1).[45] Finally, Scotus

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cum eo cuius est per se non primo.—Nona conclusio est quod in habentibus quidditatem non per se nec primo, sed per accidens, quod quid est est idem cum ea cuius est solum per accidens, et non per se nec primo.—Pro omnibus hiis tribus conclusionibus potest argui uno modo sic [. . .]."

[44] Cf. *SQSM* VII:16 (vol. 2, p. 321): "Ad solutionem quaestionis et etiam ad intellectum multarum auctoritatum hic in littera, oportet distinguere de materia considerata in universali et in particulari; et de materia per se, quae nullam condicionem includit extra rationem materiae ut est pars substantiae, quae vere est substantia; et de materia per accidens, quae aliquam condicionem accidentalem includit. Et dico quomodocumque 'accidentale': sive large, ut exsistentiam, sicut materia 'simul totius'; sive proprie, et hoc velut necessarium, hoc est sine qua non, ut semicirculi sunt materia circuli; sive praeter necessarium, ut litterae in cera sunt materia accidentalis syllabae, sicut habetur in littera."

[45] *Ibid.*: "Oportet etiam distinguere de 'simul toto.' Quia licet communiter vocetur 'individuum cum actuali exsistentia' cuius est generari et corrumpi–et idcirco in littera

assigns only two senses to *species*, and these are "as form, opposed to matter" and as "universal, opposed to singular," the critical notion of *species* as *forma totius* (B) does not appear.[46]

On the other hand, the text known as *Lectura, III*, d. 22, q. un., has these elements.[47] Incidentally, the reason why Antonius Andreae would look to this question "Whether Christ was really a man in the *triduum*" is because Scotus, in explaining what it means to be a *homo* and its relation to the body, explicitly focuses on an opinion based on interpreting *Met*. VII, 10. Scotus considers the view of Hugh of St.-Victor, that, in the three days that his body lay in the tomb, Christ was truly a man, in virtue of the hypostatic union. Scotus then expands the scope to those who argue the same point based on their interpretation of what it is to be a man:

> There are some others who arrive at the same conclusion as Hugh (of St.-Victor), but who speak more generally, thinking that only the form pertains *per se* to the nature of a quiddity, and then what has a form would have the quiddity of a thing, in the way that who has an intellective soul has humanity, and since Christ had the intellective soul united to him during the *triduum*, he was a man. They prove this assumption, namely, that only the form, and not matter, pertains to the quiddity of the thing: according to the Philosopher, VII *Metaphysics*, Chapter 5, "matter is that by which a thing is able to be and not to be"; therefore, according to what he means there, "there is matter in all things that come to be, whether by nature or by chance, and each one of them is possible not to be by reason of its matter"; therefore, if matter were a part of the quiddity, the quiddity would be able to be generated and corrupted, which is against the Philosopher in the same Book VII [of the *Metaphysics*], Chapter 8, "On the parts of the definition" [=c. 10], where he intends that whatever things are conceived without matter, such as the descriptions of species, these things alone are not corrupted.[48]

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dicantur partes, in quas fit divisio, esse partes quiditativae 'simul totius,' quia eius est primo dividi (non autem communis habentis proprie quiditatem)–, tamen aliquando vocatur 'simul totum' compositum etiam universale, sicut patet in illa auctoritate superius adducta, 'homo et equus,' etc."

[46] *Ibid.*: "Similiter, oportet distinguere de specie: quia quandoque sumitur pro forma, distinguendo contra materiam; quandoque pro universali, distinguendo contra singulare."

[47] For a similar discussion, see *Reportatio*, III, d. 22, q. un. (Paris, 1891–95, vol. 23, pp. 421–32). This text has many of the same elements, but does not include a discussion of the meanings of *simul totum*.

[48] Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, III, d. 22, q. un., in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 23, ed. Barnaba Hechich et al. (Vatican City, 2003), p. 71: "Aliqui alii sunt qui in conclusione coincidunt cum Hugone, tamen generalius loquuntur, volentes quod nihil sit de per se ratione quiditatis rei nisi forma, et tunc quod habet formam, habet quiditatem rei (ut qui habet animam intellectivam habet humanitatem), et cum Christus habuit eam sibi unitam in triduo, fuit homo. Assumptum probant, scilicet quod nihil pertineat ad quiditatem rei nisi sola forma, et non materia, quia secundum Philosophum, VII *Metaphysicae*,

In his reply to this, "the first argument" for the opposing view, Scotus makes explicit that the interpretation of *Met*. VII,10 is at issue:

> It should be known that the Philosopher, in VII *Metaphysics*, in the chapter "On the parts of the definition" [=c. 10], speaks in various ways of these three terms: "*species*," "*simul totum*," and "*materia*," and frequently the equivocal use of terms leads one astray, and makes it so that many explain that chapter badly.[49]

The terms are "*species*," "*simul totum*," and "*materia*," the same three that Antonius Andreae uses in both the *Expositio* and the *DTP*, and in nearly the same order. Dividing *species*, Scotus gives the same three senses as Antonius: *altera pars rei compositae* (A), *forma totius* (B), and *universale abstractum* (C).[50] Likewise, the *simul totum* and *materia* divisions are very close to those of Antonius, although his distinction of matter in the sense *magis contracte* to matter *per accidens* does not include the key words *praeter necessarium*.[51] In a later section, responding to a different argument, Scotus distinguishes between the senses of *habens quidditatem*.[52]

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cap. 5, 'materia est quo res potest esse et non esse'; ideo (secundum quod vult ibi) 'in omnibus generatis, sive a natura, sive a casu, est materia, et quodlibet talium est possibile non esse ratione materiae; si ergo materia esset pars quiditatis, quiditas posset generari et corrumpi, quod est contra Philosophum in eodem VII cap. 8 'De partibus definitionis,' ubi vult quod 'quaecumque concipiuntur sine materia, ut rationes speciei, solum haec non corrumpitur.'"

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 84: "Propter enim intentionem Philosophi, sciendum quod Philosophus vario modo loquitur et aequivoce, in VII *Metaphysice*, cap. 'De partibus definitionis,' de istis tribus: 'species,' 'simul totum' et 'materia,' et aequivocatio nominum multotiens decipit et facit ut illud capitulum a multis male exponatur."

[50] *Ibid.* (omissio per homoioteleuton repaired via *Ordinatio,* III, d. 22, q. un. [Paris, 1891–95], vol. 14, p. 764): "Speciem enim aliquando accipit pro 'forma' quae est altera pars rei compositae, aliquando vero pro <forma totius, ut humanitate, de qua in eodem capite: Speciem autem dico quod quid erat esse, ubi etiam dicit quod materia est pars talis speciei. Aliquando accipit speciem pro> 'universali abstracto ab individuis,' cuius universalis abstracti primo est ipsum quod-quid-est, sicut cap. illo 'De partibus definitionis' cito post principium, mota quaestione de partibus definitionis, dicit et accipit ibi speciem pro universali abstracto, dicens 'ex quibus est speciei ratio, ut concavitatis'; tunc infra cap. 9 VII: 'universalis et speciei est definitio.'"

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 84–87.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 89: "Ad tertium, cum arguitur quod in conceptis cum materia non est idem quod-quid-est cum eo cuius est, dicendum quod aliquid dicitur habere quod-quid-est tripliciter: vel per se et primo, vel per se et non primo, vel per accidens tantum, et non primo nec per se. Et quolibet istorum modorum, sicut aliquid habet quod-quid-est, sic habet illud idem sibi, ita quod illud quod habet quod-quid-est per se et primo, habet sibi illud idem per se et primo; quod per se, per se; et quod per accidens, per accidens.—Sed tunc ad propositum dico quod 'homo' habet quiditatem per se et primo, et sic est sibi idem quiditas; hic homo habet quiditatem per se, non primo, et sic quiditas est idem sibi;

Antonius Andreae's divisions and terminology for the most part follow *Lectura* III, rather than *SQSM*. The *SQSM* exerts an influence, but here it is secondary to that of the *Lectura* III version. *Lectura* III also carries passages parallel to the parts of the *DTP* that are not found in the *Met*. commentary, but they are not contiguous to the others.

1.3.4. *Conclusion*

This analysis of the individuating principle and the role of matter in the definition permits a few conclusions concerning Antonius's work. First, both Antonius's *Met.* and *DTP* versions relate to a common text. Inspired primarily by the *Ordinatio*, that "core text" could have been Antonius's *quaestiones ordinariae* in a version that predates the current form of the *DTP*, or it could have been some other text, such as the *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis* ascribed to him.

Second, Antonius Andreae seems to add something to Scotus's position. Specifically, he makes explicit notions of matter that are not found in Scotus's works. In the *Questions on the Metaphysics*, Scotus distinguishes between *species* as *forma* and *species* as *universale*. In *Ordinatio/Lectura* III, he refers to *species* as *forma* in the sense of *altera pars rei compositae* and as *forma totius*, as well as *species* as *universale abstractum*. In both these texts, Scotus always uses the word *materia* to refer to what, together with the form, constitutes a composite.

Antonius Andreae, in his *Metaphysics* commentary, follows the division of *Ordinatio/Lectura* III, but in the *DTP*, he insists on the equivalence between *forma* and *species*, stating "alio modo accipitur forma *sive species* pro universali abstracto" (my emphasis). Further, both in *DTP* I:5 and in his commentary on *Met*. V, he explicitly states that matter has a sense corresponding to each meaning of form. Matter therefore corresponds, not only to the part of the composite but also to the form in the other senses. This is why, both in both *Exp*. VII,10 and *DTP* I:5, Antonius, before dividing matter, restricts the sense of 'matter' to "materia quae est altera pars compositi." Antonius explains then how matter corresponds to the senses of form in *Exp*. V,5/*QSM* V:5 and *DTP* I:5. Only in the *DTP* does Antonius cite a sense of matter corresponding to the sense of form as a universal; but both in the *DTP* and in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, Antonius Andreae is unequivocal in saying that there is a matter that

homo vero 'albus' habet quiditatem magis per accidens, ideo quiditas est magis per acciens idem sibi."

corresponds to the *forma totius*, which, in the words of *Exp.* V:10, is "differentia sive proprietas individualis, quae est praecisa causa individuationis."

2. Francis of Marchia

Francis of Marchia (Franciscus de Marchia, Franciscus de Esculo, Franciscus Rubeus de Pignano) likely entered the Franciscan Order at his hometown convent of Appignano del Tronto, near Ascoli Piceno in the Marches region of Italy. He studied at Paris, probably around 1310, that is, in the years immediately following the death of John Duns Scotus, and, after a period of teaching in provincial *studia*, he returned to Paris, where he read the *Sentences* in 1319–20, and was promoted to master of theology. In 1328, as lector of the Franciscan convent of Avignon, he fled the papal court with some of his fellow Franciscans, the then-Minister General Michael of Cesena, the theologian William of Ockham, and the lawyer Bonagrazia of Bergamo. After spending the next years in the court of Louis of Bavaria and composing polemics against Pope John XXII, he was caught by pro-papal authorities, and ca. 1343–44 he publicly renounced his opposition to the papacy. No biographical details of Francis of Marchia after 1344 have been found.[53]

Francis of Marchia's major philosophical work is his *Commentary on the* Sentences *of Peter Lombard*, for which numerous editorial projects are underway.[54] Among his other philosophical writings, however, his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* has probably attracted the most attention, followed by his *Quodlibet*. Moreover, as studies have recently shown, Francis's *Metaphysics* commentary exercised a strong influence on later thought.

2.1. *Francis of Marchia's Commentaries on the* Metaphysics

In fact, two commentaries on the *Metaphysics* carry Francis of Marchia's name. The so-called *Quaestiones super primum et secundum librum*

[53] The current summary of Francis of Marchia's biography can be found in Tiziana Suarez-Nani & William Duba, "Introduction," in: Francisci de Marchia *Reportatio IIA (Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum)*, qq. 1–12 (Francisci de Marchia Opera Philosophica et Theologica) II, 1 (Leuven, 2008), pp. xiii–xviii.

[54] For a bibliographical overview of Francis of Marchia's works, see Suarez-Nani & Duba, "Introduction," pp. xix–xxiii; and Russell L. Friedman & Christopher Schabel, "Francis of Marchia's Commentary on the *Sentences*: Question List and State of Research," *Mediaeval Studies* 63 (2001), 33–106, at 33–35.

Metaphysicorum (=*FS1M*) in reality mostly considers Book I of the *Metaphysics* and may or may not be the same as Francis's longer commentary. The longer commentary (=*FQSM*) covers Books I–VII of Aristotle's text and exists in two manuscripts: Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3490, fols. 1–57r (=M), and Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, 104, fols. 48r–102v (=E).

Much of what we know of Francis's *Met.* commentary and its place in the history of medieval philosophy derives from the efforts of successive generations of scholars to identify the *FS1M* and *FQSM*, their author, and their intellectual milieu. The first contemporary mention of Francis's *Met.* commentary comes from Franz Ehrle. In his monumental study of Peter of Candia's commentary on the *Sentences* and the bio-bibliographical details of many of Candia's sources, Ehrle lists, among Francis of Marchia's surviving works, his *Met.* commentary (*FS1M*) in the Florentine codex (Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Faesul. 161, fols. 67ra–73ra).[55] Victorin Doucet picked up the attribution and combined it with Pelster's note on a Padua manuscript (Biblioteca Antoniana 173) along with his investigations into two Vatican manuscripts (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3130 and 4871). Padua contains five questions, two of which are found in the *FS1M*, and the next three correspond to *FQSM* IV:9–11. Vat. lat. 3130, fols. 29ra–36vb, has the same series of questions as the Florentine manuscript, while Vat. lat. 4871 has *FQSM* III:7 and IV:10.[56]

The longer *Quaestiones* (*FQSM*) were long known to be in the Mazarine manuscript (M) but were not associated with Francis of Marchia until the 1960s. MS M belonged to the library of the Dominican Convent of St.-Jacques in Paris when Jacques Quétif and Jacques Echard, surveying the works of Dominican authors, studied the manuscript as a witness to the *Quaestiones de cognitione animae coniunctae corpori* by Bernard of Trilia,

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[55] See Franz Ehrle, *Die Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunders und zur Geschichte des Wegestreits* (Münster i. W., 1925), p. 254.

[56] See Victorin Doucet, "L'oeuvre scolastique de Richard de Conington O.F.M.," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 29 (1936), 396–442, at 404–05. The Florentine manuscript is described in Celestino Piana, "Nuovo contributo allo studio delle correnti dottrinali nell'Università di Bologna nel sec. XIV," *Antonianum* 23 (1948), 221–54, at 224; Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3130 also contains two anonymous sermons which Nazareno Mariani has published as being by Francis of Marchia; see Nazareno Mariani, "Due sermoni attribuiti a Francesco della Marca," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 98 (2005), 571–95; on this attribution, and for a full list of the contents of Vat. lat. 3130, see R. Lambertini, "Predicare Aristotele. A proposito di alcuni sermoni recentemente attribuiti a Francesco d'Appignano," in: Claudio Micaelli & Gianluca Frenguelli, eds., *Le forme e i luoghi della predicazione*. Atti del Seminario internazionale di studi: Macerata, 21–23 novembre 2006 (Macerata, 2009), pp. 155–75.

O.P. (d. 1292), contained in folios 83ra–148ra, with a colophon on fol. 148ra reading: "Expliciunt questiones magistri Bernardi de Trilla de cognitione anime coniuncte corpore." Preceding this text, the Dominicans found a commentary on Books I–VII of the *Metaphysics*, a series of six questions concerning intelligible being, and a question on Apostolic Poverty. They note: "All these are without the name of the author, who, if not Bernard itself, at least it is another of ours [that is, a Dominican], since he opposes the opinion defended by Peter John Olivi and some other Minorites toward the end of the 13th century."[57]

In fact, the Mazarine codex (M) contains (with the current attribution, discussed below, in parenthesis):

A. Commentary on Books I–VII of the *Metaphysics* (*FQSM*) (fols. 1ra–57rb).
B. *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* (Petrus Thomae) (fols. 57va–69vb).
C. *De Paupertate Christi et Apostolorum* (Hervaeus Natalis) (fols. 72ra–82va).[58]
D. Bernard of Trilia, *Quaestiones de cognitione animae coniunctae corpori* (fols. 83ra–148ra).
E. Anonymous question, *Utrum anima in tantum possit elevari per gratiam ut essentiam Dei videat immediate* (fols. 148rb–151vb).
F. Fragment (from a piece copied out of order?) (fols. 151vb–154rb).
G. Anonymous question, *Utrum lumen glorie elevans animam ad videndum Deum in patria per essentiam sit dispositio que est necessitans ad visionem illam ita quod non possit Deus ab anima sic disposita non videri* (fols. 154rb–156rb).
H. *Apologia* (Jean Quidort) (fols. 157ra–158ra).[59]

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[57] See Jacques Quétif & Jacques Échard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1719), vol. 1, p. 433a: "7. Quaestiones de cognitione animae coniunctae corpori et excellenter declaratae a F. Bernardo de Trilia magistro in sacra theologia de ordine Praedicatorum. [. . .]—Extant et apud nostros Parisienses ad S. Jacobi. [. . .]—Altero codice eiusdem rationis, qui est collectio plurium, et in quo I sunt Quaestiones in septem primos libros metaphysicorum et postea sex quaestiones quarum prima: *Utrum intellectus creatus producat rem intellectam in esse intelligibili*? et tandem singularis quaestio, quae sic incipit: *Ad evidentiam quaestionis, qua quaeritur utrum asserere Christum et apostolos habuisse in rebus temporalibus venientibus in usum humane vitae proprietatem et dominium, sit haereticum?* Ista omnia absque nomine auctoris, qui si non est hic Bernardus, alius etiam noster ex doctrina est censendus, nam sententiam a Petro Joannis Olivi et quibusdam Minoritis sub finem saeculi XIII propugnatam redarguit. [. . .] De his quaestionbius de cognitione animae conjunctae corpori sic habet Bernardus Guidonis: Tractatus est peroptimus et completus. Meminit etiam Laurentius."

[58] Edited in Jeffrey G. Sikes, "Hervaeus Natalis: De Paupertate Christi et Apostolorum," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 12–13 (1937–38), 209–97; cf. Kerry E. Spiers, "Poverty Treatises by Hervaeus Natalis and Pierre Roger (Clement VI) in Codex Vaticanus Latinus 4869," *Manuscripta* 39 (1995), 91–109.

[59] Edited in Palémon Glorieux, "Un mémoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia. Sa carrière à l'Université de Paris (1279–1287)," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 17

Albert Zimmermann drew attention to the *FQSM* in his fundamental study *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* and questioned the attribution to Bernard of Trilia;[60] later, on the basis of a similarity between the *FQSM*'s doctrine of univocation, on the one hand, and John the Canon's account of Francis of Marchia's *Sentences* commentary, on the other, Zimmermann suggested that the *FQSM*'s author "should be sought in the neighborhood of Francis of Marchia; perhaps he is even identical with him."[61] The specialist in the works of Bernard of Trilia, Pius Künzle, also recognized that this work could not be by Bernard; he further noticed that the questions immediately following the *FQSM* (B) constituted Peter Thomae's *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*. Moreover, he found two references in the *FQSM* that pointed to Peter Thomae as the author: first, a question (V:21) ends with (fol. 43ra) "hec An^{us} super librum VI principio capitulo de positione," which he reads as "Hoc An<toni>us super librum VI principiorum, capitulo de positione," and he states that "without doubt, this refers to Antonius Andreae, another well-known early Scotist, author of a commentary on the *De sex principiis*."[62] Moreover, in VI:6, on fol. 48ra, where

(1928), 406–26 and 18 (1929), 24–58, esp. 17 (1928), 407–13; on the identification with Jean Quidort, see the introduction to Bernard of Trilia, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione animae separatae*, ed. Pius Künzle (Bern, 1969), pp. 16*–17*.

[60] See Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*; see also Albert Zimmermann, "Allgemeine Metaphysik nach einem anonymen Kommentar zur aristotelischen Ersten Philosophie aus dem 14. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 48 (1966), 190–206.

[61] See Albert Zimmermann, "Analoge und Univoke Bedeutung des Terminus 'ens' nach einem anonymen Metaphysikkommentar des 14. Jahrhunderts," in: *Deus et Homo ad mentem I. Duns Scoti.* Acta tertii Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Videbonae 28 sept.–2 oct. 1970 (Rome, 1972), pp. 723–30, at 724–25. See also Albert Zimmermann, "Die Ratio Anselmi in einem anonymen Metaphysikkommentar des 14. Jahrhunderts," *Analecta Anselmiana* 4.1 (1975), 195–201, at 197.

[62] In fact, (B) contains the first four questions of Petrus Thomae's work, followed by two anonymous questions. See Garrett Smith, "Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 52 (2010), 161–200, at 182–183 (note that in this paper, Smith defends the attribution to Peter Thomae of the *Tractatus de modis distinctionum*, recently edited as Pere Tomàs, *Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum*, eds. Celia López Alcalde and Josep Batalla [Santa Coloma de Queralt, 2011]; but the treatise is of Antonius Andreae). The reference to a 'Antonius' is likely to a commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum* (the example of the parts of a man sitting comes straight from Chapter 6 of the pseudo-Porretan work), but the text does not match the surviving commentary attributed to Antonius Andreae, at least in the copy preserved in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, CLM 5961. Moreover, of the two witnesses to the question, only M has the text, where it appears as a violent addition to the text shared with E, namely (E fol. 86va, M fol. 42vb): "Dicendum quod positio partium in toto est differentia quantitatis accidentalis, non autem essentialis. positio autem partium in loco est differentia quantitatis accidentalis (non . . . accidentalis] *om.* (*hom.*) M) per accidens. Et quia differentia essentialis quantitatis est ignota, ideo Philosophus accipit differentiam accidentalem loco differentie essentialis. Eodem modo

the author argues that "truth" in the sense by which a thing is true, such as "true gold," does not formally exist in reality, the author states: "Et videtur esse dicendum quod talis veritas non est in re formaliter, licet alias dixerim oppositum, quia melius capio interdum quam aliud."[63] Since Peter Thomae argues that truth and falsity are in reality and have a formal basis in reality, Künzle concluded that Petrus Thomae was the author.

Shortly after Künzle attributed the *FQSM* to Petrus Thomae, Celestino Piana published, along with Antonio García y García, the catalogue of the Collegio di Spagna's manuscripts, including the Bologna copy (E). This text begins with an abbreviated title (fol. 48r): "QOS ME^{CE} I FRA DE MAR." Piana and García y García attributed the manuscript (with reservations) to Francis of Marchia ("*Questiones metaphysice I Francisci de Marchia?*").[64] The appearance of this manuscript caused Künzle to reconsider his thesis. He noted that the 18th-century catalogue also assigned the commentary to Francis of Marchia; since, however, the *incipit* differed from that of Francis's commentary in Florence (*FS1M*), Künzle read "Franciscus de Maronis," to whom were attributed *libros metaphysicos*, which had never been found.[65]

Charles Lohr brought most of the existing studies together and observed that the *FS1M* and the *FQSM* share the same question titles; moreover, he argued that the fragments discussed by Doucet also contain copies of the same commentary. On the basis of the similarity between the *FS1M*

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potest exponi Commentator, licet Commentator videatur esse prime opinionis." After this, and with no punctuation that would set off the text, M continues (fols. 42vb–43ra): "Quod non sit positio talis ordo partium in loco.—Sed positio est ordo partium in loco; ergo illud est positum cuius est ille ordo, sed ordo est partium per te et non totius; ergo partes essent posite; ergo partes hominis sederent et non homo, quod est falsum. Probatio maioris: illud est ordinatum ordine, cuius est ordo; sed ordo est partium; ergo partes sunt ordinate, ergo posite.—Respondeo et dicitur quod secundum rei veritatem positio non est formaliter ordo ille propter argumentum factum, sed positio est quedam forma positi quam consequitur dictus ordo ita quod ordo est extra essentiam suam et posterior, tamen, quia illa forma est fere ignota propter suum debile esse, ideo circumloquimur eam per ordinem qui consequitur ipsam positionem.—Hec an_us super librum *VI principio<rum>*, capitulo de positione." Gensler, "Catalogue of Works," p. 148, on the authority of Künzle, includes M among the witnesses to Antonius Andreae's commentary.

63 See Pius Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine 3490 zum Schriftum des Franziskaners Petrus Thomae, vorab zu seinen *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 59 (1966), 3–37, at 9. See the discussion of these passages below.

64 See Antonio García y García & Celestino Piana, "Los manuscritos filósofico-teológicos, históricos y científicos del Real Colegio de España de Bolonia," *Salmanticensis* 14 (1967), 81–169, at 137, as cited in Pius Künzle, "Petrus Thomae oder Franciscus de Maronis?," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 61 (1966), 462–63.

65 See Künzle, "Petrus Thomae oder Franciscus de Mayronis?"

(solidly attributed to Marchia) and the *FQSM*, and of the catalogue entries for the Bologna manuscript going back to the 15th century, Lohr attributed the *FQSM* definitively to Francis of Marchia.[66] Lohr also noted that John the Canon appears to cite Book VII of Francis of Marchia's *Sentences* commentary. Some decades later, Notker Schneider confirmed this attribution, providing the context of John the Canon's citation of Francis of Marchia, and associating it with its target.[67] Writing later in the 14th century, John the Canon notes:

> There is one opinion of Francis of Marchia on Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, that definition and the thing defined are not distinct in reality (*non distinguuntur ex natura rei*), but are totally the same, because the definition states explicitly that same thing that the thing defined states implicitly.[68]

Francis, in Book VII, q. 7, argues for his view:

> I say, therefore, that definition and what is definable are not formally distinct with respect to what they state outside the intellect, but are totally the same, because the definition states explicitly that same thing that what is definable states implicitly.[69]

One early 14th-century manuscript witness to John the Canon's *Physics* commentary, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3013 refers to Thomas Aquinas as *frater Thomas*; on the basis of this negative evidence, Anneliese Maier suggests that John the Canon's commentary predates Thomas's 1323 canonization.[70] Schneider thus adopts 1323 as the date for John the Canon's commentary and, observing numerous other

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[66] See Charles H. Lohr, "New Material Concerning Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*," *Antonianum* 46 (1971), 486–88.

[67] See Notker Schneider, *Die Kosmologie des Franziskus de Marchia: Texte, Quellen, und Untersuchungen zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 28 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1991), pp. 27–29; cf. Lohr, "New Material," p. 487: "Still to be studied, however, would be the relation of certain questions *Super XII Metaphysicae* in Antoniana 173, fols. 59c–60d to Marchia's work."

[68] Cf. Ioannes Canonicus, *In libros Physicorum* I, q. 5, a. 1 (Schneider, *Die Kosmologie*, p. 28, n. 87, from Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3013): "est una opinio Francisci de Marchia super septimum Metaphysicae, quod definitio et definitum non distinguuntur ex natura rei, sed sunt eadem totaliter, quia illud idem quod dicit definitum implicite dicit definitio explicite."

[69] See Francis of Marchia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (=*FQSM*), VII:7 (cited in Schneider, *Die Kosmologie*, p. 28, n. 87, from Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3490, fol. 52vb): "Dico ergo aliter, quod diffinitio et diffinibile quantum ad illud, quod dicunt extra intellectum, non distinguuntur formaliter, sed sunt totaliter eadem, quia illud idem quod dicit diffinibile implicite, dicit diffinitio explicite."

[70] See Anneliese Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie. Das Problem der intesniven Grösse. Die Impetustheorie* (Rome, 1968), p. 199, n. 56.

cases where John copies entire questions from the *FQSM*, assigns to the *FQSM* the date of pre-1323.[71] Christopher Schabel, however, presents and analyzes in detail the evidence for the dating of John the Canon's *Physics* commentary, concluding that "what John the Canon cites and does not cite points to a date soon after 1329 but probably before Buridan." Therefore, no firm external witness to the *FQSM* has yet surfaced that can date the text with accuracy.[72]

At the end of this complex history, the *FQSM* emerges as without doubt the work of Francis of Marchia, and the task becomes to interpret it in the context of Francis's thought and the development of the *Metaphysics*.

2.2. *Partial or Complete Editions of Questions*

Roberto Lambertini has published a question list of *FS1M* in the course of describing the contents of Vat. lat. 3130.[73] Both Künzle and Zimmermann published question lists of the *FQSM* based on M, and so both lists reflect its defects. Most notably, the Mazarine manuscript counts the last 12 questions of Book V (15–24) as the first 12 of Book VI, so VI:1–12 are, in actuality, V:15–24, and VI:13–18 are VI:1–3. Some other question divisions are not so clear. V:1, for example, announces five articles: (1) *Utrum finis habeat rationem per se cause*, (2) *Utrum finis sit causa ipsius agentis vel solum sit causa ipsius effectus*, (3) *Utrum finis sit simpliciter prima causa*, (4) *Utrum sit nobilissima causa*, and (5) *Utrum finis habeat rationem cause secundum esse quod habet in intentione agentis vel secundum esse extra quod habet in effectu*. Only articles one and two are treated. Then, however, M presents as the second question of the book (hence, V:2) one whose title, *Utrum finis habeat rationem cause secundum esse quod habet extra in effectu*, resembles that announced as the fifth article of the first question, while the same text in E has a title that corresponds precisely to that announced as the fifth article, and this title is even preceded by the formula *Quantum autem ad secundum articulum*.[74] It is likely, therefore, that what Künzle and Zimmermann present as V:2 is the third article of V:1.

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[71] See Schneider, *Die Kosmologie*, p. 28.

[72] See Christopher Schabel, "Francis of Marchia's *Virtus derelicta* and the Context of its Development," *Vivarium* 44 (2006), 41–80, at 48–49, n. 14; cf. Russell Friedman and Christopher Schabel, "Introduction," pp. 8–9. The 1329 date comes from the appointment of Gerald Odonis as Minister General, as he is called in the printed edition; the use of this title should be confirmed in the manuscripts.

[73] See Lambertini, "Predicare Aristotele," pp. 167–69.

[74] Cf. E, fol. 75va: "Quantum autem ad secundum articulum, utrum finis habeat rationem cause sui esse quod habet intentione agentis vel esse quod habet extra in effectu, hic

TABLE 5. *Editions of* **FQSM** *questions*

Proemium, ed. Russell L. Friedman, in: Sabine Folger-Fonfara, "Franziskus von Marchia: Die erste Unterscheidung einer allgemeinen und einer besonderen Metaphysik," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), 461–513, at 504–13.
I:1, ed. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 84–98.
1:5, ed. Notker Schneider, "Eine ungedruckte Quästio zur Erkennbarkeit des Unendlichen in einem Metaphysik-Kommentar des 14. Jahrhunderts," in: Albert Zimmermann & Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, eds., *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter. Übersetzungen, Kommentare, Interpretationen* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 18 (Turnhout, 1986), 96–118, at 104–07.
II:1, ed. Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine," 25–28.
IV:4, ed. Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine," 28–32.
V:16 (=VI:2), ed. Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine," 32–37.
VI:4 (=VI:16), ed. Zimmerman, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik*?, pp. 98–100.
VII:1, ed. Fabrizio Amerini, "*Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis*. Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of Accidents," *Vivarium* 44 (2006), 96–150, at 144–50.
VII:5, ed. Notker Schneider, "Franciscus de Marchia über die Wirklichkeit der Materie (Metaph. VII q. 5)," *Franziskanische Studien* 71 (1989), 138–58, at 144–49.

In addition, Girard J. Etzkorn et al. are currently preparing the critical edition of the entire work, which will replace the provisional edition recently made by Nazareno Mariani.

2.3. *Structure*

Francis of Marchia's commentary ends in the middle of Book VII (the lemma for the last question is the end of Chapter 9),[75] and there is no sign that he had questions on the other books. It is a question-commentary, and for the most part, the questions are short and simple, although a few compound questions can be found (e.g., II:2 *Utrum finis speculativae sit veritas*, which also asks *Utrum finis practicae sit opus*). The critical edition will contain the entire work in approximately 600 pages of text. The order

sunt duo modi dicendi [...]"; cf. the previous article, fol. 75ra: "Quantum ad secundum articulum, utrum finis sit causa ipsius agentis, respondeo quod duplex est agens [...]."

[75] VII:12 makes repeated references to the *littera* that gives rise to *dubia*, and at one point Marchia quotes the *littera*, in its entirety (E fol. 102ra, M fol. 56va): "Que tria dubia tanguntur in littera, cum dicit quod 'proprium substantie ex hiis accipere est quia necesse est ipsam preexistere alteram substantiam actu preexistentem que facit ut animal, si fit animal; quale vero et quantum non necessarium nisi potestate solum.' Primum dubium tangitur cum dicit 'quale vero et quantum non necessarium nisi potestate solum.'" The passage is *Met.*, Z 9, 1034b16–19, that is, the last four lines of Chapter 9, as rendered in the Moerbeke revision (see *Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. XXV.3, p. 148).

and content are closely linked to the text of Aristotle: Francis frequently makes reference to the *littera*, and, in fact, many of the question titles are theses that Aristotle seems to hold. Thus, of the 16 unique questions on Book I (excluding the *proemium* and I:6, *Utrum in brutis sit prudentia*, which merely makes the distinctions necessary for I:7, also entitled *Utrum in brutis sit prudentia*), 11 make reference in the preliminary arguments to Aristotle's position *in littera*, in seven of these cases to support the opinion *quod sic* (in two of the others, the question was of the form "whether A or B"), and in five cases using the formula *in oppositum est Philosophus in littera*.

If Francis's questions originally accompanied a literal exposition, they were posed in a series of one or more *dubia* at the end of each discrete section (*lectio*), and traces of this arrangement remain in the text. Some questions were asked directly of the same *lectio*. So, I:10, for example, asks "whether beasts have experience," and, for the initial argument *quod non*, Francis cites *Met.*, A 1, 981a2–3, in the minor premise (for experience being the beginning of scientific knowledge) and *Met.*, A 1, 980b26–27, as the entire argument *in oppositum*, namely, that beasts "have a small share of experience."[76] After concluding that beasts do have experience, Francis replies curtly to the initial argument *quod non*: "experience is not in itself the cause of art."[77] The question immediately following, namely, I:11, then asks "whether experience is the cause of art," addressing the same *littera* as I:10. More significantly, the commentary on Book IV has a double beginning, one possibly reflecting an earlier division of the sort one would expect following an *expositio* and the other in the same form as the *incipit*s to the other six books of the commentary:

> Concerning the beginning of the fourth book there are three doubts. First, whether being *qua* being is the subject of metaphysics. Second, whether there are any proper passions of *per se* being besides the passions of its inferiors. Third, whether there are principles and elements of *per se* being. The first doubt was discussed in the first question of the first book of this

[76] Cf. *FQSM* I:10 (E fol. 53ra, M fol. 7ra, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation): "Quaeritur utrum bruta animalia habeant experientiam.—Quod non videtur, quia habens principium sive instrumentum scientiae est capax sive susceptivum scientiae; sed experientia est principium scientiae sicut patet in littera; ergo habens experientiam est capax scientiae; sed brutum non est capax scientiae, ergo nec experientiae.—In oppositum est Philosophus in littera quod bruta 'parum participant experimento.'" In the *Responsio*, Francis also cites *Philosophus in littera* for two more passages (981a1–2 and 981a7–10).

[77] *Ibid.* (E fol. 53ra, M fol. 7vb): "Ad rationem in oppositum dicendum quod experientia non est causa per se artis."

> work (=I:1); the second was discussed in the third book (=III:8); the third shall be discussed here.
>
> Concerning the fourth book I ask first whether there is some principle or cause of being *qua* being.[78]

The first paragraph, while containing useful internal references, is anomalous in this question-commentary: with the exception of the first book (which begins with a proemium) and Book III (which begins with *queritur*), the *incipit* for all the other books follows the form *Circa secundum librum queritur*. This fragment, therefore, attests to a transition from reading or expounding the text of Aristotle and posing questions on it. Hence, Francis's questions originally followed *lectiones*, perhaps as part of a course. It is not clear, however, whether such *lectiones* consisted purely in reading Aristotle's text, or constituted an exposition.

Francis of Marchia mentions the opinions of others, but usually as anonymous *aliqui*. He refers to, for example, a *doctor antiquus* and a *doctor novus* in I:15. In II:1, Francis calls Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus *unus doctor* and *alius doctor*, respectively, and opposes them both in arguing that the first object of the intellect is "something" (*aliquid*).[79] In IV:5 he reports: "Here it is said by some doctor in his writings that some accident falls between subject and accident can be understood in two ways: either that it falls between subject and accident by reason of its subject, or that it falls between them by reason of inhering."[80] With that, Francis spends the better part of a column presenting the position before concluding that "such is the opinion with its argumentation, which is worth more than the opinion is."[81]

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[78] Cf. *FQSM* IV:1 (E fol. 66rb–va; M fol. 21rb, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation): "Circa principium quarti libri sunt tria dubia. Primum utrum ens secundum quod ens sit subiectum metaphysicae. Secundum utrum entis per se sint aliquae passiones propriae praeter passiones suorum inferiorum. Tertium utrum entis secundum se sint principia et elementa. De primo dictum fuit in quaestione prima primi libri huius; de secundo fuit dictum in tertio libro; de tertio dicatur hic.—Circa quartum librum quaero primo utrum entis secundum quod ens sit aliquod principium vel causa."

[79] Cf. *FQSM*, II:1, Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine," pp. 25–28; cf. Sabine Folger-Fonfara, *Das "Super"-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziskus von Marchia* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 96 (Leiden, 2008), pp. 31–39.

[80] Cf. *FQSM* IV,6 (E fol. 70vb, M fol. 27ra, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation): "Respondeo. Hic dicitur a quodam doctore in scriptis suis quod accidens aliquod cadat medium inter subiectum et accidens potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod cadat medium inter subiectum et accidens ratione subiecti, vel quod cadat medium in ratione inhaerendi." Cf. Thomas ab Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 5.

[81] *Ibid.* (E fol. 71ra, M fol. 27rb): "Haec est opinio cum sua declaratione quae plus valet quam opinio."

A few scattered internal references can be found, such as those already mentioned in IV:1. At the end of III:2, Francis refers to V:1: *Utrum autem finis secundum esse quod habet extra habeat rationem causae vel non, videbitur alias*.

2.4. *Significance*

At the current point in research on Francis of Marchia, perhaps the most important contribution of his commentary on the *Metaphysics* to come to light is his distinction between general and special metaphysics, to which Albert Zimmermann first directed contemporary attention.[82] In effect, the distinction goes back to a classic problem in the *Met*, ably discussed in the introduction to this volume. In different parts of the *Met.*, Aristotle seems to place contradictory requirements on the subject of First Philosophy. In Books A and Γ, he argues that the subject of metaphysics is "being *qua* being," while in E and Λ, he seems to say that the subject of investigation is instead separate substances, that is, beings that are eternal, immaterial and immobile. While many of his predecessors tried to reconcile the two requirements, Francis of Marchia states simply that there are two metaphysics:

> There are two types of metaphysics: a common metaphysics and a proper, or particular metaphysics. And according to this I say that the subject of common metaphysics is reality (*res*) in common as it is common to all things of first intention, but not as it is contracted to a thing of a determinate genus, nor to a simple substance, nor quantity, nor ultimate causes, nor to abstract or non-abstract reality, but as it is reality in common to all things of first intention. But the subject of particular metaphysics is reality separate from matter according to essence and according to reason.[83]

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[82] See Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 349–71; Antonino Poppi, "Ontologia e scienza divina nel Commentario alle Sentenze di Francesco della Marca (1319)," *Miscellanea francescana* 104 (2004), 100–20; and Folger-Fonfara, "Franziskus von Marchia," pp. 461–513, and *Das "Super"-Transzendentale*, pp. 127–55. Marco Forlivesi, "*Quae in hac quaestione*," p. 237, n. 68, suggests that Scotus's own comments in his authentic *De cognitione Dei* may constitute "prior art" in dividing the metaphysics.

[83] Cf. *FQSM* I:1 (E fol. 49va; M fol. 2vb, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation): "Quarta conclusio est quod duplex est metaphysica, quaedam communis et quaedam propria sive particularis. Et secundum hoc dico quod subiectum metaphysicae communis est res ut est communis ad omnes res primae intentionis, non secundum quod est contracta ad rem determinati generis nec substantiae simplicis nec quantitatis nec causarum ultimarum nec ad rem abstractam vel non abstractam, sed ut est res communis ad omnes res primae intentionis. Subiectum vero metaphysicae particularis est res separata a materia secundum essentiam et secundum rationem."

Francis then slightly rewords his conclusion:

> Or I say differently that there are two types of metaphysics. This is clear from the Philosopher, IV *Metaphysics*, Chapter 1: "A science that is generically one investigates all beings *qua* beings, and to its species pertain the species." Here he clearly says that there are general and special metaphysics. Accordingly, I say that the first subject of common metaphysics is reality in the sense of reality that is not contracted to any thing of a determinate genus, neither substance, nor quantity, nor any other genus, nor to an abstract or non-abstract reality, but rather it is a reality that is simply common to all things of first intention. But the subject of particular metaphysics is reality separate from matter according to reason and in reality. That particular metaphysics takes its subject from common metaphysics, and common metaphysics proves the first subject of particular metaphysics; therefore particular metaphysics is subalternate to common metaphysics, and this particular metaphysics is properly called "divine science," because it has divine being as its first subject. But common metaphysics is only divine science insofar as it proves the proper subject of divine science, and thus both metaphysics are, with regards to their subject, divine science, but in different ways. For one is divine because it concerns divine being, the other is divine because it proves divine being, and both can be called "metaphysics," although in different ways, because both exceed the boundaries of physics (*transcendit metas physicae*), for metaphysics is the same as "transcending the boundaries of physics." Indeed, both common and proper metaphysics transcend the boundaries of physics, because both concern abstract beings, but one positively, the other privatively.[84]

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[84] Cf. *FQSM* I:1 (E fol. 49rb; M fol. 2vb, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation): "Vel aliter dico quod duplex est metaphysica. Patet per Philosophum IV *Metaphysicae* capitulo 1: 'omnia entia in quantum entia speculatur una scientia genere, species autem specierum.' Ecce plane dicit quod est metaphysica generalis et specialis. Secundum hoc dico quod subiectum metaphysicae communis primum est res secundum quod res non contracta ad aliquam rem determinati generis nec substantiae nec quantitatis nec alicuius alterius generis nec ad rem abstractam nec non abstractam, sed est res simpliciter communis ad omnes res primae intentionis. Subiectum vero metaphysicae particularis est res separata a materia secundum rationem et secundum rem. Illa metaphysica particularis accipit suum subiectum a metaphysica communi, et haec metaphysica probat primum subiectum metaphysicae particularis, et ideo metaphysica particularis subalternatur metaphysicae communi, et haec metaphysica particularis vocatur proprie scientia divina quia ipsa est de ente divino sicut de primo subiecto. Metaphysica autem communis non est scientia divina nisi in quantum probat subiectum proprium scientiae divinae, et sic utraque quoad subiectum est scientia divina, sed differenter, quia una est divina quia est de ente divino, alia vero divina quia probat ens divinum, et utraque potest vocari metaphysica, licet diversimode, quia utraque transcendit metas physicae, nam metaphysica idem est quod metas physicae transcendens. Utraque enim metaphysica, communis et propria, transcendit metas physicae, quia utraque est de entibus abstractis, sed una positive, alia privative."

For Francis of Marchia, the link between general and special metaphysics is one of subalternation: *metaphysica communis* proves the existence of separate substances, which *metaphysica particularis* then investigates.

In his *Met.* commentary, Francis delineates a philosophical system that makes free use of the concepts and methods of argumentation used by Scotus and his followers, but he frequently defends views somewhat distant from the Subtle Doctor's position. This independence of spirit explains in part his appeal for 20th- and 21st-century historians of philosophy. At the same time, he expresses his system in terminology common to the Scotists, which can account for the reception by his contemporaries.

2.5. *Influence*

The distinction between general and special metaphysics has long been viewed as one of the major developments of 17th-century philosophy, and Sabine Folger-Fonfara recently studied the similarities and divergences between Francis of Marchia's contribution and those of later philosophers.[85]

To connect Francis of Marchia with the history of early modern Scotism, the history of ideas in the intervening period needs investigation. What little research has been conducted on the reception of the *FQSM* reveals its immediate and lasting influence. Notker Schneider has shown that John the Canon not only cited the *FQSM* but also copied entire questions in his *Physics* commentary.[86] Fabrizio Amerini's investigations have revealed that the *FQSM* was a major source for Paul of Venice's own commentary on the *Met.*[87]

2.6. *Marchia on Truth*

An examination of Marchia's method in a question may help elucidate his approach in the *FQSM* as well as clarify the status of the *FQSM* among Francis's surviving works. While Künzle failed twice to prove correctly the authorship of the *FQSM*, the internal reference that he found has not been resolved. Francis's statement there that his position holding that truth, as

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[85] See Folger-Fonfara, *Das "Super"-Transzendentale*, esp. pp. 160–70; and Marco Lamanna, "Il 'supertrascendentale' nella metafisica di Francesco d'Appignano," *Quaestio* 8 (2008), 684–90. See now the reconstruction of Marchia's doctrine of transcendentals in: Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 495–513.

[86] See Schneider, *Die Kosmologie*, p. 28, n. 87.

[87] See Fabrizio Amerini, "Francesco di Appignano come fonte di Paolo Veneto. Il caso degli accidenti eucaristici," *Picenum Seraphicum* 25–26 (2006–08), 19–67.

a passion of things, does not formally exist in reality differs from what he said previously, implying that he changed his mind. Perhaps his discussion can help situate the *FQSM* among his other philosophical writings, that is, his *Quodlibet* and Commentaries on the *Sentences*.

In fact, one of the major distinctions between Francis of Marchia's doctrine in the *Quodlibet*, on the one hand, and in the *Sentences* and *FQSM*, on the other, is that of neutral intentions. In the *Quodlibet*, Francis of Marchia argues that the intentions of thing (*res*), being (*ens*), and something (*aliquid*), as well as the intentions of one, true, and good (the passions of being) are neutral intentions: that is, they are neither first intentions nor second intentions but something common to both. Francis further states that first intentions are intentions of real beings, and second intentions are mental beings. Neutral intentions, therefore, abstract from real and mental being (making them "supertranscendentals"). By implication, true, as a passion of being, formally exists irrespective of the mind's action. Yet, Francis's doctrine on intentionality as it appears in the Commentary on the *Sentences* (and in the *FQSM*) takes an entirely different approach: intentions are all mental beings, and first intentions are all concepts consequent upon real things as they exist in the mind; numbers, therefore, can be absolute beings (as opposed to respective beings), founded on reality and yet having a purely mental existence as first intentions. Likewise, the science of being *qua* being, metaphysics, can be a real science and still consider mental beings, because it considers mental beings as consequent upon reality. This view allows for purely mental beings to be first intentions and not neutral ones, and in this way matches the doctrine in the *FQSM*.[88] Similarly, the doctrine of "true" and "false" in the *FQSM* appears to require a doctrine of intentionality in line with what Francis states in the *Sentences* commentaries, and not the one defended in the *Quodlibet*; indeed, the doctrine in the *Quodlibet* seems to argue that the transcendentals, including "true," have formal existence outside of the mind.

Francis's exposition of "true" and "false" in the *FQSM* reflects his mature view, is compatible with his statements in the *Sentences* commentary, and represents a conscious break with the *Quodlibet*. In *FQSM* VI:6, he argues that all types of truth are mental productions, and yet, because they remain passions of being, they pertain to metaphysics.

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[88] On Francis's doctrine of intentionality, see William O. Duba, "Neither First, nor Second, nor . . . in His Commentary on the *Sentences*: Francis of Marchia's *intentiones neutrae*," *Quaestio* 10 (2010), 285–313.

Francis makes two key distinctions. First, he distinguishes between two kinds of truth and falsehood: the "truth of the intellect" is the truth (and falsehood) by which we have a true understanding; second, the "truth of reality" is the truth or falsehood that a thing has in itself, for example, what we mean when with say "this is true gold" or "this is false silver."[89] Second, he differentiates among the ways something can be true, using an analogy to the case of motion, which is suited in different ways to the thing that moves (i.e., formally), the mover (virtually and effectively), and the end-point (materially and objectively). Truth is in reality both causally and materially: when we consider true gold, we consider something in the world (hence, the gold is the matter of our consideration), and that something can be said to be the cause of our true understanding.[90]

Francis states that the truth of reality is not formally in reality, but is only materially so, and he retracts his previous statements to the contrary. His arguments hinge on the idea that between one and the same thing there can only obtain a relation of reason. The truth of reality can be considered (A) in itself (a thing is true when it is what it ought to be), (B) in its effect (a thing is true when it is what it appears to be), and (C) in its cause (a thing is true when it corresponds to its form in the cause). In all three cases, "truth" singles out a relationship between the thing and itself, in itself (A, absolute truth), or *qua* itself in another (BC, related truth). Francis insists "the truth of reality has no other modes."[91]

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[89] Cf. *FQSM* VI:6 (E fol. 93va; M fol. 48ra): "Ad quod dicendum quod duplex est veritas et duplex est falsitas opposita: quedam enim est veritas qua intellectus dicitur verus et falsitas qua intellectus dicitur falsus; quedam vero est veritas qua res dicitur vera sicut dicimus 'hoc est verum aurum; hoc est verum argentum' et falsitas opposita qua res dicitur falsa, sicut dicimus 'hoc est falsum aurum et falsum argentum.'"

[90] *Ibid.*: "Quantum ad primum, sciendum quod aliquid convenit alicui tripliciter: vel formaliter et subiective, sicut motus convenit mobili formaliter; vel virtualiter et effective, sicut motus convenit moventi; vel materialiter et obiective, sicut motus convenit termino, quia terminus motus est materia motus. Ad propositum, veritas est in rebus causaliter in quantum res sunt cause veritatis in intellectu; similiter et veritas est in rebus materialiter in quantum res sunt materia veritatis, sed utrum veritas sit in rebus formaliter—hec est difficultas."

[91] *Ibid.* (E fol. 93vb; M fol. 48rb): "Ad ampliorem ergo intellectum predictorum, sciendum quod triplex est veritas rei, scilicet veritas absoluta et veritas relata, et hec est duplex, quia vel est veritas relata ad suam causam, vel est veritas relata ad suum effectum. Veritas absoluta rei est quando est ita in se sicut debet esse, sicut aurum est verum aurum quando ita est in se sicut debet esse. Veritas relata ad suam causam quando res ita est in se sicut est in sua causa, sicut ymago dicitur vera quando ita representat faciem sicut est in se. Veritas autem relata ad suum effectum est quando res ita est in se sicut apparet sensui vel intellectui, sicut homo dicitur verus homo quando ita est in intellectu sicut pretendit exterius. Non sunt plures modi veritatis rei."

Francis's treatment bears a distant resemblance to that of Duns Scotus. The latter, in his own *Met.* commentary, distinguished between *veritas in re* and *in intellectu*; of the truth in itself, Scotus identified two types of *veritas in re*, namely, (SA) in comparison to what produces the truth and (SB) in comparison to what cognizes the truth.[92] The former includes (SA1) absolute truth, which is "the conformity of what is produced to its producer," as well as determinately in the sense of (SA2) adequation (as the Son of God is the truth) and (SA3) imitation (as creatures are with respect to their exemplars). The latter (SB) covers the truth "by comparison to the intellect" and covers the capacity to make itself known to any capable intellect (SB1), to the created intellect (SB2), and the state of actually being cognized in the intellect (SB3).[93] Incidentally, Scotus's text found its way into Antonius Andreae's *Questiones* (*AQSM* VI:6) with only slight modification.[94]

Francis's model combines some of Scotus's distinctions and does away with others: first, (C) "truth in its cause" absorbs Scotus's absolute truth (SA1) and being determinately true by adequation (SA2) and imitation (SA3). Second, (B) "truth in its effect" explicitly refers to the operation of the intellect as actually occurring (SB3) and implicitly excludes any way

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[92] For an introduction to the scholastic debate on truth leading up to Scotus, see Jos Decorte, "Henri de Gand et la définition classique de la vérité," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 68.1 (2001), 34–74; see also William O. Duba, *Seeing God: Theology, Beatitude and Cognition in the Thirteenth Century* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 2006), pp. 186–202.

[93] Cf. *SQSM* VI:3 (vol. 2, pp. 65–66): "Et primo distinguendum est de vero. Est enim veritas in rebus et veritas in intellectu. In rebus duplex in genere, videlicet per comparationem ad producentem et per comparationem ad cognoscentem sive intelligentem.—Primo modo aut dicitur veritas absolute conformitas producti ad producens, aut determinate conformitas talis secundum adaequationem, aut tertio modo determinate conformitas secundum imitation. Et, licet primus istorum trium modorum videatur esse communis secundo et tertio, tamen si nomen 'veri' imponatur ad significandum quodcumque trium praedictorum secundum propriam rationem, erit aequivocum. Secundus modus invenitur in Filio Dei, quia est veritas, quia, secundum Augustinum, summa similitudo principii; haec enim est conformitas cum adaequatione. Tertius modus invenitur in creatura quae imitatur exemplar cui aliquo modo assimilatur, defective tamen, alias non diceretur imitari.—Secundo modo, scilicet per comparationem ad intellectum, dicitur res vera tripliciter. Primo, quia sui manifestativa—quantum est de se—cuicumque intellectui potenti manifestationem cognoscere. Secundo, quia est assimilativa intellectus assimilabilis, qui non est nisi intellectus creatus. Tertio, quia facta manifestatione vel assimilatione, res est in intellectu sicut cognitum in cognoscente." For a thorough analysis of Scotus's doctrine of truth, including *SQSM* VI:3, see Laurent Cesalli, *Le Réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif* (Paris, 2006), pp. 137–60.

[94] See Pini, "Sulla fortuna," pp. 339–40.

for something to be potentially true. Significantly, (A) truth in absolute is considered not as a relation of the thing to its producer but of the thing to "how it ought to be." In all three senses, "truth" is a relation of reason, dependent on the act of the mind considering it.

In an argument only found in MS E of the *FQSM*, Francis of Marchia makes clear his point: simple terms are true via composition and division. In other words, just as in the intellect we can never cognize the true with a simple apprehension, but must bring about some sort of comparison, so too simple realities are never true in themselves, but only via a relation of reason. No reality is truly independent of a mind actually considering it.[95] Hence the error of those, such as Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent, who argue that truth is the first object of the intellect: the first object of the intellect must be something real, and not a relation of reason.[96]

In the sense of being an object of the mind's consideration (*obiective*), *veritas rei* and *veritas intellectus* are both in the intellect. Formally, however, *veritas rei* is a relation of reason obtaining in something outside the mind, while *veritas intellectus* is a relationship between two mental objects, and therefore formally (*formaliter, subiective*) exists in the mind.[97]

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[95] Cf. *FQSM* VI:6 (E fol. 93vb; M fol. 48rb): "Item, sicut veritas intellectus non est <in> intellectu simplici<ter> sed in intellectu composite et divise I *Perihermeneias* (*De Int.*, I, 16a12–13; *Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. 2.1, p. 5), ita suo modo correspondenter veritas rei non est in re simpliciter accepta, sed modo composito vel diviso. Sicut concipiendo simpliciter aurum, numquam concipimus circa ipsum rationem veri nec falsi, si<c>, quando concipimus ipsum aurum modo composito vel diviso, tunc concipimus circa ipsam rationem veri vel falsi, sicut, quando concipimus quod aurum ita est in re sicut debet esse, tunc concipimus circa ipsum totum veri vel falsi. Compositio autem et divisio talis non est formaliter in re sed solum secundum rationem, quia nulla res componit realiter cum se ipsa igitur veritas rei non est formaliter in re, sed solum secundum rationem. Eodem modo, quando concipio quod aurum est ita in se sicut apparet, tunc concipio circa ipsum rationem veri; concipere autem aurum ita est in se sicut apparet est concipere ipsum modo composito. Similiter, quando concipio quod res ita est in se sicut est in sua causa, concipio ipsum modo composito, et tunc concipio circa ipsam rationem veri. Et ita numquam concipiendo rem simpliciter concipio circa ipsam rationem veri nec falsi, sed solum concipiendo ipsam modo composito vel diviso; talis autem divisio non est formaliter in re, sed solum secundum rationem. Et hanc rationem innuit Philosophus in littera, quod compositio et divisio <sunt> in mente et non in rebus."

[96] *Ibid.* (E fol. 94ra; M fol. 48rb): "Ex istis sequitur correlativum quod verum non est primum obiectum intellectus, quia primum obiectum intellectus est aliquid reale; verum autem formaliter est relatio rationis."

[97] *Ibid.* (E fol. 94ra; M fol. 48rb–va): "Quantum ad secundum articulum, licet aliqui dicant sine aliqua distinctione quod verum et falsum non sunt in intellectu subiective per modum forme, sed solum obiective per modum obiecti, tamen dico aliter, distinguendo, sicut iam dictum est, quod duplex est veritas, scilicet veritas rei et veritas intellectus, et

Francis explicitly distinguishes his position against *aliqui* who "say without any distinction that true and false are not in the mind subjectively, in the manner of a form, but only objectively, in the manner of an object."

Francis then concludes that *veritas rei* pertains to the science of metaphysics, since the same practitioner studies a subject and judges whether it is true or not; so the metaphysician, who studies being, judges true being;[98] *veritas intellectus*, in contrast, is a passion of the intellect's acts of composition and division, and hence logical reasoning, and so pertains to logic.[99]

Francis's position on truth is clearly incompatible with his doctrine on (super)transcendentals in the *Quodlibet*. There, Francis argues that the transcendentals, including "true" (in the sense of *veritas rei*), isolate something common to beings of first intention (real beings) and beings of second intention (mental beings).[100] Here, however, he is saying that, whatever the sense of "true," it refers to a mental being and is only distinguished according to whether it refers to a relation of reason between real beings (*veritas rei*) or between mental beings. At the same time, Francis's doctrine of truth in the *FQSM* does largely match his classification of real and mental beings, first and second intentions, in his *Scriptum* on Book I of the *Sentences*, with one notable difference: the *FQSM* uses one criterion not found in the *Sentences* for classifying these beings: subjective existence in the soul.

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secundum hoc dico quod veritas rei non est in intellectu subiective per modum forme, sed solum obiective per modum obiecti; subiective autem est in re que dicitur vera, non autem in re extra, sed in re concepta ab intellectu non simpliciter, sed in re concepta modo composito vel diviso. [. . .] De veritate autem intellectus dicitur econverso quod illa est formaliter in intellectu per modum forme non tantum per modum obiecti."

98 *Ibid.* (E fol. 94ra; M fol. 48va): "Quantum ad tertium articulum, dicendum quod veritas rei pertinet ad considerationem metaphysici, quia aut spectat ad considerationem metaphysici aut alicuius alterius. Non alicuius alterius, quia nullius est considerare naturam entis in se nisi metaphysici; ad eundem autem artificem pertinet considerare naturam rei in se et considerare utrum illa res sit vera vel falsa. Ergo veritas rei pertinet ad considerationem metaphysici. Hoc etiam apparet, quia nullus alius artifex intromittit se de veritate rei; ergo relinquitur quod considerare hoc pertinet solum metaphysico."

99 *Ibid.* (E fol. 94ra–b; M fol. 48va): "Veritas autem intellectus videtur quod pertineat ad considerationem logici, quia ad eandem scientiam pertinet consideratio subiecti et passionis; sed veritas et falsitas consistunt in compositione et divisione intellectus; compositio autem et divisio pertinent ad considerationem logici; Igitur, verum et falsum intellectus pertinent ad logicum. Et hoc est quod concludit Philosophus in littera, quod ens et verum pretermittantur, quia mentis est passio."

100 See Duba, "Neither First."

In the *Scriptum*, Francis divides beings according to the pairs real and mental, on the one hand, and made-by-the-soul and not-made-by-the-soul, on the other. Arguing that arithmetic is a real science, and yet numbers do not have extramental existence, Francis addresses the objection that a real science only considers extramental beings. To the contrary, he says, real sciences such as metaphysics, physics, and the moral sciences still consider beings of reason.[101] He eventually settles on a solution that distinguishes between being effectively by the soul and being objectively in the soul:

> Although number only exists objectively in the soul, it is not *per se* effectively by the soul. Whence a fourfold order of beings can be posited: some are beings that are not effectively by the soul, nor do they exist only objectively in the soul, as are natural beings, which do not depend on the soul objectively, nor effectively. Some are beings that are only in the soul objectively, and are in themselves effectively by the soul, as are all second intentions, as the intention of genus and individual, proposition, syllogism. [. . .] Some are beings that are only effectively by the soul, and exist outside the soul subjectively, as are artificial beings, which are effectively by the intellect and not by nature, but exist subjectively in reality. Some are beings that are only objectively in the soul, but are not in themselves effectively by the soul, but only indirectly, *per accidens*, as are all the species of numbers.[102]

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[101] Cf. Francis of Marchia, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn et al. (in preparation; cf. Francis of Marchia, *Quodlibet*, ed. Nazareno Mariani [Grottaferrata, Rome, 1997], pp. 472–73): "Ad secundam rationem dico quod arithmetica non est magis scientia realis quam metaphysica et physica et geometria, et quaelibet istarum est per se de ente in anima. De metaphysica patet, quia est de causalitate primae causae cuius causalitas est ens rationis formaliter, quia relatio causae cuiuscumque et relatio principii et relatio eminentiae et relatio primitatis in ente primo ad alia entia est relatio rationis, et tota metaphysica est principaliter de hoc. Similiter in physica principaliter tractatur de primo motore; relatio autem motoris primi ad mobile est relatio rationis. Similiter geometria per se considerat gradus mensurae bicubiti, tricubiti et sic de aliis quae sunt relationes rationis. Similiter scientia moralis, quae est scientia realis, per se considerat pactiones, contractus, pignora, mutua, deposita, emptiones et venditiones, quae omnia dicuntur relationes rationis, et tamen est scientia realis."

[102] *Ibid.*: "Aliter potest dici ad istam rationem et ad omnes sequentes quod, licet numerus sit tantum in anima obiective, non tamen est per se ab anima effective. Unde potest poni quadruplex ordo entium. Quaedam sunt entia quae non sunt ab anima effective, nec sunt tantum in anima obiective, sicut sunt entia naturalia, quae non dependent ab anima obiective nec effective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum in anima obiective et per se ab anima effective, sicut sunt secundae intentiones omnes, ut intentio generis et individui, propositionis, syllogismi, quae non sunt nisi tantum in anima obiective et ab anima effective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum ab anima effective et sunt extra animam subiective sicut sunt entia artificialia, quae sunt ab intellectu effective et non a natura, sed sunt extra subiective. Quaedam vero entia sunt quae sunt tantum in anima obiective; sed non sunt per se ab anima effective nisi tantum indirecte per accidens, sicut sunt omnes species numerorum quae, licet sint tantum obiective in anima, non

Knowable beings are by definition capable of existing objectively in the soul. Real beings (natural and artificial beings) also exist subjectively outside the soul. Beings are effectively-by-the-soul when something in the soul causes their existence; they are "not-effectively-by-the-soul" when their existence is caused by the mind's attending to something in extramental reality.

This double division between being in the soul vs. in reality and being by-the-soul and not-by-the-soul underlies Francis of Marchia's doctrine of "middle relations" (*relationes mediae*) between real relations and relations of reason. In *Scriptum* I, d. 30, Marchia argues that there are three types of relations: a strictly real relation (*simpliciter realis*), which is not-effectively-by-the-soul, nor does it exist in the soul; a strict relation of reason (*simpliciter rationis*), which is objectively in the soul and effectively-by-the-soul, and includes the class of second intentions; and a middle relation (*relatio media*), which is objectively in the soul and not-effectively-by-the-soul, such as the repugnance between "two" and "five" or between any two contraries: since they are incompossible, they do not exist in any single extramental object, but the intellect, considering them, conceives their incompossibility.[103] Middle relations differ from relations

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tamen sunt per se effective ab anima, sed quaelibet earum consequitur unitates quodam ordine conceptas, et sicut res extra consequuntur proprie accidentia extra, ita unitates quodam ordine conceptas consequitur propria forma numeri secundum diversam proportionem unitatum conceptarum quae non consequitur eas extra, quia unitates extra distinguuntur subiecto et loco; eadem autem forma accidentalis non potest simul fundari in diversis subiectis loco et subiecto distinctis. Sed unitates conceptae apud intellectum non distinguuntur loco nec subiecto, ideo forma numeri consequitur eas apud intellectum, et non consequitur eas in re extra. Et tunc haec est differentia inter intentiones secundas quas considerat logica, et intentiones primas quas considerat arithmetica, quia logica est de intentionibus secundis quae sunt tantum in anima et ab anima, ideo non est scientia realis; sed arithmetica est de intentionibus primis quae non sunt ab anima sed consequuntur res secundum modum essendi in anima, et quantum ad hoc potest dici realis."

[103] *Ibid.*, d. 30, q. un., a. 1, ed. Etzkorn et al., in preparation: "Quantum ad primum potest dici probabiliter, secundum alia iam dicta, quod triplex est relatio. Quaedam simpliciter realis cuius esse non est ab anima effective nec in anima obiective, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium extra qui nec dependet ab anima effective nec dependet ab anima subiective, ut ordo locati ad locum, dependentiae accidentis ad subiectum, et sic de omnibus aliis. Quaedam vero est relatio cuius esse est in anima obiective et ab anima effective, sicut sunt intentiones secundae, ut propositio, syllogismus, genus, species etc., quae non sunt subiective extra animam sed tantum obiective in anima et ab anima effective, quia habitudo praedicati ad subiectum, affirmativa vel negativa, est tantum ab anima, et ista relatio simpliciter est rationis. [. . .] Quaedam vero est relatio media cuius esse est tantum in anima obiective, sed non ab anima effective per se et directe nisi tantum per accidens ratione extremorum conceptorum, sicut est repugnantia qua intellectus concipit repugnantiam inter duo et quinque, dicendo 'duo sunt quinque' statim concipit falsitatem repugnantiae."

of reason insofar as the former arise necessarily and inseparably when the extremes are conceived, while the latter only arise contingently. In this way, he says, true and false propositions "are only objectively in the intellect, but are not effectively by the intellect but arise from the nature of the extremes, because it is not in the power of the intellect to verify or falsify propositions."[104]

Francis is not content with this solution, because some first intentions, such as relations of reason like loans and gifts, are artificial beings with purely mental existence, and they do not seem to fit into this scheme. He therefore ends his discussion saying that the issue is not yet clear ("nondum est clarum").[105]

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[104] *Ibid.*: "Consimiliter dico quod quaedam relationes consequuntur extrema concepta necessario et inseparabiliter, et tales relationes oriuntur ex natura extremorum conceptorum et non effective ab intellectu, sicut sunt istae de quibus dictum est. Ex quo patet quod, licet veritas et falsitas complexa sint tantum obiective in intellectu, non tamen sunt effective ab intellectu, sed oriuntur ex natura extremorum, quia non est in potestate intellectus verificare vel falsificare propositones. Quia, licet sit in potestate intellectus formare propositiones universaliter affirmativas vel negativas quocumque modo, non tamen est in potestate sua verificare propositiones formatas necessarias nec falsificare eas, quia principia scimus in quantum terminos cognoscimus. Et hoc modo termini dicuntur esse causa principiorum et principia conclusionum quantum ad habitudinem veritatis, non quod termini sint causae effectivae complexionis principiorum affirmativae nec negativae, sed solum intellectus est causa complexionis eorum affirmativae vel negativae; sed termini compositi vel divisi per intellectum sunt causa convenientiae quantum ad veritatem vel repugnantiae quantum ad falsitatem. Similiter principia non sunt causa conclusionum quantum ad complexionem affirmativam vel negativam, quia illa est ab intellectu, sed solum sunt causa conclusionum quantum ad habitudinem veritatis et falsitatis, quia principia concepta sunt causa veritatis conclusionis sequentis, ita quod ex veritate principiorum statim oritur veritas conclusionis ex natura extremorum sic conceptorum.—Quaedam vero sunt relationes in anima quae consequuntur extrema concepta tantum contingenter, sicut terminos conceptos consequuntur complexio affirmativa et negativa mere contingenter, quia intellectus quoscumque terminos potest componere et dividere, et quascumque propositiones potest varie combinare in diversis figuris et diversis modis. Similiter quoscumque terminos potest varie combinare per modum subicibilis et praedicabilis dicendo 'homo est animal' et 'animal est homo,' et ideo omnes tales relationes sunt effective ab intellectu, et istae vocantur proprie relationes rationis, et tales sunt omnes intentiones secundae. Et haec est differentia tunc inter intentiones secundas et intentiones primas quae tantum sunt in anima et non extra, quia intentiones primae, quae sunt tantum in anima obiective, sic sunt obiective in anima quod non sunt effective ab anima per se, sed tantum consequuntur necessario extrema primarum intentionum quae sunt extra animam. Intentiones vero secundae sic sunt in anima quod sunt ab anima, nec sequuntur necessario extrema concepta.—Ex quo patet quomodo relationes mediae sunt reales, quia non sunt ab anima; sunt tamen rationis, quia non sunt extra animam, et de tali ordine rerum videtur esse numerus, licet sit forma absoluta. Et tunc haec est differentia inter entia in anima et entia ab anima, quia entia ab anima sunt tantum relativa, entia vero in anima obiective non sunt tantum relativa sed etiam absoluta; et sic potest poni arithmetica scientia realis."

[105] See Notker Schneider, "Die Qualität der Zahlen. Die aristotelische Zahlentheorie Nach *Metaph.* V (Δ) 14 und ihre mittelalterliche Kommentierung und Umdeutung,"

TABLE 6. *Francis's Division of Beings by Relationship to the Mind* (Scriptum *I, d. 24, q. 3*)

existence / origin	*subiective extra* + *obiective in anima*	*obiective in anima* only
non effective ab anima	natural beings	e.g., numbers
effective ab anima	artificial beings	second intentions, some first intentions

In the discussion of truth in *FQSM* VI:6, Francis of Marchia adds the final piece that makes the issue clear: subjective existence in the soul. While in *Scriptum* I, d. 24, q. 3, Francis states that mental beings "are only in the soul objectively," in *FQSM* he argues against those who "say without any distinction that true and false are not in the mind subjectively, in the manner of a form, but only objectively, in the manner of an object." In fact, Francis emphasizes subjective existence: everything that is conceived (exists in the soul objectively) is conceived as a form inhering in a subject, and that subject can be found by considering what the form denotes:

> There are two types of truth, namely, the truth of the thing and the truth of the intellect, and accordingly I say that the truth of reality is not subjectively in the intellect in the manner of a form, but is only objectively in the manner of an object; but subjectively it is in the thing that is said to be true, but not in the external thing, but in the thing conceived by the intellect, not simply, but in a combined or divided manner. This is clear, because every form existing formally in something denotes that subject, but the truth of reality does not denote that intellect, but rather denotes that thing [. . .].
>
> Conversely it is said concerning the truth of the intellect that it is formally in the intellect in the manner of a form, not only in the manner of an object. The proof: because what is only objectively in the intellect does not denote that intellect, otherwise the intellect would be denoted by any being whatsoever, since any being is objectively in the intellect; but true and false denote the intellect, because the intellect is true or false in understanding; therefore truth and falsity are subjectively in the intellect.[106]

Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 2 (1991), 587–609. At 604–09 Schneider discusses Francis of Marchia's theory of number as it appears in *FQSM* V:11 and V:15, concluding that number is an accident founded on (*materialiter*) unities, but is not formally the same as them.

[106] Cf. *FQSM* VI:6 (E fol. 94ra; M fol. 48rb–va): "Quantum ad secundum articulum, licet aliqui dicant sine aliqua distinctione quod verum et falsum non sunt in intellectu subiective per modum forme, sed solum obiective per modum obiecti, tamen dico aliter, distinguendo, sicut iam dictum est, quod duplex est veritas, scilicet veritas rei et veritas intellectus, et secundum hoc dico quod veritas rei non est in intellectu subiective per

True and false, in all senses, are effectively by the mind and are mental beings. *Veritas rei*, however, has subjective existence in the conceived (extramental) reality insofar as it anchors a relation of reason between an extramental thing conceived in two ways; *veritas intellectus* subjectively exists in the mind, since it describes a relation of reason between mental beings. When Francis argues that *veritas rei* pertains to metaphysics (a science of first intentions) and *veritas intellectus* to logic (a science of second intentions), he implicitly resolves what he left in doubt in the *Scriptum*: the group of purely mental beings that are effectively by the mind includes both first and second intentions, but these intentions can be distinguished according to what they denote: second intentions denote mental beings, and first intentions real beings:

Table 7. *Hypothetical Reconstruction of Francis's Division of Beings According to* Scriptum *I, d. 24, q. 3, and* FQSM *VI:6*

existence (*obiective, subiective*) origin	*in re, extra*	*in anima, in re concepta*	*in anima, in anima*
non effective ab anima	natural beings	e.g., numbers	(divine action)
effective ab anima	artificial beings	e.g., *veritas rei* (social realities?)	*intentiones secundae* (e.g., *veritas intellectus*)

The position on truth could be seen as a development of Francis's view in the *Scriptum*, making a distinction that the *Scriptum* does not, namely, between mental beings that are subjectively in the mind and those that are subjectively in things conceived to be outside the mind; using this distinction, one could solve Francis's problem with intentionality in the *Scriptum*. But would Francis agree? On the one hand, the *FQSM* discussion shares many of the same notions as the *Scriptum*, and Francis's retraction of his previous position, that *veritas rei* has formal existence in

modum forme, sed solum obiective per modum obiecti; subiective autem est in re que dicitur vera, non autem in re extra, sed in re concepta ab intellectu non simpliciter, sed in re concepta modo composito vel diviso. Patet, quia omnis forma existens in aliquo formaliter denominat ipsum subiectum, sed veritas rei non denominat ipsum intellectum, sed ipsam rem [. . .]—De veritate autem intellectus dicitur econverso quod illa est formaliter in intellectu per modum forme non tantum per modum obiecti. Probatio, quia illud quod est tantum in intellectu obiective non denominat ipsum intellectum, aliter intellectus denominaretur a quolibet ente, cum quodlibet ens sit obiective in intellectu; sed verum et falsum denominant intellectum, quia intellectus intelligendo est verus vel falsus; ergo veritas et falsitas sunt in intellectu subiective."

reality, cannot refer to his *Sentences* commentary; it can, however, refer to his position in the *Quodlibet*, where the transcendentals, including truth, are portrayed as independent of the distinction between real and mental. For this reason, the *FQSM* appears to be Francis's most mature scholastic work, and the *Quodlibet* the earliest.

On the other hand, one of the scholars of Francis of Marchia's *Metaphysics* commentary (and an editor of the present volume), has, in his investigations on the nature of substance and accidents, highlighted the "succinct and problematic" structure of this work; some arguments are telegraphic in nature and weak in force, and the conclusions hesitant. He suggests with some probability that these signs of uncertainty point to the *FQSM* predating the *Sentences* commentary.[107] One can add that, for an author who in his *Sentences* commentary reacted so passionately to the positions of Peter Auriol, the complete absence of any mention of Auriol's doctrine, including when discussing such characteristic doctrines as sensory deception,[108] probably indicates that the *FQSM* constitutes an early work.[109]

At the very least, the close doctrinal affinity between the *FQSM* and Francis of Marchia's *Sentences* commentary should be apparent. Moreover, it should also be clear that, throughout his academic career, Francis of Marchia struggled to distinguish between concepts of things, about things, and about concepts.

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[107] See Fabrizio Amerini, "La natura della sostanza nel commento alla *Metafisica* di Francesco d'Appignano," in: Domenico Priori, ed., *Atti del IV Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d'Appignano* (Appignano del Tronto, 2007), pp. 45–71.

[108] Cf. *FQSM* IV:9, on the topic of sensory deception, has no trace of Auriol, although Francis uses examples of illusions similar to those characteristic of Peter Auriol: where Auriol gives the example of a partially submerged stick that appears bent, Francis uses an oar to demonstrate the position.

[109] The last question of the *FQSM*, VII:11 concerns the generation of substances, a problem where Francis of Marchia defends the Scotist view with passion in q. 23 of Book IV of his *Sentences* commentary and in Book II. In these *Sentences* questions, Marchia targets, among others, positions held by Walter Burley in his *principium quarti* (ca. 1314–18) and those found in Peter Auriol's commentary on Book IV (1317), itself perhaps also a *principium*; on this, see Tiziana Suarez-Nani and William Duba, "Introduction," in: Francisci de Marchia *Reportatio IIA (Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum)*, qq. 13–27 (Francisci de Marchia Opera Philosophica et Theologica) II, 2 (Leuven, 2010), pp. lviii–lxxxiii. Unfortunately, while the division of the question in the *FQSM* announces a discussion of the generation of animals, the text only concerns substances in general, and the examples for Francis's position pertain to the elemental substances. As this is the last question in the *FQSM*, it is impossible to determine whether Francis intended to include another section that discussed the other views.

3. Nicholas Bonet

Often mistaken for a commentary, Nicholas Bonet's *Metaphysica* is something much more audacious, as its *incipit* already makes clear:

> All men, rather all intellectual natures, since they naturally desire to know, therefore one should begin with the first things knowable according to nature. But it is manifest that, if those first things are not cognized, nothing after them can be known.[110]

The opening evokes the *incipit* of the Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All men by nature desire to know," but with two adjustments: first, Bonet expands the scope, via apposition to the Philosopher's words: "All men, rather all intellectual natures"; second, by fitting it into a circumstantial *cum*-clause, Bonet breaks with Aristotle's investigation into the nature of human knowledge and heads straight to how to acquire knowledge, namely, by beginning with the first knowable things. For Bonet's purpose, the *incipit* to the *Metaphysics* forms the major premise of a syllogism: all those desiring to know must begin with the first things knowable. The minor premise echoes the *incipit* to the *Posterior Analytics*:

> But every teaching and every scientific discipline has as its object the first things that are understood or the first things that are knowable, or something that includes them. But the first things that are understood are the intrinsic principles most common to all things or to many of them. The distinct knowledge of a conclusion depends on the distinct knowledge of principles, and the distinct knowledge of principles depends on the distinct knowledge of terms that can be resolved [into other terms], and the distinct knowledge of terms that can be resolved from the distinct knowledge of terms that cannot be resolved, until we arrive at the term that is entirely irresolvable, that is, in absolute. It is manifest, therefore, that every teaching and every scientific discipline is of a term and a subject that are able to be resolved, and depends on the prior knowledge of something absolutely simple.[111]

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[110] Cf. Nicholaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica* (=*NMet*), I, 1 (Venice, 1505, fol. 2ra [=V]; Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers, 43 [=F], fol. 65r): "Omnes homines, ymmo omnes nature intellectuales, cum nature scire desiderant, ideo a primis scibilibus secundum naturam est incipiendum. Manifestum est autem quod illis non cognitis non contingit aliquid posterius sciri" (an online version is avalable at <http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/bsb00008024/images/>, accessed on September 1st, 2013).

[111] *Ibid.*: "omnis autem doctrina, omnisque disciplina scientifica habet pro obiecto prima intellecta et prima scibilia, vel aliquid quod includit illa; primo autem intellecta sunt principia intrinseca communissima omnibus aut pluribus; notitia quoque conclusionis distincta dependet ex distincta notitia principiorum, et distincta notitia principiorum

The *Posterior Analytics* begins "every teaching and every rational discipline comes about from pre-existing knowledge." Bonet uses this *locus* to arrive at the conclusion: there must be some absolutely prior term the knowledge of which is the foundation of all knowledge:

> It is clear, therefore, that for all men naturally desiring to know from what are prior according to nature, one must begin from the term that is entirely irresolvable and consequently from the term that is entirely most common. But most common things are entirely simple and the causes and principles of subsequent things. But the knowledge of the first term that is absolutely irresolvable is called "metaphysics," from *meta*, which means "exceeding" (*trans*) and *ycos* (*science*), because it concerns the entirely first quiddity that transcends the first ten categories, by whatever name they may be called.[112]

Since all who desire to know should begin with the first knowable things, and since scientific knowledge depends on the knowledge of terms, any scientific investigation must begin with the most common term, which, Nicholas states, is common in the ontological sense of having the greatest extension. For Nicholas, being *qua* being is univocal being, transcending the categories, and its investigation lies at the beginning of scientific inquiry.[113] The investigation of the first being, God, for Nicholas constitutes

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dependet ex distincta notitia terminorum resolubilium; et distincta notitia terminorum resolubilium ex distincta notitia terminorum irresolubilium quousque perveniamur ad terminum omnino irresolubilem sive simpliciter. Manifestum est igitur quod omnibus doctrina et disciplina scientifica termini et subiecti resolubilis sit et dependet ex priori notitia simpliciter simplicis."

[112] *Ibid*.: "Palam igitur quod a prioribus secundum naturam omni homini desideranti scire naturaliter est incipiendum a termino omnino irresolubili et per consequens a termino omnino communissimo. Comunissima autem sunt omnino simplicia et posteriorum cause et principia. Notitia autem primi termini irresolubilis simpliciter 'metaphysica' dicitur a 'meta' quod est 'trans' et 'ycos' 'scientia,' quia est de omnino prima quiditate transcendenti decem prima genera quocumque nomine exprimantur (*sic*)." Compare to *SQSM* I, prologue (ed. Andrews et al., v. 1, p. 9), "Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta,' quod est 'trans,' et 'ycos' 'scientia,' quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus," which also appears in *AQSM* I:1 (V 3vb). For an analysis of Scotus's expression in the context of his metaphysics, see Aertsen, "The Transformation of Metaphysics in the Middle Ages," pp. 29–31. But whereas Scotus applies metaphysics to "transcendentibus," which, as Aertsen underscores, means the "*communissima*, such as being qua being and its properties," Bonet implies that transcendence merely describes the quiddity of being qua being, and thus puts less emphasis on metaphysics as a *scientia transcendens*.

[113] For a thorough exploration of the univocity of being in Nicholas Bonet (as well as extensive discussion of the spurious works and doctrines attributed to him), see Isabelle Mandrella, "Metaphysik als Supertranszendentalwissenschaft? Zum scotistischen Metaphysikentwurf des Nicolaus Bonetus," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 75.1 (2008), 161–93.

natural theology and represents the end of philosophical investigation. Although a very different philosopher from Francis of Marchia, Nicholas Bonet uses a division similar to Francis's distinction between common and particular metaphysics, and he uses them to develop his own systematic philosophy, whose parts (*Metaphysica, libros Physicorum, liber Praedicamentorum*, and *Theologia* or *Theologia naturalis*) take their titles (except for the last) from Aristotle's works, but not their structure. Nicholas's *Metaphysica* is not a commentary, but rather the first part of the author's total rewrite of philosophy.[114] As such, it has the honor of being the first work given the name "metaphysics" by its author.

3.1. *Career*

What we know of Nicholas Bonet's career has been summarized by Martin de Barcelona in 1925: coming from the Touraine, he entered the Franciscan convent of Tours. He appears among the Paris masters of theology convoked by Philip VI Valois to the Bois de Vincennes on 19 December 1333 to provide their opinion on the beatific vision. Pope Benedict XII sent him (as *sacrae theologiae professor*) in 1338 on a diplomatic mission to the Khan. In 1342, Clement VI appointed him (as *sacrae theologiae magister*) to be bishop of Malta; on 27 October 1343, the bull appointing Nicholas's successor to the episcopal seat mentions his death. Like practically every other Franciscan theologian from this period, an early modern tradition imagines Nicholas studying personally under Duns Scotus, although in the case of Nicholas, there is no corroborating evidence whatsoever.[115] Given his literal borrowings from Gerald Odonis's *Sentences* commentary, Nicholas's work must have been composed in the early 1330s.[116]

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[114] This break must be emphasized; as Aertsen recently observed, "in dictionaries and compendia, the first three works [i.e., *Metaphysica, Physica*, and *Praedicamenta*] are often categorized as 'Aristotle commentaries,' but this designation is incorrect and does not do justice to their original character. Bonet's *Metaphysics* is not a commentary that that follows the order of exposition in Aristotle's writing, but an independent treatise in nine books. It really is the first systematic account of metaphysics in the Middle Ages, for what we usually call 'Aquinas's metaphysics' or 'Scotus's metaphysics' is in fact a reconstruction of the modern interpreter" (*Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 481).

[115] See Martin de Barcelona, "Nicolas Bonet (†1343), Tourangeau, Doctor Proficuus O.M.," *Études franciscaines* 37 (1925), 638–57, at 638–40; F. O' Brian, "Bonet Nicolas," in: *Dictionaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiasiques* (Paris, 1937), vol. 9, cols. 849–50, largely recapitulates Martin de Barcelona.

[116] See Christophe Grellard, "Les présupposés méthodologiques de l'atomisme: la théorie du continu de Nicolas d'Autrécourt et Nicolas Bonet," in: Christophe Grellard, ed., *Méthodes et statut des sciences à la fin du Moyen-Âge* (Paris, 2004), pp. 181–99, at 182.

To these biographical data can be added one additional point from his appearance among the signatories to the Bois de Vincennes decision: Nicholas Bonet most likely incepted as master of theology in Spring 1333. This fact is clear from the organization of the Vincennes documents, the inception dates of his neighbors in the text, and the requirements of the Franciscan convent. The two documents attesting to the Bois de Vincennes conference are dated to 2 January 1334 (n.st.) and acted in the church of St. Mathurin, recording the events: the king convoked all masters of theology, regent and non-regent, currently in Paris to his palace in the Bois de Vincennes on 19 December, where he asked and received their opinion on the ongoing beatific vision controversy; on 27 December, the king asked them to draw up and affix with their seals documents attesting to their opinion, which they issued on 2 January 1334.[117] The letters themselves are written in the names of 23 masters of theology, with a paragraph written in the name of six more masters who were unable to attend to the Bois de Vincennes conference. Nicholas Bonet is the second-to-last of the 23 primary signatories. The names are listed in order of rank: first, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierre de la Palude; followed by the archbishop of Rouen, Pierre Roger; the chancellor of Paris, William Bernardi; Archdeacon John of Blangy; and then the remaining 19 masters of theology without a major secular post.

These masters appear to be listed in order of inception, as can be seen from a list of them, along with the information about when they read the *Sentences*, were the subject of a papal bull requesting that they be promoted to master (*bullatus*), or were mentioned as being master of theology:

1. Nicholaus de Lyra O.F.M. (MTh by 1309).[118]
2. Johannes de Mentheno, O.S.B.
3. Matheus de Archis (MTh by October, 1328).[119]

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[117] See Heinri S. Denifle & Émile L.M. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1889–97), vol. 2, ps. 1, nn. 981–82, pp. 429–34 (=*CUP*).

[118] William Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Brills Companions to the Christian Tradition) 7 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 569–649, p. 582.

[119] Matheus de Archis first appears in a papal letter dated 20 October 1328 (see Guillaume Mollat, *Jean XXII [1316–1334], Lettres communes analysées d'aprés les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, 13 vols. [Paris, 1921–33] [=*LC Jean XXII*], n. 43165, presumably associated with the presentation of the university *rotuli*). The letter, addressed to "Mathaeo de Erchiis, sacrae theologiae magistri, rectori parochialis ecclesiae de Wanpais, Laudunensis diocesis," gives him the expectation of a canon's prebend in Soissons and is also noted as "Cassata est de man. domini vicecancellarii."

4. Petrus de Palma O.P. (Sent. 1322, MTh between 13 January and 7 March 1325).[120]
5. Johannes de Caricampo O.CIST.
6. Petrus de Casa, O. CARM. (Prior General).
7. Symon de Meneriis (MTh by 1330).[121]
8. Guillelmus de Castro Reginaldi O.P. (Sent. 1326).[122]
9. Germanus Celati (BTh. by 1229, MTh by Jan 1331).[123]
10. Garinus de Gyaco O.P. (Sent. 1328).[124]
11. Guillelmus de Brienne O.F.M. (MTh, *bullatus* July 1331).[125]
12. Guillelmus Caltot, O.P.
13. Olivarius Salaadini.
14. Gerardus de Pergamo, O.E.S.A.
15. Petrus de Verberia, O.VALLIS SCOLARUM.
16. Nicholaus de Alexandria O.E.S.A. (MTh., *bullatus* March 1333).[126]
17. Petrus Horle, O. CARM. (MTh., *bullatus* April 1333).[127]
18. Nicholaus Bonet, O.F.M.
19. Durandus de Aureliaco, O.P. (Sent. 1330).

The two other Franciscans (1, 11) appear in order of inception, as do the two Carmelites (6, 17); The Dominicans appear in the order the year they were assigned to read the *Sentences* (except for Caltot, who does not appear on those lists). What we know about when these people became masters matches with their being listed an order of inception, provided three assumptions: first, that *magistri bullati* incepted shortly after the emission of the bull; second, that at this time, Dominicans regularly incepted during the third year after reading the *Sentences*, as we know to be the case for Peter of Palma [128] (on this assumption, William of Castro Reginaldi incepted in 1329, Garinus of Gyaco in 1331, possibly William Caltot in 1332, and Durandellus in 1333). The final assumption is that Denifle's statement that Oliver Salaadini was probably a master of theology by 1328 is incorrect.

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[120] Cf. *CUP*, n. 835, p. 278 (13 January 1325), Petrus de Palma appears as "bachelarius in theologia"; n. 838, p. 282, a sermon "per magistrum Petrum de Palma" was given on the feast of Saint Thomas (7 March 1325), announcing the retraction the Condemnations of 1277 insofar as they applied to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.

[121] See William J. Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century: A Social Portrait* (Cambridge, Eng., 1999), pp. 211–12.

[122] Cf. *CUP*, n. 854, p. 292.

[123] See Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars*, pp. 146–47.

[124] Cf. *CUP*, n. 865, p. 303.

[125] *Ibid.*, n. 914, p. 346.

[126] *Ibid.*, n. 951, pp. 403–04.

[127] *Ibid.*, n. 953, p. 405.

[128] See above, note 120.

Oliver Salaadini appears as *magister artium* as early as 1316[129] and later served as rector of the University of Paris. Denifle and Chatelain suggest that, since he held a canonry at St.-Pol-de-Léon in 1328, he was probably already a master of theology by that date.[130] In fact, "Oliverius Saladini" shows up as *magister* and a canon of St.-Pol-de-Léon in a papal letter of 9 October 1325.[131] He never is called a master of theology before 1333; as late as 11 September 1331, a letter names him merely as *magister* without specifying the discipline.[132] William Courtenay's research on the Paris Augustinian *livre des contracts* has uncovered the earliest mention of Oliver Salaadini as master of theology. While the first volume of this 17th-century document is missing, the second volume contains summaries of the documents in the first volume, as well as an index of names treated, by folio. Matching the index to the document summaries, Courtenay has established that Oliver Salaadini is named a regent master of theology in either a document dated 1330 or one dated 20 September 1333.[133] Therefore, it is entirely possible that Caltot, Salaadini, Gerard of Bergamo, and perhaps Peter of Verberia all incepted as master of theology in 1332.

While conclusive evidence may not be obtainable, what is known of the signatories to the 2 January 1334 letter does not conflict with their being listed in order of inception as master of theology. In any case, Nicholas Bonet's name appears at the very end, in the middle of three masters who definitely incepted in 1333.

Moreover, Nicholas Bonet had to have been the regent master in the academic year 1333–34: there are only three Franciscan friars listed in the document: Nicholas of Lyra, who first appears as master in Spring 1309, William of Brienne, who incepted in 1331, and Nicholas Bonet. Normally, Franciscan masters were regent only for the year or two immediately following their inception, at which point the new master was appointed. Therefore, it is most likely that the Franciscan regent master at the Bois de Vincennes was Nicholas Bonet, and it was the first year of his regency.

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[129] See William J. Courtenay, *Rotuli Parisienses: Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, 2 vols. (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance) 44 (Leiden, 2002), vol. 1, p. 35.

[130] Cf. *CUP*, n. 774, p. 226: "An. 1328, cum verisimiliter jam esset magsiter theologiae, erat canonicus Leonensis (Reg. Joh. XII, an. 13, 29)."

[131] Cf. *LC Jean XXII*, n. 23520.

[132] Cf. *LC Jean XXII*, n. 54927.

[133] Special thanks to Prof. Courtenay for these indications; see also Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars*, pp. 194–95.

Nicholas Bonet's name has been associated with the doctrine of Bonetism, namely, the view that Christ's words on the Cross to Mary with regard to John the Evangelist (Jn. 19,26: *Mulier, ecce filius tuus*) caused John the Evangelist to become, in fact, the son of Mary. Martin de Barcelona, unable to find any mention in Bonet's works, traces the debate over the accusation to the late 14th century, where Bonet's name does not appear; rather, he finds Nicholas Aymeric attesting that the doctrine was first preached by a Franciscan in 1370.[134] As a matter of fact, the accusation predates Bonet's regency. Nicholas Bonet's name is often associated with Francis of Meyronnes on this matter, and Meyronnes was accused of this already in his lifetime: in his 1325 *Sentences* commentary, Alfred Gonteri Brito defends Meyronnes against just this charge, claiming that Meyronnes only held the possibility *de potentia Dei absoluta* of Christ making John be the son of Mary.[135] Meyronnes only said that God could create the form of such a real relationship without the prior act of generation that brings it about, not that God did so create such a relationship.[136]

Indeed, Bonet's doctrines have long been considered to belong to the extreme side of the realism-nominalism spectrum.[137] At the beginning of the 1505 edition, there is published a letter from Tiberius Bazalerius of

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[134] See de Barcelona, "Nicola Bonet," pp. 654–56.

[135] See William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, & Christopher Schabel, "Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito." In: Philipp W. Rosemann, ed., *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, 2 vols. (Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard) 2 (Leiden, 2010), vol. 2, pp. 263–368, at 306–07.

[136] The only place in Meyronnes's work where the question is treated is, indeed, the unpublished commentary on Book III ("Verbum caro factum" redaction), q. 52, "Utrum Christus in cruce moriens potuerit facere quod beatus Iohannes evangelista fuerit vere filius Virginis benedictae," where the *doctor illuminatus* sets out a rule of *doctor noster* (Troyes, Médiathèque du Grand Troyes, 995, fol. 56ra): "Circa primam partem questionis premittitur una regula doctoris nostri ex qua propositio declaratur quod quandocumque est aliqua dispositio previa ad aliquam formam, sine qua dispositione agens naturale non potest talem formam inducere, <Deus potest talem formam inducere> sine tali previa dispositione, sicut in generatione corporis Christi non precesserunt communes dispositiones sicut in ceteris hominibus." Meyronnes then applies the rule to the question (fol. 56va): "Ista autem regula sic[ut] confirmata, declaratur propositum, scilicet quod Christus potuerit beato Ioanni evangelista incausare* respectum filiationis ad matrem suam sine generatione previa, cum talis generatio sit ad filiationem et maternitatem, que sunt forme permanentes, transitus dispositio (*sic*). Et <sine> tali dispositione, ut patuit, Deus possit introducere formam ad quam est." In wording the first *dubium*, however, Francis (as recorded in the manuscript) slips out of the hypothetical (fol. 56vb): "Sed remanet dubium: si beatus Ioannes evangelista fuit secundo genitus virginis."

[137] See the taxonomy by Laurent Cesalli, "La querelle des universaux au XIVe siècle," in: *Thomas d'Aquin et la querelle des universaux*. Proceedings of the Workshop on *Thomisme et antithomisme au Moyen Age*, Paris, 18–19 février 2011, forthcoming.

Bologna, then teaching philosophy at Padua,[138] to Lorenzo Venier, charging him with the task of editing the volume. Discussing a conversation with Cardinal Marc Cornaro, Tyberius states:

> But when I mentioned Nicholas Bonet and his most unfettered doctrine, whom Giovanni Pico della Mirandola extolled with high praise. He [the cardinal] affirmed that he was entirely in agreement with him and that he was a man of very sharp learning. For this reason, his most reverend eminence, considering the common utility and ornament of all, ordered me that I by no means whatsoever permit the genius of such a doctor be concealed in squalor or in a place of shadows.[139]

While invoking the spirit of Pico della Mirandola undoubtedly helped sell books, the letter implies that Bonet's work wielded an influence over Renaissance Platonists.

3.2. *Bonet's* Metaphysica

Nicholas Bonet's *magnum opus* comprises four works: the *Metaphysica* (nine books), *Physica* (eight books), *Predicamenta* (ten books), and *Theologia Naturalis* (seven books). Bonet clearly intended this work to be appreciated as a whole, and therefore this chapter's focus on the *Metaphysica* must be understood as only representing part of a larger treatise. The structure of the first three books of the *Metaphysica* varies slightly from that of the last six: while all books have: A) an introduction to the problem to be considered in the book and announcement of the articulation; followed by B) the announced articles; Books I–III then present C) *difficultates* (objections) that arise with respect to the position being held, while Books IV–IX raise *difficultates* at the end of each chapter, instead of at the end of the book. All books then end with D) a conclusion and the announcement of the topic for the next book.

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[138] This letter, and his teaching in Padua, would have occurred during his five-year suspension from Bologna, possibly explaining why he is introduced as "philosophiam publice Paduae docens" and not as Master of Arts and Medicine; see Herbert S. Matsen, "Students' 'Arts' Disputations at Bologna around 1500," *Renaissance Quarterly* 47 (1994), 533–55, at 546.

[139] See the Venice 1505 edition of *NMet*, fol. 1r: "Ego vero de quodam Nicholao Bonetto eiusque resolutissima doctrina mentionem feci, quem miris praeconiis Ioannis Picus Mirandula extollebat, quando eum sibi ex omni parte consentaneum et exactissimae litteraturae esse affirmabat, quam ob causam mihi iussit sua reverendissima dominatio communi omnium utilitati consulens et ornamento, ut tanti doctoris ingenium tenebrarum situ aut squalore offuscare haud quaquam permitterem."

The books consider the subject of metaphysics (I), the science of metaphysics (II), the meanings of terms pertaining to real, formal and mental distinction and indistinction (III), the principle of non-contradiction (IV), the "simple" passions of being (V), as well as "disjunctive" passions (VI), the Platonic position on ideas and the existence of universals separate from particulars (VII), followed by a "Peripatetic" assessment and an analysis of mathematical beings (VIII), and finally the relationship between first philosophy and second philosophy (IX).

In the first book, as is clear from the introduction to this section, Nicholas identifies the subject of metaphysics as being *qua* being, which is a univocal concept, transcending the categories. To be precise, he distinguishes two senses of being: being in the sense of everything positive outside of nothing; and being in the sense of a determinate description (*ratio*) or quiddity distinct from other descriptions or quiddities.[140] It is in this latter sense that being is univocal and is the subject of metaphysics, being *qua* being; in the former sense, being could be said to be the first adequate object of the intellect.[141] In the second book, Bonet argues for the form of knowledge pertaining to metaphysics, namely, that it (the *habitus huius metaphysicae*) is not properly a science, since it does not consist in demonstrating conclusions from principles. Rather:

> Therefore, one says that the habit of this metaphysics is the habit of a proposition that is immediate, necessary, immutable and impossible to be otherwise. But all passions of being *qua* being are convertible with being, and necessarily inhere in being. I mean "habit of a first proposition" not as a proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself, because the proposition "being is being" is entirely first, but the proposition "being is one" is not so but, rather, it is the habit of an immediate proposition, because there is no medium that is prior to its subject and passion.

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[140] Cf. *NMet* I, VI (V fol. 7ra; F fol. 75r): "Et primo de ente est ponenda una brevis distinctio, et postea membra divisionis sunt exponenda. Ens autem est nomen quod potest esse impositum ad significandum omne positivum quod est extra nihil, sive sit ens reale sive rationis, sive directe sit in predicamento, sive per reductionem, sive sit extra predicamentum. Alio modo loqui possumus de significato huius nominis ens prout est impositum ad significandum non omne positivum quod est extra nihil, sed ad significandum unam determinatam rationem seu quiditatem connumerabilem contra alias rationes et quiditates."

[141] For the primary significance of this distinction to Bonet's metaphysics, see the exposition in Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 481–95; see also Theo Kobusch, "Das Seiende als transzendentaler oder supertranszendentaler Begriff. Deutungen der Univozität des Begriffs bei Scotus und den Scotisten," in: Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, & Mechtild Dreyer, eds., *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 53 (Leiden, 1996), pp. 345–66, at 360–61.

> And perhaps all passions of being *qua* being inhere in being immediately such that one does not inhere by means of another, nor can one be proven of being by another—at least some are immediate. And even if one were proven by another, the middle term would not be prior to the subject and the predicate, but only to the predicate; therefore such a proof would not be *a priori* without qualification. And from this it further follows that an apodictic syllogism cannot concern being *qua* being and its passions.[142]

Here, as elsewhere, Nicholas refers to "this metaphysics." Throughout the work, he talks of "our metaphysics" (*metaphysica nostra*) and "this metaphysics" (*haec metaphysica*). As Marta Borgo points out in her chapter in this volume, the word "metaphysics" is said in many ways, chief among them to refer to a written work and to a type of knowledge.[143] For Nicholas these senses often blend: Aristotle's metaphysics is expressed in the 14 books of *Metaphysica sua*, just as this metaphysics is expressed in the books of *Metaphysica nostra*.[144] Furthermore, this passage reveals that Bonet envisions metaphysics as the habit of propositions that are entirely immediate, in the sense of being axiomatic. These propositions involve

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[142] Cf. *NMet* II, 2 (V fols. 12vb–13ra; F fol. 86r): "Dicitur ergo quod habitus huius metaphysice est habitus propositionis immediate, necessarie, immutabilis et impossibilis aliter se habere; omnes namque passiones entis inquantum ens convertuntur cum ente et necessario sibi insunt. Habitus inquam propositionis prime non in qua predicatur idem de seipso, quia ista propositio 'ens est ens' est omnino prima propositio; et non ista 'ens est unum,' sed est habitus propositionis immediate, quia nihil est medium prius subiecto et passione.—Et forte omnes passiones entis inquantum ens insunt enti immediate ita quod non una mediante alia, nec probatur de ente una per aliam, saltem alique sunt immediate. Et dato quod una probaretur per aliam, medium non esset prius predicato et subiecto, sed predicato tantum; ideo talis probatio non esset simpliciter a priori. Ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod de ente inquantum ens et de suis passionibus non possit fieri syllogismus demonstrativus."

[143] See above, p. 19 ff.; see also Fabrizio Amerini's elucidation of the philosophical and historical dimensions of the problem in his "Metaphysics and the *Metaphysics* in the Later Middle Ages. Some Remarks on their Relationship," in: Proceedings of the Symposium *Metaphysics in Later Middle Ages (XIVth–XVth Centuries): Decline or Revival? Nijmegen, 2–3 September 2011*, forthcoming.

[144] At times, Bonet rapidly alternates between the two meanings of *metaphysica*, as in the conclusion to Book VI (V fol. 38ra, F fol. 130v): "Dictum est igitur de passionibus entis inquantum ens, nec occurrunt pro nunc alie. Et si aliquando occurrerint intellectui, conformiter est dicendum sicut in predictis est tibi ostensum in universali, sicut ars ista requirit; sit etiam intellectus tuus semper applicativus hec omnia que dicta sunt in hac brevi et plana et clara metaphysica. Et si contingat te descendere ad inferiores scientias, semper aspicias ad ista principia universalia que hic in ista metaphysica tibi sunt tradita. Palam igitur quod, si tu perfecte sciveris ordinem et processum artificialem huius metaphysice, poteris per temetipsum alias scientias ordinare, nec indigebis alio instructore, et hoc de sexto libro."

passions of being and cannot be proven.[145] The heart of Bonet's *Metaphysica* consists in outlining these propositions, but to do so, he must first establish the terms of the debate.

Book III begins:

> Being *qua* being is obvious, since it is the first that-which-is (*quod quid est*) that does not have a that-which-is, but is the principle of anything that has a that-which-is. Therefore, one must examine the identity and distinction of the first that-which-is with respect to every other that-which-is from the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*). And because in these cases we often use words that are not known to some people, I will set forth to whomever is listening to this metaphysics in how many ways these words are said and what they mean. And the first investigation shall concern the term "thing" (*res*): what is a "thing" and what you call a "thing," what is being the same really, what is to be distinguished really, what is a real distinction, what is a formality (*formalitas*), what is understood by "formally being the same," what by "being formally distinct," what is the formal distinction, what is being the same according to the first mode of *per se* predication, what according to the second mode of *per se* predication, what in the third mode, what in the fourth mode, what is a quiddity, what is an intrinsic mode of a quiddity, what is identical predication, what is denominative predication, what is an absolute division, what is a relative in division, what is being the same by absolute in division and what by relative indivision. For we often use these terms in this metaphysics; therefore it is entirely necessary that you not be ignorant of their meaning in this book, in which we use these terms. For ignorance of the meaning of terms deceives many and lets many make mistakes, and allows them to condemn this metaphysics, which wants to show clearly that it is possible, rather that it is necessary that there exist a distinction on the part of reality (*ex natura rei*), not made by the intellect and without also being a real distinction.[146]

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[145] For a discussion of other themes in Books I and II, see Isabelle Mandrella, "La Controverse sur l'univocation de l'étant et le surtranscendantal," *Quaestio* 8 (2008), 159–75; and Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 489–91.

[146] Cf. *NMet* III, 1 (V fol. 19rb; F fol. 97v): "Ens inquantum ens manifestum est, quoniam est primum quod quid est non habens quod quid est, sed principium cuiuslibet habentis quod quid est. Est igitur de identitate et distinctione primi quod quid est ab omni alio quod quid est ex natura rei perscrutandum. Et quia in istis frequenter utimur verbis aliquibus non notis, cuilibet hanc metaphysicam audienti, quotiens hec nomina dicantur et quid significent premittendam. Et sit igitur prima inquisitio que occurrit circa hunc terminum 'res': quid sit res, et quid tu vocas rem, quid sit esse idem realiter, quid distingui realiter, quid distinctio realis, quid formalitas, quid intelligitur per esse idem formaliter, quid per esse distincta formaliter, quid distinctio formalis, quid est esse idem primo modo dicendi per se, quid secundo modo dicendi per se, quid tertio modo, quid quarto modo, quid sit quiditas, quid modus intrinsecus quiditatis, quid predicatio idemptica, quid predicatio denominativa, quid divisio absoluta, quid indivisio relativa, quid est esse idem indivisione absolute, quid indivisione relativa. Istis namque terminis frequenter utimur in hac metaphysica, ergo omnino est tibi necessarium quod in isto libro, in quo nos istis terminis

The conclusion makes clear what Nicholas Bonet's *divisio textus* implies: Book III defends the doctrine of the formal distinction, as developed by Scotus and as further elaborated by the Parisian Scotists around 1320, most notably Francis of Meyronnes.[147] The vocabulary that Bonet defines is the vocabulary of the Parisian Scotists. To explain how contradictories could exist in the same thing, such as when relations of paternity and filiation exist in the same simple divine essence, the Scotists argue that in one thing (*res*) there can be several "formalities" (*formalitates*), which are extramentally distinct from each other but not really distinct. Bonet follows this line, arguing that even the "enemies and attackers of formalities" (*emuli et impugnatores formalitatum*) admit that not all contradictories imply a real distinction.[148] Bonet points to his side's unbeatable argument:

> Therefore the Achilles consists in this: some extremes of contradictory predicates cannot by their nature (*ex natura rei*) inhere at the same time in the same thing, that is, in all ways the same, and that they reveal a certain non-identity, but not necessarily a real one, therefore a formal non-identity, or by its nature, which is what we wanted to conclude.[149]

After demonstrating the formal distinction through defining his terms and rational argumentation, Bonet finishes the expository part of the book with an attempt to prove its Aristotelian derivation, beginning with a celebrated passage:

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utimur, significatione eorum non ignores (in quo . . . ignores]quotiens de quolibet eorum dicitur non ignores significata eorum F). Ignorantia namque de significato terminorum multos decipit, et multos errare permittit, et hanc metaphysicam condemnare, que divisionem ex natura rei et non per intellectum esse possibilem, immo necessariam absque reali divisione clare vult ostendere."

147 On Francis of Meyronnes's doctrine, see most recently Hannes Möhle, *Formalitas und modus intrinsecus. Die Entwicklung der scotistischen Metaphysik bei Franciscus de Mayronis* (Münster i. W., 2007). For the development of the doctrine of formal non-identity among Franciscans, including Meyronnes, at Paris at this period, see William O. Duba & Christopher Schabel, "*Ni chose, ni non-chose*: The *Sentences*-Commentary of Himbert of Garda, OFM," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 53 (2011), 149–232.

148 Cf. *NMet* III, 7 (V fol. 22ra; F fol. 103r): "Hoc etiam emuli et impugnatores formalitatum habent concedere quod omnia contradictoria equalem distinctionem non concludunt, sed secundum eos et bene solum concludunt rationes et conceptus, et aliquam necessario distinctionem realem ut esse et non esse et plurima alia; hoc etiam concedit omnis scola: quod aliqua contradictoria aliquam distinctionem in re extra et realem necessario non concludunt. Et contra negantes hoc arguit Aristoteles in IV *Metaphysice* et concludit contra tales quod ipsi indigent sensu et pena et debent flagellari donec ipsi concedant quod de eodem simul non verificantur flagellari et non flagellari."

149 *Ibid.* (V fol. 22rb; F fol. 103v): "Stat igitur Achilles: quod aliqua extrema contradictionis de predicatis ex natura rei non possunt simul inesse eidem omnibus modis idem ex natura rei, et quod aliquam non-identitatem ex natura rei concludunt, sed non realem necessario, igitur formalem vel ex natura rei, quod concludere volebamus."

> But it further appears that this position on formalities had its origins not in Scotland, nor in France, but rather in Greece, in Athens, in the schools of Aristotle, who with word and writing taught it, as is clear to anyone who looks at his philosophy.[150]

Nicholas lists a series of proofs from Aristotle, including the statement that "the whole seventh book of the *Metaphysics* is full of these quiddities and their non-identity."[151] He adds in Averroes's commentaries as well, concluding:

> From these statements it appears plain that their [i.e., Aristotle and Averroes's] intention is that in an individual there are many quiddities, of which one includes another and is made up of them, and finally there comes about the resolution to the first quiddity, which is the quiddity of being *qua* being, which is entirely irresolvable.[152]

Having defined his terms in a manner that requires the formal distinction, Bonet proceeds to the heart of his metaphysics: the passions of being *qua* being. According to Bonet, there are two kinds of passions of being: simple and disjunct. Book V considers the simple passions; Book VI the disjunct ones. Since metaphysics is a habit of immediate propositions about being, however, one "disjunct passion" must be considered first, for it concerns the propositions themselves, namely, the passion singled out by the principle of non-contradiction as applied to propositions, the *primum principium complexum*, "there can be affirmation and negation of anything, and of nothing can there be both at the same time" (*de quolibet affirmatio et negatio et de nullo simul*). Book IV therefore investigates the principle, its scope, applicability and problems, arguing that being *qua* being is the subject-matter of metaphysics.

In Book V, Nicholas Bonet addresses the simple passions of being, that is, the terms that share the same extension, the transcendentals. For each term, Nicholas argues that they, like the *primum principium complexum*, extend beyond having being *qua* being as their proper subject. However,

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150 Cf. F, fol. 103v: "Amplius autem videtur quod ista positio formalitatum ortum habuit non in Scotia nec in Francia, sed magis in Grecia apud Athenas in scholis Aristotelis, qui verbo et scripto eam docuit, ut patet omni intuenti philosophiam suam."

151 *Ibid.:* "Totus etiam septimus metaphysice plenus est de istis quiditatibus et earum non-identitate."

152 Cf. *NMet* III, 7 (V fol. 22va; F fol. 104r): "Ex quibus patet manifeste quod intentio eorum est quod in individuo sunt multe quiditates, quarum una includit aliam et constituitur ex illis, et finaliter fit resolutio istarum ad primam quiditatem, que est quiditas entis inquantum ens, que omnino est irresolubilis."

as restricted to being *qua* being—and he assigns to each passion a symbol to indicate this technical sense—they form one of the immediate propositions of his metaphysics. He explains this with the first example, *unum*:

> Unity therefore contracted in this way and convertible with being can be called the unity of the first, most common univocal predicate. And therefore, if you like, it can be said to be transcendent in some way, like its subject, although it is not transcendent without qualification. Or, if you like, let it be called "*b*," because I do not know its proper name. Let this be therefore one and the first proposition of this metaphysics: "being is one" or "being is *b*." This proposition is immediate, nor can it be proven by a prior subject and predicate, since nothing is prior to the subject of this proposition, as it is entirely irresolvable being, and it has a simple concept without qualification; therefore nor can the proposition "being is one and undivided" be proven with an apodictic syllogism.[153]

Nicholas takes the transcendental terms, restricts them to a sense in which they have being *qua* being as their subject, and then combines them to make a series of propositions. The insistence on the propositions being immediate and indemonstrable underscores that the propositions fulfill the requirements set forth in Book III. In total, Nicholas identifies seven propositions that correspond to the seven passions, understood in a restricted sense to apply to being *qua* being.

Table 8. *NMet V: The First Seven Propositions of Bonet's* Metaphysics *(Simple Passions)*

ens est	B. unum C. verum D. bonum E. primum F. communicabile G. contrahibile primum H. purum quid simpliciter simplex

[153] *Ibid.* V, 1 (V fol. 27va; F fol. 113r): "Unitas ergo sic contracta et cum ente convertibilis potest unitas primi predicati univoci communissimi appellari. Et ideo, si placet, dicitur aliqualiter transcendens, sicut et eius subiectum, licet non simpliciter transcendens. Vel, si placet, vocetur 'b,' quia eius proprium nomen ignoro. Sit ergo una et prima propositio huius metaphysica: 'ens est unum' vel 'ens est b.' Hec propositio est immediata, nec potest a priori subiecto et predicato probari, cum subiecto huius propositionis nihil sit prius, cum sit ens omnino irresolubile, et habeat conceptum simpliciter simplicem; ergo nec propositio 'ens est unum et indivisum' per syllogismum demonstrativum concludi potest."

Book VI continues the investigation in the realm of disjunctive passions, which, when restricted to being *qua* being produce a further series of propositions. By "disjunctive passions," Nicholas means contrary pairs, such as "odd" and "even"; in fact, limiting the subject of those passions to being *qua* being produces a series of propositions, some of which are directly predicated of being (and therefore receive a letter), and some are predicated of a proposition involving being (and therefore are called propositions, but not given a letter). The first pair, "necessary" and "contingent," reveals how Nicholas limits disjunctive passions to being, and implicitly distinguishes between these two types of propositions. Concluding the discussion, Bonet states:

> Absolute necessity as opposed to non-entity without qualification is a *per se* passion of being. Let, therefore, this be the first proposition concerning the disjunct passions of being *qua* being (if they should be called "disjunct passions," because they are not properly so-called, as was said above): "Being is necessary being" or "Being is *i*." This proposition is immediate, since it cannot be proven by a prior subject and predicate.
>
> Let the second proposition be concerning relative necessity in comparison to the other quiddities, and let it be this proposition: "Being is necessarily good, one, true, the first thing that can be contracted, and so on for its other necessary passions." For this relative necessity indicates a mode of connecting being to its passions, and this proposition is immediate like the others. [. . .] But now concerning the relative necessity of being qua being with respect to the being of existence this third proposition can be formed "Being necessarily exists," because it has a necessary connection to the being of the first intelligence and is impossible to be otherwise; this proposition is immediate, like the other prior ones. But further, concerning the connection of the quiddity of the being to the being of the generable thing, this proposition is formed "being exists contingently" [. . .] this proposition is immediate, just as the other ones, because it cannot be apodictically concluded from a prior subject and predicate.[154]

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[154] *Ibid.* VI, 1 (V fol. 32bis vb; F fols. 121v–122r): "Nunc autem ad propositum revertentes dicamus quod per se passio entis est necessitas absoluta opposita non-entitati simpliciter. Sit igitur hec prima propositio in ordine de passionibus disiunctis entis inquantum ens, si passiones disiuncte debeant dici, quia non proprie, ut superius est dictum: 'Ens est necesse esse' vel 'ens est i.' Hec propositio est immediata, cum non possit probari a priori subiecto et predicato.—Secunda propositio sit de necessitate relativa in comparatione ad alias quiditates, et sit propositio ista: 'Ens necessario est bonum, unum, verum, primum contrahibile, et sic de aliis suis passionibus necessariis. Hec enim necessitas relativa dicit modum connexionis entis ad suas passiones; hec propositio est immediata sicut alia [. . .] adhuc autem de necessitate relativa entis inquantum ens ad esse existentie formetur hec propositio tertia: 'Ens necessario existit,' quia habet connexionem necessariam ad esse prime intelligentie et impossibile est aliter se habere; hec propositio est immediata sicut alie priores. Amplius autem de connexione quiditatis entis ad esse rei generabilis formetur

Only necessity in the primary sense can be predicated directly of being *qua* being, and in this sense it becomes proposition "being is *i*." At the same time, relative necessity can be predicated of the seven simple propositions; moreover, in this sense, one can say that everything that exists, when it exists, necessarily exists; and with respect to things that are capable of being generated and corrupted, one can say that being is contingent.

Nicholas Bonet continues in this vein for the remaining of Book VI:

TABLE 9. *NMet VI: The Propositions with Symbolic Predicates Pertaining to Disjunct Passions*

	I. necesse esse
	K. prius natura
	K.'[155] prius origine
ens est	L. in potentia vel possibile
	M. incorruptibile aliqua incorruptibilitate relativa
	N. corruptibile aliqua corruptibilitate relativa
	O. simpliciter incorruptibile

As with propositions concerning the simple passions, so too with the "disjunct" ones, Nicholas Bonet emphasizes that these are immediate and indemonstrable passions, hence that of which metaphysics is the habit. Nicholas uses symbols to indicate the restricted sense in which the passions in question are understood, as applying to being *qua* being.[156] He

hec propositio: 'ens contingenter existit.' [. . .] Hec propositio est immediata, sicut et sunt priores, quia non potest demonstrative concludi a priori subiecto et predicato."

[155] The printed edition (V) has K twice. Our reference manuscript (F) has M twice instead.

[156] For a commentary on this part of Bonet's work and a general presentation of his metaphysics, see Jose Riesco Terrero, "Nicolas Bonet escribe una metafisica sistematica das siglos y medio antes que Suarez," *Salamanticensis* 9 (1962), 3–21. It should also be noted that this symbolic tendency, and the accompanying recognition of the insufficiency of plain language, surfaces very early in the *Metaphysica*, on the discussion of the sense of the term *ens* itself: cf. *NMet* I, 5 (V fol. 8va, F fols. 77v–78r): "Ens inquantum ens dicit unam rationem determinatam connumerabilem contra alias. Sit hec secunda propositio. Hec probatur ex prima, quia ex quo est quiditas univoca decem predicamentis in qua conveniunt et est in eis alia quiditas in qua differunt, sequitur necessario quod hec ratio non sit illa, sed numeretur contra alias.—Et si dicas quod hoc nomen 'ens' est impositum ad significandum omne positivum quod est extra nihil et quicquid continetur in quolibet predicamento, et non ad significandum unam quiditatem connumerabilem contra alias, potest dici quod non oportet multum contendere de nominibus, sed tantum de significato nominum, nam et si ens sit impositum secundum *a* ad significandum omne positivum quod est extra nihil, potest tamen secundum *b* imponi ad significandum unam quiditatem

concludes this section of his *Metaphysics*, the heart of his doctrine, with a statement that reveals his metaphysical understanding, magisterial purpose and conversational tone:

> Thus it is said concerning the passions of being *qua* being, and nor do any others occur to me at the moment. And if, at some point, some others should come to mind, one should say in accordance with what has been shown to you in general in the aforesaid, just as this art requires; your intellect too should always be able to apply everything that has been said in this short, plain and clear metaphysics. And if you should happen to descend to the lower sciences, always keep in mind these universal principles that are handed down to you in this metaphysics. Therefore, it is evident that, if you should know the order and technical procedure of this metaphysics, you would be able to order by yourself all the other sciences, nor would you need any other teacher. And so ends the sixth book.[157]

Books VI and VII address the problems of the separation of universals from particulars, as well as the abstraction of mathematical beings from sensible ones. Book VI presents what Nicholas understands to be the "Platonic" interpretation of universals, and Book VII the "Peripatetic" position, along with mathematical beings. Bonet distills the "Platonic" view into ten theses (*dicta*):

1. Universals exist separately outside the intellect.
2. Only the absolutely first universal (that corresponding to the concept of being *qua* being) and the last (that corresponding to the most specific species) so exist, not the intermediate ones.
3. Universals are the same as their particulars.
4. Universals are more perfect than their particulars.
5. Universals can be multiplied across many things of the same description.
6. The understood concept is the same as the thing that is understood.
7. The intellect and what is understood are the same.
8. Universals separate from their particulars are necessary for science.
9. Universals play a role in generation.
10. Universals can neither be generated nor corrupted.[158]

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determinatam modo iam dicto. Et si fiat vis de hoc nomine 'ens' et volueris quod illa quiditas determinata et precisa et connumerabilis contra alias non vocetur 'ens,' si placet vocetur 'b' vel 'quiditas prima et communissima que sit reperibilis univoce in omni eo quod est extra nihil,' quia de conceptu communissimo univoco est sermo."

157 For the text, see above, note 144.

158 Cf. *NMet* VII, 2 (V fol. 38va; F fol. 131v): "Ad separationem autem et ad quod quid est simpliciter accedamus, et platonice primo, deinde peripathetice perscrutemur et in primis dicamus intellectum opinionis platonice, secundo de eius possibilitate, tertio de

Nicholas argues for the possibility, and then the likelihood, of these theses, with some modifications. Most notably, while the second thesis excludes the real existence of intermediate universals, Nicholas supports it and insists that such a support is perfectly in keeping with Plato's teaching:

> Moreover, what should be said about the second Platonic thesis? Let us see whether it is true or false. For Plato posited that there existed really and extramentally the first and last universal, that is, the concept of being and the specific concept, such as that of "man" or "ox," but not the concept of genera, such as that of "animal" and "body." Is extramental existence more incompatible with the concept of genera than with the specific concept? I reply to you that both genera and species can really subsist outside the mind, and by the same reason that you conclude for one, I will conclude for the other; therefore, I concede that there is such a thing as a *per se* [subsisting] animal, a *per se* body, *per se* substance, just as there is a *per se* man and a *per se* ass. And if you should say "You do not reply Platonically, since Plato did not posit this, rather he denied this for genera and conceded it for species," here it is said that the response is Platonic, since this follows from his statements and from his position. And when you say "He did not say that," I say that it was enough for him to say this about species and the first universal in absolute, because anyone could posit accordingly concerning the intermediate universals, and because they were also in that sequence in which there were the species, [Plato] did not care to say much about them, since giving this manner to the species, he gave them implicitly to the genera as well.[159]

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eius necessitate, ac etiam veritate. Hec enim sunt tibi valde necessaria et valent ad plura alia speculanda.—Positio autem platonica de ideis et universalibus separatis indiget expositione decem dictorum suorum. Primum dictum platonicum fuit quod universalia extra intellectum separata existunt. Secundum: non omnia universalia, sed aliqua sunt separata, scilicet primum universale simpliciter et ultimatum, non autem universalia intermedia. Tertium dictum: quod universalia sunt idem cum singularibus. Quartum: quod universalia sunt perfectiora singularibus. Quintum: quod sunt plurificabilia in plura eiusdem rationis. Sextum dictum: quod intentio intellecta et res que intelligitur sunt idem. Septimum: quod intellectus et intellectum sunt idem. Octavum: quod universalia sic separata sunt necessaria ad scientiam. Nonum dictum: quod universalia valent ad generationem. Decimum: quod sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia."

[159] *Ibid.* VII, 3 (V fols. 39vb–40ra; F fol. 133v): "Amplius autem de secundo dicto Platonico, quid dicendum? Videamus an sit verum vel falsum. Posuit namque Plato universale primum et ultimum realiter existere extra mentem, vel conceptum entis et conceptum specificum, ut hominis et bovis, non autem conceptum generum, ut animalis et corporis. Numquid repugnat magis conceptui generum realiter extra mentem existere quam conceptui specifico? Respondeo tibi quod tam genera quam species possunt realiter extra subsistere, et eadem ratione qua tu concludis de uno, ego concludam de alio; ideo concedo quod est dare per se animal, per se corpus, per se substantiam, sicut per se homo et per se asinus. Et si dicas 'non respondes platonice, quoniam Plato hoc non posuit, immo negavit de generibus et concessit de speciebus,' hic dicitur quod responsio est platonica, quoniam ad dicta sua et ad positionem suam sequitur hoc. Et cum dicis 'hoc non dicit,' dico quod

Bonet gets the notion that the Platonists posited only species and not genera to be ideas from *Met.*, Z 14, 1039a24–33. Yet, his reconstruction of Plato's doctrine does not limit itself to what Aristotle says about Plato: he tries to infer (however maladroitly) what Plato's position would be, and he discards those statements by Aristotle that he sees in conflict with Plato. If Plato said there were ideas of being *qua* being and species, then he clearly meant there were also ideas of everything in between.

This sympathy with "the Plato of Aristotle," however, does not mean that he accepts wholeheartedly the doctrine. In particular, while Nicholas Bonet argues for the *possibility* of thesis 5, namely, that there are as many ideas of a given type as individuals, he does not seem to think it entirely probable. Thus he concludes Book VII and the discussion of the Platonic view of universals:

> Therefore, it is clear from what has been said that these ten Platonic theses of separate universals and ideas appear to be possible and true, with the sole exception of the fifth thesis, which now will be left in doubt. But although these ten theses are possible, and almost everyone agrees on them, there is doubt whether they are necessary or not, because it is difficult to find a necessary demonstration that concludes that such universals, actually separated, necessarily exist in the nature of things (*in rerum natura*), and although this can be demonstrated in absolute of the first universal, and of some intelligences that move the celestial orbs, it cannot be generally shown for every universal with respect to any species whatsoever of any category whatsoever.
>
> But let us say otherwise, and say that every philosopher and whoever else following the principles of nature who concedes that such universals can possibly exist, must concede that they do in fact exist, and when he has conceded that they are ingenerable and incorruptible, immortal and perpetual, he must necessarily concede that they always exist, because in perpetual things being and being able do not differ. And this is Platonic, because Plato posited such universals, not only as possible but, rather, as also necessary and in fact existing. But according to some other principles that are extremely discordant with the principles of the Philosophers, if separate universals are possible, it is not necessary that they in fact exist. For, according to them, the universe is not necessarily produced but is produced contingently and freely. And with that ends the Platonic treatise on quiddities in absolute, separate universals, and ideas.[160]

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sufficiebat sibi hoc dicere de speciebus et de primo universali simpliciter, quia conformiter quilibet poterat ponere de universalibus intermediis, et quia etiam remanebant in illo ordine in quo species, non curavit multa dicere de illis, quoniam dando artem de speciebus, dedit implicite et de generibus."

[160] *Ibid.* VII, 3 (V fol. 41ra; F fol. 135r–v): "Palam igitur ex dictis quod ista decem dicta platonica de universalibus separatis et ideis apparent possibilia atque vera, solo quinto

The Platonic view's major problem lies in its insistence of the necessity of the universe, which goes against the theological doctrine of contingent creation.

Just as Book VII gives ten "Platonic" theses on universals, Book VIII provides ten "Peripatetic" theses. These reflect an idiosyncratic understanding of the Stagirite's doctrine:

1. Universals really exist outside the intellect.
2. Universals really exist in particulars.
3. Universals exist *per se* separate from particulars.
4. Universals are really the same as and are predicated essentially of (*per se primo*) particulars.
5. Universals are less perfect than particulars.
6. Universals are entirely incapable of being multiplied.
7. Universals are entirely incapable of being generated and corrupted.
8. Universals *qua* universals are not in themselves intelligible, but intelligibility is only accidental to them.
9. Universals are necessary for scientific knowledge.
10. Universals are necessary for generation.[161]

In the ensuing discussion, the rather realist reading given to Aristotle's doctrine did not escape Nicholas's critics, particularly the first three theses. The editor of the 1505 version, Lorenzo Venier, appended a marginal note

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dicto excepto, quod nunc sub dubio relinquatur. Licet autem ista decem dicta sint possibilia et in hoc concordent quasi omnes, an tamen sint necessaria vel non dubium est, quia difficile est invenire demonstrationem necessario concludentem quod talia universalia actu separata necessario existant in rerum natura, et licet hoc possit demonstrari de primo universali simpliciter, et de aliquibus intelligentiis moventibus orbes, non tamen generaliter de omni universali respectu cuiuslibet speciei cuiuscumque predicamenti—Dicamus aliter tamen quod omnis philosophus, et quicumque alius sequens principia nature concedens talia universalia de possibili existere, habet concedere illa existere de facto necessario, et, cum sit concessum illa esse ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia, et immortalia atque perpetua, habet necessario concedere quod semper existunt, quia in perpetuis non differt esse et posse. Et hoc platonicum est, quia Plato posuit talia universalia, non tantum de possibili, immo etiam necessario et de facto. Secundum tamen aliqua alia principia multum dissona principiis philosophorum, non oportet, si sunt universalia separata de possibili, quod necessario sint de facto. Nam secundum eos universum non necessario est productum, sed contingenter et libere est productum. In hoc igitur completur tractatus platonicus de quiditatibus simpliciter et universalibus separatis et ideis."

[161] *Ibid.* VIII, 1 (V fol. 41ra–b; F fol. 135v): "Primum dictum Aristotelis sit istud: universalia extra intellectum realiter existunt. Secundum dictum: quod existunt realiter in singularibus. Tertium: universalia per se existunt separata a singularibus. Quartum: universalia sunt idem realiter, et per se primo predicatur de singularibus. Quintum: universalia sunt imperfectiora singularibus. Sextum: universalia sunt omnino implurificabilia. Septimum: universalia sunt omnino ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia. Octavum: universalia inquantum universalia per se non sunt intelligibilia, sed tantum hoc eis accidit. Nonum: universalia sunt necessaria ad scientiam. Decimum: universalia sunt necessaria ad generationem."

to the first thesis: "I hold according to Aristotle's meaning that universals should not be posited outside the intellect," followed by, for the second theses, "I hold that this second thesis is not Aristotelian," and finally, for the third, "Note that this third thesis, and much that is discussed here, would be judged to be pure fictions by true Peripatetics."[162] Indeed, many of the theses that Aristotle supports resemble those of Plato. The major differences between the two are expressed by Platonic theses 4–7 and Peripatetic theses 5, 6, and 8: Bonet's Plato holds universals to be more perfect than particulars, to be as numerous as the particulars that instantiate them, and to be the explanation for how intellection occurs; Bonet's Peripatetics, in contrast, hold universals to be less perfect, not multiplied numerically, and fundamentally unknowable.

At the end of the presentation of the "Platonic" and "Peripatetic" views, Nicholas answers the question:

> And if you ask which opinion is more probable and more true, I reply to you: although they all have many difficulties directly associated with them, nevertheless for now it appears that the Peripatetic opinion is more likely, and especially if one follows the principles that we have set out in this metaphysics it appears to be more in line with its theses.[163]

Nicholas Bonet defends as more likely a doctrine that universals really exist, in themselves and apart from particulars, and that such universals cannot be numerically multiplied. He ascribes this view to Aristotle, not to Plato.

Finally, Bonet concludes his *Metaphysics* by showing how the other sciences relate to metaphysics, specifically arguing that being *qua* being divides into the being that is the subject of the divine science, that is, natural theology, and the being that is the subject of the particular sciences, such as the sciences of the categories. This division occurs according to being limited and unlimited. Like with the 14 propositions he outlined in Books VI and VII, here too the division is based on terms used in a precise sense:

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[162] Cf. V, fol. 41rb, in margin: "Teneo ad mentem Aristotelis non dari universali extra intellectum," "Ego teneo hoc secundum dictum non esse aristotelicum," "Nota quod hoc tertium dictum et multa que hic narrantur a veris peripateticis pura figmenta iudicarentur."

[163] Cf. *NMet* VIII, 1 (V fol. 42vb; F fol. 138r): "Ista igitur sunt decem dicta peripathetica de universalibus separatis et de ydeis que in multis sunt dissona decem dictis platonicis de eisdem. Et si queras que opinio sit probabilior et verior, respondeo tibi: 'licet quelibet habeat plures difficultates annexas simpliciter, tamen pro nunc apparet quod opinio peripathetica sit probabilior et specialiter sequendo principia que in ista metaphysica proposuimus videtur esse consona dictis suis."

> Such a division of being *qua* being therefore shall be one type of being that is limited, and the other unlimited. By "limited and unlimited" I do not mean "finite and infinite" but, rather, in a roundabout manner I state the two differences that by themselves divide being, such that by adding the difference "limited being" to the quiddity of being, there is brought about a single *per se* limited quiddity that is common to the ten primary genera and is univocally predicable of these and of all their contents. By "unlimited being," however, I mean a certain difference that, when added to the quiddity of being, constitutes a single *per se* quiddity, which is the quiddity of the first intelligence. Thus I have used the words "limited" and "unlimited," for the proper names of these differences are not known to me.[164]

In other words, Bonet understands being as having the maximum extension, to which can be added one of two positive differences, "being limited" and "being unlimited." The former produces the univocal being of the categories, and the latter produces the first intelligence, God. Thus Nicholas Bonet concludes his *Metaphysics* with a road map to the other sciences: on the one hand, to "second philosophy," which he also calls *theologia naturalis*; and, on the other, to "third philosophy" (physics), and the categorial sciences (fourth through thirteenth philosophy).[165]

3.3. *Reception*

Bonet's *Metaphysica* was widely copied, often with the accompanying *Physics, Categories*, and *Theology*: Martin de Barcelona counted 15 copies, and Charles Lohr identified approximately 40 whole and fragmentary

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[164] *Ibid.* IX, c. un. (V fol. 43va, F fol. 138v): "Sit igitur talis divisio entis inquantum ens aliud limitatum et aliud illimitatum. Non intelligo per 'limitatum et illimitatum' finitatem et infinitatem, sed circumloquor duas differentias per se divisivas entis, sic quod per hanc differentiam 'esse limitatum' additam quiditati entis constituitur una per se quiditas limitata communis ad decem prima genera et predicabilis de ipsis univoce et de omnibus per se contentis in illis; per 'esse' autem 'illimitatum' intelligo quandam differentiam que, addita quiditati entis, constituit unam per se quiditatem, que est quiditas prime intelligentie. Propter hoc enim usus sum istis nominibus 'limitatum' et 'illimitatum,' quia non sunt nomina propria illarum differentiarum mihi nota."

[165] *Ibid.* II, 6 (V fol. 17rb; F fol. 93v): "Amplius autem manifestum est quod de ente inquantum ens erit una scientia que habebit ens pro obiecto secundo, quia ens dividitur sic primo, ut fertur ens aliud finitum aliud infinitum de ente; de ente inquantum ens erit prima scientia, de infinito secunda, de ente finito tertia. Item, quia ens finitum et limitatum dividitur eque immediate, ut fertur in decem prima genera, de quibus sunt decem scientie, quia quelibet quiditas predicamentalis habet suas proprias passiones cum ea convertibiles et de ipsa demonstrabiles, et sic quarta scientia erit de substantia, quinta de quantitate, sexta de qualitate, septima de relatione, octava de actione, nona de passione, decima de situ, undecima de quando, duodecima de ubi, tertiodecima de habitu."

manuscript witnesses.[166] Numerous others exist, including Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 16132, a copy from the Sorbonne Library which also has explicit *pecia* indications (further attesting to its widespread diffusion),[167] and Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers 39, 43, and 73.[168] It appears to have become a standard teaching text in Franciscan *studia*: for example, of the nine copies of Francis of Meyronnes's *Tractatus de transcendentibus* edited by Hannes Möhle, four also contain all or part of Bonet's *Metaphysica*, and, in Möhle's analysis these four codices comprise one of the three manuscript families of Meyronnes's treatise.[169] The *Metaphysica* was printed in Barcelona in 1493 and in Venice in 1505.

The Venice 1505 edition (=V) has served the *de facto* reference text for Bonet studies. It is an impressive volume, counting 134 folios and containing Bonet's entire philosophical masterpiece.[170] Yet, the edition has some idiosyncrasies. For example, while we refer to the chapters as they appear in V (and as apparently supported by Bonet's remarks in the text), the manuscript witness consulted, Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers, 43 (=F), has many more, smaller chapters; a comprehensive survey of all witnesses will undoubtedly reveal the full articulation of Bonet's text. In addition, a collation of approximately 1750 words from the 1505 edition against a transcription of F reveals that the 1505 edition has numerous errors, including in our sample three *omissiones per homoioteleuton* of 10, 6, and 7 words. The editor of V, Paduan philosopher Lorenzo Venier, adds running marginal commentary, often declaring that he, Venier, shares Averroes's view

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[166] See de Barcelona, "Nicola Bonet," pp. 644–47. See Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Narcissus-Richardus," *Traditio* 28 (1972), 281–396, at 286.

[167] Giovanna Murano, *Opere diffuse per "exemplar" e "pecia"* (Turnhout, 2005), p. 638, citing Destrez; the inventory for this manuscript (Léopold Delisle, *Inventaire de manuscrits de la Sorbonne conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les numéros 15176–16718 du fonds latin* (Paris, 1870), p. 40) lists its contents as "Brevis metaphysica. Physica (79v)—De predicamentis (148v)—De theologia naturali (182). XIV s." Indications of *pecia* can be found for example on fol. 22v and on fol. 43r.

[168] On the Fribourg manuscripts, see Charles H. Lohr, *Aristotelica Helvetica. Catalogus codicum Latinorum in bibliothecis Confederationis Helveticae asservatorum quibus versiones expositiones operum Aristotelis continentur* (Fribourg, 1994), pp. 207–08, 210–12, 216–17. In addition, Napoli, Biblioteca Nationale, cod. VIII.F.17, ff. 1–54 has a fragment covering books I–IX.

[169] See Hannes Möhle, *Der "Tractatus de transcendentibus" des Franciscus de Mayronis* (Leuven, 2004), pp. 84–95. The manuscripts are the two Fribourg witnesses; Prague, Metropolitni Kapituly, 1446; and Kracow, Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2060: they are all from the fi5th century (1427, 1456, 1449, and undated, respectively).

[170] The printed foliation has some errors. For example, there are no folios numbered 29 and 30, but folios 31 and 32 appear twice.

against the text of Bonet,[171] as well as identifying the thinkers behind the anonymous opinions that Bonet cites, and often defending them.[172] At times, Venier's corrective tendency gives him the appearance of playing the role of "straight man," showing just how outlandish Nicholas's assertions seemed to early 16th-century scholars, as the case of the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle above shows. Moreover, Venier's comments on Nicholas's contemporaries are not always trustworthy: on frequent occasions, Nicholas refers to the opinion of "some son of somebody" (*quidam filius cuiusdam*), and Venier often labels this person as Peter Auriol, an attribution that has gone uncontested. This does not, however, always seem to be the case. In *NMet* II, 5, Nicholas introduces a position he intends to refute:

> But now it is time to investigate whether intuitive and abstractive are differentiae of a common cognition, for concerning this many hold one opinion or the other. Some son of somebody says that they are accidental differentiae, and in no way essential, which he seeks to prove in this way.[173]

Venier writes in the margin "Credo quod iste doctor sine nomine fuerit Aureolus." While Peter Auriol does not have any similar discussion, Francis of Meyronnes, who happens to be named in the margin of the corresponding passage in F, does argue that intuitive and abstractive are not essential differences of cognition. In his commentary on Book I of the *Sentences* known as the *Conflatus*, Francis answers the question "whether [intuitive and abstractive] are essential differentiae of cognition in common," with

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[171] Cf. e.g., V fol. 15va: "Teneo ego ad mentem Ave. quod notitia intuitiva sit qua cognoscimus substantias separatas per earum essentias, abstractiva est per rationes naturales et metaphysicales acquisita."

[172] The scholastic authors and schools that Venier cites in the margins to Bonet's *Metaphysica* are (in order of appearance): nominales, [Ioannes Duns] Scotus, Franciscus de Marchia, Albertus Parvus [=de Saxonia], [Guillelmus] Occam, thomiste, [Petrus] Aureolus, Gregorius [Ariminensis], and [Gualterus] Burleus. As examples of Venier's apologism, see Book II, where on successive folios he points out the faults in Bonet's criticism of Aquinas (V fol. 18rb: "Volunt thomiste simpliciter simplicia posse confuse concipi, et ita hec ratio peccat"), announces his own allegiance to Averroes (V fol. 19ra: "Teneo ego ad mentem Commentatoris intellectionem esse rem intellectam"), and underscores the weakness of a counterexample intended to undermine Scotus (V fol. 20rb: "Scotus negaret istam consequentiam").

[173] Cf. *NMet* II, 5 (V fol. 15vb; F fol. 90v): "Adhuc autem perscrutandum occurrit an intuitivum et abstractivum sint differentie essentiales notitie in communi; de hoc namque a pluribus contrarie opinatur. Dicit quidam filius cuiusdam quod sint differentie accidentales et nullomodo essentiales, quod nititur sic probare."

> I say that they are not, because when there are two mutually exclusive essential differentiae, whatever falls under one of those differentiae is more noble than everything that falls under the other, less noble, differentia; but not everything that falls under "intuitive" is more noble than everything whatsoever that falls under "abstractive," nor vice versa. And this is clear, because abstractive cognition of God is more noble than intuitive cognition of whiteness.[174]

While Venier's comments are generally helpful, he clearly does not have a strong familiarity with Bonet's Franciscan contemporaries, and his identification of these adversaries with Peter Auriol cannot be accepted at face value.[175]

3.4. *Nicholas Bonet on Truth*

Nicholas Bonet's method and syncretic realism can be observed in his discussion of truth in *NMet* V, 2. Nicholas's goal in the chapter is to explain in what senses "true" can be used, and how truth can be a passion of being *qua* being. "Being" (*ens*), Nicholas says, "has two types of existence (*esse*): one is in the external world, and the other is in the soul." Correspondingly, there are two types of truth: in reality and in the intellect. Nicholas treats each in turn, in what could be considered two separate articles; the discussion that follows will focus on the first article, truth in reality.[176]

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[174] Francis of Mayronis, *Conflatus*, Prologus, q. XVII (ed. Venice 1520, fol. 10vL): "Secunda difficultas: Utrum sint differentie essentiales notitie in communi. Dico quod non, quia quando sunt due differentie essentiales contra se divise, quicquid cadit sub una differentiarum illarum est nobilius omni eo quod cadit sub differentia alia ignobiliori; sed non omne quod cadit sub intuitiva est nobilius quocumque cadente sub abstractiva, nec econverso. Et patet, quia abstractiva Dei est nobilior intuitiva albedinis; ergo etc." On Francis of Meyronnes's doctrine of intuitive and abstractive cognition as it developed in reaction to Auriol, see Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics: 1250–1345* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 22 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1988), pp. 327–32.

[175] The same likely holds for his comments on Scotus: on the question of numerical unity, Bonet states that there are two opinions. Cf. *NMet* I, 2 (V fol. 3ra–b): "Quiditatem termini univoci esse unam unitate reali potest habere duplicem intellectum. Primus est quod cuilibet termino univoco correspondet unitas realis minor unitate numerali, que est in quolibet univocatorum, non tamen eadem unitas realis in omnibus, nec in pluribus univocatis. Secundus intellectus: quod talis quiditas cum sua unitate reali sit omnino eadem et indivisa in omnibus univocatis." In line with the next statement, "Primus intellectus videtur possibilis pluribus," Venier notes in the margin: "Teneo hanc esse opinionem Scoti, ut dicit Franciscus de Marchia," which seems to refer to Francis of Marchia's discussion in *Reportatio IIA*, q. 15, a. 2, but Marchia's discussion there of the Subtle Doctor's view seems to bear a tenuous relationship to Scotus's writings; see Suarez-Nani & Duba, "Introduction," in: Francis of Marchia, *Reportatio IIA*, qq. 13–27, pp. xlviii–li.

[176] Cf. *NMet* V, 2 (V fol. 28rb; F fol. 114r): "Entis univoci et subiecti huius metaphysice veritas per se ponitur passio a philosophis; ens autem habet esse duplex: unum in re extra,

Nicholas considers three definitions of "ontological truth" and argues that, in all three senses, truth can be said to be a passion of being. The first sense (A) reflects Scotus's definition: truth is formally the conformity of what is produced to what produces, or of the copy to its exemplar, and is foundationally the thing and its quiddity.[177] The second sense (B) appears to correspond to that of Henry of Ghent:[178] a thing is true which makes itself evident to the intellect.[179] Bonet takes the third sense of truth (C) from Peter Auriol: truth is the pure quiddity, segregated from every extraneous quiddity; in fact, truth, purity and soundness (*sinceritas*) signify the same.[180] Rather than decide among these definitions of truth, Bonet endeavors to show how being *qua* being can be said to be true in all three ways.

Before demonstrating that all three senses of "true" can, in a qualified sense, be said to passions of being *qua* being, Bonet investigates giving a realist interpretation to Auriol's definition (C). For it is clear that in sensible reality there can be no pure quiddity abstracted from every other quiddity and accident; such quiddities only exist in cognized being, that

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et aliud in anima; veritas igitur duplex reperitur: una que inest enti secundum suum esse quod habet in re extra, et aliud secundum esse quod habet in anima. De veritate autem secundum esse quod habet in re extra prior erit speculatio, deinde de alia erit sermo. Et de veritate autem primo quid est, secundo quomodo et que sit passio subiecti huius metaphysice, cuius per se passiones inquirimus."

[177] *Ibid*.: "Manifestum autem est quod de veritate quid sit varie etiam loquuntur sapientes, dicentes quod veritas est nomen equivocum, nam dicitur veritas formaliter est conformitas producti ad producens, vel ideati ad ideam et exemplati ad exemplar, et fundamentaliter ipsa res et quiditas dicitur ipsa veritas."

[178] See Jan A. Aertsen, "Heinrich von Gent und Thomas von Aquin über die Transzendentalien. Ein Textvergleich," in: Guy Guldentops & Carlos Steel, eds., *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought: Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte* (Leuven, 2003), pp. 101–25, at 121–24; Decorte, "Henri de Gand et la définition classique de la vérité."

[179] Cf. *NMet* V, 2 (V fol. 28rb; F fol. 114r): "Secundo dicitur res vera quia sui ipsius manifestativa quantum est ex se intellectui potenti manifestationem eius cognoscere, et hec est notitia qua res dicitur nota nature. Et forte non dicit supra rem nisi respectum intelligibilitatis sequentem ipsam rem magis et minus perfecte, sicut ipsa natura secundum quod perfectior est magis intelligibilis vel minus. Sicut res se habet ad entitatem, sic isto modo dicitur se habere ad intelligibilitatem. Sicut color se habet ad entitatem, sic ad visibilitatem; nam quia albedo habet plus de perfectione quam alii colores, sic plus habet de visibilitate. Res igitur, quanto perfectior, tanto magis manifestativa sui quantum est ex se et magis intelligibilis, et hec notitia nature et intelligibilitas est veritas formaliter et quiditative a qua dicitur res et entitas rei vera denominative."

[180] Cf. *NMet* V, 2 (V fol. 28rb–va; F fol. 114r): "Fertur etiam tertio quod ipsa veritas est quiditas pura et segregata ab omni quiditate extranea, et hoc importat nomen, quia veritas, puritas et sinceritas idem significant. Tunc autem dicitur res pura, quando est ab omni extraneo segregata precisa et abstracta, sicut argentum dicitur purum et verum quando est separatum a metallo extraneo sue quiditati, precisum et abstractum." On Peter Auriol's position, see Caroline Gaus, *"Etiam realis scientia": Petrus Aureolis konzeptualistische Transzendentalienlehre vor dem Hintergrund seiner Kritik am Formalitätenrealismus* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 100 (Leiden, 2008), esp. pp. 106–14.

is, the being as present to the intellect, and thus this form of truth appears to be mired in the intellect. Bonet appeals to the first intelligence:

> But it is obvious from what has been said that the first intelligence is pure truth and pure quiddity, separate from every other quiddity and accident whatsoever, *per se* subsisting not only objectively in the intellect, but also in reality in accordance with the principles of the one who holds this opinion and posits that the first intelligence is not any determinate portion of entity, but is all entity and is an eminently subsisting quiddity. And this is Platonic.[181]

Since this doctrine of the first intelligence is Platonic, it would be in keeping with Auriol's teaching to posit Platonic ideas as well:

> But it is evident that, speaking Platonically and positing that the ideas of species exist *per se* in extramental reality just as they exist objectively in the intellect, such as "man" in itself, "ox" in itself, and so on, such ideas and forms are the pure truth, since the truth is the pure universal quiddity subsisting *per se*. For the Platonists posit that, just as horseness (*equinitas*) subsists objectively in the intellect taken apart from every individual difference and accidental predicate, so it subsists *per se* in external reality. But what truth there is to the Platonic separation of universals from singulars will be discussed in book seven of this *Metaphysics*.[182]

Converting Auriol's conceptualism into extreme realism via guilt by association, Bonet concludes that truth is a passion of being *qua* being in all three senses. (A) Being *qua* being can be produced in another and communicated according to the exemplar it has in the producer; (B) being *qua* being is the first intelligible thing and therefore is the first thing known and the first thing capable of manifesting itself; (C) Being *qua* being subsists by itself, without any further determination, at least when it is considered

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[181] *Ibid.* (V fol. 28va; F fol. 114v): "Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod prima intelligentia est pura veritas et pura quiditas, precisa ab omni alia quiditate et ab accidente quocumque, per se subsistens non tantum in intellectu obiective, sed etiam in re secundum principia istius opinantis et ponentis quod prima intelligentia non est aliqua determinata portio entitatis, sed est omnis entitas et quiditas eminenter subsistens. Et hoc platonicum est."

[182] *Ibid.*: "Palam autem quod, loquendo platonice, ponendo ideas specierum per se subsistere in re extra sicut per se subsistunt in intellectu obiective, sicut per se hominem, per se bovem, et sic de aliis, sic tales idee et forme sunt pura veritas, cum sit pura quiditas universalis per se subsistens. Ponunt enim platonici quod, sicut equinitas precisa ab omni differentia individuali et predicato accidentali subsistit in intellectu obiective, sic per se subsistit in re extra. De separatione autem platonica universalium a singularibus quid veritatis contineat in libro septimo huius metaphysice fiet sermo. Istis igitur tribus modis predictis ponitur veritas in re extra."

in the intellect.[183] Yet, in none of the three senses is truth convertible with being *qua* being: that is, there are things that, considered independently of being, can be true according to each of the three definitions.[184] Bonet concludes:

> From all this it is plainly concluded that truth in its unqualified, transcendent sense is not a passion convertible with the subject of this metaphysics, because it inheres *per se* in other quiddities considered apart from being. But truth that is contracted by some differentia can be a passion that is convertible with being, in the same way as was said above concerning unity. For just as entity is a certain proper quiddity distinct or not the same as others, so it has its proper conformity and intelligibility to nature, and consequently its proper truth, and a truth contracted in this way is a passion of being *qua* being, such that it can be the passion of no other quiddity, because as such it has its own truth. And we investigate such a truth that is a passion convertible with being. Let, therefore, the second proposition of this metaphysics be: "being is true" or "being is *c*." This proposition is immediate, like the first one, which was "being is one" nor can it be demonstrated *a priori*, since there is nothing prior to the subject of this proposition, since it has a simple concept, unless you want to demonstrate thus: "everything that is one is true; every being is one; therefore in a syllogism of the first figure, in barbara, every being is true." The premises are true, and consequently the conclusion is true, because from true premises only the true follows syllogistically. But this syllogism is not apodictic by the strongest demonstration, because the conclusion is as evident and more immediate than the first proposition, for this proposition "being is true" is more immediate than this "one is true," for passions of being more immediately inhere in being itself than one inheres in the other; moreover, secondly, because, as was said in the *Prior Analytics*, the middle term should be prior to the conclusion's subject and predicate; but in this syllogism the middle term is posterior to the subject, although it is in some way prior to the predicate.[185]

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[183] *Ibid.*: "Nunc autem ad propositum revertentes dicamus quod entis univoci inquantum ens veritas sic tripliciter distincta sive descripta est passio. Palam enim quod ens inquantum ens est manifestativum sui ipsius, immo primo notum et primo manifestativum sui ipsius et notum notitia nature, cum sit primum intelligibile in ordine distincte concipiendi et, secundum plures, etiam in ordine confuse concipiendi. Ens etiam inquantum ens est precisum et spoliatum ab omni extraneo et per se subsistit perseitate tertii modi, saltem in intellectu obiective, et sic purum et verum eo modo quo prius est expositum. Utrum autem ens inquantum ens sit precisum ab omni contrahente et accidente et quocumque posteriori per se possit extra animam subsistere, de hoc primo theologie capite primo fiet sermo. Veritas etiam que dicit respectum conformitatis producti et ideati ad exemplar fertur convenire enti; ens enim inquantum ens est alteri communicabile et producibile secundum exemplar quod est in producente."

[184] *Ibid.*

[185] *Ibid.* (V fol. 28va; F fols. 114v–115r): "Ex his omnibus manifeste concluditur quod veritas simpliciter transcendens non est passio convertibilis cum subiecto huius metaphysice,

Bonet's conclusion here reflects the other 13 cases in Books V and VI: the transcendental term *true* has greater extension than *being*; in order that it be logically convertible with *being*, one must take it in a limited sense. Moreover, his conclusion has very little connection with the prior discussion on the three meanings of extramental truth. While Bonet clearly has an opinion and a very unique way of understanding the positions of others, he is content to reduce each position to a position that he believes can be held, rather than decide among them. Yet, in doing so, his argumentation borders on dialectic: he infers from Peter Auriol's position on God a Platonic position on the existence of universals. Then again, such a technique is hardly surprising, given Bonet's explanation of Plato's doctrine on those universals by arguing dialectically from Aristotle's criticism of it.

4. Conclusion

The metaphysics of these three authors shaped the history of philosophy of the 14th and 15th centuries, and beyond. Each text is very different from the other: Antonius Andreae's *Expositio litteralis super Metaphysicam* corrects Thomas Aquinas's literal commentary to make it cohere with Scotus's doctrine; while his *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* tries to present Scotus's teaching on the *Metaphysics* in Scotus's own words in a coherent fashion. Francis of Marchia's *Metaphysics* commentary is a question-commentary that marks a waypoint—perhaps the last—on the Franciscan philosopher's ongoing search for the right answer. Nicholas

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cum per se insit aliis quiditatibus ut prescindunt ab ente. Veritas autem contracta per aliquam differentiam potest esse passio convertibilis cum ente, sicut fuit dictum superius de unitate. Nam sicut entitas est quedam propria quiditas distincta vel non eadem aliis, ita habet propriam conformitatem et intelligibilitatem nature, et per consequens veritatem; et talis veritas sic contracta est passio entis inquantum ens quod nullius alterius quiditatis est passio, quia sic habet propriam veritatem. Et talis veritas est passio convertibilis cum ente et talem passionem inquirimus. Sit igitur secunda propositio huius metaphysice talis: 'ens est verum,' vel 'ens est *c*.' Hec propositio est immediata sicut prima, que fuit 'ens est unum,' nec potest demonstrari a priori, cum nihil sit prius subiecto huius propositionis, cum habeat conceptum simplicem, nisi velis demonstrare sic: 'omne quod est unum est verum; omne ens est unum; ergo in prima figura in barbara omne ens est verum.' Premisse sunt vere, et per consequens conclusio vera, quia ex veris non sequitur nisi verum syllogistice. Sed iste syllogismus non est demonstrativus demonstratione potissima, quia conclusio est ita evidens et magis immediata quam prima propositio, nam ista est magis immediata 'ens est verum' quam ista 'unum est verum,' nam magis immediate insunt passiones entis ipsi enti quam una alteri; tum etiam secundo quia, sicut fuit dictum in *Prioribus*, medium debet esse prius subiecto et predicato in conclusione, in hoc autem syllogismo medium est posterius subiecto, licet sit aliqualiter prius predicato."

Bonet's *Metaphysics* stands apart as a textbook of systematic philosophy, on every page transpiring the influence of Aristotle but announcing itself as a *Metaphysics* distinct from, and in some ways superior to, Aristotle's work of the same name.

Perhaps they take a common approach. In determining that metaphysics is the science of being *qua* being, Antonius Andreae first organizes Scotus's thought on what constitutes scientific knowledge and the kind of knowledge that is of being *qua* being, and then he investigates those aspects of being *qua* being. Francis of Marchia too, after distinguishing between *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*, considers epistemological questions before investigating aspects of being. Nicholas Bonetus also follows this model: he first presents the epistemology and terminology necessary for determining the field of investigation and then investigating it, followed by the passions of being *qua* being and the doctrine of universals.

These three authors were extremely influential, especially within the Scotist and Mayronist schools of the 14th and 15th centuries. Some indication can be had by looking at the libraries of 15th- and 16th-centuries thinkers. In the preface to the 1505 edition of Bonet's philosophical treatise, Tiberius Bazalerius mentioned the esteem with which Giovanni Pico della Mirandola held the Franciscan theologian. Pico della Mirandola's library confirms this: it had a copy of "Questiones Nicolai Boneti in philosophia." His library also included Antonius Andreae's *Quaestiones* and Francis of Marchia's *Sentences* Commentary.[186] Many other Scholastic and Humanist libraries boasted copies of their works, and their metaphysical ideas were continually discussed into the modern period.

[186] See Pearl Kibre, *The Library of Pico della Mirandola* (New York 1936), p. 124, n. 38 (Bonet); p. 245, n. 939 (Andreae, Venice 1482 edition); p. 132, n. 102 (Francis of Marchia, I–III *Sent.*).

JOHN BURIDAN'S COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS*

Femke J. Kok

Introduction

According to some historians of philosophy, the 14th century portended the destruction of metaphysics, rather than a new beginning. The main culprit was supposedly the emergence of what was later to be called "nominalism," a way of doing philosophy which was, among other things, characterized by its parsimonious ontology.[1] Moreover, "jurisdictional concerns" would have contributed to the decline, since many issues traditionally raised in metaphysics properly belonged to the authority of theology.[2] This picture of the crisis of metaphysics is seemingly confirmed by the remarkable paucity of commentaries on the *Metaphysics* from the second half of the 14th century onward.[3]

One of the few commentaries that has come down to us originated at the University of Paris and was written by John Buridan (ca. 1300–61). Although historians of philosophy agree that Buridan's commentary has been extremely important and influential, their appraisals of its metaphysical character vary widely. According to Joël Biard, Buridan's metaphysics is in fact a natural theology, comparable to what was called a

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[1] In this chapter, I shall not use the predicate "nominalist" for Buridan, nor for his contemporaries or their philosophical points of view, because of the misleading and anachronistic character of the term. For some reflections on the use of the term "nominalism," see William J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 99 (Leiden, 2008), pp. 1–19.

[2] See, e.g., Rolf Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 43 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1994), p. 339. See also Joël Biard, "Nominalism in the Later Middle Ages," in: Robert Pasnau, ed., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 2010), vol. 2, pp. 661–73; and Jack A. Zupko, *John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourteenth-century Arts-master* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2003), pp. xiii, 139.

[3] See Charles H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," *Traditio* 23–30 (1967–74). See also Albert Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250–1350* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 9 (Leiden-Cologne, 1971), pp. 49–145.

"rational theology" a few centuries later.[4] Peter King argues that Buridan applied semantics to metaphysical questions with an incredible degree of rigor, "even to the point of casting doubt on metaphysics as a discipline independent of semantics."[5] Jack Zupko tends to agree with King, claiming that, even though Buridan "established a safe harbor for Aristotelian metaphysics in the Faculty of Arts," his tendency to view traditional problems in metaphysics as consequences of confusions of logic or language weakened metaphysics' sphere of operation.[6] Rolf Schönberger claims that Buridan's metaphysics cannot be called ontology, since we search in vain for a structural analysis of (the term) "being."[7] As regards the problem of the subject-matter of metaphysics, Albert Zimmermann claims that Buridan, whom he describes as "one of the most important representatives of 14th-century nominalism," brought the development of this problem to an end and at the same time to a new beginning, due to his new explanation of the problem.[8] Finally, Gerhard Krieger takes Buridan's *Ethics* and his ideas on the will as a starting point from which to enter his metaphysics. Krieger argues that Buridan's "transformation of metaphysics" is an anticipation of Kant, since Buridan supposedly defended the primacy of "practical reason" and human freedom as decisive for his metaphysics.[9]

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[4] Joël Biard, "God as First Principle and Metaphysics as a Science," in: Russell L. Friedman & Lauge O. Nielsen, eds., *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700* (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 75–97, esp. 91.

[5] See Peter O. King, "Jean Buridan (b. ca. 1295/1300; d. after 1358)," in: Jorge J.E. Gracia, ed., *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650* (New York, 1994), pp. 397–430, esp. 416.

[6] See Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 145.

[7] Schönberger concludes from this omission that "being" is not a metaphysical theme *in actu exercito* of metaphysics but, rather, a theme within Buridan's philosophy of science, because the term "*ens*" would only occur where the subject of metaphysics is considered. See Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, pp. 353–54.

[8] See Albert Zimmerman, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 8 (Leiden-Cologne, 1965; revised edition, Leuven, 1998), p. 125.

[9] See Gerhard Krieger, *Subjekt und Metaphysik: die Metaphysik des Johannes Buridan* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosphie und Theologie des Mittelalters) 65 (Münster i. W., 2003), esp. pp. 60–61 and 288–303. Krieger's attempt to treat Buridan as anticipating Kant is not completely satisfactory, if not antichronistic. Cf. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines médiévales: les XIVe et XVe siècles (II)," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 89 (2005), pp. 729–62, esp. 738–41.

So far, certain aspects of Buridan's metaphysics have received study, such as his theory of universals, his theory of relation, and his ideas about the ontological status of accidental being.[10] This chapter will attempt to address Buridan's metaphysical project as reflected in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[11] After a short section on the several versions of his *Metaphysics*-commentary and their influence, it will move on to discuss Buridan's concept of metaphysics. Following this, some individual metaphysical themes shall be considered, in order to see how Buridan's concept of metaphysics was put into practice, viz., his theory on being and essence, his views on substantiality, and his ideas on immaterial being.[12] The chapter will conclude with a brief statement of the defining feature of Buridan's metaphysical enterprise.

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[10] For Buridan's theory of universals, see Peter O. King, "John Buridan's Solution to the Problem of Universals," in: Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen & Jack A. Zupko, eds., *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan* (Medieval and Early Modern Science) 2 (Leiden-Boston-Cologne, 2001), pp. 1–27; King, "Jean Buridan"; and Lambert M. de Rijk, "John Buridan on Universals," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 99 (1992), 35–59. For his theory of relation, see Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*. For his theory on the ontological status of accidental being, see Lambert M. de Rijk, "On Buridan's View of Accidental Being," in: Egbert P. Bos, ed., *John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy* (Aristarium) 8 (Nijmegen, 1993), pp. 41–51; *Jean Buridan (c. 1292–c. 1360). Eerbiedwaardig ondermijner van het aristotelisch substantie-denken* (Amsterdam, 1994); "The Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in: Olga Weijers & Louis Holz, eds., *L'Enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe–XVe siècles)* (Studia Artistarum) 4 (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 303–12, esp. 308–10; Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being," in: *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 247–64; and "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité des accidents eucharistiques. Observations sur les rapports entre métaphysique et théologie au XIVe siècle," in: Zenon Kaluza & Jean-Luc Solère, eds., *La servante et la consolatrice. La philosophie dans ses rapports avec la théologie au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2002), pp. 193–245.

[11] I will use the following edition of Buridan's text: *In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones argutissimae* [*secundum ultimam lecturam*] (Paris, 1518) (repr. [with incorrect date of original publication of 1588] Frankfurt a. M., 1964) (hereafter *Qu. Met.*). Lambert M. de Rijk has argued for the reliability of this edition in comparison with several manuscripts. See de Rijk, "The Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," pp. 303–12. Incidentally, I correct the edition with Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, lat. Cl VI, 204a; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 14716; and Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 292. The reliability of these manuscripts is established, among others, by Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," pp. 193–245, esp. 215–16.

[12] Alternative case studies have been given by others, on, e.g., Buridan's theorie on relation and his theory of universals. See, e.g., Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*; King, "John Buridan's Solution to the Problem of Universals," pp. 1–27; and de Rijk, "John Buridan on Universals," pp. 35–59.

1. John Buridan's Commentaries on the *Metaphysics*

John Buridan was one of the most influential philosophers in 14th-century Paris, but details about his life are scant.[13] The scarce pieces of information that we have tell especially about his professional activities. As Bernd Michael notes, despite the legends formed by later generations, including a boxing match with the pope and a love affair with Queen Joan of Navarre, Buridan's life was apparently quiet and uneventful, falling within the fixed norms of university life.[14] The main facts are that Buridan was born in the diocese of Arras, Picardy, around 1300. After receiving his master's degree and *licentia docendi* at the Arts faculty of the University of Paris around 1325, he spent his whole academic career as a Master of Arts at the same university. He probably never studied at the Faculty of Theology, nor did he belong to any religious order. Buridan died around 11 October 1360, and definitely no later than 12 June 1361.[15]

1.1. *The Commentaries on the* Metaphysics

Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics* is but one of his many commentaries on Aristotle's works, which together constitute the largest part of his oeuvre.[16] In the 14th century, Aristotle's writings were firmly established in the arts curriculum of the University of Paris, and the literary genre of the commentary was flourishing.[17] In Buridan's day, the *Metaphysics* was read *ordinarie* at the University of Paris, but whether the

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[13] The authoritative source for Buridan's life is Bernd Michael, *Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters*, 2 vols. (Berlin 1985), esp. pp. 79–235. For an updated biography in English and a list of publications, see Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, "Buridan, John (Jean)," in: Noretta Koertge, ed., *New Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, 8 vols. (Detroit, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 446–48. For the outlines of Buridan's philosophy, see Zupko, *John Buridan*, and Gyula Klima, *John Buridan* (Oxford, 2009).

[14] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 79.

[15] For the argumentation, see Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 401–02.

[16] His most important works are the *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum*, the *Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum*, and the *Summulae de dialectica*, which is presented as a commentary on Buridan's revised version of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*.

[17] See Francesco del Punta, Silvia Donati, & Cecilia Trifogli, "The Genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought," in: Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer, eds., *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M. 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt* (Miscellanea Medievalia) 26 (Berlin-New York, 1998), pp. 138–51. See also Charles H. Lohr, "The New Aristotle and 'Science' in the Paris Arts Faculty (1255)," in: *L'Enseignement des disciplines*, pp. 251–66.

lecture course was already prescribed for students in order to receive their *licentia docendi* can only be assumed, for, as such, metaphysics was not included in the faculty statutes until 1366.[18]

As was customary for the 14th century, Buridan's lectures on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* can be categorized as literal commentaries (*expositio textus*) as well as questions (*quaestiones*); the latter being more elaborated and concerning problems encountered when explaining Aristotle's text.[19] Given Buridan's long career at the faculty of arts, it is not surprising that he lectured on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* more than once. Buridan's *Expositio* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as well as his *Quaestiones*, have been preserved in several manuscripts and in different versions or redactions. Bernd Michael mentions two versions of Buridan's *Expositio in duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*.[20] The first is available in only one codex and is a *reportatio*, meaning that it is a student's original copy book.[21]

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[18] A course was called *ordinarie* when it belonged to the official program and was taught by a regent master at a stipulated time and place. The rules for an ordinary course were prescribed by the faculty. See del Punta, Donati, & Trifogli, "The Genre of Commentaries," pp. 142–44. At the University of Paris, the early afternoon was reserved for *ordinarie* lectures. The *ultima lectura* of Buridan's metaphysics says that Buridan commented upon the metaphysics in the early afternoon. See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 807, n. 4; and Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 15, fol. 25vb. For the reception of the *Metaphysics* in the curriculum of the Parisian artsfaculty, see Astrik L. Gabriel, "Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities," in: Paul Wilpert, ed., *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und Ihre Bedeutung* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 92–102.

[19] Literal commentaries were traditionally considered a full part of philosophical practice, the foundations of the more elaborated question-commentaries. However, the 14th century is known for the decline of the more explanatory exposition in favor of the question. See Christoph Flüeler, "From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in: Sten Ebbesen & Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*. Acts of the Symposium *The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy*, January 10–13, 1996 (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 497–521, esp. 505; and Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 245.

[20] I use for this overview mainly Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 792–813. Further research by Lambert de Rijk and Christoph Flüeler shows that the situation is more complicated. As to the different versions or redactions of Buridan's metaphysics, much is still unclear, and further research is badly needed. See de Rijk, "The Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," pp. 303–12. Cf. Christoph Flüeler, "Two Manuscripts of Buridan on the Metaphysics: Paris, BN, lat. 16131 and Darmstadt, Hessische La&HB, Hs 516," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 67 (1997), 78–92; and idem, "From Oral Lecture," pp. 497–521. See also Lambert M. de Rijk, *Johannes Buridanus. Lectura Erfordiensis in I–IV Metaphysicam together with the 15th-century Abbreviatio Caminensis. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes* (Turnhout, 2008).

[21] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 792–94, 800ff. Codicological proof for the fact that the manuscript is in fact a *reportatio* is provided in Flüeler, "From Oral Lecture," pp. 497–521.

The second version exists in six copies.[22] Michael also mentions two versions of Buridan's *Quaestiones in duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis*. The first is to be found in the same manuscript as the Parisian *reportatio* of the *expositio* and ends abruptly in the ninth book.[23] The second is the *ultima lectura* of Buridan's questions on the *Metaphysics*, which is extant in at least seven copies and in an early16th-century print by Josse Bade.[24] It must have originated from after 1346, probably ca. 1350/1355, since in it Buridan explicitly referred to the condemnation of some of Nicholas of Autrecourt's propositions.[25] In virtue of the fact that it was the most influential version, as evidenced by its inclusion in most existing manuscripts, and that it is available in an early 16th-century print, the following discussion on Buridan's metaphysics is based primarily on this version.

It should be noted that Buridan did not lecture on the third, eleventh, thirteenth and fourteenth books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[26] As to the thirteenth and fourteenth books, this custom dated back to the 13th century, but the habit not to read the third and eleventh books seems to be of more recent origin.[27] Some remarks in Buridan's commentaries

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[22] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 796–97. One of these six, i.e., Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Conventi Soppressi, S. Croce, cod. 262 C 5, is not mentioned by Michael. See de Rijk, "The Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," p. 304, n. 3.

[23] As the scribe explains at the end of the manuscript, the magister had to interrupt his lectures because of the severe cold that winter. See Flüeler, "Two Manuscripts," p. 80. The scribe writes: "Non audivisti plus, quia non legit amplius. Et illud propter magnum frigus, quod tunc fuit in hieme, de quo adhuc doleo." For the difficulties in interpreting this colophon, see Flüeler, "From Oral Lecture," p. 507. According to de Rijk, the ascription of this version to Buridan still raises doubts. See de Rijk, *Johannes Buridanus. Lectura Erfordiensis*, pp. lxxviii–lxxix.

[24] For a description of the manuscripts and the print, see Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 803–07. See also above, note 11.

[25] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 282, 809–10.

[26] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 808.

[27] Several Parisian commentaries on the *Metaphysics* from the beginning of the 14th century contained questions on the third book, e.g., the commentaries by John of Jandun, Franciscus de Marchia, and Nicholas Bonetus. See Roberto Lambertini & Andrea Tabarroni, "Le *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* attribuite a Giovanni di Jandun. Osservazione e problemi," *Medioevo* 10 (1984), 41–104, esp. 94–104; Pius Künzle, "Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine 3490 zum Schrifttum des Franziskaners Petrus Thomae, vorab zu seinen *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 59 (1966), 3–37, esp. 17–23, which contains the full list of questions of Marchia's large *Metaphysics*-commentary, in this article wrongly ascribed to Petrus Thomae; Nicholas Bonetus, *Metaphysica* (Venice, 1505; an online version at <http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/bsb00008024/images/>, accessed on September 1st, 2013). Some also contain questions on the eleventh, such as the commentary of Antonius Andreae. See Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis* (Leipzig, before 1494; an online version at <http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0004/bsb00040852/images/>, accessed on September 1st, 2013).

explain why books three and eleven were not usually read: the third book inquires into problems which were to be repeated and solved in the fourth book, making reading both superfluous, while the eleventh book was regarded as "only repetition."[28] Most probably, knowledge of books three and eleven was not required of students of the University of Paris, a custom that is reflected in the first statutes of the University of Heidelberg, which were modeled on Parisian practice.[29]

1.2. *The Influence of Buridan's Commentary on the* Metaphysics

Jack Zupko claims that the real impact of Buridan on Western thought has yet to be appreciated, since, according to him, we have been looking for the wrong things. Questions of influence, he argues, are almost always raised in terms of doctrine: what are the new ideas, who advanced them and how were they passed on to posterity? Looked at in this way, Buridan does not come off well, for he only made a few original contributions to philosophy.[30] However, if influence is measured according to what extent an author's texts were used throughout an episode of history, the influence of Buridan's works seems beyond question.[31] Judging by the number of existing manuscripts and early modern prints, his works were intensively read, studied, and interpreted during the 14th, 15th and

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Moreover, one of the early redactions of Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics* (extant in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 16.131) does contain the third book. See Flüeler, "Two Manuscripts," p. 80. Buridan's literal commentary also contained book three, positioned after the twelfth. See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 795; and Flüeler, "From Oral Lecture," p. 518, n. 53.

[28] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 795: "In tertio libro moventur quaestiones quae solvuntur in quarto et ibi repetuntur et ideo communiter non solet legi," and p. 796: "Iste liber undecimus est solum recapitulatio [...]." In the *ultima lectura* of his questions, Buridan confined himself to the remark that the third book is not read. As for the eleventh, he reiterated that this book only repeats what was said elsewhere. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 5, fol. 12rb: "Et tertius non legitur, igitur rationabiliter divino duce adiutorio accedendum est ad quartum," and X, q. 6, fol. 64vb: "Et undecimus non est nisi recapitulatio alibi dictorum, ideo quia non est consuetum circa ipsum questiones fieri accedendum est ad librum duodecimum."

[29] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 808; Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought) 50 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1993), pp. 18–19; and Henri S. Denifle & Émile L.M. Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1889–97), vol. 3, p. 145, n. 1319 (hereafter *CUP*).

[30] See Jack A. Zupko, "John Buridan and the Origins of Secular Philosophical Culture," in: Stefano Caroti & Jean Celeyrette, eds., Quia inter doctores est magna dissensio. *Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle* (Florence, 2004), pp. 33–48, esp. 47–48.

[31] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 305.

16th centuries. In particular, his works on logic, natural philosophy, and ethics proved to be of lasting interest to scholars.[32] Buridan's commentaries on the *Metaphysics* were especially influential in 15th-century Central Europe, but they were not as popular as his ethics or natural philosophy.[33] The *expositiones* have, in fact, been largely neglected.[34]

In the 15th and 16th centuries, Buridan was renowned for his "nominalist" philosophy. Although there is no dispute that the term "nominalism" in the history of philosophy is uncertain, equivocal, and anachronistic when applied to the 14th century, Buridan's way of doing philosophy was a touchstone for later conceptions of nominalism. The well-known nominalist manifesto of 1474, a response to Louis XI's decree against the nominalists, states that nominalists are called, first, those doctors "who do not multiply things that are chiefly signified by terms according to the multiplication of terms," and, second, "those who pay attention to and study to know all the properties of terms, upon which depend the truth and falsity of propositions and without which one cannot make any final judgment about the truth and falsity of propositions."[35] According to Joël Biard, the true inspiration for nominalists of that time was Buridan.[36]

1.2.1. *Marsilius of Inghen*

In his own circle, Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics* was especially influential to Marsilius of Inghen. Marsilius's commentaries on Aristotle, especially his questions on the *Metaphysics*, follow closely in Buridan's footsteps.[37] Marsilius of Inghen became a Master of Arts in Paris under

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[32] Buridan's *Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum* are preserved in no fewer than 82 manuscripts.

[33] On the spread of Buridan's ideas, see Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, pp. 286–336; Mieczyslaw Markowski, "L'influence de Jean Buridan sur les universités d'Europe Centrale," in: Zenon Kaluza & Paul Vignaux, eds., *Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1984), pp. 149–63; and idem, "Buridans Metaphysikkommentare in ihren handschriftlichen Überlieferungen in den Bibliotheken in Darmstadt, Erfurt, Munich und Wien," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 27 (1984), 73–88.

[34] Christoph Flüeler gives an explanation for this tendency: "these commentaries [i.e., literal commentaries] are boring, most of them add little of value to the interpretation of the Aristotelian work, and they are rarely useful for determining the commentator's own philosophical doctrine." See Flüeler, "From Oral Lecture," pp. 502–03.

[35] Translation from Lynn Thorndike, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1944), pp. 355–60. See Charles du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus* (Paris, 1755), I, ii, pp. 286–88.

[36] Biard, "Nominalism in the Later Middle Ages," pp. 662–63.

[37] See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, p. 16. For the relationship between Buridan and Marsilius, see also Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, "The Buridan-school Reassessed. John

William Buser of Heusden († after 1413) on 27 September 1362. After his graduation, he studied and taught theology at the newly founded University of Heidelberg.[38] His commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* originated from the period of his studies in Heidelberg (probably from between 1387 and 1389), and, as with the *ultima lectura* of Buridan's questions on the *Metaphysics*, it was a mature work, developed after many years of study.[39]

Marsilius's list of questions is almost identical to Buridan's, and the elaboration of the questions often runs parallel, with several word-for-word resemblances.[40] Even though Marsilius's *quaestiones* are considerably longer and discuss aspects of problems which are not found in Buridan's, he obviously took Buridan's questions as a point of departure.[41] Given these similarities, and the fact that Marsilius's *Metaphysics*-commentary was held in high esteem at European universities in the 15th century, this work was conducive for the transmission of Buridan's metaphysics. At the University of Krakow, for example, knowledge of Buridan's metaphysics was mediated by Marsilius of Inghen's commentary on the *Metaphysics*.[42]

However, it must be noted that, in spite of many similarities, recent scholarship has also shown interesting doctrinal contrasts.[43] I have argued

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Buridan and Albert of Saxony," *Vivarium* 42.1 (2004), pp. 18–42; and Andrea Tabarroni, "John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Meaning of Accidental Terms (*Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, VII 3–5)," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), pp. 389–407, esp. 390.

[38] For an overview of facts about Marsilius's life, see Manfred Schulze, "Marsilius of Inghen," in: Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz, ed., *Biographisch-bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon* (Stuttgart 1999), vol. 16, cols. 988–1001.

[39] Marsilius taught in Heidelberg between 1386 (the year of the foundation of the *studium* of Heidelberg) until 1396 (the year of his death). See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, p. 16. Recently, Andrea Tabarroni put a more exact date to Marsilius's lectures on the *Metaphysics*, based on a passage in *questio* 16 of Book 7 (*Utrum in re singulari sit aliqua natura universalis distincta contra naturam singularem*), where Marsilius uses the example: "Urbanus VI est homo." Tabarroni reasonably claims that the use of such example points to a period that Urban VI was still alive, that is before 15 October 1389. See Tabarroni, "John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen," pp. 402–03, n. 33.

[40] For the lists of questions, see Edmond Faral, "Jean Buridan. Notes sur les manuscrits, les éditions et le contenu de ses ouvrages," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 15 (1946), pp. 1–53, esp. 37–39; and Mieczyslaw Markowski, "Les *Questiones* de Marsile d'Inghen sur la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote. Notes sur les manuscrits et le contenu des questions," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 13 (1968), pp. 8–32, esp. 10–30.

[41] See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, p. 16.

[42] See Michael, *Johannes Buridan*, p. 357. See also Mieczyslaw Markowski, "Der Buridanism an der Krakauer Universität im Mittelalter," in: Olaf Pluta, ed., *Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstantly Michalski (1879–1947)* (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie) 10 (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 245–60.

[43] See Maria E. Reina, "*Comprehensio veritatis*. Una questione di Marsilio di Inghen sulla Metafisica," in: Luca Bianchi, ed., *Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di*

elsewhere that the disagreement between Buridan and Marsilius was more than once caused by different perspectives on the role of theological argument in metaphysics.[44] The relationship between Buridan's and Marsilius's commentaries on the *Metaphysics* deserves some more investigation, in order to determine Buridan's sphere of influence as well as the foundations of Marsilius's philosophical thought.

2. Buridan's Concept of *Metaphysics*

2.1. *What is* Metaphysics*?*

In Buridan's day, an important part of the question of what metaphysics is was the question of what the subject-matter of metaphysics is. According to the scientific standards as formulated by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*, every science must have a designated subject-matter (*subiectum*). This was not a random object, or one of those things discussed in a science, but, rather, that unique genus of which the essential properties and principles were sought in the corresponding science. Moreover, it gave a science its unity, since one science was distinguished from others by means of its subject-matter.[45]

On the discussion about the subject-matter of metaphysics in the 13th and 14th centuries, much is written by Zimmermann, who ends his study with Buridan.[46] In his work, Zimmermann rightly points to the fact that in order to understand differing answers to the question of what the subject-

Eugenio Randi (Textes et Études du Moyen Age) 1 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 283–335; Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," pp. 193–245; Tabarroni, "John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen," pp. 389–407; and Femke J. Kok, "What Can We Know about God? John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Intellect's Natural Capacity for Knowing God's Essence," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Mediévales* 77.1 (2010), pp. 137–71.

[44] See Kok, "What Can We Know about God?"

[45] Thomas Aquinas had already distinguished between the *subiectum metaphysicae* and its *res consideratae.* See Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 52 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1996), p. 139. Buridan provides an answer to the question of what metaphysics considers in the first question of the first book of his *quaestiones* and in the beginning of his *expositio*. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 3rb: "Sed sapientia secundum Aristotelem non est aliud quam ipsa metaphysica, que considerat causas altissimas, scilicet Deum et intelligentias. Et etiam ipsa considerat prima principia doctrine communissima."

[46] Zimmerman, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*. On the subject-matter of metaphysics in medieval philosophy, see also Rega Wood, "The Subject of the Aristotelian Science of Metaphysics," in: *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, vol. 2, pp. 609–21.

matter of a science is, we must first consider the author's point of view concerning science in general.[47]

2.1.1. Metaphysics: *A Science*

Buridan's view on what science is resembles, to a great extent, William of Ockham's psychological definition of science, according to which science is the habit of one demonstrative conclusion.[48] As Buridan puts it, the term "science" supposits for the mental habit (*habitus*) that is added to the conclusion when a person assents to it, at the moment that he knows the conclusion to be science; that is, at the moment that he knows that the conclusion is demonstrated and is not mere opinion (for a conclusion that is not demonstrated cannot be called "science").[49] In this process, assenting to a conclusion is an act of the mind, and the habit is the disposition of the mind when it applies its power. Just like Ockham, Buridan claims that each demonstration brings about a new habit, such that a geometer who holds four geometrical conclusions is said to possess four distinct geometrical sciences.[50] However, Buridan thinks that a person who holds only two or three geometrical conclusions cannot be seriously called a (perfect) geometer. Therefore, he admits that "science" in a broader sense also supposits for an integrated whole (*totum integrale*) of habits.

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[47] See Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 122, 413. I will only consider Buridan's remarks on what science is, or what the immediate referent of the term "science" is, in his questions on the *Metaphysics*. For a detailed investigation of Buridan's conception of *scientia* (and it's relation to Ockham's), see Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, "Buridan on the Unity of a Science. Another Chapter in Ockhamism?" in: Egbert P. Bos & Henri A. Krop, eds., *Ockham and Ockhamists*. Acts of the Symposium Organized by the Dutch society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 10. Anniversary. Leiden, 10–12 September 1986 (Artistarium Supplementa) 4 (Nijmegen, 1987), pp. 93–105.

[48] Although Ockham and Buridan hold similar views on the immediate referent or object of science, viz., the conclusion, they hold different views as to the relationship between (necessary) propositions and the referents of these propositions, the (contingent) *res* in the outside world, i.e., the ultimate objects of science. See Thijssen, "Buridan on the Unity of a Science," pp. 94–95. The idea that, properly speaking, a science is the habit of one single demonstrative conclusion was already found in Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics*. See John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, VI, q. 1, in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 4, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), n. 39, and Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 303–05.

[49] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 13va: "Quidam dicunt quod scientia non est aliud quam ipsa conclusio, ita quod hoc nomen scientia supponit pro ipsa conclusione, connotando tamen quod ipsa sit demonstrata. [...] Sed loquor hic de scientia prout est habitus unius conclusionis demonstrate. Hoc notato videtur mihi quod quando assentimus alicui conclusioni, ille assensus est habitus illi conclusioni additus et non est illa conclusio."

[50] *Ibid.*, fol. 14rb: "Capiamus gratia exempli quatuor conclusiones geometrie, tunc illarum conclusionum quatuor erunt scientie adinvicem distincte."

For example, the sum of all geometrical or all metaphysical habits would be called a science.[51] These integrated wholes form the traditional sciences of geometry and metaphysics, handed down in the books of Euclid and Aristotle.

Apparently the unity of science is now at stake. Since every demonstration brings about a new habit, Buridan needs a criterion in order to bring together single conclusions under one integrated science and to maintain its unity.[52] While Ockham rejects such a unity, Buridan tries to salvage it. Even though such an integral whole cannot be called one *simpliciter*, Buridan affirms that it is one *secundum quid*, as one collection or aggregate, in the same way as an army arranged under a single king, is one.[53] Like an army, all terms and propositions grouped under the integral whole of, for example, geometry or metaphysics are ordered to one "ruler" or one "first" that constitutes their unity.[54]

Because metaphysics considers what all things are, what their causes are, and in what way they are, Buridan argues that all parts of metaphysics are ultimately related to God as the first being that causes their being.[55]

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[51] *Ibid.*, fol. 14vb: "Sed postea etiam oportet dicere quod aliquando etiam hoc nomen 'geometria' significat unum totum integrale scilicet integratum ex omnibus habitibus partialibus conclusionum partialium demonstratarum in libris *Geometrie.* Propter quod nos dicimus illum qui solum habet scientiam duarum vel trium geometricalium conclusionum non esse perfectum geometriam."

[52] *Ibid.*, fol. 14va: "Et sic apparet quomodo metaphysica considerans de omnibus debeat vel non debeat dici una scientia."

[53] *Ibid.*, fol. 14rb: "Modo igitur videamus quomodo illud totum integrale est unum. Et videtur mihi quod geometria pro tali toto integrali accepta non est simpliciter loquendo aliqua res vel aliquod ens vel aliquid unum, immo est multa entia. Tamen bene dicitur una congregatio vel unum aggregatum. Est enim ibi unitas non simpliciter, sed secundum quid et cum additione, scilicet unitas secundum connexionem multorum vel ordinem multorum attributorum ad unum. Immo simile est sicut de exercitu. Exercitus enim regis non est aliquod ens vel aliquid unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid et cum additione dicitur bene exercitus unus vel una aggregatione. Et est illa aggregatio una unitate ordinis et attributionis ad unum primum principem."

[54] Peter King explains Buridan's view as follows: the term "science," when it is taken as an integral whole, supposits for the aggregate of habits, and appellates or connotes the rank order of its attributes, for in a certain science all habits are ranked in a special order: they are all related in one way or another as attributes to a "first." In Peter O. King, "Jean Buridan's Philosophy of Science," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 18 (1987), pp. 109–32, esp. 115.

[55] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 14va–b: "Sicut exercitus dicitur unus ex unitate principiis et ex ordine omnium ad ipsum, ita etiam metaphysica dicitur una ex ordine et reductione omnium ad unum primum, quam totam reductionem metaphysicus habet considerare. Accidentia enim primitus reducuntur ad substantias, quia esse habent per illas, et substantie inseparabiles reducuntur ad separatas, quia etiam habent esse per illas, et tandem omnes separate reducuntur ad ipsum Deum a quo etiam et propter quem

However, elsewhere he explicitly states that a science is one and distinct from other sciences because of its subject-matter, with reference to the same example of an army.[56] This suggests that the "first" to which all the parts of metaphysics are ordered is the subject-matter of metaphysics. Should we conclude, therefore, that from these two statements combined, according to Buridan, God is the subject-matter of metaphysics? The answer is no, as will become clear in the following.

2.1.2. *The Subject-Matter of* Metaphysics

The uncertainty about the subject-matter of metaphysics derives from Aristotle's own remarks on the subject of "first philosophy." In Book Γ of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle defines first philosophy as that study which investigates being as being, whereas in Book E he defines it as the study of the highest genus of divine things.[57] Accordingly, medieval philosophers since Siger of Brabant and John Duns Scotus distinguished two main answers to the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics: "God," and "being as being" (*ens inquantum est ens*). The first alternative has been defended by Averroes, the second by Avicenna.[58] In short, Avicenna thinks that the subject-matter of metaphysics is being as being. He explicitly argues that God cannot be the subject-matter of metaphysics, since it is metaphysics that proves God's existence, and, according to Aristotle's *Posterior analytics*, a science has to presuppose the existence of its subject-matter.[59]

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habent esse. [...] Metaphyiscus enim considerat de omnibus quomodo sunt et propter quas causas sunt et quid sunt. Ideo omnia reducuntur ad primum ens a quo omnia sunt et propter quid sunt."

[56] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 15va: "Postea dicitur quod secundum unitatem subiecti scientia dicitur una. Et hoc est verum sicut secundum unitatem exercitus ducis ad quem alia de exercitu ordinantur totus exercitus dicitur unus. Solet etiam dici quod scientie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem suorum subiectorum. Et hoc est verum." Cf. Buridan, *Quaestiones in octo libros Phisicorum Aristotelis* (hereafter *Qu. Phys.*), I, q. 2: "Igitur necesse est dicere quod omnis talis totalis scientia dicitur una ex unitate alicuius considerati in ea, propter attributionem omnium aliorum in ea consideratorum ad ipsum secundum illas rationes secundum quas in ea considerantur. Et hoc quodcumque fuerit, vocamus subiectum proprium in illa assignandum" (quotation in Thijssen, "Buridan on the Unity of a Science," p. 97, n. 23).

[57] See Aristotle, *Met.*, Γ 1, 1003a20–23, and E 1, 1026a10–32.

[58] See Zimmerman, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 144–54. See also Biard, "God as First Principle and Metaphysics as a Science," p. 78; and John F. Wippel, "Essence and Existence," in: Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, & Jan Pinborg, eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), pp. 385–410, esp. 386–90. In Scotus's work, this question was eleborated to the fullest extent. See John Duns Scotus, *Questiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Prol., q. 1 (*Utrum subiectum metaphysicae sit ens inquantum ens sicut posuit Avicenna vel Deus et intelligentiae sicut posuit Averroes*).

[59] Cf. Aristotle, *Post. An.*, A 10, 76b3–11.

Averroes, in contrast, denies this line of reasoning, arguing that since we can know God only through his (physical) effects, it is the physicist or natural philosopher who has to provide the proof of God's existence. Being as being can perfectly well be the description of the subject of metaphysics, but according to Averroes this description signifies the genus of substance, since "being" primarily refers to the category of substance. It is the task of metaphysics to study substance in its prime instance; that is, separate substance, including God.[60] It must be noted that the question of whether the physicist or the metaphysician is able to prove God's existence is an important divisive element in Averroes's and Avicenna's discussion. However, this question becomes of less importance for Buridan's solution to the problem of the subject-matter of metaphysics, due to his specific view of the subject-matter of a science.

The most striking characteristic of the subject-matter of a science according to Buridan is that it is understood as a term, or, more specifically, a mental term.[61] To find the subject-term of a science, Buridan argues, one has to find the term that satisfies three conditions: it must be the most common genus (*genus communissimum*) found in a science, which does not exceed the boundaries of that science; it must function as a subject in relation to the first principles and properties in that science; and, finally, everything considered in a science must be somehow related

[60] See Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?*, pp. 152–54; Martin Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters) 91 (Leiden-Boston, 2007), pp. 94–99. See also Wippel, "Essence and Existence," p. 387; and Wood, "The Subject," p. 611.

[61] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 15va: "Metaphysice subiectum proprium est unus terminus et proprie loquendo est terminus mentalis, quoniam termini vocales et scripti non dicuntur termini nisi per attributionem ad mentales." An explanation is found in the sixth book of his questions on the *Metaphysics*, where Buridan examines whether speculative science can be properly divided into mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. Buridan argues that the division of speculative sciences is either based on things outside the mind, or on a ratio or concept inside the mind. Now, it cannot be based on things outside the mind, the *res considerata* of science, for several things are considered by more than one science. Hence, it has to spring from a concept inside the mind. After Buridan ruled out the conclusions and (complex) principles of the respective sciences as bearers of this distinction, he concludes that the distinction of the speculative sciences is taken from some non-complex principles, i.e., mental terms. These terms are the subject-matters, or subject-terms, of the speculative sciences. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 2, fol. 33va–b. See also King, "Jean Buridan's Philosophy of Science," pp. 113–15.

to it, viz., as its parts, principles, attributes, parts of attributes, etc.[62] In metaphysics, the term that meets all these conditions is "being."[63]

Unfortunately, Buridan's view on the subject-matter of metaphysics seems to contain a contradiction. As was said, Buridan argues that the unity of metaphysics was safeguarded because all parts of metaphysics are ultimately related to the first being that causes their being, and he says elsewhere that a science has its unity from its subject-matter.[64] However, the first being which causes the being of all other things is God, whereas the subject-matter of metaphysics is the term "being." The contradiction is acknowledged implicitly in the *rationes* of the question of whether being is the proper subject-matter of metaphysics. The objection Buridan has to refute is that God must be the subject-matter of metaphysics. The major of the argument states that the proper subject of a science is that to which everything considered in this science has attribution and can be reduced to. The minor states that all things have an attribution to God as to the cause on which their being depends.[65] However, Buridan explains that the attribution to the proper subject of the science is not the attribution of things to their cause, but the attribution of subjective parts to their genus or of proper attributes to their subject. All things are not attributed to God in the way that terms or propositions are attributed to one first term, because God, taken as the cause on which all being depends, is not a term.[66] Buridan admits that the genus of separate substances could be

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[62] *Ibid.*, fol. 15rb: "Sed tunc videndum est quomodo poterimus tale subiectum assignare. Ad hoc dicendum est quod nos debemus considerare communissimum genus quod tamen non transcendat metam illius scientie et quod consideratur per modum subiecti respectu primarum principalium passionum in illa scientia consideratarum. Et tunc illud genus diceretur subiectum proprium et adequatum in illa scientia, quia sic de illo et de eius partibus et passionibus et de aliis ad ipsum attributionem habentibus consideratur in illa scientia et de nullis aliis, nec adhuc de illis considerabitur in illa scientia nisi secundum illas rationes secundum quas dicuntur habere attributionem ad aliud primum subiectum."

[63] *Ibid.*, fol. 16ra: "Iste terminus 'ens' est subiectum proprium ipsius metaphysice, quia sicut in alia questione dicebatur, in qualibet scientia subiectum proprium debet assignari genus communissimum inter omnia que non transcendunt metas scientie consideratum per modum subiecti respectu primarum et principalium passionum in illa scientia consideratarum. Modo, sic se habet illud genus ens in metaphysicam."

[64] See above, notes 55 and 56.

[65] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 16ra: "Illud debet poni subiectum proprium alicuius scientie ad quod omnia in ea considerata habent attributionem et reductionem, ut dicebatur in alia questione. Modo, omnia considerata in metaphysica habent attributionem ad ipsum Deum et finaliter in ipsum reducuntur; igitur."

[66] *Ibid.*, fol. 16rb–va: "Omnia bene habent attributionem ad ipsum Deum tanquam ad illam causam a qua dependent in esse suo. Sed alia debet esse attributio ad subiectum proprium scientie, scilicet attributio partium subiectivarum ad suum genus vel passionum ad

subject-matter in a "more noble part of metaphysics," but he does not elaborate on this idea.[67]

According to Buridan, all that philosophers plead for concerning the subject-matter of a science is met in his subject-term: the subject-term is the first known in a science, it guarantees the science's unity, and its *quid est* and *quia est* are presupposed.[68] Taking terms as the subject-matter of science, Buridan thus overcomes many of the traditional problems regarding the subject-matter of metaphysics. One of these problems is that, since there is nothing extraneous to being, it has neither distinguishable proper attributes, nor principles. According to Buridan, the term "being" has properties, viz., the connotative terms that are exchangeable with it, such as "one," "same," "different," and also disjunctively: "cause or caused," "prior or posterior," "act or potency," and so on.[69] Since these terms are connotative, whereas "being" is taken as a simple concept, they are not synonymous with "being." The term "one," for example, connotes the absence of division.[70] However, these terms are interchangeable with "being" according to their signification, since they are predicable of exactly the same

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suum subiectum. Et ideo sicut termini vel propositiones attribuuntur res ad ipsum Deum, quia Deus non est terminus."

[67] *Ibid.*, fol. 16rb: "Et concedendum est quod in aliqua parte nobiliori metaphysice potest poni subiectum hoc genus, scilicet substantia separata." In the early 14th century, Nicholas Bonetus excluded "natural theology" from his metaphysics, and Franciscus de Marchia distinguished a general and a special metaphysics, of which the latter studied divine being. However, this path was not followed by later 14th-century authors. See Sabine Folger-Fonfara, "Franziskus von Marchia: Die erste Unterscheidung einer allgemeinen und einer besonderen Metaphysik," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), 461–513. See also William O. Duba's chapter in this volume.

[68] See Buridan, *Qu. Met., IV*, q. 4, fol. 15rb–va: "Sciendum est quod tenendo istam determinationem omnia verba philosophorum qui locuti sunt de subiectis scientiarum apparebunt clara. Solet enim dici quod in unaquaque scientia subiectum debet esse primo notum. Et hoc rationabile est, cum in scientia nihil consideretur nisi secundum attributionem ad ipsum subiectum. [...] Postea dicitur quod secundum unitatem subiecti scientias dicitur una. [...] Similiter de tali subiecto, ut ponitur primo *Posteriorum*, oportet presupponere quid est et quod dicitur per nomen. Et etiam supponitur quia est, quia illud statuitur in scientia tanquam primum fundamentum."

[69] *Ibid.*, fol. 16rb: "Isti termini 'ens' [...] sunt passiones proprie, scilicet termini connotativi cum eo convertibiles, ut isti termini 'unum,' 'idem,' 'diversum' et etiam sub disiunctione 'causa vel causatum,' 'prius vel posterius,' 'actus vel potentia,' et sic de multis aliis."

[70] *Ibid.*, q. 7, fol. 18ra: "Iste termimus 'unum' est terminus connotativus, connotat enim carentiam divisionis."

things.[71] None of these terms are distinct from being, but they are distinct from the term "being."[72]

Furthermore, even though it was fundamental in the metaphysical tradition prior to Buridan, the question of whether metaphysics or physics should prove God's being loses its importance for the discussion of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Buridan argues that it suffices for a demonstration to presuppose its subject's nominal definition (*quid nominis*). For example, it is enough to know that the nominal definition of a vacuum is "a place filled with no body" to have a demonstration of a vacuum, viz., "if a vacuum exists, it is a place filled with no body," or, "a place filled with no body does not exist, therefore a vacuum does not exist."[73] Similarly, a science has to presuppose only the nominal definition of its subject-matter, i.e., a science has to presuppose only the signification of the term that is assigned to it as subject-matter, but not its existence in the "real world."[74]

Finally, one objection to the view that terms serve as subject-matter of a science has to be dealt with: since a mental term exists only in the

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[71] *Ibid.*, fols. 17vb–18va: "Utrum isti termini 'ens' et 'unum' convertantur quantum ad significationes suas.' See also King, "Jean Buridan," p. 400. An exception is the term "something" (*aliquid*), which is also interchangeable with "being," and which is taken as a simple concept. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 7, fol. 18ra: "Iste enim terminus 'ens' vel 'aliquid' accipitur secundum conceptum simplicem, scilicet absolutum a connotatione."

[72] *Ibid.*, q. 4, fol. 16rb: "Multe sunt passiones istius termini 'ens.' Non tamen distincte ab ente, sed distincte ab illo termino 'ens.'" According to Buridan, the term "being" also has parts, although these are not integral, but subjective parts, i.e., the ten categories. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 16rb: "Licet istius termini 'ens' non essent partes integrales apud mentem, tamen sunt eius partes subiective, scilicet decem predicamenta."

[73] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, 4, fol. 11va: "Item oportet semper supponere quid nominis. Et potest nomen describi quantum ad quid nominis si aliquis ignoraverit. Hoc totum apparet per Aristotelem in quarto *huius*, unde si dicas 'quid intelligatur per vacuum,' respondebo quod illud intelligo per hoc nomen 'vacuum' sicut per hanc orationem 'locus non repletus corpore.' Et sic ego concedam ad bonum sensum istam propositionem 'vacuum est locus non repletus corpore' et illa potero uti in demonstratione, non tamen ad sensum proprium, quia falsa est, sed ad sensum hypotheticum: si vacuum est, ipsum est locus non repletus corpore, et econverso, si locus non repletus corpore est, ipse est vacuum, vel etiam ad alium sensum, scilicet, vacuum est locus non repletus corpore, id est, hoc nomen 'vacuum' significat penitus idem vel eadem sicut ista oratio 'locus non repletus corpore,' et tunc ex tali propositione que non supponit vacuum esse, si posset demonstrari quod aliquis locus est et non repletus corpore, concluderetur demonstrative quod vacuum est."

[74] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 16rb: "Quando etiam dicitur quod de subiecto oportet precognoscere quid est, hoc non debet intelligi quod oporteat precognoscere diffinitionem, sed oportet precognoscere quid nominis, scilicet significationem subiecti." The claim that a science cannot demonstrate its subject was already abandoned by Scotus, who stated that a science needs to presuppose only the concept of its subject and that it can demonstrate its existence from its effects. See Wood, "The Subject," pp. 618–19. For Buridan's answer to the question of whether physics or metaphysics should proof God's existence, see below, section 3.3.

mind (in fact: in several minds) the unity of science seems, once more, at stake. This does not seem to bother Buridan, for he answers: "and when it is asked where this term is found, in your mind or in mine, it is answered that you have your metaphysics in your mind, and I have mine in my mind."[75]

2.2. *First Philosophy*

Now that it is clear what the subject-matter of Buridan's metaphysics is, its place within the spectrum of philosophical disciplines must be considered. In the proemium of the first book of his questions on the *Metaphysics*, Buridan holds a rather traditional view on the place of metaphysics among the other sciences. According to Buridan, Aristotle proved this science to be most admirable (*admirabilissima*), most certain (*certissima*), most free (*liberrima*), most divine (*maxime divina*), and most honorable (*maxime honoranda*). Therefore, although every other science is more necessary than metaphysics, none of them is more worthy.[76] Buridan fully agrees with Aristotle, showing his awareness of the spirit of his day by the subordinate clause: "although many are opposed to him as regards this question."[77] According to Buridan, many philosophers think that of the five intellectual virtues, i.e., wisdom (*sapientia*), knowledge (*scientia*), understanding (*intellectum*), prudence (*prudentia*), and art (*ars*), it is prudence that is the main virtue.[78] Buridan obviously disagrees, maintaining the traditional view that wisdom, and therefore metaphysics, is the highest intellectual virtue.[79]

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[75] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 15va: "Et quando queritur ubi est ille terminus, utrum in mente tua an in mente mea, respondetur quod tu habes metaphysicam tuam in mente tua, et ego meam in mente mea."

[76] *Ibid.*, I, q. 1, fol. 3ra: "Quia Aristoteles probat in textu quod metaphysica, quam ipse vocat sapientiam, est admirabilissima, est certissima, est liberrima, est maxime divina, et maxime honoranda; et tandem concludit: 'necessariores quidem ipsa omnes, dignior vero nulla.' Et idem habetur sexto *Ethicorum*, ubi dicit quod sapientia est intellectus et scientia, et tanquam caput habens scientiam honoribilissimorum, et quia Aristoteles sic eam commendat, non indigemus eam ulterius commendare, sed querere an ista scientia sit isto modo commendenda." Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, A 2, 983a1–11.

[77] *Ibid.*, fol. 3rb: "Breviter respondeo ad questionem <utrum metaphysica sit omnium scientiarum dignissima et optima> cum Aristotele, quamvis multi in ista questione sunt ipsi contrarii."

[78] *Ibid.*, fol. 3rb: "Et nulli negant sapientiam, excepta prudentia, esse nobiliorem et meliorem; sed multi dicunt prudentiam esse nobiliorem et meliorem, quia prudentia considerat de actibus humanis quomodo bene possunt fieri."

[79] *Ibid.*, fol. 3rb: "Istis notatis, dico quod metaphysica sive sapientia est omnium virtutum intellectualium optima et nobilissima." However, Buridan explicitly excludes the

According to Buridan, speculative or theoretical sciences, i.e., sciences that are sought for their own sake (*quesita gratia sui ipsius*) are more perfect than practical sciences; i.e., sciences that are sought because of something else. To prove his point, Buridan compares our operations with those of God, which can be distinguished as speculative operations—to understand and to contemplate himself—and practical operations—to govern the world and to diffuse his grace. Buridan argues that God is absolutely (*simpliciter*) good through his speculative operations, whereas his practical operations are only good in relation to creatures. In the same way, man can be said to be better in an absolute sense through contemplation of God and heavenly things, which are treated by metaphysics, rather than through human actions related to our bodies and other human beings, which belongs to the realm of prudence.[80] According to Buridan, prudence and wisdom are related to each other as a servant is to his master: prudence tempers the passions in order to prepare the soul for wisdom, like a servant prepares the house for his lord.[81]

Buridan further discusses the status of metaphysics by determining its relation to the other speculative sciences, in particular physics.[82] The priority of metaphysics over physics is explained by Buridan with help of the (wrong) etymology of the name "metaphysics." He believes that this name is derived from "*meta*," which is "beyond," and "*physis*," which is "nature." Therefore, the nominal definition of "metaphysics" is "transcending natural

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intellectual habits given to us by God supernaturally, since these were neither mentioned by Aristotle himself, nor did the task of dicussing them belong to the Faculty of Arts. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.,* I, q. 1, fol. 3rb: "Tamen excipio habitus intellectuales nobis a Deo supernaturaliter infusos, quia de his non intromisit se Aristoteles nec pertinet de illis disputare ad istam facultatem."

[80] *Ibid.*, fol. 3rb: "Consideremus Deum, cuius duo sunt opera: unum speculativum, scilicet intelligere et contemplari seipsum; alterum practicum, scilicet mundum gubernare et bonitatem suam largiri et distribuere. Modo, constat quod Deus multo magis potest argui optimus ex illo opere speculativo quam ex illo opere practico, quoniam ex illo opere speculativo est simpliciter bonus et perfectus nullo alio indigens; sed ex opere practico arguitur bonus non simpliciter sed nobis, quia posito quod nihil nobis tribueret, esset eque bonus sicut si nobis celestia partiretur, saltem in seipso. Igitur per simile homo dicitur simpliciter melior et nobilior ex contemplatione Dei et supercelestium, que est per metaphysicam, quam ex actibus humanis ad corpora nostra vel ad vicinos, de quibus est prudentia."

[81] *Ibid.*, fol. 3rb: "Prudentia respectu sapientie est sicut ministra parans locum sapientie temporando passiones appetitus, sicut servus parat domum gratia domini."

[82] *Ibid.*, q. 2, fol. 4ra: "Speculative principaliores sunt practicis, ut habetur in isto proemio. Principales autem scientie speculative non sunt nisi tres, ut patet octavo *huius*, scilicet metaphysica, physica et mathematica." See also Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 2, fols. 33va–34rb. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Buridan does not consider the relationship between metaphysics and mathematics in detail.

things," and the nominal definition of "the science of metaphysics" is "the science that transcends natural things and natural science."[83] Another argument Buridan deals with holds that metaphysics is called "first philosophy" because it studies the first causes of things.[84] However, physics, just like metaphysics, considers the first causes of being, for it considers the first mover, which is God.[85] Buridan solves this apparent contradiction claiming that physics indeed considers the first causes, but only in a posterior way, i.e., in respect to motion, whereas metaphysics considers them in a prior way, i.e., essentially. Even though both metaphysics and physics study the first causes, metaphysics precedes physics as regards the manner of consideration.[86]

Here we arrive at an important difference between metaphysics and the other sciences: metaphysics is the only science that considers *simplicter* the essences (*quiditates*) of being. For Buridan, metaphysics becomes a science of quiddities.[87] According to him, a geometer does not have true knowledge of what a triangle is, for he does not worry about questions like whether a figure is distinct from a magnitude, or a magnitude from a substance. Nor has a physicist true knowledge of what a man is, or what a donkey is, for even though he can describe such things by means

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[83] *Ibid.*, IV, q. 3, fol. 14va: "Et apparet etiam quod physica non est principalior quam metaphysica. Hoc enim apparet per quid nominis huius nominis 'metaphysica.' 'Metaphysica' enim dividitur a 'meta,' quod est 'trans,' et 'physis,' quod est 'natura,' quasi transcendens naturas, et subauditur 'scientia' quasi 'scientia transcendens naturas et scientias naturales." Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, Prol., in: Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), p. 9, n. 8: "Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a 'meta,' quod est 'trans' et 'ycos' 'scientia,' quasi transcendens scientia, *quia est de transcendentibus*" (italics are mine).

[84] *Ibid.*, I, q. 4, fol. 5ra: "Si metaphysica debeat dici prima philosophia [. . .] hoc est quia [. . .] ipsa considerat de primis causis entium."

[85] *Ibid.*, fol. 5ra: "Nec etiam <metaphysica debet dici prima> propter hoc quod considerat de omnibus causis primis entium, quia etiam sic physica diceretur prima omnium, quoniam ipsa considerat de primo motore et rebus mobilibus ut celo, sicut patet octavo *Physicorum.* Modo, primus motor est ipse Deus, qui omnium est primum principium."

[86] *Ibid.*, fol. 5va: "Dico quod verum est <quod physica etiam considerat primas causas>, sed hoc non est modo quiditativo, immo solum respective ad motum. Et iste modus considerandi est posterior, quia est respectivus ad posteriora. Metaphysicus autem modo priori, scilicet quiditative considerat Deus et intelligentias."

[87] *Ibid.*, I, q. 3, fol. 4vb: "Non est verum quod ipsa <metaphysica> debeat sistere in illis communissimis rationibus entium. Immo ad ipsam pertinet descendere ad specialissimas rationes quiditativas omnium entium. Nulla enim scientia preter metaphysicam habet considerare de quiditate rei simpliciter, sive in generali, sive in speciali, ut habetur sexto *huius*," and *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 1, fol. 33ra: "Metaphysica considerat entia non soli in generali, sed etiam in speciali." See also Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, p. 348.

of their movement or some other operation, he cannot say whether a human being, e.g., Socrates, is an animal by one substantial form, a man by another, and Socrates by yet another.[88]

Buridan further explains this view in the sixth book of his questions on the *Metaphysics*, where he asks whether metaphysics is the only science that considers the quiddities of things. Since Buridan is of the opinion that the essence of a thing is nothing but the thing itself, he has to meet the objection that every special science considers quiddities, since every special science consider things.[89] For example, physics considers the prime mover, i.e., God, and since the quiddity of God is nothing but God himself, physics can be said to consider God's quiddity.[90] Buridan admits that physics, as well as other special sciences, considers quiddities, since quiddities are nothing but things. However, his point is that they do not consider them *as* quiddities, but in light of another aspect. In case of physics, things are studied as subject to change. Only metaphysics considers things *as* quiddities.[91]

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[88] *Ibid.*, I, q. 3, fol. 4vb: "Geometer non habet simpliciter scire que res est triangulus. Non enim curat utrum figura sit res distincta a magnitudine nec utrum magnitudo sit res distincta a substantia. Similiter physicus non habet scire simpliciter quid est homo vel quid est asinus, licet possit talia describere per aliquos motus vel per aliquas operationes. Physicus enim non habet scire utrum homo, videlicet Sortes, est per aliam formam substantialem homo et per aliam animal et per aliam Sortes, an utrum per eamdem, ideo nescit simpliciter quid est homo." The question of whether one subject can have many (subordinate) substantial forms is considered in the seventh book of Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, but also in his commentary on *De Anima*. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 14, fol. 49ra–50rb; and Buridan, *Quaestiones in De anima*, II, q. 4. For an elaborated discussion on Buridan's viewpoints of the unicity of substantial form in his *De Anima*, see Sander W. de Boer, *Soul and Body in the Middle Ages. A Study of the Transformations of the "scientia de anima," c. 1260–c. 1360* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen, 2011).

[89] See *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 8, fol. 18vb: "Et per essentiam in proposito intelligo ipsam rem. [...] Et ego dico cum illo Linconiensi et Commentatore quod in unaquaque re est idem illa res et eam esse, ita quod non differt essentia ab esse, nec esse ab essentia." For an outline of Buridan's view on being and essence, see below, section 3.1.

[90] *Ibid.*, VI, q. 1, fol. 33ra: "Similiter quiditas Dei non est aliud quam Deus. Et tamen Deum considerat naturalis, quia considerat primum motorem, qui est Deus. Igitur naturalis considerat quiditates rerum."

[91] In the text, Buridan solves this question in a more technical way, with an appeal to a special characteristic of cognitive verbs like "to know" or "to consider." A predicate placed after such verb (*a parte post positum*) names the ratio by which this predicate is grasped. Properly speaking physics considers quiddities only if the predicate "quiddities" precedes the verb "to consider" in the proposition "physics considers quiddities," i.e., if is said "*quiditates considerat*," and not "*considerat quiditates*." See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 1, fol. 33rb: "Nulla scientia <specialis> considerat quiditates rerum. Differt enim dicere 'quiditates considerat' et 'considerat quiditates,' quia dictum fuit alias quod talia verba 'scio,' 'cognosco,' 'considero,' etc., faciunt predicatum a parte post positum appellare rationem a

Since metaphysics is the only science that considers quiddities as quiddities, it is not only the first but also the most certain science. For all other sciences receive the evidence of their principles from metaphysics, i.e., they have their principles *ex suppositione*, until they strengthen them with evidence from the study of metaphysics.[92] Moreover, as regards perfect knowledge of its conclusions, metaphysics is also the easiest science; not because it is easiest to learn but because metaphysical knowledge is needed in order to understand the principles of other (speculative) sciences and to thus have perfect knowledge of their conclusions.[93] Even though metaphysics is studied primarily for its own sake, it is also a grounding science that proves or confirms the principles of all other philosophical sciences.

Buridan's view on the order of sciences attests to common sense. Even though metaphysics is truly first philosophy, the other philosophical disciplines can be easily practiced without any knowledge of metaphysics. If someone were to ask the physicist or mathematician for the ultimate evidence of their principles, they can point to the metaphysician, who is able to provide this proof. They do not have to search for the indubitable principles of metaphysics themselves in order to be able to practice physics or mathematics. Therefore, the other philosophical disciplines are not, strictly speaking, subordinated to their grounding discipline, i.e., metaphysics.[94]

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qua sumitur tale predicatum. Et ideo de virtute sermonis sequitur 'considerat quiditates,' igitur, considerat eas secundum rationes secundum quas dicuntur quiditates. Sed sic non sequitur si dico 'quiditates considerat.' Et sic cum iam dictum sit in tertia conclusione quod nulla scientia specialis considerat quiditates secundum illas rationes secundum quas dicuntur quiditates, sequitur simpliter quod nulla considerat quiditates. Et tunc infero ultimam conclusionem quod sola metaphysica considerat quiditates rerum."

92 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 4, fol. 5rb: "Omnes alie scientie eo modo quo addiscuntur ante metaphysicam recipiunt multa principia bene dubitabilia et obscura nisi per metaphysicam explanantur." See also I, q. 3, fol. 4vb: "Tertio modo certitudo scientie attenditur ex evidentia principiorum. Et sic sine dubio metaphysica est certissima, quia ipsi sunt propria prima principia communissima et evidentissima per que principia aliarum scientiarum aliquando explanantur et confirmantur. [...] Et sic tales scientie que primo addiscuntur non habent simpliciter evidentiam suarum conclusionum, sed solum ex suppositione."

93 *Ibid.*, fol. 5rb: "Sic enim ego pono quod alie scientie secundum quod primitus solent adipisci sunt bene faciliores quam ipsa metaphysica, tamen secundum perfectam scientiam suarum conclusionum scientie ipse sunt multo difficiliores quam ipsa metaphysica et ipsa metaphysica quantum ad scientiam conclusionum simpliter perfectam inter ceteras scientias est facillima. [...] Et si prius oportet habere metaphysicam, sequitur quod facilius est eam habere quam principia aliarum scientiarum facere evidentia. Ideo facilius est habere metaphysicam quam perfectam scientiam aliarum conclusionum in aliis scientiis."

94 See Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 142.

2.3. Metaphysics' *Relation to Theology*

In order to determine the status of metaphysics, the relationship between metaphysics and theology must also be considered. Aristotle himself called metaphysics "divine science" and "theology," and, moreover, Buridan interprets the name "metaphysics" as "the science that transcends natural things and natural science," suggesting that metaphysics is a class in its own, between science and theology.[95] But metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline at the faculty of arts, was institutionally distinguished from theology, which belonged to a higher faculty.[96] Traditionally, metaphysics contained many questions that touched upon the authority of the higher faculty of theology, e.g., the question of whether God is omnipotent, of whether he can create *ex nihilo*, of how his simplicity is safeguarded in view of his trinity, etc. However, Buridan does not seem to feel the urge to transgress his authority by addressing questions that belonged to theology. This is clear from the fact that he frequently omits a question, or a certain part of a question, of which it is required that it is not treated by "this faculty," the faculty of arts.[97] It has been argued sufficiently by others that these remarks show not an excessive case of (ecclesiastic) censure on the artist's academic freedom but, rather, a case of designation of teaching authority between various academic disciplines.[98]

Buridan seldom raises the question of the relationship between metaphysics and theology explicitly. His scarce remarks on this topic in the first book of his commentary on the *Metaphysics* suggest that, for him, the priority of theology over all other sciences was beyond doubt:

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[95] Aristotle, *Met.*, A 2, 983a4–9, and E 1, 1026a18.

[96] Arts masters in Buridan's day had to take a vow that they would not dispute purely theological questions and that, if they had to dispute a question that touched upon both faith and philosophy, they would conclude in favor of faith. See Mary M. McLaughlin, *Intellectual Freedom and its Limitations in the University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1977), pp. 127–28. See also Edith D. Sylla, "*Ideo quasi mendicare oportet intellectum humanum.* The Role of Theology in John Buridan's Natural Philosophy," in: *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 221–47, esp. 221–22; and Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," pp. 247–64.

[97] See, e.g., Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 3, fol. 66va: "Alie rationes fierent que nullo modo spectant ad istam facultatem, scilicet una de Trinitate quomodo in tribus adinvicem vere diversis potest salvari pura simplicitas sine compositione. Alia est de assumptione humanitatis, quia statim posset alicui apparere quod si Deus non sit ex pluribus partibus compositus, tamen est alteri componibilis et unibilis. Quibus tamen non obstantibus, pura fide credendum est quod ipse simpliciter est simplex nec ex partibus compositus nec alteri componibilis. Sed ista dimitto, quia non licet de eis in ista facultate disputare."

[98] See Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200–1400* (Philadelphia, 1998), p. xii. See also Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 140.

> When it is argued that metaphysics is not the most principal [science], I say that this is true if we compare it to theology, which is founded upon articles of faith. But leaving theology aside, it is the most principal of all the other sciences.[99]

Buridan also explains why theology was left aside:

> It should be noted that we are not comparing here metaphysics to theology, which proceeds from beliefs that are not known, because although these beliefs are not known *per se* and most evident, we hold without doubt that theology is the more principal discipline and that it is wisdom most properly speaking. In this question, however, we are merely asking about intellectual habits based on human reason, discovered by the process of reasoning, which are deduced from what is evident to us. For it is in this sense that Aristotle calls metaphysics "theology" and the "divine science." Accordingly, metaphysics differs from theology in the fact that although each considers God and those things that pertain to divinity, metaphysics only considers them as regards what can be proved and implied, or inductively inferred, by demonstrative reason. But theology has for its principles articles, which are believed quite apart from their evidentness, and further considers whatever can be deduced from articles of this kind. And in the present question this theology is dismissed.[100]

Metaphysics and theology are set apart not by their subjects (*res considerata*) but by their respective methods. Both metaphysics and theology consider God and the things that belong to divinity. However, theology, in contrast to metaphysics, springs from principles that are not known *per se*, nor evident: the articles of faith. In other words, it is a revealed science. Metaphysics, in contrast, considers God and the first principles insofar as they can be proved from rational demonstration. Although Aristotle

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[99] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 3, fol. 4rb: "Quando arguitur quod ipsa <metaphysica> non est principalissima, dico quod verum est si comparetur ad theologiam fundamentam super articulos fidei. Sed illa circumscripta, ipsa est omnium aliarum scientiarum principalissima" (translation from Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 143, slightly modified).

[100] *Ibid.*, I, q. 2, fol. 4ra–b: "Notandum est etiam quod hic non comparamus metaphysicam ad theologiam, que procedit ex ignotis creditis, quamvis non per se notis nec evidentissimis, quia sine dubio illam theologiam tenemus principaliorem et maxime proprie dictam sapientiam. Sed nos in proposito non querimus nisi de habitibus intellectualibus ex humana ratione et processu ratiocinativo inventis et ex nobis evidentibus deductis. Sic enim Aristoteles metaphysicam vocat theologiam et scientiam divinam. Unde in hoc differt metaphysica a theologia quod cum utraque consideret de Deo et de divinis, metaphysica non considerat de Deo et de divinis nisi ea que possunt probari et ratione demonstrativa concludi seu induci; theologia vero habet pro principiis articulos creditos absque evidentia et considerat ultra quecumque ex huiusmodi articulis possunt deduci. Et istam theologiam dimittimus ad presens" (translation from Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 141, slightly modified).

called metaphysics "theology" and "divine science," he had in mind this metaphysical method.

The difference between the method of theology and science must be further explained.[101] According to Buridan, grasping the truth with certainty not only requires "firmness of truth," which is "firmness of a true proposition" (for by "truth" it is meant a propositional truth), but also "firmness of assent." In other words, in order to say that man has a capability for grasping truth, not only the truth itself but also man's assent to truth must be firm, which means that he adheres to truth without fear for the opposite.[102] Theology requires a different kind of "firmness of assent" than does philosophy. The assent to theological truth, the principles of Catholic faith, proceeds from the will in the same way that heretics assent to their false opinions. This kind of "firmness of assent" does not proceed from evidence, nor from any natural awareness.[103] At the same time, in order to assent to philosophical truth, the principles of (natural) science, evidentness is required.[104] Both theology and science are concerned with truth, but only philosophical truth is based on evidence. Theological truths can be grasped with certainty, but without evidence.[105] As Schönberger

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[101] Buridan does so in his question on man's capability of grasping the truth about the things in the outside world (*utrum de rebus sit nobis possibilis comprehensio veritatis*). I will not consider Buridan's ideas about the acquisition of (scientific) knowledge here in detail. For this topic, see, among others, Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, "John Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt on Causality and Induction," *Traditio* 43 (1987), pp. 238–55; Lambert M. de Rijk, "John Buridan on Man's Capability of Grasping the Truth," in: Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg & Andreas Speer, eds., Scientia *und* Ars *im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter* (Berlin-New York, 1994), pp. 281–303; and Jack A. Zupko, "On Certitude," in: *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 165–83.

[102] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 8vb: "Sed rationes que fiebant faciunt dubitare utrum talis assensus veritatis sit nobis possibilis cum certitudine. Et tunc oportet notare quod ad assentiendum veritati cum certitudine requiritur firmitas veritatis firmitas assensus. [...] Sed firmitas assensus est quo nos adheremus et assentimus propositioni absque formidine ad oppositum."

[103] *Ibid.*, fol. 8vb: "Et hoc <firmitas assensus> potest esse tripliciter: uno modo ex voluntate sine apparentia naturali. Et sic Christiani assentiunt et adherent firmiter articulis fidei Catholice et etiam aliqui heretici adherent suis falsis opinionibus in tantum quod volunt prius mori quam eas negare."

[104] *Ibid.*, fols. 8vb–9ra: "Tertio modo firmitas assensus provenit ex evidentia. Et vocatur evidentia propositionis simpliciter quando ex natura sensus vel intellectus homo cogitur sine necessitate ad assentiendum propositioni, ita quod non potest dissentire. [...] Sed alio modo accipitur evidentia secundum quid sive ex suppositione ut prius dicebatur quod observaretur in entibus communis cursus nature. [...] Et huiusmodi evidentia sufficit ad principia et conclusiones scientie naturalis." Buridan speaks primarily about natural science. However, methodically, metaphysics corresponds to the natural sciences.

[105] Of course, this reasoning does not apply to the heretics, for in their case, "firmness of assent" is not accompanied with "firmness of truth."

puts it: philosophy is the highest form of knowledge, but knowledge is not the only form of truth.[106]

2.4. *The Method of* Metaphysics*: Logic and Semantics*

To conclude this section on Buridan's concept of metaphysics, let us consider the method of metaphysics more thoroughly. In his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Buridan claims logic to be the *scientia instrumentalis* of the theoretical sciences.[107] But what is the relationship between metaphysics and logic? Zupko writes that medieval philosophers, in contrast to modern ones, did not consider logic as a "self-contained theory of inferences" or a "freestanding discipline." Rather, it was a tool kit, a method in need of practical application. The value of logic lies in its relationship to other disciplines.[108] Being asked where the science of dialectic was taught, Buridan answers that it was taught "in the books of the *Metaphysics* as far as metaphysical conclusions are concerned, in the books of the *Posterior Analytics* as far as the conclusions of the science of posterior analytics are concerned, in the books of the *Physics* as far as physical conclusions are concerned, and so on for the other sciences."[109]

According to Buridan, the acquisition and justification of knowledge is determined by language and the structure of propositions, since knowledge is a kind of assent, having terms and propositions as its immediate object.[110] Although metaphysical terms ultimately signify things in the real

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[106] See Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, p. 307.

[107] See Buridan, *Quaestiones Ethicorum*, Proeom. (Paris, 1513; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1968), fol. 2ra.

[108] See Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. 135.

[109] Translation from Zupko, *John Buridan*, p. xvii (slightly modified). See also Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 4, fol. 15va: "Et si queratur ubi traditur illa scientia dialectica, dicitur quod in libro *Metaphysice* quantum ad conclusiones metaphysicales, et in libro *Posteriorum* quantum ad conclusiones posterioristicas, et in libro *Physicorum* quantum ad conclusiones physicales, et sic de aliis."

[110] For instance, in the question of whether accidental being (*ens secundum accidens*) and being as truth (*ens ut verum*) must be excluded from metaphysical consideration, Buridan concludes that no science considers accidental being, since accidental being is nothing but a contingent proposition, and such a proposition cannot be demonstrated. Yet, the *term* "accidental being" belongs to metaphysics, since demonstrable conclusions are formed with this term. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 12, fol. 41va: "Primo dicam de ente per accidens quod ipsum est propositio contingens ut in paucioribus sicut ante dicebatur. Et ideo sequitur ista conclusio quod nulla ars vel scientia considerat de ente per accidens tanquam de conclusioni demonstrabili, eo quod talis propositio contingens non potest esse demonstrationis conclusio. [. . .] Tertia conclusio est quod in speciali iste terminus 'ens per accidens' pertinet ad metaphysicum quantum ad conclusiones demonstrabiles que de illo termino formantur."

world, knowledge of non-propositional things, such as stones and man, is always mediated by knowledge of corresponding propositions.[111] As a consequence, logic and semantics are regarded not as inferior sciences, which can be summoned or left aside at will, but, rather, as playing a substantial role in metaphysics. The application of semantics to metaphysical questions was not a noncommittal choice but a necessary step in order to achieve metaphysical knowledge.

Buridan uses logic and semantics to solve some traditional metaphysical problems in an untraditional way. He does so by explaining these problems semantically; that is, by clearing up how language is used. Of major importance to Buridan is the distinction between the level of terms and the level of (extramental) things signified by these terms. An example is found in Buridan's treatment of the problem of individuation, which is rephrased as a question about the supposition of terms.[112] The individuation of species is not said to be with respect to the things signified, i.e., putting aside concepts. According to Buridan, universals have no independent ontological status, for, in reality, man is nothing other than, e.g., Socrates or Plato. But if species only exist as singulars, then they are not in need of individuation. Therefore, individuation has to be understood differently, with respect to concepts and terms that signify things. The traditional metaphysical question of individuation is thus reinterpreted as a semantic question of restriction of terms.[113] However, even though

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[111] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 3, fol. 34va: "Respondendum est faciliter quod duplex est scientia de aliquo. Uno modo est scientia de aliquo tamquam de conclusione demonstrata vel demonstrabili nos enim loquimur hic de scientia demonstrativa. Alio modo est scientia de aliquo tamquam de re significata per aliquem terminum conclusionis. Primo modo non est scientia de terminis incomplexis nec etiam de rebus extra animam, ut de aere vel de terra vel de lapidibus, etc. Immo illo primo modo solum est scientia de propositionibus. [. . .] Et hoc totum patet primo *Posterioribus.* Secundo modo est bene scientia de omnibus rebus mundi, immo etiam de preteritis que iam corrupta sunt et de futuris que nondum sunt, quia omnis res de mundo significatur per conclusiones multas vel per terminos multarum conclusionum demonstrabilium, sicut per istos terminos 'ens,' 'unum,' 'idem,' 'diversum,' 'causa,' 'causatum,' et sic de valde multis aliis. Et tamen ex illis formantur multe conclusiones demonstrabiles"; and Buridan, *Summulae de Demonstrationibus*, VIII, 4, 3, ed. Lambert M. de Rijk (Groningen-Haren, 2001), p. 108. See also Zupko, "John Buridan," p. 272; and Paloma Perez-Ilzarbe, "*Complexio, enunciatio, assensus*. The Role of Propositions in Knowledge according to John Buridan," in: Alfonso Maierù & Luisa Valente, eds., *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language*. Acts of the 14. European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics: Rome, June 11–15, 2002 (Florence, 2004), pp. 401–13, esp. 402–03.

[112] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 17, fol. 52rb–vb: "Utrum in substantiis species contrahitur ad individuum per differentiam substantialem an accidentalem."

[113] *Ibid.*, fol. 52va: "Ista contractio non est quantum ad res significatas circumscriptis conceptibus, quia ita singulariter existit homo vel animal aut corpus aut substantia etc.,

the logical and semantic method is an intrinsic characteristic of Buridan's metaphysics, he regards it as the main task of metaphysics to consider which extramental things are signified or connoted by terms, and whether these things account for the truth or falsity of propositions. Buridan explicitly calls this approach "metaphysical."[114] In the end, the science of metaphysics is about extramental things, but since language is the key to conceptual problems, these can only be grasped by semantic analysis.

3. Metaphysical Themes

3.1. *Being and Essence*

Buridan devoted considerable attention to the traditional ontological discussion about the distinction between being and essence.[115] His main problem is that if there is neither a real nor a rational distinction between being and essence, the names "being" and "essence" would be synonymous, so there is no point in distinguishing the one from the other.[116]

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sicut Sortes vel Plato, quia nihil aliud est homo quam Sortes vel Plato. Cum ergo homo vel animal sit res singulariter existens, etiam si omnia alia essent circumscripta, manifestum est quod non indiget aliqua contractione ad hoc quod singulariter existat. Oportet ergo dicere quod huiusmodi contractiones habent intelligi quantum ad conceptus sive terminos significativos rerum. [...] Ita etiam terminus qui est species diceretur contrahi ad terminum singularem per additionem differentie restringentis terminum specificum ad supponendum pro illo solo pro quo supponit terminus singularis." See also King, "Jean Buridan," pp. 406–07.

[114] See, e.g., Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 12, fol. 41vb: "Sed in speciali credo tertiam conclusionem ponendam esse, quod metaphysicus debet investigare que cause *ex parte rerum significatarum* requiruntur vel non requiruntur ad hoc quod propositiones sint vere aut false" (italics are mine). For example, considering the question of whether as regards accidental terms (*dicti secundum accidens*), the thing itself, viz., "the white," is the same as "being that thing," viz. "being white," he claims that this problem better be solved metaphysically, that is, finding out for which things the terms "the white" and "being white" stand. See *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 3, fol. 43va: "Et ideo ista questio potest magis metaphysice solvi, scilicet sciendo pro quibus rebus termini supponunt."

[115] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 8 and q. 9, fols. 18va–20ra: "Utrum in qualibet re sit idem esse et essentia" and "Utrum esse et essentia differunt secundum rationem." An English translation of these *quaestiones* is provided in Arthur Hyman & James J. Walsh, eds., *Philosophy in the Middle Ages. The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions* (Indianapolis 1973), pp. 705–10. For another outline of Buridan's view on being and essence, see Joel Biard, "La théorie de l'être et de l'essence de Jean Buridan," in: Martin Pickavé, ed., *Die Logik des Transzendentalen: Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin, 2003), pp. 383–94. For a mapping of the main positions in this medieval debate, see John F. Wippel, "Essence and Existence," in: *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 622–34.

[116] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 9, fol. 19va: "Oppositum tamen determinat Aristoteles et Commentator. Nec possent solvi rationes que fiebant in aliis duabus questionibus: si esse

Buridan starts explaining that he understands by "essence" nothing but "the thing itself," so that the question remains whether a thing and the thing's being, e.g., rose (*rosa*) and being a rose (*rosam esse*), are the same.[117] This identification of essence with the thing itself, which was also held in the 12th century by philosophers as Peter Abelard, is a consequence of Buridan's ideas about the ontological status of universals. The essence of a thing, like humanity, was nothing besides the thing itself, since humanity does not have an ontological status on its own.[118]

Buridan subsequently discusses the idea of older philosophers (*antiqui*), among them Thomas Aquinas, who held that in every being other than God, there is a composition of being and essence, so that being must differ from essence. This distinction has to account for the difference between created being and God, since only God is absolutely simple.[119] Buridan also explicitly discusses the position, sometimes attributed to Avicenna, that "being" and "non-being" are accidental modes added to (perpetual) essences by generation and corruption.[120] Among those who denied any composition between essence and being, Buridan mentions Averroes and Grosseteste.[121]

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et essentia et etiam ens et unum essent omnino idem, tam secundum rem quam secundum rationem, statim enim illa nomina essent synonima." The comparison of "being (*esse*) and essence" with "being (*ens*) and one" already hints at Buridan's conclusion that the term "*esse*" has a connotation that the term "*essentia*" does not have, since he explained in the fourth book of his commentary that the terms "*ens*" and "*unum*" are interchangeable, although "being" is an absolute term, whereas "one" is connotative. See above, note 70.

[117] *Ibid.*, q. 8, fol. 18va: "Et per essentiam in proposito intelligo ipsam rem; et sic questio est utrum idem sit rosa et rosam esse, homo et hominem esse, et sic de aliis."

[118] See below, note 124.

[119] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 8, fol. 18vb: "Item debetis scire quod antiqui, de quorum numero erat beatus Thomas, posuerunt quod in omni ente alio ab ipso Deo erat compositio ex esse et essentia; et sic aliquo modo oporteat differre esse ab essentia, propter quod solus Deus erat simpliciter simplex."

[120] *Ibid.*, fol. 18vb: "Alii etiam dixerunt quod esse et non esse sunt quidam modi diversi accidentales accidentes essentie; unde per generationem essentia accipit esse et per corruptionem accipit non esse. Et sic aliqui posuerunt essentias rerum perpetuas, quamvis successive illi modi diversi attribuantur eis ut quam rosam aliquando dicimus esse et aliquando non esse." The view that being was an accident superadded to essence was attributed to Avicenna by, among others, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, and James of Viterbo. See Wippel, "Essence and Existence," p. 393.

[121] *Ibid.*, fol. 18va–b: "Oppositum dicit Commentator esse de intentione Aristotelis in isto quarto, ubi dicit quod est idem homo, ens homo et unus homo, modo per ens homo Aristoteles videtur intelligere esse hominis." According to Buridan, Grosseteste is of the opinion that every predicate said of God signifies the simple essence of God. But when the same predicate is said of something other than God, it signifies the thing's dependence on God. This signification, however, does not imply any multiplication in the dependent thing. See *ibid.*, fol. 18vb: "Sed Lincolniensis secundo *Posteriorum* videtur esse contrarie

Buridan's own position is that there is no real difference between the thing and its being.[122] To prove his point, Buridan argues against those who held that "being" and "non-being" are accidental modes of perpetual essences; for, according to Buridan, this is the only way in which "rose" could differ from its being. However, Buridan saw two impossible consequences. First, prime matter would be superfluous if essence was persistent, since prime matter is posited as a persistent subject underlying change.[123] Second, if an essence, like humanity, persists after the human being is destroyed, it would either persist separately or in matter, viz., the matter of the corpse. If it persists separately from matter, one would posit platonic ideas, which goes against Aristotle. But if it persists in the corpse, this corpse would still be a human being, for a thing is a human being because of its humanity. This is, of course, false, since a corpse is not a human being.[124] Moreover, it seems that here the same thing is destroyed and yet persists, which is a contradiction, since a thing only persists if it exists.[125]

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opinionis. Dicit enim quod omne predicatum de Deo predicat sive significat simplicem Dei essentiam; sed esse predicatum de alio ab ipso Deo predicat sive significat dependentiam illius ab ipso Deo. Et ista dependentia, ut dicit, nihil multiplicat in re dependente." Grosseteste's opinion was rejected by Buridan, because it only explains why "stone" and "being a stone" differ according to reason, but not why "God" and "being God" differ according to reason. Moreover, children are able to use forms such as "stone" and "being a stone" without perceiving any connection between them and God. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 9, fol. 19vb.

[122] *Ibid.*, fol. 18vb: "Et ego dico cum illo Lincolniensi et Commentatore quod in unaquaque re est idem illa res et eam esse, ita quod non differt essentia ab esse nec esse ab essentia." Buridan obviously has in mind real difference here (*secundum rem*), for the question of whether they differ according to reason was to be answered in the next *quaestio*.

[123] *Ibid*: "Primo quia sequeretur quod non indigeremus ponere primam materiam. Illa enim non ponitur nisi quia oportet subiectum deferens transmutatione manere sub utroque termino."

[124] *Ibid.*: "Secundo sequeretur quod in cadavere maneret humanitas; et tamen humanitate res est homo, sicut albedine res est alba; ideo cadaver adhuc est homo, quod est falsum dicere. Et probatur prima consequentia quia: humanitas nihil aliud potest esse quam essentia vel quiditas hominis que manet homine corrupto. Et illa vel maneret separata vel maneret in materia cadaveris si maneret in materia cadaveris, habetur propositum. Si dicatur quod maneat separata a materia, hoc erit ponere ideas Platonis quas postea improbabit Aristoteles." The same argument returns in Book VII, 16, where Buridan denies to universals an indepent ontological status. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 16, fol. 51va–b.

[125] *Ibid.*, fols. 18vb–19ra: "Illud non differt a rosa quod maneret sola rosa manente et omni ipsi addito circumscripto; sed sola rosa sic manente adhuc rosa esset, quoniam contradictionem manifeste videtur implicare quod aliquid manet et tamen ipsum non est."

Since there is no difference between a thing and its being, Buridan takes the possibility of a difference according to reason into account.[126] Before discussing this possibility in metaphysical terms, Buridan presents some logical claims (*conclusiones logicas*). First, that being and essence differ, since *my* being differs from *your* essence. Second, that being and essence do not differ, since *my* being does not differ from *my* essence. Third, that no single instance of being differs from essence and no single instance of essence from being, since every being is essence and every essence is being. That being said, Buridan claims that neither his own being and his essence, nor a stone and its being differ according to reason.[127] Buridan's point of view is that a thing cannot differ from itself *in any way*. Therefore, if a thing and its being are not really different, then neither are they rationally different. The proposition "being and essence differ according to reason" is false if the terms of that proposition are taken properly, in personal supposition (*suppositio personalis*), for then they stand for those things that they ultimately signify, which is exactly the same thing. However, Buridan admits that the proposition "being and essence are the same according to the thing, but differ according to reason" can be true if the terms of that proposition are not taken properly, but in another sense. According to Buridan, when we say that "being and essence are the same according to the thing," we mean that they are the same thing. However, when we say that "being and essence differ according to reason," we mean that we use the name "being" and the name "essence" for one and the same thing from different aspects (*rationes*).[128]

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[126] *Ibid.*, fol. 19ra: "Sed propter solutiones rationum dicendum est ut videtur in illa questione quod esse et essentia, sive rosa et rosam esse, differunt secundum rationem. Ex alio enim conceptu imponitur hoc nomen 'rosa' et hoc nomen seu hec oratio 'rosam esse.' "

[127] *Ibid.*, q. 9, fol. 19va: "Primo vos potestis supponere aliquas conclusiones logicas, scilicet, quod esse et essentia differunt vel non sunt idem, scilicet, esse meum et essentia tua. Postea etiam esse et essentia sunt idem et non differunt, scilicet, esse meum et essentia mea. Postea etiam dico quod esse non differt ab essentia, immo etiam nullum esse differt ab essentia, nulla etiam essentia differt ab esse, quia omne esse est essentia et omnis essentia est esse, ut patet per precedentem questionem. [...] Pono conclusionem quod esse meum et essentia mea non differunt secundum rationem, nec lapis et esse eius, quia impossibile est quod idem differat a seipso, sive secundum rem, sive secundum rationem, vel secundum quodlibet aliud."

[128] *Ibid.*: "Et ideo apparet quod tales rationes Aristotelis et aliorum sunt improprie. Dico sic improprie, quia si sint vere, ille non sunt vere secundum sensum proprium sermonis, immo secundum alium sensum dico tales propositiones 'ens et unum differunt secundum rationem,' vel esse et essentia, vel homo et animal, et sic de aliis. Sed tamen ille propositiones conceduntur 'esse et essentia sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem,' dico quod conceduntur ad sensus quos dicam, quando enim dico quod esse et essentia sunt idem secundum rem, sensus enim est quod esse et essentia sunt eadem res;

Up to this point, Buridan indicates that the difference between being and essence is not a real difference within the thing but that they differ on the conceptual side. Now he has to explain why this difference in aspects is not fictitious, that is, he has to provide a reason for the fact that we grasp one thing under different aspects. Buridan clearly regards this as a difficult task.[129] The most plausible solution seems to be that a nomen signifies without reference to time, whereas a verb signifies with reference to time, an opinion that Buridan attributed to Aristotle and the grammarians. According to this opinion, a thing is called "essence" according to a simple, absolute concept without the connotation of time, whereas it is said "to be" (or to have been, or to be going to be) according to a concept connoting time.[130]

Buridan accepts this solution, but in a slightly revised form, in order to avoid an objection which runs as follows: suppose that God preserved the world in rest and without any movement (so that as a consequence there was no time), and a visual image of John remained in my eye, I would judge John to be, and I would be right. Yet, if "is" in the proposition "John is" supposits for John and connotes the present time, the proposition would be false if the connoted time ceases to exist, just as the proposition "man is white" would be false if whiteness were taken away.[131] However, this is notably not the case, for in the given situation in which time ceased to be, the proposition "John is" remains true.

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sed quando dico quod esse et essentia differunt secundum rationem, sensus est quod alia est ratio a qua imponitur hoc nomen 'esse' et alia ratio est a qua imponitur hoc nomen 'essentia,' aliter illa nomina essent penitus synonima."

[129] *Ibid.*: "Sed tunc restat magis difficultas, cum illa differentia rationum non debeat dici ficta."

[130] *Ibid*, fol. 19vb: "Et ideo Aristoteles et grammatici videntur solvere statim difficultatem. Nomina enim significant sine tempore, quia etiam res concipiuntur non intelligendo aliquod tempus. Sed etiam res possunt intelligi non intelligendo determinatum tempus cui res existunt vel coexistebant. Et sic imponuntur verba ad significandum cum tempore. Ergo eadem res dicitur essentia secundum conceptum simplicem, scilicet absolutum a connotatione temporis, et eadem res dicitur esse secundum conceptum connotantem tempus, vel etiam dicitur fore vel fuisse."

[131] *Ibid.*: "Sed sine dubio quamvis illa dicta prima facie videantur clara, tamen latet ibi magna difficultas. [...] Immo ponamus per potentiam divinam quod omnia fiant in quiete sine motu, et quod etiam Deus conservaret nos sine aliquo motu, et remaneret in oculo meo illa species secundum quam ego video te, adhuc iudicarem te esse, et esset etiam verum te esse; ideo hoc iudicium non videtur esse proprium propter apprehensionem temporis. Etiam si illa propositio 'Ioannes est' connotat tempus presens, quoniam ex defectu connotati falsificatur propositio. Cum enim album supponat pro homine et connotet albedinem, statim ablata albedine, hec esset falsa 'homo est albus'; et tamen constat quod si nullum esset tempus, ut si omnia conservarentur in pura quiete, adhuc non minus esset verum quod res essent."

Buridan's solution to this difficulty is that a thing is perceived and judged to be when it is in the ken of the knower.[132] The name "being" has indeed a connotation which the name "essence" does not have, but the presence that "is" connotes is not a temporal or successive presence but a presence "just as you are present to me." In other words, there is no time co-understood, only a sense of presentness in the ken of the knower.[133] Names such as "essence," "man," or "stone," in contrast, are used when the intellect detaches the concept of a thing from the concept of this presence and from the concept of the relation (*habitudo*) of the thing to its presence.[134] Being, or more accurately, the judgment that something is, thus seems to coincide with its "presentness." However, Buridan does not think it necessary that a thing is within our ken every time we judge it to be, for we can also judge something to be by reasoning, after its being in the ken of sense, e.g., if the stars were in our ken once, we judge them to be, even when they are not in our ken, since the intellect concluded that they are incorruptible.[135]

Although Buridan does not use the expression here, one could say that the distinction between being and essence runs exactly parallel to the notions of intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge.[136] In this respect, Buridan's discussion of being and essence shows similarities to his discussion of knowledge of a singular. According to Buridan, knowledge of a singular is only possible when the thing cognized is within the

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[132] *Ibid.*: "Et videtur mihi esse dicendum quod res percipiuntur et iudicantur esse secundum quod percipiuntur tanquam in prospectu cognoscentis."

[133] *Ibid.*, fols. 19vb–20ra: "Et ideo revertendo ad opinionem predictam Aristotelis et grammaticorum videtur michi quod hoc verbum 'esse' connotat presentiam quam non connotat 'essentia' vel hoc nomen 'lapis' etc. Et licet non connotat presentiam temporalem et successivam, immo presentia sicut tu esses presens mihi. [...] Ad intelligendum rem esse non oporteat aliqui tempus cointelligere, sed solum quod res apprehendatur per modum presentialitatis in prospectu cognoscentis."

[134] *Ibid.*, fol. 20ra: "Quando autem per intellectum absolvimus conceptum rei a conceptu talis presentie, et etiam a conceptu habitudinis rei ad talem presentia, tunc imponimus res ad significandum per illa nomina 'essentia,' 'homo,' 'lapis.' "

[135] *Ibid.*, fol. 19vb: "Unde rem aliquam non iudicas esse nisi sit in prospectu sensus. Ideo si Sortes recedit a prospectu sensus, tunc tu nescis utrum sit. Verum est tamen quod argumentatione nos iudicamus aliquem esse, sed hoc est referendo ad ea que fuerunt in prospectu sensus. Verbi gratia, quia in prospectu sensus videmus astra, et per rationes intellectus iudicat astra esse incorruptibilia, ideo intellectus concludit astra esse, licet non sint in prospectu cognoscentis."

[136] The same position is attributed to Scotus by Allan B. Wolter. See Allan B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," in: John K. Ryan & Bernardine M. Bonansea, eds., *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965* (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 45–60, esp. 58–60; see also Wippel, "Essence and Existence," pp. 406–07.

ken of the knower: the kind of knowing that, according to Buridan, "some call intuitive."[137] Buridan thus chooses a merely psychological solution to the traditionally metaphysical problem of being and essence.

3.2. *The Theory of Substantiality*

3.2.1. *The Ontological Status of Accidental and Substantial Being*

Buridan's view of the ontological status of accidental being was one of the most original parts of his metaphysics.[138] The problem touches both philosophy and theology. According to the Aristotelian ontology, what it is to be called a "being" is to be capable of existence *per se*. Traditionally, primary and secondary substance, and separable substantial forms (e.g., the human soul), were thought to be capable of existence *per se*, whereas accidents could only be called "being" in a secondary way, since an accident's being is nothing but its inherence in a substance (*accidentis esse est inesse*).[139] According to this Aristotelian view, accidents are not called "beings" in a univocal way, only analogously, by attribution to a substance (*per attributionem ad substantiam*). However, this clear-cut distinction between the ontological status of substance and accident was blurred by the doctrine of transubstantiation, a doctrine of faith. After the transubstantiation of the host, its accidents remain, while its substance, bread, is changed into the body of Christ. The accidents are then said to subsist without a subject (*sine subiecto*), or without inherence in a substance.

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[137] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 20, fol. 54va: "Nullus est conceptus singularis nisi sit conceptus rei per modum existentis in presentia et in prospectu cognoscentis tanquam illa res appareat cognoscenti sicut demonstratione signata. Et istum modum cognoscendi vocant aliqui 'intuitivum.' " For a detailed discussion about cognition of singulars see King, "Jean Buridan," pp. 406–10.

[138] The traditional metaphysical question concerning this problem was the question of whether substance and accidents can be called "being" in a univocal way. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 6, fols. 16va–17vb: "Utrum hoc nomen ens significet substantias et accidentia secundum unam rationem sive secundum unum conceptum." An edition of this question is provided in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," pp. 219–32. Other questions which have importance for this subject are V, q. 8: "Utrum causalitates sive dependentie rerum ad invicem sunt dispositiones addite illis causis et illis causatis," for there the ontological status of inherence is considered, and VII, q. 3: "Utrum in dictis secundum accidens sit idem ipsum et esse ipsum," on the question of whether an accidental term, i.e., a thing denoted in one of its accidental modes, e.g., "the white (thing)," is the same as "being that accident," e.g., "being white." The answer to this question helps Buridan to answer another question: whether abstract accidental terms such as "whiteness" have always (co-)reference to the substrate of the accident.

[139] See Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," pp. 249–50. See also Calvin J. Normore, "Accidents and Modes," in: *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 677–83.

One might expect Buridan to set aside this theological exception to a philosophical theory in order to consider the ontological status of accidents in a purely natural light, but this is not the course he takes. Instead, he takes both viewpoints into account. Buridan makes the position of faith his starting point. One must hold by faith that God's power is able to separate (and conserve) accidents from their substances, hence accidents, such as whiteness, are able to subsist just like substances.[140] From this conclusion, Buridan argues that a concept like whiteness is a simple, non-connotative concept, just like every concept in the category of substance.[141] Since abstract accidental terms such as "whiteness" are non-connotative (unlike concrete accidental terms such as "the white"), the term "being" signifies substance and accidents alike, by means of a simple, absolute concept. Moreover, accidents possess the status of being not only while they are conserved without a substance, but also while inhering in a substance, since an accident is essentially the same while it inheres and while it exists separately from its subject.[142]

But if substance and accident are both *essentially* capable of existing on their own (*per se*), in what way would substance differ from accident?

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[140] See Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," pp. 252–53. See also Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 6 (in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," pp. 227–28): "Dico ergo quod nos tenemus quod per potenciam Dei accidencia possunt separari a substanciis et separatim subsistere et sine substancia sibi subiecta; vnde dicimus quod sic de facto subsistunt in sacramento altaris. Tunc ergo ponamus quod albedo sic per se subsistit absque hoc quod alicui subiecto inhereat, tunc manifestum est quod illa albedo vere est ens et vere est aliquid. Ideo hoc nomen 'ens' vel hoc nomen 'aliquid' eque simplicter et secundum conceptum eque simplicem dicitur de albedine sicud diceretur de lapide vel de asino." In the philosophical underpinning of this reasoning, Buridan claims that the abstract accidental term "whiteness" (*albedo*) is not equal to "being white" (*esse album*), since if whiteness becomes separated from its substance, it could still be signified by the name "whiteness," but not by the expression "being white," for the latter requires a white thing. According to Buridan, Aristotle asserts that "whiteness" and "being white" are the same thing, but differ from the concrete accidental term "the white" (*album*). See Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," pp. 250–54, esp. note 15.

[141] In other words, whiteness does not connote, but signifies the color white and neither signifies nor connotes the substance in which the color white inheres. In contrast, the terms "being white" (*esse album*) and "the white (thing)" (*album*) signify the substance which is white and connote the whiteness inhering in this substance.

[142] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 6 (in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," p. 228): " 'Vnde eciam ex hoc manifestum est quod conceptus a quo sumitur hoc nomen 'albedo' est ita simplex sine aliqua connotacione sicud aliquis terminis substancialis. Et si de isto termino 'albedo' predicetur hoc nomen 'ens' vel hoc nomen 'aliquid,' non oportet quod de eo predicetur secundum aliquam attribucionem ad substanciam subiectam vel ad aliquem terminum substancialem, quia sine substancia subiecta ipsa est ens et aliquid. Et non minus ipsa est ens vel aliquid quando inheret quam si subiectum esset ablatum; ipsa enim est illud idem quando inheret quod ipsa esset si subiectum esset ablatum."

Why would whiteness, once separated from substance, not be a substance itself? To solve these problems, Buridan redefines the Aristotelian notions of substance and accident. He defines substance as that which exists on its own in the order of nature without inhering in any other thing, or a part of such a thing that exists on its own. Accident, in contrast, is that which neither exists on its own in the order of nature nor is a part of a thing that exists on its own, but something that could exist on its own in a miraculous way.[143] According to these definitions, separately conserved accidents cannot be called substances, since they do not subsist naturally, but miraculously.[144] However, this is not an essential difference, for according to Buridan, even though accidents inhere in their subjects in the natural order, they do not inhere essentially.

Buridan's view on the ontological status of accidental being has some interesting philosophical consequences. First, since not every being is substance, "substance" is not the most general genus (*genus generalissima*). Instead, the most general genus is "something" (*aliquid*), a term which is interchangeable with being.[145] Second, if accidents are univocally called "beings," so that they do not inhere by themselves in their subject, their actual inherence in a substance requires an explanation. Otherwise, the separate existence of accidents would be a contradiction.[146] According

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[143] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 6 (in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," p. 230): "Sed tunc restant duo dubia. Si accidencia ponerentur sic per se subsistere, quomodo ponetur differencia inter substancias et accidencia? [...] Ad primum istorum ego dico quod Aristoteles dixisset quod albedo esset vere substancia, si sic posset per se subsistere, et esset hoc aliquid, quia, si queratur 'quid est hoc?,' non potest responderi nisi quod hoc sit albedo. Sed nos possumus aliter dicere, scilicet quod omne illud est substancia quod naturaliter per se subsistit ita quod non inheret alteri; et omne illud eciam est substancia quod est pars talis naturaliter subsistentis. Et omne illud est accidens quod sic non subsistit per se naturaliter, nec est pars per se subsistentis, non obstante quod subsistit per se miraculose. Et sic albedo, quamuis per se subsisteret, non diceretur 'substantia,' quia non sic subsistit naturaliter, sed miraculose." See also Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," p. 254.

[144] The idea that the difference between substance and accident lies in how they naturally behave can already be found in Thomas Aquinas. However, according to Thomas, the natural inherence of accidents in substance needs no further explanation, whereas Buridan is of the opinion that the separability of accidents from their substances requires an adaptation of the nature of accidents and their natural inherence in substance, since accidents are called "beings" univocally, even while inhering in substance. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Peryermenias*, I, 2.

[145] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 6 (in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," p. 231): "Et ita oporteret eciam concedere quod hoc nomen 'substancia' non esset genus generalissimum, sed illud nomen 'quid' vel 'aliquid.' "

[146] Buridan considers this subject in a question about causal relations. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 8, fols. 31rb–32ra: "Utrum causalitates sive dependentie rerum adinvicem sunt dispositiones addite illis causis et illis causatis."

to Buridan, the inherence of an accident in its subject requires a special kind of relation, an added disposition (*dispositio addita*). Contrary to the inherence of the accident in a substance, the inherence of an added disposition in its subject is inseparable, in order to avoid an infinite regress. Whereas whiteness can exist separately from substance, it cannot be separated from its ability to inhere. Therefore, even God could not preserve the inherence of whiteness in a substance without there being whiteness, for this would imply a contradiction.[147]

Though Buridan is aware of the fact that with the added disposition he introduces a "new entity" within his ontology, he thinks that this was necessary in order to explain the ontological status of accidents as univocal beings, inspired by the truth of faith that God is able to preserve accidents without a substance.[148] Thus, Buridan's view of the ontological status of accidental being is a marked discontinuity with his general tendency to minimize the amount of ontological entities.[149] Moreover, Buridan takes as his starting point not a semantic analysis but a doctrine of Eucharistic theology, and he apparently feels the urge to diverge from an Aristotelian doctrine on the basis of faith. In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Marsilius of Inghen presents Buridan's view of the ontological status of accidental being as the common opinion (*communis opinio*) of theologians. Interestingly, he expresses his doubt as to whether Buridan stuck to this opinion until the end of his life.[150] However, there is no evidence

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147 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 8, fol. 32ra: "Dico quod oportet quod sit dispositio addita ad hoc quod albedo inhereat lapidi vel etiam ad hoc quod dependeat a lapide, propter hoc quod possibile est quod ipsa maneat non inherens et non dependens, scilicet a lapide. Sed ultra tu dicis illa dispositio inheret subiecto et dependet ab eo. Concedo; sed hoc est inseparabiter, sicut Aristoteles credidit quod albedo inheret lapidi. Unde Deus non posset facere quod esset inherentia albedinis ad lapidem, et non esset albedo, quia implicaret contradictionem. [. . .] Ideo non proceditur in infinitum."

148 Buridan admits that he acknowledges the existence of such an added disposition only because faith taught him that accidents can be preserved without substance. See Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," p. 256; and Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 8, fol. 32ra: "Sic ergo probabile est quod in predictis sint tales dispositiones addite. Quas tamen nullo modo concederem nisi esset illa separabilitas quam ex fide tenemus."

149 See, e.g., Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, V, q. 7, fol. 31ra: "Si possumus omnia salvare per pauciora nos non debemus in naturalibus ponere plura, quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora."

150 Marsilius himself chose another solution, which he called "more metaphysical." See Bakker, "Aristotelian Metaphysics," p. 258, esp. note 25. See also Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, IV, q. 5 (in Bakker, "Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité," p. 236): "Primo recitanda est opinio communis quam multi theologi tenent; et est bone memorie magistri Iohannis Biridani in questionibus suis super isto quarto, quamuis non credam quod in fine uite fuerit illius opinionis. Secundo respondebitur aliter ad questionem et ut michi apparet magis metaphysicalter."

in Buridan's writings which suggests that he changed his mind. On the contrary, the *ultima lectura* of his commentary on the *Metaphysics* shows remarkable consistency as regards the view that accidents can persist on their own.[151]

3.2.2. *Form and Matter*

The view that God's power is able to separate accidents from their substances also affects Buridan's view on form and matter. If the whiteness of the bread can be conserved without inherence in the substance of bread, this whiteness is conserved as a separate accidental form. Buridan therefore argues that just as the inherence of an accident in a substance, the inherence of form in matter requires an added disposition.[152]

Concerning the relationship between form and matter, Buridan argues that matter is prior to form in time, since matter is perpetual. In addition, matter is prior to form and to the composite of form and matter with regard to generation, since form and the composite arise from pre-existing matter. Finally, matter is prior according to nature, insofar as matter is the (material) cause of both form and the composite.[153] In the same time, however, form is prior to matter and more truly called a being and a substance with regard to perfection. Moreover, form is prior according to nature, to the extent that form is the (formal) cause of both matter and the composite.[154]

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[151] See, e.g., Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 1, fol. 42rb, and VII, 6, fol. 45ra. The same view is found in id, *Summulae de dialectica*, 6.4.12.

[152] This view is expounded in the question of whether form is prior to, and more truly called a being and a substance than matter and the composite of form and matter. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 2, fols. 42vb–43ra: "Utrum forma sit prior et magis ens et etiam magis substantia quam materia et quam compositum."

[153] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 2, fol. 42vb: "Et statim certum est quod materia prior est secundum tempus quam forma vel compositum, et loquor de materia et forma et composito pertinentibus ad idem suppositum ut ad istum hominem vel ad istum lapidem. Conclusio ergo manifesta est. Sic arguebatur, quia materia est perpetua secundum Aristotelem, forma autem non, nec compositum. Et perpetuum est prius tempore non perpetuo. [...] Ita etiam materia conceditur prior via generationis, quia ex ipsa preexistente fit et consequitur generatio tam forme quam compositi. Adhuc etiam materia est prior secundum naturam quodammodo quam forma vel compositum, quia causa est prior causato secundum naturam; et tamen materia est causa forme et est causa compositi."

[154] *Ibid.*: "Deinde etiam forma est via perfectionis prior quam materia, quia est multo perfectior et nobilior. Et sic intendebat Aristoteles cum dicit formam esse priorem materia. [...] Sed econverso dicendum est quod ipsa forma est prior ipsa materia quodammodo secundum naturam, quia forma est causa et materie et compositi." See also *ibid.*, fol. 43ra: "Forma enim dicitur magis ens et magis substantia quam materia, non secundum intensionem gradualem sed ipsa forma est perfectior et melior et dignior."

As long as priority is taken in the right sense, the relationship between form and matter is clear, according to Buridan. Not so easy to determine was the relationship of priority according to nature, or causality, between form and the composite, and, *mutatis mutandis*, between matter and the composite. The problem is that form can neither be prior to, nor be the cause of, the whole composite, which includes both form and matter, for in that case form would be the cause of, and prior to, itself. Therefore, if form is prior to the composite according to nature, this would only be true with respect to the other part, i.e., matter. The same is true for the priority of matter over the composite.[155] But here a problem seems to arise concerning the relationship between the composite as a whole and its two components, matter and form. If form and matter are prior to the composite only with respect to the other part, and not with respect to the whole composite, then the opposite could as well be argued, i.e., that the composite is prior to matter and form.[156] To solve this problem, Buridan again introduces the added disposition. Based on the theological truth that accidental forms can be preserved separately from their subjects, he argues that the inherence of form in matter requires an added disposition, as in the case of the inherence of accidents in a substance. This being said, he solves the problem semantically: since the term "composite" is a connotative term, which supposits for form and matter but connotes the added disposition according to which it is formally a composite, both form and matter are prior to the composite rather than the other way around.[157]

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[155] *Ibid.*: "Sed videtur bene difficilius utrum forma sit isto modo prior composito. Constat enim quod forma non est prior ipso composito nec est causa totius compositi ratione ipsius totius compositi, quia non est prior qualibet parte compositi nec causa cuiuslibet partis compositi; esset enim prior seipsa et causa suiipsius, quod est impossibile. Et ideo si sit prior composito vel etiam causa compositi hoc non est nisi ratione alterius partis, scilicet ipsius materie. [...] Ex eo enim solo quod forma est prior ipsa materia et causa ipsius materie, ipsa dicitur prior composito. [...] Eodem modo diceretur quod materia non est prior composito nec causa compositi nisi propter prioritatem et causalitatem quam habet ad formam."

[156] *Ibid.*: "Sed tunc est dubitatio: quia tu concedis quod compositum ibi denominatur a ratione partis, nam ratione materie dicitur posterius forma et causatum ab ipsa forma, et ratione forme dicitur posterius ipsa materia et effectus ipsius materie. Ergo similiter secundum denominationem a ratione partis ita consimiliter dicam quod compositum est prius ipsa materia et causa ipsius materie, quia ratione forme hoc sibi convenit. Dictum enim est quod forma est causa materie et prior ipsa, et ita etiam ratione materie dicam quod compositum est causa forme et prius ipsa. Et ita non magis est dicendum quod materia vel forma sit causa compositi et econverso, quod videtur absurdum dicere."

[157] *Ibid.*, fols. 42vb–43ra: "Sed quia ex fide tenemus quod possint separari et separatim conservari, ideo videtur quod oportet ponere dispositionem seu inherentiam additam,

Buridan also raises the question of whether the form of material substance is this substance's whole essence. According to Buridan, Aristotle held against Plato that a sensible substance is essentially a composite of form and matter, such that the essence of a substance is not equal to its form.[158] He solves the question by claiming that "quiddity" is used differently by logicians and natural philosophers. Whereas logicians only consider predicable terms, natural philosophers consider the things to which these terms refer. Logically speaking, a quiddity or essence is a quidditative predicate; more specifically, it is a definition that is composed of genus and difference. Given that genus and difference are linked to the form, a logician can hold that the essence of a species is its form. The natural philosopher, however, holds that the quiddity of a thing is the significate of a quidditative term, or the thing for which the quidditative term supposits, and this is the composite of form and matter in case of sensible substances.[159] Since the method of the metaphysician is that of the natural philosopher, Buridan concludes that not only the form of a sensible thing but also the composite of form and matter constitutes its quiddity, since form is always accompanied by matter in a sensible substance.[160]

Finally, Buridan considers the problem of the unicity or plurality of forms in one subject. Even though this subject is also treated in his

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scilicet inherentiam forme ad materiam, ita quod licet hoc 'compositum' solum supponit pro materia et forma, tamen connotat illam dispositionem secundum quam ipsum est formaliter compositum, sicut album supponit solum pro substantia licet connotet albedinem secundum quam substantia dicitur alba et formaliter sic disposita. Unde sic ymaginandum esset quod licet homo sit formaliter homo per animam humanam, tamen non dicitur formaliter compositus per illam dispositionem additam, que non est substantia, sed accidens. Et ideo etiam hoc nomen compositum non est nomen substantiale, scilicet de predicamento substantie. [...] Secundum hoc ergo diceretur quod materia et forma sunt naturaliter priores et cause principales illius dispositionis addite magis quam econverso."

158 *Ibid.*, q. 12, fol. 48rb: "Aristoteles reprehendit Platonem volentem materiam auferre a quiditatibus et dispositionibus substantiarum sensibilium. Et primo *Physicorum* ponit substantiam sensibilem esse essentialiter compositam ex materia et forma."

159 *Ibid.*, fol. 48rb–va: "Videtur mihi dicendum quod aliter logici loquuntur de quiditate et aliter physici. Logici enim quasi sistunt in intentionibus predicabilibus et physicus inquirit que sint res significate per illas intentiones sive per illos terminos predicabiles. Tunc ergo quiditatem logicus vocat predicatum quiditativum et maxime ipsam diffinitionem compositam ex genere et differentia, quia genus et differentia sunt quedam forme, scilicet accidentales, quia sunt quidam conceptus sive quidam termini significativi. Immo, potest concedi quod quiditas speciei est forma vel forme. Sed physicus ponit quod quiditas rei sit illud quod per predicatum quiditativum significatur et pro quo predicatum quiditativum supponit. Et sic breviter dico quod quiditas equi vel asini non est forma equi vel asini, sed est compositum ex materia et forma."

160 *Ibid.*, q. 7, fol. 45vb: "Nec materia fit solitarie, nec forma fit solitarie, sed compositum est quod fit solitarie aliqua determinata factione."

commentary on *De anima*, Buridan thinks that it is primarily metaphysical, since it considers the quiddities of things.[161] While Buridan adheres to the unicity of substantial form, he has, however, to solve an important objection, based on the fact that things are grasped by many (subordinate) essential predicates. Socrates, for example, is called "human being," "animal," and "animated body." These different essential predicates seem to indicate different substantial forms, for they must have a ground in reality in order not be fictitious, and, since they are essential and not accidental predicates, different accidental forms cannot account for them.[162]

Buridan rejects this (primitive) semantic analysis, with an appeal to the principle of parsimony. According to Buridan, there is simply no need to posit a plurality of substantial forms, for the plurality of essential predicates can be easily explained by a diversity of accidental forms.[163] He explains this with help from a psychological mechanism, viz., that quidditative concepts can be formed by the intellect out of accidental concepts. In order to explain how the intellect proceeds from an accidental concept to an essential concept, Buridan argues that the intellect first understands accidents and its subject simultaneously in a confused way, such as "a white thing" or "a laughing thing," but that the intellect later on finds out that accidents change, whereas the subject remains the same, e.g., when a laughing subject starts to wail. At that point, the intellect is able to abstract a quidditative concept from an accidental one.[164] Interestingly, Buridan uses an analogy with God to prove his point: the mere

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[161] See above, note 88.

[162] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 12, fol. 49rb: "Item. Certus est quod alius est conceptus secundum quem Sortes est homo et alius secundum quem dicitur animal. Et sic oportet quod ista diversitas conceptuum habeat ex parte rei originem et correspondentiam, aliter illa diversitas conceptuum esset ficta, quod est inconveniens dicere. Sed illa diversitas ex parte rei non attenditur ex parte accidentium vel extraneorum, quia tunc illi conceptus non essent quidditativi, immo accidentales et denominativi, ergo diversitas illis conceptibus correspondens est ex diversitate formarum substantialium in Sorte."

[163] *Ibid.*, fol. 50ra: "Ultimo arguitur communi argumento frustra sit per plura etcetera, si omnia possint salvari etc. Sed omnia possumus salvare ponendo unicam formam substantialem in singulari supposito, sicut apparebit in solvendo rationes aliorum, ergo non sunt ponende plures etcetera."

[164] *Ibid.*, q. 14, fol. 50ra–b: "diversi conceptus subordinati secundum superius et inferius proveniunt a principio ex diversis accidentibus naturalibus et sensibilibus. [...] Sed tu arguebas quod tales conceptus non esset quiditativi. Solutio dico quod intellectus primitus potest intelligere confuse accidens et subiectum simul, ut intelligendo album aut ridens. Sed postea, videns mutationem accidentis subiecto manente, ut quia hoc modo ridet et modo lamentabatur et hoc modo est album postea nigrum, potest abstrahere conceptum subiecta a conceptu accidentis. Et tunc ille conceptus non amplius erit accidentalis, sed quiditativus."

fact that we use many essential predicates for God, such as "God" and "substance," does not lead to the conclusion that there are many forms or many essences in God, since God is absolutely simple. Analogously, we should not posit many forms in something because of the plurality of essential predicates used for them.[165]

3.3. *On Immaterial Being*

The final metaphysical topic to be discussed here concerns Buridan's ideas on immaterial being. Traditionally, the class of immaterial beings includes human souls and separate substances, viz., the intelligences and God. Since the nature of the human soul is mainly discussed in his commentaries on *De Anima*, Buridan's views on immaterial being in his metaphysics include only the latter. Moreover, Buridan wonders whether it is necessary to posit separate substances in addition to God. The intelligences were regarded as necessary for safeguarding natural processes, above all celestial movement, but Buridan thinks that it would suffice to have only one separate substance: God.[166] Surely, Buridan does not imply that separate substances do not exist. He actually defended the existence of many separate substances, i.e, many legions of angels. But Buridan excluded angels from the philosophical realm. The existence of angels might be true according to Catholic faith, but it cannot be proved demonstratively.[167] In the philosophical realm, it was not necessary to posit the existence of a manifold of separate substances, since the existence of God is sufficient for explaining every natural phenomenon. In Buridan's *Metaphysics*, the class of immaterial being is restricted to God.

3.4. *God's Existence*

Buridan's metaphysical doctrine of God is mainly found in the twelfth book of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the most "theological" book

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[165] *Ibid.*, fol. 50ra: "Deo attribuuntur plura predicata quiditativa subordinata. Ipse enim est Deus et est substantia. [...] Et tamen non oportet ponere plures formas vel essentias in Deo, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo, pari ratione non oportet in aliquo arguere plures formas propter diversa predicata quiditativa."

[166] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, 9, fol. 73ra: "Ideo sequitur secunda conclusio: quod preter ipsum Deum non oportet ponere alias substantias separatas ad movendum corpora celestia."

[167] *Ibid.*: "Alia etiam conclusio ponitur: quod sunt multo plures substantie separate quam sphere celestes vel motus celestes, scilicet magne legiones angelorum. Sed ista probari non possunt rationibus demonstrativis, habentibus ortum ex sensatis."

and, hence, most entitled to the name "natural theology."[168] Buridan is quite optimistic about the intellect's capacity for acquiring knowledge of God, and, according to him, the intellect has a capacity for knowing God, even though intuitive or *a priori* knowledge about God is not possible. This capacity for knowing God applies both to God's being and his essence.[169]

In his treatment of being and essence, Buridan claims that a judgment about a thing's being requires the knower to have a direct contact with the thing known, but he makes an exception for those things whose being can be deduced by reason. An example of such a thing is the first mover: since some motion appears in the prospect of our sense, and the intellect knows by reason that everything is moved by a mover and that the first moved thing is moved by a first mover, we rightly judge that a first mover exists, even though it never was in the ken of our sense.[170]

The existence of a first mover was proved in physics, but Buridan argues in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, as well as in his commentary on the *Physics*, that the natural philosopher cannot prove the existence of God, for God is not only the first mover but also primarily the first cause (a fact that Buridan expects everyone to affirm).[171] According to Buridan, it is the metaphysician who considers the causes of being, or more accurately, causes insofar as the things they cause depend upon them in being. The natural philosopher, by contrast, considers the causes insofar as the things they cause depend upon them for motion and change.[172] But if

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[168] However, a study into Buridan's "natural theology" should consider the eighth book of the *Physics* as well, since here the existence, the immobility and the indivisibility of the first mover were considered, as well as the question of whether the first mover or God could create *ex nihilio*, and of whether God has infinite power (*vigor*).

[169] For Buridan's view of the intellect's capacity for knowing God, see Kok, "What Can We Know about God?"

[170] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 9, fol. 19vb: "Per rationes intellectuales iudicat (sc. intellectus) omnem motum esse a motore et primum motum a primo motore; et motus aliquis apparet nobis magis in prospectu sensus, ideo iudicamus motorem esse, immo tandem primum motorem esse."

[171] *Ibid.*, II, q. 4, fol. 11va: "Physicus non potest demonstrare Deum esse, quia omnes concedunt Deum non esse aliud quam primam causam." For Buridan's proof of the existence of the first mover, see Rolf Schönberger, "Philosophical Theology in John Buridan," in: *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, pp. 265–81.

[172] See *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 4, fol. 11va: "Ad physicum non pertinet demonstrare primam causam esse, quia physicus non considerat de causis nisi prout sunt cause in movendo vel transmutando. Metaphysicus autem de causis considerat secundum quod sunt cause in essendo. Et ideo physicus non potest ultra ascendere quam ad primam causam moventem, sive ad primum motorem." Cf. Buridan, *Qu. Phys.*, VIII, q. 1: "[. . .] quia physicus et metaphysicus considerant differenter de causis, quia de eis considerat physicus solum in quantum

natural philosophy proves that a first mover exists, and if the first mover is nothing but God, how can Buridan deny that natural philosophy is able to prove God's existence?[173] The crux of the argument lies in the identification of the first mover with God. Buridan argues that it is imaginable that the first mover from the *Physics* is not identical with the first cause from the *Metaphysics* (i.e., God): if the first cause of being is only the final cause, for the sake of which all moving things move.[174] Therefore, even if it is right that the first mover is God, natural philosophy does not prove the conclusion "God exists," for we cannot know within natural philosophy that the first mover is God.[175] Since only metaphysics considers what things are, it is for the metaphysician to consider what the first cause of being is, and whether it is identical to the first mover.[176] Both the proof for the existence of the first cause of being and the establishment of the identity between the first cause of being and the first mover were to be given in metaphysics.

Buridan proves the existence of the first cause by proving that causes do not proceed infinitely, so that there must be a first.[177] He distinguishes

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ex eis dependent causata in generando vel corrumpendo, in movendo vel omnino in transmutando, tam active quam passive. Metaphysicus autem considerat de eis secundum quod ab eis dependent causata in essendo. Unde Aristoteles non diceret quod Deus esset causa intelligentiarum in movendo vel transmutando eas, quia reputavit eas intransmutabiles, sed tamen intelligentiae et omnia alia in esse suo dependent ex ipso Deo. De quo modo dependendi non intromittit se naturalis" (quotation in Thijssen, "Buridan on the Unity of a Science," p. 97, n. 23). See also Schönberger, "Philosophical Theology," pp. 269–70.

173 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 4, fol. 4va: "Sed tamen argueretur sic: primum motorem demonstrat physicus esse; et ille primus motor est Deus; igitur Deum esse demonstrat physicus."

174 According to Buridan, many philosophers indeed thought this way. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 4, fol. 11va: "Sed adhuc dubitatur utrum primus ille motor sit prima causa. Immo, multi opinati fuerunt ut apparebit in duodecimo *huius* quod prima causa non esset prima causa movens, sed solum esset causa in genere finis gratia cuius omnia moventia movent." For example, Ockham had denied the natural provability of the fact that God is the efficient cause of the created world, although he did not deny the fact itself. See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 31–32.

175 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 4, fol. 11va: "Sed tamen non sequitur: physicus demonstrat istam conclusionem 'Deus est,' quia licet primus motor sit Deus secundum rei veritatem, tamen nos per physicam nescimus quod ista sit vera 'primus motor est Deus.' "

176 See Buridan, *Qu. Phys.*, VIII, q. 1: "Verum est etiam, prout debemus supponere ex sexto *Metaphysicae*, quod ad scientiam naturalem non pertinet inquirere vel scire de aliquo ente simpliciter quidditative quid ipsum est, vel quae ipsum est. Solus enim metaphysicus considerat simpliciter quidditates entium. [. . .] Dico ergo quod ad metaphysicam et non ad physicam pertinet demonstrare primam causam esse et primam causam efficientem et primam finalem et primam formalem et primam materialem" (quotation in Thijssen, "Buridan on the Unity of a Science," p. 97, n. 23).

177 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 5, fols. 11vb–12rb: "Utrum sit processus in infinitum in causis." See also idem, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 4, fol. 11va: "Et si non esset prima causa, immo quod in infinitum procederetur, constat quod non esset Deus."

between essential causes (*cause per se*), and accidental causes (*cause per accidens*).[178] Moreover, a cause can be called "essential" or "accidental" either according to predication in a causal proposition, i.e., a proposition in which the name "cause" is predicated of a subject, or according to a real dependence of an effect on its cause. According to the first sense, a builder of houses (*domificator*) is called an essential cause of a house, whereas a musician is said to be an accidental cause of a house, notwithstanding the fact that they are one and the same person. According to the second sense, a cause is called essential if its effect depends on it necessarily, so that it cannot exist without depending on this cause.[179]

Of course, a proof of God as the first cause of being involved this latter meaning of an essential cause. According to Buridan, both Aristotle and Averroes thought that there must be a first cause among essentially subordinated causes, based on the following reasoning *ad absurdum*: if there is no first cause, every cause would be a middle cause, having a prior cause. But a middle cause cannot itself cause, except in virtue of a prior cause. However, if every cause is a middle cause, none of them would be naturally first, hence, none of them is able to cause. As a consequence, there would exist no causes at all, which is impossible.[180]

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[178] *Ibid.*, II, q. 5, fol. 12ra: "Notandum est quod multe solent dari distinctiones de ipsis causis. Quedam enim dicuntur cause per se et alie dicuntur cause per accidens."

[179] *Ibid.*: "Et ista distinctio dupliciter accipitur. Uni modo quod perseitas attendatur secundum predicationem in propositione causali. Voco autem propositionem causalem in proposito ubi hoc nomen 'causa' predicatur de aliquo subiecto. Sic enim Aristoteles in quinto *huius* et in secundo *Physicorum* dicit domificatorem per se esse causam domus et musicum esse causam domus per accidens, quod non intelligimus quantum ad realem dependentiam causati a sua causa, cum eadem res sit domificator et musicus, sed ad illum sensum: domificator dicitur per se causa domus et musicus per accidens, quia illa propositio est per se vera 'domificator est causa domus' et ista est per accidens vera 'musicus est causa domus.' [...] Alio modo dicta distinctio intelligitur quod perseitas attendatur secundum realem dependentiam causati a causa. Et causa dicitur per se alicuius causati si de necessitate illud causatum dependeat ab illa causa non solum in fieri, sed etiam in esse et permanentia, ita quod non posset esse nisi dependendo ab illa causa."

[180] *Ibid.*, fol. 12ra–b: "Sed ipsi <Commentator et Aristoteles> negant processum in infinitum in causis essentialiter subordinatis propter talem rationem: si procederetur in infinitum in causis, sequeretur quod nulla esset prima. Et sic quelibet esset media habens ante se priorem. Modo, in causis essentialiter subordinatis media non possunt agere nec etiam causare nisi in virtute prioris prius naturaliter existentis et causantis. Immo omnes medie congregate simul non possent esse vel causare nisi in virtute prioris prius naturaliter existentis et causantis simul. Tamen preter omnes medias simul sumptas nulla esset prior cum omnes essent medie, ut ponitur. Ideo nulle cause possent causare, et sic omnino nulla esset causa, quod est manifeste impossibile. Ergo, in causis essentialiter ordinatis necesse est esse primam causam."

Second, Buridan wants to prove that the first cause is the agent-cause of the heavens.[181] This step is important not only for establishing the identity between the first cause of being and the first mover but also in the light of Christian faith. After all, in Christian faith it is believed that God is the creator of finite being. In contrast to many of his predecessors, Buridan thinks that Aristotle and Averroes held that God moves the heavens actively.[182] Buridan, who endorsed the same opinion, distinguished two ways in which something can be said to be an agent. According to the first way, an agent brings a thing into existence, or produces it from non-being to being. In that sense, the heavens do not have an agent-cause according to Aristotle. However, Buridan believes by faith that they do have an agent-cause, since according to faith, the heavens are created in time. According to the second way, an agent preserves a thing. Buridan mentions an example of such a conserving agent: a luminous body preserving a ray of light. When the body is destroyed, the ray of light would immediately disappear.[183] Given that the creation of the world is held by faith but is not proved demonstrably, Buridan's strategy is to show that even if heaven is not produced by God from non-being to being, it would still depend on God as a conserving agent. He explains this by means of an analogy: heaven depends on God as a conserving cause, in the same way as a ray of light depends on a luminous body.[184]

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[181] Buridan devotes two questions to this problem. The first considers whether Aristotle and Averroes were of the opinion that God moves the first mobile (*primum mobile*) as an agent, or only as a final cause; The other question considers whether the heaven, according to its substance, depends on God as on an agent cause. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 6, fols. 67va–69vb, and q. 7, fols. 69vb–70va.

[182] *Ibid.*, XII, q. 6, fol. 68rb: "Ista questio est multum difficilis, quia tam auctoritates Aristotelis ad invicem, quam etiam auctoritates Commentatoris ad invicem videntur contradicere, sicut apparuit. Credo tamen quod fuerit intentio eorum quod Deus moveret celum active motu diurno."

[183] *Ibid.*, XII, q. 7, fol. 70ra: "Dupliciter dicitur agens. Unum est producens rem de non esse ad esse. Et sic diceret Aristoteles quod celum secundum suam substantiam non habet causam agentem, licet secundum fidem diceremus quod celum habet vel habuit causam agentem, quia factum fuit cum ante non esset. [...] Aliud est agens conservans, sicut nos dicemus quod radium factum in aere conservat corpus lucidum, quoniam si removeretur corpus lucidum periret radius ille."

[184] *Ibid.*: "Et oportet omnino imaginari sicut de radio luminis. Si enim aer fuisset perpetuus et sol perpetue stetisset et quievisset super nostrum hemispherium, constat quod perpetuo fuisset radius luminis in aere et semper dependens a sole. Et tamen oportet concedere quod ista dependentia esset a sole tanquam a causa agente, quia substracta causalitate solis vel remoto sole statim periret radius. Ita imaginandum est quod Deus est verissima lux et quod celum et intelligentia et omnia alia non sunt nisi tanquam radium ab illa luce provenientes, unde si Deus substraheret causalitatem suam a celo vel ab aliquo alio, statim illud periret et annihilaretur."

Buridan's metaphysical attempt to establish the identity between the first being and the first mover seems rather unsatisfactory. Buridan holds by faith that God created the world, so he produced it from non-being to being, and hence he believes that the first being is also the first agent. However, since faith is not enough to establish a metaphysical proof, he has to rely on the concept of God as a conserving agent. Moreover, Buridan's proof of the heavens' active dependence on God is based on an analogy, the acceptability of which remains to be seen. In the end, the proof that the first mover was also the first cause and the first being is established not demonstratively, but by relying on an analogy.

3.5. *God's Nature*

Since Buridan thinks that a thing and its essence coincide, the capacity to know God's being also includes God's essence. According to Buridan, one has essential knowledge of something when one has an essential concept of it. Buridan explains how such an essential concept can be acquired by our intellect, once again with an appeal to a psychological theory. Perception of the created world provides us with a confused concept, which can be stripped by the intellect of all its connotations, so that an absolute, proper concept of God remains. This psychological mechanism is the same as the one that enables our intellect to acquire a simple concept of substance from the perception of accidents.[185] It should be noted, though, that this absolute concept of God is a philosophical concept, which does not provide information about God's complete nature, for this includes properties that cannot be known in a natural way, for example his trinity. The concept is absolute in the sense that it does not add anything extraneous to God's essence.[186]

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[185] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. 10vb: "Quia aliquid intelligere quiditative est ipsum intelligere secundum conceptum a quo sumitur predicatum quiditativum. [...] Unde quamvis non possimus intelligere substantias nisi mediantibus accidentalibus sensibilibus, tamen intellectus potest substantiam abstrahere ab accidentibus et cognoscere sive formare conceptum simplicem substantie. Et ita etiam possemus dicere quod ex istis inferioribus ascendimus ad cognitionem Dei, et secundum convenientiam vel disconvenientiam attribuimus ipsi diversa predicata et multa, tamen intellectus tandem potest elicere conceptum simplicem quo intelligit ipsum absolute et separate ab aliis." Buridan elaborated his view about simple substantial concepts in the fourth question of the first book of his *Questions on the Physics* and in the sixth question of the first book of his *Questions on the Soul.*

[186] For Buridan, as for Scotus, the names of perfections that we impose on creatures and God alike, are grounded in the same concepts, which are derived from creatures. Yet, according to Buridan, the perfections imposed on God relate to absolute concepts,

Since our knowledge of God is always mediated by his many effects, the concepts that we form of God are diverse.[187] Schönberger points out that a compilation of all passages about God, scattered through Buridan's works, shows us a more or less traditional picture.[188] The predicates that Buridan ascribes to God are mainly the predicates that were ascribed to him already in ancient philosophy: God is immutable, without affects, completely simple, identical to his own thought (*Deus est ipse intellectio*), eternal, and necessary.[189] As Buridan argues repeatedly, all these predicates are derived from that which is sensible. Since God is most perfect, only those predicates can (and must) be applied to God which signify a simple perfection, whereas all others should be denied of him.[190] Beyond philosophical predicates, Buridan acknowledges some Christian predicates of God, like that he is a free agent, for he is able to produce diverse effects

whereas the perfections imposed on creation relate to the same concepts before they were stripped of their connotations. For an extensive discussion on the subject of natural knowledge of God's essence in Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, see Kok, "What Can We Know about God?"

187 See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 13rb: "Non enim ascendimus ad eius notitiam nisi mediante notitia istorum inferiorum. Modo ex diversis mediis per que devenimus in notitiam Dei, formamus de ipso diversos conceptus."

188 See Schönberger, "Philosophical Theology," p. 265; and Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, pp. 298–301, 315.

189 See Schönberger, *Relation als Vergleich*, pp. 298–301, 315.

190 According to Buridan, a predicate of simple perfection does not connote any diminution, either in itself or in relation to something else. For example, the name "donkey" must be denied of God, for even though it signifies a perfect thing within a certain species, we can find more perfect things among that which is sensible, so there are more perfect predicates than "donkey." See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 8, fol. 70rb: "Cum Deus sit simpliciter perfectissimus, omne predicatum simpliciter perfectionale debet ipsi attribui, et alia debent de ipso negari. Et voco predicatum perfectionale quod nullam diminutionem connotat, nec ad ipsum sequitur aliqua diminutio, sive simpliciter, sive in respectu alterius. Dico autem respectu alterius significari diminutionem si sequatur hoc esse minus perfectum quodam alio vel aliud esse perfectius ipso. Et ideo hoc nomen 'asinus' non dicetur hoc modo predicatum perfectionale, quia quamvis significaret rem perfectam in tali specie, tamen invenitur aliquid perfectius et melius asino. Ideo hoc nomen 'asinus' non potest affirmari de Deo." This idea has its ground in Aristotle. In the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, those things are called perfect or complete that do not lack anything good and are not surpassed by anything else, and if they cannot be surpassed by anything in their *species.* Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Δ 16, 1021b14–1022a2.

from one matter, or even from nothing, and that he is omnipresent.[191] Furthermore, Buridan acknowledges God's omnipotence.[192]

However, from the second half of the 13th century, the status of the divine attributes or predicates was questioned, since the multiplicity of predicates seems to disagree with God's simplicity.[193] This gave rise to the epistemological question of how to distinguish a unity into different parts, and to the ontological question of whether such distinction has a grounding in reality. Buridan wonders in various places whether or not different predicates endanger God's simplicity.[194] He claims that the distinction between the predicates does not correspond to a multiplicity in God. The three divine names, for example, do not imply a distinction between the divine persons.[195] This answer gives rise to the question of whether the predicates are synonymous or fictitious, for otherwise they seem to lack a ground in reality.[196] According to Buridan, they are neither synonymous

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[191] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 1, fol. 65ra: "Notandum est quod quedam sunt agentia libera, ut Deus et intelligentie et anima intellectiva. Alia sunt agentia naturalia et non libera. [...] Primo ex fide tenere debemus quod Deus ex eadem materia posset facere valde diversos effectus, immo etiam ex nihilo. Sed hoc demonstrari non posset." See also idem, XII, q. 14, fol. 77ra: "Sed princeps mundi est immaterialis et incorporeus, et sic non determinat sibi aliquem situm. Ideo potest sufficienter esse presens toti mundo ad regendum totum."

[192] In his questions on the *Metaphysics*, Buridan defines God's omnipotence in response to the argument that God would not be omnipotent if he cannot make another God. Buridan replies that God's omnipotence is not the potency to make the impossible happen but, rather, the potency to make happen whatever is possible, i.e., whatever does not imply an internal contradiction. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 14, fol. 77ra: "Deus est omnipotens non quia posset facere impossibilia fieri, sed quia potest facere omnia possibilia fieri; et ideo non est contra omnipotentiam eius si non posset facere alium Deum." See also Schönberger, "Philosophical Theology," pp. 266–67.

[193] See Bernard M. Lemaigre, "Perfection de Dieu et multiplicité des attributs divins," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 50 (1966), 198–227. See also Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 36, 39. For the use of the term "attributes" as a technical expression for God's properties, see Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 35–36. Buridan mainly used the term "predicates," which is more neutral, since it does not imply an ontological distinction of several properties, only a semantical distinction.

[194] He considers the question of whether the multiplicity of predicates danger God's simplicity for example in *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 4, "Utrum primus motor sit omnino simplex," fols. 66va–67ra; XII, q. 6, "Utrum fuerit intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris quod Deus moveat primum mobile active an solum quod moveat ipsum per modum cause finalis," fols. 67va–69vb; and XII, q. 8, "Utrum Deus est delectatio et vita," fols. 70va–71va.

[195] Of course, Buridan dismissed the subject of the Trinity from his consideration as soon as he raised it, for it did not belong to the faculty of arts. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 8, fol. 71ra: "Sed de isto non debemus nos intromittere in ista facultate, quia trinitas non est ratione probanda, sed pure fide credenda."

[196] *Ibid.*, fol. 71rb: "Ista difficultas remanet Commentatori et nobis, quia secundum predicata prius attributa Deo non distinguuntur persone divine. Quelibet enim persona divina

nor fictitious. To prove his point, he used a traditional argument: their difference does have a ground in reality, though not in God. Rather, it exists in the sensible things from which they were derived. Since it is sensible things which account for the rational difference between these predicates, the predicates do not express a distinction in God and thus not endanger his simplicity.[197] The difference between those predicates lies in the sensible things from which they are derived, and in the human mind, but, crucially, not in God.

Finally, Buridan wonders why we attribute several predicates to God's simple essence. He argues simply that God's perfection cannot be grasped by any of these attributes in isolation. It does not follow from any of them that he is more perfect than any of the sensible things from which the predicates are derived. For example, from the mere fact that God is substance, we cannot conclude that he is more perfect than a stone. However, from the collection of all these attributes we can conclude God's greatest perfection.[198]

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vivit, vult, intelligit, delectatur, amat, et amatur. Et ideo oportet videre duo. Primo quo modo evitabitur quod illa predicata non sint synonyma vel ficta."

[197] *Ibid.*, fol. 71rb: "Respondetur sicut alias dicebatur quod cum Deus non sit sensibilis et nos non possimus ad notitiam insensibilium venire nisi per notitiam sensibilium, propter hoc quod intellectus noster non intelligit sine sensatione previa; ideo oportet insensibilia describere et circumloqui per predicata ex istis inferioribus inventa, in quibus inferioribus bene correspondet realis diversitas, a qua sumitur diversitas secundum rationem illorum predicatorum. Et illa predicata secundum similitudinem et rationem vel proportionem aliquam aut secundum dissimilitudinem attribuimus illis insensibilibus. Et remanet semper inter illa predicata diversitas secundum rationem, cui diversitati non correspondet diversitas in Deo vel in intelligentia, sed in illis a quibus primo accepta fuerunt illa predicata. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod non sint synonyma." See also idem, XII, q. 4, fol. 66va: "Dicendum est quod illa diversa predicata non sunt ficta et quod habent correspondentia ex parte rei, non quia sit diversitas in Deo, sed quia est diversitas in aliis rebus quibus mediantibus veniebamus in notitia ipsius Dei. Et a quibus illa predicata accepimus." In these passages, Buridan seems to adopt Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of analogy. However, at other points in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he proves that these predicates can be stripped of all their connotations, so an absolute, proper concept of God remains. See above, note 191. Cf. Schönberger, "Philosophical Theology," p. 266.

[198] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 8, fol. 71rb–va: "Et ista magis apparebunt solvendo secundam dubitationem, scilicet: quid nobis prodest tot predicata attribuere Deo simplici existenti. Respondetur quod hoc est quia per unum predicatum non intelligeremus nec possemus arguere tantam Dei perfectionem et potentiam quantam possumus intelligere et arguere per duo predicata, aut tria, aut plura. [. . .] Sed ex congregatione istorum predicatorum et plurium aliorum, ut quod est causa totius mundi et agens et finalis, nos possumus concludere maximam perfectionem substantie eius, maxime quando fuerit conclusum quod nihil est ipsi additum per quod ipsi ista diversa predicata conveniant. Tunc enim erit tante perfectionis secundum suam substantiam quante essent omnia diversa que possent correspondere illis diversis predicatis." See also idem, XII, q. 4, fol. 66va: "Sed statim tu dicas: si non sit diversitas in Deo correspondens, quid nobis prodest tot diversa predicata

3.6. *Provability and Probability in the Twelfth Book of the* Metaphysics

Whereas the Aristotelian concept of God is not always in agreement with faith, the Christian predicates and truths about God cannot always be demonstrated by reason. For instance, the fact that God can create from nothing must be held by faith, but cannot be demonstrated.[199] Buridan, who had to swear that he would settle controversies between philosophy and faith in favor of faith, recognized and considered this friction between Aristotelian philosophy and faith repeatedly.

An interesting example of the friction between faith and philosophy is the question of whether God understands himself and everything outside himself. In Buridan's day, the idea that God had perfect knowledge of himself and his creatures was generally accepted among theologians, since it was expressed unequivocally in the Bible and the ecclesiastic tradition. However, the philosophical underpinning of this theological idea was more problematic.[200] According to Buridan, everyone would agree that God understands himself in a perfect way.[201] More controversial was the view that God understands everything outside himself clearly and distinctly, such that he understands every being and every way (*modum*) in which they are, either in themselves or in relation to others. This view is held by faith, but Buridan thinks that it can also be proved rationally, although only by some probable arguments (*demonstratio probabilis*) based on God's causality.[202]

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ipsi attribuere? Dico quod valde prodest, quia aliter non bene possemus apprehendere nobilitatem et potentiam ipsius Dei."

[199] See above, note 191.

[200] See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 3–4.

[201] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 13, fol. 75va: "Omnes concedunt quod Deus intelligit se. [. . .] Item omnes concedunt quod ipse intelligit se perfectissime."

[202] *Ibid.*, fol. 75vb: "Positis conclusionibus in quibus fides et opinio omnium philosophorum concordant, ponenda conclusio in qua aliqui philosophi discordaverunt a fide, quamvis etiam multi concordaverint. Dicimus ergo quod Deus omnia alia a se intelligit clarissime et sic distincte quod omne ens intelligit, et omnem modum se habendi ipsum ad seipsum et ad quelibet alia. Et scit quod Sortes differt a Platone, et scit quomodo differunt ab eo, et quando et quomodo unusquisque agit vel non agit. Et ista conclusio non solum ex fide, immo etiam aliquibus rationibus probabilibus potest persuaderi." Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Λ 9, 1074b15–1075a10, esp. 1074b34: "Therefore, it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking" (transl. Jonathan Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, 2 vols. [Princeton, 1995], vol. 2, pp. 1698–99). Aristotle himself seems to be of the opinion that the first principle could only think about himself. In the 14th century, this opinion was also ascribed to Averroes, based on his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, p. 71.

An important premise for these arguments is the fact that God actively (and immediately) causes everything outside himself. Since God causes everything by his intellect and will, he must know everything, for an intellectual agent knows everything that he makes by his intellect and will.[203] Moreover, Buridan supposes that a cause represents its effect. Supposing that God is the sufficient and total cause of being, he is then also a sufficient representative of all being other than himself. Therefore, when God knows himself perfectly, he perfectly knows the representative of everything outside himself.[204]

Thus, Buridan tries to solve the question by making a plausible cause for the position of faith. That his arguments could only be probable already follows from the premise that God is the efficient cause of everything else. As I indicated above, Buridan proved this point only *probabiliter*. However, Buridan himself did not question the premises of his argument, at least not explicitly. William of Ockham, who held the same opinion as Buridan on this issue, mentions exactly this point in his *Quodlibeta*: it cannot be proved sufficiently that God understands anything outside himself, since it cannot be proved sufficiently that God is the efficient cause of

[203] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 13, fol. 75vb: "Prima ratio est quod Deus omnia alia a se causat active, secundum dicta in prioribus questionibus. Et omne quod Deus agit, ipse agit per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed agens intellectuale omne illud intelligit quod agit per intellectum et voluntatem. Ergo Deus omne aliud a se intelligit."

[204] Buridan supposes that an effect represents its cause sufficiently, so that the intellective power knows a cause by its effect. But since an effect is contained in its cause more perfectly than a cause in its effect, a cause must also represent its effect. See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 13, fols. 75vb–76ra: "Alio ratio bene probabilis est. Suppono enim primo quod aliquis effectus sit sufficiens representativum sue cause, ita quod virtus cognoscitiva per illum effectum posset cognoscere causam eius. [. . .] Et adhuc rationabilius est quod causa et cognitio perfecte cause sit sufficiens representativum sui effectus, maxime si sit causa efficiens et totalis, quia perfectius effectus continetur in causa quam causa in effectu.' [. . .] Secundo suppono quod Deus est causa sufficiens et totalis secundi enti, et postea Deus et secundum ens simul, vel etiam Deus per se solum, sunt causa sufficiens tertii entis, et sic deinceps usque ad ultima entia. Ex quibus sequitur quod Deus est sufficiens representativum sui entis. Cum ergo Deus perfectissime cognoscat seipsum, ipse cognoscit perfectissime sufficiens representativum secundi entis. Ergo per illud representativum quod maxime est Deo presens ipse cognoscit illud secundum ens. Et iterum per cognitionem suiipsius et illius secundi entis ipse cognoscit tertium ens. Et sic deinceps. Ideo concluditur quod ipse perfectissime intelligit omnia." The argument is a little more complicated than I sketched, for Buridan's starting point is a chain of causality.

anything.[205] Of course, the decisive answer to the question if and in what way God knows creation belongs to theology.[206]

Nowhere in his metaphysics does Buridan seem to struggle with the reconciliation of faith and reason more than in the twelfth book. More than once he starts his response by noting that a certain question looks very difficult to him, mainly because the opinions of the philosophers and faith differ.[207] He develops a variety of solutions to these difficulties. Sometimes he admits that a truth of faith was not provable, only probable, as in the aforementioned example. On other occasions, he reconciles Aristotle's opinion with faith.[208] Sometimes he just observes that the opinion of the philosophers differ from the truth of faith, without trying to reconcile them or make a plausible case for the opinion of faith.[209] Despite Buridan's optimism about the intellect's capacity for knowing immaterial being, his "natural theology" seems to be the least certain part of his metaphysics.

4. Conclusion

As we have seen above, historians of philosophy hold Buridan's commentary on the *Metaphysics* in high esteem, but their appraisals of its metaphysical character vary widely. Some doubt whether Buridanian metaphysics is a discipline independent of semantics. Others argue that it does not deserve the name "ontology," or that it would in fact be a kind of "natural theology."

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[205] See Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, II, q. 2, in: Guillelmi de Ockham *Opera Theologica*, vol. 9, ed. Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1980), p. 115.

[206] The theologian Marsilius of Inghen, who uses, among others, the same arguments from causality as Buridan, finally concludes in his theological writings that God's knowledge of the things other than himself can be demonstrated by natural reason. See Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 109–12.

[207] See Buridan, *Qu. Met.*, XII, q. 13, fols. 71va–73ra: "Utrum quot sunt motus celestes tot sint intelligentie et econverso," esp. fol. 72ra: "Ista questio est valde difficilis; et aliter esset respondendum secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem et aliter secundum fidei veritatem."

[208] *Ibid.*, q. 3, fol. 66ra, where he explains that Aristotle could have been right in claiming that heaven and celestial movement are eternal (*sempiternum*), provided that "eternal" is understood as "everlasting," which means "being in every time." In contrast to God's eternity (*eternitas*), the heavenly and celestial movement is limited to time, since where there is no heavenly and celestial movement, there is no time.

[209] *Ibid.*, q. 9, fols. 72va–73ra, where Buridan, considering the question of whether there are as many intelligences as there are celestial movements, just lists the conclusions according to the philosophers and that of faith one after the other and finally concludes that "the views of the philosophers were surely different from the truth of faith."

Clearly, Buridan's metaphysics is characterized by a semantic approach to traditional metaphysical problems, an approach that was used in many of his philosophical works to clarify philosophical problems and to sharpen the discussion. But instead of transforming metaphysics into semantics, this approach, rather, offers a new perspective on ontological problems. For Buridan, semantics is a necessary step in order to achieve metaphysical knowledge. One could also say that Buridan's semantics implies ontology, for he explicitly uses the word "metaphysical" for that approach which considers the extramental things signified and connoted by terms. Buridan's discussion on being and essence can be called exemplary for his way of doing metaphysics. Semantics here functions as a window to reality, with Buridan's semantic analysis showing how conceptual confusion leads easily to the mistaken idea that different names imply a difference on the ontological level.

Beyond Buridan's semantic approach, a characteristic feature of his metaphysics that has as yet remained unnoticed, is its reliance on cognitive psychology. Buridan repeatedly appeals to psychological mechanisms for the underpinning of his metaphysical views. The difference between being and essence is explained with an appeal to cognitive psychology, referring to the notion of intuitive knowledge. Likewise, the unicity of substantial form is argued for with the help of another cognitive mechanism that explains how the intellect is able to form quidditative concepts out of accidental concepts. In the same way it is proved that the intellect can form an absolute concept of God from his effects.

As the "science transcending natural things and natural science," metaphysics was placed somewhere between natural philosophy and theology. While the beginning of the 14th century displays a tendency to distinguish between a general and a special metaphysics, of which the latter considers God and the separate substances, Buridan did not follow this path. However, the relationship between metaphysics and theology is not unproblematic in his metaphysics. This becomes clear from his discussion on the ontological status of accidental being, where he takes a doctrine of faith as the starting point of his philosophical analysis. Since no other example of such excessive "theological interference" can be found in Buridan's metaphysics, it is tempting to say that the case of the ontological status of accidental being is a mere exception, albeit an interesting one.

Although Buridan's approach towards metaphysics foreshadowed a break with the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics, it did not portend the end of metaphysics itself, or of the problems traditionally raised in metaphysics. Admittedly, following Buridan's approach might lead one

to ask, in the end, for a redistribution of philosophical problems among the diverse philosophical disciplines, consequently reducing the amount of purely metaphysical problems. Buridan himself thought highly of the discipline of metaphysics, the importance of which was, according to him, beyond question. History seems to be on his side, for the revival of metaphysics in the 15th and 16th centuries proves that its role was far from being played out.

PAUL OF VENICE'S COMMENTARY ON THE *METAPHYSICS*

Alessandro D. Conti

Paul of Venice (Paulus Nicolettus Venetus—Paolo Nicoletti Veneto), O.E.S.A. (Udine 1369–Venice 1429) was the most important Italian philosopher and one of the most interesting thinkers of the late Middle Ages.[1] He fully developed a metaphysics of essences inspired by Wyclif's own form of realism, based on the ontological primacy of universals over singulars, and by Duns Scotus's philosophy. He maintained some of the fundamental theses of the metaphysical system of the Doctor Subtilis, and, like Wyclif himself, reinterpreted them by putting much more stress on the realist aspects of the doctrines:

- a single general concept of being holding for God and creatures, and another one, narrower, holding for substances and accidents;
- real distinction among the ten categories, based on the differences among their essences;
- real identity and formal distinction between essence and being;
- a manifold kind of being for universals;
- real identity and formal distinction between the universals *in re* and singulars;
- process of individuation operating at two different levels by two different principles: it multiplies an universal form by means of matter, and constitutes individuals by means of *haecceitates* (thisnesses) or *rationes individuales* (individual principles);
- existence of three distinct but connected types of truth, two of which must be regarded as real properties of extramental things.

Paul's work where we can find his metaphysical theories totally displayed is his mammoth commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, i.e., the *Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (henceforward, *Lect. Met.*), extant

[1] On Paul of Venice's life, works, and thought, see Alessandro D. Conti, *Esistenza e verità. Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo Medioevo* (Rome, 1996); and Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice," in: Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition)*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/paul-venice/> (accessed on September 1st, 2013).

in two Italian manuscripts, Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, *fondo Aldini*, 324 (A.D. 1434) and Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, Ia.3–6[2] although the doctrines expounded there sometimes needs to be integrated with what he writes in the sixth part of the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* (A.D. 1408—henceforward *Sum. Nat.*), totally dedicated to metaphysical themes, in his *Quaestio de universalibus* (henceforward *Qu. Un.*),[3] and in the Commentary on the *Ars vetus*: the *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem veterem Aristotelis* (A.D. 1428).

In what follows, a glimpse into Paul's metaphysics shall be offered together with a short description of the main stylistic features of his *Metaphysics* commentary and a brief analysis of the logical tool he utilizes in building up his system, namely, the twin notions of identity and distinction, a "family" of concepts that he draws from Wyclif's notions of formal distinction. As is well known, the Aristotelian treatise is not a homogeneous text but a compound and stratified one, and Paul's commentary is very long (the Pavia manuscript consists of 470 folios) and too articulated, and, what is more, it is repetitious and without a real doctrinal focus, so that it is impossible follow closely its configuration in expounding it. On the contrary, it is necessary to adopt a systematic way of presentation. Thus, in the first section of the chapter, I shall illustrate the structure of the work. The second section will deal with the analysis of the notions of identity and distinction. The third section will be dedicated to being and categories in their mutual relations. In the fourth section I shall explore his solution of the question of the composition of essence and being in creatures. In the fifth section, I shall examine his theory of universals, concentrating on the problem of the relationship between formal universals and individuals. In the sixth section, the most important and somehow original aspects of Nicoletti's metaphysics, namely, his theory of individuation, will be considered. In the seventh section I shall focus on his notion of truth and the ontological link between singular substances, accidents, and complexly signifiables. Finally, in the last section some conclusions on the main features of Nicoletti's world will be drawn.

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[2] As for the quotations, I shall refer to the Pavia manuscript.

[3] As for the quotations from *Sum. Nat.* and *Qu. Un.*, I shall refer to Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6433B, fols. 116r–136r.

1. *The* Metaphysics *Commentary*

The precise dating of composition of Paul's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* remains a matter for conjecture; however, on the basis of the study of Alan Perreiah,[4] it is commonly assumed that it was written in the early 1420s (possibly 1420–24). It appears to be a commentary on both Aristotle's work and Averroes's own commentary on it—and this fact partially explains its uncommon length: even if Paul does not comment on Books M and N, the commentary consists of about 1,200,000 words! Yet, it cannot be utilized in order to better understand Aristotle's and Averroes's thought, since, despite the appearances, it is not an exegetical work. It is not really aimed at this goal; rather, Aristotle and Averroes are used by the Italian master simply as *auctoritates* for supporting his own views. So their works are not studied and commented in themselves but are interpreted from his peculiar point of view, in order to corroborate his own philosophical theses and doctrines. For instance, Paul constantly tries to bring Averroes's reading of the Aristotelian text into line with his own theories, and, if it is not possible, he argues against Arab commentator's explanations.

The true interlocutors of his philosophical discussions are others, namely, some of the main realist authors of the Middle Ages, such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Alexander of Alexandria, Walter Burley, and John Wyclif; the great masters of his order, Giles of Rome and Gregory of Rimini; and the chief exponents of the late medieval nominalism, such as Ockham, Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen, against whom he renewed Burley's and Wyclif's attacks.[5] The ways of relating to all these thinkers are various: Paul's *Lectura* is full of remarks, questions, and digressions inspired by the commentaries of Albert, Thomas Aquinas, and Alexander,[6] but his views are rather in debt to Scotus's and Wyclif's, although there are only about half a dozen quotations from Scotus's writings and a pair from Wyclif's *Summa de ente*—as far as I could see. Moreover, very often he gathers as many alternative opinions as possible and plays mutually incompatible theses against each other. This contributes

[4] See Alan R. Perreiah, *Paul of Venice: A Bibliographical Guide* (Bowling Green, Oh., 1986), p. 121.

[5] Cf. for instance Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 1, fol. 295va–b.

[6] See Fabrizio Amerini, "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria, and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

to making his commentary stimulating and enriching from an historical point of view, but also makes it difficult to grasp his own ideas in their unity.

These reflections can help us to understand why for about 150 years Paul was *erroneously*, but unanimously, believed to be an Ockhamist in logic and metaphysics and an Averroist in psychology and epistemology. But here, in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, it is possible to find not only clearly displayed and expounded his own form or realism but also, paradoxically, his most keen criticisms to Averroistic position on psychology and epistemology. In the commentary on the fourth book,[7] Nicoletti explicitly argues against the unicity of the passive intellect, utilizing a line of reasoning drawn from the *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* and the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas.[8] And in the commentary on the twelfth book, he claims that this Averroistic thesis is lacking a solid basis, since it can be maintained from the physical point of view only, according to which everything is considered *qua* affected-by or connected-with motion, but it is *false* from the metaphysical point of view, which is the most comprehensive of all. From this viewpoint, according to which the passive intellect has to be considered a substantial form, it is evident that it has a beginning in time, but certainly not an end, and that, like any other material substantial form, it is multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies.[9]

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[7] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 3, fols. 136vb–137ra.

[8] Among the arguments employed the most important are the following three: (1) if the soul is the form of the body, as Aristotle states, it is impossible that the passive intellect is one in all men, since one and the same principle in number cannot be the form of a multiplicity of substances; (2) If the passive intellect is one and the same for all men, then after death nothing remains of men but this unique intellect, and in this way the bestowal of rewards and punishments is done away with; and (3) One and the same intellect could hold contradictory opinions at once, in apparent violation of the law of contradiction.

[9] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, XII, tr. 1, c. 3, fol. 427ra–b: "Aristoteles ergo in *Physicis* omnia conside-rans fieri per mutationem et motum posuit aeternitatem mundi, et motus et temporis. Et consequenter, probans esse incorruptibilem intellectum, ne concederet multitudinem infinitam animarum separatarum, voluit illum esse aeternum et unicum in omnibus hominibus. In *Metaphysicis* autem, considerans intellectum esse formam substantialem, asseruit ipsum incipere cum corpore et numerari ad numerationem corporum; non tamen corrumpi, propter suam impassibilitatem. Et, ut ostenderet quod ea quae dicta sunt in *Physicis* non convincunt, asserit quod nihil prohibet sic dicere et quod est perscrutandum—ad innuendum quod in hoc libro *Metaphysicae* determinaturus erat hanc difficultatem. Non tamen determinavit eam, quia morte preventus non complevit librum *Metaphysicae*, sicut <patet> ex quaestionibus motis III huius, quas non complete in hoc libro determinavit."

2. The Logical Basis of His Metaphysical System: Identity and Distinction

Paul's formulation of the theory of identity and distinction is a further development of Duns Scotus's and Wyclif's ideas about the subject.[10] The Italian master recognizes two main types of identity: material (*secundum materiam*) and formal (*secundum formam*). There is material identity when the material cause is the same, either in number (it is a case of the same thing called in different ways) or by species (it is a case of two objects made of the same kind of stuff). There is formal identity when the formal cause is the same. This happens in two ways: if the form at issue is the singular form of the individual composite, then there is a unique object known in different ways; if the form at issue is the common essence instantiated by the singular form, then there are two distinct objects belonging to the same species or genus. Correspondingly, the main types of distinction (or difference) are also two: material and formal. There is material distinction when the material cause is different, so that the objects at issue are separable entities. In general, there is formal distinction when the formal cause is different. This happens in two ways: if the material cause is also different, then it is a particular case of material distinction. If the material cause is the same, then a further analysis is necessary. If the material cause is the same by species only, then it is an improper case of formal distinction; but if the material cause is the same in number, then there is properly formal distinction, since the forms at issue have different metaphysical compositions (expressed by different definite descriptions) but share the same substrate of existence, so that they are one and the same thing in reality. For example, there is a proper formal distinction in the case of the two properties of being-capable-of-laughing (*risibile*) and of being-capable-of-learning (*disciplinabile*), which are connected forms instantiated by the same set of individual substances.[11]

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[10] On Duns Scotus's theories of formal distinction, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976), 5–74, esp. 25–43; Peter O. King, "Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and Individual Difference," *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 51–76; and Steven D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 43,1 (2005), 7–62. On Wyclif's theories, see Paul V. Spade, "Introduction," in: John Wyclif, *On Universals*, transl. by Anthony Kenny, with an Introduction by Paul V. Spade (Oxford, 1985), pp. vii–li; and Alessandro D. Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," in: Ian C. Levy, ed., *A Companion to John Wyclif, Late Medieval Theologian* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition) 4 (Leiden, 2006), pp. 67–125.

[11] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, V, tr. 2, c. 3, fol. 185ra–b.

Material distinction is a necessary and sufficient criterion for real difference, traditionally conceived, whereas there is formal distinction if and only if there is one substance in number (i.e., material identity in the strict sense) and a multiplicity of formal principles with different descriptions instantiated by it. Paul therefore inverts the terms of the question in relation to what earlier approaches had done. By means of the formal distinction, Duns Scotus and Wyclif had tried to explain how it is possible to distinguish many different real aspects internal to the same individual substance: the passage is from one to many. In contrast, Paul is attempting to reduce multiplicity to unity: the passage is from many to one. What Paul wants to account for is the way in which many different entities of a certain kind (namely, of an incomplete and dependent mode of existence) can constitute one and the same thing in number.

3. Being and Categories

The cornerstone of Paul of Venice's metaphysics is his definitions of *ens* and *esse*. He deals *ex professo* with these two notions mainly in the fourth book of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. He describes *ens* and *esse* in relation one to the other, since he affirms that *ens* is that which is (*id quod est*) or that which has being (*id quod habet esse*).[12]

Paul distinguishes two different notions of *Ens*: one more general (*large*), clearly drawn from Scotus's notion of being (*ens*); the other more particular (*stricte*). Both the notions are analogous—says Paul—but the *Ens* taken in the first sense is predicated essentially (*essentialiter*) of God and the creatures, as everything real is immediately something which is (in this sense).[13] Since it is purely conceptual, this homogeneity does not eliminate the difference in natures between God and the creatures, however.[14] The notion of *Ens* taken *stricte* directly applies only to those beings which have a well defined nature and an external efficient cause and principle of their existence.[15] Therefore, it is predicated essentially only of categorial being, and causally and denominatively (*causaliter et denominative*) of God, who is the real cause of everything else. In fact, any

[12] *Ibid.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 125vb.

[13] *Ibid.*, fol. 122ra–b.

[14] *Ibid.*, fol. 124rb: "Neque obstat quod Deus et creatura sint primo distincta, quia ista primitas non est ratione conceptus, sed naturae; conveniunt quidem in eodem conceptu, sed non conveniunt in eodem natura."

[15] *Ibid.*, fol. 122rb: "Ens secundum quod huiusmodi habet princi-pium et causam."

other entity is (something real) only insofar as it shares the being of God in accordance with its own nature, value, and position in the hierarchy of creatures.[16] God is said *to be* a being according to the second, narrower, sense just as an individual substance is said *to be* so and so in virtue of an accident, or the sun is said *to be* warm. In these cases, the copula does not mean identity, because no substance is (identical with) an accidental form, nor is the sun the same thing as the warmth. The *Ens* taken in this second sense is the object (*subiectum*) of metaphysics and is immediately divided into the ten categories.[17]

Such a position implies not only that God (as well as separate substances) is not a proper object of the metaphysical science but also that the most proper one is the categorial being—and, in fact, the sixth part of the *Summa philosophiae naturalis*, which deals with metaphysics, is mainly concerned with the ten (Aristotelian) categories.

The categories stem not from the *Ens* as from a over-ordered and comprehensive genus but in different ways, according to their own modes of being. In the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, like Burley, Paul maintains that the division into categories is first of all a division of *res* existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of the mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them; and the abstract forms belonging to one category are really distinct from those in others. He also presents a method for deducing them which is derived from the first example of

[16] *Ibid*. See also XII, tr. 1, c. 3, fol. 427rb: "Et ita, si 'Aristoteles' supervixisset, docuisset inceptionem mundi, ad modum fidei christianae; non quidem per motum vel mutationem, sed per simplicem emanationem, quam vocamus creationem, quae est quaedam productio non praesupponens motum, neque mutationem, neque materiam."

[17] *Ibid.*, fol. 122ra–b: "Ens transcendenter sumptum dupliciter sumitur, videlicet large et stricte. Ens large sumptum est commune analogum ad Deum et ad creaturam, de quibus essentialiter praedicatur, sed non tamquam de partibus subiectivis aut tamquam de his quorum unum est principium alterius. Et sic ens in quantum ens non habet principia neque causas. [. . .] Ens stricte sumptum est quoddam commune analogum ad decem praedicamenta, de quibus essentialiter praedicatur tamquam de partibus subiectivis. [. . .] Deus enim est principium et causa totius entis descendentis in decem praedicamenta, sub quo non continetur Deus tamquam pars subiectiva, sed in eo continetur per modum principii. Ideo ens sic sumptum non essentialiter et per se praedicatur de Deo, sed solum causaliter et denominative, eo modo quo accidens praedicatur de substantia et caliditas de sole. Substantia enim non est accidens in abstracto, sed in concreto, nec sol est formaliter calidus, sed solum virtualiter et causaliter. Ita Deus non est entitas in abstracto, sed ens in concreto, non quidem formaliter et quidditative, sed denominative et causaliter—semper loquendo de ente transcendenter sumptum quod est causatum et subiectum metaphysicae, et quod immediate dividitur in decem praedicamenta tamquam partes subiectivae." See also *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 1, fols. 122ra–b, 123va–124rb, and 125vb; VII, tr. 1, c. 2, fol. 242vb; and *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii* (henceforward *Exp. Porph.*), c. *de specie*, in: *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem veterem Aristotelis* (Venice, 1494), fol. 22rb.

sufficientia praedicamentorum utilized by Burley in his last commentary on the *Categories*.[18] According to this view, there are two fundamental modes of being proper to world items: being by itself, which characterizes substances, and being in something else (*in alio*), which characterizes accidents. The latter is subdivided into three less general modes: being in something else in virtue of its matter; being in something else in virtue of its form; and being in something else in virtue of the whole composite. Something can be in something else in virtue of its matter, form, and composite according to three different ways: from inside (*ab intrinseco*), from outside (*ab extrinseco*), and partially from inside and partially from outside (*partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco*). If something is in something else in virtue of its matter and from inside, then it is a quantity; if from outside, it is a where (*ubi*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an affection (*passio*). If something is in something else in virtue of its form and from inside, then it is a quality; if from outside, it is when (*quando*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an action (*actio*). If something is in something else in virtue of the whole composite and from inside, then it is a relation; if from outside, it is a possession (*habitus*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is a position (*positio vel situs*).[19]

In the later commentary on the *Categories*, in addition to this, Paul proposes four other examples of metaphysical deduction of the ten categories, as follows. A second one inspired by the *sufficientia praedicamentorum* utilized by Albert the Great in his *Liber de praedicamentis* (tr. 1, c. 3). A third one drawn from the second *sufficientia* mentioned by Burley in his last commentary on the *Categories*.[20] A fourth one, which he calls "*communis*," based on a starting distinction between absolute and relational (*modus respectivus*) modes of being, the former proper to substance, quantity, and quality and the latter to the remaining seven categories. And, finally, a fifth example, called "*specialis*," which combines the categorial division with the division into four (individual substance,

[18] Cf. Walter Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (A.D. 1337), c. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, in: *Expositio super Artem Veterm Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Venice, 1509), fol. 21ra–b. In his turn, Burley had derived it from Robert Kilwardby's commentary on the *Categories* (*lectio* 5).

[19] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, V, tr. 2, c. 2, fol. 180rb–va. See also VII, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 235ra–b.

[20] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, c. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentrum*, fol. 21va. In his turn, Burley had derived it from Simon of Faversham's commentary on the *Categories* (q. 12).

universal substance, individual accident, and universal accident) of the second chapter of the *Categories*, describes the relationship between substance and the nine kinds of accidents in terms of causality, and considers relation as an accident which, like quantity and quality, comes from inside the substance.[21]

4. Essence, Being, and Existence

As we have already seen, *ens* is that which has being (*esse*), but, according to Paul, the finite corporeal beings (namely, "things" such as men, animals, and plants), the *res* of the world, have got four different kinds of being (*esse*): real (*esse reale*), essential (*esse essentiale*), temporal (*esse temporale*), and individual (*esse suppositale vel individuale*). The real being is nothing but the whole reality of the finite being itself (Socrates considered together with all the properties which can be truly attributed to him). The essential being is the mode of being proper to the specific nature (in the case of Socrates, the human nature) that a certain singular directly instantiates. The temporal being is the state of affairs designated by infinitive expressions like "*hominem esse*" or "*esse album*"—namely, the complex object of the act of judging, grounded on the existence of a singular substance or a set of singular substances.[22] Finally, the individual being is the actual existence of the primary substance of a finite being as it is distinct from the whole reality of the finite being itself.[23]

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[21] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (henceforward *Exp. Pred.*), c. *de numero praedicamentorum*, in: *Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem veterem Aristotelis* (Venice, 1494), fol. 50ra–vb.

[22] On this particular point, see Paul's commentary on the *De anima*, III, tr. 1, c. 4, t.c. 22 (Venice, 1504), fol. 144vb.

[23] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 1, fol. 92vb: "Est notandum primo quod esse quadrupliciter sumitur. Primo pro esse reali, eo modo quo sumit Aristeteles, II *De anima*, dicens quod sensatio est unum esse et opinatio alterum. Secundo pro esse essentiali, eo modo quod sumit Philosophus, III *De anima*, dicens quod aliud est magnitudo et magnitudinis esse, et rectum alterum est a recto esse. Ubi dicit Commentator quod ibi accipitur magnitudo et rectum pro individuo et esse magnitudinis et recti pro quidditate et essentia. Tertio sumitur pro esse temporali; et sic sumit Aristoteles, I *Posteriorum*, dicens quod non est idem unitas et unitatem esse, quia unitatem esse significat complexe, unitas incomplexe. Quarto accipitur pro esse suppositali vel individuali; et sic sumit Boethius in libro *De hebdomadibus* (dogmatibus *ed.*), dicens: 'Diversum est esse et illud quod est,' ubi (ita *ed.*) per esse intelligitur individuum et per illud quod est intelligitur quidditas."

In view of this position, inspired by Wyclif's doctrine of level of being,[24] Paul of Venice also, like the English master, maintains no real distinction between essence and being.[25] The essence of a creature does not precede its being, as essence without being, as well as being without essence, would be a self-contradictory state of affairs. In fact, essence without being would imply that an individual could be something of a given type without being real in any way, while being without essence would imply that there could be the existence of a thing without the thing itself. As a result, the *pars destruens* of his theory on being and essence is a not too implicit refutation of the twin opinions of Aquinas and Giles of Rome.[26] Thomas Aquinas had postulated a real composition of essence and *esse* in creatures, in order to account for the dependence of the world upon God at a merely philosophical level. He thought that as the essence of a creature receives its being from God, essence and being are distinct from each other, but related one to the other just as potency (essence) and act (being). Giles pursued the same line of thought, as he admitted a distinction between essence and being as between *res* and *res*.

Because of the complexity of the metaphysical composition of creatures, the simple affirmation of the real identity between essence and being is insufficient for adequately describing the relationships among their constituents. Consequently, like Wyclif,[27] Paul speaks of a formal difference (*distinctio* or *differentia formalis*) that he calls also "difference of reason" (*distinctio rationis*), between essence and being in creatures. In fact, from the extensional point of view, being and essence of creatures

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[24] Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 7, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985), pp. 126–28. See also his *De intelleccione Dei*, c. 5, in: Michael H. Dziewicki, ed., *De ente librorum duorum excerpta* (London, 1909), pp. 101–02. On Wyclif's theory of levels of being and in general on his metaphysics, see Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 67–125.

[25] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 2, fol. 127rb: "Ens non est aliquid superadditum essentiae, sive accipiatur ens ut importat esse essentiae sive ut importat esse existentiae; dicit enim Philosophus quod nihil differt dicere in re 'homo' et 'ens homo.' Si autem ens aliquid diceret supra hominem, differret dicere 'homo' et 'ens homo,' quia dicendo 'homo' diceretur quidditas et essentia tantum, dicendo autem 'ens homo' diceretur essentia et existentia; et dicerentur duae res; et per consequens differret dicere 'homo' et 'ens homo.' [...] Dicendum ergo quod esse et essentia dicunt eandem rem sub diversis rationibus. Eadem enim res numero importata per habitum dicitur essentia et importata per actum dicitur esse. Idem enim est lux et lucere; sed lux dicit habitum, lucere autem actum." See also VI, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 223vb: "Unumquodque est ens per suam quidditatem, ita quod idem est ens, essentia [essentia] et quidditas, licet differant ratione."

[26] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 2, fol. 127rb.

[27] Cf. Wyclif, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 7, pp. 128–31; and *De materia et forma*, c. 4, in: Michael H. Dziewicki, ed., *Miscellanea philosophica*, 2 vols. (London, 1902–05), vol. 1, pp. 184–85.

are equivalent, as every being is an essence and *vice versa*; yet, from the intensional point of view, there is a formal difference, since the actual existence of a thing presupposes its essence and not *vice versa*. More precisely, in the *Summa philosophiae naturalis*, where he copes exhaustively with the problem, Paul summarizes his position as follows: (1) the essence and being of any creature cannot be really distinct from each other; (2) the essence of a thing is formally different from its real being (*esse reale*) and from its essential being (*esse quidditativum*); (3) the essence and the essential being of a thing are formally (*ratione*) different from temporal and individual beings; and (4) specific and generic essences can keep on being even though no individual instantiates them, but in this case they have not any actual existence (*esse actuale*).[28] Hence, according to Paul, the essence and the essential being of a thing are one and the same reality regarded from two different points of view. In fact, when Paul uses abstract terms, such as "*humanitas*," he wants to signify the common nature intentionally conceived as a mere form, made up by a set of essential properties; conversely, when he uses concrete terms, such as "*homo*," he wants to signify the common nature extensionally conceived as a real entity instantiated by at least one individual actually existing; and finally, when he uses compound expressions, such as "*homo communis*" or "*in communi*," he wants to signify that same common nature considered *qua* common—namely, regarded from the point of view of its own mode of being, as it is apt to inform an item put lower down the *linea praedicamentalis*.[29]

Like Wyclif, the Augustinian master seems to think of the essence as a universal form intentionally considered, and the existence (taken in the strict sense) as the mode of being proper to primary substances. Thus, when Paul affirms that essence and being are really identical and formally distinct, he simply restates the thesis of the real identity and formal distinction of universals and individuals typical of the Oxonian Realists of the late Middle Ages. The most important results of such a metaphysical analysis are the following: (1) extension of the range of the notion of being; (2) distinction between being and existence, as the former is the universal condition of every kind of reality and the latter the mode of being peculiar

[28] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 1, fol. 93ra: "His visis sit haec prima conclusio: nillius rei essentia habet esse tamquam formam ab illa realiter distinctum. [...] Secunda conclusio: nulla essentia ab esse reali trascendenter sumpto et a suo quidditativo esse aliter differt quam ratione. [...] Tertia conclusio: nullaessentia vel quidditativum esse differt a suo esse temporali vel suppositali aliter quam ratione. [...] Quarta conclusio: essentia generis vel speciei habet esse existere absque ratione individuali, sed non esse actuale."

[29] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 1, fol. 93ra.

to individual substances only; and (3) a sort of assimilation of the distinction between essence and being to the distinction between universal and singular.[30] This last point is related to Paul's theory of universals, and it cannot be properly understood without it.

5. Universals and Individuals

According to Paul, finite (corporeal) beings have a threefold kind of substantial forms (*forma quae dat quod quid est esse*), and therefore a threefold kind of matter: the form and the matter of the (individual) composite (*forma compositionis*), the form and the matter proper to the species (*forma speciei*), and the form and the matter of the whole reality of the finite being (*forma totius*).[31] The *forma compositionis* is the singular form which, joined to the matter (or *materia compositionis*), makes up the individual substance, like the *anima intellectiva* in relation to man. The *forma speciei* is the difference, as it divides genus into species and constitutes the species itself. Conversely, the *materia speciei* is the genus, as it is determined by the difference. The *forma totius* is any superior form in relation to its subordinate forms, like *animalitas* in relation to *humanitas*; while the *materia totius* is any subordinate entity in relation to superior in the *linea praedicamentalis*, like Sortes in relation to man or animal. The concepts of matter and form are therefore relative, since their meanings are connected with each other. Being the form of something and being the matter of something are converse relations of three different kinds (*compositionis, speciei, totius*), whose arguments and values are the

[30] On Wyclif's and Paul of Venice's doctrines on essence and being, see Alessandro D. Conti, "Essenza ed essere nel pensiero della tarda scolastica (Burley, Wyclif, Paolo Veneto)," *Medioevo* 15 (1989), 235–67.

[31] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 1, fols. 92vb–93ra: "Forma quae dat quod quid est esse est triplex, scilicet compositionis, speciei et totius. Forma compositionis est alter pars compositi, quae dicitur forma partis, contrahens materiam ad determinatam speciem. [...] Forma speciei est differentia divisiva generis, et generaliter quelibet pars definitionis declarans quidditatem rei. [...] Forma totius est superius respectu inferioris, [...] et generaliter omne continens respectu contenti. [...] Et sicut triplex est forma, ita triplex est materia, scilicet compositionis, speciei et totius. Materia compositionis est alter pars compositi contracta per formam naturalem vel artificialem. Et haec dicitur materia partis. [...] Materia speciei est genus contractum per differentiam essentialem. Sicut enim materia potentialiter formas generands continet, ita genus potentialiter continet omnes species, secundum Porphyrium in *Universalibus*. [...] Est enim genus materia in qua differentiae et materia ex qua speciei. Materia totius est inferius respectu sui superioris—quae dicitur pars subiecta."

metaphysical constituents of the singular substance, the metaphysical constituents of the specific forms, and the categorial items (*entia praedicamentalia*) respectively.

The *forma totius* can be considered from a twofold point of view: intensionally (*in abstracto*) and extensionally (*in concreto*). Considered *in abstracto*, the *forma totius* simply expresses the set of essential properties which compose a categorial form, without any reference to the existence of individuals which, if that is the case, instantiate it. Considered *in concreto* the *forma totius* is that same form conceived of as instantiated by at least one singular item. For instance, the human nature intensionally considered is the *humanitas*, extensionally considered is *homo*. Both of them are *formae totius* as they are superordinated to the whole human concrete compounds, but they denote the same nature with different connotations, since *humanitas* refers to the human nature as a form (i.e., something existentially incomplete and dependent), whereas *homo* refers to the same nature as a real entity (i.e., something existentially autonomous and independent).[32] This *forma totius* is the universal *in re* (or formal universal) of the medieval realist tradition.

Like many other Realists of the Late Middle Ages, Paul admits that there are four kinds of universals:[33] (1) the general causes of everything (*universale causale*), namely, God and the angelic intelligences, who can produce several different effects and specifically distinct individuals; (2) the ideas of any possible species present in the mind of God (*universalia ante rem*)—ideas which are really identical with God Himself, but formally distinct from Him;[34] (3) the common natures existing *in re* as part of the essence of singulars, which determine the main features of the individuals which instantiate them; and (4) the abstract concepts *in anima*, which are mental images of the common natures *in re* naturally caused by the common natures themselves in the human intellect.

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[32] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Exp. Porph.*, Prooem., fol. 9va.

[33] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, Prooem., c. 2, fol. 9va–b: "Notandum primo quod quadruplex est universale, iuxta imaginationem antiquorum: primum universale est causale, scilicet causa productiva individuorum plurium specierum indifferenter. Et sic Deus et intelligentiae dicuntur universalia. […] Secundum universale est ideale, causa scilicet exemplaris eiusdem speciei omnium individuorum aequaliter. […] Tertium universale est universale formale, scilicet natura universalis communicata multis, ut humanitas existens in omnibus hominibus. […] Quartum universale est intentionale, scilicet conceptus mentalis univoce de pluribus praedicabilis, ut isti conceptus, homo, animal." See also *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 3, fol. 94rb–va.

[34] On this specific point concerning divine ideas see in particular Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 2, fol. 298rb.

As natures of a certain kind, formal universals are identical with their own individuals (for example, *homo* is the same thing as Socrates) as far as their actual reality is concerned. In fact, universals are formal causes in relation to their own individuals, and individual material causes in relation to their universals, since individuals are *partes subiectivae* of the universals. All the genera, species, and individuals belonging to the same category are, therefore, really identical (as the individuals which instantiate a certain specific nature instantiate also all the forms superior to it) and, if considered in themselves, just as individuals, species, genera, are formally distinct from each other (as in this case the strings of elements which constitute their metaphysical structure are partially different from each other). This entails that for Paul, just as for Burley and Wyclif, formal universals are *in actu* also outside our minds, but this full existence depends entirely on the existence of their individuals. Without them, common natures would not be really universals.[35] In Nicoletti's view, the property of being universal is possessed potentially by common natures which are not instantiated by any individual, and it becomes wholly actual when a common nature is instantiated by at least one singular—universality is therefore an aspect of the common natures completely independent of our mind, and dependent on the existence of individuals. Quite the opposite, according to moderate Realists, such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, the universality (namely, the property of being apt to be present in many things and to share the being with them) is possessed only potentially by common natures, even instantiated by individuals, and it is because of an intervention of the human mind that this property becomes wholly actual. But in this way—argues Paul—the universal concept in our mind would not be matched in the world by a thing of the same degree of generality, and therefore our abstractive knowledge would be somehow misleading.[36]

This interpretative scheme of the nature of universality and of the relationship between common natures and singulars is ultimately grounded on individuation, since no actual universality and no instantiation is possible without individuation. Individuation is fundamental to both universals and individuals, as universals and individuals, distinct on the level of being, are linked together on the level of full existence (*esse existere in*

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[35] Cf. *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 2, fol. 94ra: "Secunda conclusio: universalia habent esse actuale extra animam praeter operationem intellectus. [. . .] Tertia conclusio: universalia denudata a singularibus suis non sunt actu universalia, sed potentia tantum."

[36] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 1, fol. 295rb–va.

actu) by individuation. The primary substance, which is the core of the finite being, is the final result of an ontological enrichment of the specific form, just as the specific form was the output of an ontological improvement of the generic form, and so on.[37] What plays a dominant role in this process of individuation is the difference (no matter whether generic, specific, or individual), for it is the formal principle (*ratio*) which causes the passage from a categorial item to its inferior in the *linea praedicamentalis*. The incomplete forms of being peculiar to real universals presuppose individuals. In their turn, individuals can exist as metaphysical items, located at a particular place in space and time, and can be identified as distinct members of the same species only by means of the process of individuation through which they are obtained as from common natures.

6. Individuation and Singular Substance

Paul of Venice does not discuss *exhaustively* the problem of individuation in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (even though some interesting affirmations can be found in the glosses to the third book of the Aristotelian treatise), but in other two works: the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* (p. VI, c. 5), where he deals with the problem of angelic individuation, and in the chapter on species of the Commentary on the *Isagoge*.

In the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* and in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Paul's view is apparently drawn from Duns Scotus's doctrine, given the fact that he identifies the principle of individuation with the *haecceitas* (or *ratio individualis*),[38] whereas later on in the Commentary on the *Isagoge* he seems to adopt Thomas Aquinas's terminology and solution, although he keeps on speaking of *haecceitates* (and *rationes individuales*).[39] Therefore his final position on the problem looks like a sort of impossible mixture of antagonistic opinions. Yet, in point of fact, the cornerstone and knotty problem of his theory lies in this twofold approach to the question. Since the beginning, the Italian master assumes that the process of individuation operates at two different levels by two seemingly different principles: it multiplies a universal form by means of matter, and it constitutes individuals by means of the *rationes individuales*.

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[37] Cf. *Qu. Un.*, fol. 124ra: "Genus contrahitur per differentiam, et ex his fit species, sicut ex specie et ratione suppositali fit individuum et singulare."

[38] Cf. *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 5, fol. 95va–b; and *Lect. Met.*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 83vb.

[39] Cf. *Exp. Porph.*, c. *de specie*, fols. 23vb–24ra.

As we have already said, in the *Summa* and in the *Lectura*, Paul's treatment of individuation is in line with Duns Scotus's. He claims that the principle of individuation is twofold, *propinquum* and *remotum*. The immanent principle is that one whose presence necessarily entails the existence of the individual that it constitutes, and whose absence necessarily entails the non-existence (or disappearance) of the individual. The remote principle, in contrast, is just what the immanent principle presupposes, but whose presence and absence alone are insufficient for causing the existence or disappearance of the individual, as it continues being after the corruption of the individual. *Haecceitas* is the immanent principle of individuation, whereas form, matter, and quantity are the remote principles. *Haecceitas* in its turn has a twofold origin, as it derives from matter and form together, in the case of corporeal substances, and from the *quidditas* alone, in the case of angelic intelligences.[40] Furthermore, according to Paul, there is a close similarity between the *haecceitas*, which he also calls *differentia individualis*, and the specific difference. The specific difference is what differentiates the species from the genus, since it is the determination or property which, once added to the genus, results in the species. At the same time, the specific difference is really identical with the genus, from which it is distinct only in virtue of a formal principle (*alia ratio*). The same happens to the individual difference: it is what differentiates the individual from the species; but, from the ontological point of view, it is really identical-with and formally distinct-from the species itself; and it is the formal principle in virtue of which the individual is what it is, something singular, concrete, and perfectly determined in itself (*hoc aliquid demonstratum*).[41]

As far as the problem of angelic individuation is concerned, the logical consequence deriving from such premises is that it is impossible to find two angels who share the same specific nature and are numerically distinct, since only one *haecceitas* can spring up from an incorporeal species.[42] This solution is close to the inner sense of Duns Scotus's view and contrasts with Aquinas's belief,[43] even though, like Thomas, Paul claims that the angelic intelligences are specifically, and not numerically,

[40] Cf. *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 5, fol. 95vb.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. VI, c. 5, fol. 96rb; c. 26, fol. 112rb–va; and *Lect. Met.*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 83vb. See also *Qu. Un.*, *secunda conclusio*, fol. 128va; and *tertia conclusio*, fol. 129rb.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. VI, c. 5, fol. 96ra.

[43] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 93; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8; and *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 50, a. 4.

different from each other. However, the Augustinian master thinks that angels are individuated by the *haecceitates*, but not multiplicate because of the absence of matter, so that there is only one angel per species. Since specific natures of incorporeal beings do not include any reference to matter, only one *ratio suppositalis* can flow from such species. As a consequence, broadly speaking, every angel is *unum numero*, as two (or more) angels are, in any case, "many things," but no angel is *unum numero* in the strictest sense of the term.[44]

In the Commentary on the *Isagoge*, answering the question whether the matter or the form is the principle of individuation, Paul distinguishes between the principle of individuation proper to material substances and the principle proper to immaterial substances: the former is the matter itself; the latter is the form.[45] He makes no mention of the *haecceitas*. The Scotistic approach of the *Summa philosophiae naturalis* seems to be replaced with a Thomistic assessment. But when he copes with the question of whether individuals add something new in relation to the specific nature or not, he restates what he had held in the *Summa* and in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, as he maintains that: (1) the singular substance is the final result of a process of individuation whose starting point is a universal form; (2) the individuation is what differentiates the individual substance from its species; (3) the individuation is nothing but the *haecceitas* itself; and (4) the *haecceitas* and the specific form are only formally distinct from the individual substance they make up.[46]

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[44] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 5, fol. 95vb.

[45] Cf. *Exp. Porph.*, c. *de specie*, fol. 23vb.

[46] Cf. *Exp. Porph.*, c. *de specie*, fols. 23vb–24ra: "Secundum dubium: utrum individuum aliquid addat supra speciem. Respondetur quod tam species quam individuum praedicaemnti substantiae dupliciter possunt considerari, videlicet physice et logice. Verbi gratia, homo potest considerari ut est compositum ex materia et forma, una cum dispositionibus qualitativis et quantitativis; et sic homo speraddit animali has dispositiones accidentales realiter differentes tam ab homine quam ab animali. Et ista est consideratio physica. Consideratio autem logica est si consideratur homo ut componitur tantum ex genere et differentia; et sic homo superaddit animali differentiam, non tamen distinctam ab aliquo illorum realiter, sed tantum ratione. Ita Sortes potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo physice, in quantum componitur ex particulari materia et particulari forma, una cum proprietatibus accidentalibus nominatis; et sic superaddit homini illas proprietates realiter differentes tam a specie quam ab individuo. Alio modo potest considerari logice, in quantum componitur ex specie et individuatione tantum; et sic superaddit speciei individuationem, non quidem realiter differentem ab aliquo illorum, sed solum ratione. Dicendum igitur quod sicut generaliter quaelibet species, cuiuscumque praedicamenti fuerit, superaddit generi differentiam, ita quodlibet individuum superaddit speciei individuationem, quae est ratio incommunicabilis, faciens individuum non posse nisi de uno solo praedicari. […] Et ideo est dicendum quod, sicut animalitas et rationalitas, ex quibus componitur

In this way, Paul is trying to solve the aporetic aspects of Scotus's doctrine by means of the identification of the *ratio individualis* with the informing act through which the specific nature (the *forma totius in concreto*) molds its matter. This identification had been already suggested by the opposition between immanent and remote principles of individuation described in the *Summa philosophiae naturalis*. In fact, all the constituents of the individual compound (matter, form, and quantity) had been contrasted with the *haecceitas*, which, for that reason, could not be identified with any of them. The equivalence between *individuatio* and *sorteitas* of the Commentary on the *Isagoge* conveys the same basic idea: individuation is (1) the act through which specific forms (or natures) become something actually existing, as it is what individuals add to species, and also (2) what causes this passage from being (*esse*) to existence. As a consequence, the principle of individuation is a positive entity, belonging to the substantial order, added to the specific nature, and related to it as potency to act.[47] Reference to matter as the principle of individuation for corporeal substances does not undermine the substantial Scotistic machinery of Paul's doctrine, as individuation for corporeal substances is a twofold process. It constitutes the individual *qua* individual, giving it existence *in actu*, and it causes the passage from the unicity of the specific nature to the multiplicity of individuals which instantiate it. In other words, individuation explains *how* one and the same specific nature generates many individuals of the same type, and *what* causes this "generation." Matter is the answer to the first question, and *haecceitas* the answer to the second one. Paul's statements about angelic individuation are consistent with this. Since no specific nature as such has actual existence, there must be individual angels. Since there is no matter among angels, there is no multiplicity. Therefore, there is only one angel in each species, and each angel differs *specifice* from the others.

What makes the real difference between Duns Scotus's view on individuation and Paul's theory is the diverse evaluation of the relationship between the *haecceitas* and the specific nature. According to Scotus, the relation that links the *haecceitas* to the species is as act to potency. According to Paul, it is just the reverse. The Italian master claims that the *ratio individualis* plays the role of potency in relation to the species. Individuation

homo, non realiter differunt ab homine, sed tantum ratione, ita humanitas et sorteitas, quae est ipsa individuatio, non realiter differunt a Sorte."

47 Cf. *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 5, f. 96rb.

is the potential element of the individual compound (it is the "matter"), and species the actual element (it is the "form"). As a consequence, within Paul of Venice's system, individuals are not the core of being, as they result from an ontological "weakening" of the specific natures, which have a form of being totally independent of them. This conclusion is in line with Paul's theory of divine ideas, as God thinks of specific natures, and through them knows and creates individuals.[48] But, on the level of existence, which, according to Paul, is only a particular kind of being, individuals are superior to any other kind of entity, as they are the ontological substrates necessarily presupposed by the incomplete forms of existence peculiar to the other entities.

7. Substances, Accidents, and Complexly Signifiables

As is evident, Paul has a twofold consideration of accidents as abstract forms and concrete properties. Many times in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he insists that quantity, quality, and relations are (abstract) forms of nine different kinds inherent in the composite substances.[49] In this way, like Burley and Wyclif, he wants to safeguard the reality of accidental forms as well as their real distinction from substance and from each others, while at the same time affirming their dependence on substance in existence. Paul thinks that, if considered in themselves, accidents are abstract forms, really distinct from substance; whilst, if considered as concrete items which affects singular substances, they are not *really* distinct from the substances in which they are present, but only *formally*, as they

[48] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 2, fol. 298rb: "Idea proprie sumpta est quidditas specifica causaliter existens in mente divina, ad cuius exemplar supremus conditor creaturas producit in esse. [...] Idea debet esse quidditas specifica, quoniam idea habet rationem actus et formae; genus atuem et individuum habent rationem materiae; ergo idea non potest esse quidditas generis neque individui." See also *Qu. Un.*, *decima conclusio*, fols. 133vb–134rb. Paul criticizes Duns Scotus's theory of divine ideas mainly because the Doctor Subtilis had maintained that divine ideas correspond to individuals and not to species—see, in particular, *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 2, fol. 297va–b. On Paul's theory of divine ideas, see Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice's Theory of Divine Ideas and its Sources," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 409–48 (at pp. 438–48 the edition of the text: *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 3, c. 2).

[49] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, V, tr. 2, c. 2, fol. 179rb–vb, dedicated to the categories in general and, more in particular, to the distinction and relationship between substance and accidents; and tr. 3, c. 1, fols. 193ra–197va, dedicated to quantity; c. 2, fols. 197va–201rb, dedicated to quality; and c. 3, fols. 201rb–207vb, dedicated to relations and relatives (*ad aliquid*).

are mere modes of the substance.[50] The formal distinction enables us to rightly understand how this is possible. In the same way as the abstract forms of the universality and individuality, really different from each other, present at the same time in the same real item give origin to the formally different entities of the universal and of the singular, the really different abstract accidental forms which inhere in the same singular substance at the same time give origin to the formally different concrete entities of the (categorial) accidents. Almost the same happens with the complex signifiables.

Paul deals with them and the problem of the meaning and truth of sentences[51] in his commentary on the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*.[52] His aim is twofold, as he intends to better determine the ontological status and nature of the *complexe significabile* by clarifying the relations of real identity and formal distinction that, according to him, link it with the individual substance (or substances) on which its reality is grounded; and to develop a general theory of the proposition[53] logically more rigorous and less compromised with a metaphysics of the possible than that supported by Gregory of Rimini, his main source.

Paul's approach to the question is ontological, like that of Gregory, since, according to Paul, the true is an attribute of the things and only secondarily of the thought, but at the same time consistent with the

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[50] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, VII, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 236vb.

[51] Paul seems to distinguish between sentence and proposition, considered as what is expessed by a declarative sentence, but, like almost all medieval authors, he uses the two terms '*propositio*' and '*enuntiatio*' interchangeably for designating both the linguistic form by which the propositional content (*our* proposition) is manifested and the propositional content itself. On Paul of Venice's theory, see Giulio F. Pagallo, "Note sulla *Logica* di Paolo Veneto: la critica alla dottrina del *complexe significabile* di Gregorio da Rimini," in: *Aristotelismo padovano e filosofia aristotelica*. Atti del XII Congresso internazionale di filosofia, Venezia, settembre 1958 (Florence, 1960), pp. 183–91; Norman Kretzmann, "Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Proposition," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), 767–87; Gabriel Nuchelmans, "Medieval Problems concerning Substitutivity (Paul of Venice, Logica Magna, II, 11, 7–8)," in V. Michele Abrusci, Ettore Casari, & Massimo Mugnai, eds., *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Storia della Logica, San Gimignano, 4–8 dicembre 1982* (Bologna, 1983), pp. 69–80; Conti, *Esistenza e verità*, pp. 276–93.

[52] Cf. Paul of Venice, *Lect. Met.*, VI, c. 4, fol. 233rb–vb. See also V, tr. 2, c. 2, fol. 181ra; *Logica Magna*, p. II, fasc. 6: *Tractatus de veritate et falsitate propositionis et Tractatus de significato propositionis*, II, tr. 10 or 11, ed. Francesco Del Punta, transl. Marylin McCord Adams (Oxford, 1978); and *Exp. Pred.*, c. *de subiecto et praedicato*, fols. 47va–48rb; c. *de affirmatione et negatione*, fol. 52vb; c. *de substantia*, fols. 65vb–66ra; and c. *de priori*, fols. 136va–137va.

[53] Paul defines the *propositio* as a well-formed (*congrua*) and making-sense (*perfecta*) mental sentence (*enuntiatio mentalis*), which signifies the true or the false—see *Logica Magna*, p. II, *Tractatus de propositione* (Venice, 1499), fol. 101rb–va.

fundamental principle of every form of correspondence-theory of truth, that of the isomorphism of language, thought, and the world. In fact, in his commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and on the *Categories* Paul explains that the direct and adequate objects of propositions, which make them true, are *res complexae extra animam*. Such entities are extramental realities made up by a subject-thing and a predicate-thing linked together in one and the same substance (or the same set of substances).[54]

Paul distinguishes three different kinds of truth, connected together: the truth of imitation (*veritas imitationis*), the truth of disclosure (*veritas manifestationis*), and the relational truth (*veritas respectiva*). The first type of truth is the measure of the conformity (*adaequatio*), which all the things have in relation to their corresponding ideas in the mind of God, from which they derive.[55] The second type also is a real property of the extramental things (*passio entis*), which measures their various degrees of disposition to be apprehended by our intellect.[56] The relational truth, unlike the first two *veritates*, is not an absolute property of things but, just as its name says, a relation, and precisely a relation of conformity which has in our intellect its substrate of existence, in the mental sentences its *fundamentum*, and in the molecular objects (*complexa*) existing *extra animam* its *terminus ad quem*. Notwithstanding it is related to the activity of the intellect, the *veritas respectiva* is the effect caused in our intellect by the existence of the *veritas manifestationis*. If the things were not intelligible by themselves, they could not be grasped and recognized by our intellect for what they are. So, like Gregory, Paul also supports the idea that human knowledge is true only *qua* knowledge of the ontological true, and that propositions are true only insofar as they are the signs of the ontological true.[57]

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[54] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, VI, c. 4, fol. 233rb–va; and *Exp. Pred.*, c. *de subiecto et praedicato*, fol. 48ra.

[55] *Ibid.*, fol. 233rb: "Veritas imitationis est adaequatio rei ad intellectum divinum. Tunc autem res adaequatur intellectui divino quando debito ordine et debito gradu essendi consequitur ideam intellectus divini, sicut etiam illa domus est vera domus quae adaequatur intellectui artificis, quando debite consequitur exemplar existens in mente artificis. Unde verum est ens habens omne illud quod habere debet, et veritas est entitas aut essentia habens quicquid habere debet, quando debite consequitur et imitatur ideam divini intellectus."

[56] *Ibid.*, fol. 233va: "Veritas manifestationis est adaequatio rei ad intellecum nostrum. Tunc enim res adaequatur intellectui quando seipsam humano intellectui repraesentat sicut est. Et sic accipiendo verum convertitur cum ente."

[57] *Ibid.*, fol. 233vb: "Patet ergo quod non solum in intellectu componente et dividente est veritas et falsitas subiective, sed etiam in re extra animam; quoniam in vero auro est veritas imitationis subiective et in falso auro est falsitas subiective, opposita illi veritati privative, eo modo quo opponuntur lumen et tenebra. Sed verum et falsum transcendenter

On the basis of this account, which, then, is the relationship that holds between singular substances, finite beings, and *complexe significabilia*? In Paul's opinion, the complex truth signified by a true affirmative proposition is a composite reality which is part of the whole reality (the *esse reale* of the *Summa*) of a finite corporeal being. Socrates being a man (*Sortem esse hominem*) is *in re* Socrates himself considered together with the countless concrete properties of which he is the bearer. At the same time, the proposition identifies only one of these properties, that signified by the predicate-term (in our example, the property of being a man), which is formally different from the abstract form (in our example, that of humanity) connoted by the predicate-term and from Socrates himself. In fact, as we have already seen, the *formae totius* (or specific natures or essences) can be conceived of *in abstracto* and *in concreto*. Both the abstract form of humanity and the concrete property of being a man are substantial items superordinated to the singular human compounds, but while humanity is properly a form, namely, something existentially incomplete and dependent, being a man is a sort of existentially autonomous, independent, and non-elementary item. For that reason, Paul denies that what verifies a proposition such as "Socrates is white" are Socrates and the accidental form of whiteness taken together. On the contrary, he claims that the *significatum adaequatum* of that proposition is the reality of Socrates and his state of being white (*album*).[58] True negative propositions, too, such as "Socrates is not a donkey," have something which corresponds to them in reality, namely, something which is neither a substance nor an accident but a sort of negative state of affairs grounded in the two *esse realia* proper to the things signified by the subject and predicate terms (in our example, Socrates and the nature of the donkey).[59] So, the being proper to complexly signifiables can be identified with the *esse temporale* listed by Paul as the third level of being proper to the finite beings, and, as such, it is really identical-with and formally distinct-from the finite (corporeal) beings itself and with the singular substance which gives actuality to it.

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sumpta non opponuntur nisi secundum affirmationem et negationem, dicens Philosophus quod verum est ens et falsum est non ens. Ideo extra animam non est falsum transcendenter sumptum subiective in aliquo, sed veritas est subiective in ente sicut unitas. Ad Philosophum autem dicentem quod verum et falsum sunt in anima, bonum autem et malum sunt in rebus, respondetur quod ipse loquitur de vero et de falso secundum compositionem et divisionem, non autem de vero et falso secundum imitationem et manifestationem." See also *Lect. Met.*, V, tr. 2, c. 2, fol. 181rb–va.

[58] Cf. *Logica Magna*, II, tr. 11, p. 170. See also *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 1, c. 1, fol. 123ra.

[59] Cf. *Lect. Met.*, IV, tr. 2, c. 3, fol. 143va; and *Exp. Pred.*, c. *de substantia*, fol. 66ra.

8. Concluding Remarks

As the previous analyses have shown, Paul's world consists of: (1) finite beings (that is, things like angels, men, animals, plants and flowers, stones etc.), each made up by a primary substance and a host of concrete properties existing in it and by it; (2) substantial and accidental forms; and (3) *complexe signficabilia*, the *significata* of propositions, that is, extramental complex realities made up by a subject-thing and a predicate-thing linked together in one and the same substance or set of substances (for instance, the fact that Socrates is a philosopher, or the fact that some man is white).[60] He conceives of primary (i.e., individual) substances as the ultimate substrates of existence and subject of predication in relation to everything else; therefore, for him, the only way to guarantee the reality of the items belonging to other categories and of substantial natures instantiated by primary substances was that of regarding them as attributes of singular substance. As a consequence, the finite being cannot be totally identified with the primary substance. No primary substance contains the whole being of the finite being, which is an ordered congeries of categorial items. In their turn, primary substances are not absolutely simple items but are somehow complex ones, since they are compounded by potency and act, and particular matter and form—a form which is really (*realiter*) identical-with and formally (*formaliter*) distinct-from the specific nature itself, just as the whole primary substance is really identical-with and formally distinct-from the universal (or secondary) substance. Also the complexly signifiables, which are, in a certain way, parts of the finite being are really identical-with and formally distinct-from the finite being itself and from any other complexly signifiable which rests upon the same substance (or the same set of substances). Hence, within Paul of Venice's system of thought, the twin notions of real identity and formal distinction are the main kind of relationship holding between the constitutive elements of his world.

The substantial and accidental forms present in finite beings are nothing but the categorial items themselves, taken together with their peculiar modes of being. All these items are real being, in the sense that they are mind-independent. Yet, primary substances only are existent, namely, actual beings—*entia in actu*. Individuation is what causes the passage from being in general (*esse*) to existence, and from specific natures (universals)

[60] Cf. *Exp. Pred.*, c. *de subiecto et praedicato*, fol. 48ra.

to individuals. Because of the modalities of this passage, substantial universal forms are, at the same time, really (*realiter*) identical-to and formally (*formaliter*) distinct-from their individuals.[61] For that reason, and given that there are four different kinds of being (*esse*) in the finite beings (*entia*), universal natures have a form of being their own, independent of singulars. So, even if all the individuals belonging to a certain substantial species were annihilated, the species would keep on being as a mere metaphysical possibility (*esse indeterminatum et in potentia*) in the absolute power of God and in the pure potentiality of the prime matter.[62] What is more, a common nature would be annihilated if and only if all the individuals belonging to it were destroyed not only in relation to their actual existence but also in relation to their potential being.[63] Still, the potential being of individuals is nothing but the essential being proper to universals, and therefore the annihilation of the individuals in relation to their potential being is the destruction of universals themselves.

As a consequence, Paul of Venice's metaphysics states the centrality of specific natures, which, after all, correspond to the ideas in the mind of God, and in relation to which the actual existence of individuals is functional, since individuals exist only as material substrates (*partes subiectivae*) of the natures themselves. According to the moderate (Aristotelian) Realists of the 13th century, the actual existence of at least one individual was necessary in order to guarantee the existence *in potentia* of the corresponding universal. On the contrary, in Paul of Venice's view, the existence of a universal essence is the necessary condition for the existence of individuals. Hence, paradoxically his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* celebrates the "dissolution" of the Aristotelian ontology and the primacy of the Neo-platonic view.

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[61] Cf. *Sum. Nat.*, p. VI, c. 2, fol. 94ra. See also *Qu. Un.*, *prima conclusio*, fol. 124ra–b; *secunda conclusio*, fol. 127va; and *nona conclusio*, fol. 133va–b.

[62] Cf. *Exp. Porph.*, Prooem., fol. 8va. It is evident that there is a certain affinity among the *esse indeterminatum* of universals of which Paul speaks, the *esse essentiae* or *in genere* of Wyclif (*Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 7, p. 127) and the second level of being (or categorial being) analyzed by Giles of Rome in his commentary on *Posterior Analytics* (*Super Analytica Posteriora*, II [Venice, 1488], fol. N1rb).

[63] Cf. *Exp. Pred.*, c. *de substantia*, fol. 57va–b: "Destructo quolibet homine coniunctim ita quod non sit aliquod individuum speciei humanae, non manet homo, sed manet essentia hominis in suis causis. [...] Si tamen deficerent omnes homines et actu et potentia, non maneret species humana secundum esse neque secundum essentiam."

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY PARISIAN COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS**

Paul J.J.M. Bakker

1. Introduction

Fifteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* have received remarkably little scholarly attention. Yet, judging from the number of extant works, the tradition of commentaries on the *Metaphysics* would seem to have flourished in the 15th century, especially in comparison to the second half of the 14th century, when only a handful of commentaries was produced. No fewer than 42 commentaries written between 1400 and 1500 are known to have survived, either as complete texts or as fragments, either in manuscripts or in printed editions.[1] Of these 42 commentaries, five were written by Dominican masters, three by Franciscans,[2] three by Conventual Franciscans,[3] one by an Augustinian, and 30 by secular authors.[4] The commentaries can be assigned to three main geographical regions: Italy (eight commentaries), France (ten commentaries), and Central Europe (22 commentaries). The absence of English commentaries is striking. The Italian works mainly came from Padua, Florence, and Bologna. All but one of the French commentaries are from Paris. Within the Central European group, commentaries from Krakow (six or seven) and Erfurt (five) constitute the most important subgroups. Hence, judging

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1 The complete list of extant commentaries is given in Appendix 1.

2 None of the three works composed by Franciscan authors seems to be wholly autonomous. The first is an *abbreviatio* of Scotus's commentary (Johannes de Colonia), the second a *tabula* of Antonius Andreae's commentary (Kilianus Stetzing), and the third a *declaratio* of Antonius Andreae's commentary (Nicolaus Murrifex).

3 One of the three commentaries composed by Conventual Franciscans is referred to as *annotationes* (or *castigationes*) of Scotus's commentary (Mauritius de Portu). The other two seem to be autonomous works (Antonius Trombeta and Nicolaus de Orbellis).

4 If we take into account the authors whose commentaries seem to be no longer extant, as listed in Appendix 1, we can add six Dominicans, one Franciscan, one Augustinian, one Servite, one Carmelite, one Carthusian, and one secular.

from the origins of the extant works, it seems that in the 15th century, Padua, Florence, Bologna, Paris, Krakow, and Erfurt were the most important centers for the production of commentaries on the *Metaphysics*.

The focus of the present chapter will be on the Parisian group of commentaries. In particular, for reasons of availability, attention will be given to the works by the following six authors: Georgius Bruxellensis, Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Versoris, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti.[5] The *Metaphysics* commentaries produced by these six authors date to the second half of the 15th century. Judging from the oldest surviving manuscripts or earliest printed editions, the works can be arranged chronologically into three main groups:

1. Johannes Versoris's commentary seems to belong to the 1450s. One of the manuscripts containing this work (Prague, Národní Knihovna České Republiky, XXIII. C. 106) was written in 1459.
2. The commentaries by Nicolaus de Orbellis, Johannes Hennon, and Johannes le Damoisiau can be dated to the decade 1470–80. One of the manuscripts containing Orbellis's commentary (Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, 127) was written in 1473. The single manuscript containing Hennon's work (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6529) was written in the same year. The single manuscript containing Damoisiau's commentary (Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8) was written in 1479–80.
3. The commentaries by Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti seem to have been produced between 1485 and 1495. The earliest printed edition of Georgius Bruxellensis's commentary was published in 1486. The earliest dated printed edition of Petrus Tartareti's commentary was published in 1493. No manuscript witnesses of these works are known to survive.

2. Formal Characteristics

Before examining the contents of these three groups of commentaries, let me briefly discuss three of their formal characteristics, namely, (a) the

[5] No attention will be given here to the commentary of Johannes de Nova Domo, which I have not been able to examine. The commentaries of Johannes de Caulaincourt and Johannes Hervaeus will also be left aside, given that the surviving manuscripts of their works are defective and difficult to read in several places. All references will be to the following manuscripts and editions: (1) Georgius Bruxellensis, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Paris, 1502) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (2) Johannes Hennon, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6529 (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (3) Johannes le Damoisiau, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8 (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (4) Johannes Versoris, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Cologne, 1494; repr. Frankfurt a. Main, 1967) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*); (5) Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus librorum philosophie naturalis secundum viam doctoris Subtilis Scoti*, pars III: *Metaphysica* (Basel, 1494) (henceforth *Cursus Met.*); and (6) Petrus Tartareti, *Commentarii in libros Metaphysice Aristotelis* (Basel, 1514) (henceforth *Comm. Met.*).

relationship between the commentaries and the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, (b) the literary formats of the commentaries, and (c) the scope of the works.

(a) The six commentaries each refer to Aristotle's text in different ways. Johannes Versoris's commentary is the only work that incorporates the complete text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Books I–XIV) in William of Moerbeke's Latin translation. In contrast, in Nicolaus de Orbellis's commentary, Aristotle's text is only referred to in short lemmata.[6] In both commentaries by Johannes Hennon and Johannes le Damoisiau, only a few lines of Aristotle's text are cited at the beginning of each book. But these citations seem to function more as a pictorial decoration of the manuscript than as part of the text.[7] The commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis contains the abbreviated text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* composed by (or attributed to) Thomas Bricot. A salient feature of Bricot's abbreviation is that it summarizes entire chapters of Aristotle's text in a concise series of *conclusiones*.[8] Finally, Petrus Tartareti usually cites a short passage of

[6] A complete list of these lemmata is given below, in Appendix 2.

[7] This way of referring to Aristotle's text by way of decoration at the beginning of each book seems to have been quite popular in late 15th-century Paris. It is also found in the commentaries of Johannes de Caulaincourt and Johannes Hervaeus.

[8] For example, the first three chapters of Book I of the *Metaphysics* are summarized in the following three series of *conclusiones*. Thomas Bricot, *Textus abbreviatus Metaphysicae*, in: Georgius Bruxellensis, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Paris, 1502), fol. 2va: "Pro istis igitur sit hec prima *conclusio*: ex multis memoriis in hominibus fit experimentum. […] Secunda conclusio: ars et scientia per experientiam fiunt in hominibus. […] Tertia conclusio: ars et experientia non differunt quoad agere. […] Quarta conclusio: experti certius operantur artificibus inexpertis. […]"; fol. 2vb: "Quinta conclusio: artifices non experti sunt sapientiores quantum ad cognitionem non expertis. […]"; fol. 7va: "Pro quo sit prima conclusio: sex sunt conditiones sapientis. Prima est scire omnia ut contingit, idest, eodem modo quo possibile est. Secunda est difficilia cognoscere, quia non dicimus illum sapientem qui facilia cognoscit et levia. […] Tertia est ipsum habere scientiam certiorem aliis. Quarta est posse reddere causas quesitorum. Quinta est habere scientiam que suiipsius gratia est vel causa sciendi. Sexta est habere scientiam principaliorem. […] Secunda conclusio: necesse est habenti scientiam inesse istas sex conditiones. […]"; fol. 7vb: "Tertia conclusio: sapientia simpliciter dicta seu metaphisica habet considerare primas causas et prima principia. […] Ad videndum qualis scientia sit metaphisica sit prima conclusio: metaphisica est scientia speculativa. […]"; and fol. 8ra: "Secunda conclusio: metaphisica est scientia libera. […] Tertia conclusio: metaphisica est scientia honorabilissima. […] Quarta conclusio: metaphisica procedit ex notitia causarum admirabilium." The *conclusiones* are generally followed by short proofs. For bibliographical information concerning Bricot's abbreviations of Aristotle's works, see *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke* (Leipzig, 1932), vol. 5, pp. 528–46, esp. nn. 5540–45. Bricot's authorship of the *Abbreviatio* of the *Metaphysics* is not entirely certain.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (in Moerbeke's translation) at the beginning of each book and from time to time a few more lines as part of his *expositio* of Aristotle's text.[9]

(b) All six commentaries implement the literary formats of *expositio* and *quaestio* in one way or another.[10] The commentary by Nicolaus de Orbellis is the only one that adopts the *expositio* format as its overall structure, but within this basic *expositio* format, Orbellis discusses Aristotle's text in short *notabilia* (which are sometimes composed of articles and structured by means of *conclusiones*) and *dubitationes* (some of which exhibit the standard *quaestio* structure). The remaining five commentaries adopt the *quaestio* format as their basic structure. Johannes Versoris's commentary is composed of *quaestiones*, but within these *quaestiones* (usually in the first *notabile*), some elementary *expositio* is given to explain the logical order of Aristotle's text.[11] Johannes Hennon's commentary has a

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[9] For example, the following passages are cited at the beginning of Books I and II of Tartareti's commentary: fol. 112rb: "Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Signum autem est sensuum dilectio; preter enim et utilitatem propter se ipsos diliguntur, et maxime aliorum qui est per oculos. Non enim solum ut agamus sed et nihil agere debentes ipsum videre pre omnibus ut dicam aliis eligimus. Causa autem est quia hic maxime sensuum cognoscere nos facit et multas rerum differentias demonstrat. [=*Met.*, A 1, 980a21]"; fol. 113va: "De veritate theorica sic quidem difficilis est, sic vero facilis. Signum autem est neque digne quemquam adipisci ipsam posse nec omnes exortes esse, sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere [=*Met.*, α 1, 993a30]." In the *expositio* of Book I, the following lines are cited: fol. 112rb: "Quoniam autem scientiam hanc querimus, circa quales causas et circa qualia principia scientia sapientia sit [=*Met.*, A 2, 982a5] [...] Quia vero non activa, palam ex primum philosophantibus. Nam propter admirari homines [=*Met.*, A 2, 982b11]." The following lines are cited in the *expositio* of Book II: fol. 113va: "At vero quod sit principium quoddam et non infinite cause existentium nec in directum [=*Met.*, α 2, 994a1] [...] Contingunt autem auditores secundum consuetudines hominibus; nam ut consuevimus ita etc. [=*Met.*, α 3, 995a1]."

[10] For general information concerning these formats, see Olga Weijers, "La structure des commentaires philosophiques à la Faculté des arts: quelques observations," in: Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi, & Stefano Perfetti, eds., *Il commento filosofico nell'Occidente latino* (*secc. XIII–XV*). *The Philosophical Commentary in the Latin West* (*13–15th centuries*). Atti del colloquio Firenze-Pisa, 19–22 ottobre 2000 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale) 10 (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 17–41.

[11] Versoris's *quaestiones* usually contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of *notabilia* (sometimes only one, sometimes six or seven); (4) answer to the question (generally in the form of *conclusiones* with extensive proof); (5) *dubitationes* (sometimes one or two, sometimes six or seven). Some typical examples of *expositiones textus* in Versoris's commentary are the following: I, q. 3, fol. 3ra: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus posuit principium primum generationis scientie in nobis, quod est naturale desiderium ad scire, hic consequenter ostendit principium cognitionis per omnes gradus eius, ut tandem veniat ad accipiendum dignissimum gradum cognitionis, ut ostendat debere versari circa altissima principia et altissimas causas, ut etiam ostendat illum esse speculativum et non practicum"; III, q. 1, fol. 17ra: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus secundo *huius* dedit

similar make-up: within an overall *quaestio* structure, Hennon frequently offers classical *divisiones* and *expositiones* of Aristotle's text.[12] Johannes le Damoisiau and Petrus Tartareti also adopt the *quaestio* structure, but they place separate *expositiones* of Aristotle's text in front of the *quaestiones* (instead of including them in their *notabilia*).[13] The *expositio* format is the least developed in the commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis, where only some of the *quaestiones* contain elementary *divisiones* of Aristotle's abbreviated text.[14]

(c) With regard to scope, commentaries can be grouped into those that cover Books I–XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and those that only deal with Books I–VI. The commentaries by Johannes Versoris and Nicolaus de Orbellis belong to the first group.[15] Although Orbellis's commentary (the only one that adopts the *expositio* format as its basic structure) covers

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modum considerande veritatis in omni materia, consequenter in hoc tercio incipit procedere ad veritatis inquisitionem entium, circa que versatur huius scientie consideratio"; V, q. 13, fol. 50va: "Sciendum primo quod postquam Philosophus distinxit nomina aliqua que partinent (!) ad perfectionem entis, consequenter, quia totum et perfectum aut sunt penitus idem aut sibi invicem proxima, distinguit quedam nomina que pertinent ad rationem totius et ad rationem partis."

[12] Hennon's *quaestiones* normally contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of three *notabilia*; (4) a *conclusio responsalis*; (5) three *dubia*. The *divisiones* and *expositiones* of Aristotle's text are usually found in the *notabilia*. Most of the *dubia* are not subsidiary problems related to the principal question but, rather, are independent questions, in which the standard *quaestio*-structure is reiterated.

[13] The commentaries by Damoisiau and Tartareti contain exactly the same elements (in precisely the same order): (1) *expositio textus*; (2) title of the question; (3) arguments *quod non* (or *quod sic*) and *in oppositum*; (4) a series of four *notabilia*; (5) three *dubia*; (6) a *conclusio responsalis*. In both works, the *notabilia* and *dubia* include but few elements of textual explanation.

[14] Georgius's *quaestiones* normally contain the following elements: (1) title of the question; (2) arguments *quod sic* (or *quod non*) and *in oppositum*; (3) a series of two *notabilia*; (4) two *conclusiones responsales*; (5) three *dubia*. The *divisiones* are usually given in the first *notabile* of the first question of each book. Some typical examples of *divisio textus* in Georgius's commentary are the following: II, q. 1, fol. 10rb: "Sciendum est primo quod in hoc secundo libro Aristoteles determinat de facilitate et difficultate que est in cognitione veritatis. Et habet tria capitula. In primo determinat de facilitate et difficultate cognitionis entium. In secundo removet opinionem ponentium processum in infinitum in causis. In tertio declarat contingentia in cognitione veritatis"; IV, q. 1, fol. 19ra: "Sciendum est primo in hoc quarto libro quod Aristoteles incipit determinare questiones motas in tertio. Et dividitur iste liber in duos tractatus. Primus est de consideratione huius scientie circa incomplexa. Secundus est de consideratione huius scientie circa complexa. Primus continet tria capitula. In primo ostendit quod hec scientia habet considerare de ente et de partibus eius. In secundo ostendit quod habet considerare de uno. In tertio quod habet considerare de passionibus entis et unius."

[15] Versoris's commentary contains the text of Book I–XIV of the *Metaphysics*, but his *quaestiones* only cover Books I–XII. Versoris offers the following explanation of why the text of Books XIII and XIV is nevertheless included: fol. 116rb: "Finiunt decimustercius et

TABLE 1. *Number of* Quaestiones *Contained in the Five* Quaestio *Commentaries*

	Versoris	Hennon	Damoisiau	Bruxellensis	Tartareti
I	7	2	1	5	1
II	5	1	1	2	1
III	7	–	1	2	1
IV	6	2	1	3	1
V	15	1	1	3	1
VI	3	1	1	2	1
VII	12	–	–	–	–
VIII	4	–	–	–	–
IX	5	–	–	–	–
X	10	–	–	–	–
XI	5	–	–	–	–
XII	17	–	–	–	–

Books I–XII, the work is, nevertheless, highly selective. The list of lemmata clearly indicates that large sections of Aristotle's texts are given no attention.[16] The second group of commentaries by Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Petrus Tartareti, and Georgius Bruxellensis are more limited in scope. Given that these four commentaries all limit themselves to the first six books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, it seems quite likely that this practice somehow reflects the educational program at the Arts faculty of the University of Paris.[17] The commentary by Johannes Hennon occupies a position of its own in that it covers only Books I–II and IV–VI (omitting Book III).[18]

To conclude this outline of the formal characteristics of the Parisian commentaries, and before examining their contents, let me indicate in table 1

decimusquartus libri *Metaphisice* Arestotilis, qui sunt additi ad duodecim precedentes libros propter quibusdam (!) studiosos illorum noticiam speculari aspirantes."

[16] See the list of the lemmata given in Appendix 2, below.

[17] The commentary by Johannes de Caulaincourt also covers Books I–VI. Johannes Hervaeus limits himself to Books I–V. For both works, see Appendix 1.

[18] Hennon only offers a very short *divisio* of Book III (fol. 316va) and then immediately jumps to Book IV. In the commentary by Georgius Bruxellensis, the (abbreviated) text of Book III of the *Metaphysics* is also lacking. At the end of Book II, Georgius explains this omission as follows: fol. 13vb: "Finis secundi *Metaphysice*. Tertius liber, quia nihil in eo resolutorie dictum est, Parisii (!) non legitur." The commentary nevertheless contains two questions related to Book III (see Appendix 2, below). The link between these questions and Book III of the *Metaphysics* is established by a lemma (preceding the first question): fol. 13vb: "*Necesse est ad quesitam* etc. [=*Met.*, B 1, 995a25]." Georgius's commentary also states that only the first two and a half chapters of Book I (from 980a21 to approximately 983b6) were read at Paris: fol. 8rb: "Et hec de primo *Metaphysice*. Residuum, quia tantum de opinionibus antiquorum est, Parisii (!) non legitur" (the same statement is repeated a few columns further, fol. 9va).

the number of *quaestiones* the five *quaestio* commentaries devote to each individual book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[19] Nicolaus de Orbellis's *expositio* commentary is, of course, excluded.

3. Contents

The fact that most of the 15th-century Parisian commentaries under discussion devote only a few questions to Books I–VI of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* means that a only a limited number of topics are given attention. In the present chapter, the following issues will be briefly discussed: (3.1) the *concept of metaphysics*, (3.2) the *subject-matter of metaphysics*, more specifically the question of whether "being *qua* being" constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics and the question of whether the quiddities of particular beings as such fall under the consideration of metaphysics, (3.3) *knowledge of separate substances*, and finally (3.4) the relationship between *being and unity* and *being and essence*.

3.1. *The Concept of Metaphysics*

Most 15th-century Parisian commentators agree on the basic questions concerning the concept of metaphysics. They argue that metaphysics is a science (*scientia*), that it can rightly be called "wisdom" (*sapientia*), and that it is a speculative rather than a practical science. They sometimes offer slightly different, more-or-less elaborated explanations of their views. For example, in answering the question of whether metaphysics is a speculative or a practical science, all six commentators claim (unsurprisingly) that metaphysics is a speculative science. Johannes le Damoisiau argues for this position by merely stating that the characteristic features of a practical science, as opposed to that of a speculative science, do not apply to metaphysics.[20] Johannes Versoris, Johannes Hennon and Georgius Bruxellensis argue more extensively that metaphysics (or "first

[19] A complete list of the titles of the *quaestiones* (and *dubitationes*) for each of these works can be found in Appendix 2, below.

[20] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 269rb: "Dubitatur tertio utrum metaphisica sit scientia speculativa, et an scientia speculativa sit melior et nobilior practica. Pro responsione supponitur primo ex dictis circa prologum logice quid sit praxis, quid speculatio, quid scientia practica et quid speculativa. Unde ad scientiam practicam requiritur quod ipsa sit directiva alicuius vere praxis secundum respectum conformitatis, aptitudinalis et prioritatis; que omnia repugnant scientie metaphisice; quare ipsa non est scientia practica. Secundo supponitur quod scientia speculativa est illa que queritur propter scire, sed practica est que queritur propter operari."

philosophy" according to Georgius Bruxellensis) aims at nothing but the acquisition of knowledge through the elimination of ignorance and that, historically speaking, metaphysics only developed after the practical sciences had been established. The texts of these three authors show some striking literary similarities:

Johannes Versoris	Johannes Hennon	Georgius Bruxellensis
Conclusio responsiva: metaphisica est scientia speculativa et non practica. Probatur *ratione* et *signo*.	Prima conclusio est hec: methaphisica est scientia speculativa. Probat Philosophus *ratione* et *signo*.	Prima (*sc.* conclusio *PB*) est: metaphisica est scientia speculativa. Probat (*sc.* Aristoteles *PB*) *ratione* et *signo*.
Ratione sic: metaphysica queritur propter ignorantiam effugandam, et non propter aliud queritur; et sic queritur propter scire; ergo etc. Assumptum probat Arestoteles nam: propter ammirari nunc et primum inceperunt homines philosophari, differenter tamen, quia in principio erant ammirantes pauciora dubitabilium, deinde paulatim procedentes nunc de maioribus et offuscatioribus ammirantur; sed omnis qui dubitat et ammiratur ignorat; ergo assumptum fuit verum.	*Ratione* sic: illa scientia que solum queritur propter scire est speculativa; sed methaphisica est huiusmodi; igitur. Maior patet, quia finis scientie speculative est scire, practice vero est operari. Et minor probatur: philosophantes istam scientiam primo inquisiverunt ad fugiendam ignorantiam; sed non fugatur ignorantia nisi propter scire; igitur. Maior huius prosillogismi patet, quia propter admirari homines nunc et prius inceperunt philosophari. Unde a principio de paucioribus mirabantur, sed paulatim procedentes de maioribus dubitaverunt. Sed qui dubitat et admiratur, ignorare videtur. Ergo ista scientia primo quesita est ad fugiendam ignorantiam [...]	*Ratione* sic: illa scientia est speculativa que est solum propter scire quesita; sed sic est de prima philosophia; igitur. Minorem probat quia: propter admirari inceperunt homines philosophari, et primo mirabuntur de minoribus, secundo de maioribus, ut de ente et passionibus entis et de his que fiunt circa solem et astra; sed qui dubitat et admiratur ignorare videtur; quare hec scientia quesita est propter ignorantiam fugiendam et per consequens propter scire.

Signo sic arguit Arestoteles quia: iam cunctis existentibus artibus ordinatis ad utilitatem vite aut voluptatem aut introductionem in alias scientias, hec scientia cepit inquiri. Quod est signum quod solum queritur propter ipsum scire et non propter aliam utilitatem.[21]

Signo sic probat dictam conclusionem quia: hec scientia tunc inquiri cepit quando fere omnes artes ordinate ad sublevendam necessitatem humanam et voluptatem et ad instantionem omnis honeste conversationis et morum invente fuerant; ergo ista scientia non queritur propter aliam scientiam, sed solum propter se ipsam.[22]

Signo probat sic quia: prima philosophia cepit inquiri omnibus fere inventis que necessaria erant ad vitam et ad voluptatem; igitur ipsa non queritur propter aliquam vite necessitatem; et per consequens queritur solum propter scire.[23]

In addition, Johannes Versoris also offers an account of the notion of *praxis*. Taking his cue from John Duns Scotus, he defines *praxis* as an operation of a potency different from the mind, that is, naturally subsequent to the mind's cognitive operation and is capable of being chosen according to the judgment of right reason (*recta ratio*). From this definition he infers that *praxis* belongs to the will. For acts of the will are subsequent to acts of the mind and are capable of being chosen on the basis of right reason. Acts of the mind can only be called "practical" insofar as they control the acts of the will. Versoris argues that it is for this reason that logic too must be seen as a speculative science. For logic is in command of acts of the mind, not of acts of the will.[24] Nicolaus de Orbellis offers a similar, but more detailed account of the notion of *praxis*, which is clearly derived

[21] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, q. 7, fol. 11rb.

[22] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 31rb.

[23] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 5, fol. 8vb.

[24] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 7, fol. 11rb: "Ideo describitur praxis a Doctore subtili sic: praxis est operatio alterius potentie quam intellectus naturaliter posterior ipsa intellectione nata conformiter elici rationi recte ut recta sit. Ex quo patet quod huiusmodi actus alterius potentie, scilicet voluntatis, que primo praxis dicitur, non est in ipso intellectu nisi dumtaxat ut in dirigente, quia tunc non oporteret ipsum intellectum extendi, sed est in voluntate ut in eliciente illum actum et operante, et sic de aliis potentiis executivis pro quanto earum actus imperantur a voluntate. Neque actus ipsius intellectus practicus dicitur nisi pro quanto directivus est actus illius cui primo convenit ratio praxis. Ex quo patet quod male dixerunt ponentes logicam esse practicam. Nam secundum diffinitionem praxis prius datam nullus habitus intellectus est practicus nisi quia est directivus alterius potentie operationis quam intellectus. Logica autem non est directiva nisi operationum intellectus, et ideo speculativa est et non practica." This explanation differs from the one given by Scotus in his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum*, I, q. 7. See Ioannis Duns Scoti *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 3, ed. Robert Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1997), p. 154.4–10.

from the explanation given by the 14th-century Franciscan commentator Antonius Andreae.[25]

Antonius Andreae	Nicolaus de Orbellis
Stat ergo prima conditio quod praxis sit actus alterius potentie quam intellectus vel, quod idem est, alterius generis a speculatione. Et per consequens nec logica nec rhetorica est scientia practica. [...] Secunda conditio est quod est naturaliter posterior intellectione. [...] Tertia conditio est quod praxis est actus aptus natus conformiter elici intellectui recto. [...] Quarta conditio est talis: quod praxis est actus qui potest recte et non recte elici. [...][26]	Tertio ex dictis dicam ad questionem. Quantum ad primum praxis a qua scientia dicitur practica est actus alicuius potentie alterius quam intellectus naturaliter posterior intellectione natus conformiter elici intellectioni recte ad hoc quod sit rectus. In ista descriptione quattuor ponuntur. Prima conditio est quod sit actus alicuius potentie alterius quam intellectus. [...] Secunda conditio est quod praxis naturaliter posterior est intellectione. [...] Tertia conditio est quod praxis sit actus natus conformiter elici intellectioni recte. [...] Quarta conditio est quod praxis est actus rectus qui potest recte et non recte elici. [...][27]

Like Versoris (and in much the same words as Antonius Andreae), Orbellis argues that metaphysics is a speculative science.[28]

A different line of reasoning is found in Petrus Tartareti. He elaborates in some detail on the notion of "practical knowledge" (*notitia practica*), which can be understood in two ways: formally and virtually. Formally speaking (*formaliter*), practical knowledge is complex, i.e., propositional, knowledge that brings about some *praxis* either indirectly (when the *praxis* is mentioned in the premises of a syllogism of which the conclusion is not explicitly formulated, for example: "all supreme good is to be

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[25] For more information on Antonius Andreae's extremely influential commentary on the *Metaphysics* (and its relation to the works of John Duns Scotus), see William O. Duba's chapter in the present volume. I use the following edition: Antonius Andreae, *Quaestiones super duodecim libros Metaphysice* (Venice, 1481) (henceforth *Qu. Met.*).

[26] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 11, fol. c1rb–va. Notice that Andreae's "*prima conditio*" is very close to the first two lines of Johannes Versoris's text cited below, note 66.

[27] Cf. *Cursus Met.*, I, fol. 16ra–vb.

[28] *Ibid.*, fol. 16vb: "Quantum ad tertium articulum dico quod metaphysica est scientia speculativa et non practica. Quod patet tum ex auctoritate Aristotelis tum quia cognitio entis inquantum ens non dirigit aliquam vere praxim." Cf. the following passage in Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 11, fol. c1va): "Quantum ad tertium dico quod methaphysica est scientia speculativa, non practica. Probatur tum ex auctoritate Aristotelis hic in littera et sexto *Methaphysice*. Probatur etiam per rationem: omnis scientia practica est directiva alicuius vere praxis secundum duplicem respectum predictum; sed methaphysica non est huiusmodi; ergo etc."

chosen; God is a supreme good; hence etc.") or directly (in case the *praxis* is referred to in an explicitly articulated conclusion, for example: "hence God is to be chosen"). Virtually speaking (*virtualiter*), practical knowledge is non-complex knowledge of a term which virtually contains the knowledge that brings about some *praxis* (for example the term "God"). Therefore, in Tartareti's view, a proposition such as "God is a supreme good" represents a piece of (virtual) practical knowledge, because it brings about the *praxis* of choosing God.[29] Now, given that metaphysical propositions such as "being is good" do not bring about some *praxis*, but only lead to speculation, it follows that metaphysics is a speculative science.[30]

3.2. *The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics*

Our commentators also agree on the question of what metaphysics is about. All six argue, in one way or another, that being *qua* being (*ens inquantum ens*) constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics.

Johannes Versoris mentions three different opinions concerning this question. Averroes considers metaphysics to be about God, the followers of John Buridan (*Buridanistae*) hold metaphysics to be the science of causes *qua* causes, and a third, unidentified group of thinkers view metaphysics as the science of the quiddities (or essences) of material things.[31] In contrast, Versoris argues that the subject-matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being.[32] Yet in explaining his view, Versoris arrives at a much more

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[29] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: "Adverte ulterius quod aliqua noticia dicitur practica dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, alio modo virtualiter. Formaliter adhuc dupliciter, scilicet mediate et immediate. Immediate sicut est noticia conclusionis, quia immediate inclinat ad praxim eligendam vel fugiendam; et cognoscitur hoc modo quando talis conclusio includit rem significantem praxim. Mediate sicut est noticia premissarum que inclinat ad praxim mediante conclusionis noticia, ut noticia harum premissarum: 'omne summe bonum est eligendum; Deus est summe bonum; igitur.' Virtualiter est noticia incomplexa alicuius subiecti virtualiter continentis noticiam premissarum et ipsius conclusionis practice, cuiusmodi est noticia ipsius Dei. Ideo noticia istius propositionis 'Deus est summe bonus' est noticia practica."

[30] *Ibid.*: "Istis suppositis, respondetur ad dubium quod metaphysica est scientia speculativa, quia immediate inclinat ad speculationem eliciendam, cuiusmodi est noticia huius quod est 'ens est bonum.' "

[31] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 1va: "Dubitatur primo utrum ens sit subiectum huius scientie. [...] Pro solutione dubii sciendum quod Averrois propter rationem ultimam tenet quod Deus est subiectum huius scientie. Alii dicunt quod causa secundum intentionem cause accepta est subiectum, sicut Buridaniste. Et alii dicunt quod est quidditas rei materialis."

[32] *Ibid.*: "Sed contra ista ponuntur conclusiones. Conclusio prima: Deus non est subiectum huius scientie, sicut probat Avicenna quia: de subiecto debet presupponi quia est et debent inquiri passiones eius; sed in ista scientia Deum esse est quesitum; ergo. [...]";

complex (and perhaps not entirely consistent) position. Plainly accepting the analogy of being, he states that metaphysics is first and foremost about substance as the primary kind of being to which all other kinds of being are somehow related.[33] He also claims that metaphysics has being in general (*ens commune*) as its subject-matter, God and the immaterial intelligences as its ultimate goal, and categorial and transcendental being as its properties.[34] Finally he argues that real created being (*ens creatum reale*), i.e., being that is divided into the ten categories, must count as the subject-matter of metaphysics (so as to exclude both beings of reason and uncreated being, i.e., God).[35] It remains unclear to what extent these different statements agree with one another.

Nicolaus de Orbellis argues more straightforwardly that being *qua* being is the primary subject-matter of metaphysics. In his view, an entity counts as the primary subject-matter of a science when its characteristic and essential properties are primarily investigated by that science. In the case of metaphysics, this can only be true of being as such, because metaphysics deals with unity, truth, goodness, act, and potency, which are the essential properties of being as such. Orbellis's reasoning at this point again closely corresponds to the explanation given by Antonius Andreae:

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fol. 1vb: "Conclusio secunda: causa secundum intentionem cause accepta non est subiectum huius scientie. […] Conclusio tercia: quidditas rei materialis non est subiectum huius scientie. […] Conclusio quarta: ens inquantum ens est subiectum huius scientie. Patet, quia sibi conveniunt conditiones subiecti respectu huius scientie; ergo etc."

[33] *Ibid.*, fol. 1vb: "Dicitur ultra quod, licet hec scientia sit de ente inquantum ens ut de subiecto adequato, est tamen principaliter de primo membro analogie, quod est substantia, ad quam omnia alia habent attributionem." On Versoris's views about the analogy of being, see his reply to the following argument: "Tercio arguitur sic: subiectum scientie debet esse univocum; sed ens non est univocum; ergo etc." (fol. 1vb). To which Versoris replies: "Ad terciam dicitur quod sufficit unitas analogie, que necessaria est subiecto scientie communis" (fol. 1vb).

[34] *Ibid.*: "Unde […] hec scientia est de ente communi ut de subiecto, de Deo et intelligentiis ut de fine, et de decem cathegoriis et de partibus eius et de ceteris transcendentibus ut de passionibus eius." In explaining this passage, the primacy of substance is reaffirmed: "Ens enim secundum quod ens est subiectum attributionis et adequatum huic scientie, cuius inquiruntur proprietates et principia, et inter partes principalior est substantia, sed Deus est finis ultimus" (fol. 1vb).

[35] *Ibid.*, fol. 1va: "Dubitatur secundo utrum ens quod est hic subiectum sit commune Deo et creaturis, enti reali et enti rationis. Dicitur quod non, quia, ut habetur quarto *huius*, inquirende sunt cause entis quod est hic subiectum; sed ens commune Deo et creaturis non habet causas; ergo etc. Similiter hec scientia est realis; et ens commune enti reali et enti rationis non est totaliter reale; ergo etc. Et sic restat quod ens creatum reale, quod dividitur in decem predicamenta, est subiectum huius scientie."

Antonius Andreae	Nicolaus de Orbellis
Ad conclusionem istam arguitur etiam per rationes. Primo sic: illud est subiectum cuiuslibet scientie cuius per se primo sunt passiones que considerantur per se in illa scientia; sed nihil aliud ab ente est huiusmodi, quod scilicet passiones methaphisice sunt per se primo illius; ergo ens et nihil aliud est subiectum primum scientie methaphisice. [...] Sed minor patet quantum ad utranque partem, quia passiones methaphisice, puta unum, bonum, verum, unum et multa, actus et potentia etc., non sunt alicuius inferioris entis per se primo, sed cuiuslibet inquantum ens, nam alias non convenirent omni enti; ergo sunt per se primo passiones entis inquantum ens.[36]	Tertia conclusio est ista: ens inquantum ens est primum subiectum in methaphisica. [...] Item etiam probatur ratione: illud est subiectum primum cuiuslibet scientie cuius sunt per se primo passiones que per se considerantur in illa scientia; sed nihil aliud ab ente est huiusmodi, cui passiones considerate immediata insint per se primo; ergo ens est primum subiectum metaphisice. [...] Sed minor patet, quia passiones metaphisice, puta unum, verum, bonum, actus et potentia, necessitas, contingentia et sic de aliis, non sunt alicuius entis inferioris primo et per se, sed cuiuslibet inquantum ens, nam alias non convenirent omni enti; ergo sunt passiones entis inquantum ens primo et per se.[37]

However, Orbellis (like Andreae) does not completely exclude God and the immaterial substances from the domain of metaphysics. They do not count as primary subject-matter but are nevertheless considered to belong to metaphysics insofar as they fall under the more general concept of being *qua* being. More precisely, metaphysics deals with God and the immaterial substances as the causal principles of being, or as the noblest of all beings. For that reason, metaphysics is sometimes called "theology" or "divine science."[38]

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[36] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a4rb.

[37] Cf. *Cursus Met.*, I, fol. k7rb.

[38] *Ibid.*, fols. k7vb–K8rb: "Ad cuius evidentiam notandum primo quod scientia non videtur esse tantum circa aliquid tanquam circa subiectum principaliter consideratum, sed etiam circa causas subiecti. [...] Consimiliter est in proposito de metaphisica. Nam eius consideratio est circa causas altissimas non tanquam subiectum principale, sed tanquam principia subiecti. Unde in principio sexti *huius* dicitur quod principia et cause queruntur enti. Considerat ergo metaphisica causas altissimas ut principia sui subiecti. Vel etiam aliter considerat eas ut partes principales subiecti primi, quia sunt nobilissima entia. Secundo notandum quod substantie immateriales et immobiles non pertinent ad considerationem scientie alicuius particularis note nobis ex puris naturalibus. Licet enim de ipsis sint multe proprietates cognoscibiles quantum est ex parte earum, non tamen nobis via sensus. Ideo aliqua scientia possibilis est haberi de eis, sed non nobis. Proprietates autem scibiles a nobis via sensus sunt passiones entis. Unde verum est quod iste substantie sunt subiectum alicuius scientie speculative potenti<s> eas cognoscere, sed non nobis. Et ideo quantum ad ea que sunt scibilia de eis cadunt sub consideratione metaphisice, non ut primum subiectum, sed tanquam aliquid contentum sub primo subiecto, quod est ens. [...] Et ideo scientia hec est circa separabilia et immobilia tanquam circa principia et principales partes subiecti, et hoc modo denominatur theologia vel divina, non a subiecto, sed a causa." This passage in fact summarizes a longer passage by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a6ra–b).

Johannes Hennon first phrases the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics in terms that are almost identical to Antonius Andreae's wording:

Antonius Andreae	Johannes Hennon
Est ergo sensus questionis: utrum ens communissime sumptum ut sub se continet omne ens finitum et infinitum et sub propria et formali ratione entitatis, id est ens inquantum ens, sit subiectum primum scientie metaphisice sic adequatum quod nihil subterfugiat considerationem huius scientie ut participat rationem entis.[39]	Ex hiis infertur sensus questionis, videlicet: utrum ens communissime sumptum ut sub se continet omne finitum et infinitum sub propria et formali ratione entitatis sit primum subiectum methaphisice primitate adequationis, ita quod nichil subterfugiat considerationem huius scientie quod non subterfugiat rationem entis, nec aliquid pertineat ad considerationem huius scientie nisi quod participet rationem entis.[40]

Having thus formulated the question, Hennon (again following Andreae) rejects the Averroist position according to which God and the immaterial intelligences (taken together as the "class of separate beings" [*genus entium separatorum*]) constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics.[41] His main criticism against the Averroist view is that God and the immaterial intelligences could only constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics by virtue of some common feature from which the science of metaphysics would ultimately derive its unity. But then this common feature would have to count as the primary subject-matter of metaphysics rather than God and the immaterial intelligences themselves.[42] Having thus rejected the Averroist position, Hennon develops a view that comes close to that

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[39] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a2va.

[40] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 306va. For the phrase "primum subiectum methaphisice primitate adequationis," see below, note 45ff.

[41] The Averroist position is introduced as follows: "Consequenter ponuntur tria dicta secundum opinionem Commentatoris, qui dicit quod Deus et intelligencie, sive (quod idem est) genus encium separatorum, est primum subiectum huius scientie. [...] Primum dictum est quod nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse. Secundum dictum est quod prima philosophia non potest probare Deum esse, sed tamen scientia naturalis hoc potest. Tertium dictum quod genus entium separatorum est primum subiectum prime philosophie" (fol. 306va–b). The Averroist position is described in precisely the same words by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fols. a2vb–a3ra).

[42] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fols. 306vb–307ra: "Contra tertium dictum, quod est principale, arguitur sic quia: unius scientie unum est subiectum, ut patet primo *Posteriorum*; ergo si Deus <et> intelligencie sint huius scientie subiectum, oportet quod habeant aliquod commune in quo communicant et a quo hec scientia habeat unitatem. Et per consequens illud erit magis subiectum quam Deus et intelligencie." A similar, but more elaborate criticism is given by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a3rb).

of Orbellis, although formulated with somewhat less terminological accuracy. First he claims God to be the primary subject-matter of metaphysics (where "primary" means "most perfect"), since God is the first and most perfect of all things considered in metaphysics.[43] Second he claims that being *qua* being, which is common to God and creatures, constitutes the primary subject-matter of metaphysics.[44] To explain his second claim, Hennon uses exactly the same argument as Andreae and Orbellis: metaphysics deals with unity, truth, goodness, act, and potency, which are the essential properties of being as such. Hence, being as such must count as the primary subject-matter of metaphysics (where "primary" obviously means something else than "most perfect"). In contrast to Versoris (who defends the analogy of being) and Orbellis (who, in this context, is silent on this issue), Hennon explicitly claims to presuppose the univocity of being.[45]

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[43] *Ibid.*, fol. 307ra: "Dimissa igitur opinione Commentatoris, ponuntur duo alia dicta. Primum est quod Deus est subiectum methaphisice primum primitate perfectionis. Probatur sic quia: principalius consideratum in aliqua scientia est subiectum primum eius primitate perfectionis; sed [in] inter omnia considerata in methaphisica Deus est ens principalius et perfectius; igitur."

[44] *Ibid.*: "Secundum dictum: ens inquantum ens, quod est commune Deo et creature, est subiectum primum scientie methaphisice." Hennon's phrasing again closely resembles that of Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a3va): "Quantum ad tertium articulum dicendum quod ens inquantum ens, quod est commune Deo et creature, est subiectum primum methaphisice."

[45] *Ibid.*: "Pro isto dicto supponenda est univocatio entis, que tamen quarto *huius* probabitur. Istud dictum probatur per duas auctoritates positas post oppositum. Et per rationem sic probatur: illud est subiectum primum huius scientie cuius passiones primo considerantur in ista scientia; sed entis sunt per se primo passiones considerate in methaphisica; ergo ens inquantum ens est methaphisice subiectum primum. Minor patet, quia unum, verum, bonum, actus et potentia et sic de aliis non sunt alicuius entis inferioris per se primo, sed cuiuslibet sunt; ergo entis in communi sunt" (for the corresponding passages from Andreae and Orbellis, see above, p. 587). In contrast to the formula "subiectum methaphisice primum *primitate perfectionis*" (see above, note 43), and in line with the formulation used by Hennon in the title of the question (see above, p. 588), one might suppose him to mean that being *qua* being is the "primum subiectum methaphisice *primitate adequationis*." In another context (*Cursus Met.*, IV, fols. m4vb–5ra), Nicolaus de Orbellis also sustains the univocity of being: "De secundo articulo sit ista prima conclusio: ens communiter sumptum non est univocum omnibus entibus univocatione phisica. [...] Secunda conclusio est ista: ens communiter sumptum est univocum omnibus entibus univocatione logica. [...] Tertia conclusio est ista: ens communiter sumptum est vere univocum omnibus entibus univocatione metaphisica, sic intelligendo quod ens dicit aliquem unum conceptum realem abstrahibilem ab omnibus participantibus ens quidditative secundum quem conceptum ens est predicabile de omni ente univoce et realiter et in quid."

Johannes le Damoisiau holds basically the same opinion as Hennon, but puts it in a more elaborate and more precise way. In comparison to Hennon, Damoisiau offers more sophisticated explanations of the notions of "being" (*ens*), "subject-matter" (*subiectum*), "primary subject-matter" (*primum subiectum*), and of the meaning of the term "*qua*" (*inquantum*) in the expression "being *qua* being."

> Secundo: quod ens potest capi dupliciter. Uno modo participialiter, quo modo connotat tempus presens, alio modo nominaliter.—Tertio: quod hec dictio "inquantum" potest sumi multipliciter, scilicet reduplicative et specificative. Hic autem accipitur specificative et denotat ens cui ipsa additur accipi secundum suam rationem formalem, ita quod sit sensus: ens inquantum ens, id est ens sub ratione entis, est subiectum methaphisice. Nec ad hoc sequitur quod omne ens sit subiectum metaphisice, sicut sequeretur si ly "inquantum" sumeretur reduplicative.—Quarto: triplex est subiectum alicuius scientie, scilicet commune, speciale et specialissimum.—Quinto: quod sicut duplex est primitas, ut ad propositum sufficit, scilicet perfectionis et adequationis, ita potest dupliciter intelligi aliquid esse primum subiectum alicuius scientie, scilicet primum primitate perfectionis et primum primitate adequationis. Hic autem est sermo de subiecto primo primitate adequationis, quod scilicet non excedit scientiam nec exceditur ab ea, ymo quidquid cadit sub consideratione scientie, cadit sub ratione formali talis subiecti, et e contra, quidquid participat rationem formalem illius subiecti, cadit sub consideratione illius scientie. Unde si ens inquantum ens ponatur subiectum primum methaphisice tali primitate, quidquid participat rationem entis ut sic cadit sub consideratione methaphisice, et quidquid considerat methaphisicus, sub ratione entis considerat.[46]

However, apart from these technical clarifications (which play only a minor role in the rest of his elaboration), Damoisiau's view is essentially the same as that of Hennon. Like Hennon, Damoisiau claims being *qua* being, which is common to God and creatures, to be the primary subject-matter of metaphysics.[47] He also states that his view presupposes the univocity of

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[46] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 267ra. Damoisiau's explanation of the notion of "*primitas adequationis*" almost verbatim resembles the following passage by Antonius Andreae (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. a2^{vb}): "Sed primitas sive prioritas adequationis notat <e>qualitatem precisam subiecti ad scientias, quando scilicet scientia non excedit subiectum nec e converso. Sed quicquid cadit aliquo modo sub consideratione scientie, cadit sub ratione formali subiecti, et e converso, quicquid participat rationem formalem subiecti, cadit sub consideratione illius scientie. Verbi gratia si ens inquantum ens ponit<ur> subiectum primum metaphisice tali primitate, quicquid participat rationem entis ut sic cadit sub consideratione methaphisice, et quicquid methaphisicus considerat, sub ratione entis considerat."

[47] *Ibid.*: "His premissis, dicendum quod ens inquantum ens sive ens simpliciter sumptum, quod est commune Deo et creature, est primum subiectum methaphisice primitate

being: the notion of "being" applies univocally to created and uncreated being, to finite and infinite being, and to the ten categories.[48] Damoisiau criticizes the Averroist view of the subject-matter of metaphysics, while admitting (unlike Hennon) that both God and the immaterial substances (taken together as the "class of separate beings") can be considered to be the primary, i.e., most perfect subject-matter of metaphysics.[49]

Finally, Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti also maintain that being *qua* being constitutes the subject-matter of metaphysics, but they offer little explanation of their views.[50]

Closely linked to the problem of the subject-matter of metaphysics is the question of whether the quiddities or essences of particular beings as such fall under the consideration of metaphysics. In other words, does the metaphysician examine the quiddities or essences of, for example, bodies

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adequationis, quia nichil aliud ab ente et passionibus eius consideratur in methaphisica. Unde si hec scientia non esset de ente, oportebit esse aliquam aliam scientiam superiorem et priorem ista que consideret de ipso ente in communi."

[48] *Ibid.*: "Sciendum primo quod pro responsione ad titulum questionis aliqua sunt supponenda ex dictis in logica et physica. Primo: quod ens est univocum ad ens creatum et increatum, finitum et infinitum, et ad decem predicamenta."

[49] *Ibid.*, fol. 267ra–b: "Ex quo sequitur opinionem Commentatoris esse falsam, qui dicit quod Deus et intelligentie, sive genus entium separatorum, [non] est primum subiectum huius scientie primitate adequationis, quamvis forte hoc bene sit verum de primitate perfectionis." Hennon only admits God (not the entire "class of separate beings") to be the primary (i.e., most perfect) subject-matter of metaphysics. See above, notes 42ff.

[50] Georgius Bruxellensis treats this question very shortly at the beginning of his commentary on Book IV of the *Metaphysics*. After a detailed refutation of the "opinio scotistarum" concerning the concept of a "primary subject-matter" (*primum subiectum*), Georgius arrives at the following conclusion (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 19va–b): "Conclusio secunda: ens inquantum ens est subiectum metaphisice. Probatur sic quia: idem est subiectum habitus et primorum principiorum habitus; sed subiectum primorum principiorum metaphisice est ens; igitur ens est subiectum metaphisice. Minor patet de isto principio: 'impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse.' Item: idem est subiectum habitus et prime passionis; sed subiectum prime passionis, scilicet unitatis, est ens; igitur. Hoc etiam patet auctoritate Aristotelis in principio huius quarti post oppositum allegata. Item: communissime scientie subiectum debet esse communissimum; sed metaphisica est scientia communissima; igitur. Item: dyalectica et metaphisica et sophistica, ut habetur sexto *huius*, conveniunt in subiecto, quod est ens simpliciter; igitur. Item: enti inquantum ens convenit ratio primi subiecti respectu huius scientie; igitur. Et est advertendum quod hec dictio 'inquantum' non tenetur reduplicative, quia omne ens esset subiectum, sed tenetur specificative, ita quod specificat rationem secundum quam ens est subiectum metaphisice." Petrus Tartareti arrives at the following conclusion in *Comm. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: "Ens inquantum ens est subiectum totius metaphysice. Que conclusio relinquitur probata ex dictis in primo articulo." However, the first article of his question mainly concerns the concept of "being" (*ens*) itself, as univocal to God and creatures, and the concept "*experientia*."

qua bodies, animals *qua* animals, men *qua* men etc.? This issue is discussed by all the commentators except Nicolaus de Orbellis.[51] Johannes Versoris's treatment of the question is slightly different from that of the others. He briefly refers to one anonymous opinion according to which both the quiddities and the essential properties of all particular beings (for example, the quiddity and essential properties of man *qua* man) fall under the consideration of metaphysics.[52] But against this opinion, he argues that metaphysics is about being in general. Now, given that being in general in fact encompasses all particular beings, it follows that metaphysics investigates particular quiddities under the aspect of being in general and of their universal principles and causes. Hence metaphysics investigates the quiddities of particular beings in general (*in universali*), but not in particular (*in particulari*).[53] However, insofar as metaphysics constitutes the last science in the order of teaching (*ordo doctrinae*), it presupposes all knowledge previously acquired through the special sciences. Hence, from this perspective, Versoris claims that the ideal metaphysician should possess knowledge of all particular quiddities as acquired through the special sciences, even though, as metaphysician, he can only examine the quiddities of particular beings in general and under the aspect of being.[54]

Similar views can be found in Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti, but, in contrast to Versoris, their respective explanations and arguments all reflect Antonius

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[51] Orbellis raises one *dubitatio* about singularity as the proper formal object of sense perception ("An singularitas sit ratio formalis obiectiva sensus," *Cursus Met.*, I, fols. 13va–15ra), but this *dubitatio* is totally unrelated to the question of the subject-matter of metaphysics.

[52] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 5ra–va: "Queritur sexto utrum ad sapientem pertineat consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in particulari. [...] Ulterius sciendum est, descendendo magis ad quesitum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere [...] quod ad metaphysicum pertinet cognitio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in speciali et passionum propriarum illarum rerum, scilicet quod metaphisicus inquantum huiusmodi habet cognoscere quidditatem hominis inquantum homo, et sic de aliis speciebus specialissimis."

[53] *Ibid.*, fol. 5va: "Sed considerato processu Aristotelis in isto libro, videtur magis dicendum esse ad quesitum pro conclusione responsiva videlicet quod ad metaphisicum pertinet consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum in universali, et non in particulari. [...] Prima pars conclusionis patet, quia subiectum metaphisice est ens, quod ambit et continet sub se omnia alia entia; modo quelibet scientia habet cognoscere suum subiectum, partes et proprietates eius; ergo metaphisicus habet considerare quidditates omnium rerum secundum quod reducuntur in ens, in principia et causas universales eius, partes et proprietates."

[54] *Ibid.*: "Nisi pro quanto secundum ordinem doctrine nostre metaphisica est postrema scientia. Et sic acquisitio eius supponit omnes alias scientias fuisse acquisitas. Quare metaphisicus perfectus habet cognoscere quidditates omnium rerum etiam in particulari, non quod in hoc libro *Metaphisice* ab Aristotele tradantur."

Andreae's treatment of the question to some extent. Andreae mentions two anonymous opinions on this issue. According to the first opinion, metaphysics studies all particular quiddities, both *qua* quiddity (*quidditas*) and *qua* particular quiddity (*haec quidditas*). Only accidental properties are excluded from the domain of metaphysics and assigned to the special sciences.[55] The second opinion goes one step further by claiming that metaphysics not only examines the quiddities of particular beings but also includes their essential accidents (*accidentia per se*). Only non-essential accidents (*accidentia per accidens*) are assigned to the special sciences. For example, in the case of man, this view claims that metaphysics studies man's quiddity (both *qua* quiddity and *qua* quiddity of man) along with man's essential accidents.[56] In contrast to these two opinions, Andreae himself denies that metaphysics studies particular quiddities as such. According to him, metaphysics only examines particular quiddities in general (*in universali*) under the general aspect of being (*sub ratione entis*). Otherwise, the various special sciences would become superfluous.[57] More specifically, Andreae argues against the second anonymous opinion saying that, if metaphysics studies the quiddities of particular beings together with their essential accidents, whereas the special sciences only

[55] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 9, fol. b5ra: "Sed sunt duo modi dicendi. Unus modus est quod ad metaphysicum pertinet cognoscere quamlibet quiditatem secundum quod quiditas est et secundum quod hec quiditas, non tamen secundum omnem rationem cuiuscumque accidentis huic quiditati, sed hoc pertinet ad alias scientias." Andreae offers four arguments in favor of this opinion.

[56] *Ibid.*, fol. b5rb: "Alius modus dicendi tenens eandem conclusionem est quod quiditas hec et particularis est prior accidentibus, et accidentia per se respectu illius quiditatis sunt priora accidentibus per accidens. Licet ergo quiditas secundum quod hec <et> particularis et etiam quantum ad per se accidentia pertineant ad metaphysicum, tamen inquantum mobile vel huiusmodi, que sunt accidentia per accidens, id est ut formaliter intellecta sub aliquo accidente per accidens, pertinet ad aliam scientiam, quia sic est posterior seipsa intellecta sine illis accidentibus que sunt accidentia per accidens." Andreae goes on by explaining the precise similarity and dissimilarity between the two opinions: "Ambo isti modi conveniunt in hoc quod alie scientie non considerant quiditatem nec hanc quiditatem in se, sed tantum accidentia sibi. Sed differunt quia primus modus dicit quod metaphysica considerat quiditatem et hanc quiditatem tantum ut quiditas est; secundus modus dicit quod metaphysica considerat quiditatem et hanc quiditatem non tantum ut quiditas est, sed etiam quantum ad per se accidentia."

[57] *Ibid.*, fol. b5va: "Aliter ergo dicendum quod ad metaphysicam inquantum talis non pertinet considerare omnes quiditates in particulari, sed in universali tantum et sub ratione entis. Et hoc probat ratio facta quia: aliter alie omnes superfluerent. Unde et Aristoteles multum temperate dicit sicut decet et ut convenit quia 'sapientis non est scire omnia quocunque modo, sed ut contingit,' id est in communi et in universali."

examine the non-essential accidents, the special sciences become subalternated to the science of metaphysics.[58]

In the commentaries by Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti, we find several elements of Andreae's explanation. Hennon refers to the same two opinions as Andreae.[59] Moreover, he argues against the second that the special sciences either become superfluous or become subalternate sciences of metaphysics.[60] Finally, he accepts the same view as Andreae.[61] Damoisiau also describes two opinions regarding this question. One coincides with the first opinion mentioned by Andreae: all particular quiddities, both *qua* quiddity and *qua* particular quiddity, fall under the consideration of metaphysics while the various accidental properties are treated in the special sciences.[62] One of the arguments used by Damoisiau in support of this view is the argument from the subalternation of the special sciences, which

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[58] *Ibid.*, fol. b5rb–va: "Contra illud in quo secundus modus distinguitur a primo arguitur sic quia: si sic, ergo omnes alie scientie erunt scientie methaphisice subalterne. Consequens est falsum, ut etiam ipsi dicunt. Ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentie quia: tunc nulla passio remanet consideranda in aliis scientiis, quia sola methaphisica considerat proprias et primas passiones, alia autem accidentia per accidens, et per consequens nulla alia demonstrat primam passionem inesse, sed presupponit demonstrari in alia; sed conclusio ubi demonstratur prima passio est principium in inferiori scientia ubi demonstratur posterior passio vel aliquid aliud; sed hec est conditio scientie subalternantis et subalternate; ergo omnes alie scientie sunt subalternate scientie methaphisice."

[59] *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 310rb: "Sciendum est primo quod de questione mota sunt due opiniones. Prima est quod alie scientie a methaphisica non considerant quiditates nec hanc quiditatem in se, sed tantum secundum accidens eius. Et hec dividitur in duo. Nam quedam est opinio dicens quod methaphisicus considerat quiditatem in communi et hanc quiditatem in particulari consideratam ut quiditas est, et non secundum aliqua accidentia rei per se nec per accidens. Et sic dicit hec opinio quod methaphisicus habet considerare hominem ut ens, ut substantia et ut homo. Alia opinio dicit quod methaphisicus considerat quiditatem, non tantummodo consideratam ut quiditas est, sed etiam quantum ad per se accidentia eius. Et hec ultra primam additur quod methaphisicus habet considerare accidentia per se conveniencia quiditatibus particularibus."

[60] *Ibid.*, fol. 310rb–va: "Contra secundam opinionem arguitur quia: sequeretur quod alie scientie superfluerent vel quod methaphisice subalternarentur. Consequens est falsum. Sed consequentia patet quantum <ad> primam partem, quia quiditates particulares cognoscuntur in aliis scientiis aut sub ratione eius (et tunc, cum in methaphisica sub eadem ratione consideratur, sequitur quod alie scientie superfluunt), aut sub ratione alicuius accidentis (et tunc ille subalternantur methaphisice). Nam quando subiectum unius est inferius ad subiectum alterius et addit super ipsum differentiam accidentalem, sicut sonus additur numero et visuale additur linee, ibi est subalternatio, dummodo una habeat considerare principia alterius."

[61] *Ibid.*, fol. 311ra: "Conclusio responsalis: ad methaphisicum non spectat cognoscere omnes quiditates rerum in particulari."

[62] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 268vb: "Pro solutione supponitur quod de dubio proposito sunt due principales opiniones. Una est dicentium quod ad metaphisicum pertinet considerare quamlibet quiditatem secundum quod quiditas et etiam secundum quod hec

was used by Andreae to criticize the opinion according to which metaphysics examines both the quiddities of particular beings and their essential accidents.[63] The other opinion mentioned (and implicitly endorsed) by Damoisiau in fact corresponds with Andreae's own view: metaphysics studies the quiddities of particular beings in general and under the aspect of being.[64] Georgius Bruxellensis argues more briefly, but along similar lines, that the quiddities of particular beings do not fall under metaphysics but are investigated by the special sciences.[65] Finally, Petrus Tartareti refers to the same opinions as mentioned by Johannes le Damoisiau (albeit in the reverse order), but without choosing one of them.[66]

The likeness between Antonius Andreae's commentary, on the one hand, and those of Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, and Petrus

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quiditas, sed non secundum rationem cuiuscumque accidentis illi quiditati, ymo secundum hoc consideratur ab aliis scientiis."

[63] *Ibid.*, fol. 269ra: "Secundo arguitur: si methaphisicus non cognosceret quiditates in particulari, ymo sic considerarentur ab aliis scientiis, sequeretur quod alie scientie essent subalternate methaphisice aut non ab ea distincte, quia ad eandem scientiam pertinet superius et inferius. Hec tamen quiditas secundum quod mobilis vel quanta vel intellecta sub aliquo accidente per accidens pertinet ad aliam scientiam, tamen quiditas quantum ad per se accidentia eius que concomitantur quiditatem sive naturam rei, consideratur a methaphisica." Andreae uses this argument against his second opinion (see above, note 60).

[64] *Ibid.*: "Ideo est alia opinio quod ad methaphisicum inquantum huiusmodi non pertinet considerare omnes quiditates in particulari, sed tantum in universali et sub ratione entis (alias superfluerent omnes alie scientie, ut dictum est). Ideo dicit Philosophus in textu quod sapiens omnia scit ut contingit. Neque oportet, ut dicit, sapientem habere scientiam superiorem de omnibus."

[65] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 1, fol. 37ra–b: "Sciendum secundo quod opinio aliquorum est quod ad metaphysicam spectat considerare quidditates rerum sic quod nulla scientia particularis quidditatem in ratione quidditatis habet considerare, sed circa eam considerat accidentia propria. […] Conclusio prima: metaphisica non considerat quidditates omnium rerum in particulari. Patet, quia sic sequeretur quod scientie particulares superfluerent. […] Conclusio secunda: scientie speciales habent considerare quidditatem suorum subiectorum in particulare. Patet, quia si supponerent eam, sequeretur quod omnes scientie essent metaphisice subalternate, quod est falsum. Et patet consequentia, quia omnis scientia acciperet sua principia propria a metaphisica; igitur. Antecedens patet, quia propositio in qua predicatur diffinitio de diffinito est principium demonstrandi passiones de subiecto, et illa acciperetur a metaphisica; ergo quelibet scientia acciperet sua principia propria a metaphisica."

[66] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb: "Respondetur breviter quod de hoc sunt duo modi dicendi. Dicunt enim aliqui quod ad metaphysicum secundum quod huiusmodi non pertinet considerare omnes quidditates in particulari, sed tantum in universali et sub ratione entis. Alias omnes alie scientie superfluerent, quod est falsum. Ideo dicit Philosophus in textu quod sapiens omnia scit ut contingit, quod sic glossant: 'id est, in universali.' […] Aliter tamen dicunt aliqui quod metaphysicus inquantum metaphysicus habet considerare quidditates omnium rerum et quod nullus artifex habet ea investigare quam metaphysicus."

Tartareti, on the other, is confirmed by the following passages, which explain the relationship between metaphysics and the special sciences.

Antonius Andreae	Johannes Hennon	Johannes le Damoisiau	Petrus Tartareti
Ad tertium dicendum quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, secundum rationem superioris, sicut patet in exemplo quod adducitur, quia arismeticus considerat de numero et binario secundum rationem numeri. Et sic methaphisicus secundum rationem entis in communi considerat de omni ente, tamen de superiori et inferiori potest esse alia et alia scientia secundum aliam et aliam rationem propriam. Unde si binarius haberet aliquas passiones proprias demonstrabiles de ipso non per rationem numeri, eius consideratio pertineret ad aliam scientiam ab arismetica.[67]	Ad tertiam dicitur quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, secundum rationem superioris, ut patet in exemplo adducto. Nam arismeticus considerat de numero et binario secundum rationem numeri. Similiter geometria considerat de triangulo et ysochele secundum rationem trianguli. Similiter methaphisicus considerat de omni ente secundum rationem entis. Sed tamen de superiori et inferiori potest esse alia et alia scientia, secundum aliam et aliam rationem propriam, ut patet si binarius haberet aliquas passiones de ipso demonstrabiles non per rationem numeri, sed per rationem propriam.[68]	Pro ulteriori tamen declaratione huius opinionis est primo advertendum quod, licet ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare superius et inferius, genus et speciem, quantum ad rationem superioris et passionem eius, tamen de inferiori quantum ad suas proprias rationes potest esse illa scientia de superiori, non tamen disparata, sed ordinata, sed non subalternata; cuius subiectum debet addere supra subiectum subalternantis differentiam accidentalem, sicut sonus additur numero et visuale linee.[69]	Et si dicatur quod ad eandem scientiam pertinet considerare superius et inferius, ergo si metaphysica considerat ens, ergo etiam considerabit omnia inferiora eius—respondetur quod, licet ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare superius et inferius quantum ad rationem superioris et passionem eius, tamen de inferiori quantum ad suas proprias rationes et proprias passiones potest esse alia scientia a scientia superioris.[70]

67 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 9, fol. b5va–b.
68 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 2, fol. 311ra.
69 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 269ra.
70 *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 113rb.

3.3. *Knowledge of Separate Substances*

All commentators, with the exception of Johannes Hennon, raise the question of whether and how human beings in their present life can acquire knowledge of separate substances. They generally combine this issue with the question of whether and how God (sometimes referred to as the first cause) can be known.[71] Their views of these two related issues diverge more strongly than their opinions about the concept and the subject-matter of metaphysics. On the one hand, Johannes Versoris argues that quidditative knowledge of God and separate substances is wholly unattainable for human beings in their present condition. According to him, only God's existence (*quia est*) can be known, not his quiddity (*quid est*). On the other hand, Johannes le Damoisiau, Nicolaus de Orbellis, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti all argue that some form of quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances is possible in this life. They offer (more-or-less) different explanations of precisely what form of quidditative knowledge can be acquired.

Johannes Versoris explicitly takes his cue from Thomas Aquinas. He argues that quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances cannot be obtained because, in our present condition, our knowledge necessarily depends on sense perception. God and the separate substances are not only inaccessible to our senses but they also fail to produce effects that can bring about quidditative knowledge of their causes. However, according to Versoris, human beings are able to obtain knowledge of the existence of God and the separate substances through a (well known and not further described) threefold procedure: the "way of causality" (*via causalitatis*), the "way of eminence" (*via eminentiae*) and the "way of negation" (*via remotionis*).[72] Versoris defends Aquinas's view about the impossibility

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[71] Some of our commentators also raise questions (or *dubia*) about the possibility and difficulty of human knowledge of the truth. This is the case in Johannes Versoris, Nicolaus de Orbellis, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti.

[72] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 2, fol. 13ra–b: "Dubitatur utrum intellectus noster corpori coniunctus possit cognoscere Deum et substantias separatas. Pro dubio cum sancto Thoma ponitur hec conclusio: intellectus noster corpori coniunctus non potest cognoscere Deum et substantias separatas quantum ad quid sunt, sed solum quantum ad quia sunt et non quid sunt. […] Ratione autem patet sic: intellectus noster corpori coniunctus propter causam in primo articulo dictam nihil potest cognoscere nisi per ministerium sensus. Ideo dicitur tercio *De anima* quod oportet quemlibet intelligentem fantasmata speculari. Sed substantie separate non sunt per se sensibiles neque habemus aliquo modo effectus ipsis adequatos quorum cognitio conferat ad cognoscendum quidditates earum. Ergo etc. […] Secunda pars patet, quia, ut dicit sanctus Thomas, tripliciter possumus devenire ad cognoscendum quia Deus est, scilicet per viam causalitatis, eminentie et remotionis, et etiam quia sunt

of quidditative knowledge against the opinion of some anonymous authors claiming to follow Albert the Great on this point. These anonymous authors argue that the human possible intellect becomes united to the (separate) agent intellect as a result of a previously acquired complete knowledge of all intelligible forms, both natural and mathematical. This unity with the agent intellect enables the human (possible) intellect, of itself and without needing phantasms any longer, to acquire immediate quidditative knowledge of separate substances. The human intellect in that condition is called the "acquired intellect" (*intellectus adeptus*). According to Versoris, this opinion is untenable for a variety of reasons.[73]

Nicolaus de Orbellis and, to a lesser extent, Johannes le Damoisiau are obviously familiar with Antonius Andreae's treatment of the question.[74] Orbellis repeats parts of Andreae's detailed criticism of two views, which

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alique substantie separate, et quid non sunt, et etiam attribuere ipsis eminenter ea que perfectionem simpliciter dicunt." This threefold procedure of obtaining knowledge of God goes back to Ps. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII, c. 3. Its standard formulation is found in Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, divisio primae partis textus, ed. Pierre Mandonnet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 88–89 ("per viam causalitatis [...] per viam remotionis [...] per viam eminentiae"), and d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, p. 809 ("per remotionem, per causalitatem, per eminentiam").

[73] *Ibid.*, fol. 13rb: "Huic etiam conclusioni adversantur quidam dicentes se in hoc sequi Albertum, qui ymaginabatur (ut dicunt) quod postquam intellectus noster possibilis consecutus est perfecte omnes formas intelligibiles naturales et mathematicas, que cadunt sub actualitate luminis intellectus agentis, tunc unitur sibi intellectus agens non solum per modum efficientis, sed etiam unitur sibi per modum forme intelligibilis, et intelligit ipsum intellectum agentem et substantiam anime perfecte et seipsum, nec plus ad intelligendum eget conversione ad fantasmata, sed habet lumen suum totaliter conversum superius concipiendo substantias separatas, et ideo ab ipsis immediate recipere potest illuminationes et quidditates earum cognoscere. Qui intellectum sic formatum et completum vocant 'intellectum adeptum.' In qua adeptione ponunt felicitatem hominis pro isto statu consistere. Sed ymaginatio videtur impossibilis [...]."

[74] Johannes le Damoisiau answers the question to the affirmative: "Dubitatur tertio utrum de ultimo fine vel prima causa et aliis substanciis separatis cognoscamus quid sunt. Respondetur quod sic" (*Qu. Met.*, I, q. 1, fol. 273rb). Having given five arguments in favor of this answer (some of which correspond verbatim to arguments found in Antonius Andreae: see below, note 77), Damoisiau concludes that separate substances can be known through "common quidditative concepts" and through "accidental or connotative concepts": "Et sic patet quod eciam pro isto statu possibile est intellectum nostrum cognoscere tam materialia quam immaterialia et substancias separatas quantum ad conceptus quiditativos communes et quantum ad conceptus accidentales vel connotativos eciam positivos et proprios" (fol. 273va). This conclusion is mainly based on the following argument (which I have not been able to locate in Antonius Andreae): "Si cognoscamus de substanciis separatis quia sunt, ut concedunt adversarii, oportet quod habeamus aliquem conceptum priorem cui attribuimus existere. Et universaliter dato quocumque conceptu attributali substanciarum separatarum quem de ipsis enunciamus, habemus priorem conceptum quiditativum cui ipsum accidentalem attribuimus, et non solum habemus conceptum negativum vel privativum sensibilium, qualem habemus de chymera, cui non attribuimus illos conceptus

resemble Johannes Versoris's position, almost verbatim. The first of these views claims that only the existence (*quia est*) of a separate substance can be known, not its quiddity, the second that the quiddity of a separate substance can only be known negatively (*quid non est*).

Antonius Andreae	Nicolaus de Orbellis
Respondetur ad omnes istas quinque rationes quod non concludunt nisi quod cognoscimus de substantiis separatis quia sunt, vel inquantum sunt cause omnium istorum inferiorum, non autem propter quid, cum effectus deficiens non sufficiat ad causandum noticiam de quid est cause. Aliter respondetur quod cognoscimus de illis substanciis quid non sunt, quia scilicet non sunt aliquid istorum inferiorum. Per hoc enim cognoscimus ipsas esse causas excedentes respectu horum. Non autem cognoscimus quid sunt. Et hoc concludunt dicte (decem *ed.*) rationes et non plus.	Responsio quod de substantiis separatis cognoscimus quia sunt vel inquantum sunt causa omnium illorum inferiorum, non autem cognoscimus quid sunt. Aliter dicitur quod de ipsis cognoscimus quid non sunt, quia scilicet non sunt aliqua istarum (!) inferiorum.
Sed contra, primo contra utramque solutionem simul [. . .]	
Secundo contra primam responsionem specialiter arguitur sic: [. . .]	
Preterea, impossibile est cognoscere compositionem aliquorum nisi cognitis terminis vel extremis, quia secundum Philosophum primo *Periarmenias*, capitulo de verbo, esse significat quandam compositionem quam sine compositis non est intelligere. Sed esse inmediate inest quiditati illarum substantiarum. Ergo si cognoscimus substantias esse, et per consequens esse quiditati earum inesse, sequitur de necessitate quod cognoscimus quiditates earum.	Contra primam rationem arguitur sic: impossibile est cognoscere compositionem aliquorum nisi cognitis terminis et extremis, quia, ut habetur primo *Periarmenias*, esse significat compositionem quam sine extremis non est intelligere. Si igitur cognoscimus eas esse, et per consequens esse quiddititati (!) eorum inesse, sequitur de necessitate quod cognoscimus quidditates earum.

accidentales positivos quos attribuimus substanciis separatis. Ergo de ipsis cognoscimus quid sunt" (fol. 273rb).

Tercio contra responsionem secundam arguitur specialiter sic quia: in omni propositione (prepositione *ed.*) negativa (necessaria *ed.*) est aliqua propositio affirmativa prior. Ergo si cognoscatur de substantia separata quid non est, oportet cognoscere quid est. Antecedens patet ex secundo *Periarmenias*, capitulo ultimo, ubi dicit Philosophus quod illa propositio "bonum non est malum" est vera, quia hec affirmativa prior est vera "bonum est bonum." Et quarto *huius* dicit Philosophus "notior itaque est dictio quam opposita negatio."[75]

Contra secundum arguitur sic: quod omni propositioni negative est aliqua affirmativa prior. Ergo si cognoscatur de substantia separata quid non est, oportet de ipsa cognoscere quid est. Antecedens patet ex secundo *Periarmenias*, capitulo ultimo, ubi dicit Philosophus quod ista propositio "bonum non est malum" non est vera nisi quia hec affirmativa prior est vera "bonum est bonum." Et quarto *huius* dicit Philosophus "notior utique est dictio quam opposita negatio."[76]

Orbellis's own solution to the question is somewhat less elaborate than that of Andreae. The latter introduces six degrees (*gradus*) of intellectual knowledge (corresponding to six degrees of sensory knowledge) claiming that God and the separate substances can be quidditatively known through the fifth degree (i.e., by means of composite concepts) and also, although less properly, through the sixth (i.e., by means of knowledge of their effects).[77] However, Orbellis mentions only two kinds of knowl-

[75] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fols. c3vb–c4ra. Andreae's last argument is also found in Johannes le Damoisiau (*Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 273rb–va): "Tercio arguitur: omni negative est aliqua affirmativa prior et notior, puta in qua predicatur idem de seipso, que omni negative est prius vera. Sed nos cognoscimus de substanciis separatis proposiciones negativas. Ergo cognoscimus aliquas affirmativas de ipsis."

[76] Cf. *Cursus Met.*, II, fol. 18rb–va.

[77] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. c4ra–b: "Ad videndum autem quomodo iste substantie a nobis cognoscantur notandum est quod sex sunt gradus cognitionis sensitive quibus correspondent alii sex gradus cognitionis intellective. [...] Similiter etiam correspondenter dicuntur sex gradus cognitionis intellective. Prima cognitio est intuitiva, que dicitur notitia visionis, que est de obiecto presenti ut presens est in sua existentia. Secunda cognitio est abstractiva, que est obiecti presentis in sua specie genita ab obiecto quod potest esse absens in sua existentia. Tertia est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto primi modi. Quarta est [in] cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto secundi modi. Quinta est cognitio alicuius ex conceptibus aggregatis. Sexta est per accidens cum aliquid cognoscitur per speciem illius quod sibi accidit. Exemplum primi: cognitio beatorum in patria. [...] Exemplum secundi: cum intelligo rosam absentem. Exemplum tertii: cum intelligo aliquod oppositum contrarie vel forte privative obiecto intuitive viso, ut cum intelligo non visum obiectum intuitive. Exemplum quarti: cum intelligitur oppositum contrarie vel privative obiecto abstractive cognito, puta cum intelligo non rosam abstractive. Exemplum quinti: cum intelligo aliquid esse ens infinitum necessarium sempiternum. Exemplum sexti: substantia intelligitur per speciem accidentis secundum unam opinionem.—Ad propositum dico quod quiditas substantiarum separatarum non intelligitur nec primo, nec secundo, nec tertio, nec quarto, sed quinto modo, scilicet in conceptu aggregato, et aliqualiter sexto modo, scilicet per effectus suos. Substantie enim separate cognoscuntur per hoc quod multa apprehensa simul concipiuntur que omnia nunquam alibi inveniuntur et nulli alii conveniunt. Et iste

edge, sensory and intellectual, both of which can be either intuitive or abstractive.[78] He argues that God and the separate substances cannot be known intuitively in this life (neither through sensory nor through intellectual intuitive cognition), but only through abstractive intellectual cognition. More accurately, God and the separate substances can be known abstractively (*abstractive*), not by means of (intelligible) species produced by God and the separate substances themselves but only by means of (intelligible) species derived from created beings that are accessible to sense perception. Orbellis explicitly refers his readers to John Duns Scotus's *Ordinatio* (I, d. 3) for a more detailed explanation of his view.[79]

Georgius Bruxellensis treats the question of our knowledge of separate substances in three consecutive *dubia*. The first asks whether separate substances can be known by us, the second whether separate substances can be known quidditatively, and the third whether separate substances can be known by means of absolute and proper concepts that signify naturally (rather than by convention).[80] The first *dubium* is mainly designed to disprove the two views also criticized by Nicolaus de Orbellis (and Antonius Andreae).[81] Georgius's second *dubium* corresponds nearly verbatim

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est conceptus aggregatus, puta de Deo quod est ens infinitum necessarium et primum etc., que omnia nulli conveniunt simul accepta nisi Deo. Et sic de aliis intelligentiis."

[78] Cf. *Cursus Met.*, II, fol. 18va: "Dicendum est ergo quod huiusmodi substantie possunt intelligi secundum suas quidditates ab intellectu viatorum secundum modum qui dicetur. Pro quo sciendum quod duplex est noticia, scilicet sensitiva et intellectiva, et utraque est duplex, scilicet intuitiva et abstractiva. Cognitio intuitiva est que respicit obiectum ut presens est <in sua existentia>. Exemplum de sensitiva: ut oculus videt colorem. Exemplum de intellectiva: ut cognitio beatorum in patria. [...] Cognitio autem abstractiva est que est obiecti presentis in sua specie generata ab obiecto, quod potest esse absens in sua existentia. Exemplum de sensitiva: ut fantasia imaginatur colorem visum. Exemplum de intellectiva: ut cum intelligo rem absentem."

[79] *Ibid.*: "Ad propositum ergo dico quod substantie separate non cognoscuntur a nobis pro statu isto cognitione intuitiva, ut patet ab ipsis, nec etiam abstractiva que fit per species genitas in ratione obiecti, cum species ipsarum non cadunt sub sensu. Bene tamen cognoscuntur cognitione abstractiva per species creaturarum. Quod sic declarat Scotus, distinctione 3 primi *Sententiarum* [...]." The explanation that follows corresponds to John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 66, in: Iohannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia*, vol. 3, ed. Carlos Balić et al. (Civitas Vaticana, 1954), p. 42.10–20.

[80] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fols. 10vb–11va: "Dubitatur primo utrum substantie separate cognoscantur a nobis. [...] Dubitatur secundo utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles. [...] Dubitatur tertio utrum possumus substantias separatas cognoscere per conceptus absolutos proprios et naturaliter representativos."

[81] *Ibid.*, fols. 10vb–11ra: "Ad dubium respondetur quod de substantiis abstractis non solum cognoscimus quia sunt vel quid (quia *ed.*) non sunt. Patet, quia de eis habemus multos conceptus tam simplices quam complexos, ut de primo ente cognoscimus quod est immaterialis, quod est virtus infinita, quod est productivum rerum. Et confirmatur quia:

to Petrus Tartareti's *dubium* on the knowledge of separate substances. Both authors distinguish between three forms of quidditative knowledge and between different kinds of concepts: simple and composite (or complex), absolute and connotative. With respect to our knowledge of God or the first cause, they argue that it is possible for us in this life to have composite proper concepts (for example the concept of a necessary and infinite being) and simple, connotative proper concepts (for example the concept of something that creates).

Georgius Bruxellensis	Petrus Tartareti
Ideo ad videndum qualem noticiam simplicem de Deo habere possumus est advertendum quod tripliciter aliquid potest cognosci quidditative. Uno modo per hoc quod immediate intuetur in se. Secundo modo est habere propriam speciem sive proprium conceptum representativum eius naturaliter. Tertio modo, quia habemus de Deo conceptus proprios et simplices, vel proprios non absolutos, sed connotativos.	Ideo ad videndum qualem noticiam de Deo habere possumus est advertendum quod aliquid potest cognosci quidditative tripliciter. Uno modo, quia intuimur illud in seipso. Secundo modo, quia habemus propriam speciem vel proprium conceptum representativum eius naturaliter. Tertio modo, quia habemus de eo conceptus complexos vel simplices, vel compositos non absolutos, sed connotativos.
Primus modus non est nobis possibilis in presenti statu, quia possemus esse beati in hac vita. De secundo videbitur in tertio dubio. Sed pro tertio sit conclusio prima: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu composito sibi proprio. Patet, quia possumus aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium componere ex conceptibus simplicibus abstractis ex aliis rebus et illum attribuere enti particulariter accepto, dicendo "ens necesse esse," "ens summe bonum est infinite potentie simpliciter loquendo." Conclusio secunda: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici connotativo sibi proprio. Patet, quia aliquis conceptus connotativus, scilicet cui correspondet ista vox "creativum," est proprius Deo et predicari potest de ente particulariter sumpto. Talis autem conceptus	Primus modus non est nobis possibilis, neque secundus, pro statu isto, quia tunc in hac vita possemus esse beati. De tertio sit prima conclusio: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu composito proprio. Patet, quia possumus aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium componere ex conceptibus simplicibus abstractis ab aliis rebus et illum attribuere enti particulariter accepto, ut ens necessarium esse, ens summe bonum, ens infinitum et sic de aliis. Secunda conclusio: prima causa est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici connotativo sibi proprio. Patet, quia aliquis est conceptus connotativus cui correspondet ista vox "creativum," et est propria (!) Deo. Unde adverte quod de isto conceptu connotativo dicunt aliqui quod non est naturaliter significans, sed ad placitum,

de his habemus noticiam complexam; igitur et incomplexam." For Nicolaus de Orbellis and Antonius Andreae, see above, pp. 599–600.

est simplex, quamvis plura significet, sicut iste terminus "album" est terminus simplex, quamvis unum significet et aliud connotet. De tali autem conceptu connotativo dicunt aliqui quod non est naturaliter significans, sed ad placitum, sicut et quodlibet signum vocale, quia conceptus naturaliter significans precise eam rem significat pro qua supponere potest, quia huiusmodi conceptus est talis in esse ficto qualis est res in esse reali.

sicut et quodlibet signum vocale, quia conceptus naturaliter significans precise istam rem significat pro qua potest supponere.

Ex his patet quod prima causa est cognoscibilis quidditative per conceptus quidditativos ab aliis rebus <abstractos>. Quod autem determinatum est de prima causa debet intelligi de aliis substantiis separatis et abstractis.[82]

Ex his patet quod prima causa est cognoscibilis quidditative per conceptus quidditativos ab aliis rebus abstractos. Et quicquid dictum est de prima causa etiam dicatur de aliis substantiis separatis.[83]

Finally, in his third *dubium*, Georgius introduces yet another distinction between proper and common concepts, or, more accurately, between "simple, absolute and proper concepts" and "simple, absolute and common concepts." Using this distinction, he claims that it is impossible for humans, in our present life, to have a simple, absolute and proper concept that signifies the first cause naturally. For, in order to be a natural sign of the first cause, such a concept would have to be formed in our minds directly by the first cause itself (which is considered an absurd requirement). Likewise, material substances cannot be known through simple, absolute, and proper concepts signifying naturally. For material substances are not known by us immediately, only by way of their various (proper) accidents.[84] At the same time, Georgius claims that we can have a simple, absolute, and common concept of the first cause. This claim is substantiated as follows. Given that it is possible for us to have connotative concepts of the first cause (as was shown in the second *dubium*), there must be some absolute concept underlying them. The same condition applies to all connotative concepts. For example, the connotative concept of "the

82 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 11ra–b.

83 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 114rb.

84 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. 11rb–va: "Pro dubio sit prima conclusio: prima causa non est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu simplici absoluto sibi proprio qui sit naturaliter representativus eius. Probatur quia: talis conceptus est effectus ipsius rei cuius est; ergo nihil est cognoscibile per talem conceptum nisi quod immediate et in ipso facit precognitum; igitur. Ex quo sequitur quod substantia non est in aliquo tali conceptu simplici proprio et absoluto cognoscibilis."

white" (*album*) presupposes an underlying absolute concept of something capable of being white, for example the concept of paper or shirt. According to Georgius, in the case of the first cause, the simple absolute concept underlying the various connotative concepts is the common concept of either being (*ens*) or substance (*substantia*). He points out that some argue, on account of this reasoning, that there must be some common quidditative concept predicable (univocally) of God and creatures, but it remains unclear whether or not he himself endorses this view.[85]

3.4. *Being and Unity, Being and Essence*

Our six commentators agree to a large extent about the question of whether the terms "being" and "unity" signify one and the same nature, and whether they can be used interchangeably. Some of them (Nicolaus de Orbellis and Johannes Hennon, again following Antonius Andreae) pay attention to Avicenna's view according to which "being" and "unity" do not signify the same nature and that unity, given that it belongs to one particular Aristotelian category (viz., quantity), is not convertible with being as such, that includes all categories.[86]

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[85] *Ibid.*, fol. 11va: "Secunda conclusio: prima causa potest cognosci in aliquo conceptu simplici absoluto, non proprio, sed communi. Patet, quia omnis conceptus connotativus aliquem conceptum absolutum presupponit cui mediate vel immediate attribuitur, sicut album attribuitur absoluto. Aliquid enim est quod dicitur album, ut lignum vel lapis. Et hoc potest probari ex ratione vel diffinitione explicante quid significet talis conceptus, ut ratio huius nominis 'album': album enim est informatum albedine. Patet autem quod quelibet talis ratio alicui conceptui absoluto attribuitur. Cum ergo prima causa sit cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu quidditativo, sequitur quod est cognoscibilis in aliquo conceptu absoluto, et est conceptus entis vel substantie. Ex hac autem ratione concludunt aliqui quod necesse est esse aliquem conceptum Deo et creature communem predicabilem in quid de Deo et creaturis. Ideo aliter Deus non posset ex creaturis cognosci."

[86] Johannes Versoris also refers to Avicenna in this context, but he presents his view in a slightly different manner, mentioning the real distinction between being and essence: "Sciendum secundo quod Avicenna posuit unum et ens non significare substantiam rei, sed aliquid additum substantie rei. Et ad hoc dicendum de ente movebatur ex hoc, quia in qualibet re que ab alio habet esse aliud est esse rei ab essentia. Et quia hoc nomen 'ens' imponitur ab esse, concludit quod hoc nomen 'ens' significat aliquid superadditum essentie sive substantie rei. Sed hoc de uno dicebat, quia existimavit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente sit idem cum uno quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quandam naturam superadditam substantie rei. [...] Dicebat tamen quod hoc non obstante, unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significet ipsam rei substantiam, sed significat accidens quod inheret enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine significat accidens homini inherens" (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27rb).

Antonius Andreae	Nicolaus de Orbellis	Johannes Hennon
Utrum unum et ens significent eandem naturam. [...] In ista questione sic procedam: primo quedam opinio premittetur, secundo eius improbatio apponetur, tertio ad questionem aliter dicetur. Quantum ad primum sciendum est quod una est opinio Avicenne, cuius conclusio est quod ens et unum significant aliam naturam. In sua autem positione dicit tria dicta. Primum dictum est quod ens et unum predicantur de omnibus entibus. Secundum quod non sunt idem secundum naturam, licet sint idem subiecto, sicut passio et subiectum que sunt idem subiecto. Tertium dictum est quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet de genere quantitatis, et per consequens non convertitur cum ente.[87]	Circa predicta tamen posset dubitari an ens et unum significent eandem naturam. [...] In ista questione sic procedam: primo quedam opinio premittetur, secundo improbatio apponetur, tertio ad questionem aliter dicetur. Quantum ad primum sciendum quod est una opinio Avicenne, que stat in tribus dictis. Primum est quod ens et unum predicantur de omnibus. Secundum est quod non sunt idem secundum naturam. Tertium est quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet de genere quantitatis, et per consequens non convertitur cum ente.[88]	Sciendum est primo quod de ista materia videtur Avicenna dicere tres propositiones. Prima est: ens et unum predicantur de omnibus. Secunda est: quod non sunt idem secundum naturam, licet sint idem subiecto sicut passio et subiectum. Tertia est: quod unum est determinati generis, scilicet quantitatis.[89]

Unlike Avicenna, most of our commentators distinguish between unity as a numerical principle and unity as a transcendental concept. In the first sense, unity belongs to the category of quantity; in the second, it does not. Hence they argue that transcendental unity is convertible with being as such.[90] As regards the signification of the terms "being" and "unity,"

87 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d3rb–va.

88 Cf. *Cursus Met.*, IV, fols. m6vb–7ra.

89 Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318va.

90 Cf. Johannes Versoris, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27rb: "Necesse est ergo confiteri quod unum quod est principium numeri aliud est ab uno quod cum ente convertitur." Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. m7rb–va: "De primo sit ista prima distinctio quod unum dicitur dupliciter: quoddam enim unum est quod est principium numeri, quoddam quod convertitur cum ente. Primum unum est de genere quantitatis, secundum unum est transcendens et passio entis." Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 284vb: "Sciendum secundo quod pro solutione aliarum rationum ante oppositum supponitur primo quod 'unum' accipitur multipliciter, ut patuit circa primum *Phisicorum*. Uno modo pro uno quod est principium numeri de genere quantitatis. Secundo modo pro uno transcendente, quod scilicet est principium numeri transcendentis causati ex divisione essentiarum proportionaliter sicut numerus de predicamento quantitatis causatur ex divisione continui. Tertio

Johannes Versoris argues that they signify one and the same nature *secundum rem*, but not *secundum rationem*. For the term "unity" signifies something that is not implied by the term "being," namely, the fact that being is intrinsically undivided. This "intrinsic undividedness of being" (*indivisio entis in se*), signified by the term "unity," is itself not a real being, but only a being of reason. For, as the mere negation of dividedness (*negatio divisionis*), it does not imply any positive characteristic of being. Versoris emphasizes, however, that although the undividedness implied by the term "unity" is a being of reason, it nevertheless has some foundation in reality itself (*fundamentum in re*).[91] Georgius Bruxellensis develops a similar view in somewhat less technical terms.[92] The other authors (again following Antonius Andreae) all claim that the terms "being" and "unity" signify one and the same nature *realiter*, but not *formaliter*. In other words, they consider the distinction between being and unity to be neither a real distinction (as Avicenna seems to claim) nor a distinction of reason (as Versoris argues), but a formal distinction.[93] Some of the commentators

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modo capitur 'unum' pro simplici. Unum autem primo modo dictum est determinati generis, et non unum secundo modo, ymo tale unum convertitur cum ente et pro eadem convertibiliter supponit cum ente. Sed unum tertio modo dictum est membrum divisionis entis, quia dividitur ens in unum et multa, id est in simplex et compositum." Johannes Hennon, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318va–b: "Et secundum hoc duplex est unum: quoddam est principium numeri de genere quantitatis, aliud est unum quod est principium numeri transcendentis." Petrus Tartareti, *Comm. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116va: "Ad dubium respondetur quod ens et unum convertuntur capiendo 'unum' transcendenter ut est passio entis, et de quocumque predicatur 'ens,' ita et 'unum.' Et sic dico quod unum non dividit ens. Sed unum quod dividit ens magis est unum quod est principium numeri." Georgius Bruxellensis claims without further distinction that unity is convertible with being: "Ad dubium dicitur quod ens et unum convertuntur, quia de quocumque dicitur ens de eodem dicitur unum, et de quocumque dicitur unum de eodem dicitur ens" (*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 20rb).

[91] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 27vb: "Sit igitur conclusio responsiva: ens et unum eandem naturam secundum rem important. [. . .] Conclusio secunda: unum supra ens addit aliquid secundum rationem. [. . .] Et ratione sic arguitur: unum significat indivisionem entis in se, que quidem indivisio nomine 'entis' non significatur; igitur etc. Item cum unum non addat aliquod secundum rem supra ens et convertatur cum ente, tunc, si non adderet aliquid secundum rationem, essent penitus synonoma (!), et sic esset nugatio dicendo 'ens unum.' Verum est tamen quod illud additum supra ens, quod est negatio divisionis entis in se, que quidem negatio est ens secundum rationem tantum, fundamentum tamen habet in re, quia, ut dictum est, talis negatio divisionis fundatur in ipsa forma perficiente et terminante, et per consequens uniente potentiam in se."

[92] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 19vb: "Pro dubio est advertendum quod isti termini 'ens' et 'unum' eandem rem significant sub diversis tamen rationibus, quia 'ens' significat illam rem ut est quedam natura in se, sed 'unum' significat eam ut est in se indivisa."

[93] Cf. Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. m7vb: "Tertia conclusio sit ista: ens et unum dicunt eandem naturam realiter, sed distinguuntur formaliter" (Orbellis seems to copy Antonius Andreae [*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d4va]). Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 284vb: "Secundo supponitur quod unum secundo modo dictum est passio entis.

(Nicolaus de Orbellis and Johannes le Damoisiau) specify that the term "unity" does not merely indicate a negation (the undividedness of being) but some positive characteristic of being as well.[94]

The question of the relationship and distinction between being (*esse*), or actual existence (*existentia*), and essence (*essentia*) is raised by three of our commentators: Johannes le Damoisiau, Georgius Bruxellensis, and Petrus Tartareti. Damoisiau offers by far the most sophisticated treatment of the problem. He mentions four opinions on this issue. The first is Avicenna's view that being constitutes "something added" (*aliquid additum*) to a thing's essence.[95] The second is Thomas Aquinas's position, according to which being is different from essence, but does not add anything to it; instead, being arises out of the internal constituting principles of an essence. In this context, Damoisiau introduces (somewhat surprisingly) the distinction between the term "being" taken as a noun (*nominaliter*) and the term "being" taken as a participle (*participialiter*). "Being" taken

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Ideo de ipso dicendum est sicut solet dici de aliis subiectis et passionibus suis, scilicet quod sunt idem realiter, propter impossibilem separationem, sed distinguuntur formaliter. Et ideo ens et unum non dicunt eandem naturam quiditative et formaliter, sed bene realiter." Johannes Hennon, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 318vb: "Secundum dictum: ens et unum non dicunt unam et eandem naturam formaliter, etiam capiendo 'unum' ut est principium numeri transcendentis. Patet, quia alia est ratio entis et unius; ergo ens et unum non dicunt unam naturam formaliter." Petrus Tartareti thinks along the same lines, as can be conjectured from the following passage: "Tertio supponitur quod conceptus entis non includitur formaliter in passionibus vel differentiis ultimatis, sed realiter. Ideo de passionibus et differentiis ultimatis eius non predicetur nisi denominative, et non quidditative" (*Comm. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116rb). Concerning the signification of "being" and "unity" he simply concludes: "Conclusio responsalis ad quesitum: ens et unum dicunt unam et eandem naturam" (fol. 116vb). One might wonder to exactly what extent Johannes Versoris's claim that the term "unity" signifies the undividedness of being, i.e., a being of reason, which nevertheless has some *fundamentum in re*, in fact coincides with the view according to which being and unity are formally distinct.

[94] Cf. Nicolaus de Orbellis, *Cursus Met.*, IV, fol. m7vb: "Quarta conclusio sit ista: unum quod est passio entis dicit formaliter aliquid positivum. Probatur quia: unum dicit perfectionem simpliciter; sed negatio non dicit perfectionem simpliciter de se et formaliter; ergo ipsum unum non dicit puram negationem" (Orbellis again copies Antonius Andreae [*Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d4va]). Johannes le Damoisiau, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 285ra: "Ex quibus sequitur quod unum supra ens aliquid addit, non quidem tanquam dispositionem accidentalem entis, sed aliquid positivum quod non est formaliter ens, sed bene realiter. Et illud est aliquid positivum et non pura negatio."

[95] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 286ra: "Dubitatur primo utrum esse existentie sit aliquid additum realiter sive distinctum ab essentia, cum dicat Avicenna esse accidere omni rei create. [. . .] Nam Avicenna videtur respondere affirmative volens unum et ens significare aliquid additum rei, et non substantiam eius. Maxime de ente hoc dicit, propter entia que habent esse ab alio et quorum substantia est in potentia ad esse. Idem autem non est in potentia ad seipsum. Tum etiam, quia differt dicere rem et rem entem. Unde potest sciri quid est res et ignorari an sit."

as a noun is derived from essential being. This type of being does not add anything to an essence. "Being" taken as a participle is obtained from existential being. In the case of created beings, as opposed to uncreated being, i.e., God, this type of (actual) existential being differs from the (potential) being of an essence.[96]

The third view discussed by Damoisiau is attributed to Albert the Great and some anonymous "others," who claim that the terms "being" and "essence" signify one and the same entity (*realitas*). In this view, the only difference between the two terms resides in their way of signifying that entity: the term "being" signifies by way of an act (*per modum actus*), whereas the term "essence" signifies the same entity by way of a habit (*per modum habitus*). Other, more theologically oriented proponents of Albert's view claim that one and the same thing is called "essence" insofar as it is an object of the divine intellect, and "being" insofar as it is the result of the divine creative act.[97] Finally, the fourth view discussed by Damoisiau is that of John Duns Scotus, who distinguishes between four kinds of being: essential being (*esse essentiae*), existential being (*esse actualis existentiae*), subsistent being (*esse subsistentiae*), and propositional being, that signifies the composition of a subject term and a predicate term.[98]

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[96] *Ibid.*: "Doctor Sanctus vero dicit quod esse est aliud ab essentia rei, non tamen superadditum essentie rei ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentie. Ideo hoc nomen 'ens,' quod secundum ipsum imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum homine, quod imponitur ab essentia. [. . .] Hic tamen advertatur quod 'ens' aliquando accipitur nominaliter, et tunc imponitur ab esse essentie, ut communiter dicitur; nec illo modo 'ens' dicit aliquid additum super essentiam; et de ente sic accepto intelligitur illud dictum textus 'idem est homo et ens homo.' Alio modo accipitur 'ens' participialiter, quo modo imponitur ab esse existentie, quod in rebus creatis non est idem cum esse essentie, ut dicit Doctor Sanctus, eo quod essentia rei create est possibilis esse. Nichil autem est possibile ad seipsum. Ex essentia etiam et esse primo componitur quelibet res creata et de ipsa essentia recipit esse in illa compositione."

[97] *Ibid.*, fol. 286ra–b: "Albertus autem et aliqui alii volunt quod idem sit essentia et existentia, ita quod illa realitas eadem que significatur nomine 'essentie' per modum habitus significatur per modum actus per hoc verbum 'esse.' Dicit enim quod esse non est aliud quam diffusio essentie in eo quod est. Aliter ab aliis ponitur differentia esse et essentie, quia scilicet illa realitas que inquantum est obiectum intellectus divini dicitur essentia, et ut est terminus operationis divine, scilicet creationis, dicitur esse. Nec secundum istos est ymaginandum quod essentia sit quedam res que sit in potentia ad esse, quasi ad quandam aliam rem, sed quod tam essentia quam esse est in potestate creantis. Quando enim aliquid creatur, tota realitas creatur."

[98] *Ibid.*, fol. 286rb: "Alia est opinio Doctoris Subtilis. Pro qua supponitur quod quadruplex reperitur esse, scilicet esse essentie (et hoc tantum differt in modo concipiendi ab essentia); aliud est esse actualis existentie quo res ponitur in rerum natura extra suam causam; aliud est esse subsistentie, quod est esse actualis existentie in seipso non dependens in subsistendo ab alio vel ad aliud suppositum; et his tribus modis esse est aliquid reale

Against the background of these four opinions, especially that of Scotus, Damoisiau himself argues that, in the case of created beings, there is neither a real distinction between being and essence nor a mere distinction of reason.[99] He also insists that the distinction between being and essence must be found at a metaphysical level (*metaphysicaliter*) and cannot be located at the level of grammar (*grammaticaliter*) alone.[100] What remains then is that being and essence are distinct *ex natura rei*. For in created beings, essence neither precedes being in the order of time (*duratione*) nor in the order of origin (*ordine originis*), but only in the order of nature (*ordine naturae*).[101] At the same time, being and essence are not distinct as two different quiddities, but rather as a quiddity (essence) with its intrinsic mode (being). Such an intrinsic mode does not modify the formal definition (*ratio formalis*) of a quiddity, given that it does not have a formal definition of itself—only quiddities have formal definitions; modes do not.[102] Hence, Damoisiau emphasizes that being and essence are not formally distinct but are only *ex natura rei*. For, unlike a distinction *ex natura rei*, a formal distinction always implies a difference at the level of the formal definitions of the distinct entities. But in the case of the (potential) essence of a thing and its (actual) existence, there is no

extra animam. Quarto modo est esse quod significat compositionem intellectus unientis predicatum cum subiecto, quod est sinchategorema. De quo dicit Philosophus quinto *huius* quod esse significat verum et non esse falsum. Et de illo non est ad propositum, sed de esse actualis existentie."

[99] *Ibid.*: "Hoc supposito, dicitur primo <quod> in nullo creato essentia et actualis existentia differunt realiter. [...] Dicitur secundo quod essentia et esse non sola ratione differunt."

[100] *Ibid.*: "Dicitur tertio quod esse et essentia non differunt tantum grammaticaliter. Patet, quia tunc questio ista non esset methaphisicalis, sed tantum grammaticalis; sed constat quod est summe methaphisicalis."

[101] *Ibid.*, fol. 286va: "Restat nunc ulterius videre quomodo differunt existentia et essentia. Et quoad hoc dicitur primo quod essentia rei creabilis non precedit existentiam suam in duratione. [...] Dicitur secundo quod essentia rei creabilis non precedit suam existentiam ordine originis. [...] Dicitur tertio quod talis essentia precedit suam existentiam ordine nature. Patet, quia creatio posterior est ipsa quiditate, cum omnis relatio sit posterior suo fundamento; sed ipsa creatio passiva est quedam relatio; igitur."

[102] *Ibid.*: "Dicitur quarto quod essentia creabilis non distinguitur a sua existentia sicut quiditas a quiditate, sed sicut quiditas a suo modo intrinseco. Patet, quia modus intrinsecus est qui adveniens alicui non variat eius rationem formalem, eo quod de se nullam habet rationem formalem; sed existentia adveniens essentie non variat eius rationem formalem."

difference of definition. Damoisiau thus differentiates clearly between a distinction *ex natura rei* and a formal distinction.[103]

Finally, Georgius Bruxellensis and Petrus Tartareti offer less sophisticated discussions of the distinction between being and essence. Tartareti argues quite straightforwardly that, in created beings, being and essence are really identical but formally distinct. He claims that the only reason why existence is sometimes considered to be an added, accidental property of an essence is that (actual) existence is not included in the formal definition of a created thing. The case is different for God, whose quiddity of itself includes actual existence.[104] Georgius Bruxellensis devotes two separate *dubia* to the distinction of being and essence, but in the end, his exact position in the debate remains unclear (just as his position with respect to the univocity of being). On the one hand, he argues that being adds nothing real to an essence, neither an absolute thing (*res absoluta*) nor a real relation (*respectus realis*).[105] On the other hand, he puts forward two possible interpretations of the idea that being and essence are distinct according to reason alone (*solum ratione*), without explicitly endorsing one of them. What is clear, however, is that Georgius does not argue in favor of a formal distinction (or a distinction *ex natura rei*) between being and essence.[106]

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[103] *Ibid.*: "Distinguitur ergo existentia ab essentia ex natura rei, sed non formaliter. Quod non formaliter patet, quia quandocumque sunt aliqua totaliter idem quantum ad diffinitionem, illa non possunt formaliter distingui; sed homo in potentia et homo in actu sunt penitus idem quantum ad diffinitionem; igitur."

[104] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 1, fol. 116va: "Dico ulterius quod esse existentie et esse essentie sunt idem realiter, licet distinguantur formaliter. [...] Dicitur tamen ipsa existentia accidere cuilibet rei create, quia est extra eius conceptum et non quod sit accidens, capiendo 'accidens' pro forma inherente rei. Et dicitur notanter 'cuilibet rei create,' quia existentia Dei est de conceptu quidditativo Dei. Ista enim est in primo modo dicendi per se 'Deus est,' et ista est per accidens et in materia contingenti 'homo est.'"

[105] Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 2, fol. 21ra–b: "Dubitatur primo utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia. [...] Pro dubio est advertendum quod de distinctione esse ab essentia varie sunt opiniones. Quidam dicunt quod esse addit supra essentiam aliquam absolutam, alii quod esse addit ultra essentiam aliquem respectum realem ad agens. Alii dicunt quod ratione solum distinguuntur. Alii vero dicunt quod <distinguuntur> solum grammaticaliter, quia 'essentia' significat ipsam nominaliter et 'esse' significat verbaliter. Sed prima et secunda opinio sunt false. [...]" Georgius's second *dubium* is devoted to the third opinion (see following note). The fourth opinion is completely left aside.

[106] *Ibid.*, fol. 21rb–va: "Dubitatur utrum esse et essentia solum ratione different. [...] Pro dubio est advertendum quod essentia illa dicitur esse que est posita extra nihil. In hoc autem quod dicitur essentia posita extra nihil duo dicuntur, scilicet ipsa essentia et ipsa positio extra nihil. Quidam igitur voluerunt dicere quod esse est ipsa positio extra nihil, et ita ipsa positio extra nihil non est alia res a re ipsa posita, licet sit bene alius conceptus secundum quem concipitur ut res et secundum quem concipitur posita extra nihil.

4. Conclusion

At a first glance, it seems that we can conclude that the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* flourished in the 15th century, insofar as many more commentaries were produced than in the previous century. The tradition was established in many important intellectual centers throughout Europe, with the notable exception of England, and spread across a wide variety of religious orders, even though most of the commentators were seculars. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider the 15th century to be the golden age of Aristotelian metaphysics.

However, a closer examination of the Parisian group of commentaries challenges this idea of a flourishing tradition. First of all, most of the commentators covered only a limited selection of Aristotle's work (Books I–VI) and addressed only a relatively small number of questions (in many cases only one or two). Furthermore, there is little evidence of philosophical innovation or sophistication in the Parisian works. Leaving aside one isolated reference to John Buridan's followers (*Buridanistae*), all references named are the conventional authorities on the topic: Avicenna, Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. The most influential commentator is Antonius Andreae, whose commentary was used as a model by Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti (and, to a lesser extent, Georgius Bruxellensis), which gave these works a strong flavor of early 14th-century Scotism. Finally, several of the commentators not only reproduced entire sections from Antonius Andreae's commentary but also copied fragments of text from each other's works or that by other, as yet unidentified authors. As a result, the commentaries ended up being very similar to one another in many respects.

However, Johannes Versoris's commentary is an exception. It is much less selective, it is hardly (if at all) influenced by Antonius Andreae's commentary, and it seems to be largely unaffected by mutual copying. Versoris's commentary also differs from the other works with respect to contents. While our commentators seem to agree on several issues, particularly on the concept and the subject-matter of metaphysics, Versoris follows his own line of reasoning. For example, with respect to the subject-matter of

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[…] Alii tamen dicunt quod ipsum existere est ipsa essentia existens, nec est res aliqua absoluta vel respectiva et inherens, sed esse aliquam essentiam existere. Hoc autem, puta aliquam essentiam existere, omnino nulla res est."

metaphysics, his approach differs from that of the other Parisian authors, even though his conclusions are similar to theirs. Moreover, Versoris not only follows different lines of reasoning but also defends his own particular views. For example, he argues that quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances is wholly unattainable for us in this life, and that being and unity are only distinct according to reason (*secundum rationem*). In contrast, the other authors claim that some form of quidditative knowledge of God and the separate substances can be acquired in this life and that being and unity are formally distinct (*formaliter*). Versoris also stands alone in explicitly defending the analogy of being while the other authors either argue in favor of the univocity of being (Johannes le Damoisiau, Johannes Hennon, Nicolaus de Orbellis, and Petrus Tartareti) or leave the question undecided (Georgius Bruxellensis). As a rule, Versoris adopts Thomist solutions, whereas the other authors, with the notable exception of Georgius Bruxellensis, proceed along Scotist lines.

To conclude, if we leave aside Versoris's commentary and ignore all the slight differences in detail, we see that the Parisian commentaries are actually very similar in terms of both formal structure and contents. In fact, they look like standard accounts of Aristotelian metaphysics to be used as teaching manuals for the Arts faculty or *studia* of the religious orders. From the perspective of philosophical innovation or sophistication, the fifteenth-century tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was, therefore, not as flourishing as the comparative numbers of extant commentaries would suggest.

APPENDIX 1
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY *METAPHYSICS* COMMENTARIES[107]

1. Antonius de Carlenis O.P. (d. 1460), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Unknown [Italy]) (Lohr 1, 365).[108]
2. Antonius Trombeta O.F.M. CONV. (d. 1517), *Quaestiones quodlibetales metaphysicae* (Padua) (Lohr 1, 366–67).[109]
3. Arnoldus Bodense, *Disputationes super librum XII Metaphysicae* (Unknown [Vienna?]) (Lohr 1, 369).
4. Bertholdus dictus Gepzen (?), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* (Ezlingen) (Lohr 7, 130).
5. Dominicus de Flandria O.P. (d. 1479), *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam* (Florence [?]) (Lohr 1, 399).[110]

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[107] This list of 42 extant commentaries is based on Charles H. Lohr's survey of "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," published between 1967 and 1974 in subsequent issues of *Traditio*: 23 (1967), 313–413 (= Lohr 1); 24 (1968), 149–245 (= Lohr 2); 26 (1970), 135–216 (= Lohr 3); 27 (1971), 251–351 (= Lohr 4); 28 (1972), 281–396 (= Lohr 5); 29 (1973), 93–197 (= Lohr 6); and 30 (1974), 119–44 (= Lohr 7). The abbreviated text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Books I–VI composed by (or attributed to) Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) (see Lohr 6, 177–78, and above, note 8) has not been included in this list. In addition to the 42 extant commentaries, Lohr lists 12 15th-century authors whose commentaries seem to be no longer extant: Ambrosius Spiera (Spera) Tarvisinus O.S.M. (Lohr 1, 357); Andreas de Biliis (Biglia) O.E.S.A. (Lohr 1, 358); Baptista de Fabriano O.P. (Lohr 1, 374); Erasmus Friesner de Wunsiedel O.P. (Lohr 1, 405); Franciscus Securus de Nardo O.P. (Lohr 1, 412); Gualterus Scotus de Parisiis (?) (Lohr 2, 188); Hieronymus de Janua O.P. (Lohr 2, 239); Jacobus de Jutirboc O. CARTH. (Lohr 3, 143); Johannes Capreolus O.P. (Lohr 3, 184); Johannes Nicolaus Blancus (Bianchi) O. CARM. (Lohr 4, 306); Vincentius Merlinus O.P. (Lohr 6, 196); and Franciscus de Fortis O.F.M. (Lohr 7, 134). Commentaries discovered since the publication of Lohr's survey have not been taken into account.

[108] For this author, see Thomas Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols. (Rome, 1970–93), vol. 1 (*A–F*), p. 109, esp. n. 283 (*Quaestiones in libros XII Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*); and Steven J. Livesey, *Antonius de Carlenis, O.P. Four Questions on the Subalternation of the Sciences* (Philadelphia, 1994).

[109] According to Lohr, a new edition of this work was printed in 1502 as *Opus in Metaphysicam*. See also Edward P. Mahoney, "Antonio Trombetta and Agostino Nifo on Averroes and Intelligible Species: A Philosophical Dispute at the University of Padua," in: Antonino Poppi, ed., *Storia e cultura al Santo di Padova fra il XII et il XX secolo* (Vicenza, 1976), pp. 289–301 (repr. in: Edward P. Mahoney, *Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance* [Aldershot, 2000], n. IX); and Sven V. Knebel, "*Volo magis stare cum Avicenna*. Der Zufall zwischen Averoisten und Avicennisten," in: Andreas Speer & Lydia Wegener, eds., *Wissen über Grenzen. Arabisches Wissen und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia) 33 (Berlin-New York, 2006), pp. 662–76, esp. 672–76.

[110] For this work, see Léon Mahieu, *Dominique de Flandre: sa métaphysique* (Bibliothèque Thomiste) 24 (Paris, 1942). See also Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 1, pp. 315–18, esp. 317, n. 861 (*Summa divinae philosophiae* [*Quaest. In XII libros Metaphys.*]); Franco Riva, "L'analogia dell'ente in Domenico di Fiandria," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 86 (1994), 287–322; and E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Suárez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," *Vivarium* 33 (1995), 50–75. Dominicus's commentary has been

6. Franciscus de Casleto (fl. 1437), *Metaphysica* (Toulon [Toloniae?]) (Lohr 1, 409).
7. Gabriel Zerbus, *Quaestiones metaphysicae* (Bologna or Padua [?]) (Lohr 2, 150).
8. Georgius Bruxellensis (d. 1510), *Cursus optimarum quaestionum* [...] *Metaphysica* I–VI (Paris) (Lohr 2, 156–57).[111]
9. Henricus Ruyn (fl. 1428), *Disputata super Metaphysicam* (Erfurt) (Lohr 2, 228).[112]
10. Humbertus de Albiziis O.P. (d. 1434), *Glossae super libris Metaphysicae* (Firenze) (Lohr 2, 244).[113]
11. Jacobus de Gostynin (d. 1506), *In Metaphysicam* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 142).[114]
12. Jodocus de Marbach (fl. 1446–47), *Expositio libri VII Metaphysicae* (Leipzig) (Lohr 3, 151).
13. Johannes de Caulaincourt (d. after 1483), *In libros Metaphysicorum* (Paris) (Lohr 3, 184).[115]
14. Johannes de Colonia O.F.M. (fl. 15/2 c.), *Quaestiones magistri Iohannis Scoti abbreviatae et ordinatae per alphabetum super IV libris Sententiarum Quodlibetisque Metaphysicae et De anima* (Unknown [Cologne ?]) (Lohr 3, 185).
15. Johannes de Glogovia (d. 1507), *Quaestiones super XII libros Metaphysicae* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 200).[116]
16. Johannes de Glogovia (d. 1507), *Expositio in libros Metaphysicorum* (Krakow) (Lohr 3, 200).

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edited as *Quaestiones in duodecim Metaphysicae libros Aristotelis secundum processum et expositionem doctoris angelici Thomae de Aquino ordinis praedicatorum* (Venice, 1499; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967).

[111] For this author, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), vol. 3: *Répertoire des noms commençant par G* (Studia Artistarum) 6 (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 73–74.

[112] The *Disputata super Metaphysicam* by Henricus Ruyn (Runen or Ryen) have been edited by Andrea Tabarroni, "Henricus Ruyn, *Disputata Metaphysicae*. An Edition," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin* 61 (1991), 185–428.

[113] For this work, see Thomas Kaeppeli & Emilio Panella, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 4 (*T–Z*) (Rome, 1993), pp. 412–13, n. 3915.

[114] For this author, see Władysław Seńko, "La Philosophie médiévale en Pologne: caractère, tendances et courants principaux," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 14 (1970), 5–21, esp. 17–18.

[115] For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. III: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes de Caulaincourt (*alias* Johannes de Magistris)," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 49 (2007), 195–237, esp. 231–33.

[116] For this author, see Stefan Swieżawski, "Matériaux servant aux recherches sur Jean de Glogow († 1507)," in: *Mélanges offerts à Etienne Gilson* (Toronto-Paris, 1959), pp. 613–50; and Seńko, "La Philosophie médiévale en Pologne," pp. 16–17. Johannes's commentary has been edited by Ryszard Tatarzyński, *Jan z Glogowa, Komentarz do Metafizyki* (Opera philosophorum medii aevi. Textus et studia) 7 (Warszawa, 1984).

17. Johannes Hennon (d. after 1484), *Liber philosophiae Aristotelis* (*Metaphysica* I–V) (Paris) (Lohr 3, 203).[117]
18. Johannes Hervaeus (fl. 1478–1505), *In libros I–V Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 3, 204).[118]
19. Johannes le Damoisiau (d. after 1488), *In libros I–VI Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 255).[119]
20. Johannes Meyger de Lübeck (?) (fl. 1458–62), *Quaestiones metaphysicae* (1462) (Rostock) (Lohr 4, 262).
21. Johannes de Nova Domo (fl. 1400–15), *Positiones notabiles circa libros Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 264).[120]
22. Johannes Orient (fl. 1405–42), *Lectura cum textu et quaestionibus omnium XII librorum Metaphysicae collecta ex scripto Alexandri* [*de Alexandria*] (Krakow or Prague [?]) (Lohr 4, 265).
23. Johannes Ottonis de Münsterberg (d. 1416), *Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae* (Prague) (Lohr 4, 266).
24. Johannes de Raczіborsko (fl. 1444–45), *In Metaphysicam* (Krakow) (Lohr 4, 273).[121]
25. Johannes Rucherat de Weselia (d. 1481), *Exercitium Metaphysicae* (Erfurt) (Lohr 4, 277).[122]

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[117] For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. I: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes Hennon," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 47 (2005), 125–55, esp. 154–55.

[118] For this author, see Richard Sharpe, *A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland Before 1540* (Turnhout, 1997), p. 262 (John Harvey); and Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), vol. 5: *Répertoire des noms commençant par J* (*suite: à partir de Johannes D.*) (Studia Artistarum) 11 (Turnhout, 2003), p. 84.

[119] For this work, see Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris. II: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes le Damoisiau," *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 48 (2006), 209–28, esp. 226–28.

[120] For this work, see Anton G. Weiler, "Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les universaux," *Vivarium* 6 (1968), 108–54, esp. 120–23 and 153–54 (edition of fragments); also Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, vol. 5, pp. 132–34, esp. 133.

[121] For this author, see Jerzy Zathey, "*Colligite fragmenta ne pereant*. Contribution aux recherches sur l'histoire de l'enseignement à l'université de Cracovie au XV[e] siècle," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 10 (1961), 96–102; and Sophie Włodek, "Quelques informations sur les commentaires médiévaux de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote conservés dans les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Jagellone à Cracovie," in: Paul Wilpert, ed., *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Miscellanea mediaevalia) 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 767–74, esp. 769–70.

[122] For this author, see Gustav A. Benrath, "Rucherat, Johann, von Wesel," in: Wolfgang Stammler & Karl Langosch, eds., *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, 14 vols. (Berlin-New York, 1978–2008), vol. 8 (Berlin-New York, 1992), pp. 298–304, esp. 301.

26. Johannes de Slupcza (?) (d. 1488), *Puncta super libros Metaphysicae* (Krakow) (Lohr 4, 282).[123]
27. Johannes Streler de Francfordia O.P. (d. 1459), *Quaestiones libri Metaphysicae* (Vienna) (Lohr 4, 284).[124]
28. Johannes Tinctoris de Tornaco (d. 1469), *Textualia vel copulata Metaphysicae* (Cologne) (Lohr 4, 287).[125]
29. Johannes Versoris (d. after 1482), *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Paris) (Lohr 4, 293–94).[126]
30. Kilianus Stetzing O.F.M. (fl. 15 c.), *Tabula super Metaphysicam Antonii Andreae* (Colchester & Erfurt ["tabula super *Metaphysicam* rev. doctoris Fr. Antonii Andreae o.m. Scotelli magno labore collecta [. . .] in Anglia Colcestriae, Erfordiae vero completa"]) (Lohr 4, 307).
31. Mauritius de Portu O.F.M. Conv. (d. 1513), *Annotationes (Castigationes) in Scoti Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae* (Milan or Padua [?]) (Lohr 4, 344).[127]
32. Nicolaus Murrifex O.F.M. (fl. 1454–60), *Declaratio super Antonii Andreae Metaphysicam* (Magdeburg) (Lohr 5, 288).
33. Nicolaus de Orbellis O.F.M. Conv. (d. 1475), *Compendium mathematicae, physicae et metaphysicae* (Paris [?]) (Lohr 5, 289).[128]
34. Nicolaus Theodorici de Amsterdam (d. ca. 1460), *Quaestiones Metaphysicae* (Rostock & Leipzig) (Lohr 5, 303).[129]

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[123] For this work, see Ryszard Tatarzyński, "Le Commentaire à la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote attribué à Jean de Slupcza: le choix des questions relatives à la causalité," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 24 (1979), 133–68.

[124] For this author, see Thomas Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 3 (*I–S*) (Rome, 1980), pp. 17–8, esp. 17, n. 2676.

[125] For this author, see Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben.* Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, 3 vols. (Munich, 1956), vol. 3, pp. 411–32; Emile van Balberghe, "Les œuvres du théologien Jean Tinctor," in: Emile van Balberghe, *Les Manuscrits médiévaux de l'abbaye du Parc* (Brussels, 1992), pp. 123–53; Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, "Frühumanismus in Köln. Neue Beobachtungen zu dem thomistischen Theologen Johannes Tinctoris von Tournai," in: Johannes Helmrath, Helmut Wolff, & Heribert Mueller, eds., *Studien zum 15. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Erich Meuthen* (Munich, 1994), pp. 667–95; and Raymond Macken, *Medieval Philosophers of the Former Low Countries. Bio-Bibliography and Catalogue*, 2 vols. (Leuven, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 376–80.

[126] For this author, see Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, vol. 5, pp. 170–77, esp. 173; Pepijn Rutten, "*Secundum processum et mentem Versoris*: John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 292–336; and Serge-Thomas Bonino, "Le thomisme parisien au XVe siècle," *Revue thomiste* 107 (2007), 625–52.

[127] For this author, see Sharpe, *A Handlist*, pp. 375–76 (Maurice O'Fihely).

[128] For this author, see Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), vol. 6: *Répertoire des noms commençant par L-M-N-O* (Studia Artistarum) 13 (Turnhout, 2005), pp. 166–68, esp. 167.

[129] For this author, see Macken, *Medieval Philosophers*, pp. 423–28; and Jan Pinborg, "Die Aristoteles-Quaestionen des Magister Nicolaus von Amsterdam," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 25 (1964), pp. 244–62. Two questions from Nicolaus's commentary on the *Metaphysics* (IV, q. 5: *Utrum "ens" univoce significat substantiam et accidens*, and VII, q. 1: *Utrum substantia sit prior accidente definitione, notitia et tempore*) are edited by Paul J.J.M. Bakker, "Nicholas of Amsterdam on Accidental Being. A Study and Edition of Two Questions from

35. Paulus Nicolettus Venetus O.E.S.A. (d. 1429), *Lectura super librum Metaphysicorum* (Padua [?]) (Lohr 5, 318).[130]
36. Paulus Soncinas O.P. (d. 1494), *Quaestiones metaphysicales* (*In libros Metaphysicae quaestiones*) (Milan, Ferrara, or Bologna [?]) (Lohr 5, 321).[131]
37. Petrus Martinez de Osma (d. ca. 1480), *Compendium super libros VII–XII Metaphysicae* (Salamanca) (Lohr 5, 363).[132]
38. Petrus de Rivo (d. 1499), *Textualia Metaphysicae* (Louvain) (Lohr 5, 367).[133]
39. Petrus de Sienno (d. before 1460), *Quaestiones super librum Metaphysicorum* (Krakow) (Lohr 5, 371).[134]
40. Petrus Tartareti (d. ca. 1522), *Quaestiones super tota philosophia naturali et metaphysica* (*Metaphysica* I–VI) (Paris) (Lohr 5, 374–75).[135]

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his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*,'" *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 15 (2012), 131–80.

[130] For this work, see Amos Bertolacci, *Il commento di Paolo Veneto ai libri IV e VI della Metafisica di Aristotele e la tradizione esegetica medievale* (Laurea [M.A. equivalent] dissertation, University of Pisa, 1990–91); Leonardo Riccadonna, *Il commento di Paolo Veneto al libro VII della Metafisica di Aristotele e la tradizione esegetica medievale* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pisa, 1994–95); Alessandro D. Conti, *Esistenza e verità. Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del tardo Medioevo* (Rome, 1996); Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice on Individuation," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 65.1 (1998), 107–32; Alessandro D. Conti, "Paul of Venice's Theory of Divine Ideas and its Sources," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 14 (2003), 409–48; and Fabrizio Amerini, "Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Alexandria and Paul of Venice on the Nature of Essence," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 15 (2004), 541–89.

[131] For this author, see Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 3, p. 203, n. 3177. Paulus Soncinas's commentary (which covers Books IV–XII) has been edited as *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae* (Venice, 1588; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967).

[132] For this author, see Horacio Santiago-Otero & Klaus Reinhardt, *Pedro Martínez de Osma y el método teológico. Edición de alcunos escritos inéditos* (Madrid, 1987); José Labajos Alonso, "Pensiamento metafísico de Pedro de Osma," *La Ciudad de Dios* 207 (1994), 49–75; and José L. Fuertes Herreros, "Contra el nominalismo. Humanismo y renovación de la filosofía y teología en Pedro Martínez de Osma (1428–1480)," *Revista española de filosofia medieval* 11 (2004), 243–55.

[133] For this author, see Luc Burie, "Proeve tot inventarisatie van de in handschrift of in druk bewaarde werken van de Leuvense theologie professoren uit de XVe eeuw," in: Edmond J.M. van Eijl, ed., *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis, 1432–1797. Bijdragen tot haar geschiedenis* (Bibliotheca Ephemerium theologicarum Lovaniensium) 45 (Leuven, 1977), pp. 214–72, and Chris Schabel, *Theology at* Paris*, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (Alderhot, 2000).

[134] For this author, see Włodek, "Quelques informations," pp. 769–70; and Feliks Krause, "Przedmiot metafizyki i jego specyficzne właściwości według Piotra z Sienna (L'objet de la métaphysique et ses propriétés spécifiques selon Pierre de Sienno)," *Acta Mediaevalia* 12 (1999), 215–34.

[135] For this author, see Gerhard Krieger, "Die Begründung der Metaphysik in der Existenz. Zu einer Parallele zwischen sprachanalytischer Ontologie und spätmittelalterlichem Scotismus," *Franziskanische Studien* 72 (1990), 70–86; and Olga Weijers & Monica B. Calma, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 7: *Répertoire des noms commençant par P* (Studia Artistarum) 15 (Turnhout, 2007), pp. 233–38, esp. 236–37.

41. Simon Baechcz de Homburg (d. 1464), *Exercitium metaphysicae* (Erfurt) (Lohr 6, 140).
42. Thuo Nicolai de Vribergia (d. 1472), *Disputata in libros Metaphysicorum* (Erfurt) (Lohr 6, 191–92).[136]

[136] Thuo's commentary has been edited: Thuo de Vribergia, *Disputata metaphysicae*, ed. Andrea Tabarroni (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi) 13 (København, 1998), pp. 1–277. See also Egbert P. Bos, "Thuo of Vriborg and Marsilius of Inghen," in: Sten Ebbesen & Russell L. Friedman, eds., *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*. Acts of the Symposium *The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy*, January 10–13, 1996 (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 523–39 (with an edition of Marsilius of Inghen, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 15, *Utrum sit aliquis conceptus singularis essentialis*).

APPENDIX 2
LISTS OF *QUAESTIONES*, *DUBITATIONES*, AND *LEMMATA*

I. *Johannes Versoris*, Quaestiones super Metaphysicam *(Cologne, 1494; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967)*

Liber primus

1. Utrum ista scientia que metaphisica dicitur sit scientia distincta ab aliis partibus philosophie.
2. Utrum omnes homines natura scire desiderant.
3. Utrum ex sensu fiat memoria, et ex memoria fiat experimentum, et ex experimento fiat ars.
4. Utrum expertus artifex certius operetur artifice non experto.
5. Utrum scientia speculativa sit melior activa sive practica et magis nomine sapientie digna.
6. Utrum ad sapientem pertineat consideratio quidditatum omnium rerum etiam in particulari.
7. Utrum metaphisica sit scientia speculativa vel activa.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum cognitio veritatis sit homini possibilis.
2. Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis veniat ex parte rerum vel intellectus nostri.
3. Utrum ista scientia que philosophia prima dicitur sit maxime veritatis scientia.
4. Utrum in causis efficientibus sit processus in infinitum.
5. Utrum in finibus et formis sit processus in infinitum.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti veritatis scientiam necesse sit primum dubitare.
2. Utrum unius scientie aut diversarum sit omnia genera causarum speculari.
3. Utrum unius scientie aut diversarum sit considerare simpliciter prima principia demonstrationum, et si unius, utrum eiusdem sit vel alterius considerare substantiam, que est primum et principale ens.
4. Utrum preter substantias sensibiles et singulares sint ponende alie substantie separate ab eis secundum esse universales et predicabiles de ipsis singularibus substantiis, ut posuerunt plathonici.
5. Utrum genera sint principia aut elementa rerum aut eadem ex quibus inexistentibus et primis componitur unumquodque.
6. Utrum omnium rerum sint eadem principia secundum numerum.
7. Utrum unum et ens sint principia substantialia rerum.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum ens dicatur univoce de creaturis.
2. Utrum ens et unum dicant eandem naturam.
3. Utrum primum principium sit ista propositio: "impossibile est idem simul inesse et non inesse eidem."
4. Utrum noster intellectus possit simul multa intelligere.
5. Utrum omne nomen significet unum tantum.
6. Utrum omne quod apparet sit verum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum ad metaphisicum pertineat nominum multiplicium distinctio.
2. Utrum diffinitio elementi sit bene assignata in qua dicitur "elementum est ex quo componitur aliquid primo inexistente indivisibili specie in aliam speciem."
3. Utrum consideratio huius nominis "natura" ad metaphisicum pertineat.
4. Utrum illa que dicuntur unum quinto modo, scilicet quorum intelligentia est indivisibilis loco, tempore et ratione, sunt maxime unum.
5. Utrum divisiones entis et substantie posite in textu sint sufficientes.
6. Utrum divisiones eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, oppositi et contrarii, specie diversorum et eorundem specie sint sufficienter assignate.
7. Utrum modi prioris et posterioris sint sufficienter in textu positi.
8. Utrum divisiones potestatis seu potentie et quanti sint sufficienter posite.
9. Utrum modi qualis seu qualitatis sint sufficienter assignati.
10. Utrum modi ad aliquid sint sufficienter ab Arestotele positi.
11. Utrum modi perfecti sufficienter ponantur in textu.
12. Utrum inter privative opposita sit dare medium.
13. Utrum totum universale et integrale differant.
14. Utrum conditiones colobon sint sufficienter assignate.
15. Utrum falsum est in rebus.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio philosophie in factivam, que mechanica dicitur, et activam, que moralis, et theoricam, que speculativa dicitur, sit sufficiens.
2. Utrum de ente per accidens sive secundum accidens sit scientia.
3. Utrum ens quod dicitur verum sit de consideratione metaphisice.

Liber septimus

1. Utrum substantia sit prior accidente tempore, diffinitione et cognitione seu noticia.
2. Utrum materia sit substantia.
3. Utrum ex cognitione istorum sensibilium deveniamus in cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium.
4. Utrum accidentia diffiniantur per additamentum.
5. Utrum quod quid est sit idem cum eo cuius est quod quid est.
6. Utrum sint ydee ponende separate ut sint cause horum inferiorum.

7. Utrum forma generetur vel compositum in his que componuntur ex materia et forma.
8. Utrum diffinitiones rerum sensibilium concipiunt materiam.
9. Utrum partes diffinitionis significent unum et utrum ex ipsis fiat unum.
10. Utrum universale sit substantia.
11. Utrum, si ydee ponerentur ut posuit Plato, possent diffiniri.
12. Utrum ipsum quod <quid> est sit principium et causa rei cuius est.

Liber octavus

1. Utrum materia et forma sint principia omnium substantiarum sensibilium.
2. Utrum species vel forme rerum habeant se sicut numeri.
3. Utrum accidentium sit materia.
4. Utrum ex materia et forma per se fiat aliquod unum.

Liber nonus

1. Utrum differentia posita ab Arestotele inter potentias rationales et irrationales sit sufficiens, que est quod potentie rationales sunt eedem oppositorum et potentie irrationales non sunt eedem oppositorum.
2. Utrum nihil sit possibile nisi quando actu est, ut dixerunt mechanici.
3. Utrum omne illud ex quo aliquid fit sit in potentia ad quod fit.
4. Utrum actus prior sit potentia diffinitione substantia sive perfectione et tempore.
5. Utrum actus sit melior potentia et intelligentia prior.

Liber decimus

1. Utrum omnia mensurantur uno.
2. Utrum unum sit substantia aliqua per se subsistens.
3. Utrum unum et multa opponantur contrarie.
4. Utrum diffinitio contrariorum sit bene posita, in qua dicitur: contraria sunt que plurimum differunt eorum que sunt in eodem genere et in eodem subiecto et sub eadem potestate.
5. Utrum privatio et habitus sint principium contrarietatis.
6. Utrum equale opponitur magno et parvo.
7. Utrum unum et multa opponantur.
8. Utrum media contrariorum componantur ex extremis.
9. Utrum contrarietas sit differentia secundum speciem.
10. Utrum corruptibile et incorruptibile differant genere.

Liber undecimus

1. Utrum unius scientie sit considerare principia rerum.
2. Utrum si ens pure equivoce diceretur de omnibus entibus, de omnibus entibus esset scientia una.
3. Utrum ad metaphysicam pertineat considerare prima principia demonstrationum.

4. Utrum preter scientias particulares sit ponenda scientia universalis ab aliis distincta.
5. Utrum aliqua scientia consideret de ente per accidens.

Liber duodecimus

1. Utrum materia et forma sint principia substantiarum sensibilium.
2. Utrum eadem principia sint omnium entium, scilicet substantiarum et accidentium.
3. Utrum sit necesse esse aliquam primam substantiam sempiternam et immobilem.
4. Utrum primus motor moveat celum tanquam bonum appetibile.
5. Utrum celum secundum sui substantiam et secundum suum motum a primo principio dependeat.
6. Utrum celum sit animatum.
7. Utrum prima causa, que est Deus, sit omnino simplex.
8. Utrum Deus sit suum intelligere et sua vita.
9. Utrum sit tantum unum primum principium.
10. Utrum sint ponende plures substantie intellectuales separate.
11. Utrum in substantiis separatis sit multitudo individuorum sub una specie.
12. Utrum substantie intellectuales separate create sint composite.
13. Utrum cognitio prime substantie intellectualis sit discursiva, scilicet aut per modum compositionis et divisionis, aut per modum simplicis intelligentie.
14. Utrum substantia intellectualis creata sit suum intelligere et sua potentia intellectiva.
15. Utrum substantie separate create intelligant per species a rebus sensibilibus acceptas.
16. Utrum substantia intellectualis creata quandoque intelligat in actu et quandoque potentia.
17. Utrum substantie separate cognoscant se ipsas.
18. Utrum bonum et finis universi sit ordo universi vel aliud bonum separatum.

II. *Nicolaus de Orbellis*, Cursus librorum philosophie naturalis secundum viam doctoris Subtilis Scoti, *pars III*: Metaphysica (*Basel, 1494*)

I: Omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant (fol. 1ra) [=*Met.*, A 1, 980a21]; Animalia quidem igitur natura sensuum (fol. 1vb) [=*Met.*, A 1, 980a27]; Fit autem ex memoria hominibus experimentum (fol. lii rb) [=*Met.*, A 1, 981a1]; Ad agere quidem igitur (fol. liii ra) [=*Met.*, A 1, 981a15]; Experti quidem quem sciunt licet propter quid (fol. liii rb) [=*Met.*, A 1, 981a30]; Primum quidem igitur (fol. lv ra) [=*Met.*, A 1, 981b15]; Quoniam autem hanc scientiam (fol. lv rb) [=*Met.*, A 2, 982a5]; Quare vero non active (fol. lv vb) [=*Met.*, A 2, 982b11].

II: De veritate theorica sic quidem (fol. lvii ra) [=*Met.*, α 1, 993a30]; Forsan autem ex difficultate secundum (fol. lvii va) [=*Met.*, α 1, 993b7]; Non solum autem his dicere gratiam (fol. m ra) [=*Met.*, α 1, 993b12]; Vocari vero philosophiam veritatis scientiam (fol. m rb) [=*Met.*, α 1, 993b20].

III: Necesse est ad quesitam scientiam nos aggredi (fol. mii rb) [=*Met.*, B 1, 995a25].

IV: Est scientia que speculatur ens inquantum ens et que (fol. miii vb) [=*Met.*, Γ 1, 1003a21]; Ens autem quidem multis dicitur modis (fol. miv rb) [=*Met.*, Γ 2, 1003a33]; Ubique autem non proprie primum est (fol. mvi va) [=*Met.*, Γ 2, 1003b16]; Quoniam autem unius est opposita speculari (fol. mviii rb) [=*Met.*, Γ 2, 1004a10]; Volunt autem hoc demonstrare (fol. n ra) [=*Met.*, Γ 4, 1006a6]; *Est autem alia opinio Pithago* (fol. n ra); Verum inter contradictionem nihil esse contingit sed necessarium est aut dicere aut negare (fol. n va) [=*Met.*, Γ 7, 1011b24].

V: Principium dicitur aliud quidem unde utique aliquid (fol. nii va) [=*Met.*, Δ 1, 1012b35]; Elementum vero dicitur ex quo componitur primo inexistente (fol. nii va) [=*Met.*, Δ 3, 1014a26]; Natura dicitur uno modo nascentium generatio (fol. nii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 4, 1014b16]; Necessarium dicitur sine quo (fol. nii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 5, 1015a20]; Unum dicitur aliquod secundum accidens aliquod secundum se (fol. niii va) [=*Met.*, Δ 6, 1015b17]; Uni vero esse principium alicui est numero (fol. niii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 6, 1016b17]; Amplius autem alia secundum numerum sunt unum (fol. niii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 6, 1016b32]; Ens dicitur aliud quidem secundum se id autem secundum accidens (fol. nvi va) [=*Met.*, Δ 7, 1017a8]; Eadem vero dicuntur (fol. nvi va) [=*Met.*, Δ 9, 1017b28]; Diversa vero (fol. nvi vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 9, 1018a10]; Priora et posteriora dicuntur (fol. nvii rb) [=*Met.*, Δ 11, 1018b9]; Potestas dicitur principium et mutationis in altero aut inquantum alterum (fol. nvii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 12, 1019a15]; Ad aliquid vero dicuntur (fol. o ra) [=*Met.*, Δ 15, 1020b26]; Perfectum vero dicitur unum (fol. oii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 16, 1021b12]; Terminus dicitur quod est cuiuslibet ultimum (fol. oii vb) [=*Met.*, Δ 18, 1022a4]; Dispositio dicitur habitus (fol. oiii ra) [=*Met.*, Δ 19, 1022b1]; Privatio dicitur uno modo (fol. oiii ra) [=*Met.*, Δ 22, 1022b22]; Ex aliquo esse dicitur uno quidem modo (fol. oiii rb) [=*Met.*, Δ 24, 1023a26].

VI: Principia et cause queruntur entium palam (fol. oiii va) [=*Met.*, E 1, 1025b3]; Sed quoniam ens simpliciter (fol. ov va) [=*Met.*, E 2, 1026a33]; Quod autem ut verum ens (fol. ovi rb) [=*Met.*, E 4, 1027b17].

VII: Ens dicitur multipliciter (fol. ovii rb) [=*Met.*, Z 1, 1028a10]; Dicitur autem substantia (fol. oviii va) [=*Met.*, Z 1, 1028b34]; Et primo dicemus de eo quedam logice (fol. oviii vb) [=*Met.*, Z 4, 1029b13]; Eorum autem que fiunt hec natura (fol. p va) [=*Met.*, Z 7, 1032a12]; Quoniam vero diffinitio (fol. piii vb) [=*Met.*, Z 10, 1034b20]; Quoniam vero de substantia (fol. pv vb) [=*Met.*, Z 13, 1038b1].

VIII: Ex dictis namque silogizare oportet et colligentes (fol. pvii ra) [=*Met.*, H 1, 1042a4].

IX: Ergo de primo ente et ad quod omnes alie cathegorie (fol. pviii va) [=*Met.*, Θ 1, 1045b28].

X: Unum vero dicitur multis modis (fol. q vb) [=*Met.*, I 1, 1052a15]; Opponuntur autem unum et multa (fol. qii vb) [=*Met.*, I 3, 1054a20].

XI: Quod quidem sapientia (fol. qiv ra) [=*Met.*, K 1, 1059a19];

XII: De substantia quidem theorica (fol. qiv ra) [=*Met.*, Λ 1, 1069a18].

III. *Johannes Hennon,* Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6529*

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens simpliciter sumptum, quod est commune Deo et creature, sit methaphisice subiectum primum primitate adequacionis, hoc est querere utrum ens inquantum ens sit subiectum adequatum mathaphisice (!).
    1. Utrum prudencia sit in brutis.
    2. Utrum expertus non habens artem cercius operetur artifice non experto.
    3. Utrum omnes actiones et generaciones sint circa singularia.
2. Utrum ad methaphisicum spectet considerare omnes quiditates rerum.
    1. Utrum magis universalia sint difficiliora ad cognoscendum.
    2. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia libera.
    3. Utrum methaphisica sit sciencia honorabilissima.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi sit ex parte intellectus nostri aut ex parte rerum cognoscibilium.
    1. Utrum in causis essencialiter subordinatis sit processus in infinitum.
    2. Quot sunt impedimenta impediencia nos a cognicione veritatis.
    3. Utrum necesse sit ponere statum in omni genere causarum.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum "ens" predicetur univoce de Deo et creaturis, de substanciis et accidentibus.
    1. Utrum quecumque conveniunt in aliquo uno conceptu reali simul eciam conveniant in aliqua realitate.
    2. Utrum indifferencia conceptus ad plura cum eius unitate sit racio sufficiens univocacionis illius conceptus.
    3. Utrum differencie non ultime et eciam passiones entis includant ens quiditative.
2. Utrum ens et unum convertantur et eandem naturam significent.
    1. Utrum "unum" significet aliquid principaliter positive.
    2. Utrum impossibile sit demonstrare primum principium.
    3. Utrum istud principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum possibile sit duo accidencia solo numero differencia esse in eodem subiecto simul.
    1. Utrum relaciones de tercio modo relativorum dicantur mutue.
    2. Quot modis dicitur perfectum.
    3. Utrum universaliter quodlibet quantum dicatur "colobum."

Liber sextus

1. Utrum sciencia speculativa bene dividatur in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam.
   1. Utrum de ente per accidens sit sciencia.
   2. Utrum entis per accidens sit causa per se et determinata.
   3. Utrum intellectus possit plura intelligere.

IV. *Johannes le Damoisiau*, Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, *Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8*

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens inquantum ens sit subiectum methaphisice.
   1. Utrum omnes actus et generationes sint circa singulare.
   2. Utrum ad methaphisicum inquantum huiusmodi pertineat cognoscere quiditates omnium rerum in singulari.
   3. Utrum methaphisica sit scientia speculativa, et an scientia speculativa sit melior et nobilior practica.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi res sit ex parte cognoscentis, scilicet intellectus nostri, vel ex parte rerum cognoscibilium.
   1. Utrum methaphisica sit scientia maxime veritatis.
   2. Utrum in causis essentialiter ordinatis sit procedere in infinitum.
   3. Utrum de ultimo fine vel prima causa et aliis substantiis separatis cognoscamus quid sunt.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum universale sit res extra animam existens in rebus singularibus distincta a re singulari.
   1. Utrum universalia habeant esse in rerum natura preter operationem intellectus.
   2. Utrum universalia sint conceptus mentales.
   3. Utrum universale sit aliqua entitas ex natura rei distincta a rebus singularibus et posteriorica (?).

Liber quartus

1. Utrum “ens” et “unum” significent eandem naturam et inter se convertantur.
   1. Utrum esse existentie sit aliquid additum realiter sive distinctum ab essentia, cum dicat Avicenna esse accidere omni rei create.
   2. Utrum negatio habeat distinctam formalitatem ab affirmatione cui opponitur.
   3. Utrum hoc principium “impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse” sit firmissimum, notissimum et simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam sui esse.
   1. Utrum possibile sit duo accidentia solo numero differentia esse simul in eodem subiecto.
   2. Utrum tres modi relativorum sint a Philosopho convenienter assignati.
   3. Utrum sit possibile plures substantias immateriales esse in eadem specie.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio qua Philosophus dividit scientiam speculativam in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam sive divinam sit sufficiens.
   1. Utrum hec famosa divisio scientie speculative realis in phisicam, mathematicam et methaphisicam sit sufficiens.
   2. Utrum de ente per accidens sit scientia.
   3. Utrum ens verum debeat excludi a consideratione methaphisica.

V. *Georgius Bruxellensis*, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicae *(Lyon, 1502)*

Liber primus

1. Utrum talibus habitibus qui metaphisica dicitur sit unus numero.
   1. Utrum principiorum metaphisicalium habitus sit idem numero cum habitus conclusionum.
   2. Utrum principiorum metaphisicalium sit unus habitus numero.
   3. Utrum principiorum et conclusionum sit idem habitus.
2. Utrum omnes homines natura scire desiderent.
   1. Utrum appetitus quo omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant sit ipsius voluntatis aut intellectus.
   2. Utrum inter omnes sensus maxime diligamus sensum visus.
   3. Utrum verum sit quod illud est magis eligendum cuius privatio est magis fugienda.
3. Utrum prudentia insit brutis.
   1. Utrum ex experimentis generetur ars.
   2. Dubitatur secundo de modo quo ex experimento fit ars.
   3. Utrum noticia experimentalis sit noticia propositionis universalis accepte ex multis singularibus vel sit multe memorie multorum singularium.
4. Utrum expertus non artifex certius operetur artifice non experto.
   1. Utrum possit aliquis esse artifex sine experimento.
   2. Utrum omnes actus et operationes sint circa singularia.
   3. Utrum sensus sit circa singulare.
5. Utrum metaphysica sit sapientia.
   1. Utrum metaphisica sit scientia practica vel speculativa.
   2. Utrum omnis noticia directiva praxis sit practica.
   3. Utrum metaphisica sit honorabilissima.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis rerum parum de actu habentium proveniat ex parte rerum vel ex parte nostri intellectus.
    1. Utrum substantie separate cognoscantur a nobis.
    2. Utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles.
    3. Utrum possumus substantias separatas cognoscere per conceptus absolutos proprios et naturaliter representativos.
2. Utrum in causis efficientibus sit processus in infinitum.
    1. Utrum in aliis generibus causarum possit esse processus in infinitum.
    2. Utrum infinitum sit cognoscibile a nobis.
    3. Quot sunt impedimenta in veritatis inquisitione contingentia.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti scientiam veritatis necesse sit primum dubitare.
    1. Utrum eiusdem scientie sit considerare omnia genera causarum.
    2. Utrum eiusdem scientie sit omnes substantiales (!) considerare.
    3. Utrum preter substantias sensibiles sint ponende alique alie substantie.
2. Utrum genera et species sint principia rerum vel partes ex quibus unumquodque componitur.
    1. Utrum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium sint eadem principia.
    2. Utrum ens et unum sint substantie rerum.
    3. Utrum numeri, superficies, linee et puncta sint substantie vel non.
    4. Utrum genera et species sint universalia in rerum natura in ipsis singularibus existentia vel extra singularia subsistentia.
    5. An quelibet res mundi sit seipsa singularis et individua vel an sit talis per aliquam differentiam individualem tanquam per principium individuationis.
    6. An sit ponenda differentia individualis tanquam principium formale et essentia distinctivum unius individui ab alio eiusdem speciei.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum subiectum metaphisice sit ens inquantum ens.
    1. Utrum ad scientiam spectat de uno determinare.
    2. Utrum unum dicat aliquam entitatem superadditam enti.
    3. Utrum ens et unum convertantur.
2. Utrum possibile sit aliqua esse eadem realiter et differre ratione.
    1. Utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia.
    2. Utrum esse et essentia solum ratione differant.
    3. Quot sunt conditiones primi principii.
3. Utrum hoc principium “impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse” sit firmissimum.
    1. Utrum omnia que apparent sint vera.
    2. Utrum omnia contradictoria sint simul vera.
    3. Utrum contradictoria sint simul falsa.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam.
    1. Quot sunt modi unius.
    2. Quot sunt modi entis.
    3. Quot modis dicuntur opposita.
2. Utrum relatio sit vera res extra animam preter operationem anime existens.
    1. Utrum ens ad non ens et non ens ad ens possit realiter referri.
    2. Utrum cuiuslibet cause realis ad suum causatum sit relatio realis.
    3. Utrum idem realiter referatur ad seipsum.
3. Utrum relatio sit entitas ab omni entitate realiter distincta.
    1. Quot sunt modi totius et partis.
    2. Quot sunt conditiones colobon.
    3. Quot modis dicitur falsum.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum ad solam metaphisicam pertineat considerare quidditates omnium rerum in particulari.
    1. Utrum de ratione habitus practici sit esse activum et causativum eius de quo est.
    2. Utrum de ente per accidens possit esse scientia.
    3. Utrum entis per accidens causa sit ens ut in pluribus.
2. Utrum ad veritatem cathegorice de inesse mere de presenti requiratur quod subiectum pro aliquo supponat.
    1. Utrum veritas propositionis sit entitas a propositione vera distincta.
    2. Utrum significatum totale totius propositionis sit una res extra animam.
    3. Utrum propositioni correspondeat aliquod significatum totale a significatis suorum terminorum distinctum.

VI. *Petrus Tartareti*, Commentarii in libros Metaphysice Aristotelis *(Basel, 1514)*

Liber primus

1. Utrum ens inquantum ens sit subiectum metaphysice.
    1. Utrum omnis actus sit circa ipsum singulare.
    2. Utrum ad metaphysicum pertineat considerare omnium rerum quidditates in singulari et sub propriis rationibus earum.
    3. Utrum metaphysica sit scientia speculativa vel practica.

Liber secundus

1. Utrum difficultas cognoscendi res sit ex parte cognoscentis vel ex parte rerum cognoscibilium.
    1. Utrum veritatis apprehensio rerum sit possibilis, quod non est aliud quere nisi utrum apprehensio propositionis vere sit possibilis.
    2. Utrum substantie separate sint a nobis quidditative cognoscibiles.
    3. Utrum in causis essentialiter subordinatis sit procedere in infinitum.

Liber tertius

1. Utrum inquirenti cognitionem veritatis necesse sit primum dubitare.
    1. Utrum singularium principia sint eadem numero.
    2. Utrum ens et unum sint substantie rerum.
    3. Utrum linee, numeri, superficies et puncta sint substantie.

Liber quartus

1. Utrum ens et unum significent eandem naturam et inter se convertantur.
    1. Utrum ens et unum convertantur.
    2. Utrum in eadem re esse realiter distinguatur ab essentia et existentia.
    3. Utrum hoc primum principium "impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse" sit firmissimum, notissimum et simpliciter primum.

Liber quintus

1. Utrum necessaria habeant causam sui esse.
    1. Quot sunt modi totius et partis.
    2. Quot sunt conditiones colobon.
    3. Quot modis dicitur falsum.

Liber sextus

1. Utrum divisio qua Philosophus dividit scientiam speculativam in physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam sit sufficiens.
    1. Utrum divisio scientie speculative realis in physicam, metaphysicam et mathematicam sit sufficiens.
    2. Utrum de ente per accidens sit scientia.
    3. Utrum verum debeat excludi a consideratione metaphysice.

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LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS

Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, 290
Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Ripoll 109
Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, 104
Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College, 344
——, Gonville and Caius College, 509
——, Peterhouse, 152
——, Peterhouse, 157
——, Peterhouse, 192 III
——, Peterhouse, 192 IV
Carpentras, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 292
Casale Monferrato, Biblioteca del Seminario, Ia.3–6
Cordoba, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 57
——, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 129 Est. 3
Darmstadt, Hessische La&HB, Hs 516
Durham, Cathedral Library, C. IV. 20
Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, 2° 178
——, Stadtbibliothek, Ampl. F 325
——, *Universitätsbibliothek*, CA 40 276
——, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q. 290
Florence, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, 84 cod. 15
——, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Fesul. 161
——, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. XIII Sin. 7
——, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, *conv. soppr.* E. I. 252
Fribourg, Couvent des Cordeliers, 39
——, Couvent des Cordeliers, 43
——, Couvent des Cordeliers, 73
Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 650
——, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 709
London, Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 333
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, H 105 inf.
Munich, Staatsbibliothek, Clm 11591
Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII. E. 2
——, Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII. E. 37
Oxford, Balliol College, 241
——, Merton College, 272
——, Merton College, 292
——, New College, 285
——, Oriel College, 33
——, Oriel College, 65
Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, 173
——, Biblioteca Antoniana, 386 Scaff. XVIII
Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3490
——, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6433B
——, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6529
——, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16131
——, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16132
——, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14716
Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, *fondo Aldini*, 324

Prague, Národní Knihovna České Republiky, XXIII. C. 106
Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, 127
Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, ms. 2322
Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, L. III. 21
Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 23
Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3013
——, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ott. lat. 2048
——, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3130
——, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4538
——, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4871
Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, lat. Cl VI, 204a
Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 5297
Worcerster, Cathedral Library, Q. 13
Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. F. 8

INDEX OF NAMES

All medieval names are indexed under the first part of the name. So Thomas Aquinas is indexed under the T.

The separate books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are indexed under *Met.* followed by their discerning letter: *Met.* A (Book I), *Met.* α (Book II).

Abd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākušī, 61
abstractive cognition, 487–488
Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, 60
Abubacer, 60
accidents
  Alexander of Alessandria on, 322, 341–344
  Aristotle on, 152
  being and, 201–203
  composites and, 235, 238
  coupled, 235–236
  essence and, 234–238, 338
  Eucharistic, 11, 184, 186, 203, 342
  God and, 529
  individuation and, 296
  inherence and, 202–204
  inseparability of, 173
  John Dinsdale on, 184–187, 202
  John Wyclif on, 569
  and knowledge, 178–179
  as mode of being, 222, 223
  nature of, 234–238, 341–344
  Paul of Venice on, 569–572, 573–574
  predication of, 150–152, 163–165, 170–171, 172–173, 184–187
  Richard of Clive on, 202
  senses of, 241–242
  subdivision of, 558
  substance and, 11, 184–187, 191, 234–238, 262–263, 322, 528–532
  Thomas Aquinas on, 234–238, 343
Adam of Buckfield
  career, 140
  influences on
    of Averroes, 141, 158–159, 206
    of Richard Rufus, 159
  sources used by, Richard Rufus, 140
  views on, being, unity of, 158–159
  works
    Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 139, 140, 158–159
    Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 139
adequation (*adaequatio*), 265–269
Aegidius Romanus. *see* Giles of Rome
al-Andalus, 59–60
Albert the Great, 92, 288
  criticisms of, on Averroes, 127
  influences of
    on Johannes le Damoisiau, 608–609
    on later philosophers, 598, 608
    on Paul of Venice, 553
  influences on
    of Arabic sources, 95–100
    of Aristotle, 95
    of Averroes, 96–101, 108–131, 133–134
    of Avicenna, 96–101, 108–131, 133–134
  sources used by
    Averroes, 96–101, 109–111
    Avicenna, 96–101, 109–111
  views on
    Arabic metaphysics, 100–101
    conflict between Averroes and Avicenna, 101, 108–109, 111–112, 120–131
      table with overview of, 114–119
    Islam, 96 n6
    Judaism, 100 n16
    metaphysics, subject-matter of, 135
    transcendentals, 112–113
  works
    commentaries on *Nicomachean Ethics*, 100 n18
    Commentary on *De caelo*, 101 n19, 122, 127, 133
    Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 96–101, 108–113
      concealment of dissent Averroes/Avicenna, 120–126
      elimination of dissent Averroes/Avicenna, 126–128
      exegetical formats of, 109–111
      harmonizing of dissent Averroes/Avicenna, 128–131, 133–134
    Commentary on the *Physics*, 122, 127, 133
    Expositio Metaphysicae, 321–322

Liber de praedicamentorum, 558
used by, Paul of Venice, 558
Albertus Magnus. *see* Albert the Great
Alexander of Alessandria, 315–358
career, 316–317
influences of, on Paul of Venice, 315, 553
influences on
of Henry of Ghent, 327–328, 329
of John Duns Scotus, 316
of Thomas Aquinas, 316, 334–335
sources used by
Albert the Great, 321–322
Averroes, 318–320
Avicenna, 322–323
Thomas Aquinas, 321
views on
accidents, 322, 341–344
Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 330–333
Metaphysics Z (Book VII), 336–344
relationship to *Categories*, 352–357
structure of, 333–336
being, analogy of, 326–328
being-essence distinction, 328–330
compounds, 347–348
definition, 348–349
intentional distinctions, 332
matter, 346–347
quiddity, 347, 355–357
quod quid erat esse, 337–341
substance, 344–352
transcendentals, 332–333
works
Commentary on the *De anima*, 317
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
dating of, 316–317
structure of, 317–318
Alexander of Aphrodisias
influences of
on al-Fārābī, 107
on Averroes, 66, 83, 108
on Avicenna, 103, 104, 107
works
commentaries on *Metaphysics* Δ (Book V), 103
On the Principles of the Universe, 104
Alexander of Hales, 315, 317
al-Fārābī
influences of, on Avicenna, 103, 104, 107
influences on
of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 107
of Themistius, 107
views on, subject-matter of metaphysics, 67
works
De scientiis, 60
On the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 103
Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City, 104
Survey of the Sciences, 103
Alfred Gonteri Brito, 470
al-Ghazālī, 149, 159–160
al-Ḥakam II, 59
al-Kindī, 67, 107
Almohads, 60, 61
Alpharabius. *see* al-Fārābī
Amerini, Fabrizio, 452, 463
Ammonius Son of Hermeias, 107
analogy
of genus, 161, 167–168
semantic, 180–182, 205, 206–207
unity of, 200
see also analogy of being
analogy of being, 11–12, 147
Alexander of Alessandria on, 326–328
anti-reductionistic view of, 149, 157
Aristotle on, 219, 259–260
English commentators on, 190, 205
Geoffrey of Aspall on, 159–169, 195–196
Giles of Rome on, 258–261
Johannes Versoris on, 586
John Dinsdale on, 180–184, 196, 205
John Duns Scotus on, 11, 156–158, 168
reductionist view of, 165–166, 170
Richard of Clive on, 169–174, 195–196
Richard Rufus on, 150
Thomas Aquinas on, 154–155, 218–219, 221–223
William of Bonkes on, 190, 196
angels/intelligences. *see* intelligences/angels
animastice, 421–422
Anonymi Boethio Daco usi Quaestiones Metaphysicae (Leipzig MS), 277, 278, 313
Anonymus Lipsiensis
influences of, on Anonymus Zimmermanni, 277
influences on
of Anonymus Zimmermanni, 277
of Boethius of Dacia, 278
sources used by
Boethius of Dacia, 278, 282
Proclus, 281
views on
being-essence distinction, 287
individuation, 294

ordering by perfections, 310–311
works, *Anonymi Boethio Daco usi Quaestiones Metaphysicae*, 277, 278, 313
Anonymus Zimmermanni
influences of, on Anonymus Lipsiensis, 277
influences on
of Anonymus Lipsiensis, 277
of Siger of Brabant, 277, 278, 289
sources used by
Proclus, 281
Thomas Aquinas, 282
views on
being-essence distinction, 289
Christian theology, 311
God, 308–309
individuation, 294–296
metaphysics
reasons for studying, 286
subject-matter of, 285
ordering by perfections, 310–311
relations, status of, 303–304
substantial forms, plurality of, 302
works, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, 277, 278–279, 313
Anselm of Canterbury, 265
Anthony of Parma, 408
Antioch, 41, 55
Antonius Andreae, 360
influences of
on French commentators, 584, 587–588, 596, 599–600, 605, 611
on later philosophers, 493
influences on
of John Duns Scotus, 414, 415
of Thomas Aquinas, 316, 334–335
mentions by, of Peter Auriol, 420
organizing/adding to Scotus's works, 419–424, 433, 439
sources used by
John Duns Scotus, 417
Thomas Aquinas, 417, 418–419
texts of
compared to
Johannes le Damoisiau, 596
John Hennon, 588, 596, 605
Nicolaus de Orbellis, 584, 587, 599–600, 605
Petrus Tartareti, 596
views on
being, unity of, 605
forms, 429–431
knowledge, 599–600
matter, 424–428, 430–433, 434–440
metaphysics
relation between other sciences and, 596
subject-matter of, 586–587
practical science, 423–424
quiddities of particular beings, 593–595
simul totum (concrete whole), 430–432
works
chronology of, 416–417, 439
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
chronology of, 416
compared to *Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalium*, 434–436
cross-references in, 423–424
Expositio, 418–419, 429–436, 438
goal of, 414, 492
manuscripts of, 417–418
organizing Scotus's material in, 414, 417–424
Quaestiones, 419–420
as Scotist textbook, 415
structure of, 419–420, 433
Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalium, 416, 418, 424, 433–434, 492
compared to Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Antonius Andreae), 434–436
compared to Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Duns Scotus), 436–439
Scriptum in artem veterem, 416
Arabic-Latin translations
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 48, 49, 55, 93, 138
authorship of, 49, 63
of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. *see Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes)
Aristoteles Latinus XXV
Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka and, 42–43, 45
Translatio Anonyma sive "Media" and, 38–39
Translatio Composita sive "Vetus" and, 34–36
Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima" and, 30–31

Aristotelianism, 17, 62, 141, 144
see also Neoplatonism; Peripatetics/Peripatetic views
Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis (TnS), 24
books included in, 30
chronology of, 53–54
information in title of, 28
Ripoll *Student's Guide* on, 26 n25
see also Metaphysica, lib. I.5-X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova"
Aristotle
criticisms of, on Plato, 338–339, 340
influences of
on Albert the Great, 95
on Nicholas Bonet, 476
views on
accidents, 152
analogical predication, 220–221
being, 78–79, 200, 219, 224
analogy of, 219, 259–260
equivocation of, 145–148, 259–260
categories, 149
compounds, 354–355
coupled accidents, 236
essence/quiddity, 337–340, 346, 356
First Mover, 72, 87
forms, 346, 354–355, 428
God, 80–81, 244–246, 251–252, 539–540
happiness, 391
homonymy, 146
human soul, 353–354
knowledge, 464–465
matter, 354–355, 424
metaphysics
nature of, 331
subject-matter of, 8–9, 67, 69–70, 214, 257, 324–325, 363–364, 504
political concepts, 393, 403
scientific investigation, 216–217
substance, 72–73, 227–228, 229, 354–355
as essence, 337–340
separate, 242–244
universality of, 349–352
synonymy, 146
transcendentals, 332
truth, 265, 270–271
universals, 339–340
works
Categories, 2, 12–13, 227, 229, 351, 520
commentaries on, 176
homonymy and synonymy in, 146
relationship with *Metaphysics*, 352–357
De anima, 80
De caelo, 70
Ethics, 100 n18, 286, 520
Libri naturales, 53
Metaphysica. *see under* names of specific books; names of specific translations
Nicomachean Ethics, 104
Organon, 86
Physics, 68, 70, 147, 243–245
Posterior Analytics, 76, 84, 103, 107, 216, 324, 331, 464–465, 504, 507–508
Sophistical Refutations, 259
assimilation (*assimilatio*), 266
authorship
of Arabic-Latin translations
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 49
of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, *Metaphysica Nova*, 49, 55, 138
of Greek-Arabic translations, of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 63, 65
of Greek-Latin translations
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*
of *Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Composita sive "Vetus,"* 24
of *Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media,"* 39–42, 55
of *Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, 42–45, 55
of *Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima,"* 33, 54–55
of *Physica Vaticana*, 40
Avempace, 59
Avenzoreth, 97 n7
Averroes (Ibn Rušd), 283–285
career, 59–62
as commentator, 61–62, 65–66, 89
cosmological system of, 75–76
criticisms on. *see also* dispute with Avicenna
of Albert the Great, 127
of Johannes le Damoisiau, 591
of John Hennon, 588
dispute with Avicenna, 62, 68–71
Albert the Great and, 101, 108–109, 111–112, 114–119, 120–131, 133–134
Alexander of Alessandria on, 329

on essence-existence distinction, 241–242, 329
role in Latin philosophy, 131–132
table with overview of, 114–119
on transcendentals, 112–113, 120, 124, 126–127, 128–131
importance of
in Islamic World, 89
in Latin West, 88–93, 135
influences of
on Adam of Buckfield, 141, 158–159, 206
on Albert the Great, 96–101, 108–131, 133–134
on John of Jandun, 397
on Nicholas Bonet, 476
on Richard Rufus, 150–151, 205–206
on Thomas Aquinas, 61, 90–91, 135, 210
influences on
of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 66, 83, 108
of Themistius, 66, 108
reconstruction of, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 82–88, 89
views on
being, 79–80, 81
predication of, 92
pros hen equivocation of, 147–148
Christian faith, 320
demonstrative reasoning, 86–88
division of *Metaphysics*, 83–85
First Mover, 72–76
forms, 428–429
God, 80–81, 91, 539–540
happiness, 391
homonymy, 147
material subjects, 13–14
metaphysics
inner consistency of, 76–77
subject-matter of, 10, 68–72, 283, 363–364, 507–508, 588
order of *Metaphysics*, 82–88, 89
perfections, 309
quiddity, 355–356
quod quid erat esse, 337, 338
substance, 231–232, 355
synonymy, 147
transcendentals, 112
unicity of intellect of all humans, 398
works
Commentary on the *De caelo*, 49–50
Compendio de Metafisica, 84 n69
De substantia orbis, 71
Long Commentary. *see Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes)
Long Commentary on De caelo, 101 n19, 122
Long Commentary on Posterior Analytics, 69, 71, 77
Long Commentary on the Physics, 71, 122, 323
Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, 61, 62, 64, 65
decline of importance of, 92
Hebrew version of, 92
translations of, 94
Short Commentary/Epitome. *see Short Commentary/Epitome on the Metaphysics* (Averroes)
use of, by Albert the Great, 96–101
Averroists/Averroistic views, 93, 113, 385, 405, 408, 410, 554, 588, 591
Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), 132
criticisms on, of Thomas Aquinas, 240–241
dispute with Averroes, 62, 68–71
Albert the Great and, 101, 108–109, 111–112, 114–119, 120–131, 133–134
Alexander of Alessandria on, 329
on essence-existence distinction, 241–242, 329
role in Latin philosophy, 131–132
table with overview of, 114–119
on transcendentals, 112–113, 120, 124, 126–127, 128–131
importance of, in Latin West, 5, 135
influences of
on Albert the Great, 96–101, 108–131, 133–134
on John Dinsdale, 184–185, 206
on John Duns Scotus, 135
on Richard of Clive, 172, 206
on Thomas Aquinas, 155, 210
influences on
of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 103, 104, 107
of al-Fārābī, 103, 104, 107
of al-Kindī, 107
of Pseudo-Aristotelian works, 104, 107
misunderstanding of, by Thomas Aquinas, 241
reconstruction of, Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 101–105
views on
being, unity of, 148–149, 177, 604

being-essence distinction, 287–288, 523
categories, 172
classification of sciences, 105–106
essence, 148–149, 155, 239, 349
essence-existence distinction, 148–149, 155, 239, 241–242
existence, 148–149, 155
forms, 428–429
material subjects, 14
metaphysics
inner consistency of, 77
subject-matter of, 10, 67–71, 283, 324, 363–364, 507–508, 588
relations, status of, 303–304
transcendentals, 112
works
Dānish Nāma-i ʿalā ʾī (The Book of Scientific Knowledge), 148–149
De animalibus, 114
De diluviis, 114
Ilāhiyyāt, 98, 101–107
Kitāb al-Šifā, 57, 98
classification of sciences in, 105–106
influence on reading Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 57
Latin translations of, 60
Liber de philosophia prima, 256
Samāʿ (Science of Divine Things), 115, 118
use of
by Albert the Great, 96–101
by Alexander of Alessandria, 322–323

Bartholomaeus of Bruges, 389, 396
Basilios Bessarion, 48, 93
Bauloye, Laurence, 63
beatific vision controversy, 466, 467
being *qua* being
God and, 80–81
passions of, 476–480, 490–491
as subject-matter of metaphysics, 8, 9–10, 15, 67, 76–77, 212–213, 214–216, 223–224, 257–258, 324–325, 330–331, 364, 450–452, 472–473, 484–485, 591
being/beings, 542–543
accidents and, 201–203
analogy of
Alexander of Alessandria on, 326–328
anti-reductionistic view on, 149, 157
Aristotle on, 219, 259–260
English commentators on, 190, 205
Geoffrey of Aspall on, 159–169, 195–196
Giles of Rome on, 258–261
Johannes Versoris on, 586
John Dinsdale on, 180–184, 196, 205
John Duns Scotus on, 11, 156–158, 168
reductionist view on, 165–166, 170
Richard of Clive on, 169–174, 195–196
Richard Rufus on, 150
Thomas Aquinas on, 154–155, 218–219, 221–223
William of Bonkes on, 190, 196
Aristotle on, 78–79, 200, 219, 224
Averroes on, 79–80, 81
classification of, 457–459, 461–462
different kinds/modes of, 219–220, 221–222, 559, 574, 608
equivocation of, 145–148, 150, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, 165, 169–170, 183, 195, 200, 203, 205, 206, 259–260
focal meaning of, 78, 91
Francis of Marchia on, 457–459
generality of, 212, 375–376
genus and, 174–175, 218–219, 327–328, 344
God and, 76–77, 79–81
hierarchies of, 246
immaterial, 536
intellect and, 177–179, 197, 251–254
Paul of Venice on, 556–557, 559, 573
Plato on, 200
potency for, 291–292
predication of
Averroes on, 92
Geoffrey of Aspall on, 161–164
John Dinsdale on, 175–177
John Duns Scotus on, 171–172, 196
Richard of Clive on, 171–172
Thomas Aquinas on, 153–154, 220
quiddity of, 478, 485, 489, 591–596
senses of, 219, 223
signification and, English commentators on, 193–195
single notion of, 206
substance and, 176, 177–179, 197–199, 214–215, 223–226
unity of
Adam of Buckfield on, 158–159
Antonius Andreae on, 605
Avicenna on, 148–149, 177, 604
debates about, 137–138, 149–158
English commentators on, 188–189, 191, 200–201
French commentators on, 604–605

Geoffrey of Aspall on, 159–160, 162
John Dinsdale on, 174–187
John Duns Scotus on, 138, 156, 188
logicians notion of, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
metaphysicians notion of, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
Richard Rufus on, 149–152
Thomas Aquinas on, 153–156
univocation of, 145, 155, 158, 159–161, 169–170, 179, 183, 189, 195, 259–260, 530–531
univocity of, 589
see also analogy of being; being-essence distinction; substance/substances
being-essence distinction
Alexander of Alessandria on, 328–330
Anonymus Lipsiensis on, 287
Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 289
Avicenna on, 287–288, 523
French commentators on, 287–293, 609–610
Giles of Rome on, 289, 560
John Buridan on, 522–528
Paul of Venice on, 560–562
Peter of Auvergne on, 287–288, 290–291
Radulphus Brito on, 289, 291–292
Siger of Brabant on, 287, 288
Thomas Aquinas on, 263–264, 288–289, 523, 560
Benedict XII, Pope, 466
Bernard of Trilia, 441, 443
Bernardino da Trino (Bernardinus de Tridino), 93
Biard, Joël, 495, 502
Bidāyat al-muǧtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtasid (Starting-Point of the Studious and End-Point of the Contentable), 89
bliss, 286
Boethius of Dacia, 143
and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 24
alleged translation of, 31–32
influences of, on Anonymus Lipsiensis, 278
works
De summo bono, 286
De Trinitate, 213
questions on the *Metaphysics* (lost), 282
Bois de Vincennes conference (1334), 466, 467–469
Bologna, University of, 408, 409–410, 576
Bonetism, 470
Borgo, Marta, 1, 473
Bouyges, Maurice, 63
Brenet, Jean-Baptiste, 385, 394–395
Budd al-ʿārif (The Escape of the Gnostic, Ibn Sabʿīn), 89
Bürke, Bernard, 23 n15, 48
Burnett, Charles, 41
Burnyeat, Myles, 82 n60

Caliphate of Cordoba, 59
categories
Aristotle's doctrine of, 149
Avicenna's doctrine of, 172
John Dinsdale on, 187
Paul of Venice on, 557–559
Categories (Aristotle), 2, 12–13, 146, 176, 227, 229, 351, 352–357, 520
causes
conclusions and, 217
God and, 538–540, 546
as object of science, 331
as subject-matter of metaphysics, 258
certainty, 371
Chatelain, Émile L.M., 469
Chevenal, Francis, 409
Christian theology/faith
Averroes on, 320
metaphysics and, 517–519, 548
philosophy and, 311–312, 405, 545–547
as revealed science, 518–519
chronology/dating
of Alexander of Alessandria's work, 316–317
of Antonius Andreae's work, 416–417, 439
of Averroes's commentaries, 62
of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 54
of Francis of Marchia's works, 444–446, 463
of Giles of Rome's work, 256
of John of Jandun's work, 390
of Nicholas Bonet's work, 466
of Paul of Venice's work, 553
of Thomas Aquinas's work, 209
of translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 28, 38, 52–54
classification, of sciences, 105–106
Clement VI, Pope, 466
cognitive process
and acts of abstraction, 374–375
limitations of, 367–373
see also intellect

Comin da Trino (Cominus de Tridino)
edition (1560) (Averroes commentaries), 92, 94
commentaries
15th century, 575–629
cultural and geographical provenance of, 3
English, 137–208
Aristotelian background of, 145–158
debates about unity of being, 149–158
description of works, 138–145
influences of, on Thomas Aquinas, 210
influences on
of French tradition, 143
of Thomas Aquinas, 188
views in
on accidents and inherence, 201–203
on being, analogy of, 190, 205
on being, signification of, 193–195
on being, unity of, 188–189, 191, 200–201, 204–205
on being and substance, 197–198
on existence, 198–199
on semantic analogy, 205, 206–207
French
13th century, 277–314
15th century, 575–612
overview of, 613–629
authors and texts, 277–280
influences of
on Alexander of Alessandria, 323
on English tradition, 143
influences on, of Antonius Andreae, 584, 587, 588, 596, 599–600, 605, 611
and reasons for studying metaphysics, 286–287
sources used in, 281–283, 312, 611
views in
on being-essence distinction, 287–293, 609–610
on Christian theology, 311–312
on metaphysics, subject-matter of, 283–285, 585–591
on plurality of substantial forms and, 300–303
Italian, 575
literary formats used in
expositio, 2–3, 578–579
quaestio, 2–3, 578–579
Commentary on the *Categories* (John Duns Scotus), 188
Commentary on the *Categories* (Simplicius), 176
Commentary on the *De anima* (Alexander of Alessandria), 317
Commentary on the *De anima* (John Buridan), 536
Commentary on the *De anima* (John of Jandun), 385, 397, 408
Commentary on the *De caelo* (Albert the Great), 101 n19, 122, 127, 133
Commentary on the *De caelo* (Averroes), 49–50
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Adam of Buckfield), 139, 140, 158–159
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Albert the Great), 96–101, 108–113, 120–131, 133–134
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Alexander of Alessandria), 316–318
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Antonius Andreae), 414, 415, 416, 417–420, 423–424, 429–436, 438, 492
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Georgius Bruxellensis), 576, 626–628
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Hermann of Winterswijk), 410
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Johannes le Damoisiau), 576, 579–581, 625–626
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Johannes Versoris), 576, 579, 581, 619–622
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John Buridan), 499–502, 504–549
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John Duns Scotus), 144
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John Hennon), 576, 624–625
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John of Jandun), 385–390, 408–409
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Nicolaus de Orbellis), 576, 622–623
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Paul of Venice), 315, 551–574
Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Petrus Tartareti), 576, 628–629
Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Albert the Great), 100 n18
Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (John Buridan), 520
Commentary on the *Oeconomica* (John of Jandun), 389
Commentary on the *Physics* (Albert the Great), 122, 127, 133

Commentary on the *Physics* (John Buridan), 537
Commentary on the *Sentences* (Francis of Marchia), 440, 453, 457–463
Commentary on the *Sentences* (Giles of Rome), 270
Commentary on the *Sentences* (Thomas Aquinas), 154, 155
Compendio de Metafisica (Averroes), 84 n69
composite/composites
  accidental, 235, 238
  of essence and being, 288
  of matter and form, 12–13, 227–231, 234, 287, 532–534
  substances, 262, 296
compositions
  of substance
    Giles of Rome on, 261–265
    levels of, 246–248
compounds
  Alexander of Alessandria on, 347–348
  Aristotle on, 354–355
conclusions, causes and, 217
Conflatus (Francis of Meyronnes), 487–488
Constantinople, 55
contraries, 397–398
Cordoba, 59
corruption, as mode of being, 222
cosmology, according to Averroes, 75–76
Courtenay, William J., 416, 469
Creator, 287
  see also First/Prime Mover; God
critical editions. *see* editions, modern critical
crusades, 95–96, 98–99
cut-and-paste Metaphysics, 25–26

Dānish Nāma-i ʿalāʾī (The Book of Scientific Knowledge, Avicenna), 148–149
Darms, Gion, 23 n15, 48
dating. *see* chronology/dating
De anima (Aristotle), 80
De animalibus (Avicenna), 114
De caelo (Aristotle), 70
De diluviis (Avicenna), 114
De motu supercelestium (Robert Grosseteste), 90
De potentia et actu (Robert Grosseteste), 90
De scientiis (*Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm*, al-Fārābī), 60
De substantia orbis (Averroes), 71
De summo bono (Boethius of Dacia), 286
De Trinitate (Boethius of Dacia), 213
De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (Thomas Aquinas), 554
Defensor pacis (Marsilius of Padua), 388, 401
definition, Alexander of Alessandria on, 348–349
Del Punta, Francesco, 18
Denifle, Henri S., 468, 469
Destructiones modorum significandi (John Aurifaber), 410
Di Vona, Piero, 387
Die Gedanken sind frei (German song), 287
difference, genus and, 263, 534
digressions, used by Albert the Great, 109–111
distinctions, 554
  being-essence
    Alexander of Alessandria on, 328–330
    Anonymus Lipsiensis on, 287
    Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 289
    Avicenna on, 287–288, 523
    French commentators on, 287–293, 609–610
    Giles of Rome on, 289, 560
    John Buridan on, 522–528
    Paul of Venice on, 560–562
    Peter of Auvergne on, 287–288, 290–291
    Radulphus Brito on, 289, 291–292
    Siger of Brabant on, 287, 288
    Thomas Aquinas on, 263–264, 288–289, 523, 560
  essence-existence, 17
    Averroes on, 241–242
    Avicenna on, 148–149, 155, 239, 241–242
    French commentators on, 607–610
    Thomas Aquinas on, 241–242, 331
  formal, 474–476, 555, 561, 570, 573, 610
    John Duns Scotus on, 332, 475, 556
  intentional, 330, 332
  material, 555–556
Dolcini, Carlo, 406
Dominican *Studium* (Naples), 90
Doucet, Victorin, 441, 444

Ebbesen, Sten, 395
Echard, Jacques, 441
editions
  of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 23
  of Averroes's commentaries, 93–94

of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 23, 48, 63–64, 93–94
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John of Jandun), 388–389
modern (critical)
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 23, 30–31
of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 64
importance of introductions in, 26–27
of *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Francis of Marchia), 446–447
Ehrle, Franz, 441
Elements of Theology (Proclus), 281
Elijah del Medigo, 64, 92, 93
Elsakhawi, Ahmed, 63
Endress, Gerhard, 62, 88
English commentaries, 137–208
Aristotelian background of, 145–158
debates about unity of being, 149–158
description of works, 138–145
influences of, on Thomas Aquinas, 210
influences on
of French commentaries, 143, 206
of Thomas Aquinas, 188
views in
on accidents and inherence, 201–203
on being, 191, 200–201, 204–205
analogy of, 190, 205
signification of, 193–195
and substance, 197–198
unity of, 188–189
on existence, 198–199
on semantic analogy, 205, 206–207
ens qua ens (being as being). *see* being *qua* being
entia in prospectu (*intellectus*), 393
entia in rationis, 393–394
Epistula ad Sanctum Augustinum, 131
Epitome (Averroes). *see Short Commentary/Epitome on the Metaphysics* (Averroes)
equivocation
Averroes on, 147–148
of being, 150, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, 165, 169–170, 183, 195, 200, 203, 205, 206, 259–260
Aristotle on, 145–148, 259–260
see also univocation
Erfurt, 410, 575–576
Ermatinger, Charles, 389
essence
accidents and, 234–238, 338
Aristotle on, 346
Avicenna on, 148–149, 155, 239, 349
existence and, 176, 239–241, 247–252, 254, 262–265
extramentality and, 239–242
God and, 560
material objects and, 13–14
matter and, 524
quiddity and, 346, 347, 355–357
substance and, 231–234, 247–252, 337–340, 534
Thomas Aquinas on, 237
truth and, 267–272
see also essence-existence distinction; existence; quiddity/quiddities
essence-existence distinction, 17
Averroes on, 241–242
Avicenna on, 148–149, 155, 239, 241–242
French commentators on, 607–610
Thomas Aquinas on, 241–242, 331
see also essence; existence; quiddity/quiddities
Ethics (Aristotle), 286
Ethics (*Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum*, John Buridan), 496
existence
Avicenna on, 148–149, 155
different senses of, 221
English commentators on, 198–199
essence and, 176, 239–241, 247–252, 254, 262–265
matter and, 346–347
see also essence; essence-existence distinction
expositio format, 2–3, 578–579
Expositio Metaphysicae (Albert the Great), 321–322
Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem veterem Aristotelis (Paul of Venice), 552, 567–568
extramentality, essence and, 239–242

faith. *see* Christian theology/faith
falsehood, 270
First End, 73–75
First Form, 73–75
first intelligence, 485, 490
first substance, 72
First/Prime Mover, 70–76, 244–245, 251–252, 540–541
see also Creator; God
Florence, 576
Folger-Fonfara, Sabine, 452
forma partis. *see* form/forms, substantial
forma totius. *see* form/forms, specific

formalities, 474–476
form/forms
  Antonius Andreae on, 429–431
  Aristotle on, 346, 354–355, 428
  Averroes on, 428–429
  individuation and, 567–568
  matter and, 12–13, 426, 428, 430–431, 439, 532–536
  quiddity and, 355–357, 426
  specific, 232, 436–438, 440, 562–563, 565, 572
  substantial, 231–232, 247–248, 262–263, 344–346, 528
    Alexander of Alessandria on, 344–346
    Bartholomaeus of Bruges on, 396
    intension and remission of, 396–397
    John of Jandun on, 396–397
    meaning of, 78
    Peter Auriol on, 396
    plurality of, 300–303, 394–395, 534–535, 562–565
    primary substance and, 353–354
    Thomas Aquinas on, 321, 345–346
    unicity of, 321, 345, 534–535
Francis of Marchia, 440–463
  career, 440
  criticisms of
    on John Duns Scotus, 449
    on Thomas Aquinas, 449
  influences of, on later philosophers, 493
  influences on, of John Duns Scotus, 455
  views on
    beings, classification of, 457–459, 461–462
    intentionality, 453
    metaphysics, types of, 450–452
    relations, types of, 459–460
    transcendentals, 457
    truth, 452–457, 461–463
  works
    chronology of, 463
    Commentary on the *Sentences*, 440, 453, 457–463
    Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, 440, 457, 461–463, 492
      dating of, 444–446
      editions of, 446–-447
      influence of, 452
      manuscripts of, 440–444
      significance of, 450–452
      structure of, 447–450
    Quodlibet, 440, 453, 457, 463
    used by, Paul of Venice, 452
Francis of Meyronnes, 470, 475, 486, 487–488
Franciscan *Studium* (Bologna), 316
Franciscus de Esculo. *see* Francis of Marchia
Franciscus de Marchia. *see* Francis of Marchia
Franciscus Rubeus de Pignano. *see* Francis of Marchia
Frederik II Hohenstaufen, Holy Roman Emperor, 90
freedom, metaphysics and, 286–287, 392–393
French commentaries
  13th century, 277–314
  15th century, 575–612
    overview of, 613–618
  authors and texts, 277–280
  influences of
    on Alexander of Alessandria, 323
    on English commentaries, 143, 206
  influences on, of Antonius Andreae, 584, 587–588, 596, 599–600, 605, 611
  reasons for studying metaphysics and, 286–287
  sources used in, 281–283, 312, 611
  views in
    being-essence distinction, 287–293, 609–610
    on Christian theology, 311–312
    on metaphysics, subject-matter of, 283–285, 585–591
    on substantial forms, plurality of, 300–303
Freudenthal, Gad, 74
fundamentum, meaning of term, 270

García Marqués, Alfonso, 91
García y García, Antonio, 444
Garinus of Gyaco, 468
Gauthier, René-Antoine, 54, 209 n2
Genequand, Charles, 63
generality, of being, 212
generations, as mode of being, 222
Gensler, Mark, 416–417, 418
genus/genera
  analogy of, 161, 167–168
  being and, 174–175, 218–219, 327–328, 344
  difference and, 263, 534
  Plato on, 200
  species and, 264, 310–311, 339, 562, 566
  and subject-matter of metaphysics, 10, 216–218, 508–510

substance and, 337, 508, 530
Thomas Aquinas on, 200
unity of, 200
Geoffrey of Aspall
career, 141
criticisms on, of Richard of Clive, 170–171
influences on, of Richard Rufus, 142, 205
views on
being
analogy of, 159–169, 195–196
predication of, 161–164
unity of, 159–160, 162
works
Questions on *De caelo*, 166
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 139, 142, 159–169
George of Bruxelles (Georgius Bruxellensis)
texts of
compared to
Johannes Versoris, 581–582
John Hennon, 581–582
Petrus Tartareti, 602–603
views on
being, unity of, 606
being-essence distinction, 610
essence-existence distinction, 607
knowledge, 597, 601–604
quiddities of particular beings, 595
works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
list of questions in, 626–628
literary formats used in, 579, 581
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577
scope of, 580
Georges, Stefan, 64
Gerald Odonis, 466
Gerard of Cremona, authorship of *Translatio Anonyma sive "Media,"* 40
Gerard of Pergamo, 468, 469
Ghisalberti, Alessandro, 409
Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), 255–275
career, 255–256
criticisms of, on Thomas Aquinas, 270
influences of, on Paul of Venice, 553
sources used by, 256
views on, 560
being, analogy of, 258–261
being-essence distinction, 289, 560
composition of substance, 261–265
metaphysics, subject-matter of, 257
truth, 265–269
works
commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, 263
Commentary on the *Sentences*, 270
Quaestiones de esse et essentia, 267
Quaestiones metaphysicales, 256, 263–264
dating of, 256
overview of, 273–275
Quodlibet, 267
Giovan Maria Giunta, 93
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, 471, 493
God
accidents and, 529
Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 308–309
Aristotle on, 80–81, 244–246, 251–252, 539–540
Averroes on, 80–81, 91, 539–540
and being, 76–77, 79–81
being *qua* being and, 80–81
causes and, 538–540, 546
essence and, 560
existence of, 15, 67–74, 244–246, 288, 536–541
immateriality and, 249
infinity of, 399–400
intellect's dependence on senses and, 368–369
intelligences and, 291, 536
John Buridan on, 536–544
John Duns Scotus on, 366
John of Jandun on, 399–400
knowledge and, 366, 391–392, 407, 537, 541, 597–602, 604
metaphysics and, 76–77, 506–507
nature of, 541–544
omnipotence of, 399–400
Paul of Venice on, 556–557
perfect knowledge of, 545–546
perfections of, 91, 309–310, 323, 366, 544
simplicity of, 16–17, 542–543
as subject-matter of metaphysics, 9, 15, 212–213, 215–216, 258, 283–285, 311, 325–326, 507–508, 509, 587
synonymy and, 74–75, 543–544
Thomas Aquinas on, 16–17, 91, 212–213, 215–216, 244–246, 251–254, 399
views on, God, perfect knowledge of, 545–546

see also Christian theology/faith; Creator; first intelligence; First/Prime Mover
Godfrey of Fontaines, 296
Greek-Arabic translations
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 76
authorship of, 65
Greek-Latin translations, of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. *see under* names of specific translations
Gregory of Rimini, 553, 570
Gutas, Dimitri, 61

haecceity, 426, 428, 565–568
happiness, 391–393
harmonization, 128–131, 133–134, 176
Hasse, Dag N., 49, 64
healthy, analogy of, 146, 147, 153–154, 155, 161
Heidelberg, University of, 501, 503
Henry of Ghent, 296
influences of, on Alexander of Alessandria, 327–328, 329
views on
intentional distinctions, 332
truth, 489
Hermann of Winterswijk, 410
Hocedez, Edgar, 296
Hoffmann, Rudolf, 23 n15, 64
homonymy, 146, 147
Hugh of St.-Victor, 437
human soul
Aristotle on, 353–354
Thomas Aquinas on, 345
unicity of, 345

Ibn Ḫaldūn, 89
Ibn al-Nadīm, 65
Ibn Bāǧǧa, Abū Bakr, 59
Ibn Rušd. *see* Averroes
Ibn Sabʿīn, 89
Ibn Sınā. *see* Avicenna
Ibn Ṭufayl, Abū Bakr, 60
Ibn Tūmart, 60
identity
formal, 555, 561
material, 555
real, 570, 573
Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm (*De scientiis*, al-Fārābī), 60
Ilāhiyyāt (Science of Divine Things, Avicenna), 101–105
Arabic-Latin translations of
use of, by Albert the Great, 98, 109–111
criticisms of Averroes on, 114–120
reworking of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in, 106–107
order of quotations in, 106–107
sources for, 103–104, 107
immateriality, 363, 364
being and, 536
of God, 249
of intellect, 214
positive/negative senses of, 215–216
imposition, notion of, 192
individuation
accidents and, 296–297
of angels, 566–568
Anonymus Lipsiensis on, 294
Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 294–296
form and, 567–568
French commentators on, 293–300
John Buridan on, 521
matter and, 14–15, 424–426, 431, 439, 567–568
Paul of Venice on, 564–565
Peter of Auvergne on, 296–298
Porphyry on, 297
process of, 262, 263
Radulphus Brito on, 298–300
substance and, 296–298
infinity, 311, 399–400
inherence
accidents and, 202–204
idea of, 172, 185–186
intellect
abstraction and, 374–375
acquired, 598
of angels, 251–254
being and, 177–179, 197, 375–376
combinatorial power of, 376–379
immateriality of, 214
senses and, 214, 368–381, 383–384
truth in, 265–271, 454, 455, 456–457, 489–491, 571
truth of propositions and, 376–380
unicity of, 398, 554
see also cognitive process
intelligences/angels, 9, 15–16, 226, 247–248, 249, 251, 287–288, 291–292, 536
individuation of, 566–568
intentionality, 453, 462
Intentiones Philosophorum (*Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, al-Ghazālī), 60
intuitive cognition, 487–488
investigation, scientific, Aristotle on, 216–217

Islam
attitude of Western Medieval world towards, 96 n6, 100
influences of, on Avicenna, 102, 104
Italian Renaissance, Averroes importance during, 93
Italy, 55

Jacob Mantino, 92, 93
Jaeger, Werner, 82
James of Piacenza, 408
James of Venice (Jacobus Veneticus Graecus)
career, 54–55
translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 25, 30–32
style of, 33–34
see also Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima"
Jesus Christ, 437
Johannes Hennon. *see* John Hennon
Johannes le Damoisiau
criticisms of, on Averroes, 591
influences on, of Albert the Great, 608–609
texts of
compared to
Antonius Andreae, 596
John Hennon, 596
Petrus Tartareti, 596
views on
being-essence distinction, 609–610
essence-existence distinction, 608
knowledge, 597
metaphysics, in relation to other sciences, 596
quiddities of particular beings, 594–595
works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
list of questions in, 625–626
literary format used in, 579, 581
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577
scope of, 580
Johannes Versoris
influences on, of Thomas Aquinas, 597–598
texts of
compared to
Georgius Bruxellensis, 581–582
John Hennon, 581–582
views on
being
analogy of, 586
unity of, 606
metaphysics, subject-matter of, 585–586
notion of *praxis*, 583–585
quiddities of particular beings, 592
works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
list of questions in, 619–622
literary format used in, 581
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577
scope of, 579
works of, Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, originality of, 611–612
John Aurifaber (Johannes Aurifaber), 410
John Buridan, 498–549
influences of
on later philosophers, 498
on Marsilius of Inghen, 502–504
on Paul of Venice, 553
life/career, 495, 498
nominalism of, 3
reconciliation of faith and reason, 547
use of
psychology, 527–528, 535, 541, 548
semantics, 520–522, 548
views on
accidents and substance, 528–532
being-essence distinction, 522–528
form and matter, 532–536
God
existence of, 536–541
nature of, 541–544
perfect knowledge of, 545–546
immaterial being, 536
individuation, 521
logic and semantics, 520–522
metaphysics
status of, 512, 513–516
subject-matter of, 496, 510–512
metaphysics and theology, 517–519
method of metaphysics, 520
nominalism, 502
sciences, 505–507, 513
universals, 521
works
Commentary on *De anima*, 536
Commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics*, 520
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
Book XXII, 545–547
books excluded from, 500–501
importance of, 495–497, 547–548
influences of, 501–502

manuscripts of, 499–500
substantial discussion of, 504–549
Commentary on the *Physics*, 537
Ethics, 496
John Dinsdale
criticisms on, of Parisian Arts masters, 180–182
influences on
of Avicenna, 184–185, 206
of Parisian philosophical tradition, 143
of Parmenides, 175
of Peter of Auvergne, 143–144, 176, 177, 185
of Plato, 175
views on
accidents, 184–187, 202
predication of, 184–187
being, 196, 205
analogy of, 180–184
and intellect, 197
predication of, 175
unity of, 174–187
categories, 187
works, Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 140, 143, 174–187
John Duns Scotus
criticisms on, of Francis of Marchia, 449
influences of
on Alexander of Alessandria, 316
on Antonius Andreae, 414, 415
on Francis of Marchia, 455
on Paul of Venice, 551, 553, 565–568
influences on, of Avicenna, 135
sources used by, Thomas Aquinas, 367
views on
being, 156, 188
analogy of, 11, 156–158, 168
different kinds of, 608
predication of, 171–172, 196
substance and, 198–199
unity of, 138
univocation of, 179
cognitive process
conquering limitations of, 373–383
limitations of, 367–373
formal distinctions, 332, 475, 556
God, 366
intellect's dependence on senses, 368–381, 383–384
material differences, 427
matter, 436–439
metaphysics
method of, 365–367
in relation to other sciences, 381–382
structure of, 381
subject-matter of, 67, 135
propositions, 377–381, 427
substances, 421–422
transcendentals, 376
truth, 455
works
Commentary on the *Categories*, 188
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 144
Lectura, 433, 437, 439
Notabilia super Metaphysicam, 359
Ordinatio, 601
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 359–384
arguments in, 361–362
compared to *Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalis* (Antonius Andreae), 436–439
history of development of, 359–361, 415
manuscripts of, 418
organized by Antonius Andreae, 419–424, 433, 439
structure of, 419
use of, by Antonius Andreae, 417, 419–420
John Hennon
criticisms of, on Averroes, 588
texts of
compared to
Antonius Andreae, 588, 596, 605
George of Bruxelles, 581–582
Johannes le Damoisiau, 596
Johannes Versoris, 581–582
Nicolaus de Orbellis, 605
Petrus Tartareti, 596
views on
being, unity of, 605
metaphysics, in relation to other sciences, 596
quiddities of particular beings, 594
works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
list of questions in, 624–625
literary format used in, 578–579, 581
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577
scope of, 580
John of Blangy, 467

John of Jandun, 385–412
  criticisms of
    on Peter of Auriol, 393–394
    on Radulphus Brito, 393–394
  influences of, on later philosophers, 407–410
  influences on
    of Averroes, 397
    of Thaddaeus of Parma, 408–410
  views on
    concrete accidental terms, 395
    entia in rationis, 393–394
    God, 399–400
    objects of logic, 393–394
    philosophy
      and happiness, 391–393
      and political concept, 401–407
    substantial forms, 394–397
    unicity of intellect of all humans, 398
  works
    Commentary on *De anima*, 385, 397, 408
    Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 385, 408–409
      dating of, 390
      manuscripts of, 386–388
      printed editions of, 388–389
    Commentary on the *Oeconomica*, 389
    Defensor pacis, 388
John of Toledo, 60
John the Canon, 445–446, 452
John the Evangelist, 470
John Wyclif
  influences of, on Paul of Venice, 551, 552, 553, 560–561
  views on
    accidents, 569
    formal distinctions, 556
    universals, 564
John XXII, Pope, 440
Jordanus de Tridento, 396
Josse Bade, 500
Judaism, attitude of Albert the Great towards, 100 n16
Junta edition (1562–74), of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 48, 63, 93
justice, 309

King, Peter, 496
Kitāb al-ʿIbar (Book of Lessons, Ibn Ḫaldūn), 89
Kitāb al-Šifā (*Liber Sufficientiae*, Book of the Cure, Avicenna), 57, 60, 98, 105–106
knowledge
  accidents and, 178–179
  Antonius Andreae on, 599–600
  Aristotle on, 464–465
  French commentators on, 597–604
  God and, 15, 366, 391–392, 407, 537, 541, 545–546, 597–602, 604
  intellectual, 601
  John Buridan on, 520–521
  Nicholas Bonet on, 464–465
  order of, 213–214
  practical, 584–585
  sensory, 601
  substance and, 597–604
  truth and falsehood and, 190, 270, 571
Krakow
  commentaries from, 575–576
  philosophers at, 317 n6, 410
Krakow, University of, 503
Krieger, Gerhard, 496
Kuksewicz, Zdzislaw, 396, 409
Künzle, Pius, 443–444, 446, 452

Lambertini, Roberto, 446
Latin Scholasticism, 61
Latin versions, of Aristotle's *Met.*, 22–24
  see also under names of specific translations
laws, 405–406
Lectura (John Duns Scotus), 433, 437, 439
Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Paul of Venice), 315, 551–574
Liber Caeli et Mundi, 101 n19
Liber de Causis (Pseudo-Aristotle), 21, 104, 107, 111, 281
Liber de philosophia prima (Avicenna), 256
Liber de praedicamentorum (Albert the Great), 558
Liber Sufficientiae (*Kitāb al-Šifā*, Avicenna), 57, 60, 98, 105–106
libri naturales (Aristotle), 53
logic
  metaphysics and, 520–522
  notions of being and, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
  objects of, 393–394
  as speculative science, 583
Logic (al-Ghazālī), 149
Lohr, Charles, 444–445, 485
Long Commentaries (Averroes), 61, 62
Long Commentary on De caelo (Averroes), 122
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics (Averroes), 23, 27, 48, 283–285

Arabic-English translations of, 63
Arabic-French translations of, 63
Arabic-Latin translations of, 27, 48–51
authorship of, 49, 63
books included in, 50
chronology of, 54
English critical edition of, 64
importance in Latin West, 88–92
influence on reading Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 57
sequence of books in, 50–51
two-level structure of, 48
use of, by Albert the Great, 98, 109–111
Aristoteles *Metaphysics* in, 48–49, 63, 64
books included in, 65
use of, by Averroes, 66
goal of, 108
importance of, 5, 107–108
in Islamic world, 89
use of
by Alexander of Alessandria, 318–320
by Giles of Rome, 256
views in
on demonstrative reasoning, 87
on essence-existence distinction, 241
on First Mover, 72
on metaphysics, inner consistency of, 77–78, 79–80
Long Commentary on the Physics (Averroes), 71, 122, 323
Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (Averroes), 69, 71, 77
Lorenzo Canozi, 64, 93
Lorenzo Venier, 471, 483–484, 486–488
Louis of Bavaria, 390, 440

Maier, Annelies, 390, 396, 445
Mālikism, 59
manuscripts
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Alexander of Alessandria), 317
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Antonius Andreae), 417–418
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Georgius Bruxellensis), 576
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Johannes le Damoisiau), 576
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Johannes Versoris), 576
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John Buridan), 499–500
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John Hennon), 576
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (John of Jandun), 386–388
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Nicolaus de Orbellis), 576
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Petrus Tartareti), 576
of *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes), 63, 64
of *Metaphysics* (Aristotle), 24, 31, 35, 43, 45, 46, 48
of *Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes), 64
of *Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalium* (Antonius Andreae), 418
of *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Francis of Marchia), 440–446
of Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Buridan), 500
of Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Duns Scotus), 418
of *Short Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes), 64
Maqāṣid al-falāsifa (*Intentiones Philosophorum*, al-Ghazālī), 60
Marc Cornaro, 471
Marsilius of Inghen, 502–504, 531
Marsilius of Padua, 386–388, 390, 401
Martin, Aubert, 63
Martin de Barcelona, 466, 470, 485
material subject
Averroes on, 13–14
Avicenna on, 14
essence and, 13–14
matter
Alexander of Alessandria on, 346–347
Antonius Andreae on, 424–428, 430–433, 434–440
Aristotle on, 354–355, 424
essence and, 524
existence and, 346–347
form and, 12–13, 426, 428, 430–431, 439, 532–536
individuation and, 14–15, 424–426, 431, 439, 567–568
John Duns Scotus on, 436–439
quiddity and, 355–357, 431–432, 434–436
species and, 431
substance and, 229–234, 247–249, 262–263
Thomas Aquinas on, 345, 424–425
Matthew of Gubbio, 409
Mayronists/Mayronistic views, 493
Mazarin codex, 441–442

Media. *see Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media"*
medieval writing, diffusion of, 24–25
Met. A (Book I), 6, 24, 65, 66–67, 82, 85, 104, 105, 106–107, 214, 225, 257, 324, 326, 334, 448, 450, 579–580
Met. α (Book II), 6, 82, 83, 85, 104, 107, 114, 225, 243, 245, 324, 334, 579–580
Met. B (Book III), 6, 30–31, 74, 83, 85, 91, 106–107, 224, 243, 310, 334, 500–501, 579–580
Met. Γ (Book IV), 6, 8, 67, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85–86, 103, 106–107, 114–115, 146, 153, 159, 214, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224–225, 240, 257, 324–325, 334, 364, 450, 507, 579–580
Met. Δ (Book V), 6, 31, 82, 83, 85, 86, 91, 106–107, 114–115, 150, 218, 225, 238, 243, 259, 303, 309, 334–335, 344, 424–425, 579–580
Met. E (Book VI), 6, 8, 67, 83, 85–86, 103, 106–107, 214, 224, 233, 243, 257, 285, 324–325, 326, 334–335, 450, 507, 579–580
Met. Z (Book VII), 6, 9, 12, 66, 74, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 103, 106–107, 116, 145–146, 150–151, 224–225, 226, 227, 229, 231, 235, 236–237, 239, 243, 249, 334–335, 336–341, 349–350, 352–353, 364, 428, 482, 579–580
Met. H (Book VIII), 6, 9, 12, 82, 84, 103, 107, 224–225, 226, 227, 243, 334–335, 336, 340, 356, 364, 579–580
Met. Θ (Book IX), 6, 9, 12, 78, 82, 84, 87, 103, 106–107, 224–225, 227, 334–336, 579–580
Met. I (Book X), 30–31, 84, 104, 106–107, 117, 224–225, 257, 285, 286, 310, 334–336, 579–580
Met. K (Book XI), 29, 65, 210, 224–225, 226, 242–243, 334–335, 500–501, 579–580
Met. Λ (Book XII), 31, 65, 66, 72, 74, 82, 83, 104, 106–107, 117–119, 211–212, 224–225, 226, 242–244, 249, 251–252, 254, 324, 334–335, 364, 450, 579–580
Met. M (Book XIII), 6, 65, 104, 105, 106–107, 224–225, 334–335, 364, 500
Met. N (Book XIV), 6, 65, 82, 104, 105, 106–107, 224–225, 334–335, 364, 500
metametaphysics, 361
Metaphysica (Nicholas Bonet), 464–467, 471, 485–488, 493
Metaphysica, lib. I.5-X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova" (TS), 27, 48
  authorship of, 49, 55, 138
  chronology of, 53–54
  replaced by, 141
  see also Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis
Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Composita sive "Vetus" (TC), 23
  authorship of, 24
  books included in, 26 n27, 29–30
  chronology of, 52–53
  compared to *Translatio Anonyma sive "Media,"* 38
  compared to *Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima,"* 34–37
  information in title of, 28–29
  reviser/copyist of, 36–37
  Ripoll *Student's Guide* on, 26 n25
Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima" (TJ), 23
  authorship of, 33, 54–55
  books included in, 26 n27, 29–30
  chronology of, 52–53
  compared to *Translatio Composita sive "Vetus,"* 34–37
  information in title of, 28–29
  see also James of Venice
Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media" (TA), 23
  authorship of, 39–42, 55
  books included in, 26 n27, 30
  chronology of, 38, 52–53
  compared to *Translatio Composita sive "Vetus,"* 38
  information in title of, 28
  original form of, 38–39
  used by Albert the Great, 95, 100
  used by William of Moerbeke, 37–38, 42–45, 46–48
Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka (RTM), 23, 27 n33, 93, 577, 578
  authorship of, 42–45, 55
  books included in, 29–30
  chronology of, 52–54
  information in title of, 28–29
  replacing *Translatio Scoti sive "Nova,"* 141
Metaphysica nostra, 473
Metaphysica Nova. see Metaphysica, lib. I.5–X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova"
Metaphysica sua, 473
metaphysics, 67–71, 92, 270, 391, 591
  aims of, French commentators on, 581–582
  and classification of sciences, 105–106, 213–214
  current practice of, 367–373, 374, 384

destruction of, 495
freedom and, 286–287, 392–393
God and, 76–77, 506–507
happiness and, 391–393
inner consistency of, 76–77
nature of, 330–333
polysemy of term, 19–22
reasons for studying, 286–287
in relation to other sciences, 381–382, 392, 484–485, 512
French commentators on, 596
logic, 520–522
physics, 71–74, 513–514
semantics, 520–522
as science, 257–258, 331–333, 363–364, 505
demonstrative science, 82–83, 85, 87, 88, 105, 217–218, 333, 363, 364, 366, 505, 518–519
French commentators on, 581
general science, 8, 226, 363, 364
method of, 365–367, 520
propter quid science, 367–368
quia science, 367–368
speculative science, 581, 584
status of, 11–12, 216–218, 222, 225, 392, 472, 512, 513
universal science, 76, 213, 226, 324–325
structure of, 381
subject-matter of, 66–76, 86
Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 285
Antonius Andreae on, 586–587
Aristotle on, 8–9, 67, 69–70, 214, 257, 324–325, 363–364, 504
Averroes on, 10, 68–72, 283, 363–364, 507–508, 588
Avicenna on, 10, 67–71, 283, 324, 363–364, 507–508, 588
being *qua* being as, 8, 9–10, 15, 67, 76–77, 212–213, 214–216, 223–224, 257–258, 324–325, 330–331, 364, 450–452, 472–473, 484–485, 585, 591
causes as, 258
Francis of Marchia on, 450–452
French commentators on, 283–285
genus and, 216–218
Giles of Rome on, 257
God as, 9, 15, 212–213, 215–216, 258, 283–285, 311, 325–326, 507–508, 509, 587
inner consistency of, 76–81
Johannes Versoris on, 585–586
John Duns Scotus on, 67
Nicolaus de Orbellis on, 586–587
Peter of Auvergne on, 284
quiddity as, 514–516
Radulphus Brito on, 284–285
Siger of Brabant on, 285
Thomas Aquinas on, 212–218, 223–224, 283
theology and, 517–519, 548
two types of, 548
Francis of Marchia on, 450–452
Nicholas Bonet on, 466
unity of being and, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
as wisdom, 213, 324, 330, 512, 581
Metaphysics (al-Ghazālī), 149
Michael, Bernd, 498
Michael Scot
Arabic-Latin translations of
Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*Metaphysica Nova*), 1, 48, 49, 55, 93, 138, 141
Averroes's *Commentary on Aristotle's De caelo*, 49
Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 1, 63, 90
style of, 49
Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics (Averroes), 61, 62, 64, 65, 92, 94
Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, 33, 39–40, 55
Möhle, Hannes, 486
Moses Ibn Tibbon, 92
most intelligible object, notion of, 213–214, 215
motion/motions
eternal continuity of, 251
existence of, 68 n21, 70–72, 87
as mode of being, 222

negations, as mode of being, 222
Neoplatonism, 102, 111, 133, 281, 312, 574
see also Aristotelianism
Nicholas Aymeric, 470
Nicholas Bonet, 464–492
career, 466–471
influences of, on later philosophers, 493
influences on
of Aristotle, 476
of Averroes, 476
of Gerald Odonis, 466
views on
formal distinctions, 474–475
knowledge, 464–465
metaphysics
scientific status of, 472

subject-matter of, 472–473
types of, 466
passions of being as being, 476–480
Platonic view of universals, 480–483
propositions, 473–474, 476–479
truth, 488–492
works
dating of, 466
Metaphysica
incipit of, 464
manuscripts of, 486
nature of, 464–467
reception of, 485–488
structure of, 471
superiority of, 493
Physica, 471
Predicamenta, 471
Theologia Naturalis, 471
Nicholas of Autrecourt, 500
Nicholas of Lyra, 467, 469
Nicolaus de Orbellis
texts of
compared to
Antonius Andreae, 583, 587, 599–600, 605
John Hennon, 605
views on
being, unity of, 605
knowledge, 597, 598–601
notion of *praxis*, 583
works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
books in, 622–623
literary format used in, 578
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577
scope of, 579–580
Nicolaus of Damascus, 66, 82
Nicoletto Vernia, 64
Nicolettus Venetus, Paulus. *see* Paul of Venice
Nicomachean Ethics (*Etica Nicomachea*, Aristotle), 100 n18, 520
Nifo, Agostino, 132
nominalism, 3, 495, 502
non-being, 327, 523–524, 540–541
non-contradiction, principle of, 380–381, 476
non-material things. *see* immateriality
Noone, Timothy, 138
Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 64
Notabilia super Metaphysicam (John Duns Scotus), 359
objects
material, 12–13
sensible, 227–234
Ockhamists/Ockhamistic views, 554
Oeconomica (Pseudo-Aristotle), 104
Oliver Salahadini, 468, 469
On the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics (al-Fārābī), 103
On the Principles of the Universe (Alexander of Aphrodisias), 104
opinions, contradictory, 397–398
ordering, by perfections, 310–311
see also structure
Ordinatio (John Duns Scotus), 601
Organon (Aristotle), 86
Oxford, University of, 140, 141, 142, 144

Padua, University of, 388, 576
Padua edition (1473)(Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*), 64, 93
Paolo Nicoletti Veneto. *see* Paul of Venice
papal bull (1231, Gregory IX), 53
paraphrases, used by Albert the Great, 109–111
Paris, University of
Arts Faculty, 138–139, 385–386
educational program, 580
questions on the *Metaphysics* produced at, 277–314
Arts masters of
criticisms of, 180–182
and John of Jandun's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 386, 389
commentaries from, 575–629
reading of Aristotle at, 498–499
Theology masters of, 440
order of inception of, 467–469
Parmenides, 175
parsimony, principle of, 535
participation, 307–311
passions
of being *qua* being, 476–480, 490–491
disjunctive, 478–479
simple, 476–477
Pattin, Adriaan, 408
Paul of Venice, 551–574
criticisms of, on Averroists, 554
influences on
of Albert the Great, 553
of Alexander of Alessandria, 315, 553
of John Buridan, 553
of John Duns Scotus, 551, 553, 565–568
of John Wyclif, 551, 552, 553, 560–561

of several philosophers, 553
of Thomas Aquinas, 565
sources used by
Albert de Great, 558
Francis of Marchia, 452
Gregory of Rimini, 570
Walter Burley, 558
views on
accidents, 569–572, 573–574
being, 556–557, 559, 573
being-essence distinction, 560–562
complex signifiables, 572, 573
deducing of categories, 557–559
God, 556–557
identity and distinction, 555–556
individuation, 564–566
overview of, 573–574
substances and accidents, 569–572, 573–574
substantial forms, plurality of, 562–565
truth, 570–572
universals, 563–564, 574
works
Expositio super Universalia Porphyrii et Artem veterem Aristotelis, 552, 567–568
Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, 315, 551–574
dating of, 553
manuscripts of, 552
structure of, 553
Quaestio de universalibus, 552
Summa philosophiae naturalis, 552, 557, 561, 565, 567–568
perfections
Averroes on, 309
of God, 91, 309–310, 323, 544
ordering by, 310–311
ranking of, 291
Peripatetics/Peripatetic views, 62, 97–102, 483–484
see also Aristotelianism
Perreiah, Alan, 553
Peter Auriol
criticisms on, of John of Jandun, 393–394
mentions of
by Antonius Andreae, 420
by Francis of Marchia, 463
by Nicholas Bonet, 487–488
views on
entia in prospectu (*intellectus*), 393
substantial forms, 396
truth, 489–490
Peter Helias, 164–165
Peter of Auvergne
career, 279–280
criticisms on, of Radulphus Brito, 306
influences of
on John Dinsdale, 143–144, 176, 177, 185
on Radulphus Brito, 277–278
influences on
of Godfrey of Fontaines, 296
of Henry of Ghent, 296
of Siger of Brabant, 277
sources used by
Proclus, 281
Thomas Aquinas, 282
views on
being
analogy of, 180–181
and intellect, 177, 197
being-essence distinction, 287–288, 290–291
Christian theology, 311
individuation, 296–298
metaphysics
reasons for studying, 286
subject-matter of, 284
perfections, 309–310
relations, status of, 304–305
substantial forms, plurality of, 301–302
works, 313
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 277, 279–280
Quodlibet, 296
Peter of Candia, 441
Peter of Ireland, 90
Peter of Palma, 468
Peter of Verberie, 468, 469
Peter Thomae, 360, 443–444
Petrus Tartareti
texts of
compared to
Andreae, 596
Georgius Bruxellensis, 602–603
Johannes le Damoisiau, 596
John Hennon, 596
views on
being-essence distinction, 610
essence-existence distinction, 607–608
knowledge, 597, 602–603
metaphysics, in relation to other sciences, 596
notion of *praxis*, 584–585

works
Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
list of questions in, 628–629
literary formats used in, 579, 581
manuscripts of, 576
reference to Aristotle's text in, 577–578
scope of, 580
Philip VI, of France, 466, 467
philosophers
and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*
approach to structure of, 6
problems of interest for, 7
reception of, 1–2, 5
scientific status of metaphysics and, 11–12
philosophy
Christian theology and, 311–312, 405, 545–547
political concepts and, 401–407
Physica (Nicholas Bonet), 471
Physica Vaticana, 40, 52
physics, relation between metaphysics and, 71–74, 513–514
Physics (Aristotle), 68, 70, 147, 243–245
Physics (Averroes), 137–138
Piana, Celestino, 444
Pierre de la Palude, 467
Pierre Roger, 467
Pinborg, Jan, 393, 410
Pini, Giorgio, 418, 419, 420
Plato
criticisms on, of Aristotle, 338–339, 340
influences of, on John Dinsdale, 175
views on
being, 200
universals, 239–240, 480–483
Platonism, 9, 62, 281, 395
plenitude, principle of, 242
plurality, of substantial forms, 300–303, 394–395, 534–535, 562–565
political concepts, 393, 401–407
Pomponazzi, Pietro, 132
Ponzalli, Ruggero, 48
popes, 95, 404, 440, 466
Porphyry, 297
Posterior Analytics (Aristotle), 76, 84, 103, 107, 216, 324, 331, 464–465, 504, 507–508
posteriority, 381
praxis, 583–585, 591
Predicamenta (Nicholas Bonet), 471
predicates/predication
of accidents, 150–152, 163–165, 170–171, 172–173
John Dinsdale on, 184–187
analogical, 152–153, 165, 168–169, 175–176, 189, 220–221, 222
analogous, 175, 183. *see also* equivocation
Aristotle on, 220–221
of being
Averroes on, 92
Geoffrey of Aspall on, 161–164
John Dinsdale on, 175–177
John Duns Scotus on, 171–172, 196
Richard of Clive on, 171–172
Thomas Aquinas on, 153–154, 220
causal, 164, 170–171
equivocal, 175, 220
essential, 151, 163, 171
formal, 163, 164, 171
God's simplicity and, 541
indirect, 152
ontological importance of, 92
Richard Rufus on, 151–152
subject in, 427
univocal, 168, 175, 220, 221, 222
Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City (al-Fārābī), 104
priority, 310, 339, 366, 381
privations, as mode of being, 222
Proclus, 281, 307, 312
propositions
general, 217
John Duns Scotus on, 377–381, 427
known *per se*, 377
Nicholas Bonet on, 473–474, 476–479
Thomas Aquinas on, 377
truth of, 371–373, 376–380, 571–572
pros hen equivocation, of being, 145–147, 150, 153, 156, 158, 159, 160–161, 163
Pseudo-Aristotelian works
Liber de Causis, 104, 107, 111
Oeconomica, 104
Theologia Aristotelis, 104, 107
psychology, John Buridan's use of, 527–528, 535, 541, 548
Pugio Fidei, 92

Quaestio de universalibus (Paul of Venice), 552
quaestio format, 2–3, 578–579, 581
Quaestiones de esse et essentia (Giles of Rome), 267
Quaestiones de quolibet (Thomas Aquinas), 247–248, 250
Quaestiones de tribus principis rerum naturalium (Antonius Andreae), 416, 418, 424, 433–434, 436–439, 492

Quaestiones de veritate (Thomas Aquinas), 265
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam (Francis of Marchia), 440–453, 457, 461–463, 492
Quaestiones metaphysicales (Giles of Rome), 256, 263–264
  overview of, 273–275
Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (John Buridan), 496
Quaestiones super Metaphysicam (Radulphus Brito), 277, 280, 313
Quaestiones super Metaphysicam (Siger of Brabant), 277, 278, 313–314
Quaestiones super Metaphysicam (Zimmermann MS), 277, 278–279, 313
quantity, 184, 186, 187, 240, 293
  individuation and, 297, 299–300
  substance and, 294
Questions on De caelo (Geoffrey of Aspall), 166
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (Adam of Buckfield), 139
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Book VII (Qq. *Met. O*^{2}, Anonymus), 140, 145
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Books III–VII (*Qq Met.-L*, Anonymus), 139, 142, 159–169, 205
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Books I–IV (Qq. *Met.-A*, Anonymus), 140, 145, 189, 198
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Books I–V (Qq. *Met.-P*^{2}, Anonymus), 140, 145, 188, 189, 190, 194, 196, 198, 200–201
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Books I–V, VII, XII (Qq. *Met.-P*^{3}, Anonymus), 140, 145, 188
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, *Books I–V, VII–VIII* (Anonymus), 139
Questions on the *Metaphysics*, Books I–VII (Qq. *Met. O*^{1}, Anonymus), 140, 145, 188
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (Geoffrey of Aspall), 139, 142, 159–169
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Dinsdale), 140, 143, 174–187
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Duns Scotus), 359–384, 415, 418, 419–424, 433, 436–439
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (Marsilius of Inghen), 503–504
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (Peter of Auvergne), 277, 279–280
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (Richard of Clive), 139, 142, 169–174
Questions on the *Metaphysics* (William of Bonkes), 140, 144, 188–204
Quétif, Jacques, 441
quiddity/quiddities, 262, 296, 337–341, 365
  Alexander of Alessandria on, 347, 355–357
  Averroes on, 355–356
  of being, 478, 485, 489, 591–596
  different use of term, 534
  essence and, 346, 347, 355–357
  form and, 355–357, 426
  matter and, 355–357, 431–432, 434–436
  as subject-matter of metaphysics, 514–516
  see also essence
Quillet, Jeannine, 387
quod quid erat esse, 337–341, 346
Quodlibet (Francis of Marchia), 440, 453, 457, 463
Quodlibet (Giles of Rome), 267
Quodlibet (Peter of Auvergne), 296

Radulphus Brito
  criticisms of, on Peter of Auvergne, 306
  criticisms on, of John of Jandun, 393–394
  influences on
    on Peter of Auvergne, 277–278
    of Siger of Brabant, 277, 289
  sources used by
    Proclus, 281
    Thomas Aquinas, 282
  views on
    being-essence distinction, 289, 291–292
    Christian theology, 311–312
    entia in rationis, 393–394
    individuation, 298–300
    metaphysics
      reasons for studying, 286–287
      subject-matter of, 284–285
    relations, status of, 305–307
    substantial forms, plurality of, 302–303
  works, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, 277, 280, 313
Ramon Martín, 92
Raymond of Sauvetat, 60
reality
  extramental complex, 572, 573
  hierarchical structure of, 16
  truth in, 454, 456
  see also truth
reasoning, demonstrative, 86–88, 91
Recensio Palatina (William of Moerbeke), 46, 47–48, 54

Recensio Vulgata (William of Moerbeke), 46, 47–48, 54
relationes mediae, 459–460
relations
  middle, 459–460
  ontological status of, 303–307
  types of, 457–459
religion. *see* Christian theology/faith
Remarks on the Metaphysics (*Notabilia super Metaphysicam*, John Duns Scotus), 359
Richard of Clive
  criticisms of, on Geoffrey of Aspall, 170–171
  influences on
    of Avicenna, 172, 206
    of Parisian philosophical tradition, 143
  at Oxford University, 142
  views on
    accidents, 172, 202
    being
      analogy of, 169–174, 195–196, 205
      predication of, 171–172
  works, Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 139, 142, 169–174
Richard Rufus of Cornwall
  influences of
    on Adam of Buckfield, 159
    on Geoffrey of Aspall, 142, 205
  influences on, of Averroes, 150–151, 205–206
  sources used by, Arabic-Latin translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 138
  views on
    accidents, predication of, 150–152, 163–164
    being
      analogy of, 150
      unity of, 149–152, 205–206
  works
    Scriptum super Metaphysicam, 138, 150, 159
    use of, by Adam of Buckfield, 140
Ripoll *Student's Guide*, 20–22, 25–26
Robert Grosseteste, 90
Roger Bacon, 139
RTM (*Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*
rulers, 403–404, 406–407
Samāʿ (*Liber primus naturalium*, Avicenna), 115, 118
Schmugge, Ludwig, 403
Schneider, Notker, 445, 452
Schönberger, Rolf, 496, 519–520, 542
science/sciences
  classification of
    Avicenna on, 105–106
    Thomas Aquinas on, 213–214
  metaphysics in relation to other, 71–74, 381–382, 392, 484–485, 512, 513–514, 520–522, 596
  practical, 423–424, 513
  theoretical, 513
  and title of metaphysics, 331
  unity of, 506, 510
Scotists/Scotistic views, 132–133, 413–414, 415–416, 417, 424, 428, 443, 452, 475, 493, 567, 612
Scriptum in artem veterem (Antonius Andreae), 416
Scriptum super Metaphysicam (Richard Rufus), 138, 150, 159
Scuola Normale Superiore (Pisa), 18
semantics, 520–522, 548
Seneca, 391
senses
  of accidents, 241–242
  and analogical predication, 220–221
  of being, 219, 223
  of existance, 221
  intellect and, 214, 368–381
  of substance, 229
Sententia Libri de anima (Thomas Aquinas), 209
Sententia super Metaphysicam (Thomas Aquinas), 155, 210–254, 282, 417
separation, notion of, 230
SF questions on the *Elenchi*, 279
Short Commentary/Epitome on the Metaphysics (Averroes), 61, 62, 64, 66
  decline of importance of, 92
  views in
    on demonstrative reasoning, 87
    on First Mover, 71
    on fundamental division of *Metaphysics*, 84
    on metaphysics, inner consistency of, 77, 80
Siger of Brabant
  influences of
    on Anonymus Zimmermanni, 277, 278, 289

on Peter of Auvergne, 277
on Radulphus Brito, 277, 289
sources used by
Proclus, 281
Thomas Aquinas, 282
views on
being-essence distinction, 287, 288
concrete accidental terms, 395
essence-existence distinction, 287
individuation, 293–294
metaphysics, subject-matter of, 285
perfections, 310–311, 323
relations, status of, 303–304
substantial forms, plurality of, 300–301
works, *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, 277, 278, 313
signifiables, complex, 572, 573
signification, notion of, 192–195
Simplicius, 176
simul totum (concrete whole), 430–432, 436–438
Sophistical Refutations (Aristotle), 259
species
genus and, 264, 310–311, 339, 562, 566
matter and, 431
Stephen (from Antioch), 41, 55
structure
of Alexander of Alessandria's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, 317–318, 333–336
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*
Averroes reconstruction of, 82–88, 89
Avicenna's reconstruction of, 101–105
in medieval translations, 29–30, 50–52
philosopher's approach to, 6
Thomas Aquinas on, 223–226, 242–243, 334–335
of Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Antonius Andreae), 419–420, 433
of *Lectura super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (Paul of Venice), 553
of *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes), 48
Metaphysica (Nicholas Bonet), 471
of metaphysics, 381
Quaestiones in Metaphysicam (Francis of Marchia), 447–450
of Questions on the *Metaphysics* (John Duns Scotus), 419
see also ordering, by perfections
styles of commentaries
digressions, 109–111
paraphrases, 109–111
subject-matter
of metaphysics, 66–76, 86
Albert the Great on, 135
Alexander of Alessandria on, 324–326
al-Fārābī on, 67
al-Kindī on, 67
Anonymus Zimmermanni on, 285
Antonius Andreae on, 586–587, 588–589
Aristotle on, 8–9, 67, 69–70, 214, 257, 324–325, 363–364, 504, 507
Averroes on, 10, 68–72, 283, 363–364, 507–508, 588
Avicenna on, 10, 67–71, 283, 324, 363–364, 507
being *qua* being as, 8, 9–10, 15, 67, 76–77, 212–213, 214–216, 223–224, 257–258, 324–326, 330–331, 364, 450–452, 472–473, 484–485, 591
causes as, 258
Francis of Marchia on, 450–452
French commentators on, 283–285
George of Bruxelles on, 591
Giles of Rome on, 257
God as, 9, 15, 212–213, 215–216, 258, 283–285, 311, 325–326, 507–508, 509, 587, 588–589
inner consistency of, 76–81
Johannes le Damoisiau on, 590–591
John Buridan on, 496, 509
John Duns Scotus on, 67, 135, 362–365, 507
John Hennon on, 588–589
Nicholas Bonet on, 472–473, 484–485
Nicolaus de Orbellis on, 586–587
Peter of Auvergne on, 284
Petrus Tartareti on, 591
quiddity as, 514–516, 586
Radulphus Brito on, 284–285
Siger of Brabant on, 285, 507
substance as, 8–9, 10, 450–452
Thomas Aquinas on, 212–218, 223–224, 283
metaphysics, genus and, 216–218
of sciences
John Buridan on, 508–509
terms as, 510–512
subject-term, 508–509, 510
substance/substances, 270

accidents and, 11, 184–187, 191, 234–238, 262–263, 322, 528–532
Alexander of Alessandria on, 344–352
Aristotle on, 72–73, 227–228, 229, 242–244, 337–340, 349–352, 354–355
Averroes on, 231–232, 355
being and, 176, 177–179, 197–199, 214–215, 223–226
cognoscibility of, 421
compositions of, 261–265
as essence, 231–234, 247–252, 337–340, 534
genus and, 337, 508–510, 530
immaterial, 15–16
individuation and, 296–298
John Duns Scotus on, 421–422
matter and, 229–234, 247–249, 262–263
nature of, 344–349
notion of, 12–13
Paul of Venice on, 569–572, 573–574
primary, 12–13, 228–231, 528, 559, 565, 573
substantial forms and, 353–354
quantity and, 294
sensible, 243, 544
essence and, 231–234, 247–251
form and matter and, 228–234, 247–248, 534
theory of, 73–74, 177, 179, 212, 225–226, 228–231
separate, 212, 214–216, 225–226
Aristotle on, 242–244
knowledge of, 597–604
subdivision of, 569–570
as subject-matter of metaphysics, 8–9, 10
Thomas Aquinas on, 228–236, 247–251, 263
and universality, 349–352
universals and, 239, 339–340
see also being/beings
Summa philosophiae naturalis (Paul of Venice), 552, 557, 561, 565, 567–568
Summa super Priscianum (Peter Helias), 164–165
Summa theologiae (Thomas Aquinas), 554
Survey of the Sciences (al-Fārābī), 103
syllogism, Aristotelian, 217–218
synonymy
Aristotle on, 146
Averroes on, 147
God and, 74–75, 543–544
Thomas Aquinas on, 154–155
TA (*Translatio Anonyma sive "Media"*). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media"*
Tabarroni, Andrea, 410
Tafsīr mā baʿd at-ṭabīʿa. *see Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes)
TC (*Translatio Composita sive "Vetus"*). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Compostita sive "Vetus"*
Teicher, Jacob, 92
Tempier, Stephen, 278, 295, 311
terms, concrete accidental, 395
Thaddaeus of Parma, 408–410
Themistius, 66, 104, 107, 108
Theologia Aristotelis (Pseudo-Aristotle), 104, 107
Theologia Naturalis (Nicholas Bonet), 471
theology. *see* Christian theology/faith
Thomas Aquinas, 334–335
Boethian readings of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 31–32
career, 208–209
criticisms of, on Avicenna, 240–241
criticisms on
of Francis of Marchia, 449
of Giles of Rome, 270
education of, 90
influences of
on Alexander of Alessandria, 316, 334–335
on English commentators, 188
on Johannes Versoris, 597–598
on Paul of Venice, 553
influences on
of Averroes, 61, 90–91, 135, 210
of Avicenna, 155, 210
of English commentators, 210
misunderstanding of, Avicenna, 241
sources used by
Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis, 54
Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, 210
tripartite schema of metaphysics, 223–224
views on
accidental composites, 238
accidents, 234–238, 343
being
analogy of, 154–155, 218–219, 221–223
predication of, 153–154, 220

unity of, 153–156
being-essence distinction, 263–264, 288–289, 523, 560
classification of sciences, 213–214
cognitive process, 369–370, 371
essence, 237
essence-existence distinction, 241–242, 330
forms, 428
genus, 200
God, 16–17, 91, 212–213, 215–216, 244–246, 251–254, 399
human soul, 345
matter, 345, 424–425
metaphysics
inner consistency of, 76–77
subject-matter of, 212–218, 223–224, 283
Metaphysics Z (Book VII), 336–337, 338
Metaphysics K (Book XI), 243
Metaphysics Λ (Book XII), 243–244
propositions, 377
quiddity, 355–356
quod quid erat esse, 336–337, 338
structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 223–226, 242–243, 334–335
substance, 228–236, 263
composition of, 247–251
universality of, 349–351
substantial forms, unicity of, 321, 345–346
synonymy, 154–155
truth, 265, 267, 270
universals, 239
works
commentaries, 141
Commentary on *De Trinitate*, 213
Commentary on the *Sentences*, 154, 155
De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, 554
popularity of, 209
Quaestiones de quolibet II, 247–248, 250
Quaestiones de veritate, 265
Sententia Libri de anima, dating of, 209
Sententia super Metaphysicam, 155, 210–254, 417
Aristotelian character of, 211–212
preface to, 213, 215–216
systematic nature of, 212
used by French commentators, 282
Summa theologiae, 554
use of
by Alexander of Alessandria, 321
by Antonius Andreae, 417, 418–419
by French commentators, 282
by John Duns Scotus, 367
by Paul of venice, 554
used by, John Duns Scotus, 376
Thomas Bricot, 577
Thomists/Thomistic views, 132, 155, 255, 289, 567, 612
Tiberius Bazalerius of Bologna, 470–471, 493
time, backwards eternal, 245
titles/subtitles, 27–28, 29
TJ (*Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima"*). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4 Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima"*
TnS (*Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis*). *see Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis*
Toledo, 59
Tommasso Giunta, 93
Tractatus de transcendentibus (Francis of Meyronnes), 486
Tractatus de tribus impostoribus, 132
transcendentals, 476–477
Albert the Great on, 112–113
Alexander of Alessandria on, 332–333
Aristotle on, 332
and the Averroes/Avicenna dispute, 112–113, 120, 124, 126–127, 128–131
Francis of Marchia on, 457
John Duns Scotus on, 376
Translatio Anonyma sive "Media" (TA). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive "Media"*
Translatio Composita sive "Vetus" (TC). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Composita sive "Vetus"*
Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima" (TJ). *see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4 Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima"*
Translatio Scoti sive "Nova" (TS). *see Metaphysica, lib. I.5–X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova"*
translations
of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*
age of, 27–29
Arabic-Latin, 23–24, 27, 48, 318
authorship of, 24, 33, 39–42, 49, 54–55, 63, 65

chronology of, 52–54
contamination in, 25 n23
geographical delineation of, 54–55
Greek-Latin, 22–25, 33, 48
internal structure of, 29–30, 50–52
number of versions of, 24–25
philological dimensions of, 56–57
titles/subtitles of, 27–29
transliteration in, 33–34
untranslated words in, 33–34
of Averroes's *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 318
transliterations, 33–34
transubstantiations, 528
truth
Anselm of Canterbury on, 265
Aristotle on, 265, 270–271
different kinds of, 571
essence and, 267–272
Francis of Marchia on, 452–457, 461–463
Giles of Rome on, 265–271
Henry of Ghent on, 489
in intellect, 265–271, 454, 455, 456–457, 489–491, 571
John Duns Scotus on, 455
knowledge and, 571
Nicholas Bonet on, 488–492
Paul of Venice on, 570–572
Peter Auriol on, 489–490
of propositions, 371–373, 376–379, 571–572
in reality, 454, 456, 488–489
Thomas Aquinas on, 265, 267, 270
see also reality
TS (*Translatio Scoti sive "Nova"*). *see Metaphysica, lib. I.5–X, XII. Translatio Scoti sive "Nova"*
Twetten, David B., 70

Umayyads, 59
unicity, of substantial forms, 321, 345, 534–535
Union Académique Internationale, 64
unity
of analogy, 200
of being
Adam of Buckfield on, 158–159
Antonius Andreae on, 605
Avicenna on, 148–149, 177, 604
debates about, 137–138, 149–158
English commentators on, 188–189, 191, 200–201
French commentators on, 604–607
Geoffrey of Aspall on, 159–160, 162
George of Bruxelles on, 606
Johannes Versoris on, 606
John Dinsdale on, 174–187
John Duns Scotus on, 138, 156, 188
logicians notion of, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
metaphysicians notion of, 156, 157, 163, 167–168, 173, 182–184
Richard Rufus on, 149–152, 205–206
Thomas Aquinas on, 153–156
of genus, 200
numeric, 425
of sciences, 506, 510
transcendental, 605
universals/universality
Aristotle on, 339–340
in coupled accidents, 235
different kinds of, 563–564
essence and, 264–265
formal, 564
John Buridan on, 521
John Wyclif on, 564
Nicholas Bonet on, 480–484
Paul of Venice on, 563–564, 574
Peripatetic these on, 483–484
Plato on, 239–240, 480–483
substance and, 14, 239, 339–340, 349–352
Thomas Aquinas on, 239
Universities. *see* Bologna, University of; Heidelberg, University of; Krakow, University of; Oxford, University of; Padua, University of; Paris, University of
univocation
of being, 145, 155, 158, 159–161, 169–170, 179, 183, 189, 195, 259–260, 530–531
see also equivocation
univocity, of being, 589
Urban IV, Pope, 95
Uṣṭat (translator), 65

Vanni Rovighi, Sofia, 408
Vansteenkiste, Clemens, 90–91
veritas intellectus, 455
veritas rei, 455
Vetus. see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Composita sive "Vetus"
Vetutissima. see Metaphysica, lib. I–IV.4 Translatio Jacobi sive "Vetustissima"
Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun, 24, 33, 40–41, 42, 43, 46, 53, 54

Wadding, Luke, 418
Walter Burley, 553, 557–558, 564, 569
Weisheipl, James A., 209 n2
William Bernardi, 467

William Buser of Heusden, 503
William Caltot, 468, 469
William of Bonkes
  views on
    accidents and inherence, 202–204
    being, analogy of, 190, 196
    significations, 195
  works, Questions on the *Metaphysics*, 140, 144, 188–204
William of Brienne, 467, 468
William of Castro Reginaldi, 468
William of Moerbeke
  translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, 25, 26 n27, 55, 93, 577, 578
    based on *Translatio Anonyma sive "Media,"* 37–38, 42–45, 46–48
    different drafts of, 46, 47–48
    manuscripts used for, 45, 46–48
    method used for, 46–48
    style of, 44
  see also Metaphysica, lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka
William of Ockham, views on, science, 505–506
wisdom, metaphysics and, 213, 324, 330, 512, 581
Wood, Rega, 138

Zabarella, Jacopo, 132
Zimara, Marcantonio, 385, 388–389
Zimmermann, Albert, 137, 443, 446, 450, 496, 504
Zonta, Mauro, 92
Zupko, Jack, 496, 501, 520